WEBVTT - 05: Is Amazon Spying on You?

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<v Speaker 1>I want to thank every Amazon employee and every Amazon customer,

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<v Speaker 1>because you guys paid progress. You guys paid problems. This

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<v Speaker 1>is Megacorp, an investigative podcast exposing some of the world's

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<v Speaker 1>most unethical corporations. This series is about Amazon. I'm Jake Hanrahan,

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<v Speaker 1>journalists and documentary filmmaker. Megacorp is produced by H eleven

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<v Speaker 1>for cool Zone Media. So we've spoken about the awful

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<v Speaker 1>work conditions in the Amazon warehouses, the company's disregard for

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<v Speaker 1>health and safety, and we've also looked at how Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>manages to avoid paying millions of dollars in tax. Now, though,

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to move on to something different, because, as

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<v Speaker 1>I've mentioned, each step up the Amazon pyramid of facori,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a new scandal to be examined. In this episode,

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to be asking the question, is Amazon spying

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<v Speaker 1>on you? We know the government is, we know social

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<v Speaker 1>media is, we know Google is. But what about Amazon?

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<v Speaker 1>A company that, in its delusion, prides itself on being

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<v Speaker 1>the smiley, happy face of the consumer experience. Let's find out. First,

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<v Speaker 1>let's take a look at Amazon's range of smart speakers. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>if you don't know what a smart speaker is, consider

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<v Speaker 1>yourself lucky, but to explain. The smart speaker, sometimes referred

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<v Speaker 1>to as a home assistant, is an Internet enabled two

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<v Speaker 1>ways speaker system that basically replaces getting up and pressing

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<v Speaker 1>buttons in your home. For example, if you want to

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<v Speaker 1>search for something online, you can ask the smart speaker

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<v Speaker 1>to do it. If you don't want to just get

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<v Speaker 1>up and switch off the light, you can program the

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<v Speaker 1>smart speaker to do it on your command. Some of

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<v Speaker 1>the most advanced smart speakers can be programmed to basically

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<v Speaker 1>run your whole house for you. Amazon leads the global

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<v Speaker 1>market when it comes to smart speakers, but the start

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<v Speaker 1>of they'd sold a hundred million That sold sixteen point

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<v Speaker 1>five million smart speakers by the fourth quarter of twenty

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<v Speaker 1>and almost seventy of smart speaker users in the US

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<v Speaker 1>favor using the Amazon Echo. The Echo is their most

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<v Speaker 1>popular smart speaker. It's enabled with Alexa. Alexa is basically

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<v Speaker 1>the technology that makes Amazon's smart speakers work. Alexa is

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<v Speaker 1>a virtual assistant cloud technology that is able to learn

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<v Speaker 1>things as you use it in a more detailed way

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<v Speaker 1>of speaking, Alexa is a voice activated user interface that

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<v Speaker 1>you uses a combination of machine learning and artificial intelligence.

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<v Speaker 1>To function. It all sounds very futuristic, but it's here,

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<v Speaker 1>it's now, lots of people have it now. Personally, I

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<v Speaker 1>can be a bit of a luddy and I do

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<v Speaker 1>not understand why anyone would want such a device in

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<v Speaker 1>their house. However, as I just said that many many

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<v Speaker 1>people do, this is helping Alexa learn, yeah, literally learn.

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<v Speaker 1>The more commands Alexa receives, the more Alexa develops. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>Alexa has learned one hundred thousand new skills since the

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<v Speaker 1>technology was first launched in November. So to sum up,

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<v Speaker 1>through the Amazon Echo and its utilization of Alexa, Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>has a reach into hundreds of millions of homes across

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<v Speaker 1>the world. So you'd really hope, for the sake of

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<v Speaker 1>personal autonomy and privacy that they're not listening into your

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<v Speaker 1>conversations through the smart speakers. Right Well, in t nineteen,

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<v Speaker 1>it emerged that Amazon employees had been listening to voice

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<v Speaker 1>recordings captured via the Echo in consumers homes and offices.

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<v Speaker 1>This wasn't a couple of rogue employees either, No, Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>literally hired thousands of people to do this. The job

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<v Speaker 1>was to not only listen to what you're saying, but

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<v Speaker 1>to also transcribe and annotate it. They would then feed

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<v Speaker 1>it back into the software with the aim of apparently

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<v Speaker 1>helping Alexa better understand voice commands. Of course, this raises

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<v Speaker 1>extremely serious questions about citizens personal privacy. But it gets

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<v Speaker 1>even worse. Reported by Forbes, the people tasked with listening

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<v Speaker 1>to your conversations quote required to record the data, whether

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<v Speaker 1>the device has been activated on purpose or not end quote.

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<v Speaker 1>So basically, they can listen into your conversation even if

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<v Speaker 1>you don't want them to. So by buying an Amazon Echo,

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<v Speaker 1>you've essentially invited an employee of Amazon to listen into

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<v Speaker 1>your private conversations, whether you've given Alexa command or not.

