WEBVTT - Boaz Weinstein

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio News. Hello and welcome to

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<v Speaker 1>the Money Stuff Podcast. I'm Matt Levine. I'm here with

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<v Speaker 1>Kitty Greifeld and our guest is Paus Weinstein of Sappa

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<v Speaker 1>Capital Management. I feel like we've thought since the beginning

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<v Speaker 1>of this podcast but having you on to talk about

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<v Speaker 1>closed unfund activism, but man, closed unfund activism has in

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<v Speaker 1>a new form gotten really hot. I want to talk about,

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<v Speaker 1>like what your trade is. You're out with a tender

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<v Speaker 1>to buy what five ten percent of OBDC two five

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<v Speaker 1>percent of OBDC to the Blue Owl private BDC ive

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<v Speaker 1>had a thirty five ish percent discount to marked Navy,

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<v Speaker 1>So like, what's the trade here? Like, are you like

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<v Speaker 1>going in the book and like doing detailed credit work

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<v Speaker 1>and being like, we think this stuff is worth seventy

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<v Speaker 1>five cents on the dollar, so we'll pay sixty five?

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<v Speaker 1>Are you hedging the credit? Are you trolling? Are you

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<v Speaker 1>what's the sort of basic trade here?

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<v Speaker 2>Why? Matt, do you assume it's not all the above?

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<v Speaker 1>It's just a lot. I'm going to start. I'm going

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<v Speaker 1>to start with trolling. The reason to assume it's trolling

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<v Speaker 1>and not all of the above is because I think

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<v Speaker 1>I think you mentioned before we started, people's first natural

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<v Speaker 1>question is do you think you'll get.

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<v Speaker 3>Any Okay, so I've read some people suggest, oh, this

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<v Speaker 3>is some sort of pr blitz, like like to get

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<v Speaker 3>myself in the story.

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<v Speaker 2>We actually had the tenders. It worked well.

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<v Speaker 3>We actually had the tenders ready before the Blue Oul

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<v Speaker 3>story became a huge.

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<v Speaker 1>Said the tenders like for OBDC two or like do

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<v Speaker 1>you have fifteen of these ready?

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<v Speaker 3>Togain, We have a few ready to go. We started

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<v Speaker 3>with two, so there was you mentioned one of them.

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<v Speaker 3>The other is Starwood s Reid. Starwood when b Reid

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<v Speaker 3>had its problems and be Read being an interval fun

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<v Speaker 3>that a few years ago had very high redemptions and

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<v Speaker 3>was able to actually cure this problem because it was

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<v Speaker 3>somewhat in isolation. It was b read and s Read

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<v Speaker 3>in part because of the rise and interest rates and

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<v Speaker 3>the real estate portfolio is suffering.

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<v Speaker 2>They were able to cure it. They did a special

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<v Speaker 2>transaction with Calsters and the problem.

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<v Speaker 1>Basically Calters bought shares at nav and they use that

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<v Speaker 1>to cast your blood.

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<v Speaker 3>Or is that they got to earn a very attractive

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<v Speaker 3>yield for I think supplying liquidity as needed and sort

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<v Speaker 3>of just that there wouldn't be a kind of run

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<v Speaker 3>on the fund, calm things down, and actually redemptions went

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<v Speaker 3>below that five percent cap. But s Reat Starwood, this forady,

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<v Speaker 3>almost four years ago is still gated and they at

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<v Speaker 3>some point suspended and now they led out a certain

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<v Speaker 3>amount of a month and that amount was increased, and so

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<v Speaker 3>four years later it's still gated. And so the way

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<v Speaker 3>this all happened, sorry that it's not trolling, Okay. The

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<v Speaker 3>way it happened was we learned from some rias, some

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<v Speaker 3>private wealth advisors that there was a block of twenty

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<v Speaker 3>to thirty million from a single group of advisors of

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<v Speaker 3>s REET that just wanted to sell. They wanted out,

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<v Speaker 3>they didn't want to wait potentially multiple years. And s

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<v Speaker 3>Read actually we felt like, you know, the nav's actually

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<v Speaker 3>probably pretty good. It doesn't have the private credit problems.

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<v Speaker 3>It's real estate. B Read has seen their NAV go up,

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<v Speaker 3>and we felt like people need liquidity. They've waited now

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<v Speaker 3>four years, they only gotten partial and so and the

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<v Speaker 3>percentage that's you know, in the queue to redeem is

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<v Speaker 3>very high. And so as that was happening, we also.

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<v Speaker 1>Did you get the call because like you do close

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<v Speaker 1>on fund activism.

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<v Speaker 3>Like, yes, so they are. They are not close cousins,

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<v Speaker 3>they're literally like brother and sister. You might even say

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<v Speaker 3>they're like identical twins, but like there's one thing different

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<v Speaker 3>about them, you know, the redemption rights. This kind of

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<v Speaker 3>like history we have in closed in funds is not

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<v Speaker 3>just like tangentially helpful. It is front and center the

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<v Speaker 3>more or less the same. There were forty act products

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<v Speaker 3>that manager is the sec to deal with if they

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<v Speaker 3>don't treat their investors properly, we can avail ourselves of

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<v Speaker 3>the courts as we have in closed end funds. And

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<v Speaker 3>so I had tenders ready for Starwood and for Blue

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<v Speaker 3>Owl because I was aware of outflows. Then the Blue

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<v Speaker 3>Houl story took like three legs worse and we went.

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<v Speaker 1>Right in Blue Ouse. So you were like aware of

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<v Speaker 1>out those in particular. Yes, so were like I'm ready

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<v Speaker 1>for the private credit industry generally or like Blue out particularly.

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<v Speaker 1>I heard of some arias who went out.

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<v Speaker 3>It was both because it was more like where do

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<v Speaker 3>you start, you know, and prove the concept. And my colleague,

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<v Speaker 3>my partner, Kieran Goodwin, has been ranting on Twitter in

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<v Speaker 3>a good way for two and a half years, three years,

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<v Speaker 3>about how the BDCs and interval funds have over promised

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<v Speaker 3>liquidit either investors, you know, you have fire insurance in

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<v Speaker 3>a sell off that you can get out, but it

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<v Speaker 3>doesn't work if there's actually a fire.

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<v Speaker 1>What is overpromise me? Because like I think a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of them would say, we promised five percent tenders and

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<v Speaker 1>we're doing five percent tenders.

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<v Speaker 3>Yes, here's what I think over promised is. And maybe

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<v Speaker 3>the docs even say this, But to say in a

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<v Speaker 3>large sell off or in some scenarios where there's a

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<v Speaker 3>lot of fear, it's going to take you potentially years

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<v Speaker 3>to get your money back, you know, like where we say,

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<v Speaker 3>you know you have those long disclaimers and then you

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<v Speaker 3>actually say no assurance can be made that an entire

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<v Speaker 3>investment won't be lost, and you're like, really, like we're

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<v Speaker 3>going to lose one hundred do we have really to

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<v Speaker 3>say that?

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, maybe they did.

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<v Speaker 3>I don't have a dog in the fight of like

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<v Speaker 3>how good were their disclosures. I might need to remodel

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<v Speaker 3>my house, I might need to I might need the money,

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<v Speaker 3>And they say, well, look for the last twenty quarters,

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<v Speaker 3>you would have been able to get out of all

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<v Speaker 3>of it, because as long as it's under five, you're good.

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<v Speaker 3>If it's ten, and that's a lot, you can get

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<v Speaker 3>out of half five out of ten. But what happens

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<v Speaker 3>if it's forty. You know what happens, You're getting out

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<v Speaker 3>of an eighth of it. And then of course the

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<v Speaker 3>you know, I was going to bring my George Sorows

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<v Speaker 3>Reflexivity book because what about the reflexivity? You know, a

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<v Speaker 3>term that was overused in finance very long ago, but

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<v Speaker 3>I think it's very apropos here the reflexivity of falling

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<v Speaker 3>naves leading to larger outflows, leading to fores selling, leading

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<v Speaker 3>to falling naves and then you're out in three or

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<v Speaker 3>four years. I don't believe that the retail investor understood that,

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<v Speaker 3>And I wonder if it's even disclosed.

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<v Speaker 1>Because I assume that like roughly none of these redemptions

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<v Speaker 1>are people trying to remodel their houses, and like roughly

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<v Speaker 1>all of it is like people worried about knaves.

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<v Speaker 3>No, no, no, for sure, there's just the general people. Some

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<v Speaker 3>people have cash needs, right, and yes, do they have

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<v Speaker 3>cash needs? And they're like, how should I satisfy it? Okay,

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<v Speaker 3>there's this thing I'm a little worried about, you know.

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<v Speaker 3>I mean some like I don't want to answer all

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<v Speaker 3>of the above to a lot of the either ords

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<v Speaker 3>that you ask me so, but I do think in

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<v Speaker 3>this case there's a percentage of people that want their

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<v Speaker 3>money back because they need the money. I think when

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<v Speaker 3>you go to like cliff Water, the shocking number of

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<v Speaker 3>fourteen percent, which was only four percent, let's say, the

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<v Speaker 3>quarter before, you can easily argue that extra ten or

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<v Speaker 3>people worried about their naves or worried that the gate's

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<v Speaker 3>going to shut. That an interval fund can't actually suspend

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<v Speaker 3>a BDC can. So the products are not the same,

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<v Speaker 3>but for sure they feed into each other. And the

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<v Speaker 3>retail investor, I don't believe, understood that the liquidity of

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<v Speaker 3>the underlying does not at all match the liquidity of

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<v Speaker 3>their investment.

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<v Speaker 4>Well, you mentioned brokers and something that I've been wondering

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<v Speaker 4>about in all of this. I mean, Matt and I

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<v Speaker 4>were discussing on a recent pod that, like, we live

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<v Speaker 4>in a disclosure based society, and I'm sure that these

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<v Speaker 4>disclaimers were laid out in the perspectuses, et cetera. But

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<v Speaker 4>I wonder where the failure of communication was, whether it

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<v Speaker 4>was on the brokers, on the salespeople putting their clients

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<v Speaker 4>in this. And because it does feel like there's some

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<v Speaker 4>structural mismatch of liquidity expectations here when it comes to

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<v Speaker 4>retail investors in these products.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so one thing is and it's kind of why

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<v Speaker 3>I have such a hard time getting the manager sometimes

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<v Speaker 3>of closed in funds to do what I think is

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<v Speaker 3>to do the right thing. It's like, and if I

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<v Speaker 3>say to them, hey, you should turn this closed in

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<v Speaker 3>fund into an open ended fund.

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<v Speaker 2>And if you're am ninety five.

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<v Speaker 3>Percent of it or open ended products and five or

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<v Speaker 3>ten or are these closed ended products, whether they be

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<v Speaker 3>BDCs or actual closed in funds, why do they fight

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<v Speaker 3>me so hard? The C suite will fight me because

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<v Speaker 3>the value the stock market will ascribe to an ETF

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<v Speaker 3>where in theory you can get your money back tomorrow,

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<v Speaker 3>and a closed in fund where in theory you're locked

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<v Speaker 3>in forever. You know, other than my activism is so different,

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<v Speaker 3>and so the lure, the kind of the drug of

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<v Speaker 3>permanent capital. It sounds so good not even have to

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<v Speaker 3>deal with investors. I mean, Bill Lackman, you know, benefited

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<v Speaker 3>so greatly by this structure where he moved his hedge

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<v Speaker 3>fund to be a closed in fund, because when he

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<v Speaker 3>went through his draw down and he did great, you know,

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<v Speaker 3>since eighteen people couldn't leave, and they left the by

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<v Speaker 3>way of a twenty five to thirty five percent discount,

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<v Speaker 3>which he also stopped up by buying back a quarter

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<v Speaker 3>of the shares, something you don't see fs doing with FSK.

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<v Speaker 3>So the thing is the reason you ask about the disclosures.

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<v Speaker 3>It's kind of on the one hand, the sales commissions

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<v Speaker 3>were so large to draw people to want to sell

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<v Speaker 3>it the private wealth, and that, you know, that I

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<v Speaker 3>think is a scandal. I think it'd be nice if

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<v Speaker 3>the clients know, expost, what their trusted advisor was paid

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<v Speaker 3>for putting them into this thing. My grandmother used to

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<v Speaker 3>call drek. I don't know if that is a technical term,

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<v Speaker 3>but if anyone understands Yiddish, they know what I mean.

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<v Speaker 3>And so there are gonna be those questions how much

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<v Speaker 3>were you paid? What were you paid?

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<v Speaker 1>Oh?

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<v Speaker 3>You know, and so that's interesting. And then the second

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<v Speaker 3>part of it, you know, is that maybe there was

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<v Speaker 3>some like benign you know, ignorance, but really the seeds

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<v Speaker 3>of the destruction of these products are really rooted in

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<v Speaker 3>the desire for the manager to raise retail money, but

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<v Speaker 3>having to do it in this way where retail says,

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<v Speaker 3>am I gonna be able to get my money back?

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<v Speaker 3>And you offer these clauses in these terms to bring

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<v Speaker 3>them in because you want that permanent capital. Turns out

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<v Speaker 3>it's not so permanent. And by the way, it's not

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<v Speaker 3>so permanent because because it's a forty C product, the

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<v Speaker 3>board could be replaced and they could fire the manager,

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<v Speaker 3>just like just as we've done in closed infunds.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, this is what I was going to say. Like

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<v Speaker 1>when I first started writing about your Tilted Blue al,

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<v Speaker 1>I got emails being like, he's gonna take over of

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<v Speaker 1>the fund, replace the manager, get the fees. I feel

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<v Speaker 1>like with a five percent tender, that's not like top

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<v Speaker 1>of mind. But are you is that like a possibility

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<v Speaker 1>for some.

