WEBVTT - Whistleblowers: A very special kind of bs detector

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<v Speaker 1>Hey, folks, I want to take a minute to ask

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<v Speaker 1>for your help. This show is a labor of love

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<v Speaker 1>for all of us here on the team at calling BS.

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<v Speaker 1>We debate which organizations to investigate. We carefully consider how

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<v Speaker 1>to best tell these stories. Our goal is to create

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<v Speaker 1>a show that exposes purpose washing and the real harm

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<v Speaker 1>it does in the world. But we also want to

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<v Speaker 1>create a show that's fun to listen to and serves

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<v Speaker 1>as a practical guide for entrepreneurs and leadership teams about

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<v Speaker 1>how to do purpose right. We're really proud of what

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<v Speaker 1>we've made so far, and we're super excited about getting

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<v Speaker 1>season three into production so we can share it with

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<v Speaker 1>all of you now to the help we need. So far,

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<v Speaker 1>we are self funded. We need a sponsor or sponsors

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<v Speaker 1>to help us with the cost of production. But, and

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<v Speaker 1>this is important, we feel like it would be disingenuous

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<v Speaker 1>given the theme of the show to accept money from

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<v Speaker 1>just anybody. It's important to us that the sponsors of

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<v Speaker 1>this show shared of shows values. We're looking for partners

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<v Speaker 1>who are purpose led themselves, Companies or organizations that truly

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<v Speaker 1>walk their talk. Companies who understand the harm that purpose

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<v Speaker 1>washing does and who understand how important it is for

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<v Speaker 1>all of us that more companies embrace the path to purpose.

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<v Speaker 1>If you're a part of an organization like that, or

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<v Speaker 1>you know one that seems like a good fit, don't

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<v Speaker 1>hesitate to drop us a line. You can reach me

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<v Speaker 1>directly at Team Montague at Calling Bullshit podcast dot com.

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<v Speaker 1>Thanks for listening, and let's get on with the show.

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<v Speaker 1>When powerful organizations do wrong, who stands up for what's right?

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<v Speaker 1>Francis how Good is thirty seven, a data scientist from Iowa.

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<v Speaker 1>The thing I saw Facebook over and over again was

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<v Speaker 1>there were conflicts of interest between what was good for

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<v Speaker 1>the public and what was good for Facebook. And Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>and over again shows to optimize for its own interests,

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<v Speaker 1>like making more money. It's people, in most cases, just

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<v Speaker 1>regular folks. Tyler Schultz says he quit out for Holmes

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<v Speaker 1>and her partner, Sonny Balwani ignored his complaints about falsified

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<v Speaker 1>research right off the bat. I realized that there's this

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<v Speaker 1>open secret that the technology didn't really exist. So all

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<v Speaker 1>these red flags were just piling up insiders who see

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<v Speaker 1>something and aren't afraid to say something, even when they

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<v Speaker 1>know it may cost them dearly Snowdon said he saw

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<v Speaker 1>firsthand and became increasingly concerned about the reach of the

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<v Speaker 1>n S, a electronic surveillance of innocent America. These are

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<v Speaker 1>public issues. These are not my issues, you know, these

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<v Speaker 1>are everybody's issues. There's a name for people like this, Whistleblowers.

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Calling Bullshit, the podcast about purpose washing, the

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<v Speaker 1>gap between what an organization says they stand for and

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<v Speaker 1>what they actually do, and what they would need to

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<v Speaker 1>change to practice what they preach. I'm your host, Time

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<v Speaker 1>onto you, and I've spent over a decade helping organizations

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<v Speaker 1>define what they stand for, their purpose and then help

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<v Speaker 1>them to use that purpose to drive transformation throughout their business. Today,

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<v Speaker 1>for the finale of season two, we're devoting the entire

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<v Speaker 1>episode to a special kind of BS detector, the whistleblower.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm speaking with three experts on the topic who will

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<v Speaker 1>explain why these people are so important and why, rather

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<v Speaker 1>than fearing them and shunning them, organizations should actually do

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<v Speaker 1>everything they can to protect them. Imagine you work for

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<v Speaker 1>a biotech company, a Silicon Valley unicorn with a charismatic

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<v Speaker 1>founder and a ten billion dollar valuation. You work there

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<v Speaker 1>because you believe this company is doing the right thing

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<v Speaker 1>changing health care for the better. Plus your grandfather's on

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<v Speaker 1>the board of directors. He's how you were introduced to

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<v Speaker 1>the company in the first place. But one day you

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<v Speaker 1>realize that this promising new technology that you're selling is

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<v Speaker 1>no more complicated than a bio student running tests with

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<v Speaker 1>a pipette, That the data you're publishing is misleading investors

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<v Speaker 1>into thinking you have an invention that doesn't actually exist,

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<v Speaker 1>and that the patients you're testing your technology on, some

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<v Speaker 1>of whom have life threatening conditions, are getting inaccurate results.

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<v Speaker 1>When you talk to your superiors, they dismiss you, and

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<v Speaker 1>when you talk to your grandfather, he dismisses you. So

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<v Speaker 1>what do you do. Do you just quietly quit or

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<v Speaker 1>are you ethnically pelled to say something publicly? A jury

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<v Speaker 1>convicted that Parinis, founder of four counts of defrauding investors yesterday.

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<v Speaker 1>One of her former employees was the first to blow

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<v Speaker 1>the whistle about the problems at the company. He then

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<v Speaker 1>shared his concerns with a state regulator, and then he

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<v Speaker 1>went to the Wall Street Journal. We all like to

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<v Speaker 1>think will do the right thing, that when confronted with

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<v Speaker 1>a problem that goes against our morals, we'll speak up

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<v Speaker 1>or act. But what if calling out the bullshit means

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<v Speaker 1>damaging your career, or your family relationships, or even your

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<v Speaker 1>personal safety. The fact is it is definitely easier in

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<v Speaker 1>a situation like this to just look the other way.

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<v Speaker 1>But if you raise the issue internally and management won't

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<v Speaker 1>address a problem, you are literally the last line of defense.

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<v Speaker 1>We all rely on and benefit from whistleblowers who take

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<v Speaker 1>on risks like this. Without whistleblowers, the public never have

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<v Speaker 1>learned that therein nosis blood tests were built around a lie,

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<v Speaker 1>or that Boeing had a toxic culture that ignored basic

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<v Speaker 1>safety precautions, and that hundreds of people died as a

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<v Speaker 1>direct result. Without whistleblowers speaking truth to power, it would

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<v Speaker 1>be a lot harder to detect bs in the world.

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<v Speaker 1>And here on the show, Francis Hogan was an important

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<v Speaker 1>part of the very first company we covered. Her insider

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<v Speaker 1>knowledge showed the world just how nefarious Facebook actually is.

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<v Speaker 1>A few episodes later, we spoke with whistleblower Tarick Fancy

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<v Speaker 1>about sustainable investing at Black Rock, and most recently, we

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<v Speaker 1>looked into the consulting firm McKenzie with two former employees

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<v Speaker 1>who helped us to understand the culture and the scope

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<v Speaker 1>of BS. At one of the world's most influential companies,

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<v Speaker 1>we rely on whistleblowers because they are a special kind

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<v Speaker 1>of BS detector, people with inside information and the courage

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<v Speaker 1>to go public. When whistleblowers need help, they often turn

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<v Speaker 1>to attorneys like my first guest today, Mary Inman. Mary

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<v Speaker 1>understands the unique challenges of coming forward because she's devoted

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<v Speaker 1>her career to protecting people who do. She's a partner

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<v Speaker 1>in Constantine Canon, a law firm that specializes in representing whistleblowers,

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<v Speaker 1>and over the years, she's built up an impressive resume,

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<v Speaker 1>defending many names you've heard of and countless others that

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<v Speaker 1>you may not have. Mary, Welcome to the show. TI,

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<v Speaker 1>thank you so much for having me today. It's a

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<v Speaker 1>real honor to be on your show. It's great to

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<v Speaker 1>have you here. So for the benefit of our listeners,

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<v Speaker 1>let's start off with an introduction. If you could just

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<v Speaker 1>tell folks a little bit about your background and how

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<v Speaker 1>you found your way into being an attorney for I

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<v Speaker 1>guess you know many of the most famous whistleblowers in

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<v Speaker 1>the world. So um, I went to law school, like

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<v Speaker 1>many lawyers trying to change the world. Didn't really know

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<v Speaker 1>how I was going to do that. I did some

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<v Speaker 1>work in the public Defender's office in law school, UM

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<v Speaker 1>and then clerked for a couple of judges, and I

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<v Speaker 1>just had the most amazing opportunity to drop in my lap.

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<v Speaker 1>A friend of mine referred me to a headhunter that said,

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<v Speaker 1>there's this little boutique law firm that's opening a San

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<v Speaker 1>Francisco office and they specialized in representing whistleblowers. So this

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<v Speaker 1>was like twenty four years ago, and that was a

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<v Speaker 1>time when there really weren't whistle blowers, weren't really the

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<v Speaker 1>esteemed place that they sit in our society today, part

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<v Speaker 1>of every news cycle, it seems like. And I was

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<v Speaker 1>just really really lucky. At the time I started, the

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<v Speaker 1>Supreme Court had not even yet said that the whistleblower

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<v Speaker 1>primary whistle blower program called the False Claim Sect something

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<v Speaker 1>we'll talk about later today. It wasn't even held to

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<v Speaker 1>be constitutional yet. So I remember getting advice from people saying,

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<v Speaker 1>what you want to specialize in this one statue that

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<v Speaker 1>the Supreme Court hasn't even said is legitimate, is constitutional?

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<v Speaker 1>And I said, well, um, it sounds really intriguing I'm

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<v Speaker 1>gonna roll the dice, and I did, And boy, I

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<v Speaker 1>did I have any idea that this was going to

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<v Speaker 1>become an amazing growth field and that the United States

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<v Speaker 1>government in particular has come to see whistle blowers as

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<v Speaker 1>their most effective law enforcement tool. So who are some

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<v Speaker 1>of the folks that you have represented in your career?

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<v Speaker 1>You know a lot of them. I do know a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of them, and it's been an enormous privilege every

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<v Speaker 1>day I kind of jumped out of bed to represent

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<v Speaker 1>people who really have the intestinal fortitude and the strength

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<v Speaker 1>to speak truth to power. So I think some of

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<v Speaker 1>your listeners probably most familiar. Tyler Schultz says Sarani's whistle

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<v Speaker 1>blower is one of my clients. Um. I've had a

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<v Speaker 1>number of health air fraud whistleblowers, including a gentleman by

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<v Speaker 1>the name of Dr James Taylor, who will be front

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<v Speaker 1>page news in the in the New York Times soon

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<v Speaker 1>exposing Medicare fraud by health insurers. I've also represented another

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<v Speaker 1>gentleman by the name of Benjamin Paling, who has also

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<v Speaker 1>shown a light on United Health Group for Medicare fraud,

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<v Speaker 1>as well as Dr Taylor shining a light on Kaiser permanente.

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<v Speaker 1>So there's been a huge group of them. But the

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<v Speaker 1>one I like to talk about the most is a

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<v Speaker 1>whistle blower that was the subject of a story in

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<v Speaker 1>The New Yorker magazine a few years ago called The

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<v Speaker 1>Personal Toll of whistle Blowing. His name was Dr Darren

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<v Speaker 1>sewell Um, and he's one that I like to talk

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<v Speaker 1>about a lot because I think he might still be

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<v Speaker 1>with us today had he not made the choice to

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<v Speaker 1>be a whistleblower. Tell us that story, what happened there? Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>So I think it's it's something that we're gonna explore.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm I'm confident today is this idea what are the

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<v Speaker 1>repercussions of speaking out? And I'm sure a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>your listeners are well all aware that it can be

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<v Speaker 1>a career defining moment, in fact that it's often considered

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<v Speaker 1>career suicide. And so we're pretty familiar with the fact

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<v Speaker 1>that in certain industries, particularly healthcare or defense, you may

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<v Speaker 1>never work again if you speak out. But I think

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<v Speaker 1>what people are less aware of, and we're becoming more

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<v Speaker 1>sensitized too, is the psychosocial impacts of speaking out. The

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<v Speaker 1>New England Journal of Medicine did a research study a

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<v Speaker 1>number of years ago now that basically looked at whistlers

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<v Speaker 1>in the pharmaceutical industry who had reported off label marketing fraud,

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<v Speaker 1>and the study showed that the health effects were such

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<v Speaker 1>that whistlers have higher incidences of divorce, of alcoholism, of depression.

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<v Speaker 1>And I think so much of that comes from this

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<v Speaker 1>really primal notion that when you speak up and speak out,

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<v Speaker 1>you lose your tribe. You speak out against your tribe,

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<v Speaker 1>and your tribe tends to close ranks around you, and

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<v Speaker 1>there's really strong psychological circumstances to losing your support network.

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<v Speaker 1>So in the case of Dr Seol, he exposed health

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<v Speaker 1>care fraud at health Insure in Florida, and he really

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<v Speaker 1>could never work again because of his personal situation where

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<v Speaker 1>his daughter lived in Florida. He really couldn't just go

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<v Speaker 1>live somewhere else. And so all the health insurers community

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<v Speaker 1>and health care community was aware of him. And so

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<v Speaker 1>when he would get a job interests, you know, when

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<v Speaker 1>they called for references, all of a sudden they didn't

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<v Speaker 1>want to talk to him again. Um, And that became

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<v Speaker 1>a really difficult circumstance for him. Um. He actually wore

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<v Speaker 1>a wire for the FBI on that case. So and

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of stress that goes along with that, and

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<v Speaker 1>you know, and he and he passed away after UM,

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<v Speaker 1>just a long series of circumstances of not being employed.

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<v Speaker 1>So they really do, UM put a lot on the line.