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<v Speaker 1>If Big Brother is always watching, it's clear now that

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon is always listening, that is, if you've got one

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<v Speaker 1>of these smart speakers in your home. Now, apparently, if

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<v Speaker 1>the people hired to listen, in record, and annotate conversations

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<v Speaker 1>in your home via the Amazon Echo here private data

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<v Speaker 1>such as your bank details, they're told to just mark

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<v Speaker 1>it down as critical data and move on. Let's hope

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<v Speaker 1>every single one of the thousands of people Amazon employed

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<v Speaker 1>to do this honest and didn't steal anyone's details. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>according to this Forbes article. One of the darker elements

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<v Speaker 1>to this situation is that two workers employed to log

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<v Speaker 1>the conversations thought they heard a sexual assault. When they

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<v Speaker 1>reported it to their superiors, Amazon ironically enough, told them

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<v Speaker 1>it's not their job to interfere. So Amazon will listening

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<v Speaker 1>to your conversations to improve their software data. But if

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<v Speaker 1>they hear someone being sexually assaulted, they don't want to

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<v Speaker 1>do anything about it, according to this article. Now, unfortunately

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't stop. They're not at all. Let's talk about Ring.

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<v Speaker 1>Ring is a home security company owned by Amazon. They

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<v Speaker 1>bought it in eighteen for one billion dollars and now

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<v Speaker 1>millions of people across the world used the technology. Ring

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<v Speaker 1>provides a line of WiFi connected security cameras for your home.

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<v Speaker 1>You've likely seen footage of Ring doorbell security systems online.

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<v Speaker 1>Is basically a little camera in the doorbell or wherever

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<v Speaker 1>they put it in their house that allows the homeowner

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<v Speaker 1>to see what's going on outside before they open the

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<v Speaker 1>door or inside, for example, if they want to keep

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<v Speaker 1>an eye on their kids as they're plane. Through the wifire,

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<v Speaker 1>you can have Rings set up on your phone or

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<v Speaker 1>your tablet or your laptop or wherever it's not a

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<v Speaker 1>bad idea, but they have been at several problems with

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon's Ring, so let's start with the hackers. This is

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<v Speaker 1>particularly dark. It was reported by journalists Joseph Cox and

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<v Speaker 1>some month of Cole that hackers had built themselves a

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<v Speaker 1>dedicated software for hacking into Amazon's Ring security cameras. It

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<v Speaker 1>becomes clear how funked up this is when looking at

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<v Speaker 1>a story from Mississippi in the US, where it was

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<v Speaker 1>discovered that hackers had managed to get into a ring

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<v Speaker 1>security camera placed in the bedroom of three young girls,

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<v Speaker 1>one of them was just eight years old. Hacker managed

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<v Speaker 1>to take control of the ring security camera, playing music

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<v Speaker 1>through its speaker as the young girls played in their room.

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<v Speaker 1>Daker was watching them the whole time. Dakker then played

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<v Speaker 1>the song Tiptoe through the Tulips, and when one of

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<v Speaker 1>the young girls asked who was there, the hacker replied,

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<v Speaker 1>it's Santa, it's your best friend. Here's the actual recording

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<v Speaker 1>of these hackers interfering with the Ring camera in the

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<v Speaker 1>room of these young girls. I'm your best friend. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>sand a clause. I don't you want to be my

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<v Speaker 1>best friend? You can mess up your room, you can

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<v Speaker 1>break your TV. You can do whatever you want. In

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<v Speaker 1>another incident of the same year, a hacker took control

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<v Speaker 1>of a RING security camera in Florida and began screaming

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<v Speaker 1>racist comments at a family for up to three minutes

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<v Speaker 1>before they were forced to pull the batteries out of

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<v Speaker 1>the Ring unit. So why was this happening, Well, essentially,

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon's Ring wasn't requiring its users to choose two step

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<v Speaker 1>verification by default. With something as delicate as in home

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<v Speaker 1>security cameras, this should have been a standard requirement for

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<v Speaker 1>all users, because without the two steps, it was a

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<v Speaker 1>lot easier for hackers to get into their system. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>reporters Joseph Cox and Samantha Cole found that hackers were

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<v Speaker 1>building and sharing programs to access RING cameras on criminal forums.

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<v Speaker 1>This of course sets a very dark precedent. If that

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't bad enough, though, it was later discovered that Ring's

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<v Speaker 1>own employees had been improperly accessing Ring users video data.

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon's Ring employees were spying on customers themselves. It was

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<v Speaker 1>discovered that four of Amazon's Ring employees had been fired

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<v Speaker 1>after abusing their position. They had watched footage from Ring

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<v Speaker 1>security cameras without the customer's knowledge or permission. This all

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<v Speaker 1>came out when Amazon Device President of Public Policy Brian

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<v Speaker 1>Huesman answered U S Senators in a letter after they

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<v Speaker 1>had written to Amazon expressing safety concerns about RING devices

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<v Speaker 1>in November twenty nineteen. In the response letter from Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>obtained by Motherboard, the question and answer is as follows

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<v Speaker 1>quote question to your knowledge have there been any documented

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<v Speaker 1>instances of this access being abused? Answer? Over the last

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<v Speaker 1>four years, RING has received four complaints or inquiries regarding

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<v Speaker 1>a team member's access to RING video data. Although each

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<v Speaker 1>of the individuals involved in these incidents was authorized to

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<v Speaker 1>view video data, the attempted access to that data exceeded

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<v Speaker 1>what was necessary for their job functions. In each instance,

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<v Speaker 1>one Ring was made aware of the alleged conduct, RING

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<v Speaker 1>promptly investigated the incident, and, after determining that the individual

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<v Speaker 1>violated company policy, terminated the individual. In addition to taking

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<v Speaker 1>swift action to investigate and take appropriate disciplinary action in

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<v Speaker 1>each of these cases, RING has taken multiple actions to

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<v Speaker 1>limit such data access to a smaller number of team members.