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<v Speaker 3>Of these drawing from the lessons of closed in funds

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<v Speaker 3>in the same way that retail was in some cases

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<v Speaker 3>sheepish enough to buy what was sold to them. You know,

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<v Speaker 3>they didn't call their broker. As I've already said in

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<v Speaker 3>a prior podcast, a famous president of a very large

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<v Speaker 3>fund said these products are sold, not bought. They didn't

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<v Speaker 3>call their broker to say, get me the latest interval fund,

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<v Speaker 3>as if they even know what that nomenclature means. They

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<v Speaker 3>were told this, you know you want yield, you're seventy

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<v Speaker 3>three years old. This is going to give you a

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<v Speaker 3>nice yeld, great manager. So they often will will even

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<v Speaker 3>vote in a way that harms themselves, as bpr E

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<v Speaker 3>just did in December. It just became a stock and

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<v Speaker 3>they went from being able to get at NAV to

0:10:32.600 --> 0:10:36.520
<v Speaker 3>now nursing a live thirty percent loss extra loss. So

0:10:37.080 --> 0:10:39.760
<v Speaker 3>in order to actually take one of these over, you're

0:10:39.760 --> 0:10:43.120
<v Speaker 3>going to have the manager tell the clients you shouldn't

0:10:43.160 --> 0:10:45.360
<v Speaker 3>listen to them, and a lot of them are actually

0:10:45.440 --> 0:10:50.280
<v Speaker 3>going to not listen to the activist. But imagine this, Matt. Okay,

0:10:50.840 --> 0:10:54.160
<v Speaker 3>we say we're going to do no fees for a year. Okay,

0:10:54.160 --> 0:10:56.959
<v Speaker 3>how do you like that? Client? And then as long

0:10:57.000 --> 0:11:00.280
<v Speaker 3>as the fund is below a thirty percent disc out

0:11:00.320 --> 0:11:02.360
<v Speaker 3>all cash flow, we will buy it back in the

0:11:02.360 --> 0:11:02.960
<v Speaker 3>open market.

0:11:16.679 --> 0:11:19.720
<v Speaker 1>You really want to talk about publicly listed close unfund activisms,

0:11:19.760 --> 0:11:21.240
<v Speaker 1>but I want to talk about OBDC too.

0:11:21.480 --> 0:11:25.000
<v Speaker 3>Okay, I'm talking about I'll stick with that I was

0:11:25.040 --> 0:11:26.400
<v Speaker 3>not even talking about closed in funds.

0:11:26.440 --> 0:11:27.359
<v Speaker 2>I was talking about.

0:11:27.440 --> 0:11:31.079
<v Speaker 3>Public b dcs. Okay, find that stateless state, right, I

0:11:31.160 --> 0:11:33.440
<v Speaker 3>might be buying some of them. Okay, fine, so let's

0:11:33.440 --> 0:11:37.839
<v Speaker 3>stick You're right the thing we did yeah, so okay,

0:11:37.920 --> 0:11:40.200
<v Speaker 3>So if we tendered and got more and more and

0:11:40.240 --> 0:11:42.040
<v Speaker 3>more and more, the same thing at the same point

0:11:42.040 --> 0:11:42.520
<v Speaker 3>would be made.

0:11:42.760 --> 0:11:43.800
<v Speaker 2>I think in order.

0:11:43.960 --> 0:11:46.559
<v Speaker 1>Make sure if you can think of a private yeah.

0:11:46.679 --> 0:11:48.880
<v Speaker 3>I haven't really looked into it. So this all started

0:11:48.880 --> 0:11:51.560
<v Speaker 3>with let me dip my toe in a space where

0:11:51.600 --> 0:11:53.520
<v Speaker 3>people want to get out and they don't have a

0:11:53.559 --> 0:11:55.360
<v Speaker 3>way of getting out in the pace they want to

0:11:55.640 --> 0:11:57.920
<v Speaker 3>And we'll learn as we go and learn from the

0:11:57.960 --> 0:12:01.439
<v Speaker 3>lessons of closed in funds. So yes, we had two

0:12:01.480 --> 0:12:03.840
<v Speaker 3>of them ready before Blue Owl became a thing. We

0:12:03.920 --> 0:12:07.720
<v Speaker 3>have others ready, and we in the market are super curious,

0:12:07.720 --> 0:12:07.920
<v Speaker 3>are we.

0:12:07.920 --> 0:12:08.839
<v Speaker 2>Actually going to get hit?

0:12:09.559 --> 0:12:10.720
<v Speaker 1>Then you don't know if you're going to be hit.

0:12:10.960 --> 0:12:14.240
<v Speaker 3>It's too early because first it's like this clunky process

0:12:14.240 --> 0:12:16.160
<v Speaker 3>that makes it hard to get it. They have to

0:12:16.160 --> 0:12:18.760
<v Speaker 3>get it mailed to them, and there's a long form

0:12:18.800 --> 0:12:20.280
<v Speaker 3>to fill out, and the thing that arrives in the

0:12:20.280 --> 0:12:22.880
<v Speaker 3>mail is accompanied. It's sent by the manager, and it's

0:12:22.880 --> 0:12:25.240
<v Speaker 3>accompanied by letter from the manager saying don't do we

0:12:25.240 --> 0:12:26.240
<v Speaker 3>don't recommend you do this.

0:12:26.480 --> 0:12:28.240
<v Speaker 1>I thought you had said somewhere that Blue Awl was

0:12:28.240 --> 0:12:30.640
<v Speaker 1>supportive of here, but like, is there some level of

0:12:30.640 --> 0:12:34.000
<v Speaker 1>supportive between like saying you should do this in the

0:12:34.080 --> 0:12:35.959
<v Speaker 1>letter and saying you shouldn't do that? Okay?

0:12:35.960 --> 0:12:38.400
<v Speaker 3>So I'll look, I'm I'm on your podcast. I'm all

0:12:38.400 --> 0:12:41.400
<v Speaker 3>about radical honesty or possible. So when I when I

0:12:41.440 --> 0:12:44.600
<v Speaker 3>say that, so first s Reet has already said to

0:12:44.640 --> 0:12:47.920
<v Speaker 3>their investors, we don't we recommend against okay, And so

0:12:48.000 --> 0:12:50.439
<v Speaker 3>the letter of ours will be accompanied by theirs from

0:12:50.520 --> 0:12:52.080
<v Speaker 3>them saying don't you know we don't think you should

0:12:52.120 --> 0:12:52.280
<v Speaker 3>do this?

0:12:52.559 --> 0:12:53.720
<v Speaker 2>What did I mean with Blue Owl?

0:12:53.800 --> 0:12:57.440
<v Speaker 3>I know two of the founders pretty well, and and

0:12:57.480 --> 0:12:59.440
<v Speaker 3>so when I did this, I happen to have written

0:12:59.440 --> 0:13:01.160
<v Speaker 3>to them to say hate. By the way, as I

0:13:01.160 --> 0:13:03.240
<v Speaker 3>go into this, I don't have an activist angle. I'm

0:13:03.240 --> 0:13:05.320
<v Speaker 3>just here to provide a bid, and they wrote me

0:13:05.520 --> 0:13:07.080
<v Speaker 3>you know I'm not giving away states herecause I'm only

0:13:07.120 --> 0:13:09.720
<v Speaker 3>singing back saying, you know, let's continue to have a dialogue.

0:13:10.000 --> 0:13:11.960
<v Speaker 3>You know, we like each other this and that, and

0:13:12.000 --> 0:13:14.440
<v Speaker 3>so like I didn't get any hate or any anger

0:13:14.520 --> 0:13:16.480
<v Speaker 3>or anything like that, and so that was that was

0:13:16.559 --> 0:13:19.240
<v Speaker 3>my take. Now, as far as I know, they have

0:13:19.360 --> 0:13:21.040
<v Speaker 3>not commented on whether.

0:13:20.960 --> 0:13:24.280
<v Speaker 1>They can't really recommend, so they could stay silent live

0:13:24.720 --> 0:13:26.880
<v Speaker 1>if they're marking it at one hundred right.

0:13:27.280 --> 0:13:29.240
<v Speaker 3>Well, I think someone could say, while we think the

0:13:29.280 --> 0:13:31.959
<v Speaker 3>portfolio is really attractive, we understand the liquidity needs of

0:13:32.000 --> 0:13:34.240
<v Speaker 3>the clients may require for them to find a way

0:13:34.280 --> 0:13:37.040
<v Speaker 3>to sell. You know, I think there's many ways to

0:13:37.080 --> 0:13:39.120
<v Speaker 3>say you like something or you don't like something, and

0:13:39.320 --> 0:13:41.240
<v Speaker 3>I think there is a world where they could be

0:13:41.280 --> 0:13:42.959
<v Speaker 3>more neutral than Star War was.

0:13:43.000 --> 0:13:43.839
<v Speaker 2>But we'll see what they say.

0:13:43.840 --> 0:13:44.280
<v Speaker 1>I don't know.

0:13:44.600 --> 0:13:47.679
<v Speaker 4>I am curious what you make of the marks when

0:13:47.720 --> 0:13:49.760
<v Speaker 4>it comes to some of these blue offhons that you're

0:13:49.760 --> 0:13:53.040
<v Speaker 4>tendering for, because the fact that you're going through with

0:13:53.080 --> 0:13:55.079
<v Speaker 4>this trader you would like to execute it. I mean,

0:13:55.120 --> 0:13:58.240
<v Speaker 4>does that imply that you know, you think that the

0:13:58.360 --> 0:14:02.720
<v Speaker 4>naves are accurate or to just maybe there's somewhere between,

0:14:02.840 --> 0:14:05.840
<v Speaker 4>you know, a sixty five percent discount and one hundred percent.

0:14:06.800 --> 0:14:11.320
<v Speaker 3>I actually don't think we bid conservatively. I was was

0:14:11.360 --> 0:14:13.240
<v Speaker 3>somewhere in New York last few year.

0:14:13.280 --> 0:14:15.000
<v Speaker 1>You were initially announced it was twenty to thirty five,

0:14:15.040 --> 0:14:16.440
<v Speaker 1>and then you're bid down thirty five.

0:14:16.520 --> 0:14:19.960
<v Speaker 3>Well twenty little yeah, well I was capturing Starwood in

0:14:20.000 --> 0:14:22.880
<v Speaker 3>there too, but because Starwd, I think we bid twenty seven.

0:14:23.120 --> 0:14:23.400
<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

0:14:23.680 --> 0:14:26.880
<v Speaker 2>So I ran into somebody who said you're gonna get

0:14:26.920 --> 0:14:27.480
<v Speaker 2>hit on all of it.

0:14:27.560 --> 0:14:29.960
<v Speaker 3>You didn't bid low enough because and he's like, you're

0:14:30.000 --> 0:14:32.280
<v Speaker 3>focused on NEV, but you should be focused on GAV

0:14:32.320 --> 0:14:34.280
<v Speaker 3>And you know it's really looking at like the gross assets.

0:14:34.400 --> 0:14:36.480
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you were saying this before. I think we were

0:14:36.680 --> 0:14:39.720
<v Speaker 1>filming that a thirty five discount is not what it

0:14:39.720 --> 0:14:41.920
<v Speaker 1>sounds like because these are levered funtons, right, you want

0:14:41.920 --> 0:14:42.680
<v Speaker 1>to just sure.

0:14:42.760 --> 0:14:45.560
<v Speaker 3>So some funds are very levered. Some areo point seventy

0:14:45.560 --> 0:14:48.040
<v Speaker 3>five leverage, some are one point five levered. That means

0:14:48.280 --> 0:14:50.640
<v Speaker 3>leverage on top of you know, a dollar of stuff

0:14:50.640 --> 0:14:52.600
<v Speaker 3>for the dollar that was given. So let's just say

0:14:52.640 --> 0:14:54.720
<v Speaker 3>it was, you know, a turn of leverage. If you

0:14:54.720 --> 0:14:56.920
<v Speaker 3>buy saying a minus thirty, it's like you're buying each

0:14:56.960 --> 0:14:59.840
<v Speaker 3>loan fifteen points below, not thirty points below. But then

0:15:00.120 --> 0:15:03.720
<v Speaker 3>to your question, you have the fees, and some of

0:15:03.720 --> 0:15:06.040
<v Speaker 3>them earn fees on like what's distributed so they could

0:15:06.040 --> 0:15:08.920
<v Speaker 3>somehow even with all these price declines, still earn still

0:15:08.920 --> 0:15:11.320
<v Speaker 3>earn fees. Some of them have high water marks that

0:15:11.360 --> 0:15:14.840
<v Speaker 3>don't have catchups, some do, but there's the management fee

0:15:14.840 --> 0:15:16.480
<v Speaker 3>that comes out of it. I think it's safe to

0:15:16.480 --> 0:15:18.800
<v Speaker 3>say that we don't think that there's a lot of

0:15:18.800 --> 0:15:21.440
<v Speaker 3>manager alpha these days in that space. So like those

0:15:21.440 --> 0:15:24.080
<v Speaker 3>fees are going to be eaten away. Those are not

0:15:24.240 --> 0:15:27.560
<v Speaker 3>like for their brilliance. And then you have on top

0:15:27.600 --> 0:15:29.880
<v Speaker 3>of it, you have a knave that everyone knows is

0:15:29.920 --> 0:15:32.320
<v Speaker 3>too high. Okay, so let's leave aside. Where does Blue

0:15:32.360 --> 0:15:34.840
<v Speaker 3>Oil rank in that continuum? But I think I think

0:15:34.880 --> 0:15:37.760
<v Speaker 3>I Apollo is the firm that I follow, and Blackstone

0:15:37.800 --> 0:15:40.840
<v Speaker 3>the firms that I have incredible respect for. Blackstone also

0:15:40.920 --> 0:15:44.160
<v Speaker 3>recently for how they treated their redeeming shareholders, and I

0:15:44.200 --> 0:15:46.640
<v Speaker 3>have some a bunch of new counter examples, and Apollo,

0:15:46.800 --> 0:15:49.080
<v Speaker 3>I think is considered the most conservative on the marks.

