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Speaker 1: I want to thank every Amazon employee and every Amazon customer,

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Speaker 1: because you guys paid progress. You guys paid problems. This

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Speaker 1: is Megacorp, an investigative podcast exposing some of the world's

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Speaker 1: most unethical corporations. This series is about Amazon. I'm Jake Hanrahan,

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Speaker 1: journalists and documentary filmmaker. Megacorp is produced by H eleven

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Speaker 1: for cool Zone Media. So we've spoken about the awful

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Speaker 1: work conditions in the Amazon warehouses, the company's disregard for

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Speaker 1: health and safety, and we've also looked at how Amazon

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Speaker 1: manages to avoid paying millions of dollars in tax. Now, though,

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Speaker 1: we're going to move on to something different, because, as

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Speaker 1: I've mentioned, each step up the Amazon pyramid of facori,

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Speaker 1: there's a new scandal to be examined. In this episode,

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Speaker 1: we're going to be asking the question, is Amazon spying

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Speaker 1: on you? We know the government is, we know social

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Speaker 1: media is, we know Google is. But what about Amazon?

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Speaker 1: A company that, in its delusion, prides itself on being

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Speaker 1: the smiley, happy face of the consumer experience. Let's find out. First,

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Speaker 1: let's take a look at Amazon's range of smart speakers. Now,

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Speaker 1: if you don't know what a smart speaker is, consider

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Speaker 1: yourself lucky, but to explain. The smart speaker, sometimes referred

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Speaker 1: to as a home assistant, is an Internet enabled two

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Speaker 1: ways speaker system that basically replaces getting up and pressing

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Speaker 1: buttons in your home. For example, if you want to

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Speaker 1: search for something online, you can ask the smart speaker

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Speaker 1: to do it. If you don't want to just get

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Speaker 1: up and switch off the light, you can program the

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Speaker 1: smart speaker to do it on your command. Some of

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Speaker 1: the most advanced smart speakers can be programmed to basically

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Speaker 1: run your whole house for you. Amazon leads the global

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Speaker 1: market when it comes to smart speakers, but the start

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Speaker 1: of they'd sold a hundred million That sold sixteen point

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Speaker 1: five million smart speakers by the fourth quarter of twenty

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Speaker 1: and almost seventy of smart speaker users in the US

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Speaker 1: favor using the Amazon Echo. The Echo is their most

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Speaker 1: popular smart speaker. It's enabled with Alexa. Alexa is basically

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Speaker 1: the technology that makes Amazon's smart speakers work. Alexa is

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Speaker 1: a virtual assistant cloud technology that is able to learn

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Speaker 1: things as you use it in a more detailed way

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Speaker 1: of speaking, Alexa is a voice activated user interface that

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Speaker 1: you uses a combination of machine learning and artificial intelligence.

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Speaker 1: To function. It all sounds very futuristic, but it's here,

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Speaker 1: it's now, lots of people have it now. Personally, I

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Speaker 1: can be a bit of a luddy and I do

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Speaker 1: not understand why anyone would want such a device in

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Speaker 1: their house. However, as I just said that many many

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Speaker 1: people do, this is helping Alexa learn, yeah, literally learn.

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Speaker 1: The more commands Alexa receives, the more Alexa develops. In fact,

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Speaker 1: Alexa has learned one hundred thousand new skills since the

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Speaker 1: technology was first launched in November. So to sum up,

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Speaker 1: through the Amazon Echo and its utilization of Alexa, Amazon

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Speaker 1: has a reach into hundreds of millions of homes across

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Speaker 1: the world. So you'd really hope, for the sake of

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Speaker 1: personal autonomy and privacy that they're not listening into your

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Speaker 1: conversations through the smart speakers. Right Well, in t nineteen,

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Speaker 1: it emerged that Amazon employees had been listening to voice

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Speaker 1: recordings captured via the Echo in consumers homes and offices.