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<v Speaker 1>RING periodically reviews the access privileges it grants to its

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<v Speaker 1>team members to verify that they have a continued need

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<v Speaker 1>for access to customer information for the purpose of maintaining

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<v Speaker 1>and improving the customer experience end quote. So effectively, Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon has found several cases of Ring employees literally spying

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<v Speaker 1>on their customers. Now you might say, oh, well, this

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<v Speaker 1>is only four employees. Well, I would argue that this

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<v Speaker 1>is only four employees that got caught. Amazon's Ring has

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<v Speaker 1>clearly been sloppy with its security see both externally and

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<v Speaker 1>internally reported by The intercept In. Sources inside Ring said

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<v Speaker 1>that they had provided their research and development team in

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<v Speaker 1>Ukraine unfettered access to quote a folder on Amazon's S

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<v Speaker 1>three cloud storage service that contained every video created by

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<v Speaker 1>every Ring camera around the world end quote. Not only this,

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<v Speaker 1>at the time, the video files were left unencrypted, anyone

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<v Speaker 1>from the team could download someone's sensitive security camera footage

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<v Speaker 1>with the click of a button. The source also said,

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<v Speaker 1>quote Ring unnecessarily provided executives and engineers in the US

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<v Speaker 1>with highly privileged access to the company's technical support video portal,

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<v Speaker 1>allowing unfiltered, round the clock live feeds from some customer cameras,

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<v Speaker 1>regardless of whether they needed access to this extremely sensitive

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<v Speaker 1>data to do their jobs. End quote. Imagine that people

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<v Speaker 1>are Amazon's Ring company able to look into your home

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<v Speaker 1>at seven on a live feed whenever they want to.

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<v Speaker 1>That sounds like spying to me, even if there's no

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<v Speaker 1>intention of doing anything bad behind that they shouldn't have

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<v Speaker 1>had the access. Now. Whilst Ring pointed out to US

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<v Speaker 1>senators that for employees in Ukraine had been caught and

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<v Speaker 1>fired for spying on customers, it seems, at least according

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<v Speaker 1>to the source, that they failed to mention how these

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<v Speaker 1>employees were able to do so. That is rings sloppy

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<v Speaker 1>internal security when it comes to allowing workers access to

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<v Speaker 1>Ring security video. So there's the issues with Amazon's Echo

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<v Speaker 1>smart speakers and the issues with Amazon's Ring home security devices.

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<v Speaker 1>After all that it might allow you to discover the

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon is now making little robots for your house, they too,

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<v Speaker 1>have already raised serious privacy concerns. Astro join me on

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<v Speaker 1>stage today. I'm full to introduce you to a new

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<v Speaker 1>kind of household robot that integrates Alexa advanced hardware, software,

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<v Speaker 1>computer vision, and AI in a brand new way. And

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<v Speaker 1>it's a beautiful illustration of how ambient computing can improve

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<v Speaker 1>customers lives in a way that traditional consumer electronics just

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<v Speaker 1>kept if you didn't know. Amazon's Astro is a new

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<v Speaker 1>three wheeled little robot that can autonomously drive around your home.

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<v Speaker 1>Is packed with cameras and has a little screen on

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<v Speaker 1>the front with two eyes. It's meant to be cute,

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<v Speaker 1>but honestly, it looks a little bit creepy. The idea

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<v Speaker 1>behind Astro is that it will map the layout of

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<v Speaker 1>your home and act as a little robot butler, so

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<v Speaker 1>long as everything in your house is hooked up to

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<v Speaker 1>the same system as Astros Amazon's. Is this about Astro quote?

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<v Speaker 1>Astro is a household robot for home monitoring with Alexa.

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<v Speaker 1>When you're away, use the Astro app to see a

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<v Speaker 1>live view of your home, check in on specific rooms

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<v Speaker 1>and viewpoints, and get activity alerts. When you're home, Astro

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<v Speaker 1>can follow you from room to room, playing your favorite music,

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<v Speaker 1>podcasts or shows, and find you to deliver calls, reminders, alarms,

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<v Speaker 1>and timers set with Alexa. End quote. Honestly, it sounds

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<v Speaker 1>fucking horrible, but that's Astro. So. Astro is known internally

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<v Speaker 1>at Amazon as Vesta and Astro Slash. Vesta has another

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<v Speaker 1>purpose that they don't tell you about in that advert.

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<v Speaker 1>Running surveillance on customers. Have a listen to this internal

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<v Speaker 1>training video for Astro slash VESTA. Don't ask us where

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<v Speaker 1>we got this, just have a listen to what they're

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<v Speaker 1>saying the donation. Start following that Anne stranger and keep

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<v Speaker 1>following under the stranger goes out of the field of you.