0:15:49.280 --> 0:15:51.040
<v Speaker 3>But the marks are falling as we speak.

0:15:51.280 --> 0:15:51.920
<v Speaker 2>So if you have.

0:15:52.040 --> 0:15:54.400
<v Speaker 3>Naves that are too high across the board, even if

0:15:54.400 --> 0:15:57.920
<v Speaker 3>they're more than too high at certain places, you also

0:15:57.960 --> 0:16:00.200
<v Speaker 3>have to take that out of the discount. So what

0:16:00.280 --> 0:16:02.320
<v Speaker 3>is appeeling? Okay, So now that I've like said, what's

0:16:02.360 --> 0:16:04.040
<v Speaker 3>really bad about it? You know, okay, you start with

0:16:04.160 --> 0:16:06.480
<v Speaker 3>you have fifteen, and then it's after fees thirteen and

0:16:06.520 --> 0:16:09.520
<v Speaker 3>then you have the markdown is that at least those

0:16:09.560 --> 0:16:12.000
<v Speaker 3>funds do have the ability to get back five percent

0:16:12.040 --> 0:16:14.920
<v Speaker 3>per quarter. So if they if they have only fifteen

0:16:14.960 --> 0:16:16.960
<v Speaker 3>redeem you're going to get back a thirty your money

0:16:17.080 --> 0:16:20.040
<v Speaker 3>in a quarter. But the way it's going, it was one,

0:16:20.120 --> 0:16:22.800
<v Speaker 3>then it was four. Now Cliff order is fourteen. Boy,

0:16:23.000 --> 0:16:25.080
<v Speaker 3>you know, someone should set up a poly market for

0:16:25.120 --> 0:16:28.200
<v Speaker 3>what Cliffworter redemptions are going to be next quarter. And

0:16:28.880 --> 0:16:31.880
<v Speaker 3>we are aware, I'm not sure how much detail it's

0:16:31.880 --> 0:16:34.720
<v Speaker 3>worthwhile going into in this podcast, but we're aware for

0:16:34.800 --> 0:16:39.360
<v Speaker 3>some managers of marks on chunky positions of second lean

0:16:40.600 --> 0:16:43.320
<v Speaker 3>or you know, other things that are not first lean

0:16:43.680 --> 0:16:46.120
<v Speaker 3>that are off by compared not to our model, but

0:16:46.240 --> 0:16:48.760
<v Speaker 3>compared to other funds, how they mark as much as

0:16:48.760 --> 0:16:52.440
<v Speaker 3>twenty five points between the way Jamie Diamond now has

0:16:52.480 --> 0:16:55.600
<v Speaker 3>remarked the portfolio as well as fargo far behind. That

0:16:55.680 --> 0:16:59.200
<v Speaker 3>constrains the manager on their leverage, their ability to leverage

0:17:00.080 --> 0:17:02.560
<v Speaker 3>because of you know, the mark to market for the

0:17:02.960 --> 0:17:06.920
<v Speaker 3>leverage facility. I really think this could be a systemic

0:17:07.480 --> 0:17:08.760
<v Speaker 3>nightmare and in a.

0:17:08.680 --> 0:17:12.040
<v Speaker 1>Sense of how cal constrainting the markdowns are for the

0:17:12.119 --> 0:17:16.480
<v Speaker 1>leverage facilities, Like I gather these places are run at

0:17:16.480 --> 0:17:18.919
<v Speaker 1>like less leverage than they could be and like have

0:17:19.000 --> 0:17:21.560
<v Speaker 1>some headroom there, but maybe that's not true.

0:17:21.680 --> 0:17:23.240
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I think most of them are not near their

0:17:23.359 --> 0:17:25.639
<v Speaker 3>leverage caps, so you would need a decent decline. But

0:17:25.720 --> 0:17:28.000
<v Speaker 3>also just you can see the banks even just pulling back,

0:17:28.040 --> 0:17:30.639
<v Speaker 3>and you know, why should they continue to land at

0:17:30.680 --> 0:17:33.479
<v Speaker 3>the same levels or the same terms, you know, just

0:17:33.480 --> 0:17:36.160
<v Speaker 3>like you saw in Wait where prime brokers pulled back.

0:17:36.240 --> 0:17:38.359
<v Speaker 3>So you're probably right about that. But at the end

0:17:38.400 --> 0:17:40.359
<v Speaker 3>of all that, so then why did we did because

0:17:40.359 --> 0:17:43.200
<v Speaker 3>it was a place to start. We are short at

0:17:43.400 --> 0:17:47.119
<v Speaker 3>you know, public debt at what I terms really optimistic levels,

0:17:47.119 --> 0:17:49.480
<v Speaker 3>so buying it at down thirty five, even with these adjustments,

0:17:49.920 --> 0:17:51.760
<v Speaker 3>it's probably going to be an okay investment.

0:17:52.000 --> 0:17:53.960
<v Speaker 1>You say you're short public debt, like what like like

0:17:54.680 --> 0:17:57.640
<v Speaker 1>like a match like how you'll debt against getting along

0:17:57.680 --> 0:17:59.840
<v Speaker 1>this stuff? Or like is it I'm missing something like?

0:18:00.040 --> 0:18:02.800
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, A huge part of our capital is to provide

0:18:02.800 --> 0:18:06.760
<v Speaker 3>investors tail protection, and so we our domain expertise is

0:18:06.840 --> 0:18:10.880
<v Speaker 3>credit derivatives, and so the liquidity in higheld credit ratives

0:18:10.880 --> 0:18:12.600
<v Speaker 3>as such where you can put on tens of billions,

0:18:12.640 --> 0:18:14.639
<v Speaker 3>and and so I have that as a short. In

0:18:14.680 --> 0:18:17.520
<v Speaker 3>some sense, this a discount fits as a long because

0:18:17.560 --> 0:18:20.400
<v Speaker 3>if we're right, and if these buys at minus twenty

0:18:20.440 --> 0:18:22.840
<v Speaker 3>seven or minus thirty five are bad buys, you know,

0:18:22.920 --> 0:18:25.439
<v Speaker 3>look out below, and I point you to when the

0:18:25.440 --> 0:18:28.280
<v Speaker 3>cliff Water news came out. Since that minute, say, high

0:18:28.320 --> 0:18:29.960
<v Speaker 3>yield has been suffering compared.

0:18:29.640 --> 0:18:31.240
<v Speaker 1>To Yeah, as you say, you said, look out below,

0:18:31.320 --> 0:18:34.480
<v Speaker 1>Like is there like a scenario where like the stuff

0:18:34.560 --> 0:18:37.760
<v Speaker 1>you can be short in high yield totally diverges from

0:18:37.800 --> 0:18:39.480
<v Speaker 1>like PDC software loans.

0:18:39.560 --> 0:18:41.880
<v Speaker 3>You're bringing up a good point about basis risk, right,

0:18:41.920 --> 0:18:44.639
<v Speaker 3>This is not a match trade. And the average company

0:18:44.640 --> 0:18:46.520
<v Speaker 3>in the HEILED index is quite a bit bigger and

0:18:46.640 --> 0:18:50.560
<v Speaker 3>even better than a private credit portfolio. So leave it

0:18:50.600 --> 0:18:53.320
<v Speaker 3>to the ingenuity of Goldman Sachs. Now they're pitching total

0:18:53.359 --> 0:18:55.560
<v Speaker 3>return swaps on private credit portfolios.

0:18:55.640 --> 0:18:56.960
<v Speaker 2>People want more of a one to one.

0:18:57.320 --> 0:18:58.679
<v Speaker 1>Are the pitching to you?

0:18:58.680 --> 0:19:01.640
<v Speaker 2>No, to everyone, Yeah, but you might need it.

0:19:01.880 --> 0:19:06.640
<v Speaker 3>But also you know, as I saw in COVID, sometimes

0:19:07.000 --> 0:19:10.200
<v Speaker 3>people who can't sell the thing they can't sell will

0:19:10.200 --> 0:19:12.600
<v Speaker 3>sell what they can sell, and and so private credit

0:19:12.960 --> 0:19:15.159
<v Speaker 3>can certainly infect public credit. And when I say what

0:19:15.200 --> 0:19:17.520
<v Speaker 3>I saw on COVID, and I often say, like, my

0:19:17.560 --> 0:19:20.560
<v Speaker 3>imagination and the markets is not great enough. First, So

0:19:20.600 --> 0:19:23.320
<v Speaker 3>I don't think people's imagination here is great enough because

0:19:23.359 --> 0:19:24.959
<v Speaker 3>so many people think we're going to buy none.

0:19:25.200 --> 0:19:26.800
<v Speaker 1>I think when you say, like people think you're gonna

0:19:26.800 --> 0:19:28.480
<v Speaker 1>buy none, like it's really it's like such a classic

0:19:28.560 --> 0:19:31.080
<v Speaker 1>like market maker adverse election question, like you're either going

0:19:31.160 --> 0:19:33.760
<v Speaker 1>to buy none or you're gonna get filled, and you're

0:19:33.760 --> 0:19:36.440
<v Speaker 1>gonna probably immediately regret getting.

0:19:36.160 --> 0:19:39.920
<v Speaker 3>Filled, probably if we get filled and oversubscribed or next

0:19:39.960 --> 0:19:43.040
<v Speaker 3>bid is you know, decidedly lower. I've never been in

0:19:43.080 --> 0:19:46.680
<v Speaker 3>a spot where like that information, that alternative data set,

0:19:46.680 --> 0:19:48.600
<v Speaker 3>if you will, is so desired by the market because

0:19:48.600 --> 0:19:50.560
<v Speaker 3>it's actually I'd be curious about a poly market on

0:19:50.600 --> 0:19:50.960
<v Speaker 3>that too.

0:19:51.960 --> 0:19:53.520
<v Speaker 1>Will all learn something if you get filled?

0:19:53.600 --> 0:19:55.040
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and it's not till April, by the way.

0:19:55.400 --> 0:19:58.480
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, but like if we get filled, I mean there's

0:19:58.480 --> 0:20:00.440
<v Speaker 3>a lot of people that think we're going to get so,

0:20:00.480 --> 0:20:02.400
<v Speaker 3>as you said, so what does it mean, I don't

0:20:02.400 --> 0:20:03.560
<v Speaker 3>even necessarily.

0:20:03.040 --> 0:20:05.879
<v Speaker 1>I think my instinct is you get not because because

0:20:05.880 --> 0:20:07.800
<v Speaker 1>of like the experience, and this is now a long

0:20:07.800 --> 0:20:10.159
<v Speaker 1>time ago, but they traged to convert OBDC two to

0:20:10.200 --> 0:20:13.080
<v Speaker 1>a public BDC, which was like the public BDC was

0:20:13.080 --> 0:20:17.640
<v Speaker 1>trading like down twenty twenty percent something, and the shoulders revolted.

0:20:17.720 --> 0:20:21.080
<v Speaker 1>So I extrapolate from that to like, the shoulders certainly

0:20:21.119 --> 0:20:23.199
<v Speaker 1>don't want to sell to you down thirty five percent.

0:20:23.280 --> 0:20:25.160
<v Speaker 1>But that was months ago, and.

0:20:25.280 --> 0:20:27.719
<v Speaker 3>That was months ago, and I think the difference is

0:20:28.280 --> 0:20:31.680
<v Speaker 3>the collective will of those shareholders versus the individual action,

0:20:32.040 --> 0:20:34.240
<v Speaker 3>because again, you know, you couldn't.

0:20:33.920 --> 0:20:35.439
<v Speaker 1>Get fifty percent to vote for it, but can they

0:20:35.480 --> 0:20:36.800
<v Speaker 1>get ten percent to sell to you?

0:20:37.080 --> 0:20:40.080
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, Like there are gonna be some people that actually

0:20:40.119 --> 0:20:42.639
<v Speaker 3>think our bid is high and will sell to us,

0:20:42.680 --> 0:20:44.800
<v Speaker 3>and there are some people that think that they actually

0:20:44.880 --> 0:20:47.160
<v Speaker 3>really need the money or they're afraid of marks coming

0:20:47.200 --> 0:20:51.119
<v Speaker 3>down or getting gated worse. So I would say, I

0:20:51.119 --> 0:20:53.200
<v Speaker 3>don't know, like I don't know, like you you know, I'm.

0:20:53.119 --> 0:20:53.639
<v Speaker 2>Going to wait.

0:20:53.920 --> 0:20:55.679
<v Speaker 3>Also, the form in which it occurs, it makes it

0:20:55.720 --> 0:20:57.920
<v Speaker 3>hard to get filled. But I'd be surprised we didn't

0:20:57.960 --> 0:20:58.119
<v Speaker 3>get some.

0:21:12.720 --> 0:21:14.600
<v Speaker 4>I'm curious. I mean, this is something that we were

0:21:14.640 --> 0:21:17.000
<v Speaker 4>talking about, and that makes the good point. We're all

0:21:17.040 --> 0:21:18.600
<v Speaker 4>going to learn a lot if you do get filled.