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<v Speaker 1>And it was interesting. I wasn't aware that healthcare and

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<v Speaker 1>defense are particularly that way. I can understand the company, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, maybe uh not being in a hurry to

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<v Speaker 1>hire you back, but the whole industry that you're in

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<v Speaker 1>shutting you is a completely different matter, you know what

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<v Speaker 1>I mean. That's UM, that's that's really dire. UM. So

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<v Speaker 1>just just before we get further into some of the

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<v Speaker 1>impacts on the lives of whistleblowers, how do you decide

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<v Speaker 1>how you take clients or whether you take a client

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<v Speaker 1>or not. We represent whistle blowers under what we call

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<v Speaker 1>the US Whistleblower Reward Programs, so that all of a

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<v Speaker 1>sudden narrows the universe. We wish that we could represent

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<v Speaker 1>all whistle blowers. We don't do national security whistlers, for instance,

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<v Speaker 1>in the United States were fairly hypocritical. We're one of

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<v Speaker 1>the most advanced societies for having this notion that in law,

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement settings we pay whistle blowers for information, recognizing

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<v Speaker 1>what they're giving up by speaking out. That's when these

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<v Speaker 1>whistle blowers are helpful and exposing fraud against the government

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<v Speaker 1>or fraud that impact our regulatory agencies missions like the

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<v Speaker 1>SEC fraud against investors. But when it's fraud by the government,

0:14:07.360 --> 0:14:10.720
<v Speaker 1>when we have those kinds of whistlers, when they're exposing

0:14:10.760 --> 0:14:13.640
<v Speaker 1>wrongdoing by the government, it's a very different setting. We

0:14:13.640 --> 0:14:16.079
<v Speaker 1>don't pay whistlers. In fact, we are just as bad

0:14:16.559 --> 0:14:20.000
<v Speaker 1>and medieval in terms of shooting the messenger. And so

0:14:20.480 --> 0:14:23.440
<v Speaker 1>just to make sure I understand, if I blow the

0:14:23.480 --> 0:14:28.360
<v Speaker 1>whistle on the government for some kind of malfeasance, there's

0:14:28.400 --> 0:14:32.360
<v Speaker 1>no financial reward in that for me, which makes it

0:14:32.440 --> 0:14:35.040
<v Speaker 1>very hard for you to take them on as as

0:14:35.040 --> 0:14:38.080
<v Speaker 1>a client, right right, right. So one of these we

0:14:38.120 --> 0:14:40.280
<v Speaker 1>do is we represent our clients. And this is something

0:14:40.280 --> 0:14:42.800
<v Speaker 1>that became really apparent to me when I moved to

0:14:42.920 --> 0:14:46.160
<v Speaker 1>London and sort of looked at the UK legal system

0:14:46.360 --> 0:14:48.280
<v Speaker 1>is to get to the brass tacks and gets kind

0:14:48.280 --> 0:14:49.960
<v Speaker 1>of boring to people. But I think it's important to

0:14:50.000 --> 0:14:52.520
<v Speaker 1>understand that. Um in the United States, a lot of

0:14:52.520 --> 0:14:55.760
<v Speaker 1>plane emplawyers like myself represent their clients on a contingency

0:14:55.840 --> 0:14:59.200
<v Speaker 1>fee or a success fee basis, so that means we

0:14:59.280 --> 0:15:02.560
<v Speaker 1>only get paid aid if we're successful in returning and

0:15:02.600 --> 0:15:07.120
<v Speaker 1>helping our client get a reward that actually facilitates access

0:15:07.120 --> 0:15:09.880
<v Speaker 1>to justice because in the UK they don't really like

0:15:10.040 --> 0:15:12.120
<v Speaker 1>that kind of a model, and as a result, lots

0:15:12.160 --> 0:15:15.680
<v Speaker 1>of whistlers and other people can't get lawyers because it's

0:15:15.800 --> 0:15:18.280
<v Speaker 1>very difficult to pay you know, six hundred seven hundred

0:15:18.280 --> 0:15:21.560
<v Speaker 1>dollars an hour when um, that's not within your budget.

0:15:22.120 --> 0:15:24.760
<v Speaker 1>So I think that's part of it is that these

0:15:24.760 --> 0:15:27.120
<v Speaker 1>bounties do, and I like, I don't like to call

0:15:27.160 --> 0:15:30.720
<v Speaker 1>them bounties because they almost suggest we're pirates. Um. These

0:15:30.800 --> 0:15:35.120
<v Speaker 1>these rewards and these awards go to whistleblowers to recognize

0:15:35.160 --> 0:15:38.440
<v Speaker 1>what they're giving up and to entice them to undertake

0:15:38.480 --> 0:15:42.000
<v Speaker 1>the risk in speaking out. But what's interesting is these

0:15:42.040 --> 0:15:44.440
<v Speaker 1>programs do a lot more than just pay the whistleblowers.

0:15:44.480 --> 0:15:48.200
<v Speaker 1>They actually create offices of the whistleblower. In the SEC,

0:15:48.440 --> 0:15:51.040
<v Speaker 1>the CFTC, I know we're going through alphabet soup in

0:15:51.040 --> 0:15:54.760
<v Speaker 1>the I r S, they actually have offices that are

0:15:54.800 --> 0:15:58.920
<v Speaker 1>staffed with people who are prepared to receive information from whistleblowers.

0:15:59.280 --> 0:16:02.800
<v Speaker 1>It sounds undane, but it isn't because a lot of

0:16:02.800 --> 0:16:05.840
<v Speaker 1>people don't know where to bring their information, and these

0:16:05.880 --> 0:16:10.720
<v Speaker 1>programs create, you know, staffed experts who are there with

0:16:10.760 --> 0:16:14.720
<v Speaker 1>special forms and web portals to upload your information, and

0:16:14.760 --> 0:16:17.720
<v Speaker 1>they're obligated to report back to Congress and tell them

0:16:17.840 --> 0:16:21.120
<v Speaker 1>how they're doing with this whistle lower information. And that's

0:16:21.160 --> 0:16:25.000
<v Speaker 1>really what's revolutionary here. It's not just that, it's it's

0:16:25.080 --> 0:16:27.560
<v Speaker 1>rolling out the welcome at to whistleblowers in a way

0:16:27.960 --> 0:16:31.720
<v Speaker 1>that clearly signposts where they should go and ensuring that

0:16:31.760 --> 0:16:35.840
<v Speaker 1>the information that they bring is actually looked at. Yeah,

0:16:35.880 --> 0:16:40.200
<v Speaker 1>that's important work. So you've touched on a little bit

0:16:40.240 --> 0:16:42.800
<v Speaker 1>already in some of the stories you've told what risks

0:16:42.840 --> 0:16:47.080
<v Speaker 1>whistleblowers take by deciding to shine a light on you know,

0:16:47.320 --> 0:16:51.680
<v Speaker 1>let's call it organizational malfeasance. Can you talk more about

0:16:51.720 --> 0:16:54.200
<v Speaker 1>those risks? You know, what are some of the other

0:16:54.360 --> 0:16:57.800
<v Speaker 1>aspects of it. I can think of one other for instance,

0:16:57.880 --> 0:17:02.960
<v Speaker 1>like Tyler Schultz was in a bizarre situation where his grandfather,

0:17:03.240 --> 0:17:06.280
<v Speaker 1>who was the ex Secretary of State. Is that right?

0:17:06.440 --> 0:17:09.960
<v Speaker 1>Is his grandfather was was also an investor in the

0:17:10.000 --> 0:17:13.400
<v Speaker 1>company that Tyler worked in and on the board, I believe,

0:17:13.880 --> 0:17:19.600
<v Speaker 1>and and so he risked not only, you know, terminating

0:17:19.640 --> 0:17:25.200
<v Speaker 1>his relationship with the leadership of Sarais, but also with

0:17:25.320 --> 0:17:28.360
<v Speaker 1>his own members of his own family, and he put

0:17:28.440 --> 0:17:31.280
<v Speaker 1>a lot on the line there. I think his story

0:17:31.359 --> 0:17:33.119
<v Speaker 1>is a great one to spotlight in terms of what

0:17:33.200 --> 0:17:36.320
<v Speaker 1>are the effects of whistle bling that we haven't necessarily

0:17:36.440 --> 0:17:38.720
<v Speaker 1>explored yet. And one of them, it's what I call

0:17:38.760 --> 0:17:41.800
<v Speaker 1>the inequality of arms that a whistleblower goes against a

0:17:41.880 --> 0:17:46.200
<v Speaker 1>large corporation like Saranos, which was the darling of all investors.

0:17:46.240 --> 0:17:49.359
<v Speaker 1>You know, Elizabeth was on the cover of Forbes magazine.

0:17:49.960 --> 0:17:53.080
<v Speaker 1>And what happens is when you sign up as an employee,

0:17:53.119 --> 0:17:57.200
<v Speaker 1>you signed confidentiality agreements that often include nondisclosure and non

0:17:57.240 --> 0:18:01.160
<v Speaker 1>disparagement clauses. And what happened in Tyler's case is he

0:18:01.280 --> 0:18:05.040
<v Speaker 1>was visiting his grandfather and attorneys from Boy Schiller, who

0:18:05.040 --> 0:18:08.399
<v Speaker 1>were representing sara No Nos, basically served him with a

0:18:08.400 --> 0:18:13.560
<v Speaker 1>restraining order telling him stop violating your confidentiality agreement. UM.

0:18:13.640 --> 0:18:16.200
<v Speaker 1>They had come to understand that he had been giving

0:18:16.240 --> 0:18:19.159
<v Speaker 1>information to John Careyrew with the Wall Street Journal reporter

0:18:19.200 --> 0:18:22.760
<v Speaker 1>who exposed it all. But what happened is his parents

0:18:22.880 --> 0:18:25.760
<v Speaker 1>ended up, he's a young person at the time, ended

0:18:25.840 --> 0:18:27.840
<v Speaker 1>up taking out a mortgage on their home to pay

0:18:27.840 --> 0:18:30.879
<v Speaker 1>four hundred thousand dollars to pay for the attorneys to

0:18:31.000 --> 0:18:35.560
<v Speaker 1>defend against this lawsuit. We're saying he violated their trade secrets,

0:18:35.560 --> 0:18:39.600
<v Speaker 1>their proprietary confidentiality and agreement. And one of the most

0:18:39.640 --> 0:18:42.439
<v Speaker 1>famous things that Tyler said is he said, fraud is

0:18:42.480 --> 0:18:45.639
<v Speaker 1>not a trade secret, right, and that seems intuitive to

0:18:45.720 --> 0:18:48.439
<v Speaker 1>all that that seems intuitive to all of us, right,

0:18:48.480 --> 0:18:50.480
<v Speaker 1>But that doesn't mean that he didn't have to suffer

0:18:50.560 --> 0:18:53.720
<v Speaker 1>through an immense amount of litigation in order to get

0:18:53.760 --> 0:18:56.640
<v Speaker 1>that right result, which is that you know, in public policy,

0:18:56.800 --> 0:19:01.520
<v Speaker 1>we want certain information to get out to law enforcement,

0:19:01.520 --> 0:19:04.640
<v Speaker 1>which is what he did. So it's that these huge

0:19:04.680 --> 0:19:09.360
<v Speaker 1>corporations have a corporate playbook which is to basically destroy

0:19:09.400 --> 0:19:12.520
<v Speaker 1>the whistleblower. And and it's not just to silence them's

0:19:12.560 --> 0:19:16.359
<v Speaker 1>to silence all the employees who are watching everyone else. Yeah,

0:19:16.400 --> 0:19:20.280
<v Speaker 1>that's right, scare scare everybody else, absolutely, So you know,

0:19:20.359 --> 0:19:21.880
<v Speaker 1>that's just one of the things is that they will

0:19:21.920 --> 0:19:25.040
<v Speaker 1>often sue them for theft of documents. They will sue

0:19:25.080 --> 0:19:30.000
<v Speaker 1>them for violations of the confidentiality agreement because they're so intent,

0:19:30.119 --> 0:19:33.480
<v Speaker 1>these companies on digging up dirt with this theory that

0:19:33.560 --> 0:19:37.760
<v Speaker 1>if you besmirched the whistleblower, it diverts attention from the

0:19:37.800 --> 0:19:41.280
<v Speaker 1>message that the whistleblower is is giving right, We'll shoot

0:19:41.280 --> 0:19:44.600
<v Speaker 1>the messenger to divert attention from the pr scandal that's

0:19:44.640 --> 0:19:49.160
<v Speaker 1>happening in front of their very eyes. And unfortunately, that's

0:19:49.200 --> 0:19:52.439
<v Speaker 1>that is the playbook. It makes me wonder because you know,

0:19:52.600 --> 0:19:54.680
<v Speaker 1>I've worked in a bunch of companies and I'm I've

0:19:54.760 --> 0:19:58.119
<v Speaker 1>signed a bunch of n d A. S Is it

0:19:58.280 --> 0:20:03.000
<v Speaker 1>there should be language protecting the person signing if the

0:20:03.119 --> 0:20:10.320
<v Speaker 1>company is committing fraud as as Tyler said, does that exist? Well,

0:20:10.520 --> 0:20:12.359
<v Speaker 1>you have you have put your finger on one of

0:20:12.480 --> 0:20:15.080
<v Speaker 1>to me, one of the best topics, which is UM.

0:20:15.119 --> 0:20:18.199
<v Speaker 1>There is a marvelous whistler who is because of her

0:20:18.240 --> 0:20:21.280
<v Speaker 1>experience of pinterest. Her names of Foma a Zoma. She

0:20:21.440 --> 0:20:24.600
<v Speaker 1>actually broke her n d A to speak out about

0:20:24.720 --> 0:20:27.560
<v Speaker 1>race and sex discrimination at pintrist. She's an African American

0:20:27.600 --> 0:20:32.520
<v Speaker 1>woman UM and she actually went ahead to have two

0:20:32.640 --> 0:20:35.880
<v Speaker 1>laws passed, one in California and one an Oregon called

0:20:35.880 --> 0:20:38.679
<v Speaker 1>the Silence No More Act, And what they seek to

0:20:38.720 --> 0:20:44.480
<v Speaker 1>do is hold those provisions unenforceable. So that's the insidious

0:20:44.520 --> 0:20:47.399
<v Speaker 1>part about these provisions as a lot of people see

0:20:47.480 --> 0:20:51.399
<v Speaker 1>the consequences of violating it. If they signed a severance

0:20:51.400 --> 0:20:53.600
<v Speaker 1>degree with this part of a severance package and you

0:20:53.640 --> 0:20:55.479
<v Speaker 1>have to give back all of that money, there can

0:20:55.520 --> 0:20:57.879
<v Speaker 1>be you know, damages on top of that. So it

0:20:57.920 --> 0:21:00.960
<v Speaker 1>has an enormous chilling effect of the things companies do.

0:21:01.240 --> 0:21:03.840
<v Speaker 1>They've gotten hip to the fact that these whistleblowers can

0:21:03.880 --> 0:21:08.240
<v Speaker 1>get rewards. They put in the separation agreement when you're signing,

0:21:08.480 --> 0:21:11.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, to get your you know years severance for

0:21:11.920 --> 0:21:14.720
<v Speaker 1>working there. How many years they say, I waived my

0:21:14.880 --> 0:21:18.120
<v Speaker 1>right to a reward under any of the whistleblower programs,

0:21:18.119 --> 0:21:22.440
<v Speaker 1>which is only shouldn't that shouldn't be legal. Yeah, well

0:21:22.480 --> 0:21:24.440
<v Speaker 1>that's good. The only way it stops when it is

0:21:24.480 --> 0:21:26.960
<v Speaker 1>when the SEC comes in and finds them. I was

0:21:27.000 --> 0:21:32.040
<v Speaker 1>reading an article today in publication called The Information that

0:21:32.280 --> 0:21:36.080
<v Speaker 1>said that reports to the SEC whistle blowing reports to

0:21:36.119 --> 0:21:42.680
<v Speaker 1>the SEC are up seventy six percent in over which

0:21:42.800 --> 0:21:47.919
<v Speaker 1>was already a record setting year from what do you

0:21:47.960 --> 0:21:51.560
<v Speaker 1>think is causing that. What's what's going on there? Well,

0:21:51.600 --> 0:21:55.520
<v Speaker 1>it's really interesting. Um, what might cause some of the

0:21:55.600 --> 0:21:58.920
<v Speaker 1>numbers is that we saw during the pandemic whistle blowing

0:21:58.960 --> 0:22:02.480
<v Speaker 1>just increasing across US sectors. Um, the SEC I think

0:22:02.480 --> 0:22:05.520
<v Speaker 1>saw fort rise. You know, we're all speculating here, but

0:22:05.640 --> 0:22:08.320
<v Speaker 1>is it because we're no longer in the workplace? You know,

0:22:08.400 --> 0:22:11.200
<v Speaker 1>there was a great resignation or people feeling less attached

0:22:11.200 --> 0:22:13.919
<v Speaker 1>to their employers. Are we having you know, these moments

0:22:13.920 --> 0:22:17.720
<v Speaker 1>of what really matters? So I think it started very much.