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<v Speaker 1>As soon as the person goes out of field of you,

0:16:08.880 --> 0:16:12.400
<v Speaker 1>it will start investigation. That is, it will go and

0:16:12.480 --> 0:16:18.000
<v Speaker 1>check in each scampaigns that is created. This investigation. Unknown

0:16:18.040 --> 0:16:23.520
<v Speaker 1>investigation or non person investigation will happen only after reaching

0:16:23.560 --> 0:16:28.400
<v Speaker 1>to the first scanpoint. This will not happen immediately. And

0:16:28.720 --> 0:16:34.400
<v Speaker 1>regarding the non person investigation, the patrol should start as

0:16:34.440 --> 0:16:36.960
<v Speaker 1>soon as it sees the non person in the field

0:16:37.000 --> 0:16:42.520
<v Speaker 1>of you, and immediately second later the person leaves from

0:16:42.560 --> 0:16:46.080
<v Speaker 1>the field of you, the patrol will start automatically. I mean,

0:16:46.120 --> 0:16:49.840
<v Speaker 1>when the investor is following an unknown person, then a

0:16:49.880 --> 0:16:53.240
<v Speaker 1>non person is introduced into the field of you, the

0:16:53.320 --> 0:16:57.360
<v Speaker 1>patrol or investigation immediately stops. You know, that was a

0:16:57.400 --> 0:16:59.680
<v Speaker 1>little bit hard to understand due to the start, but

0:16:59.720 --> 0:17:03.240
<v Speaker 1>that's we got it. But basically she is explaining how

0:17:03.280 --> 0:17:08.439
<v Speaker 1>Astro can run an investigation patrol. If a stranger quote,

0:17:08.480 --> 0:17:11.760
<v Speaker 1>stranger is in the house, and then Astro can hide

0:17:11.800 --> 0:17:15.360
<v Speaker 1>that activity from the non users at will if they

0:17:15.640 --> 0:17:18.840
<v Speaker 1>enter astros field of vision. So basically running about the

0:17:18.840 --> 0:17:22.320
<v Speaker 1>house doing a little investigation on this stranger. Then the

0:17:22.359 --> 0:17:26.280
<v Speaker 1>owner walks interview and quickly Astro stops it. I don't

0:17:26.280 --> 0:17:29.080
<v Speaker 1>know about you, but along with several other aspects of

0:17:29.160 --> 0:17:32.879
<v Speaker 1>Astro that will hear about, that seems quite creepy to me.

0:17:40.359 --> 0:17:43.320
<v Speaker 1>To get a better understanding of what Amazon is up

0:17:43.320 --> 0:17:47.080
<v Speaker 1>to with their Astro robot, I spoke to Matthew Goalt.

0:17:47.240 --> 0:17:50.879
<v Speaker 1>He's a staff reporter at Motherboard and the host of

0:17:50.960 --> 0:17:54.000
<v Speaker 1>their cyber podcast. He's also the one that first found

0:17:54.000 --> 0:17:58.160
<v Speaker 1>out about the surveillance situation with Astro. So the pitch

0:17:58.240 --> 0:18:01.119
<v Speaker 1>for investor or Astro as it's known now is that

0:18:01.160 --> 0:18:04.640
<v Speaker 1>it's basically like a tablet on wheels with Alexa software

0:18:04.640 --> 0:18:08.560
<v Speaker 1>built in and for a customer gets a cute little

0:18:08.560 --> 0:18:11.480
<v Speaker 1>Wally style thing the roll around your house, let you

0:18:11.480 --> 0:18:13.960
<v Speaker 1>buy stuff on Amazon, and it integrates into the rest

0:18:13.960 --> 0:18:16.680
<v Speaker 1>of the Amazon ecosystem into your home, meaning it can

0:18:16.800 --> 0:18:20.440
<v Speaker 1>communicate with ring cameras. Uh, you know, your Echo, your

0:18:20.480 --> 0:18:24.160
<v Speaker 1>Alexa and and if you have one an Amazon powered

0:18:24.200 --> 0:18:28.520
<v Speaker 1>security system. So the pitch and the way it's described

0:18:28.560 --> 0:18:32.440
<v Speaker 1>internally or kind of two different things. Um, the marketing says,

0:18:32.440 --> 0:18:34.520
<v Speaker 1>a clever little robot that learns from you and will

0:18:34.560 --> 0:18:36.760
<v Speaker 1>help you in your day to day life. So the

0:18:36.840 --> 0:18:41.399
<v Speaker 1>internal documentation kind of shows that Astro is a robot

0:18:41.400 --> 0:18:45.160
<v Speaker 1>that's designed to slowly move through your home, learn all

0:18:45.160 --> 0:18:48.040
<v Speaker 1>of its nooks and crannies, monitor to the behavior of

0:18:48.040 --> 0:18:51.760
<v Speaker 1>its inhabitants, and it literally will follow people around the house,

0:18:52.280 --> 0:18:55.360
<v Speaker 1>recording what they say and do and attempting to integrate

0:18:55.400 --> 0:18:59.760
<v Speaker 1>that data into a customer profile of the home. It

0:19:00.160 --> 0:19:04.800
<v Speaker 1>also has facial recognition software that the people working on

0:19:04.840 --> 0:19:07.960
<v Speaker 1>the device said doesn't work very well. So when you

0:19:08.000 --> 0:19:10.960
<v Speaker 1>buy this thing, you're supposed to get everyone in the

0:19:10.960 --> 0:19:14.359
<v Speaker 1>family together, you hunker down in front of it, and

0:19:14.480 --> 0:19:17.760
<v Speaker 1>you register your face. Um. This is one of the

0:19:17.800 --> 0:19:20.760
<v Speaker 1>things that Astro does is perk up when it meets

0:19:20.800 --> 0:19:22.760
<v Speaker 1>someone in the home who isn't supposed to be there.