0:21:18.880 --> 0:21:21.520
<v Speaker 4>But is this the cleanest trade that you could have

0:21:21.560 --> 0:21:23.960
<v Speaker 4>put on, because you know, you mentioned that your short

0:21:24.000 --> 0:21:27.119
<v Speaker 4>public credit, You've said elsewhere that you know your long

0:21:27.160 --> 0:21:31.280
<v Speaker 4>blue oul stock. It's a clunky process. It involves mail.

0:21:31.400 --> 0:21:34.679
<v Speaker 4>There's scary letters being tossed about, and this isn't happening

0:21:34.800 --> 0:21:37.520
<v Speaker 4>until April. So would there have been a cleaner, more

0:21:37.560 --> 0:21:41.920
<v Speaker 4>efficient way to sort of go about this trade? Why specifically?

0:21:42.000 --> 0:21:42.280
<v Speaker 4>Like this?

0:21:42.640 --> 0:21:42.840
<v Speaker 2>Right?

0:21:43.040 --> 0:21:44.760
<v Speaker 3>So what you could do is just try to buy

0:21:44.800 --> 0:21:48.000
<v Speaker 3>individual loans that you like because they're for sale. The

0:21:48.040 --> 0:21:51.479
<v Speaker 3>thing is that kind of secondary market for loans. In

0:21:51.480 --> 0:21:55.480
<v Speaker 3>some sense, it's very competitive because the loans that they're

0:21:55.520 --> 0:21:57.240
<v Speaker 3>going to be willing to sell to you at eighty

0:21:57.280 --> 0:21:59.639
<v Speaker 3>eight instead of ninety eight maybe are not the ones

0:21:59.720 --> 0:22:02.000
<v Speaker 3>you know. So first it doesn't play to our strength

0:22:02.000 --> 0:22:05.240
<v Speaker 3>as like we're not a deep distressed shop. And you know,

0:22:05.280 --> 0:22:07.639
<v Speaker 3>it's better than buying a thing at eighty eight that

0:22:07.680 --> 0:22:09.639
<v Speaker 3>someone wants to sell to you at eighty eight and

0:22:09.680 --> 0:22:11.679
<v Speaker 3>out of their whole portfolio is buying the whole thing

0:22:11.680 --> 0:22:15.560
<v Speaker 3>at sixty five and probably so I think it is

0:22:16.000 --> 0:22:18.840
<v Speaker 3>pretty clean if we get it. The mess is in

0:22:18.880 --> 0:22:20.720
<v Speaker 3>doing something new for the first time. This will be

0:22:20.760 --> 0:22:23.560
<v Speaker 3>really the first time this has happened, and operationally it's

0:22:23.680 --> 0:22:26.000
<v Speaker 3>you know, you're writing thousands of tickets. They're pretty some

0:22:26.040 --> 0:22:28.359
<v Speaker 3>of them are really small size. If it happens, so

0:22:28.720 --> 0:22:30.879
<v Speaker 3>I think the danger, as we're early, we're going to

0:22:30.960 --> 0:22:32.600
<v Speaker 3>lose money on this first trade.

0:22:32.240 --> 0:22:33.720
<v Speaker 1>If you get it, Like, how do you get out

0:22:33.720 --> 0:22:35.480
<v Speaker 1>of the trade. Is it like you put in your

0:22:35.480 --> 0:22:38.320
<v Speaker 1>five percent every quarter or is it like you like

0:22:39.200 --> 0:22:41.000
<v Speaker 1>call them up and cut a deal. Or is it

0:22:41.080 --> 0:22:43.760
<v Speaker 1>you just hold it until twenty years or.

0:22:44.040 --> 0:22:46.560
<v Speaker 3>I will be in line like everyone else and I

0:22:46.560 --> 0:22:48.560
<v Speaker 3>will get my five percent a quarter.

0:22:49.240 --> 0:22:52.920
<v Speaker 1>Which do you do that? Because like clearly you think

0:22:53.000 --> 0:22:58.760
<v Speaker 1>value is somewhere between fifty five and one hundred ninety five.

0:22:58.880 --> 0:22:59.159
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. No.

0:22:59.200 --> 0:23:01.480
<v Speaker 3>By the way, one thing I learned my first year

0:23:01.520 --> 0:23:04.000
<v Speaker 3>at Goldman Sachs as a summer intern is because I

0:23:04.000 --> 0:23:05.520
<v Speaker 3>didn't know much, I knew that like, if you have

0:23:05.560 --> 0:23:07.800
<v Speaker 3>a coupon of eight out of par and the price

0:23:07.840 --> 0:23:09.560
<v Speaker 3>goes down, the eight goes up, your yield goes up.

0:23:09.640 --> 0:23:11.960
<v Speaker 3>So now let's think about it in the context of

0:23:11.960 --> 0:23:14.680
<v Speaker 3>this fund. Your yield instead of you know, getting seven

0:23:14.760 --> 0:23:18.080
<v Speaker 3>percent at one hundred, you know, you're getting eleven percent,

0:23:18.480 --> 0:23:20.280
<v Speaker 3>you know, or ten and a half percent at sixty five.

0:23:20.359 --> 0:23:23.479
<v Speaker 3>Your checks from Blue Awl you're getting you Yeah, you're

0:23:23.480 --> 0:23:26.639
<v Speaker 3>getting an enhanced coopon. Let's hope the nabs don't come

0:23:26.640 --> 0:23:29.120
<v Speaker 3>down so quickly that you have, you know, principal losses.

0:23:29.480 --> 0:23:31.760
<v Speaker 1>So there are people. There are dentists who are running

0:23:31.800 --> 0:23:33.479
<v Speaker 1>it out who are very parish on this. There are

0:23:33.520 --> 0:23:37.639
<v Speaker 1>you who are a bitter at sixty five but like

0:23:38.080 --> 0:23:41.040
<v Speaker 1>sound pretty bearish on like broadly speaking, the portfolios of

0:23:41.080 --> 0:23:43.280
<v Speaker 1>private credit. And then there's the people who run these

0:23:43.320 --> 0:23:46.920
<v Speaker 1>funds who say they're pretty bullish and that this is

0:23:46.960 --> 0:23:50.320
<v Speaker 1>all over blown and they're still getting institutional inflos and

0:23:50.400 --> 0:23:53.680
<v Speaker 1>everything's marked at par and whatever I have written. If

0:23:53.720 --> 0:23:57.879
<v Speaker 1>I were running like say Blackstone, and I were putting

0:23:57.880 --> 0:24:00.000
<v Speaker 1>in my own money to cash people out when they're

0:24:00.080 --> 0:24:04.000
<v Speaker 1>asking to redeem, I would be pretty annoyed that I

0:24:04.040 --> 0:24:07.399
<v Speaker 1>was doing it at par and not at eighty or ninety.

0:24:08.400 --> 0:24:10.760
<v Speaker 1>You are offering it sixty five, and like black Son

0:24:10.840 --> 0:24:12.919
<v Speaker 1>can't really do that because like they have forty eight

0:24:13.040 --> 0:24:15.959
<v Speaker 1>obligations and like it's a marketing disaster. But like I

0:24:16.000 --> 0:24:17.840
<v Speaker 1>was thinking, there should be like a round robin where

0:24:17.880 --> 0:24:21.120
<v Speaker 1>like Black cent is bidding eighty for like hps's loans,

0:24:21.119 --> 0:24:23.840
<v Speaker 1>and HPS is bidding eighty for like Blue Owls loans,

0:24:23.840 --> 0:24:26.720
<v Speaker 1>and everyone's bidding eighty for each other's loans because, like you,

0:24:26.880 --> 0:24:29.040
<v Speaker 1>the publicly traded BDC's really closed one funds, right, which

0:24:29.080 --> 0:24:31.040
<v Speaker 1>is like trading like eighty. You can you can go

0:24:31.080 --> 0:24:33.000
<v Speaker 1>to a tender if you want, right, But like then

0:24:33.040 --> 0:24:35.760
<v Speaker 1>you have these private funds where you could you are

0:24:35.760 --> 0:24:37.639
<v Speaker 1>doing a tender at sixty five and you may get filled.

0:24:37.680 --> 0:24:41.920
<v Speaker 1>Like why aren't the managers trying to buy back their

0:24:41.920 --> 0:24:46.119
<v Speaker 1>own stuff at sixty five when they think it's worth

0:24:46.160 --> 0:24:46.679
<v Speaker 1>one hundred?

0:24:46.880 --> 0:24:50.679
<v Speaker 3>So without trying to flatter the interlocutor, I read what

0:24:50.720 --> 0:24:53.040
<v Speaker 3>you said, and I thought that was so interesting. Why

0:24:53.040 --> 0:24:54.960
<v Speaker 3>don't they just each buy their own stuff at eighty

0:24:55.000 --> 0:24:57.199
<v Speaker 3>if I'm paying sixty five? Here's the problem with it.

0:24:57.600 --> 0:25:00.240
<v Speaker 3>This is the irony of it to pay eighty when

0:25:00.280 --> 0:25:03.240
<v Speaker 3>their own BDCs are at sixty only makes sense if

0:25:03.280 --> 0:25:06.120
<v Speaker 3>they're going to redeem. Why does eighty make sense? Eighty

0:25:06.160 --> 0:25:08.360
<v Speaker 3>makes sense only if you can get back one hundred

0:25:08.560 --> 0:25:10.560
<v Speaker 3>sooner why would you not want to buy more more

0:25:10.640 --> 0:25:13.000
<v Speaker 3>or less the same portfolio at sixty People are selling

0:25:13.119 --> 0:25:16.840
<v Speaker 3>FSK at forty eight percent today, why not buy that back?

0:25:17.200 --> 0:25:19.280
<v Speaker 1>You're saying you should buy its public BDC.

0:25:19.480 --> 0:25:21.919
<v Speaker 3>That's yeah, you don't know, because the public BDC doesn't

0:25:21.920 --> 0:25:25.080
<v Speaker 3>have the five percent a quarter put. So so if

0:25:25.080 --> 0:25:27.040
<v Speaker 3>someone's going to pay eighty, they're going to pay eighty.

0:25:27.200 --> 0:25:29.600
<v Speaker 3>The whole basis of it is so you can redeem.

0:25:29.720 --> 0:25:31.919
<v Speaker 3>Manager A is going to redeem from manager being manager

0:25:31.960 --> 0:25:34.639
<v Speaker 3>be it and redeem from manager A. Well, okay, but

0:25:34.840 --> 0:25:37.360
<v Speaker 3>so maybe that's a good trade in some ways, it's

0:25:37.359 --> 0:25:40.439
<v Speaker 3>almost scary like then, it's just they don't even believe

0:25:40.480 --> 0:25:42.359
<v Speaker 3>in the in the value of it. They believe in

0:25:42.800 --> 0:25:45.280
<v Speaker 3>the structure giving the five percent a quarter, and that

0:25:45.280 --> 0:25:47.879
<v Speaker 3>would be much less bullish signal. But yes, if they

0:25:47.880 --> 0:25:49.440
<v Speaker 3>did that, they would they would have a higher bid

0:25:49.480 --> 0:25:52.840
<v Speaker 3>than me. They also have their their GP stakes to

0:25:53.040 --> 0:25:55.680
<v Speaker 3>justify you know, overpaying if you will. But I think

0:25:55.680 --> 0:25:58.879
<v Speaker 3>when you see all these BDCs at really big discounts

0:25:59.040 --> 0:26:02.600
<v Speaker 3>public BDCs, it's really hard to justify private BDCs at

0:26:02.640 --> 0:26:04.719
<v Speaker 3>much smaller discounts. And that's what you're talking about here.

0:26:04.800 --> 0:26:06.040
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I thinks that's right.

0:26:06.359 --> 0:26:08.600
<v Speaker 4>When it comes to this show. I also wanted to

0:26:08.600 --> 0:26:11.560
<v Speaker 4>ask in both the example of Blue Al and with Starwood,

0:26:11.600 --> 0:26:14.840
<v Speaker 4>you partnered with Cox. I believe I had never heard

0:26:14.880 --> 0:26:17.320
<v Speaker 4>of them. They're based in Philly, they were founded in

0:26:17.359 --> 0:26:21.800
<v Speaker 4>twenty twenty. Why go the partnership route? How did that

0:26:22.040 --> 0:26:22.680
<v Speaker 4>come together?

0:26:22.920 --> 0:26:23.000
<v Speaker 1>Like?

0:26:23.280 --> 0:26:25.800
<v Speaker 4>Did they approach you? Did you approach them? How did

0:26:25.840 --> 0:26:26.280
<v Speaker 4>it happen?

0:26:26.880 --> 0:26:30.560
<v Speaker 3>From just our activity and closed end funds? We developed

0:26:30.680 --> 0:26:34.119
<v Speaker 3>a following of you know, there's people that appreciate what

0:26:34.160 --> 0:26:35.960
<v Speaker 3>we're doing in closed in funds, and John Cox was

0:26:36.000 --> 0:26:38.320
<v Speaker 3>one of them, and so we developed a relationship. And

0:26:38.359 --> 0:26:41.960
<v Speaker 3>he has his expertise with the private BDC market and

0:26:42.000 --> 0:26:44.560
<v Speaker 3>he'd been doing in small size these kinds of transactions,

0:26:44.600 --> 0:26:48.080
<v Speaker 3>and so it's something where we felt since he was

0:26:48.280 --> 0:26:51.760
<v Speaker 3>aware of the flows in that market better certainly way

0:26:51.760 --> 0:26:54.320
<v Speaker 3>better than us, it would be a very nice partnership.

0:26:54.400 --> 0:26:57.520
<v Speaker 3>And that's one also that was forged through through Twitter.