0:22:17.840 --> 0:22:19.960
<v Speaker 1>We have to look at the pandemic a little bit

0:22:20.160 --> 0:22:22.399
<v Speaker 1>um to understand some of these numbers. But as to

0:22:22.440 --> 0:22:26.560
<v Speaker 1>the SEC specifically, it's their success so um. I think

0:22:26.560 --> 0:22:29.320
<v Speaker 1>it was last year they crossed the billion dollar threshold

0:22:29.320 --> 0:22:32.800
<v Speaker 1>that they've paid over a billion dollars in rewards to whistleblowers.

0:22:33.880 --> 0:22:36.399
<v Speaker 1>And you know, it's a very controversial topic outside the

0:22:36.440 --> 0:22:39.040
<v Speaker 1>United States, and the United States were very comfortable with

0:22:39.080 --> 0:22:42.959
<v Speaker 1>this idea of paying rewards to whistleblowers UM in commonwealth

0:22:43.040 --> 0:22:45.840
<v Speaker 1>countries in the UK, it's anothema and a lot of

0:22:45.880 --> 0:22:48.720
<v Speaker 1>that comes from very strong cultural stereotypes. I think there's

0:22:48.760 --> 0:22:51.760
<v Speaker 1>a notion that Americans are mercenary and were transactional and

0:22:51.800 --> 0:22:53.520
<v Speaker 1>we have to be paid to do the right thing,

0:22:53.840 --> 0:22:59.640
<v Speaker 1>whereas British people do the right thing right upright, upstanding. Yeah,

0:23:00.240 --> 0:23:03.720
<v Speaker 1>but those rewards say something. I mean they basically, um

0:23:04.119 --> 0:23:06.800
<v Speaker 1>have a ripple effect around the globe when you pay

0:23:06.840 --> 0:23:10.280
<v Speaker 1>two fifty million dollars to a whistleblower, and then that

0:23:10.359 --> 0:23:13.880
<v Speaker 1>means that we really really value them. And so when

0:23:13.920 --> 0:23:17.000
<v Speaker 1>we say you get ten to you know, ten to

0:23:17.040 --> 0:23:20.000
<v Speaker 1>thirty percent of our recovery, we mean it regardless of

0:23:20.040 --> 0:23:24.919
<v Speaker 1>what size there you know penalty was. Whistleblowers trust the

0:23:24.960 --> 0:23:29.480
<v Speaker 1>American regulators because they believe we're aggressive. So international whistle

0:23:29.480 --> 0:23:32.280
<v Speaker 1>blowers have a lot more faith bringing their information to

0:23:32.960 --> 0:23:35.359
<v Speaker 1>US regulators because they know it won't be a feudal act.

0:23:35.480 --> 0:23:38.760
<v Speaker 1>The SEC gets twelve thousand tips a year now. They

0:23:38.800 --> 0:23:42.040
<v Speaker 1>come from ninety nine countries around the globe. Last year

0:23:43.400 --> 0:23:48.000
<v Speaker 1>of the people receiving awards came from overseas. So it's

0:23:48.040 --> 0:23:51.000
<v Speaker 1>really a beacon. Um. We always say it's like Lady

0:23:51.080 --> 0:23:56.360
<v Speaker 1>Liberties torch saying give us your give us your give

0:23:56.440 --> 0:24:00.000
<v Speaker 1>us your poor, you're you're tired, and your whistleblowers. I'm

0:24:00.000 --> 0:24:02.000
<v Speaker 1>want to follow a thread that you you started to

0:24:02.000 --> 0:24:04.800
<v Speaker 1>pull out there a little bit, which was, you know,

0:24:05.160 --> 0:24:09.600
<v Speaker 1>the the results of whistle blowing. I wonder if you

0:24:09.600 --> 0:24:13.560
<v Speaker 1>could talk just about any examples that you have or

0:24:13.680 --> 0:24:16.840
<v Speaker 1>data that you have on whistleblowers whose actions have resulted

0:24:17.080 --> 0:24:23.040
<v Speaker 1>in real change, you know, in things really improving. So

0:24:23.160 --> 0:24:26.920
<v Speaker 1>I can't not start with the Ukraine whistle blower who

0:24:26.960 --> 0:24:31.240
<v Speaker 1>exposed President Trump. I mean in terms of holding powerful

0:24:31.280 --> 0:24:35.400
<v Speaker 1>people to account, that was an extraordinary result and one

0:24:35.400 --> 0:24:37.480
<v Speaker 1>of the oddest things happening. There was of course that

0:24:37.600 --> 0:24:42.240
<v Speaker 1>his identity was exposed by Trump and certain other politicians,

0:24:42.240 --> 0:24:45.639
<v Speaker 1>which is yeah, I mean incredibly like there should be

0:24:45.720 --> 0:24:48.800
<v Speaker 1>sanctions for that kind of a thing because obviously that

0:24:49.000 --> 0:24:53.080
<v Speaker 1>threatens his life and livelihood and safety. So that was extraordinary.

0:24:53.560 --> 0:24:55.560
<v Speaker 1>But I mean, I think some of the other whistleblowers,

0:24:55.600 --> 0:24:57.199
<v Speaker 1>I mean, look at the Me Too movement. You know,

0:24:57.280 --> 0:25:00.679
<v Speaker 1>it caused shock waves around the world world, and it

0:25:00.760 --> 0:25:03.440
<v Speaker 1>also caused us all to rethink what an n DA

0:25:03.720 --> 0:25:07.680
<v Speaker 1>is and should we have these kinds of agreements in place,

0:25:07.760 --> 0:25:09.960
<v Speaker 1>and so you know, you look at Francis, it makes

0:25:10.040 --> 0:25:13.000
<v Speaker 1>us relook social media. You look at these healthcare fraud

0:25:13.000 --> 0:25:16.960
<v Speaker 1>whistle lowers, You know, health insurance companies now think differently

0:25:17.119 --> 0:25:20.800
<v Speaker 1>before they upcode these diagnoses that they're doing to get

0:25:20.800 --> 0:25:24.920
<v Speaker 1>more money from Medicare. I mean, it is an incrediblely

0:25:25.080 --> 0:25:30.199
<v Speaker 1>powerful tool to shake corporations out of their slumber and

0:25:30.280 --> 0:25:32.959
<v Speaker 1>into being held accountable for wrongdoing. And I think part

0:25:33.000 --> 0:25:36.200
<v Speaker 1>of it is the deterrent effect. Right. You see these

0:25:36.240 --> 0:25:40.600
<v Speaker 1>big penalties and fines that are levied, and I think

0:25:40.600 --> 0:25:43.199
<v Speaker 1>it does have a deterrent effect. And you know, I

0:25:43.240 --> 0:25:46.439
<v Speaker 1>know from my European experience, a lot of companies choose

0:25:46.480 --> 0:25:48.639
<v Speaker 1>not to list on the U S stock exchanges that

0:25:48.800 --> 0:25:53.280
<v Speaker 1>of fear of having the jurisdiction of the SEC. Really

0:25:53.760 --> 0:25:57.959
<v Speaker 1>oh yeah, oh yeah. Um. So they want access, they

0:25:58.000 --> 0:26:00.560
<v Speaker 1>want access to our capital markets, but there's scared what

0:26:00.640 --> 0:26:04.959
<v Speaker 1>that comes? Right? Interesting? That makes me think there is

0:26:05.240 --> 0:26:10.000
<v Speaker 1>maybe some problems there. So I'm gonna ask you to

0:26:10.040 --> 0:26:14.879
<v Speaker 1>talk about or explain the False Claims Act. What is

0:26:14.920 --> 0:26:18.560
<v Speaker 1>that about, What what is it for? What does it do? Yeah,

0:26:18.680 --> 0:26:21.760
<v Speaker 1>so it is the touchstone of you can't talk about

0:26:21.800 --> 0:26:24.639
<v Speaker 1>whistleblower reward programs in the United States without going to

0:26:24.680 --> 0:26:27.320
<v Speaker 1>the False Claims Act. It's actually called Lincoln's Law. It

0:26:27.480 --> 0:26:30.480
<v Speaker 1>was enacted in the wake of the Civil War, and

0:26:30.560 --> 0:26:33.800
<v Speaker 1>it recognized something that is now more true than ever

0:26:33.880 --> 0:26:36.880
<v Speaker 1>today than it was back then, that um, it's very

0:26:36.960 --> 0:26:41.240
<v Speaker 1>difficult for the government to investigate and to detect fraud.

0:26:41.560 --> 0:26:44.720
<v Speaker 1>The United States pours tons of money into medicare and

0:26:44.800 --> 0:26:48.000
<v Speaker 1>into defense, and it's hard to police that from the

0:26:48.080 --> 0:26:51.479
<v Speaker 1>outside and that there's no substitute for a well placed

0:26:51.520 --> 0:26:55.719
<v Speaker 1>insider to bring that information forward. So we want to

0:26:55.760 --> 0:26:59.760
<v Speaker 1>incentivize these people because they have an insiders have incredibly

0:27:00.119 --> 0:27:03.639
<v Speaker 1>valuable information that basically creates a roadmap to the fraud

0:27:03.680 --> 0:27:06.399
<v Speaker 1>for any prosecutor. We often say to the prosecutors, and

0:27:06.440 --> 0:27:09.240
<v Speaker 1>I've heard prosecutors say this does key tam cases are

0:27:09.280 --> 0:27:11.960
<v Speaker 1>like cake in a box delivered to our office. Is

0:27:12.000 --> 0:27:20.640
<v Speaker 1>we just add water? Because the key tam for asking

0:27:20.680 --> 0:27:24.399
<v Speaker 1>that key tam is short for a Latin phrase that

0:27:24.480 --> 0:27:27.320
<v Speaker 1>basically stands for he who stands on the shoes of

0:27:27.359 --> 0:27:31.760
<v Speaker 1>the king as well as himself, and this comes from

0:27:31.840 --> 0:27:33.720
<v Speaker 1>English common I don't want to get too nerdy, but

0:27:33.760 --> 0:27:36.480
<v Speaker 1>there was an idea in England before they had police

0:27:36.480 --> 0:27:42.679
<v Speaker 1>forces that individuals could basically service police. And so we

0:27:42.840 --> 0:27:45.560
<v Speaker 1>took this concept in the United States and we said

0:27:45.600 --> 0:27:48.960
<v Speaker 1>We're going to make these people private attorney generals. They

0:27:49.000 --> 0:27:51.920
<v Speaker 1>will stand in the shoes of the United States government

0:27:51.920 --> 0:27:54.840
<v Speaker 1>and launch lawsuits in their names. So what I think

0:27:54.920 --> 0:27:57.680
<v Speaker 1>so powerful about the false claims because people seem familiar

0:27:57.720 --> 0:27:59.959
<v Speaker 1>with the tip program, with the sec ree file. It's

0:28:00.040 --> 0:28:02.960
<v Speaker 1>hup anonymously and if if they act on your information,

0:28:03.000 --> 0:28:05.520
<v Speaker 1>you can get a reward. Under the False Claims Act,

0:28:05.560 --> 0:28:09.879
<v Speaker 1>we deputize a whistleblower to launch a lawsuit in the

0:28:09.960 --> 0:28:13.000
<v Speaker 1>name of the government. You can imagine how I am

0:28:13.080 --> 0:28:15.680
<v Speaker 1>received when we show up and say, um, we're now

0:28:15.760 --> 0:28:20.520
<v Speaker 1>suing Boeing for you know, something defective planes to the U.

0:28:20.600 --> 0:28:23.800
<v Speaker 1>S Military or something like that. Can you imagine? There

0:28:23.800 --> 0:28:26.399
<v Speaker 1>are now thirty states that have False Claims Act. So

0:28:26.560 --> 0:28:29.880
<v Speaker 1>I have been in the position of suing on behalf

0:28:29.960 --> 0:28:34.879
<v Speaker 1>of thirty cities in California, right because if private contractors

0:28:34.880 --> 0:28:38.520
<v Speaker 1>are cheating the the FISK in California, then they can

0:28:38.520 --> 0:28:40.680
<v Speaker 1>bring these kinds of cases. And I show up at

0:28:40.720 --> 0:28:44.120
<v Speaker 1>the city attorney's office and you know, San Francisco and say,

0:28:44.160 --> 0:28:47.640
<v Speaker 1>I've just folowed a lawsuit in your name. Let's talk.

0:28:48.200 --> 0:28:50.640
<v Speaker 1>Let's talk about how do we go about discovery, Like

0:28:50.640 --> 0:28:52.720
<v Speaker 1>how are we going to prosecute this thing? Right? So

0:28:53.040 --> 0:28:55.840
<v Speaker 1>it's an enormously powerful tool, and it's something that is

0:28:55.920 --> 0:28:57.960
<v Speaker 1>unique to the United States. Although I always say to

0:28:58.000 --> 0:29:00.440
<v Speaker 1>the UK that we stole it for view and now

0:29:00.480 --> 0:29:02.640
<v Speaker 1>we're trying to sell it back to you as our own.

0:29:03.800 --> 0:29:08.440
<v Speaker 1>That's funny. Well, what goes around comes around. So I'm

0:29:08.440 --> 0:29:11.040
<v Speaker 1>gonna pivot here in just a second. But the last

0:29:11.120 --> 0:29:16.800
<v Speaker 1>question on this sort of theme of of whistleblower repression. Um.

0:29:16.840 --> 0:29:20.880
<v Speaker 1>You know, CEOs and HR departments often see whistleblowers as traders.

0:29:21.160 --> 0:29:23.720
<v Speaker 1>You know, they do things like right anti whistle blowing

0:29:23.760 --> 0:29:27.120
<v Speaker 1>language into the contracts, as you've mentioned, to prevent it.

0:29:27.200 --> 0:29:29.840
<v Speaker 1>Can you talk about some of the other strategies that

0:29:29.920 --> 0:29:34.440
<v Speaker 1>companies use to discourage whistle blowing. Sure, and so I

0:29:34.440 --> 0:29:37.120
<v Speaker 1>think it really comes back to more of this idea

0:29:37.400 --> 0:29:41.960
<v Speaker 1>of the medieval mindset, the corporate playbook that is in

0:29:42.040 --> 0:29:46.120
<v Speaker 1>place that basically shames whistle blowers who speak out. To me,

0:29:46.440 --> 0:29:49.560
<v Speaker 1>that is one of the biggest things that they do. UM.

0:29:49.600 --> 0:29:52.560
<v Speaker 1>And what's interesting is that in the wake of the

0:29:52.760 --> 0:29:58.920
<v Speaker 1>enron Um scandal, we adopted Sarbanes Oxley legislation that basically

0:29:58.960 --> 0:30:05.600
<v Speaker 1>requires companies of certain sizes to include a designated anonymous

0:30:05.680 --> 0:30:10.640
<v Speaker 1>internal whistle blowing mechanism. So we recognize that maybe if

0:30:10.680 --> 0:30:12.880
<v Speaker 1>there had been a mechanism like that that had been

0:30:12.880 --> 0:30:16.520
<v Speaker 1>clearly signposted, that could have maybe stop and Ron in

0:30:16.600 --> 0:30:20.000
<v Speaker 1>its tracks. Right. So I think that's that's one of

0:30:20.040 --> 0:30:22.880
<v Speaker 1>the things that has been imposed upon companies because they

0:30:23.000 --> 0:30:26.880
<v Speaker 1>haven't created a situation where people feel safe to speak up.