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Speaker 1: This wasn't a couple of rogue employees either, No, Amazon

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Speaker 1: literally hired thousands of people to do this. The job

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Speaker 1: was to not only listen to what you're saying, but

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Speaker 1: to also transcribe and annotate it. They would then feed

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Speaker 1: it back into the software with the aim of apparently

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Speaker 1: helping Alexa better understand voice commands. Of course, this raises

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Speaker 1: extremely serious questions about citizens personal privacy. But it gets

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Speaker 1: even worse. Reported by Forbes, the people tasked with listening

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Speaker 1: to your conversations quote required to record the data, whether

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Speaker 1: the device has been activated on purpose or not end quote.

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Speaker 1: So basically, they can listen into your conversation even if

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Speaker 1: you don't want them to. So by buying an Amazon Echo,

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Speaker 1: you've essentially invited an employee of Amazon to listen into

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Speaker 1: your private conversations, whether you've given Alexa command or not.

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Speaker 1: If Big Brother is always watching, it's clear now that

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Speaker 1: Amazon is always listening, that is, if you've got one

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Speaker 1: of these smart speakers in your home. Now, apparently, if

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Speaker 1: the people hired to listen, in record, and annotate conversations

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Speaker 1: in your home via the Amazon Echo here private data

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Speaker 1: such as your bank details, they're told to just mark

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Speaker 1: it down as critical data and move on. Let's hope

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Speaker 1: every single one of the thousands of people Amazon employed

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Speaker 1: to do this honest and didn't steal anyone's details. Now,

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Speaker 1: according to this Forbes article. One of the darker elements

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Speaker 1: to this situation is that two workers employed to log

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Speaker 1: the conversations thought they heard a sexual assault. When they

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Speaker 1: reported it to their superiors, Amazon ironically enough, told them

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Speaker 1: it's not their job to interfere. So Amazon will listening

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Speaker 1: to your conversations to improve their software data. But if

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Speaker 1: they hear someone being sexually assaulted, they don't want to

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Speaker 1: do anything about it, according to this article. Now, unfortunately

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Speaker 1: it doesn't stop. They're not at all. Let's talk about Ring.

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Speaker 1: Ring is a home security company owned by Amazon. They

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Speaker 1: bought it in eighteen for one billion dollars and now

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Speaker 1: millions of people across the world used the technology. Ring

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Speaker 1: provides a line of WiFi connected security cameras for your home.

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Speaker 1: You've likely seen footage of Ring doorbell security systems online.

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Speaker 1: Is basically a little camera in the doorbell or wherever

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Speaker 1: they put it in their house that allows the homeowner

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Speaker 1: to see what's going on outside before they open the

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Speaker 1: door or inside, for example, if they want to keep

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Speaker 1: an eye on their kids as they're plane. Through the wifire,

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Speaker 1: you can have Rings set up on your phone or

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Speaker 1: your tablet or your laptop or wherever it's not a

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Speaker 1: bad idea, but they have been at several problems with

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Speaker 1: Amazon's Ring, so let's start with the hackers. This is

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Speaker 1: particularly dark. It was reported by journalists Joseph Cox and

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Speaker 1: some month of Cole that hackers had built themselves a

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Speaker 1: dedicated software for hacking into Amazon's Ring security cameras. It

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Speaker 1: becomes clear how funked up this is when looking at

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Speaker 1: a story from Mississippi in the US, where it was

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Speaker 1: discovered that hackers had managed to get into a ring

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Speaker 1: security camera placed in the bedroom of three young girls,

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Speaker 1: one of them was just eight years old. Hacker managed

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Speaker 1: to take control of the ring security camera, playing music

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Speaker 1: through its speaker as the young girls played in their room.