0:26:57.680 --> 0:26:59.600
<v Speaker 3>Like you know, he replied to a message I wrote

0:26:59.600 --> 0:27:02.199
<v Speaker 3>many years ago, and so I actually have to say, like,

0:27:02.600 --> 0:27:04.760
<v Speaker 3>in these last two weeks, I've learned so much about

0:27:04.800 --> 0:27:07.719
<v Speaker 3>private BDCs thanks to people coming out of the woodwork

0:27:07.760 --> 0:27:08.800
<v Speaker 3>to send us their analysis.

0:27:08.880 --> 0:27:10.560
<v Speaker 1>Do you think of private credit? There's like a big

0:27:10.560 --> 0:27:15.080
<v Speaker 1>institutional drawdown fun SMA business, and then there's like the

0:27:15.119 --> 0:27:18.879
<v Speaker 1>sort of retail ish BDC stuff like do you have

0:27:18.920 --> 0:27:22.560
<v Speaker 1>a sense of what the institutional funds take? You're trying

0:27:22.560 --> 0:27:24.720
<v Speaker 1>to do a trade at like a thirty five percent discount?

0:27:24.720 --> 0:27:28.000
<v Speaker 1>Like is there an equivalent mark in like the institutional market,

0:27:28.040 --> 0:27:30.760
<v Speaker 1>Like is there a are there comps in that market?

0:27:31.000 --> 0:27:34.240
<v Speaker 3>Yeah? You might imagine that. Aside from our phone ringing

0:27:34.320 --> 0:27:36.199
<v Speaker 3>from reporters.

0:27:36.119 --> 0:27:38.600
<v Speaker 1>It's from the institutions who want to stakes.

0:27:38.920 --> 0:27:42.600
<v Speaker 3>Institutions that are very curious because they have these same

0:27:42.680 --> 0:27:43.760
<v Speaker 3>kind of positions marked at.

0:27:43.720 --> 0:27:46.200
<v Speaker 1>Par and you'll ask if you'll buy at sixty five?

0:27:46.320 --> 0:27:49.280
<v Speaker 3>No, no, no, they're they're they're like wondering, are we

0:27:49.320 --> 0:27:51.560
<v Speaker 3>going to get hit at sixty five? And if the

0:27:51.560 --> 0:27:54.960
<v Speaker 3>answer is yes, and you're that institution, do you not

0:27:55.400 --> 0:27:57.960
<v Speaker 3>redeem some at one hundred the way you can and

0:27:58.000 --> 0:28:00.639
<v Speaker 3>then go buy this at sixty five? Because again, I

0:28:00.640 --> 0:28:04.199
<v Speaker 3>think there's a huge reflexivity here that you know, and

0:28:04.280 --> 0:28:06.600
<v Speaker 3>even if even if I can't, okay, even if I can't,

0:28:06.600 --> 0:28:09.480
<v Speaker 3>I may get in on little to none. The existence

0:28:09.480 --> 0:28:12.840
<v Speaker 3>of these portfolio is in public BDCs at sixty cents

0:28:12.840 --> 0:28:15.800
<v Speaker 3>in the dollar. Forget about twenty five cents discounts forty

0:28:15.880 --> 0:28:18.440
<v Speaker 3>fifty cent discounts. You know, maybe those are the more extreme,

0:28:18.640 --> 0:28:21.679
<v Speaker 3>but at least thirty percent discounts for really great names

0:28:22.280 --> 0:28:26.480
<v Speaker 3>is a huge stain on the manager's ability with a

0:28:26.520 --> 0:28:29.000
<v Speaker 3>sophisticated investor to get them to buy new things at

0:28:29.000 --> 0:28:31.720
<v Speaker 3>one hundred. And in fact of anything, not a lot

0:28:31.720 --> 0:28:34.760
<v Speaker 3>of these institutions are not really trader, you know, Joe trader,

0:28:34.880 --> 0:28:36.840
<v Speaker 3>like they're going to sell and buy. They are thinking

0:28:36.880 --> 0:28:41.280
<v Speaker 3>about relationships and also long term movements, but it is

0:28:41.320 --> 0:28:46.160
<v Speaker 3>hard to understand why their clients are not well served

0:28:46.320 --> 0:28:49.440
<v Speaker 3>by redeeming a fund at one hundred and buying that

0:28:49.520 --> 0:28:52.480
<v Speaker 3>same manager's fund at seventy. Even for example, I've said

0:28:52.480 --> 0:28:54.840
<v Speaker 3>some great things about Apollo. I've known Jim Zelter since

0:28:54.880 --> 0:28:56.800
<v Speaker 3>I was a kid. He's such a good guy and

0:28:56.840 --> 0:28:58.680
<v Speaker 3>runs credit there and I've learned so much from him.

0:28:58.800 --> 0:29:01.240
<v Speaker 3>But even like an Apollo beat is at a thirty discount.

0:29:01.240 --> 0:29:04.560
<v Speaker 3>So so like that trade of in the in the

0:29:04.680 --> 0:29:07.760
<v Speaker 3>vehicles that allow NAV redemption, like it like a private BDC,

0:29:07.880 --> 0:29:09.920
<v Speaker 3>but lots of other kinds of things how do you

0:29:10.000 --> 0:29:12.720
<v Speaker 3>not in a sense sell manager A at one hundred

0:29:12.800 --> 0:29:13.760
<v Speaker 3>and buy Manager A.

0:29:13.600 --> 0:29:16.720
<v Speaker 1>At seventy because you keep getting that they're continue to

0:29:16.720 --> 0:29:19.360
<v Speaker 1>be institutional inflows like the drop off.

0:29:19.280 --> 0:29:22.680
<v Speaker 3>Of not only that, I'm shocked, Like I keep coming

0:29:22.680 --> 0:29:26.000
<v Speaker 3>back to how beautifully Blackstone has handled this and treated

0:29:26.040 --> 0:29:29.840
<v Speaker 3>their investors. We saw, for example, I believe it's HPS

0:29:30.200 --> 0:29:33.240
<v Speaker 3>which kind of top tick to sale to black Rock

0:29:33.280 --> 0:29:35.280
<v Speaker 3>when you look at the GP stakes of all their

0:29:35.320 --> 0:29:39.000
<v Speaker 3>peers and each lend. So one of their funds had

0:29:39.400 --> 0:29:41.760
<v Speaker 3>a lot of inflows and they had more than five

0:29:41.800 --> 0:29:44.800
<v Speaker 3>percent outflows, and they chose to only pay out five percent,

0:29:45.200 --> 0:29:47.400
<v Speaker 3>but they could have paid out more than five and

0:29:47.440 --> 0:29:50.480
<v Speaker 3>they and they had enough coming in that Like unless

0:29:50.560 --> 0:29:52.720
<v Speaker 3>the logic it's like perverse that you say, well, if

0:29:52.720 --> 0:29:55.440
<v Speaker 3>I pay out more than I'm telling people they should

0:29:55.440 --> 0:29:58.000
<v Speaker 3>redeem more. I don't know if it's game theory, but

0:29:58.120 --> 0:30:00.239
<v Speaker 3>like if I got six percent inflows and I six

0:30:00.320 --> 0:30:02.600
<v Speaker 3>percent outflows, you know, I mean I work in a

0:30:02.600 --> 0:30:04.840
<v Speaker 3>hedge fund. We have investors and want their money back quarterly,

0:30:04.840 --> 0:30:06.520
<v Speaker 3>and we just hand it to them. But this idea

0:30:06.520 --> 0:30:08.040
<v Speaker 3>of like no, I'm going to get you, I'm gonna

0:30:08.040 --> 0:30:11.520
<v Speaker 3>suspend you. I really think the managers that do that stuff,

0:30:11.520 --> 0:30:13.720
<v Speaker 3>and especially the ones that convert to a closed in

0:30:13.800 --> 0:30:17.760
<v Speaker 3>fund like Blue Rock did, they are destroying the value

0:30:17.800 --> 0:30:20.200
<v Speaker 3>of their brand. And if they don't think they are

0:30:20.280 --> 0:30:23.680
<v Speaker 3>because their investors are too unsophisticated to understand it, they

0:30:23.760 --> 0:30:26.600
<v Speaker 3>might be right for a little while. But I am

0:30:26.680 --> 0:30:30.239
<v Speaker 3>surprised that more funds are not acting like Blackstone and

0:30:30.280 --> 0:30:33.320
<v Speaker 3>paying out extra redemptions to say, come on, guys, you

0:30:33.360 --> 0:30:35.560
<v Speaker 3>know we're going to actually treat you really well.

0:30:35.760 --> 0:30:38.880
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, Like I'm sympathetic to like what HPS said is,

0:30:38.920 --> 0:30:44.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, we promised rights, but also like spreads are wide,

0:30:44.640 --> 0:30:46.680
<v Speaker 1>so we're gonna put money to work, right, Like we're

0:30:46.680 --> 0:30:48.800
<v Speaker 1>in the businesses making loans, Like we have inflows to

0:30:48.800 --> 0:30:50.520
<v Speaker 1>make loans, and we're gonna make loans of our inflows.

0:30:50.600 --> 0:30:54.880
<v Speaker 1>And there's a reason that there's a reason there's limited

0:30:54.920 --> 0:30:57.080
<v Speaker 1>liquidity here, which is that like the underlying product has

0:30:57.080 --> 0:30:59.280
<v Speaker 1>limited liquidity, and like we're not gonna just like shut

0:30:59.280 --> 0:31:00.400
<v Speaker 1>down our business money.

0:31:00.400 --> 0:31:02.040
<v Speaker 2>But they wouldn't have had to they had more inflows

0:31:02.080 --> 0:31:02.600
<v Speaker 2>than outflows.

0:31:02.640 --> 0:31:05.560
<v Speaker 1>They could have paid what I believe is they had

0:31:05.600 --> 0:31:09.640
<v Speaker 1>like something like nine percent requested outflows and like they

0:31:09.640 --> 0:31:12.360
<v Speaker 1>had more inflows than the five percent paid that not

0:31:12.520 --> 0:31:13.320
<v Speaker 1>more than the nine percent.

0:31:13.360 --> 0:31:13.560
<v Speaker 2>Busy.

0:31:13.640 --> 0:31:16.719
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, right, so I'm used to funds shrinking and rising.

0:31:16.760 --> 0:31:18.400
<v Speaker 3>I you know, I launched in a very hard time

0:31:18.400 --> 0:31:21.200
<v Speaker 3>in nine went up to five point four billion. We

0:31:21.840 --> 0:31:23.800
<v Speaker 3>we then were as low as one and a quarter billion.

0:31:23.840 --> 0:31:25.880
<v Speaker 3>We paid out every outflow and we didn't We were like,

0:31:25.880 --> 0:31:27.720
<v Speaker 3>here's your money. I hope you come back, but this

0:31:27.960 --> 0:31:30.600
<v Speaker 3>like kind of we only owe you five. Yeah, but

0:31:30.640 --> 0:31:32.520
<v Speaker 3>the manager does have an ability to go to seven,

0:31:33.000 --> 0:31:36.000
<v Speaker 3>and so you could. And when Blackstone had more than seven,

0:31:36.040 --> 0:31:38.680
<v Speaker 3>they actually solved it through this like extreme action of

0:31:38.800 --> 0:31:40.320
<v Speaker 3>paying one hundred. As you know, you were saying, why

0:31:40.320 --> 0:31:42.880
<v Speaker 3>didn't they pay eighty? So you're right, HPS is well

0:31:42.880 --> 0:31:44.680
<v Speaker 3>within its rights to do it, and I think really

0:31:44.720 --> 0:31:47.120
<v Speaker 3>well them as a manager, but I think I would

0:31:47.120 --> 0:31:49.120
<v Speaker 3>have done it differently. And I think these BDCs a

0:31:49.160 --> 0:31:52.080
<v Speaker 3>giant discounts. That's these public bdc That's a whole other

0:31:52.120 --> 0:31:55.320
<v Speaker 3>topic that has some interesting nuance that I'd love to.

0:31:55.200 --> 0:31:56.120
<v Speaker 1>Talk a bit more about it.

0:31:56.320 --> 0:31:59.640
<v Speaker 3>Like, yeah, so I'm not only making the news in

0:31:59.680 --> 0:32:02.160
<v Speaker 3>this blue out thing, but I'm also watching the news

0:32:02.520 --> 0:32:05.600
<v Speaker 3>and I watched this conference call, and you know, FSK

0:32:05.840 --> 0:32:08.920
<v Speaker 3>is run in part by somebody that I think very

0:32:08.920 --> 0:32:11.320
<v Speaker 3>well of and worked well with at Deutsche Bank, Dan

0:32:11.360 --> 0:32:15.280
<v Speaker 3>Peter Zach And I really like Dan. And I don't

0:32:15.320 --> 0:32:17.600
<v Speaker 3>know whose voice was on the call. I like saw

0:32:17.600 --> 0:32:21.160
<v Speaker 3>this on Twitter. But basically, this analyst from another fund

0:32:21.400 --> 0:32:23.400
<v Speaker 3>asked so gently a question where I would you know,

0:32:23.400 --> 0:32:27.080
<v Speaker 3>in my sharp be elbows from closing funds. I would

0:32:27.080 --> 0:32:28.800
<v Speaker 3>have been a little bit less, you know, it would

0:32:28.800 --> 0:32:31.160
<v Speaker 3>have been polite, but like he was super polite. He's like,

0:32:31.720 --> 0:32:34.760
<v Speaker 3>so your fund is trading at a fifty percent discount

0:32:34.760 --> 0:32:35.080
<v Speaker 3>to book.