0:30:26.920 --> 0:30:30.080
<v Speaker 1>So I think those those kinds of mechanisms are fine,

0:30:30.240 --> 0:30:32.920
<v Speaker 1>But those mechanisms are only as good as the culture

0:30:33.000 --> 0:30:36.040
<v Speaker 1>that's behind it. Right, You know, it has to start

0:30:36.480 --> 0:30:38.360
<v Speaker 1>with the tone of the top. It has to start

0:30:38.400 --> 0:30:42.720
<v Speaker 1>with creating an environment where, um, people feel safe to

0:30:42.760 --> 0:30:46.160
<v Speaker 1>speak out and you value it. That's the thing, right,

0:30:46.360 --> 0:30:51.080
<v Speaker 1>is culture change within corporations. And there's an irony to this,

0:30:51.240 --> 0:30:53.160
<v Speaker 1>which you pointed out to me in one of our

0:30:53.200 --> 0:30:57.680
<v Speaker 1>first conversations. At your suggestion, I read to Harvard Business

0:30:57.720 --> 0:31:02.280
<v Speaker 1>Review articles about the late data on whistleblowing, and there

0:31:02.280 --> 0:31:05.400
<v Speaker 1>were just a number of eye opening revelations in that data.

0:31:05.440 --> 0:31:12.560
<v Speaker 1>For instance, companies that don't attack whistleblowers actually do better financially. Um,

0:31:12.600 --> 0:31:17.600
<v Speaker 1>So why why is that? So? What this research is

0:31:17.640 --> 0:31:20.640
<v Speaker 1>showing is that companies that create a space where whistleblowers

0:31:20.680 --> 0:31:25.160
<v Speaker 1>feel safe to speak out. Those companies have fewer lawsuits

0:31:25.200 --> 0:31:30.200
<v Speaker 1>against them, fewer federal investigations, with the assumption being whistler

0:31:30.280 --> 0:31:34.160
<v Speaker 1>serve the function and actually helped them stop and correct

0:31:34.240 --> 0:31:39.760
<v Speaker 1>course before some wrongdoing metastasized into the next big PR scandal.

0:31:40.280 --> 0:31:43.440
<v Speaker 1>So I really love it because it tells us that

0:31:43.640 --> 0:31:46.360
<v Speaker 1>not only do we need to change how we think

0:31:46.400 --> 0:31:49.640
<v Speaker 1>about whistleblowers, we need to celebrate them as almost the

0:31:49.720 --> 0:31:52.720
<v Speaker 1>CEO's best friend. I mean, it's such a brain drain

0:31:53.080 --> 0:31:57.560
<v Speaker 1>when you let these people go, because they are really, um,

0:31:57.640 --> 0:32:02.280
<v Speaker 1>your most disruptive in the best possible way employees. Um,

0:32:02.280 --> 0:32:05.600
<v Speaker 1>And why are we creating a yes culture and not

0:32:05.680 --> 0:32:08.240
<v Speaker 1>allowing people, you know, creating a culture where people feel

0:32:08.280 --> 0:32:11.040
<v Speaker 1>safe to challenge what's going on. Aren't we all better

0:32:11.200 --> 0:32:14.720
<v Speaker 1>in our relationships when someone calls us out for doing

0:32:14.760 --> 0:32:19.520
<v Speaker 1>something wrong. Yeah. In addition, they're your bravest employees. They're

0:32:19.520 --> 0:32:22.200
<v Speaker 1>the ones that are at some level the most honest

0:32:22.880 --> 0:32:26.360
<v Speaker 1>of your employees. Like and yet people are drumming them

0:32:26.400 --> 0:32:28.960
<v Speaker 1>out of their companies. They should be, as you say,

0:32:29.040 --> 0:32:33.959
<v Speaker 1>celebrated and protected by the CEO. And and and certainly the

0:32:34.040 --> 0:32:36.920
<v Speaker 1>board if it is true and that and it is

0:32:37.160 --> 0:32:40.400
<v Speaker 1>that these companies do better financially, and it's the job

0:32:40.440 --> 0:32:44.280
<v Speaker 1>of the board of directors to look after investors, and

0:32:44.440 --> 0:32:49.080
<v Speaker 1>boards of directors should be whistleblowers best friends. It feels

0:32:49.160 --> 0:32:53.560
<v Speaker 1>like maybe that is beginning to happen a little bit more.

0:32:53.640 --> 0:32:56.600
<v Speaker 1>It feels like maybe the worm is being beginning to turn.

0:32:56.720 --> 0:32:58.800
<v Speaker 1>But you know you would know this better than I do.

0:32:58.840 --> 0:33:01.000
<v Speaker 1>You feel like the culture is headed in a better

0:33:01.040 --> 0:33:04.920
<v Speaker 1>direction now I do, actually, And one of the reasons

0:33:05.000 --> 0:33:09.400
<v Speaker 1>I think, um, we're seeing this change, of course, is

0:33:09.440 --> 0:33:15.360
<v Speaker 1>because chief compliance officers are starting to relate to whistlowers.

0:33:15.360 --> 0:33:17.760
<v Speaker 1>So if you're a chief compliance officer in a corporation,

0:33:18.360 --> 0:33:20.920
<v Speaker 1>you're not dissimilar to a whistle blower. You're not a

0:33:20.920 --> 0:33:23.680
<v Speaker 1>cost you're not a profit generating center. You're seeing as

0:33:23.680 --> 0:33:25.920
<v Speaker 1>the people who put the brakes on it tell you

0:33:26.040 --> 0:33:29.720
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't do it this way. And I think now we're

0:33:29.880 --> 0:33:33.160
<v Speaker 1>recognizing that for a lot of the scandals, compliance officers

0:33:33.160 --> 0:33:36.720
<v Speaker 1>were made compliant officers and we're told to go along.

0:33:37.240 --> 0:33:41.560
<v Speaker 1>And now there's an elevation of compliance officers where there's

0:33:41.600 --> 0:33:43.160
<v Speaker 1>more of a sense that they should be reporting to

0:33:43.200 --> 0:33:47.080
<v Speaker 1>the board board level. You know, they appreciate whistlers in

0:33:47.080 --> 0:33:50.080
<v Speaker 1>a way that a lot of people in organizations don't.

0:33:50.280 --> 0:33:54.440
<v Speaker 1>So what advice would you have for leadership at companies

0:33:54.440 --> 0:33:57.000
<v Speaker 1>to help their company be more open to whistle blowing

0:33:57.160 --> 0:34:00.680
<v Speaker 1>and therefore, you know, kind of open to open to change.

0:34:02.120 --> 0:34:04.080
<v Speaker 1>I really think one of the best things the company

0:34:04.080 --> 0:34:08.000
<v Speaker 1>can do is actually hire a former whistleblower. What signals

0:34:08.040 --> 0:34:10.960
<v Speaker 1>more that you believe in whistle blowers than hiring a

0:34:11.040 --> 0:34:13.080
<v Speaker 1>well known informer whistlel er. I think that's one of

0:34:13.120 --> 0:34:16.279
<v Speaker 1>the things that you can do most um. But I

0:34:16.320 --> 0:34:18.720
<v Speaker 1>think the other thing is we really need to teach

0:34:18.800 --> 0:34:22.719
<v Speaker 1>people how to have difficult conversations. I really think some

0:34:22.920 --> 0:34:27.359
<v Speaker 1>grassroot training on we value difference of opinions and really

0:34:27.400 --> 0:34:29.400
<v Speaker 1>walking the walk and talking to the talk. I always say, like,

0:34:29.480 --> 0:34:32.759
<v Speaker 1>let's put in your performance review that you get a

0:34:32.880 --> 0:34:36.600
<v Speaker 1>certain gold stars right when you expose wrongdoing. Why isn't

0:34:36.640 --> 0:34:40.160
<v Speaker 1>that something that's in our evaluations. Doesn't that also show

0:34:40.239 --> 0:34:43.960
<v Speaker 1>in a very brass tax kind of way, what we value.

0:34:44.000 --> 0:34:46.600
<v Speaker 1>What you put on your performance evaluation for manually is

0:34:46.640 --> 0:34:49.520
<v Speaker 1>what you value. Do you know any whistleblowers who regret

0:34:50.280 --> 0:34:54.439
<v Speaker 1>you know, having made the decision to do it, it's

0:34:54.440 --> 0:34:56.920
<v Speaker 1>a great question. I don't, and I find that to

0:34:57.000 --> 0:35:01.040
<v Speaker 1>be extraordinary. Even after they've been through the ringer, they

0:35:01.080 --> 0:35:03.239
<v Speaker 1>still look back and I feel like it was the

0:35:03.320 --> 0:35:04.920
<v Speaker 1>right thing to do. And a lot of my clients

0:35:04.920 --> 0:35:09.400
<v Speaker 1>are like, I can't exist at an organization where I

0:35:09.520 --> 0:35:12.480
<v Speaker 1>have fear that I may be wearing an orange jumpsuit

0:35:12.520 --> 0:35:14.880
<v Speaker 1>because I could be found to be a co conspirator

0:35:14.880 --> 0:35:17.640
<v Speaker 1>for going along um. And I think with a lot

0:35:17.680 --> 0:35:20.640
<v Speaker 1>of whistleblowers, they feel like they don't want to leave

0:35:20.680 --> 0:35:23.960
<v Speaker 1>it for the next person, and so even after they've

0:35:23.960 --> 0:35:25.800
<v Speaker 1>suffered it, I think a lot of them talk about

0:35:25.840 --> 0:35:28.000
<v Speaker 1>I have to look my children in the eye, I

0:35:28.080 --> 0:35:31.319
<v Speaker 1>have to look myself in the mirror, And so to

0:35:31.400 --> 0:35:34.200
<v Speaker 1>a person, they will always say, it was a hellish journey.

0:35:34.239 --> 0:35:37.480
<v Speaker 1>And we need to change how whistlers are viewed. We

0:35:37.520 --> 0:35:40.920
<v Speaker 1>need to normalize whistling and change this perception that we

0:35:40.960 --> 0:35:43.799
<v Speaker 1>have of whistlers as disloyal. But they would all do

0:35:43.880 --> 0:35:46.440
<v Speaker 1>it again, and I just find it remarkable. That is

0:35:46.480 --> 0:35:49.759
<v Speaker 1>remarkable and and kind of wonderful. I love that the

0:35:49.840 --> 0:35:53.080
<v Speaker 1>last question, is there anything else that I haven't touched on?

0:35:53.200 --> 0:35:55.640
<v Speaker 1>Or asked you about that you think we should talk about.

0:35:55.719 --> 0:35:59.000
<v Speaker 1>Is there anything else you think folks should know? Yeah,

0:35:59.080 --> 0:36:00.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, there's one thing that I really did want

0:36:00.960 --> 0:36:04.279
<v Speaker 1>to talk about UM today, and that relates to this

0:36:04.400 --> 0:36:09.600
<v Speaker 1>idea that I alluded to about them, anonymity of whistleblowers UM.

0:36:09.640 --> 0:36:11.960
<v Speaker 1>And I think we're now accustomed to the idea of

0:36:12.080 --> 0:36:17.680
<v Speaker 1>whistleblowers having, you know, being becoming almost personalities, right, not celebrities,

0:36:17.680 --> 0:36:21.320
<v Speaker 1>but personalities UM. And I think that what we're starting

0:36:21.360 --> 0:36:24.000
<v Speaker 1>to see with the i C i J, the International

0:36:24.040 --> 0:36:28.480
<v Speaker 1>Consortium of Investigative Journalists is UM what I call what

0:36:28.520 --> 0:36:29.960
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people are referred to as sort of

0:36:29.960 --> 0:36:33.600
<v Speaker 1>a leaking culture. Where in the case of the Panama Papers,

0:36:33.800 --> 0:36:37.440
<v Speaker 1>the Mosak Fonseca law firm, all those files were turned

0:36:37.480 --> 0:36:41.399
<v Speaker 1>over to sadutschs iding the reporters there, and they then

0:36:41.440 --> 0:36:44.799
<v Speaker 1>shared it out to the International Consortium and Investigative Journalism.

0:36:44.920 --> 0:36:48.279
<v Speaker 1>And now we have journalists around the world who are

0:36:48.320 --> 0:36:52.719
<v Speaker 1>looking at people who are taking advantage properly and improperly

0:36:52.840 --> 0:36:56.360
<v Speaker 1>of offshore tax havens UM. And the reason I pointed

0:36:56.400 --> 0:36:59.320
<v Speaker 1>out is that there was I mean, the Panama papers

0:36:59.400 --> 0:37:02.120
<v Speaker 1>kind of shook the world and there have since then

0:37:02.200 --> 0:37:07.240
<v Speaker 1>been Paradise papers, um Pandora papers, right. They this model

0:37:07.280 --> 0:37:09.680
<v Speaker 1>has continued to happen and we don't know who those

0:37:09.680 --> 0:37:14.240
<v Speaker 1>whistleblers are. And isn't that just right? So the the

0:37:14.280 --> 0:37:17.120
<v Speaker 1>SA Deutsches i dig reporters just a few weeks ago

0:37:17.719 --> 0:37:20.400
<v Speaker 1>did uh an interview with their source for the Panama

0:37:20.440 --> 0:37:23.080
<v Speaker 1>papers and it was, you know, a robotic voice, the

0:37:23.120 --> 0:37:24.960
<v Speaker 1>person's face was etched out and all of it and

0:37:25.040 --> 0:37:29.600
<v Speaker 1>what that whistlebler said was his her. Their life was

0:37:29.719 --> 0:37:33.080
<v Speaker 1>completely improved by the fact that they were anonymous. They

0:37:33.080 --> 0:37:36.520
<v Speaker 1>could go ahead and continue to live a life um.

0:37:36.600 --> 0:37:38.520
<v Speaker 1>And so I think that that's something we need to

0:37:38.520 --> 0:37:40.000
<v Speaker 1>think about. And that's one of the things when we

0:37:40.000 --> 0:37:42.719
<v Speaker 1>were talking about the SEC program today. That's one of

0:37:42.760 --> 0:37:46.080
<v Speaker 1>the things it affords is that whistlers can actually report

0:37:46.120 --> 0:37:49.920
<v Speaker 1>anonymously um. And that makes it a lot easier for

0:37:50.000 --> 0:37:52.080
<v Speaker 1>all of us to make that kind of a decision

0:37:52.120 --> 0:37:55.839
<v Speaker 1>and the risk reward calculus if you didn't if you can,

0:37:56.000 --> 0:37:59.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, give the information and not be outed, didn't

0:37:59.480 --> 0:38:02.919
<v Speaker 1>have to blow your life up to do it. Yeah,

0:38:03.000 --> 0:38:07.880
<v Speaker 1>I love that. Okay, Mary, this was not unexpectedly a

0:38:07.920 --> 0:38:11.560
<v Speaker 1>fantastic conversation. I want to thank you so much for

0:38:11.760 --> 0:38:14.799
<v Speaker 1>talking with us today, and I want to thank you

0:38:14.840 --> 0:38:16.880
<v Speaker 1>for the work that you do. It's so very important.