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Speaker 1: Daker was watching them the whole time. Dakker then played

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Speaker 1: the song Tiptoe through the Tulips, and when one of

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Speaker 1: the young girls asked who was there, the hacker replied,

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Speaker 1: it's Santa, it's your best friend. Here's the actual recording

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Speaker 1: of these hackers interfering with the Ring camera in the

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Speaker 1: room of these young girls. I'm your best friend. I'm

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Speaker 1: sand a clause. I don't you want to be my

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Speaker 1: best friend? You can mess up your room, you can

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Speaker 1: break your TV. You can do whatever you want. In

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Speaker 1: another incident of the same year, a hacker took control

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Speaker 1: of a RING security camera in Florida and began screaming

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Speaker 1: racist comments at a family for up to three minutes

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Speaker 1: before they were forced to pull the batteries out of

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Speaker 1: the Ring unit. So why was this happening, Well, essentially,

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Speaker 1: Amazon's Ring wasn't requiring its users to choose two step

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Speaker 1: verification by default. With something as delicate as in home

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Speaker 1: security cameras, this should have been a standard requirement for

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Speaker 1: all users, because without the two steps, it was a

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Speaker 1: lot easier for hackers to get into their system. In fact,

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Speaker 1: reporters Joseph Cox and Samantha Cole found that hackers were

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Speaker 1: building and sharing programs to access RING cameras on criminal forums.

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Speaker 1: This of course sets a very dark precedent. If that

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Speaker 1: wasn't bad enough, though, it was later discovered that Ring's

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Speaker 1: own employees had been improperly accessing Ring users video data.

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Speaker 1: Amazon's Ring employees were spying on customers themselves. It was

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Speaker 1: discovered that four of Amazon's Ring employees had been fired

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Speaker 1: after abusing their position. They had watched footage from Ring

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Speaker 1: security cameras without the customer's knowledge or permission. This all

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Speaker 1: came out when Amazon Device President of Public Policy Brian

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Speaker 1: Huesman answered U S Senators in a letter after they

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Speaker 1: had written to Amazon expressing safety concerns about RING devices

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Speaker 1: in November twenty nineteen. In the response letter from Amazon

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Speaker 1: obtained by Motherboard, the question and answer is as follows

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Speaker 1: quote question to your knowledge have there been any documented

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Speaker 1: instances of this access being abused? Answer? Over the last

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Speaker 1: four years, RING has received four complaints or inquiries regarding

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Speaker 1: a team member's access to RING video data. Although each

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Speaker 1: of the individuals involved in these incidents was authorized to

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Speaker 1: view video data, the attempted access to that data exceeded

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Speaker 1: what was necessary for their job functions. In each instance,

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Speaker 1: one Ring was made aware of the alleged conduct, RING

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Speaker 1: promptly investigated the incident, and, after determining that the individual

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Speaker 1: violated company policy, terminated the individual. In addition to taking

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Speaker 1: swift action to investigate and take appropriate disciplinary action in

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Speaker 1: each of these cases, RING has taken multiple actions to

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Speaker 1: limit such data access to a smaller number of team members.

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Speaker 1: RING periodically reviews the access privileges it grants to its

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Speaker 1: team members to verify that they have a continued need

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Speaker 1: for access to customer information for the purpose of maintaining

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Speaker 1: and improving the customer experience end quote. So effectively, Yes,

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Speaker 1: Amazon has found several cases of Ring employees literally spying

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Speaker 1: on their customers. Now you might say, oh, well, this

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Speaker 1: is only four employees. Well, I would argue that this

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Speaker 1: is only four employees that got caught. Amazon's Ring has

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Speaker 1: clearly been sloppy with its security see both externally and

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Speaker 1: internally reported by The intercept In. Sources inside Ring said

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Speaker 1: that they had provided their research and development team in

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Speaker 1: Ukraine unfettered access to quote a folder on Amazon's S

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Speaker 1: three cloud storage service that contained every video created by

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Speaker 1: every Ring camera around the world end quote. Not only this,

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Speaker 1: at the time, the video files were left unencrypted, anyone

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Speaker 1: from the team could download someone's sensitive security camera footage

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Speaker 1: with the click of a button. The source also said,

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Speaker 1: quote Ring unnecessarily provided executives and engineers in the US

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Speaker 1: with highly privileged access to the company's technical support video portal,

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Speaker 1: allowing unfiltered, round the clock live feeds from some customer cameras,

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Speaker 1: regardless of whether they needed access to this extremely sensitive

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Speaker 1: data to do their jobs. End quote. Imagine that people

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Speaker 1: are Amazon's Ring company able to look into your home

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Speaker 1: at seven on a live feed whenever they want to.