0:32:35.320 --> 0:32:36.520
<v Speaker 2>I'm going to have paraphrase, you have.

0:32:36.440 --> 0:32:38.200
<v Speaker 3>Some loans that came do that, you got paid your

0:32:38.200 --> 0:32:40.440
<v Speaker 3>money back, you got some coupons in Why do you

0:32:40.440 --> 0:32:43.680
<v Speaker 3>continue to make new investments when you can buy back

0:32:43.720 --> 0:32:46.400
<v Speaker 3>your portfolio at a fifty percent discount. Now, I'm going

0:32:46.480 --> 0:32:49.840
<v Speaker 3>to paraphrase, if the nav is right, that's one hundred

0:32:49.840 --> 0:32:52.640
<v Speaker 3>percent guaranteed return. If the nav is wrong and it's not,

0:32:52.640 --> 0:32:54.760
<v Speaker 3>shouldn't be one hundred, it should be an eighty. It's

0:32:54.760 --> 0:32:57.960
<v Speaker 3>a sixty percent guaranteed return. So any kind of like wow,

0:32:58.000 --> 0:32:59.960
<v Speaker 3>I can make a new loan at five hundred over

0:33:00.040 --> 0:33:02.400
<v Speaker 3>and I can make an eleven percent awesome loan or

0:33:02.440 --> 0:33:06.239
<v Speaker 3>it's thirteen percent awesome loan. So what's really going on

0:33:06.400 --> 0:33:09.080
<v Speaker 3>is you don't want your fund which has a NAV

0:33:09.440 --> 0:33:11.520
<v Speaker 3>of five point six billion but is trading a two

0:33:11.520 --> 0:33:13.560
<v Speaker 3>point eight billion. You don't want that five point six

0:33:13.600 --> 0:33:15.360
<v Speaker 3>to shrink because you're paid fees. By the way, they're

0:33:15.400 --> 0:33:17.760
<v Speaker 3>paid fees on NAV. You know, you invest in these

0:33:17.760 --> 0:33:21.640
<v Speaker 3>funds at this discount, they're paid their fee on basically

0:33:21.640 --> 0:33:24.120
<v Speaker 3>twice the price. You don't want to shrink. And so

0:33:24.480 --> 0:33:26.920
<v Speaker 3>when they don't go into the market and buy back

0:33:26.960 --> 0:33:29.720
<v Speaker 3>shares at a fifty percent discount, which is one hundred

0:33:29.720 --> 0:33:31.720
<v Speaker 3>percent to the upside because they want to make a

0:33:31.720 --> 0:33:34.680
<v Speaker 3>new loan at twelve percent, greed is laid bare.

0:33:35.080 --> 0:33:37.720
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I get that. I feel like the last six

0:33:37.760 --> 0:33:40.320
<v Speaker 1>months until the last two weeks has been a lot

0:33:40.320 --> 0:33:43.680
<v Speaker 1>of talking about like retailizing private credit, and if I

0:33:43.760 --> 0:33:47.840
<v Speaker 1>were a big manager, I might think I want to

0:33:47.920 --> 0:33:53.600
<v Speaker 1>have a big listed retail private credit permanent capital vehicle

0:33:54.320 --> 0:33:57.920
<v Speaker 1>for the long haul to put into four oh one ks,

0:33:58.320 --> 0:34:02.680
<v Speaker 1>to like be my flagship public vehicle and earning one

0:34:02.760 --> 0:34:08.160
<v Speaker 1>hundred percent return by shrinking that down to yeah, is

0:34:08.160 --> 0:34:11.360
<v Speaker 1>short sighted. We're in a we're in a tough optical

0:34:11.400 --> 0:34:15.040
<v Speaker 1>period for retail private credit. But like, if your long

0:34:15.120 --> 0:34:17.880
<v Speaker 1>term vision is you want to have a huge permanent

0:34:17.880 --> 0:34:22.080
<v Speaker 1>retail private credit vehicle, then like buying back shares hand

0:34:22.120 --> 0:34:24.120
<v Speaker 1>over fist is the wrong move. Now I take your

0:34:24.120 --> 0:34:25.719
<v Speaker 1>point that maybe it's the right move because it's like

0:34:25.800 --> 0:34:27.600
<v Speaker 1>cheryld er friendly and well, you know.

0:34:27.800 --> 0:34:30.600
<v Speaker 3>Agreative handover fist doesn't mean buying back one hundred percent

0:34:30.640 --> 0:34:32.879
<v Speaker 3>of the shares. If you said, I'm going to have

0:34:33.400 --> 0:34:35.680
<v Speaker 3>a fee holiday because I'm we're so sorry that your

0:34:35.680 --> 0:34:37.880
<v Speaker 3>stock's gone from you know X to you know point

0:34:37.880 --> 0:34:40.239
<v Speaker 3>four x, we're not going to charge fees for a year,

0:34:40.360 --> 0:34:43.279
<v Speaker 3>and we're going to take all cash flow and buy

0:34:43.280 --> 0:34:45.839
<v Speaker 3>back stock as long as the stock is at least

0:34:45.840 --> 0:34:47.480
<v Speaker 3>a thirty percent discun or we're going to do that

0:34:47.520 --> 0:34:50.480
<v Speaker 3>for a year and at least up to twenty five percent. Okay,

0:34:50.760 --> 0:34:53.320
<v Speaker 3>then they know they have seventy five percent left, Okay,

0:34:53.480 --> 0:34:55.759
<v Speaker 3>But in doing so, they would be raising the NAV

0:34:56.120 --> 0:34:58.520
<v Speaker 3>point by point by point, which would make the discount

0:34:58.520 --> 0:35:00.879
<v Speaker 3>even bigger if the stock didn't go up, okay, because

0:35:00.880 --> 0:35:03.000
<v Speaker 3>the NAV would be going up and so the discount

0:35:03.000 --> 0:35:05.800
<v Speaker 3>would be so they actually for buying back twenty five percent.

0:35:05.800 --> 0:35:09.000
<v Speaker 3>The shares may only shrink in my view ten percent

0:35:09.080 --> 0:35:11.080
<v Speaker 3>fifteen percent, but they would have been a manager that

0:35:11.120 --> 0:35:13.520
<v Speaker 3>did the right thing. They raised the nave up, which

0:35:13.600 --> 0:35:15.319
<v Speaker 3>had raised the price up. So this is where my

0:35:15.480 --> 0:35:18.360
<v Speaker 3>history with closing funds is so useful. I saw my

0:35:18.480 --> 0:35:21.239
<v Speaker 3>friend who runs Newburger Berman do that for a high

0:35:21.280 --> 0:35:24.240
<v Speaker 3>old fund, and that fund, after they did a tender

0:35:24.280 --> 0:35:26.160
<v Speaker 3>with us, which was very hard to get them to do,

0:35:26.760 --> 0:35:30.000
<v Speaker 3>that fund was able to issue equity and all of

0:35:30.040 --> 0:35:31.759
<v Speaker 3>the buybacks they did, they were able to raise even

0:35:31.760 --> 0:35:34.200
<v Speaker 3>more money in the secondary market, issuing at a premium

0:35:34.320 --> 0:35:37.239
<v Speaker 3>a high old fund. And so I think it is

0:35:37.880 --> 0:35:41.680
<v Speaker 3>it's so behooves managers not to pick one name managers

0:35:41.680 --> 0:35:44.360
<v Speaker 3>of BDC's trading at a more than thirty percent discount

0:35:44.719 --> 0:35:47.200
<v Speaker 3>to shrink, to grow their nav but to show their

0:35:47.239 --> 0:36:01.280
<v Speaker 3>shareholders that they care about them.

0:36:01.440 --> 0:36:03.000
<v Speaker 1>What do you think they'll do? We're sort of I

0:36:03.040 --> 0:36:06.200
<v Speaker 1>don't know. Halfway through this quarter is like BBC private

0:36:06.200 --> 0:36:09.279
<v Speaker 1>BDC redemption requests. We have all these stories about public

0:36:09.320 --> 0:36:11.520
<v Speaker 1>BDC's trading at discounts. There's going to be next quarter

0:36:11.680 --> 0:36:13.600
<v Speaker 1>you know who knows, right, Like, how's this going to

0:36:13.640 --> 0:36:15.560
<v Speaker 1>shake out? Is it all going to be you tendering

0:36:15.600 --> 0:36:17.920
<v Speaker 1>for stuff? Or is like someone going to find.

0:36:17.719 --> 0:36:20.320
<v Speaker 3>All me this whole space is like seven hundred billion.

0:36:20.880 --> 0:36:24.239
<v Speaker 3>I think that there isn't uniform everyone on the same

0:36:24.320 --> 0:36:27.520
<v Speaker 3>day votes. So Blackstone maybe because they were the best

0:36:27.520 --> 0:36:29.960
<v Speaker 3>manager were able to give or one of the best managers,

0:36:30.000 --> 0:36:32.000
<v Speaker 3>were able to give their investors the least amount of time,

0:36:32.280 --> 0:36:34.680
<v Speaker 3>and so the investors had to notify the Q one

0:36:34.719 --> 0:36:36.719
<v Speaker 3>redemption at the early est date. So Blackstone was the

0:36:36.719 --> 0:36:39.920
<v Speaker 3>first to announce because they have that brand. I think

0:36:40.120 --> 0:36:42.640
<v Speaker 3>if Blackstone had not announced seven point nine, there would

0:36:42.640 --> 0:36:44.200
<v Speaker 3>have been less redemptions with everyone else.

0:36:44.960 --> 0:36:47.279
<v Speaker 1>Yeah and yeah, I think it's clearly like everyone sees

0:36:47.320 --> 0:36:47.839
<v Speaker 1>the last one.

0:36:47.760 --> 0:36:49.919
<v Speaker 3>All right, and now people saw cliff Water and Blue

0:36:49.920 --> 0:36:51.239
<v Speaker 3>I will still open for redemptions.

0:36:52.440 --> 0:36:54.160
<v Speaker 2>We'll see you know. And once you go to like.

0:36:54.200 --> 0:36:55.960
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, and then like what do they do? Like you

0:36:56.000 --> 0:36:59.200
<v Speaker 1>get fifteen? Yeah, like what do you? What do you doing? Well,

0:36:59.239 --> 0:37:01.919
<v Speaker 1>so let me argue again, there's an hpis example which,

0:37:01.960 --> 0:37:03.920
<v Speaker 1>like you lot people in the private credit space were

0:37:03.920 --> 0:37:05.440
<v Speaker 1>like that's they did the right thing for in the

0:37:05.480 --> 0:37:07.279
<v Speaker 1>liquid product I know you disagree.

0:37:07.520 --> 0:37:09.520
<v Speaker 3>Well, look, no one made me the head of these firms,

0:37:09.600 --> 0:37:11.920
<v Speaker 3>So like that's just my opinion. If they're just going

0:37:11.920 --> 0:37:15.160
<v Speaker 3>to pay out five percent a quarter and those redemptions

0:37:15.160 --> 0:37:18.440
<v Speaker 3>are going to keep rising as they did for for example, Starwood,

0:37:18.800 --> 0:37:20.399
<v Speaker 3>they're going to have a multi year problem where it's

0:37:20.400 --> 0:37:22.560
<v Speaker 3>also going to be hard to raise new funds and

0:37:22.600 --> 0:37:25.680
<v Speaker 3>then they're going to be exposed to what's happening in

0:37:25.719 --> 0:37:27.560
<v Speaker 3>private credit. And again, I don't have to be a

0:37:27.640 --> 0:37:30.000
<v Speaker 3>Merlin to know that the navs are too high at

0:37:30.040 --> 0:37:32.840
<v Speaker 3>all of these funds. And they're not only too high

0:37:33.200 --> 0:37:35.560
<v Speaker 3>because it's too hard for them to mark them down.

0:37:35.800 --> 0:37:38.040
<v Speaker 3>They'll mark down what they observe, and then they'll do

0:37:38.120 --> 0:37:41.399
<v Speaker 3>some like matrix pricing. But JP Morgan just marked everything down,

0:37:41.400 --> 0:37:44.040
<v Speaker 3>so doesn't everything then have to come down? So I

0:37:44.080 --> 0:37:47.080
<v Speaker 3>think that really if the idea is just pay out

0:37:47.080 --> 0:37:49.839
<v Speaker 3>the five okay, so there's going to be this huge

0:37:49.920 --> 0:37:53.719
<v Speaker 3>queue and let's hope things stabilize. You know, Blackstone was

0:37:53.760 --> 0:37:56.399
<v Speaker 3>able to stabilize be read beautifully and maybe it maybe

0:37:56.440 --> 0:37:58.719
<v Speaker 3>it doesn't become as bad a thing. But at the

0:37:58.719 --> 0:38:01.799
<v Speaker 3>same time, you see all these horses together from the

0:38:01.800 --> 0:38:06.160
<v Speaker 3>default rate rising to the kind of nav recalibration, it's

0:38:06.160 --> 0:38:07.800
<v Speaker 3>not hard to see it getting really bad, and so

0:38:07.920 --> 0:38:10.080
<v Speaker 3>I wanted to at least say like, on the one hand,

0:38:10.160 --> 0:38:13.080
<v Speaker 3>when finally the bottom comes in, this product will be

0:38:13.160 --> 0:38:16.760
<v Speaker 3>really attractive, just like you know, eight closing funds got destroyed.