0:38:16.960 --> 0:38:21.800
<v Speaker 1>So UM, we really appreciate your spending time with us today. Well, So,

0:38:21.920 --> 0:38:24.120
<v Speaker 1>I cannot tell you what a pleasure it is to

0:38:24.120 --> 0:38:27.279
<v Speaker 1>be on your podcast. In particular, there's such an alignment

0:38:27.400 --> 0:38:32.359
<v Speaker 1>between whistleblowers ultimately UM exposed purpose washing. That's what they

0:38:32.400 --> 0:38:34.239
<v Speaker 1>do for a living, and I know that's what your

0:38:34.280 --> 0:38:37.040
<v Speaker 1>podcast seeks to do. And so I just felt like

0:38:37.160 --> 0:38:39.720
<v Speaker 1>it was the perfect pairing, UM, And what an honor

0:38:39.760 --> 0:38:43.080
<v Speaker 1>to be on your podcast because my clients do call

0:38:43.160 --> 0:38:47.759
<v Speaker 1>bullshit every day. Yes they do, Yes they do, and

0:38:47.840 --> 0:38:52.520
<v Speaker 1>more power to them. After talking with Mary, I'm even

0:38:52.600 --> 0:38:56.480
<v Speaker 1>more impressed with the actions of whistleblowers and convinced that

0:38:56.520 --> 0:39:00.120
<v Speaker 1>the business world should be treating them differently, and not

0:39:00.280 --> 0:39:04.720
<v Speaker 1>just because they deserve better. The research shows that companies

0:39:04.760 --> 0:39:08.440
<v Speaker 1>who deal with problems internally instead of forcing people to

0:39:08.520 --> 0:39:13.440
<v Speaker 1>go public, actually improve their culture and their bottom line.

0:39:14.160 --> 0:39:17.640
<v Speaker 1>It seems like there's a win win scenario here for everybody.

0:39:18.600 --> 0:39:22.000
<v Speaker 1>So how can leadership and companies learn to see internal

0:39:22.000 --> 0:39:26.880
<v Speaker 1>whistleblower reports as an opportunity to fix problems and ultimately

0:39:27.000 --> 0:39:30.719
<v Speaker 1>to make more money. Next up, I talked with two

0:39:30.760 --> 0:39:34.560
<v Speaker 1>experts to discuss ways that that might actually happen. Right

0:39:34.600 --> 0:39:58.040
<v Speaker 1>after a quick break, to continue this conversation, I've invited

0:39:58.120 --> 0:40:00.719
<v Speaker 1>two more experts in whistleblowing to joined me for a

0:40:00.760 --> 0:40:05.960
<v Speaker 1>panel discussion. Dana Gold is the Government Accountability Projects Senior

0:40:06.040 --> 0:40:10.960
<v Speaker 1>counsel and director of Education. Her clients have exposed environmental

0:40:10.960 --> 0:40:16.520
<v Speaker 1>fraud within nuclear power plants and atrocities within immigration detention centers,

0:40:16.880 --> 0:40:20.120
<v Speaker 1>and she has devoted her career to teaching others about

0:40:20.120 --> 0:40:25.560
<v Speaker 1>the critical role of whistleblowers. We're also joined by Kyle Welch,

0:40:25.760 --> 0:40:30.000
<v Speaker 1>professor at George Washington University School of Business and author

0:40:30.120 --> 0:40:33.120
<v Speaker 1>of those HBr papers that Mary sent over to me.

0:40:34.040 --> 0:40:37.680
<v Speaker 1>He is the expert in whistleblower data and has published

0:40:37.719 --> 0:40:41.200
<v Speaker 1>evidence that shows how much they benefit all of us

0:40:41.239 --> 0:40:45.120
<v Speaker 1>and proves that these folks are an asset to organizations

0:40:50.200 --> 0:40:53.960
<v Speaker 1>to start out with today, UM, I thought, you know

0:40:54.239 --> 0:40:57.520
<v Speaker 1>you you both come at this from such different backgrounds,

0:40:58.239 --> 0:41:01.799
<v Speaker 1>and I'm assuming you would both agree that in many

0:41:01.880 --> 0:41:06.680
<v Speaker 1>ways whistle blowing is a really good thing and it

0:41:06.760 --> 0:41:10.640
<v Speaker 1>benefits the world in important ways. But let me start

0:41:10.680 --> 0:41:13.440
<v Speaker 1>by just checking that assumption. Do you both agree with

0:41:13.520 --> 0:41:17.480
<v Speaker 1>that premise? I think you're a little too timid in

0:41:17.560 --> 0:41:20.319
<v Speaker 1>how you talk about it, to be honest with you, No, no, no,

0:41:20.719 --> 0:41:23.480
<v Speaker 1>And I'd be very frank it is you are way

0:41:23.480 --> 0:41:25.719
<v Speaker 1>too timid and how you talk about this. If you

0:41:25.719 --> 0:41:28.040
<v Speaker 1>want to find a problem in an organization, it is

0:41:28.080 --> 0:41:31.319
<v Speaker 1>through humans identifying it and speaking up. There's a lot

0:41:31.360 --> 0:41:34.239
<v Speaker 1>of things that robots are going to replace. I don't

0:41:34.239 --> 0:41:36.000
<v Speaker 1>think robots are going to be able to replace this.

0:41:36.480 --> 0:41:39.600
<v Speaker 1>What is the number one way frauds are caught? It

0:41:39.760 --> 0:41:43.239
<v Speaker 1>is whistle blowing. It's people speaking up and way way

0:41:43.280 --> 0:41:46.279
<v Speaker 1>way way down, less than half like like something like

0:41:47.040 --> 0:41:50.080
<v Speaker 1>it changes every year of the cases are identified through whistleblowers.

0:41:50.520 --> 0:41:53.160
<v Speaker 1>The next is internal lot it. But if you talk

0:41:53.239 --> 0:41:55.840
<v Speaker 1>to anybody in internal lot it or external lot it

0:41:55.880 --> 0:41:58.839
<v Speaker 1>and you ask them, how did you identify the problem?

0:41:58.880 --> 0:42:01.040
<v Speaker 1>They say, well, we were are actually asking for a

0:42:01.080 --> 0:42:05.720
<v Speaker 1>report and somebody spoke to us. And so at its core,

0:42:06.400 --> 0:42:10.680
<v Speaker 1>humans identifying problems and talking about them is how these

0:42:10.719 --> 0:42:14.960
<v Speaker 1>problems get solved. Right And Dana, I see you nodding along.

0:42:15.120 --> 0:42:17.279
<v Speaker 1>Could you speak to that a little bit? Can you

0:42:17.320 --> 0:42:20.880
<v Speaker 1>go into from your perspective, what good do whistleblowers do

0:42:21.000 --> 0:42:26.320
<v Speaker 1>for the world. This is the hundred thousand dollar question

0:42:26.440 --> 0:42:30.520
<v Speaker 1>or million dollar questions or billion dollar questions. So, expanding

0:42:30.520 --> 0:42:35.080
<v Speaker 1>on what Kyle just said, we have systems in place

0:42:35.160 --> 0:42:40.160
<v Speaker 1>in our institutions that make it predictable that they will

0:42:40.239 --> 0:42:45.840
<v Speaker 1>engage in misconduct and wrongdoing. And when you know that

0:42:45.920 --> 0:42:50.839
<v Speaker 1>these systems are broken or incredibly weak, or have these

0:42:50.920 --> 0:42:54.759
<v Speaker 1>problematic drivers. In the corporate sector, we have just the

0:42:54.760 --> 0:42:57.960
<v Speaker 1>profit motive measuring things by the short term, how we

0:42:58.040 --> 0:43:02.560
<v Speaker 1>have shareholder primacy. There all of these drivers that that

0:43:02.760 --> 0:43:06.640
<v Speaker 1>make it difficult to value the public interest, to protect

0:43:06.640 --> 0:43:09.920
<v Speaker 1>the public interests, and the humans, the employees, the workers

0:43:10.360 --> 0:43:13.960
<v Speaker 1>are in the best position to see the problems there there.

0:43:14.120 --> 0:43:18.399
<v Speaker 1>That's why the whistle boor protection laws protect employees predominantly,

0:43:18.400 --> 0:43:22.160
<v Speaker 1>I would say, not completely, but predominantly, because they're in

0:43:22.200 --> 0:43:25.920
<v Speaker 1>the best position to see the problems and to raise concerns.

0:43:26.000 --> 0:43:30.160
<v Speaker 1>And so they are what is standing between us and

0:43:30.360 --> 0:43:34.560
<v Speaker 1>horrific disasters, right. And it's terrifying to me and also

0:43:34.680 --> 0:43:39.000
<v Speaker 1>inspiring at some level because it's the human element of

0:43:39.120 --> 0:43:42.799
<v Speaker 1>how truth and truth telling can actually still make a

0:43:42.840 --> 0:43:46.240
<v Speaker 1>difference and hold abusers of power to account well. Also,

0:43:46.320 --> 0:43:51.560
<v Speaker 1>many of them pay because of the stigmatized environment around whistleblowing.

0:43:51.760 --> 0:43:56.240
<v Speaker 1>They pay off on a terrible price for coming forward,

0:43:56.520 --> 0:44:01.560
<v Speaker 1>career setbacks as well as personal set back. Some people lose,

0:44:02.000 --> 0:44:05.319
<v Speaker 1>you know, their whole support system, they lose relationships with

0:44:05.360 --> 0:44:10.040
<v Speaker 1>their family. You know. It's it's bananas, I would say,

0:44:10.239 --> 0:44:13.720
<v Speaker 1>absolutely it Actually, that makes my point about why it

0:44:13.719 --> 0:44:17.560
<v Speaker 1>it's so terrifying that we're so dependent on whistleblowers because

0:44:18.000 --> 0:44:21.560
<v Speaker 1>the risk that is involved with speaking up against those

0:44:21.600 --> 0:44:24.960
<v Speaker 1>who have far more power. We're all more vulnerable because

0:44:25.000 --> 0:44:28.400
<v Speaker 1>they are vulnerable. It is, it is, It is a

0:44:28.440 --> 0:44:32.239
<v Speaker 1>societal problem that is not that it's why we need

0:44:32.280 --> 0:44:35.280
<v Speaker 1>to care about whistleblowers because they are the one standing

0:44:35.360 --> 0:44:38.799
<v Speaker 1>up for us rather than other rising whistleblowers and um

0:44:39.200 --> 0:44:42.319
<v Speaker 1>thinking of them in some really with with a lot

0:44:42.400 --> 0:44:45.799
<v Speaker 1>of misperceptions that I think, I think are changing. I

0:44:45.840 --> 0:44:48.120
<v Speaker 1>think and I think it's interesting your podcast that talks

0:44:48.160 --> 0:44:51.480
<v Speaker 1>a lot about this erosion of trust in our institutions.

0:44:51.560 --> 0:44:54.399
<v Speaker 1>Right we have a deep erosion of trust in our

0:44:54.440 --> 0:44:58.359
<v Speaker 1>government institutions and our corporate institutions than the past four years.

0:44:58.360 --> 0:45:01.840
<v Speaker 1>Since this past administration. And you've seen whistleblowers come forward

0:45:02.040 --> 0:45:08.360
<v Speaker 1>on on COVID threats right, um, you know, pushing bogus

0:45:08.400 --> 0:45:12.320
<v Speaker 1>therapies um, and not prioritizing vaccines. You've seen climate science

0:45:12.320 --> 0:45:15.880
<v Speaker 1>whistleblowers gagged. You've seen um, you know, Facebook and Twitter,

0:45:16.000 --> 0:45:18.560
<v Speaker 1>and you know the kind of social media whistleblowers come

0:45:18.560 --> 0:45:22.200
<v Speaker 1>forward that people are realizing that it's the humans, it's

0:45:22.239 --> 0:45:25.040
<v Speaker 1>the whistleblowers who are where we're going to get actually

0:45:25.080 --> 0:45:29.479
<v Speaker 1>honest information and protecting our backs. And I think it's changed.

0:45:29.520 --> 0:45:31.719
<v Speaker 1>And you see there's emarrassed poll from a few years

0:45:31.719 --> 0:45:35.160
<v Speaker 1>ago that says like eight sent of people think whistle

0:45:35.160 --> 0:45:38.160
<v Speaker 1>blowers there should be stronger protections for whistleblowers. I mean,

0:45:38.200 --> 0:45:41.719
<v Speaker 1>it's a huge change from viewing them as snitches and

0:45:41.760 --> 0:45:46.160
<v Speaker 1>tattle tales and disloyal there's a sense that that's where

0:45:46.160 --> 0:45:48.800
<v Speaker 1>our information is going to come from when we're in

0:45:48.840 --> 0:45:52.840
<v Speaker 1>a sea of dis and misinformation. Yeah, it's obvious you

0:45:52.880 --> 0:45:56.960
<v Speaker 1>both passionately believe that whistle blowing has multiple positive benefits

0:45:56.960 --> 0:45:58.680
<v Speaker 1>from the world. And I guess the natural place to

0:45:58.719 --> 0:46:01.040
<v Speaker 1>go next is how do we remote more of it?

0:46:01.239 --> 0:46:03.680
<v Speaker 1>Although it does sound like it's moving in the right direction.

0:46:04.400 --> 0:46:08.279
<v Speaker 1>How might we accelerate that process? So, Kyle, I'm gonna

0:46:08.280 --> 0:46:11.319
<v Speaker 1>ask you to go first, what's the one thing we

0:46:11.360 --> 0:46:15.680
<v Speaker 1>ought to do well? So Tie, there's two things that

0:46:15.680 --> 0:46:18.000
<v Speaker 1>that I always talk about. One of the big things

0:46:18.280 --> 0:46:21.080
<v Speaker 1>that could be done is that for leaders that look

0:46:21.160 --> 0:46:24.360
<v Speaker 1>at whistle blowing or people speaking up understanding the value

0:46:24.440 --> 0:46:28.760
<v Speaker 1>derived from it. Um Essentially, our research shows that firms

0:46:28.800 --> 0:46:33.160
<v Speaker 1>that have more reports internally are better in almost every

0:46:33.200 --> 0:46:37.239
<v Speaker 1>regard governance. Uh, you know, they get ahead of future lawsuits,

0:46:37.320 --> 0:46:40.440
<v Speaker 1>future finds, the amount of future lawsuits, amount of future finds.

0:46:40.480 --> 0:46:43.240
<v Speaker 1>It just basically shows that you're able to avoid negative

0:46:43.239 --> 0:46:45.520
<v Speaker 1>outcomes and there's also a lot of positive outcomes that

0:46:45.560 --> 0:46:48.520
<v Speaker 1>come from it. And so that leaders leaders that essentially

0:46:48.560 --> 0:46:53.480
<v Speaker 1>see reports and say, oh, are whistle blowing numbers are up?

0:46:54.000 --> 0:46:57.279
<v Speaker 1>The wrong question is to say what's wrong? Instead, the

0:46:57.360 --> 0:46:59.680
<v Speaker 1>right question is to say do we have enough resources?

0:46:59.719 --> 0:47:01.680
<v Speaker 1>Which leads me to kind of like my second thing,

0:47:01.719 --> 0:47:05.640
<v Speaker 1>and probably more so for the audience here, there is

0:47:05.760 --> 0:47:10.480
<v Speaker 1>frequently a story told about whistle blowing, and it's unfortunate

0:47:10.560 --> 0:47:13.880
<v Speaker 1>because I think it's wrong. I think it's very wrong.

0:47:14.440 --> 0:47:18.600
<v Speaker 1>So Dana comes from the world of like the worst situations.