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Speaker 1: That sounds like spying to me, even if there's no

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Speaker 1: intention of doing anything bad behind that they shouldn't have

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Speaker 1: had the access. Now. Whilst Ring pointed out to US

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Speaker 1: senators that for employees in Ukraine had been caught and

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Speaker 1: fired for spying on customers, it seems, at least according

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Speaker 1: to the source, that they failed to mention how these

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Speaker 1: employees were able to do so. That is rings sloppy

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Speaker 1: internal security when it comes to allowing workers access to

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Speaker 1: Ring security video. So there's the issues with Amazon's Echo

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Speaker 1: smart speakers and the issues with Amazon's Ring home security devices.

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Speaker 1: After all that it might allow you to discover the

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Speaker 1: Amazon is now making little robots for your house, they too,

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Speaker 1: have already raised serious privacy concerns. Astro join me on

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Speaker 1: stage today. I'm full to introduce you to a new

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Speaker 1: kind of household robot that integrates Alexa advanced hardware, software,

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Speaker 1: computer vision, and AI in a brand new way. And

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Speaker 1: it's a beautiful illustration of how ambient computing can improve

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Speaker 1: customers lives in a way that traditional consumer electronics just

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Speaker 1: kept if you didn't know. Amazon's Astro is a new

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Speaker 1: three wheeled little robot that can autonomously drive around your home.

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Speaker 1: Is packed with cameras and has a little screen on

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Speaker 1: the front with two eyes. It's meant to be cute,

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Speaker 1: but honestly, it looks a little bit creepy. The idea

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Speaker 1: behind Astro is that it will map the layout of

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Speaker 1: your home and act as a little robot butler, so

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Speaker 1: long as everything in your house is hooked up to

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Speaker 1: the same system as Astros Amazon's. Is this about Astro quote?

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Speaker 1: Astro is a household robot for home monitoring with Alexa.

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Speaker 1: When you're away, use the Astro app to see a

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Speaker 1: live view of your home, check in on specific rooms

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Speaker 1: and viewpoints, and get activity alerts. When you're home, Astro

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Speaker 1: can follow you from room to room, playing your favorite music,

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Speaker 1: podcasts or shows, and find you to deliver calls, reminders, alarms,

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Speaker 1: and timers set with Alexa. End quote. Honestly, it sounds

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Speaker 1: fucking horrible, but that's Astro. So. Astro is known internally

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Speaker 1: at Amazon as Vesta and Astro Slash. Vesta has another

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Speaker 1: purpose that they don't tell you about in that advert.

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Speaker 1: Running surveillance on customers. Have a listen to this internal

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Speaker 1: training video for Astro slash VESTA. Don't ask us where

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Speaker 1: we got this, just have a listen to what they're

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Speaker 1: saying the donation. Start following that Anne stranger and keep

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Speaker 1: following under the stranger goes out of the field of you.

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Speaker 1: As soon as the person goes out of field of you,

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Speaker 1: it will start investigation. That is, it will go and

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Speaker 1: check in each scampaigns that is created. This investigation. Unknown

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Speaker 1: investigation or non person investigation will happen only after reaching

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Speaker 1: to the first scanpoint. This will not happen immediately. And

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Speaker 1: regarding the non person investigation, the patrol should start as

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Speaker 1: soon as it sees the non person in the field

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Speaker 1: of you, and immediately second later the person leaves from

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Speaker 1: the field of you, the patrol will start automatically. I mean,

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Speaker 1: when the investor is following an unknown person, then a

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Speaker 1: non person is introduced into the field of you, the

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Speaker 1: patrol or investigation immediately stops. You know, that was a

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Speaker 1: little bit hard to understand due to the start, but

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Speaker 1: that's we got it. But basically she is explaining how

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Speaker 1: Astro can run an investigation patrol. If a stranger quote,

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Speaker 1: stranger is in the house, and then Astro can hide

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Speaker 1: that activity from the non users at will if they

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Speaker 1: enter astros field of vision. So basically running about the

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Speaker 1: house doing a little investigation on this stranger. Then the

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Speaker 1: owner walks interview and quickly Astro stops it. I don't

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Speaker 1: know about you, but along with several other aspects of

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Speaker 1: Astro that will hear about, that seems quite creepy to me.