0:38:16.840 --> 0:38:18.919
<v Speaker 3>But in O nine when it was time to buy,

0:38:19.000 --> 0:38:20.800
<v Speaker 3>you're like, wait, I get to buy the HIGHLD market

0:38:21.000 --> 0:38:23.800
<v Speaker 3>at the lows and I get another thirty points discount

0:38:23.800 --> 0:38:26.319
<v Speaker 3>on top, Like this will be a great long At

0:38:26.320 --> 0:38:28.920
<v Speaker 3>some point. I think I'm early with this first tender,

0:38:29.160 --> 0:38:31.800
<v Speaker 3>but I think where we priced it will probably do okay.

0:38:32.280 --> 0:38:33.799
<v Speaker 1>They talk about like how is this going to shake out?

0:38:33.800 --> 0:38:34.960
<v Speaker 1>How the managers are going to do it? And you

0:38:35.200 --> 0:38:38.880
<v Speaker 1>mentioned be read as a shining star of what you

0:38:38.880 --> 0:38:41.160
<v Speaker 1>should do, Like is there a play like that here?

0:38:41.200 --> 0:38:45.120
<v Speaker 1>As they're like getting institutions to sign up to do

0:38:45.160 --> 0:38:47.640
<v Speaker 1>something like what you're doing, you know, like to provide

0:38:47.680 --> 0:38:50.239
<v Speaker 1>liquidity again, Like the thing that troubles me is like

0:38:50.840 --> 0:38:53.279
<v Speaker 1>the talk is the institutional market is still pretty good, right,

0:38:53.320 --> 0:38:55.759
<v Speaker 1>and that's it's like a strange disconnect from like the

0:38:55.840 --> 0:38:56.760
<v Speaker 1>dentist's redeeming.

0:38:56.960 --> 0:38:59.600
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean, if only there wasn't that pesky thing

0:38:59.640 --> 0:39:02.279
<v Speaker 3>called pub BDCs, and we could we could wonder about

0:39:02.320 --> 0:39:05.359
<v Speaker 3>the thought experiment of Saba bidding sixty five cents when

0:39:05.360 --> 0:39:08.239
<v Speaker 3>there's the real world examples of tons of stuff at

0:39:08.280 --> 0:39:10.200
<v Speaker 3>sixty fifty five sixty five seventy.

0:39:10.560 --> 0:39:12.400
<v Speaker 2>So like, yes, you can.

0:39:12.600 --> 0:39:15.440
<v Speaker 3>You can have this kind of cognitive dissonance where the

0:39:15.480 --> 0:39:17.680
<v Speaker 3>manager can still raise new money at NAV while their

0:39:17.719 --> 0:39:20.879
<v Speaker 3>old money is at from smart investors while their old

0:39:20.880 --> 0:39:23.520
<v Speaker 3>money is at seventy. Because someone is a bucket to

0:39:23.600 --> 0:39:26.319
<v Speaker 3>make new private credit investments, but they don't have a

0:39:26.320 --> 0:39:28.640
<v Speaker 3>bucket to do BDCs because they don't do tickers, they

0:39:28.680 --> 0:39:31.120
<v Speaker 3>don't do market You know. That gets to another thing,

0:39:31.160 --> 0:39:33.520
<v Speaker 3>back to one of your recent guests, Okay, who I

0:39:33.560 --> 0:39:37.040
<v Speaker 3>have like huge admiration for. Like I think if I

0:39:37.080 --> 0:39:39.160
<v Speaker 3>had to be like on a desert island of somebody,

0:39:39.200 --> 0:39:42.879
<v Speaker 3>I think it's cliff astness. Okay, And not just because

0:39:42.920 --> 0:39:45.359
<v Speaker 3>I get to put you know, sunscreen on his on

0:39:45.400 --> 0:39:48.440
<v Speaker 3>his bald head to protect him, but also we were

0:39:48.480 --> 0:39:51.600
<v Speaker 3>just by the way, coincidentally in Milan during the US

0:39:52.000 --> 0:39:53.839
<v Speaker 3>hockey game. It was just an amazing he's a huge

0:39:53.880 --> 0:39:56.600
<v Speaker 3>hockey fan and I'm aspiring. But when he talked about

0:39:56.680 --> 0:40:00.040
<v Speaker 3>volatility laundering. He's really like the father this whole, like

0:40:00.440 --> 0:40:02.879
<v Speaker 3>the bug becomes the feature. I want to just tell you, really,

0:40:02.960 --> 0:40:03.400
<v Speaker 3>I agree.

0:40:03.200 --> 0:40:05.040
<v Speaker 1>With that all the time, like his point that like

0:40:05.800 --> 0:40:10.480
<v Speaker 1>people want liquidity, and like arguably, yeah, you know, public

0:40:10.520 --> 0:40:12.759
<v Speaker 1>B two c's traded seventy percent traded at thirty percent

0:40:12.760 --> 0:40:15.680
<v Speaker 1>discount because they tell you that, and private credit brought

0:40:15.760 --> 0:40:17.399
<v Speaker 1>on funds and don't trade at discount because they don't

0:40:17.400 --> 0:40:17.600
<v Speaker 1>tell you.

0:40:17.600 --> 0:40:19.839
<v Speaker 3>Then, So there's a moment in April twenty twenty three

0:40:19.960 --> 0:40:22.840
<v Speaker 3>when I kind of howl at the moon because I

0:40:22.880 --> 0:40:25.720
<v Speaker 3>saw one pager from Cliff Water that professed an eleven

0:40:25.800 --> 0:40:28.040
<v Speaker 3>sharp in their fund and you know, we all know

0:40:28.080 --> 0:40:30.120
<v Speaker 3>eleven sharp takes you back to like the land of

0:40:30.160 --> 0:40:32.480
<v Speaker 3>the dinosaurs, when when you would have had a big

0:40:32.560 --> 0:40:35.920
<v Speaker 3>draw down, but this thing where private credit gets marked

0:40:35.960 --> 0:40:37.600
<v Speaker 3>every month the same. So I kind of howld at

0:40:37.640 --> 0:40:40.120
<v Speaker 3>the moon. Kieran Goodwin howld at the moon, and Cliff

0:40:40.200 --> 0:40:42.880
<v Speaker 3>jumped in in that debate, you know, and I was

0:40:42.920 --> 0:40:46.839
<v Speaker 3>thinking about that conversation. We're just howling it into Twitter.

0:40:47.800 --> 0:40:48.080
<v Speaker 2>Twitter.

0:40:48.080 --> 0:40:50.120
<v Speaker 1>First, no one is like, no, that eleven sharp is right?

0:40:50.320 --> 0:40:52.440
<v Speaker 3>Yea, yeah, Oka, Well, obviously Cliff Water put it on

0:40:52.480 --> 0:40:52.960
<v Speaker 3>their page.

0:40:53.000 --> 0:40:53.200
<v Speaker 2>You know.

0:40:53.440 --> 0:40:57.640
<v Speaker 3>So all right, I think I've said enough about them.

0:40:57.719 --> 0:40:59.160
<v Speaker 3>But but but the really story is about it.

0:40:59.160 --> 0:41:00.480
<v Speaker 1>You know how much of this there?

0:41:00.680 --> 0:41:02.720
<v Speaker 3>Oh my god, the story is a year. The story

0:41:02.800 --> 0:41:06.480
<v Speaker 3>actually continues to September. September. I'm sitting in the office

0:41:06.760 --> 0:41:12.000
<v Speaker 3>of the CEO of a really venerable insurance company and

0:41:12.239 --> 0:41:14.560
<v Speaker 3>they want to put my closed in fund product on

0:41:14.600 --> 0:41:17.439
<v Speaker 3>their platform. Could look at the ETF on stock ee change.

0:41:17.480 --> 0:41:19.920
<v Speaker 3>Let's say we made twelve percent or something, okay, And

0:41:19.920 --> 0:41:22.640
<v Speaker 3>he says, you know, here's my problem. You want me

0:41:22.680 --> 0:41:24.520
<v Speaker 3>to pay these fees. By the way, they're not two

0:41:24.560 --> 0:41:26.880
<v Speaker 3>and twenty or whatever, but I want a fee discount.

0:41:26.880 --> 0:41:29.719
<v Speaker 3>And I said, well, we're capacity constrained. And he said, well,

0:41:29.800 --> 0:41:34.200
<v Speaker 3>but Apollo is giving us a fee discount. And I said, well,

0:41:34.360 --> 0:41:37.560
<v Speaker 3>but Apollo is basically unlimited capacity to keep making more

0:41:37.640 --> 0:41:40.160
<v Speaker 3>private credit. And he said, but you don't understand. My

0:41:40.239 --> 0:41:43.440
<v Speaker 3>investors for the last three years have received one percent

0:41:43.480 --> 0:41:46.879
<v Speaker 3>a month, like clockwork, one every single month, twelve a year,

0:41:47.080 --> 0:41:48.880
<v Speaker 3>you know, with leverage minus fees. So now they were

0:41:48.880 --> 0:41:52.200
<v Speaker 3>able to get twelve and literally zero marked market volatility

0:41:52.200 --> 0:41:54.319
<v Speaker 3>back to the cliff order sharp of eleven, you and

0:41:54.360 --> 0:41:57.080
<v Speaker 3>the other end have made twelve, and there's plenty of volatility,

0:41:57.640 --> 0:41:59.480
<v Speaker 3>and how can I justify paying your fees when I

0:41:59.480 --> 0:42:02.279
<v Speaker 3>can get the twelve, you know, really easily. Now, I

0:42:02.320 --> 0:42:05.680
<v Speaker 3>had a call with that investor yesterday. Okay, that investor

0:42:05.760 --> 0:42:08.279
<v Speaker 3>is so curious because there are super long lots of

0:42:08.360 --> 0:42:11.680
<v Speaker 3>private credit funds. They are super curious if I'm going

0:42:11.680 --> 0:42:14.680
<v Speaker 3>to get hit. But they're also in super pain because

0:42:14.680 --> 0:42:16.360
<v Speaker 3>they're seeing what's happening to private credit.

0:42:16.640 --> 0:42:17.839
<v Speaker 2>And so you know what.

0:42:17.800 --> 0:42:19.200
<v Speaker 1>Kind of pain are that Are they still getting one

0:42:19.200 --> 0:42:19.759
<v Speaker 1>percent a month?

0:42:19.960 --> 0:42:20.240
<v Speaker 2>Nope?

0:42:20.280 --> 0:42:23.120
<v Speaker 3>Because you know, SOFA went down because you know, some

0:42:23.160 --> 0:42:25.120
<v Speaker 3>loans made it five hundred or now at three fifty.

0:42:25.600 --> 0:42:28.120
<v Speaker 3>So distributions were cut, by the way, what started the

0:42:28.120 --> 0:42:31.960
<v Speaker 3>ball rolling with outflows where distribution cuts and retail investors

0:42:31.960 --> 0:42:33.799
<v Speaker 3>were like, wait a second, we had a deal. You're

0:42:33.840 --> 0:42:35.239
<v Speaker 3>gonna pay me one percent a month. Now you're only

0:42:35.239 --> 0:42:37.839
<v Speaker 3>paying me eighty four basis points, and so that kind

0:42:37.880 --> 0:42:41.880
<v Speaker 3>of started the quote no snowflake ever believes it started

0:42:41.880 --> 0:42:47.400
<v Speaker 3>the avalanche. And so that investor is now facing you know,

0:42:47.480 --> 0:42:50.359
<v Speaker 3>the first brands default, the Tricolor default, and so there's

0:42:50.400 --> 0:42:52.960
<v Speaker 3>there's the problems of defaults, the problems of mark to

0:42:53.000 --> 0:42:55.759
<v Speaker 3>market write downs, the problems of outflows, the problems of

0:42:55.800 --> 0:42:58.920
<v Speaker 3>lower sofur although so far the interest rate market is

0:42:58.960 --> 0:43:02.400
<v Speaker 3>not pricing much lower rates despite the recent market moves,

0:43:02.600 --> 0:43:06.160
<v Speaker 3>and so that thing of volatility laundering, which is like

0:43:06.280 --> 0:43:08.680
<v Speaker 3>just about the best two word quote for to talk

0:43:08.680 --> 0:43:12.280
<v Speaker 3>about wrong with Wall Street, ever, is like that should

0:43:12.280 --> 0:43:14.840
<v Speaker 3>be the title of what's happening here? Is that for

0:43:14.920 --> 0:43:18.400
<v Speaker 3>too long the problems were masked and now they're the

0:43:18.560 --> 0:43:20.400
<v Speaker 3>you know, the curtain gets pulled back. And Cliff was

0:43:20.440 --> 0:43:23.719
<v Speaker 3>absolutely right, and it took a while. And in the meantime,

0:43:24.000 --> 0:43:25.520
<v Speaker 3>because it took a while, the industry is two and

0:43:25.520 --> 0:43:26.080
<v Speaker 3>a f trillion.

0:43:26.760 --> 0:43:31.400
<v Speaker 4>Something I'm curious about is the path forward for you? Because, okay,

0:43:31.560 --> 0:43:33.680
<v Speaker 4>we'll find out in mid April. If you get hit

0:43:33.760 --> 0:43:36.640
<v Speaker 4>at sixty five, maybe you'll get over subscribed, which would

0:43:37.239 --> 0:43:40.560
<v Speaker 4>certainly be informative. But what happens if you don't really

0:43:40.920 --> 0:43:43.680
<v Speaker 4>get any hits, Like do you then raise your bid?

0:43:43.719 --> 0:43:46.479
<v Speaker 4>What is the path forward from there?