0:19:23.320 --> 0:19:26.600
<v Speaker 1>So if you know, ostensibly if you have an intruder,

0:19:27.119 --> 0:19:30.239
<v Speaker 1>it will follow them around, record what they're saying and

0:19:30.320 --> 0:19:33.240
<v Speaker 1>doing stot you know, for someone to view later, and

0:19:33.840 --> 0:19:37.280
<v Speaker 1>if certain conditions are met, alert the authorities. What those

0:19:37.280 --> 0:19:42.880
<v Speaker 1>conditions are aren't exactly clear, but the the the idea

0:19:43.000 --> 0:19:45.639
<v Speaker 1>is that if they are stealing something or making certain

0:19:45.760 --> 0:19:49.040
<v Speaker 1>kinds of loud noise like say the shattering of glass,

0:19:49.720 --> 0:19:53.720
<v Speaker 1>or if or if Astro sees a fire set, it

0:19:53.760 --> 0:19:57.159
<v Speaker 1>will then contact the relevant authorities. Now, I know you

0:19:57.240 --> 0:20:00.399
<v Speaker 1>might be thinking at this stage, well, that doesn't sound

0:20:00.600 --> 0:20:03.359
<v Speaker 1>that bad. Yeah, it's mapping out my whole house, reading

0:20:03.400 --> 0:20:06.960
<v Speaker 1>people's faces, etcetera. But if somebody bursts into my house

0:20:06.960 --> 0:20:09.239
<v Speaker 1>and I'm not there, this little robot thing is going

0:20:09.280 --> 0:20:12.240
<v Speaker 1>to call the police. Well, listen on, because it's not

0:20:12.320 --> 0:20:14.880
<v Speaker 1>that simple. And at the end of this you can

0:20:14.920 --> 0:20:18.840
<v Speaker 1>decide if you think the negatives outweigh the positives. But

0:20:18.960 --> 0:20:21.480
<v Speaker 1>the people we talked to who had worked on this

0:20:21.560 --> 0:20:27.199
<v Speaker 1>thing where we're not happy with the device, Um, we

0:20:27.280 --> 0:20:29.520
<v Speaker 1>talked to several people. Every single one of them kind

0:20:29.520 --> 0:20:31.719
<v Speaker 1>of said the same thing that they thought that this

0:20:31.800 --> 0:20:35.840
<v Speaker 1>was terrible. They were horrified by the privacy implications of it,

0:20:36.359 --> 0:20:40.240
<v Speaker 1>and that generally just didn't work very well. Astro seems

0:20:40.280 --> 0:20:42.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of bad at everything that it does. Um, this

0:20:43.040 --> 0:20:46.840
<v Speaker 1>is one of my favorite quotes. Astro is terrible and

0:20:46.840 --> 0:20:49.400
<v Speaker 1>will almost certainly throw itself down a flight of stairs

0:20:49.680 --> 0:20:52.879
<v Speaker 1>if presented the opportunity, and will note that every single

0:20:52.920 --> 0:20:55.680
<v Speaker 1>person we talked to mentioned that stairs were a problem

0:20:55.720 --> 0:20:59.160
<v Speaker 1>for Astro does not know how to handle them. Quote

0:20:59.400 --> 0:21:02.320
<v Speaker 1>the person detection is unreliable at best, making the in

0:21:02.400 --> 0:21:08.080
<v Speaker 1>home security proposition laughable. So drilling down, how does Astro

0:21:08.320 --> 0:21:13.320
<v Speaker 1>collect data on its customers? So, Astro is another in

0:21:13.320 --> 0:21:17.960
<v Speaker 1>a long line of data gathering operations run by Amazon. Basically,

0:21:18.080 --> 0:21:21.520
<v Speaker 1>every interaction anyone has with Amazon, whether through using an

0:21:21.520 --> 0:21:24.720
<v Speaker 1>Echo Dot to order cheese Whiz or rewatching X files

0:21:24.720 --> 0:21:27.639
<v Speaker 1>for the five time on Prime Video, that becomes a

0:21:27.720 --> 0:21:32.840
<v Speaker 1>data point and Amazon's like huge aws stores. Um So,

0:21:32.880 --> 0:21:34.879
<v Speaker 1>if you're read a book on good Reads, or you

0:21:34.960 --> 0:21:37.119
<v Speaker 1>highlight a passage in a Game of Thrones novel on

0:21:37.160 --> 0:21:39.679
<v Speaker 1>your kindle, or you leave a one star review for

0:21:39.880 --> 0:21:45.080
<v Speaker 1>dish soap on Amazon, the site learns all of that. Ostensibly,

0:21:45.440 --> 0:21:48.639
<v Speaker 1>it uses this data to better manage the customer experience.