0:47:18.680 --> 0:47:22.319
<v Speaker 1>She's seen people in nuclear power plants. You know, I

0:47:22.360 --> 0:47:26.560
<v Speaker 1>guess I watched the Chernobyl series, and so my mind

0:47:26.560 --> 0:47:29.279
<v Speaker 1>goes to the worst were stuff ever? Right? And what

0:47:29.400 --> 0:47:33.360
<v Speaker 1>we've what Dana has is a wealth of experience, basically

0:47:33.400 --> 0:47:37.239
<v Speaker 1>in the trauma room associated with whistle blowing. But like,

0:47:38.120 --> 0:47:41.120
<v Speaker 1>there's this other side of the data that nobody sees

0:47:41.200 --> 0:47:46.200
<v Speaker 1>because whistle blowers that actually get problems solved, that don't

0:47:46.239 --> 0:47:47.960
<v Speaker 1>have to go to court, that don't end up in

0:47:47.960 --> 0:47:50.759
<v Speaker 1>the news, we never hear about. We never hear about

0:47:50.840 --> 0:47:53.960
<v Speaker 1>them because companies don't release something saying, hey, we had

0:47:54.000 --> 0:47:56.560
<v Speaker 1>a serial harasser. We got rid of the serial harrass

0:47:56.760 --> 0:47:59.160
<v Speaker 1>They don't do that. Oh we found out that we

0:47:59.280 --> 0:48:01.319
<v Speaker 1>you know, we have ridgulen stuff. They don't report it.

0:48:01.360 --> 0:48:05.040
<v Speaker 1>What I hear over and over and over again, especially

0:48:05.040 --> 0:48:06.800
<v Speaker 1>from defenders, is how hard it is to be a

0:48:06.840 --> 0:48:10.480
<v Speaker 1>whistle blower. But I would say that based on the

0:48:10.600 --> 0:48:16.400
<v Speaker 1>sample of people that actually report that, by and large,

0:48:16.480 --> 0:48:20.000
<v Speaker 1>the average human is not as evil as the type

0:48:20.200 --> 0:48:23.399
<v Speaker 1>that data is prosecuting in a courtroom. And so when

0:48:23.400 --> 0:48:25.920
<v Speaker 1>you think about that, that should frame also whistle blowing.

0:48:25.920 --> 0:48:27.839
<v Speaker 1>When you think about whistle blowing. The reason why we're

0:48:27.840 --> 0:48:31.040
<v Speaker 1>discovering fraud isn't because we have more corrupt politicians now.

0:48:31.360 --> 0:48:34.200
<v Speaker 1>It isn't because we have more problems, and we've always

0:48:34.200 --> 0:48:37.960
<v Speaker 1>had these problems. It's just this tool. It's like in

0:48:38.000 --> 0:48:40.799
<v Speaker 1>the last decade it's been the birth of it, and

0:48:40.880 --> 0:48:44.000
<v Speaker 1>we've all of a sudden realized how valuable this tool

0:48:44.120 --> 0:48:47.759
<v Speaker 1>is to identifying and solving problems. And so I look

0:48:47.800 --> 0:48:50.200
<v Speaker 1>at it, and I I see a lot more hope

0:48:50.480 --> 0:48:53.200
<v Speaker 1>and positivity coming out of this because I just have

0:48:53.320 --> 0:48:56.000
<v Speaker 1>looked at the data and I've seen firms saving millions

0:48:56.000 --> 0:48:59.560
<v Speaker 1>and millions of dollars resolving issues and not going to

0:48:59.640 --> 0:49:01.279
<v Speaker 1>court as a result of it. The ones to go

0:49:01.320 --> 0:49:04.600
<v Speaker 1>to court. It's like, it's kind of like judging driving

0:49:04.640 --> 0:49:07.080
<v Speaker 1>a car based on the E R room and if

0:49:07.080 --> 0:49:08.919
<v Speaker 1>you only if you only look at the R room

0:49:09.040 --> 0:49:11.799
<v Speaker 1>and advertise the ER room. It's good to talk about

0:49:11.800 --> 0:49:13.640
<v Speaker 1>the E R room because it will help people respond

0:49:13.719 --> 0:49:18.120
<v Speaker 1>right to these cases. But I don't think but it

0:49:18.640 --> 0:49:21.680
<v Speaker 1>doesn't represent the sample of driving. It misses many of

0:49:21.719 --> 0:49:24.160
<v Speaker 1>the benefits. That's right, That's right. That's so those are

0:49:24.160 --> 0:49:28.279
<v Speaker 1>the Thank you, Kyle. So Dana, first of all, any

0:49:28.320 --> 0:49:32.319
<v Speaker 1>thoughts on what Kyle said. Yeah, well, I I just

0:49:32.320 --> 0:49:34.400
<v Speaker 1>want to say I totally agree that you know, I

0:49:34.440 --> 0:49:38.800
<v Speaker 1>work on the fringe of extremes. Right, Like, basically, companies

0:49:38.880 --> 0:49:41.960
<v Speaker 1>or governments or agencies have failed by the time when

0:49:42.000 --> 0:49:44.799
<v Speaker 1>I when I'm involved, when I'm involved, right, So like

0:49:44.880 --> 0:49:47.480
<v Speaker 1>it's just like they missed their I always say they

0:49:47.480 --> 0:49:50.279
<v Speaker 1>have multiple chances. That the first chances do the right

0:49:50.320 --> 0:49:54.040
<v Speaker 1>thing in the first place, that doesn't require needing a whistleblower, Right,

0:49:54.080 --> 0:49:57.200
<v Speaker 1>that's your first chance. Then the second chances when a

0:49:57.200 --> 0:50:02.040
<v Speaker 1>whistle blower, an employee speaks out, identifies a problem, a

0:50:02.360 --> 0:50:07.120
<v Speaker 1>deal with that appropriately. And ninety of employees raise concerns

0:50:07.160 --> 0:50:10.680
<v Speaker 1>internally first, I mean that's what they do. People don't want, like,

0:50:10.760 --> 0:50:13.640
<v Speaker 1>it's not true that a whistleblower is only only when

0:50:13.640 --> 0:50:16.400
<v Speaker 1>you go outside the organization. I mean the laws are

0:50:16.840 --> 0:50:19.600
<v Speaker 1>except for one of them, Dodd Frank, which is complicated

0:50:19.640 --> 0:50:22.319
<v Speaker 1>and we can talk about that. But but basically, you know,

0:50:22.400 --> 0:50:25.520
<v Speaker 1>your rights start your your rights attached when you start

0:50:25.600 --> 0:50:29.520
<v Speaker 1>raising concerns internally to management or supervisors or people who

0:50:29.520 --> 0:50:33.040
<v Speaker 1>are responsible for dealing with the problem. And most employees

0:50:33.160 --> 0:50:38.080
<v Speaker 1>do raise concerns internally first before going outside. So so

0:50:38.400 --> 0:50:41.040
<v Speaker 1>this is like a powerful tool. And that's what Kyle's

0:50:41.080 --> 0:50:45.279
<v Speaker 1>data is so important for establishing, is that you have

0:50:45.440 --> 0:50:49.600
<v Speaker 1>this risk management tool sitting in you know, it's this

0:50:49.680 --> 0:50:52.360
<v Speaker 1>is like your most powerful resource they want to report

0:50:52.400 --> 0:50:55.879
<v Speaker 1>internally first you just have the opportunity to respond appropriately.

0:50:56.440 --> 0:50:58.440
<v Speaker 1>You don't even have to validate. I mean, this is

0:50:58.440 --> 0:50:59.880
<v Speaker 1>the other thing that I think it is so interesting

0:51:00.040 --> 0:51:02.319
<v Speaker 1>and one kind of reform tool is that if you

0:51:02.400 --> 0:51:07.360
<v Speaker 1>investigate an employee's concern appropriately, that there's this whole research

0:51:07.400 --> 0:51:11.520
<v Speaker 1>around procedural justice and procedural fairness that if an employee

0:51:11.600 --> 0:51:15.719
<v Speaker 1>raises a concern and the employer has, you know, an

0:51:15.719 --> 0:51:19.480
<v Speaker 1>objectively fair process, they protect the employee from retaliation. They

0:51:19.520 --> 0:51:22.719
<v Speaker 1>communicate with them about the investigation. They you know, and

0:51:22.800 --> 0:51:25.680
<v Speaker 1>like there's a perception that the investigation is fair and

0:51:25.760 --> 0:51:29.120
<v Speaker 1>objective and legitimate. And the employer comes back and says,

0:51:29.200 --> 0:51:31.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, hey, thank you, and this is what we found.

0:51:31.800 --> 0:51:35.239
<v Speaker 1>We actually didn't find that you're just your concern um

0:51:35.640 --> 0:51:37.760
<v Speaker 1>was right actually even though you had a reasonable belief

0:51:37.800 --> 0:51:41.839
<v Speaker 1>about it. Then the employee is like hugely willing to

0:51:41.960 --> 0:51:46.040
<v Speaker 1>accept those results and then becomes an ambassador on behalf

0:51:46.040 --> 0:51:49.520
<v Speaker 1>of other employees and the company that Look, this company

0:51:49.600 --> 0:51:52.799
<v Speaker 1>dealt with my problem in a really effective way. So

0:51:52.920 --> 0:51:58.920
<v Speaker 1>like there's no downside to an employer responding appropriately to

0:51:59.280 --> 0:52:02.520
<v Speaker 1>its employee when they raise concerns. There is only upside.

0:52:02.640 --> 0:52:05.879
<v Speaker 1>You avoid risk, you avoid litigation, you save money, all

0:52:05.920 --> 0:52:08.200
<v Speaker 1>of these things because you have like this best line

0:52:08.239 --> 0:52:11.360
<v Speaker 1>of defense. But it is this internal speak up culture

0:52:11.800 --> 0:52:16.160
<v Speaker 1>that has to be real and legitimate and not used

0:52:16.440 --> 0:52:19.040
<v Speaker 1>which we see sometimes as a tool to actually suss

0:52:19.040 --> 0:52:22.880
<v Speaker 1>out who the reporter is and then retaliate against them.

0:52:22.920 --> 0:52:25.240
<v Speaker 1>I mean, like there are there is some hotline abuse

0:52:25.320 --> 0:52:28.879
<v Speaker 1>that happens, although I think these third party platforms are

0:52:28.960 --> 0:52:32.799
<v Speaker 1>minimizing some of that dramatically, which is great, But I

0:52:32.840 --> 0:52:35.280
<v Speaker 1>think that's a huge pieces. Like there's so many things

0:52:35.280 --> 0:52:37.839
<v Speaker 1>that companies can do and governments can do to you know,

0:52:38.040 --> 0:52:42.040
<v Speaker 1>institutions can do to internally shore up how they respond

0:52:42.600 --> 0:52:45.960
<v Speaker 1>to their workers, to value and encourage them to speak up.

0:52:45.960 --> 0:52:47.960
<v Speaker 1>And there's like a whole list, not just one. But

0:52:48.000 --> 0:52:49.840
<v Speaker 1>then there are external things that we need to do

0:52:49.960 --> 0:52:53.160
<v Speaker 1>to Like we do need to strainen them with more protections.

0:52:53.200 --> 0:52:56.160
<v Speaker 1>We need to, like the me too movement recognize that

0:52:56.200 --> 0:52:59.360
<v Speaker 1>a whistleblower. When they speak up, they have everything to lose,

0:52:59.560 --> 0:53:02.319
<v Speaker 1>nothing to a gain, and we need to listen to

0:53:02.360 --> 0:53:05.400
<v Speaker 1>them and put the presumption that they're they're putting a

0:53:05.400 --> 0:53:07.520
<v Speaker 1>lot on the line if they're bothering to speak up,

0:53:07.640 --> 0:53:10.839
<v Speaker 1>rather than viewing them in a suspect way, and that

0:53:11.400 --> 0:53:15.120
<v Speaker 1>we need to make it safe for them to speak

0:53:15.200 --> 0:53:20.360
<v Speaker 1>up and to support that conduct as a culture. Yeah, okay,

0:53:20.719 --> 0:53:25.080
<v Speaker 1>so um, that was great. I'll take the floor for

0:53:25.120 --> 0:53:28.680
<v Speaker 1>a moment and um just humbly submit my idea in

0:53:28.719 --> 0:53:31.160
<v Speaker 1>the space, and I'd love to hear what both of

0:53:31.200 --> 0:53:35.239
<v Speaker 1>you think about this, because to me, the problem here

0:53:35.480 --> 0:53:41.520
<v Speaker 1>is education whistle blowing is still culturally stigmatized, although it

0:53:41.560 --> 0:53:45.440
<v Speaker 1>sounds like that may be improving, and and that comes from,

0:53:45.480 --> 0:53:48.200
<v Speaker 1>I think a genuine ignorance about the positive effects that

0:53:48.200 --> 0:53:50.840
<v Speaker 1>both of you have been talking about. And so my

0:53:50.920 --> 0:53:55.640
<v Speaker 1>idea is to figure out how to create whistleblower awards,

0:53:56.239 --> 0:54:00.520
<v Speaker 1>So not rewards, I'm talking about awards that are given

0:54:00.520 --> 0:54:04.880
<v Speaker 1>to recognize the positive benefits to businesses into society and

0:54:04.920 --> 0:54:07.400
<v Speaker 1>maybe get a sponsor. You know, I don't know whether

0:54:07.440 --> 0:54:11.440
<v Speaker 1>the Harvard Business Press would ever, you know, co sponsor

0:54:11.560 --> 0:54:13.719
<v Speaker 1>this or or distribute it. They tend to be a

0:54:13.719 --> 0:54:16.560
<v Speaker 1>little conservative, but it would be great if they would

0:54:16.560 --> 0:54:20.200
<v Speaker 1>get behind this, And why not since it's obviously a

0:54:20.320 --> 0:54:23.880
<v Speaker 1>business success story to promote, you know, whistle blowers. If

0:54:23.880 --> 0:54:25.880
<v Speaker 1>you want to promote better business in the world, you

0:54:25.920 --> 0:54:30.200
<v Speaker 1>ought to promote whistle blowing or you know. Again, possibly

0:54:30.200 --> 0:54:32.360
<v Speaker 1>a fantasy, but the Wall Street Journal as a partner,

0:54:32.760 --> 0:54:37.760
<v Speaker 1>let's celebrate and reward individuals and along the way educate

0:54:37.800 --> 0:54:40.520
<v Speaker 1>the wider world about the clear business benefits and clear

0:54:40.560 --> 0:54:44.560
<v Speaker 1>societal benefits of creating a culture where it is safe

0:54:44.640 --> 0:54:50.520
<v Speaker 1>to come forward. Thoughts on that first of all, as

0:54:50.560 --> 0:54:53.000
<v Speaker 1>as better as it could be, we should recognize that

0:54:53.040 --> 0:54:56.920
<v Speaker 1>the United States, for all our problems, is the best

0:54:57.000 --> 0:55:00.319
<v Speaker 1>in the world at complaining about things. We do the

0:55:00.360 --> 0:55:04.200
<v Speaker 1>best at whistle blowing because we embedded in our culture

0:55:04.760 --> 0:55:08.200
<v Speaker 1>speaking up more so than anywhere else. We actually have

0:55:08.520 --> 0:55:13.239
<v Speaker 1>of huge cultural advantage here. So the whistleblower reports in

0:55:13.239 --> 0:55:18.239
<v Speaker 1>the US are like a mile ahead culturally because in

0:55:18.280 --> 0:55:22.279
<v Speaker 1>our culture, generally speaking, it is not stigmatized nearly as

0:55:22.360 --> 0:55:25.480
<v Speaker 1>much as as it used to be, and people do

0:55:25.600 --> 0:55:27.160
<v Speaker 1>look up to it. And I think that's kind of

0:55:27.160 --> 0:55:29.480
<v Speaker 1>your point, is that we need more people looking up

0:55:29.520 --> 0:55:31.680
<v Speaker 1>to it. I would also push back a little bit too.