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Speaker 1: To get a better understanding of what Amazon is up

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Speaker 1: to with their Astro robot, I spoke to Matthew Goalt.

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Speaker 1: He's a staff reporter at Motherboard and the host of

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Speaker 1: their cyber podcast. He's also the one that first found

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Speaker 1: out about the surveillance situation with Astro. So the pitch

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Speaker 1: for investor or Astro as it's known now is that

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Speaker 1: it's basically like a tablet on wheels with Alexa software

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Speaker 1: built in and for a customer gets a cute little

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Speaker 1: Wally style thing the roll around your house, let you

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Speaker 1: buy stuff on Amazon, and it integrates into the rest

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Speaker 1: of the Amazon ecosystem into your home, meaning it can

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Speaker 1: communicate with ring cameras. Uh, you know, your Echo, your

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Speaker 1: Alexa and and if you have one an Amazon powered

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Speaker 1: security system. So the pitch and the way it's described

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Speaker 1: internally or kind of two different things. Um, the marketing says,

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Speaker 1: a clever little robot that learns from you and will

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Speaker 1: help you in your day to day life. So the

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Speaker 1: internal documentation kind of shows that Astro is a robot

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Speaker 1: that's designed to slowly move through your home, learn all

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Speaker 1: of its nooks and crannies, monitor to the behavior of

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Speaker 1: its inhabitants, and it literally will follow people around the house,

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Speaker 1: recording what they say and do and attempting to integrate

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Speaker 1: that data into a customer profile of the home. It

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Speaker 1: also has facial recognition software that the people working on

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Speaker 1: the device said doesn't work very well. So when you

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Speaker 1: buy this thing, you're supposed to get everyone in the

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Speaker 1: family together, you hunker down in front of it, and

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Speaker 1: you register your face. Um. This is one of the

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Speaker 1: things that Astro does is perk up when it meets

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Speaker 1: someone in the home who isn't supposed to be there.

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Speaker 1: So if you know, ostensibly if you have an intruder,

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Speaker 1: it will follow them around, record what they're saying and

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Speaker 1: doing stot you know, for someone to view later, and

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Speaker 1: if certain conditions are met, alert the authorities. What those

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Speaker 1: conditions are aren't exactly clear, but the the the idea

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Speaker 1: is that if they are stealing something or making certain

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Speaker 1: kinds of loud noise like say the shattering of glass,

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Speaker 1: or if or if Astro sees a fire set, it

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Speaker 1: will then contact the relevant authorities. Now, I know you

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Speaker 1: might be thinking at this stage, well, that doesn't sound

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Speaker 1: that bad. Yeah, it's mapping out my whole house, reading

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Speaker 1: people's faces, etcetera. But if somebody bursts into my house

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Speaker 1: and I'm not there, this little robot thing is going

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Speaker 1: to call the police. Well, listen on, because it's not

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Speaker 1: that simple. And at the end of this you can

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Speaker 1: decide if you think the negatives outweigh the positives. But

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Speaker 1: the people we talked to who had worked on this

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Speaker 1: thing where we're not happy with the device, Um, we

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Speaker 1: talked to several people. Every single one of them kind

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Speaker 1: of said the same thing that they thought that this

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Speaker 1: was terrible. They were horrified by the privacy implications of it,

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Speaker 1: and that generally just didn't work very well. Astro seems

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Speaker 1: kind of bad at everything that it does. Um, this

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Speaker 1: is one of my favorite quotes. Astro is terrible and

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Speaker 1: will almost certainly throw itself down a flight of stairs

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Speaker 1: if presented the opportunity, and will note that every single