0:21:48.680 --> 0:21:50.359
<v Speaker 1>You might start seeing books similar to the one you

0:21:50.480 --> 0:21:53.280
<v Speaker 1>rated highly, start getting ads for something that was mentioned

0:21:53.280 --> 0:21:56.600
<v Speaker 1>in that passage that you highlighted. Uh, and you'll probably

0:21:56.640 --> 0:21:59.800
<v Speaker 1>never see dish soap that you rated at one star

0:22:00.119 --> 0:22:03.080
<v Speaker 1>ever again, Um, and a lot of people love this.

0:22:03.760 --> 0:22:06.480
<v Speaker 1>They love the way that interacting with Amazon and its

0:22:06.560 --> 0:22:10.399
<v Speaker 1>systems allows you know, the site to learn about you

0:22:10.520 --> 0:22:14.160
<v Speaker 1>as a customer. The argument is that it makes life easier,

0:22:14.400 --> 0:22:16.639
<v Speaker 1>and that's kind of the tradeoff, right, You're sacrificing a

0:22:16.640 --> 0:22:21.520
<v Speaker 1>little bit of privacy for convenience. But the thing is,

0:22:22.080 --> 0:22:24.119
<v Speaker 1>I think a lot of what Amazon does, and a

0:22:24.160 --> 0:22:27.440
<v Speaker 1>lot of other people think that what Amazon does h

0:22:27.920 --> 0:22:31.400
<v Speaker 1>rises to the level of spying. And I think Astro

0:22:31.520 --> 0:22:33.520
<v Speaker 1>is a really good way to kind of taught, like

0:22:33.600 --> 0:22:37.720
<v Speaker 1>have that conversation. Um, there's stuff that it does that

0:22:38.520 --> 0:22:42.159
<v Speaker 1>just massive, massive, massive privacy concerns. And so if you

0:22:42.240 --> 0:22:46.280
<v Speaker 1>think about Astro as like a camera and a recorder

0:22:46.480 --> 0:22:51.439
<v Speaker 1>on wheels that is feeding information back to Amazon, Well,

0:22:51.480 --> 0:22:54.000
<v Speaker 1>who is looking at that information and why are they

0:22:54.040 --> 0:22:56.760
<v Speaker 1>looking at that information? Is there any kind of precedent

0:22:57.400 --> 0:23:00.159
<v Speaker 1>set in Amazon as a company that can tell us

0:23:00.200 --> 0:23:03.879
<v Speaker 1>about how they're going to use that information going forward?

0:23:04.000 --> 0:23:06.240
<v Speaker 1>At this point in the episode, because of what we

0:23:06.280 --> 0:23:09.360
<v Speaker 1>spoke about earlier, we know that there is a precedent

0:23:09.400 --> 0:23:11.440
<v Speaker 1>and that the people that get hold of this information

0:23:11.560 --> 0:23:16.840
<v Speaker 1>Amazon continuously disrespecting people's privacy is likely that the same

0:23:16.880 --> 0:23:21.040
<v Speaker 1>thing will happen with Astro um. And this is really

0:23:21.040 --> 0:23:24.040
<v Speaker 1>important because I think there's this big misunderstanding of Amazon.

0:23:24.080 --> 0:23:26.560
<v Speaker 1>When we start talking about its power and about breaking

0:23:26.560 --> 0:23:28.200
<v Speaker 1>it up and about whether or not it's some monopoly,

0:23:28.240 --> 0:23:29.760
<v Speaker 1>people are just like, well, it's just a website that

0:23:29.800 --> 0:23:34.560
<v Speaker 1>sells stuff that's really not true anymore. It also sells

0:23:34.640 --> 0:23:36.920
<v Speaker 1>a lot of surveillance tech, you know, like this little

0:23:36.960 --> 0:23:40.760
<v Speaker 1>astro robot. It's runs aws. It's the biggest data form

0:23:40.800 --> 0:23:43.040
<v Speaker 1>on the planet. UM. A lot of the Internet is

0:23:43.080 --> 0:23:46.320
<v Speaker 1>now filtered or stored on their cloud servers, and that's

0:23:46.320 --> 0:23:49.159
<v Speaker 1>a huge single point of failure in Amazon is storing

0:23:49.280 --> 0:23:52.480
<v Speaker 1>a lot of audio and video fed to it by

0:23:52.520 --> 0:23:55.760
<v Speaker 1>its customers through the cameras and echo dots and little

0:23:55.760 --> 0:23:58.280
<v Speaker 1>astros that are it's selling. If that wasn't bad enough,

0:23:58.440 --> 0:24:01.440
<v Speaker 1>listen to this extra detail a few Goats tells us

0:24:01.480 --> 0:24:04.040
<v Speaker 1>about the ring Comeras we spoke about the stuff of

0:24:04.119 --> 0:24:09.439
<v Speaker 1>the episode, Amazon has a lot of deals with various

0:24:09.520 --> 0:24:12.879
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement agencies across the country that gives them carte

0:24:12.880 --> 0:24:16.960
<v Speaker 1>blanche access to these ring cameras. Um. There's really good

0:24:16.960 --> 0:24:20.199
<v Speaker 1>investigations in pieces in Motherboard and then also from the

0:24:20.240 --> 0:24:25.640
<v Speaker 1>Electronic Frontier Foundation that have shown that Amazon routinely gives

0:24:25.720 --> 0:24:29.440
<v Speaker 1>cops access to these things. Um. One example, in San

0:24:29.520 --> 0:24:34.120
<v Speaker 1>Francisco in twenty nineteen, cops were given access to ring

0:24:34.119 --> 0:24:36.679
<v Speaker 1>camera footage so they could watch protests. And this is

0:24:36.720 --> 0:24:38.600
<v Speaker 1>not something that they go and they check with Hey,

0:24:38.600 --> 0:24:41.040
<v Speaker 1>can we uh, can we use your ring camera? See

0:24:41.040 --> 0:24:44.520
<v Speaker 1>what the footage is like. No, Amazon just hands it over. UM.