0:43:46.880 --> 0:43:48.759
<v Speaker 3>I don't know. Have you not met me before? Do

0:43:49.080 --> 0:43:51.160
<v Speaker 3>I just go Do I just put my bowling ball

0:43:51.200 --> 0:43:53.319
<v Speaker 3>in the bag and go home? No, let me give

0:43:53.360 --> 0:43:55.320
<v Speaker 3>you the answer the instead of trying to be funny

0:43:55.320 --> 0:43:58.280
<v Speaker 3>about it. When I put that bid in the markets

0:43:58.280 --> 0:44:01.000
<v Speaker 3>are in a certain state. Yeah, quarter later, you know,

0:44:01.040 --> 0:44:03.520
<v Speaker 3>are people going to sell to me when redemptions were

0:44:03.960 --> 0:44:04.560
<v Speaker 3>nine percent?

0:44:05.200 --> 0:44:05.880
<v Speaker 2>Maybe? Maybe not.

0:44:05.920 --> 0:44:08.439
<v Speaker 3>If redemptions are twenty percent, it stands to reason they're

0:44:08.480 --> 0:44:10.600
<v Speaker 3>more likely to sell. So I don't give up easily,

0:44:10.800 --> 0:44:13.520
<v Speaker 3>especially if we're doing something you know that we think

0:44:13.600 --> 0:44:16.960
<v Speaker 3>is of value to our clients. But I really think

0:44:17.320 --> 0:44:19.360
<v Speaker 3>if the market gets worse and then our bid probably

0:44:19.360 --> 0:44:21.719
<v Speaker 3>goes lower. But I think it's clear that there's a

0:44:21.800 --> 0:44:23.520
<v Speaker 3>value to provide a bid when people need a bid

0:44:23.560 --> 0:44:25.719
<v Speaker 3>and there isn't one, and if we don't get hit

0:44:25.760 --> 0:44:28.080
<v Speaker 3>on any yes, maybe our bid has to go up.

0:44:28.480 --> 0:44:30.000
<v Speaker 3>Or maybe it's just we were a little early.

0:44:30.280 --> 0:44:32.880
<v Speaker 4>It's interesting that you went to bowling as the example

0:44:33.320 --> 0:44:33.960
<v Speaker 4>of the sport.

0:44:34.960 --> 0:44:37.720
<v Speaker 2>I'm a sub one hundred average bowler.

0:44:38.080 --> 0:44:40.040
<v Speaker 3>My best sport and is not saying much is tennis,

0:44:40.080 --> 0:44:42.200
<v Speaker 3>and I'm like a three and a half usta. So

0:44:42.920 --> 0:44:44.920
<v Speaker 3>it's you know, unless you want to call chess a sport.

0:44:45.320 --> 0:44:48.480
<v Speaker 3>I guess yeah, oh yeah, I put my chess pieces

0:44:48.480 --> 0:44:50.319
<v Speaker 3>in the bag and went home. Yes, you got me.

0:44:54.000 --> 0:44:56.920
<v Speaker 3>I stunned to you stun silence for the first moment.

0:44:57.520 --> 0:44:59.440
<v Speaker 4>I do want to ask about dats, but.

0:45:00.280 --> 0:45:02.919
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, we're running up on times. Let's talk about debts.

0:45:03.280 --> 0:45:05.960
<v Speaker 4>Okay, oh my god, that's digital assets.

0:45:06.080 --> 0:45:07.680
<v Speaker 2>I talk about a car crash.

0:45:07.719 --> 0:45:10.000
<v Speaker 4>Well, let's talk about the car crash. There's a bunch

0:45:10.000 --> 0:45:13.239
<v Speaker 4>of dbts digital acid treasury companies that are trading at

0:45:13.239 --> 0:45:16.160
<v Speaker 4>discounts to NAV right now, would.

0:45:16.000 --> 0:45:17.440
<v Speaker 2>That entice you?

0:45:17.440 --> 0:45:18.520
<v Speaker 4>You seem like a busy man.

0:45:18.680 --> 0:45:21.239
<v Speaker 3>But well, look, there are a couple of things that

0:45:21.320 --> 0:45:24.360
<v Speaker 3>no one would disagree with about the crypto market. One

0:45:24.400 --> 0:45:29.880
<v Speaker 3>is that various less than white shoe characters are present

0:45:29.960 --> 0:45:31.799
<v Speaker 3>in it, you know, as evidenced by the number of

0:45:31.840 --> 0:45:34.880
<v Speaker 3>that have gone to jail to release from jail thanks

0:45:34.880 --> 0:45:38.480
<v Speaker 3>to some donations or otherwise. And so that world, it

0:45:38.520 --> 0:45:41.000
<v Speaker 3>has some really ethical, awesome people. And then it and

0:45:41.040 --> 0:45:43.320
<v Speaker 3>as some others, and I think one of the issues

0:45:43.320 --> 0:45:46.000
<v Speaker 3>for us with debts which we don't have with closed

0:45:46.040 --> 0:45:48.680
<v Speaker 3>end funds. And you know, again, if someone can educate

0:45:48.760 --> 0:45:51.880
<v Speaker 3>us or BDCs. I was going to say, you're always

0:45:51.880 --> 0:45:55.840
<v Speaker 3>worried about as an activist, if you wanted to actually

0:45:55.840 --> 0:45:58.160
<v Speaker 3>be an activist, that they're going to do something really deluded,

0:45:58.320 --> 0:46:00.680
<v Speaker 3>you know, like effectively a poison pill. And I don't

0:46:00.719 --> 0:46:04.320
<v Speaker 3>believe that it is impossible. It may not be easy.

0:46:04.480 --> 0:46:07.240
<v Speaker 3>I don't believe it's impossible for a DAT to issue

0:46:07.320 --> 0:46:10.640
<v Speaker 3>shares way below nav maybe even you know, well below

0:46:10.640 --> 0:46:12.840
<v Speaker 3>the share the price that's trading at, to a select

0:46:12.840 --> 0:46:14.720
<v Speaker 3>group of investors. And now if they issued it to everyone,

0:46:14.760 --> 0:46:16.799
<v Speaker 3>you'd say, okay, I can get my Proada portion, but

0:46:16.840 --> 0:46:18.399
<v Speaker 3>I would hate to buy something at a thirty five

0:46:18.440 --> 0:46:20.640
<v Speaker 3>percent discount. TOV find that they issue a lot of

0:46:20.640 --> 0:46:23.520
<v Speaker 3>shares at fifty to a select group, and now I've

0:46:23.520 --> 0:46:26.600
<v Speaker 3>been diluted. We saw the threat of a poison pill

0:46:26.960 --> 0:46:28.560
<v Speaker 3>on a closed in fund that we owned.

0:46:28.920 --> 0:46:29.640
<v Speaker 2>We went to court.

0:46:29.960 --> 0:46:32.000
<v Speaker 3>Court sided with us, but the manager did it for

0:46:32.040 --> 0:46:34.600
<v Speaker 3>four straight quarters, and that was a closed in fund.

0:46:35.160 --> 0:46:36.719
<v Speaker 1>Is just because like a DAT is not a forty

0:46:37.160 --> 0:46:37.600
<v Speaker 1>fund line.

0:46:37.600 --> 0:46:40.000
<v Speaker 3>I don't I'm not sure, but I believe they can.

0:46:40.320 --> 0:46:42.600
<v Speaker 3>Because it's not a closed in fund close in funds,

0:46:42.600 --> 0:46:45.600
<v Speaker 3>they cannot do dilutive offerings without offering them to everyone.

0:46:45.920 --> 0:46:48.920
<v Speaker 3>And then the second thing is like, all right, it's

0:46:48.920 --> 0:46:50.719
<v Speaker 3>one thing for Elon Musk wanting to pay himself a

0:46:50.719 --> 0:46:53.640
<v Speaker 3>trillion dollars. But you know, I think a DAT can

0:46:54.560 --> 0:46:57.319
<v Speaker 3>decide it wants to pay its CEO a lot of money,

0:46:57.320 --> 0:46:59.560
<v Speaker 3>and I have a handpick board and basically take money

0:46:59.560 --> 0:47:01.640
<v Speaker 3>out that way. One of the cool things I think

0:47:01.640 --> 0:47:03.560
<v Speaker 3>about your jobs you can always go to where it's

0:47:03.600 --> 0:47:05.480
<v Speaker 3>hot and interesting. And I would say that's also one

0:47:05.520 --> 0:47:07.280
<v Speaker 3>of the cool things about my job is I'm supposed

0:47:07.320 --> 0:47:10.080
<v Speaker 3>to stay in my sandbox. But my sandbox of RV

0:47:10.440 --> 0:47:13.239
<v Speaker 3>and mispricings, you know, it doesn't include what was that

0:47:13.280 --> 0:47:17.000
<v Speaker 3>company called movie pay or movie phone or whatever movie past, like,

0:47:17.080 --> 0:47:18.520
<v Speaker 3>you know, like that that was a fun one that

0:47:18.560 --> 0:47:21.520
<v Speaker 3>I just was a reader about, Like, but like, what's

0:47:21.600 --> 0:47:24.440
<v Speaker 3>I think one neat thing about this space is the

0:47:24.480 --> 0:47:27.360
<v Speaker 3>ability to break new ground or do something new in

0:47:27.400 --> 0:47:29.759
<v Speaker 3>a space that's central to a lot of investors, as

0:47:29.760 --> 0:47:31.640
<v Speaker 3>evidenced by the size of the market. So I am

0:47:31.680 --> 0:47:34.279
<v Speaker 3>really enjoying, like kind of exploring the creative side of

0:47:34.280 --> 0:47:37.200
<v Speaker 3>trying something new. I'm hoping that it doesn't lead to nothing,

0:47:37.239 --> 0:47:38.759
<v Speaker 3>but if it does and we don't get hit, it's

0:47:38.800 --> 0:47:41.560
<v Speaker 3>not the end of the world. But I'm really enjoying

0:47:42.239 --> 0:47:44.160
<v Speaker 3>rolling in my sleeves and learning about this space even

0:47:44.200 --> 0:47:44.640
<v Speaker 3>more deeply.

0:47:45.239 --> 0:47:47.920
<v Speaker 1>If you do get head, you'll be a little more nervous.

0:47:48.160 --> 0:47:49.680
<v Speaker 1>It's not that big. Yeah.

0:47:49.719 --> 0:47:52.160
<v Speaker 3>By the way, if I get hit and things change

0:47:52.160 --> 0:47:54.360
<v Speaker 3>a lot, I'm happy to come back on or whatever,

0:47:54.520 --> 0:47:56.120
<v Speaker 3>you know like that. I think what's neat about this

0:47:56.280 --> 0:47:57.960
<v Speaker 3>is this story will continue to be a story. I

0:47:57.960 --> 0:47:59.919
<v Speaker 3>don't mean my part of it, but the private credit market.

0:48:00.080 --> 0:48:00.760
<v Speaker 1>This is the story.

0:48:01.840 --> 0:48:04.760
<v Speaker 2>You're going to keep rowling, keep playing chess.

0:48:05.239 --> 0:48:07.919
<v Speaker 4>My big takeaway I want to launch a shop called

0:48:07.960 --> 0:48:11.520
<v Speaker 4>black Owl. I feel like that's the only iteration.

0:48:11.440 --> 0:48:18.640
<v Speaker 1>Only Whita, only blue space. That was the Money Stuff Podcast.

0:48:18.920 --> 0:48:20.920
<v Speaker 1>Thanks to pous Winston for coming up.

0:48:21.120 --> 0:48:23.520
<v Speaker 2>Thanks to both here all right, rock and roll?

0:48:23.800 --> 0:48:24.640
<v Speaker 4>Did you enjoy that?

0:48:25.000 --> 0:48:26.759
<v Speaker 2>I talk about this in my house when no one's there.

0:48:26.800 --> 0:48:27.640
<v Speaker 2>I just talk to the law.

0:48:27.760 --> 0:48:29.080
<v Speaker 4>I talk to the mirror.

0:48:29.239 --> 0:48:39.080
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, And that was the Money Stuff Podcast.

0:48:39.400 --> 0:48:41.600
<v Speaker 4>I'm Matt Levine and I'm Katie Greifeld.

0:48:42.040 --> 0:48:44.200
<v Speaker 1>You can find my work by subscribing to the Money

0:48:44.200 --> 0:48:46.200
<v Speaker 1>Stuff newsletter on Bloomberg.

0:48:45.760 --> 0:48:48.399
<v Speaker 4>Dot com, and you can find me on Bloomberg TV

0:48:48.560 --> 0:48:52.000
<v Speaker 4>every day on the Clothes between three and five pm Eastern.

0:48:52.480 --> 0:48:54.560
<v Speaker 1>We'd love to hear from you. You can send an

0:48:54.560 --> 0:48:57.799
<v Speaker 1>email to Money pod at Bloomberg dot net. Ask us

0:48:57.840 --> 0:48:59.839
<v Speaker 1>a question and we might answer it on the air.

0:49:00.120 --> 0:49:02.720
<v Speaker 4>You can also subscribe to our show wherever you're listening

0:49:02.800 --> 0:49:04.640
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0:49:04.680 --> 0:49:05.520
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0:49:06.080 --> 0:49:09.400
<v Speaker 1>The Money Stuff Podcast is produced by Moses Onam and

0:49:09.480 --> 0:49:10.279
<v Speaker 1>Alexis hatt.

0:49:10.800 --> 0:49:13.120
<v Speaker 4>Our theme music was composed by Blake Maples.

0:49:13.560 --> 0:49:17.080
<v Speaker 1>Amy Keen is our executive producer. Thanks for listening to

0:49:17.080 --> 0:49:19.640
<v Speaker 1>The Money Stuff Podcast. We'll be back next week with

0:49:19.760 --> 0:49:20.400
<v Speaker 1>more stuff.