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Speaker 1: person we talked to mentioned that stairs were a problem

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Speaker 1: for Astro does not know how to handle them. Quote

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Speaker 1: the person detection is unreliable at best, making the in

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Speaker 1: home security proposition laughable. So drilling down, how does Astro

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Speaker 1: collect data on its customers? So, Astro is another in

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Speaker 1: a long line of data gathering operations run by Amazon. Basically,

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Speaker 1: every interaction anyone has with Amazon, whether through using an

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Speaker 1: Echo Dot to order cheese Whiz or rewatching X files

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Speaker 1: for the five time on Prime Video, that becomes a

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Speaker 1: data point and Amazon's like huge aws stores. Um So,

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Speaker 1: if you're read a book on good Reads, or you

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Speaker 1: highlight a passage in a Game of Thrones novel on

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Speaker 1: your kindle, or you leave a one star review for

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Speaker 1: dish soap on Amazon, the site learns all of that. Ostensibly,

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Speaker 1: it uses this data to better manage the customer experience.

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Speaker 1: You might start seeing books similar to the one you

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Speaker 1: rated highly, start getting ads for something that was mentioned

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Speaker 1: in that passage that you highlighted. Uh, and you'll probably

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Speaker 1: never see dish soap that you rated at one star

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Speaker 1: ever again, Um, and a lot of people love this.

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Speaker 1: They love the way that interacting with Amazon and its

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Speaker 1: systems allows you know, the site to learn about you

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Speaker 1: as a customer. The argument is that it makes life easier,

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Speaker 1: and that's kind of the tradeoff, right, You're sacrificing a

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Speaker 1: little bit of privacy for convenience. But the thing is,

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Speaker 1: I think a lot of what Amazon does, and a

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Speaker 1: lot of other people think that what Amazon does h

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Speaker 1: rises to the level of spying. And I think Astro

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Speaker 1: is a really good way to kind of taught, like

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Speaker 1: have that conversation. Um, there's stuff that it does that

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Speaker 1: just massive, massive, massive privacy concerns. And so if you

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Speaker 1: think about Astro as like a camera and a recorder

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Speaker 1: on wheels that is feeding information back to Amazon, Well,

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Speaker 1: who is looking at that information and why are they

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Speaker 1: looking at that information? Is there any kind of precedent

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Speaker 1: set in Amazon as a company that can tell us

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Speaker 1: about how they're going to use that information going forward?

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Speaker 1: At this point in the episode, because of what we

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00:23:06,280 --> 00:23:09,360
Speaker 1: spoke about earlier, we know that there is a precedent

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Speaker 1: and that the people that get hold of this information

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Speaker 1: Amazon continuously disrespecting people's privacy is likely that the same

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Speaker 1: thing will happen with Astro um. And this is really

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Speaker 1: important because I think there's this big misunderstanding of Amazon.

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Speaker 1: When we start talking about its power and about breaking

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00:23:26,560 --> 00:23:28,200
Speaker 1: it up and about whether or not it's some monopoly,

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00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:29,760
Speaker 1: people are just like, well, it's just a website that

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00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:34,560
Speaker 1: sells stuff that's really not true anymore. It also sells

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Speaker 1: a lot of surveillance tech, you know, like this little

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Speaker 1: astro robot. It's runs aws. It's the biggest data form

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Speaker 1: on the planet. UM. A lot of the Internet is

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Speaker 1: now filtered or stored on their cloud servers, and that's

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Speaker 1: a huge single point of failure in Amazon is storing

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Speaker 1: a lot of audio and video fed to it by

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Speaker 1: its customers through the cameras and echo dots and little

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Speaker 1: astros that are it's selling. If that wasn't bad enough,

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Speaker 1: listen to this extra detail a few Goats tells us

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Speaker 1: about the ring Comeras we spoke about the stuff of

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00:24:04,119 --> 00:24:09,439
Speaker 1: the episode, Amazon has a lot of deals with various

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Speaker 1: law enforcement agencies across the country that gives them carte

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Speaker 1: blanche access to these ring cameras. Um. There's really good

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Speaker 1: investigations in pieces in Motherboard and then also from the

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Speaker 1: Electronic Frontier Foundation that have shown that Amazon routinely gives

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Speaker 1: cops access to these things. Um. One example, in San

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Speaker 1: Francisco in twenty nineteen, cops were given access to ring

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Speaker 1: camera footage so they could watch protests. And this is

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Speaker 1: not something that they go and they check with Hey,

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Speaker 1: can we uh, can we use your ring camera? See

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Speaker 1: what the footage is like. No, Amazon just hands it over. UM.