0:24:44.720 --> 0:24:46.800
<v Speaker 1>So you're when you're installing one of these things in

0:24:46.840 --> 0:24:50.640
<v Speaker 1>your home, you're becoming part of a vast surveillance network

0:24:50.960 --> 0:24:54.720
<v Speaker 1>and you don't have any control over where that data goes. Uh.

0:24:54.800 --> 0:24:57.480
<v Speaker 1>There's a town in California that partnered with RING to

0:24:57.640 --> 0:25:01.119
<v Speaker 1>give away free cameras to anyone who witnessed a neighbor

0:25:01.160 --> 0:25:04.720
<v Speaker 1>committing a crime and then promised to testify against them

0:25:04.720 --> 0:25:08.640
<v Speaker 1>in court, you know, incentivizing people to rat out their neighbors.

0:25:09.520 --> 0:25:12.960
<v Speaker 1>In an incident in Washington State, a RING user posted

0:25:13.000 --> 0:25:17.080
<v Speaker 1>footage of someone on their porch. Sheriff later tracked down

0:25:17.119 --> 0:25:19.239
<v Speaker 1>the guy and then they got into a confrontation they

0:25:19.320 --> 0:25:22.800
<v Speaker 1>killed him. The woman has said repeatedly after the fact

0:25:22.800 --> 0:25:26.639
<v Speaker 1>that she regrets posting the footage online, and she feels

0:25:26.680 --> 0:25:30.439
<v Speaker 1>that her her sharing the ring recording directly led to

0:25:30.480 --> 0:25:32.640
<v Speaker 1>the man's death. UM. And it's one of these things

0:25:32.640 --> 0:25:35.280
<v Speaker 1>where it was obviously a guy that was in distress

0:25:35.440 --> 0:25:38.320
<v Speaker 1>and in need of like a mental health check um.

0:25:38.320 --> 0:25:40.480
<v Speaker 1>And he died because of an interaction with the police

0:25:40.920 --> 0:25:44.080
<v Speaker 1>and because someone saw him on a ring camera. Now,

0:25:44.119 --> 0:25:47.480
<v Speaker 1>Amazon can't always control who gets access, and it can't

0:25:47.520 --> 0:25:52.680
<v Speaker 1>protect you from its own employees. UM. Their devices for spine,

0:25:53.320 --> 0:25:55.720
<v Speaker 1>even if ostensibly they're supposed to be used to make

0:25:55.720 --> 0:25:58.600
<v Speaker 1>our lives more convenient and keep people safe. And at

0:25:58.600 --> 0:26:01.400
<v Speaker 1>the end of the day, it's a camera or recorder

0:26:01.520 --> 0:26:03.560
<v Speaker 1>and you don't have control over what's done with the

0:26:03.640 --> 0:26:06.280
<v Speaker 1>data once it hits Amazon servers. It's one thing to

0:26:06.320 --> 0:26:10.199
<v Speaker 1>have like a closed circuit television system set up in

0:26:10.200 --> 0:26:12.760
<v Speaker 1>your home where you are the only one that has

0:26:12.800 --> 0:26:15.960
<v Speaker 1>access to the footage. But when you get integrated into

0:26:16.000 --> 0:26:21.080
<v Speaker 1>Amazon's services like this, you're you're you're inviting this huge

0:26:21.200 --> 0:26:24.520
<v Speaker 1>company to paw through all of your stuff and look

0:26:24.560 --> 0:26:28.200
<v Speaker 1>through it all. And you know, here we have Astro,

0:26:29.400 --> 0:26:33.919
<v Speaker 1>this little device that that moves around your house and

0:26:34.000 --> 0:26:37.680
<v Speaker 1>records even more information. So Amazon has been caught spying

0:26:37.680 --> 0:26:40.880
<v Speaker 1>on its customers several times. How is the spying via

0:26:40.960 --> 0:26:44.320
<v Speaker 1>Astro unique? I would say the spying the astro is

0:26:44.400 --> 0:26:48.280
<v Speaker 1>unique because it's ambulatory. This thing moves around your house.

0:26:48.480 --> 0:26:50.760
<v Speaker 1>It has your faces, It has the faces of you

0:26:51.160 --> 0:26:53.000
<v Speaker 1>and everyone in your home stored in side of it,

0:26:53.000 --> 0:26:56.280
<v Speaker 1>and it's making judgment calls about who should and shouldn't

0:26:56.320 --> 0:26:58.399
<v Speaker 1>be there. And the people who have worked on this

0:26:58.480 --> 0:27:02.639
<v Speaker 1>thing tell us it's not good at making those judgment calls. UM.