0:55:32.160 --> 0:55:35.160
<v Speaker 1>This is not a liberal idea. I mean, this solves

0:55:35.200 --> 0:55:39.439
<v Speaker 1>the problem faster, better and improves it this way better

0:55:39.480 --> 0:55:41.920
<v Speaker 1>than anything else. I agree with that. What are you

0:55:41.960 --> 0:55:44.160
<v Speaker 1>pushing back on, because that was what I was trying

0:55:44.160 --> 0:55:47.120
<v Speaker 1>to say, is that of all the people in the world,

0:55:47.360 --> 0:55:50.560
<v Speaker 1>the hardcore business press are the people who ought to

0:55:50.600 --> 0:55:53.640
<v Speaker 1>be celebrating this, and I don't think they are. But

0:55:53.719 --> 0:55:57.000
<v Speaker 1>it's I would say, though, it's that kind of shooting

0:55:57.040 --> 0:56:00.719
<v Speaker 1>from the hip that creates a problem. We don't know

0:56:00.840 --> 0:56:02.560
<v Speaker 1>that answer because you don't have the data on it,

0:56:02.600 --> 0:56:05.080
<v Speaker 1>and I don't have the date on it. Yeah, it's

0:56:05.160 --> 0:56:08.120
<v Speaker 1>my show. I get to have an opinion. I have

0:56:08.160 --> 0:56:10.880
<v Speaker 1>comanecdotal evidence, which is not the kind of data that

0:56:10.880 --> 0:56:13.680
<v Speaker 1>that Kyle does. But I used to um I used

0:56:13.680 --> 0:56:18.960
<v Speaker 1>to run executive education programs on corporate governance for directors,

0:56:18.960 --> 0:56:23.080
<v Speaker 1>corporate directors and general counsel often. And um I was

0:56:23.160 --> 0:56:28.080
<v Speaker 1>running a program at Boston College Law School and an

0:56:28.120 --> 0:56:31.040
<v Speaker 1>issue came up around a lot of concern and interest

0:56:31.080 --> 0:56:34.680
<v Speaker 1>about Dodd Frank and whistle blowers, and it went to

0:56:34.760 --> 0:56:38.319
<v Speaker 1>a place these are all enlightened nice people. It went

0:56:38.360 --> 0:56:41.000
<v Speaker 1>to a place where what can we do about the whistleblowers?

0:56:41.440 --> 0:56:45.759
<v Speaker 1>Can we can we can we get them for stealing documents,

0:56:46.200 --> 0:56:51.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, or violating gag orders. And I was just like, oh,

0:56:51.040 --> 0:56:53.960
<v Speaker 1>oh dear, oh dear, this is the this is exactly

0:56:54.000 --> 0:56:56.440
<v Speaker 1>the problem. And I think that there is this embedded

0:56:57.760 --> 0:57:00.520
<v Speaker 1>problem of perceiving even though I think this is not

0:57:00.600 --> 0:57:03.120
<v Speaker 1>as true for management. I think with general counsel sometimes

0:57:03.120 --> 0:57:05.520
<v Speaker 1>they see whistle blowers as a potential source of risk,

0:57:06.000 --> 0:57:09.600
<v Speaker 1>rather than realizing that I'm going to create more risk

0:57:10.040 --> 0:57:13.440
<v Speaker 1>if my company doesn't deal effectively with the whistleblower. I'm

0:57:13.440 --> 0:57:15.520
<v Speaker 1>actually going to increase our risk by now we're going

0:57:15.560 --> 0:57:17.640
<v Speaker 1>to have a lawsuit around litigation and not just the

0:57:17.720 --> 0:57:20.920
<v Speaker 1>underlying problem. I was like, oh my gosh, the degree

0:57:20.920 --> 0:57:24.880
<v Speaker 1>of education to your point, Hie, around why whistle blowing

0:57:25.080 --> 0:57:29.120
<v Speaker 1>is a good thing and why responding appropriately to whistleblowers

0:57:29.160 --> 0:57:32.840
<v Speaker 1>and how to do that internally is exactly what is

0:57:32.880 --> 0:57:36.760
<v Speaker 1>beneficial to a company. That's what needs to happen. And

0:57:36.840 --> 0:57:39.280
<v Speaker 1>you know, to your point about the awards, I agree.

0:57:39.320 --> 0:57:42.280
<v Speaker 1>I mean, what you're talking about is is valorizing or

0:57:42.400 --> 0:57:45.360
<v Speaker 1>calling out the right behavior rather than the wrong behavior.

0:57:45.440 --> 0:57:48.680
<v Speaker 1>And so if you're measuring, for instance, we only had

0:57:48.880 --> 0:57:53.600
<v Speaker 1>you know, zero safety problems right as opposed to saying oh,

0:57:53.640 --> 0:57:58.160
<v Speaker 1>because that discourages people from reporting accidents right as opposed

0:57:58.200 --> 0:58:01.960
<v Speaker 1>to how did we respond on to those accidents. I mean,

0:58:02.000 --> 0:58:05.320
<v Speaker 1>we have these perverse performance incentives that I think switched

0:58:06.240 --> 0:58:09.400
<v Speaker 1>for the burden to be on how management responds rather

0:58:09.480 --> 0:58:13.280
<v Speaker 1>than drive to encourage just employees to speak up. They're

0:58:13.320 --> 0:58:16.080
<v Speaker 1>gonna speak up if they feel like they're not going

0:58:16.160 --> 0:58:18.720
<v Speaker 1>to suffer retaliation and something's going to be done about

0:58:18.760 --> 0:58:20.800
<v Speaker 1>the problem. And I also just want to say one

0:58:20.800 --> 0:58:26.000
<v Speaker 1>thing about this, the money problem, is that largely that

0:58:26.240 --> 0:58:28.520
<v Speaker 1>is not what motivates people to speak out. As a

0:58:28.520 --> 0:58:30.520
<v Speaker 1>matter of fact, there's some data that says that money

0:58:30.560 --> 0:58:35.720
<v Speaker 1>depresses reporting right or depresses ethical behavior. And so when

0:58:35.760 --> 0:58:39.680
<v Speaker 1>the SEC, for instance, promotes all of these multimillion dollar

0:58:39.760 --> 0:58:42.560
<v Speaker 1>awards that it's giving to whistleblowers, I think it's just

0:58:42.600 --> 0:58:48.200
<v Speaker 1>sending totally the wrong message personally, um, because like they've

0:58:48.200 --> 0:58:51.080
<v Speaker 1>given out three hundred and twenty eight awards out of

0:58:51.360 --> 0:58:54.120
<v Speaker 1>sixty four thousand, four hundred and twenty one tips that

0:58:54.160 --> 0:58:58.160
<v Speaker 1>they've that they've received since its inception in that means

0:58:58.160 --> 0:59:03.360
<v Speaker 1>you have a point five sent chance, point five percent

0:59:03.440 --> 0:59:06.439
<v Speaker 1>chance of getting an award. It's like you buy buy

0:59:06.440 --> 0:59:09.840
<v Speaker 1>a lottery ticket. I think the success of this program

0:59:10.040 --> 0:59:14.120
<v Speaker 1>is that it's a program that allows for anonymity and

0:59:14.240 --> 0:59:19.920
<v Speaker 1>confidentiality and an opportunity that someone someone responsible might investigate

0:59:19.920 --> 0:59:22.240
<v Speaker 1>and do something about it and yeah, maybe you maybe

0:59:22.280 --> 0:59:24.800
<v Speaker 1>you'll you'll win the lottery and get a payout. But

0:59:24.880 --> 0:59:29.640
<v Speaker 1>it addresses those other two issues that that are motivating

0:59:29.680 --> 0:59:33.760
<v Speaker 1>to an employee who sees wrongdoing, right is that someone's

0:59:33.760 --> 0:59:35.640
<v Speaker 1>going to maybe do something about it and I don't

0:59:35.640 --> 0:59:38.600
<v Speaker 1>have to risk retaliation because I can stay anonymous or

0:59:38.640 --> 0:59:41.919
<v Speaker 1>you know, maintain my confidentiality. Like that's in part why

0:59:41.960 --> 0:59:44.800
<v Speaker 1>this is so successful. So I think it's not about

0:59:44.800 --> 0:59:51.000
<v Speaker 1>this money thing. It's about measuring and incentivizing the right behavior.

0:59:51.960 --> 0:59:54.600
<v Speaker 1>So what are your thoughts, just in general, on the

0:59:54.640 --> 0:59:59.440
<v Speaker 1>idea of rewarding whistleblowers with money at all? Personally, I

0:59:59.480 --> 1:00:03.480
<v Speaker 1>think we have struck, the regulators have struck a pretty

1:00:03.520 --> 1:00:06.640
<v Speaker 1>good balance. If you try to resolve something internally and

1:00:06.640 --> 1:00:09.320
<v Speaker 1>then go external, you have the highest chance for the

1:00:09.360 --> 1:00:13.120
<v Speaker 1>most reward externally on these bounties. So I I think

1:00:13.160 --> 1:00:16.120
<v Speaker 1>that balance is a great balance that the US is

1:00:16.160 --> 1:00:21.560
<v Speaker 1>created because it it doesn't steal this resource away from firms.

1:00:21.600 --> 1:00:24.480
<v Speaker 1>Because if we really want to change things, we want

1:00:24.600 --> 1:00:27.080
<v Speaker 1>the people closest to the problems to fix them. It's

1:00:27.280 --> 1:00:29.120
<v Speaker 1>much harder to get the government to fix them. But

1:00:29.560 --> 1:00:31.439
<v Speaker 1>if it has to go to the government, oh man,

1:00:31.480 --> 1:00:34.480
<v Speaker 1>they better pay. I want to pivot for just a

1:00:34.560 --> 1:00:37.800
<v Speaker 1>second and and talk a little bit about your work, Kyle.

1:00:38.680 --> 1:00:42.560
<v Speaker 1>In your work, you use the Peter Drucker quote culture

1:00:42.680 --> 1:00:46.760
<v Speaker 1>eats strategy for breakfast. Can you explain what you meant

1:00:46.800 --> 1:00:50.440
<v Speaker 1>by that in the context of whistleblowing When you have

1:00:50.480 --> 1:00:53.520
<v Speaker 1>a strong culture in your organization, where when your group

1:00:53.640 --> 1:00:57.400
<v Speaker 1>feels like almost like their kinship with like they're related

1:00:57.440 --> 1:01:00.160
<v Speaker 1>to each other, they all of a sudden make an

1:01:00.160 --> 1:01:04.360
<v Speaker 1>investment in their organization that you wouldn't get otherwise. You

1:01:04.400 --> 1:01:08.120
<v Speaker 1>would not get that otherwise, and so there's all these externalities.

1:01:08.160 --> 1:01:10.760
<v Speaker 1>And Danta kind of talked about this. One of the

1:01:10.800 --> 1:01:14.040
<v Speaker 1>tragedies of this of research and this data is that

1:01:14.120 --> 1:01:18.440
<v Speaker 1>it's very easy to measure negative outcomes. Negative outcomes come

1:01:18.440 --> 1:01:21.720
<v Speaker 1>in the form of lawsuits, fines, and then news stories.

1:01:21.760 --> 1:01:24.200
<v Speaker 1>Those are all the negative outcomes. It's very hard to

1:01:24.240 --> 1:01:27.640
<v Speaker 1>measure the positive outcomes. Somebody that is dealing with harassment.

1:01:27.680 --> 1:01:29.880
<v Speaker 1>Somebody is dealing with the problem at at work, and

1:01:29.920 --> 1:01:32.400
<v Speaker 1>the problem gets resolved all of a sudden, they feel

1:01:32.680 --> 1:01:35.120
<v Speaker 1>a huge weight off of them and working at work

1:01:35.200 --> 1:01:38.000
<v Speaker 1>environment is much better. You think about somebody being harassed

1:01:38.040 --> 1:01:39.920
<v Speaker 1>at work and then taking that home with them and

1:01:39.960 --> 1:01:43.320
<v Speaker 1>how that affects their other relationships with their spouse and kids.

1:01:44.480 --> 1:01:47.400
<v Speaker 1>It's it, it has. There's huge effects to this, and

1:01:47.400 --> 1:01:51.880
<v Speaker 1>and I think we're just we're just getting exposing just

1:01:51.920 --> 1:01:56.800
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of it that it's wide open for us. Yeah. Yeah,

1:01:57.040 --> 1:01:58.880
<v Speaker 1>I just want to expand on that a little bit

1:01:58.920 --> 1:02:01.520
<v Speaker 1>because I just think it's it's often hard to measure

1:02:03.160 --> 1:02:06.160
<v Speaker 1>problems that are prevented, right, Like it's hard when you

1:02:06.320 --> 1:02:10.400
<v Speaker 1>when you actually can prevent a big safety problem because

1:02:10.520 --> 1:02:13.400
<v Speaker 1>the company has addressed it, it's hard to say, well,

1:02:13.400 --> 1:02:18.880
<v Speaker 1>we we prevented a nuclear three mile Island disaster. And

1:02:18.960 --> 1:02:20.600
<v Speaker 1>this is like why it's a you know, it's a

1:02:20.600 --> 1:02:23.280
<v Speaker 1>weird data set to to measure, you know, I think

1:02:23.320 --> 1:02:26.240
<v Speaker 1>about GM. I whish there were more examples like this,

1:02:26.320 --> 1:02:30.360
<v Speaker 1>but you know, Tony Fernendez, the whistleblower who sued on

1:02:30.440 --> 1:02:33.800
<v Speaker 1>his own Haliburton and then GM he's an accounting fraud

1:02:34.000 --> 1:02:38.120
<v Speaker 1>he you know, GM snatched, he blew the whistle on

1:02:38.200 --> 1:02:43.160
<v Speaker 1>Haliburton and huge accounting fraud, right, and he represented himself.

1:02:43.200 --> 1:02:48.680
<v Speaker 1>Actually pro se was very successful. General Motors hired him

1:02:48.720 --> 1:02:51.840
<v Speaker 1>and they brought him on like in a really public way,

1:02:51.880 --> 1:02:54.560
<v Speaker 1>like we're gonna hire the whistleblower. And I just like

1:02:54.640 --> 1:02:59.360
<v Speaker 1>this should happen all the time, like this should like this.

1:02:59.720 --> 1:03:01.560
<v Speaker 1>You know, we've we've touched on this a couple of times,

1:03:01.560 --> 1:03:05.320
<v Speaker 1>but why doesn't it happen more? Let me can I

1:03:05.360 --> 1:03:07.600
<v Speaker 1>push back on that? Just a sect to that the

1:03:07.880 --> 1:03:14.240
<v Speaker 1>name of the show was calling bosh so so so

1:03:14.320 --> 1:03:16.520
<v Speaker 1>let me push back on that. There's an academic article

1:03:16.640 --> 1:03:19.240
<v Speaker 1>that was published by a couple of smart, sharp guys.