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Speaker 1: So you're when you're installing one of these things in

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Speaker 1: your home, you're becoming part of a vast surveillance network

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Speaker 1: and you don't have any control over where that data goes. Uh.

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Speaker 1: There's a town in California that partnered with RING to

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Speaker 1: give away free cameras to anyone who witnessed a neighbor

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Speaker 1: committing a crime and then promised to testify against them

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00:25:04,720 --> 00:25:08,640
Speaker 1: in court, you know, incentivizing people to rat out their neighbors.

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Speaker 1: In an incident in Washington State, a RING user posted

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Speaker 1: footage of someone on their porch. Sheriff later tracked down

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00:25:17,119 --> 00:25:19,239
Speaker 1: the guy and then they got into a confrontation they

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Speaker 1: killed him. The woman has said repeatedly after the fact

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Speaker 1: that she regrets posting the footage online, and she feels

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Speaker 1: that her her sharing the ring recording directly led to

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Speaker 1: the man's death. UM. And it's one of these things

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Speaker 1: where it was obviously a guy that was in distress

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Speaker 1: and in need of like a mental health check um.

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Speaker 1: And he died because of an interaction with the police

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Speaker 1: and because someone saw him on a ring camera. Now,

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Speaker 1: Amazon can't always control who gets access, and it can't

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Speaker 1: protect you from its own employees. UM. Their devices for spine,

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Speaker 1: even if ostensibly they're supposed to be used to make

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Speaker 1: our lives more convenient and keep people safe. And at

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Speaker 1: the end of the day, it's a camera or recorder

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Speaker 1: and you don't have control over what's done with the

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00:26:03,640 --> 00:26:06,280
Speaker 1: data once it hits Amazon servers. It's one thing to

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Speaker 1: have like a closed circuit television system set up in

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00:26:10,200 --> 00:26:12,760
Speaker 1: your home where you are the only one that has

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00:26:12,800 --> 00:26:15,960
Speaker 1: access to the footage. But when you get integrated into

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00:26:16,000 --> 00:26:21,080
Speaker 1: Amazon's services like this, you're you're you're inviting this huge

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00:26:21,200 --> 00:26:24,520
Speaker 1: company to paw through all of your stuff and look

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00:26:24,560 --> 00:26:28,200
Speaker 1: through it all. And you know, here we have Astro,

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00:26:29,400 --> 00:26:33,919
Speaker 1: this little device that that moves around your house and

403
00:26:34,000 --> 00:26:37,680
Speaker 1: records even more information. So Amazon has been caught spying

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00:26:37,680 --> 00:26:40,880
Speaker 1: on its customers several times. How is the spying via

405
00:26:40,960 --> 00:26:44,320
Speaker 1: Astro unique? I would say the spying the astro is

406
00:26:44,400 --> 00:26:48,280
Speaker 1: unique because it's ambulatory. This thing moves around your house.

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00:26:48,480 --> 00:26:50,760
Speaker 1: It has your faces, It has the faces of you

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00:26:51,160 --> 00:26:53,000
Speaker 1: and everyone in your home stored in side of it,

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Speaker 1: and it's making judgment calls about who should and shouldn't

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00:26:56,320 --> 00:26:58,399
Speaker 1: be there. And the people who have worked on this

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Speaker 1: thing tell us it's not good at making those judgment calls. UM.