0:27:02.680 --> 0:27:06.600
<v Speaker 1>The facial recognition software is built on shaky foundation UM,

0:27:06.640 --> 0:27:08.880
<v Speaker 1>and trying to integrate into a thousand dollar a little

0:27:08.960 --> 0:27:12.600
<v Speaker 1>robot that's going to move around your house is asking

0:27:12.640 --> 0:27:16.119
<v Speaker 1>for a disaster. UM. You know, it's one thing to

0:27:16.200 --> 0:27:19.159
<v Speaker 1>have the ring camera pointed outside your front door, or

0:27:19.160 --> 0:27:21.880
<v Speaker 1>an Alexa that listens to everything inside your home. It's

0:27:21.960 --> 0:27:24.439
<v Speaker 1>quite another to have a little device that moves around,

0:27:24.520 --> 0:27:29.359
<v Speaker 1>recording audio and video and creating a floor plan in

0:27:29.400 --> 0:27:32.040
<v Speaker 1>its memory. So this is another one of the really

0:27:32.040 --> 0:27:37.480
<v Speaker 1>interesting unique features UM of Astro that has kind of

0:27:37.480 --> 0:27:40.840
<v Speaker 1>talked about more in the design documents than it is

0:27:41.280 --> 0:27:46.159
<v Speaker 1>in the marketing. UM. It learns your floor plan, it

0:27:46.200 --> 0:27:49.480
<v Speaker 1>moves around your home, It finds all the nukes and crannies.

0:27:49.520 --> 0:27:54.840
<v Speaker 1>It's builds a rendering of your house in its memory. Uh.

0:27:54.880 --> 0:27:57.639
<v Speaker 1>It also monitors the foot traffic of everyone in the

0:27:57.640 --> 0:28:00.679
<v Speaker 1>house and learns what the hotspots are. According to the

0:28:00.720 --> 0:28:03.959
<v Speaker 1>design documents we looked at, astro nos say that at

0:28:04.000 --> 0:28:06.919
<v Speaker 1>three fifteen, the kids get home from school and the

0:28:07.080 --> 0:28:10.080
<v Speaker 1>entrance to the house becomes a traffic hot spot, so

0:28:10.080 --> 0:28:14.800
<v Speaker 1>it knows that it should avoid that. Um, it's monitoring,

0:28:15.160 --> 0:28:19.399
<v Speaker 1>it's moving around the house except when it's charging, recording

0:28:19.800 --> 0:28:24.160
<v Speaker 1>audio and video. Um, it's moving around on its own

0:28:24.359 --> 0:28:28.479
<v Speaker 1>and making explicit maps of your residence. And we already

0:28:28.480 --> 0:28:30.600
<v Speaker 1>know that hackers have been able to get access to

0:28:30.640 --> 0:28:34.880
<v Speaker 1>Amazon servers before. Just like this is all a recipe

0:28:34.880 --> 0:28:39.320
<v Speaker 1>for disaster, recipe for disaster. So after all that, it's

0:28:39.440 --> 0:28:44.840
<v Speaker 1>up to you to decide. Is Amazon spying on us? Personally?

0:28:45.160 --> 0:28:49.120
<v Speaker 1>I think yes, but your thoughts are yours. The Looking

0:28:49.160 --> 0:28:51.200
<v Speaker 1>through all of this, though, it feels to me that

0:28:51.320 --> 0:28:57.080
<v Speaker 1>Amazon is basically tricking us, consciously or unconsciously into consuming

0:28:57.200 --> 0:29:00.640
<v Speaker 1>more and more trendy gadgets that actually all up as

0:29:00.680 --> 0:29:04.080
<v Speaker 1>surveillance systems. Access is given to the police at the

0:29:04.120 --> 0:29:07.280
<v Speaker 1>drop of a hat without your permission. Access has been

0:29:07.280 --> 0:29:11.000
<v Speaker 1>stolen quite easily by hackers, and access has been given

0:29:11.040 --> 0:29:15.680
<v Speaker 1>willingly to employees working at Amazon's tech security divisions. If

0:29:15.680 --> 0:29:19.320
<v Speaker 1>you're using these products, all of the data, video, images,

0:29:19.360 --> 0:29:23.480
<v Speaker 1>and voice recordings that they collect all stored in Amazon's

0:29:23.680 --> 0:29:27.200
<v Speaker 1>Big Cloud. Up they hearing all of this, does that

0:29:27.280 --> 0:29:32.200
<v Speaker 1>make you feel safe? In the next episode of Megacorp,

0:29:32.440 --> 0:29:36.719
<v Speaker 1>will be looking into Amazon's connections to intelligence agencies across

0:29:36.760 --> 0:29:43.400
<v Speaker 1>the world, including the CIA and m I six. Megacorp

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<v Speaker 1>is made by my production company H eleven for Cool

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<v Speaker 1>Zone Media. It's written, researched, and produced by myself, Jake Hanrahan.

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<v Speaker 1>It was also produced by Sophie Lichtman. Music is by

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<v Speaker 1>Some Black, graphics by Adam Doyle and sound engineering by

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<v Speaker 1>Splicing Block. If you want to get in touch, follow

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<v Speaker 1>me on social media at Jake Underscore Hanrahan. That's h

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<v Speaker 1>A N A h A N