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Speaker 1: The facial recognition software is built on shaky foundation UM,

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00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:08,880
Speaker 1: and trying to integrate into a thousand dollar a little

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00:27:08,960 --> 00:27:12,600
Speaker 1: robot that's going to move around your house is asking

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00:27:12,640 --> 00:27:16,119
Speaker 1: for a disaster. UM. You know, it's one thing to

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00:27:16,200 --> 00:27:19,159
Speaker 1: have the ring camera pointed outside your front door, or

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00:27:19,160 --> 00:27:21,880
Speaker 1: an Alexa that listens to everything inside your home. It's

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00:27:21,960 --> 00:27:24,439
Speaker 1: quite another to have a little device that moves around,

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00:27:24,520 --> 00:27:29,359
Speaker 1: recording audio and video and creating a floor plan in

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00:27:29,400 --> 00:27:32,040
Speaker 1: its memory. So this is another one of the really

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00:27:32,040 --> 00:27:37,480
Speaker 1: interesting unique features UM of Astro that has kind of

422
00:27:37,480 --> 00:27:40,840
Speaker 1: talked about more in the design documents than it is

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00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:46,159
Speaker 1: in the marketing. UM. It learns your floor plan, it

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00:27:46,200 --> 00:27:49,480
Speaker 1: moves around your home, It finds all the nukes and crannies.

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00:27:49,520 --> 00:27:54,840
Speaker 1: It's builds a rendering of your house in its memory. Uh.

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Speaker 1: It also monitors the foot traffic of everyone in the

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00:27:57,640 --> 00:28:00,679
Speaker 1: house and learns what the hotspots are. According to the

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00:28:00,720 --> 00:28:03,959
Speaker 1: design documents we looked at, astro nos say that at

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00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:06,919
Speaker 1: three fifteen, the kids get home from school and the

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00:28:07,080 --> 00:28:10,080
Speaker 1: entrance to the house becomes a traffic hot spot, so

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Speaker 1: it knows that it should avoid that. Um, it's monitoring,

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Speaker 1: it's moving around the house except when it's charging, recording

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Speaker 1: audio and video. Um, it's moving around on its own

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Speaker 1: and making explicit maps of your residence. And we already

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Speaker 1: know that hackers have been able to get access to

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Speaker 1: Amazon servers before. Just like this is all a recipe

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Speaker 1: for disaster, recipe for disaster. So after all that, it's

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Speaker 1: up to you to decide. Is Amazon spying on us? Personally?

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Speaker 1: I think yes, but your thoughts are yours. The Looking

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Speaker 1: through all of this, though, it feels to me that

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Speaker 1: Amazon is basically tricking us, consciously or unconsciously into consuming

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Speaker 1: more and more trendy gadgets that actually all up as

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Speaker 1: surveillance systems. Access is given to the police at the

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Speaker 1: drop of a hat without your permission. Access has been

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Speaker 1: stolen quite easily by hackers, and access has been given

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Speaker 1: willingly to employees working at Amazon's tech security divisions. If

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Speaker 1: you're using these products, all of the data, video, images,

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Speaker 1: and voice recordings that they collect all stored in Amazon's

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Speaker 1: Big Cloud. Up they hearing all of this, does that

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Speaker 1: make you feel safe? In the next episode of Megacorp,

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00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:36,719
Speaker 1: will be looking into Amazon's connections to intelligence agencies across

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Speaker 1: the world, including the CIA and m I six. Megacorp

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00:29:43,560 --> 00:29:47,720
Speaker 1: is made by my production company H eleven for Cool

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00:29:47,800 --> 00:29:53,160
Speaker 1: Zone Media. It's written, researched, and produced by myself, Jake Hanrahan.

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00:29:54,120 --> 00:29:59,040
Speaker 1: It was also produced by Sophie Lichtman. Music is by

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00:29:59,160 --> 00:30:03,720
Speaker 1: Some Black, graphics by Adam Doyle and sound engineering by

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00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:07,400
Speaker 1: Splicing Block. If you want to get in touch, follow

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Speaker 1: me on social media at Jake Underscore Hanrahan. That's h

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Speaker 1: A N A h A N