1:03:19.240 --> 1:03:22.160
<v Speaker 1>What they did is they looked at uh public keytam

1:03:22.240 --> 1:03:25.720
<v Speaker 1>lawsuits and then they said, okay, let's find the people

1:03:25.760 --> 1:03:29.160
<v Speaker 1>that brought the lawsuits and do background checks on them

1:03:29.480 --> 1:03:32.000
<v Speaker 1>to see where they are in their careers. So, using

1:03:32.040 --> 1:03:34.760
<v Speaker 1>LinkedIn and private Investor, they spend a ton of money

1:03:34.800 --> 1:03:38.760
<v Speaker 1>on this. What they found was their careers showed no

1:03:38.960 --> 1:03:42.880
<v Speaker 1>deviation from their peers. I do know that people's careers,

1:03:43.000 --> 1:03:45.480
<v Speaker 1>people get fired from jobs. I know that event happens.

1:03:45.840 --> 1:03:48.200
<v Speaker 1>But when I'm saying this, I'm talking about means. I'm

1:03:48.240 --> 1:03:52.440
<v Speaker 1>talking about averages and especially means and averages of the population.

1:03:52.520 --> 1:03:55.320
<v Speaker 1>Even at the extreme. They looked at the extreme, and

1:03:55.440 --> 1:03:58.520
<v Speaker 1>in that extreme they said, hey, all these people had

1:03:58.640 --> 1:04:00.480
<v Speaker 1>like similar jobs. They didn't have their set, but they

1:04:00.480 --> 1:04:05.040
<v Speaker 1>were at similar levels relative appears. So i'miding to read that,

1:04:05.360 --> 1:04:06.760
<v Speaker 1>and I hope you send it to me, because I

1:04:06.760 --> 1:04:09.360
<v Speaker 1>think what's interesting about Dodd Frank and the false Claims

1:04:09.360 --> 1:04:10.920
<v Speaker 1>Act of course, right, is that when you file a

1:04:11.000 --> 1:04:14.320
<v Speaker 1>false claims at case, you do so under sealed. You

1:04:14.360 --> 1:04:16.800
<v Speaker 1>file a claim, but the Department of Justice and it's

1:04:16.880 --> 1:04:19.760
<v Speaker 1>under sealed, like it is under sealed, like the company

1:04:19.800 --> 1:04:22.320
<v Speaker 1>does not know. Like this is like a quiet thing.

1:04:22.520 --> 1:04:25.680
<v Speaker 1>But those whistleblowers who blew the whistle not using these

1:04:25.720 --> 1:04:30.240
<v Speaker 1>confidential systems, that experience for the whistleblower becomes then they

1:04:30.320 --> 1:04:33.640
<v Speaker 1>become radioactive quite quite frequently if it's public, you know,

1:04:33.800 --> 1:04:37.400
<v Speaker 1>very very public profile. So I just you know, I think,

1:04:37.440 --> 1:04:39.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean, again, this is like a really dramatic example

1:04:39.560 --> 1:04:42.440
<v Speaker 1>because her disclosures went viral. But I represent Don Wootton,

1:04:42.560 --> 1:04:45.960
<v Speaker 1>who's the nurse at She was the nurse at the

1:04:46.040 --> 1:04:49.920
<v Speaker 1>Erwin County Detention Center. Whistle. Yeah right, blew the whistle

1:04:50.080 --> 1:04:53.480
<v Speaker 1>on all kinds of medical mistreatment, including that women were

1:04:53.520 --> 1:04:58.480
<v Speaker 1>suffering non consensual, unnecessary gynecological procedures that went totally viral.

1:04:59.160 --> 1:05:01.880
<v Speaker 1>You know, her life is completely changed and she can't

1:05:02.600 --> 1:05:04.760
<v Speaker 1>she can't either get a job or retain a job

1:05:04.880 --> 1:05:08.280
<v Speaker 1>as a nurse during a pandemic in her local community

1:05:08.320 --> 1:05:12.120
<v Speaker 1>because she is blamed right as the one responsible for

1:05:12.360 --> 1:05:15.520
<v Speaker 1>ending that contract at that facility. Now that's very dramatic

1:05:15.560 --> 1:05:19.320
<v Speaker 1>example because she's so well known essentially, right, But and

1:05:19.640 --> 1:05:22.280
<v Speaker 1>I'm not saying that's true for all whistleblowers at all.

1:05:22.560 --> 1:05:26.919
<v Speaker 1>You know this problem, I mean, I think it's but yeah, yeah,

1:05:26.960 --> 1:05:30.440
<v Speaker 1>that that praises another question for me because you know,

1:05:30.520 --> 1:05:33.400
<v Speaker 1>another expert that we spoke to for the show actually

1:05:33.480 --> 1:05:37.320
<v Speaker 1>mentioned that there are certain industries and and she called

1:05:37.360 --> 1:05:41.760
<v Speaker 1>out health care and defense where you may never work

1:05:41.800 --> 1:05:45.480
<v Speaker 1>again if you speak out. And so I guess it

1:05:45.600 --> 1:05:50.560
<v Speaker 1>does seem like there are some industries where there there

1:05:50.760 --> 1:05:56.040
<v Speaker 1>is a stigma. I will I'm gonna call both on that.

1:05:56.040 --> 1:05:59.280
<v Speaker 1>That those are the most regulated industries. I would say

1:05:59.520 --> 1:06:02.600
<v Speaker 1>your more likely to have a problem in an industry

1:06:02.640 --> 1:06:04.960
<v Speaker 1>that doesn't have those eyeballs. So let me tell you

1:06:04.960 --> 1:06:07.520
<v Speaker 1>why I based this opinion on on the claim of

1:06:07.560 --> 1:06:10.480
<v Speaker 1>health care and defense. In the last year, I've spoken

1:06:10.520 --> 1:06:15.000
<v Speaker 1>at three defense conferences and three healthcare conferences trying to

1:06:15.120 --> 1:06:19.120
<v Speaker 1>understand and better like better understand the outcome and positive

1:06:19.200 --> 1:06:22.880
<v Speaker 1>natures associated with these compliance. Of all the two industries

1:06:22.960 --> 1:06:26.400
<v Speaker 1>that reach out to my research, No two industries reach

1:06:26.440 --> 1:06:28.960
<v Speaker 1>out to this research more like I can't even think

1:06:29.000 --> 1:06:32.680
<v Speaker 1>of a third healthcare and defense. You're hearing the failures

1:06:32.720 --> 1:06:36.000
<v Speaker 1>of it, and so if you hear censored data, you

1:06:36.040 --> 1:06:38.920
<v Speaker 1>will always get a censored by as sample from it.

1:06:39.360 --> 1:06:42.840
<v Speaker 1>And I would say, generally speaking, defense industry. Of all

1:06:42.840 --> 1:06:46.000
<v Speaker 1>the industries that reach out to me, defense and healthcare

1:06:46.160 --> 1:06:49.400
<v Speaker 1>over and over and over again have a huge focus

1:06:49.440 --> 1:06:53.000
<v Speaker 1>on this. I would say compliance in those two industries

1:06:53.040 --> 1:06:56.560
<v Speaker 1>while there are and it makes sense because the problems

1:06:56.600 --> 1:07:01.080
<v Speaker 1>if somebody dies, if something goes wrong, or got secrets

1:07:01.080 --> 1:07:03.800
<v Speaker 1>getting leaked out, it makes sense that compliance would be

1:07:03.880 --> 1:07:06.960
<v Speaker 1>huge in those industries. Dana, did you have any thoughts

1:07:07.040 --> 1:07:11.480
<v Speaker 1>about that? Yeah, I mean I think I actually think

1:07:11.520 --> 1:07:14.560
<v Speaker 1>this could be a both and situation in that I

1:07:14.640 --> 1:07:19.280
<v Speaker 1>agree that these heavily regulated industries where the stakes are

1:07:19.400 --> 1:07:23.400
<v Speaker 1>very high, have some of the most sophisticated ethics and

1:07:23.440 --> 1:07:27.920
<v Speaker 1>compliance systems. They understand why it's important to them, and

1:07:27.960 --> 1:07:31.120
<v Speaker 1>they have they're they're just far more advanced. I still

1:07:31.120 --> 1:07:35.600
<v Speaker 1>think even when you hear those outlying pieces of data,

1:07:36.160 --> 1:07:39.400
<v Speaker 1>it's still a sign of failure in that ethics and

1:07:39.440 --> 1:07:43.200
<v Speaker 1>compliance system. When you have a Boeing whistleblower who basically

1:07:43.240 --> 1:07:46.240
<v Speaker 1>said I was raising concerns about safety issues and suffered

1:07:46.280 --> 1:07:49.160
<v Speaker 1>reprisal and they weren't addressed. And the only reason now

1:07:49.200 --> 1:07:52.200
<v Speaker 1>that you're hearing about it is because they suffered reprisal

1:07:52.280 --> 1:07:56.560
<v Speaker 1>and the problem wasn't addressed, and the stakes of that

1:07:56.840 --> 1:08:06.600
<v Speaker 1>response is endangering people. Right, I'm so like, do you

1:08:06.640 --> 1:08:08.960
<v Speaker 1>need like? So, You're right, it might be an outlier,

1:08:09.640 --> 1:08:13.160
<v Speaker 1>but that failure is still a problem. It doesn't mean

1:08:13.280 --> 1:08:16.519
<v Speaker 1>that everything is bad at that company and that every

1:08:16.600 --> 1:08:20.479
<v Speaker 1>but it's like if you're talking about one plane fallen

1:08:20.520 --> 1:08:22.840
<v Speaker 1>from the sky, you kind of want to prevent that,

1:08:23.040 --> 1:08:26.240
<v Speaker 1>right and no, So, so so let's be clear. What

1:08:26.280 --> 1:08:30.240
<v Speaker 1>I'm saying is that when they do something wrong, go

1:08:30.439 --> 1:08:33.440
<v Speaker 1>hard on the paint on them to hold them accountable.

1:08:33.840 --> 1:08:37.680
<v Speaker 1>But when we're talking about means and averages in those industries,

1:08:37.800 --> 1:08:41.519
<v Speaker 1>the mean firm in compliance, the mean firm associated with this.

1:08:41.640 --> 1:08:45.640
<v Speaker 1>In defense and healthcare, they the reason why they have

1:08:45.680 --> 1:08:47.400
<v Speaker 1>these advanced systems. They try to get ahead of it.

1:08:47.439 --> 1:08:51.040
<v Speaker 1>So when somebody in in that network does something wrong,

1:08:51.439 --> 1:08:55.240
<v Speaker 1>oh my gosh, all the more, all the more should

1:08:55.240 --> 1:08:58.080
<v Speaker 1>they be held accountable because of how advanced their system

1:08:58.120 --> 1:09:02.800
<v Speaker 1>should be. Okay, I'm a little confused, So I just

1:09:02.840 --> 1:09:08.360
<v Speaker 1>want to clarify something because I think lots of companies

1:09:08.360 --> 1:09:13.400
<v Speaker 1>have like hotline reporting systems for reporting, and I have

1:09:13.479 --> 1:09:16.519
<v Speaker 1>seen experts who have pointed out that those mechanisms are

1:09:16.560 --> 1:09:21.720
<v Speaker 1>only as good as the culture behind that system. You

1:09:21.760 --> 1:09:29.439
<v Speaker 1>agree with that, okay, but you don't agree And I

1:09:29.960 --> 1:09:33.200
<v Speaker 1>get that data is hard to get here, but you

1:09:33.320 --> 1:09:37.760
<v Speaker 1>don't agree that there are industries healthcare and defense are

1:09:37.800 --> 1:09:41.160
<v Speaker 1>two that have been mentioned by other experts where there

1:09:41.280 --> 1:09:48.479
<v Speaker 1>is a problem, a cultural bias against hiring people who

1:09:48.520 --> 1:09:51.960
<v Speaker 1>have had a history of whistle blowing. But don't you

1:09:52.000 --> 1:09:54.000
<v Speaker 1>think it's kind of apples and oranges? And I think

1:09:54.000 --> 1:09:56.360
<v Speaker 1>this is why I maybe you're struggling and and I

1:09:56.400 --> 1:10:00.200
<v Speaker 1>am too. Is that it's still about people, Like if

1:10:00.240 --> 1:10:02.960
<v Speaker 1>you raised a concern internally and it was dealt with

1:10:03.000 --> 1:10:06.240
<v Speaker 1>through the ethics and compliance system, you're actually not I mean,

1:10:06.280 --> 1:10:08.400
<v Speaker 1>you're a whistle or because you raised a concern, but

1:10:08.439 --> 1:10:11.360
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't become a problem because it's about the management

1:10:11.439 --> 1:10:15.679
<v Speaker 1>response to the report. That's what really becomes the issue.

1:10:16.040 --> 1:10:18.160
<v Speaker 1>It's how does management respond to the report. That's why

1:10:18.200 --> 1:10:20.200
<v Speaker 1>we don't hear all of this data that you hear

1:10:20.240 --> 1:10:22.639
<v Speaker 1>about Kyle. It's like, that's why it's a gold mine

1:10:22.760 --> 1:10:26.400
<v Speaker 1>because here people that report internally and the company dealt

1:10:26.439 --> 1:10:28.880
<v Speaker 1>with it, right, So I'm dealing with when the company

1:10:28.920 --> 1:10:32.840
<v Speaker 1>failed to respond appropriately, right, And it happens a lot.

1:10:32.920 --> 1:10:35.120
<v Speaker 1>We are so busy, like we have a lot, you

1:10:35.160 --> 1:10:37.519
<v Speaker 1>know what, we can't help everybody, right, Like there's a

1:10:37.520 --> 1:10:40.160
<v Speaker 1>lot of failure. And they're in health care and they're

1:10:40.160 --> 1:10:42.720
<v Speaker 1>in defense, like they're in all of these industries, right,

1:10:42.760 --> 1:10:45.919
<v Speaker 1>they're all always failures. And so when I think about

1:10:46.120 --> 1:10:48.800
<v Speaker 1>how we care about the power of an individual who

1:10:48.840 --> 1:10:52.120
<v Speaker 1>sees a problem, right, and when they it's either experienced

1:10:52.120 --> 1:10:55.280
<v Speaker 1>retaliation or the problem isn't dealt with. That's when they're

1:10:55.320 --> 1:11:00.719
<v Speaker 1>prompted to go outside, and once they're public, it becomes

1:11:00.800 --> 1:11:03.720
<v Speaker 1>very hard. I think even you know, as anyone in

1:11:03.800 --> 1:11:05.759
<v Speaker 1>a play, you know, here's someone who blew the whistle

1:11:05.800 --> 1:11:09.200
<v Speaker 1>before publicly, like GM. That's why I made that example.

1:11:09.240 --> 1:11:14.719
<v Speaker 1>It's like they basically use that as as a way

1:11:14.840 --> 1:11:19.200
<v Speaker 1>of telegraphing to their culture and to their workers into

1:11:19.280 --> 1:11:22.120
<v Speaker 1>the world. We like that this person is a whistle blower.

1:11:22.120 --> 1:11:26.040
<v Speaker 1>We care about our accounting cleanliness. We're not afraid that

1:11:26.200 --> 1:11:29.080
<v Speaker 1>is like not reflexibly. If you know that someone is sued,

1:11:29.120 --> 1:11:31.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, has sued an employer in the past, and

1:11:31.760 --> 1:11:36.240
<v Speaker 1>you're an employer hiring someone, you're gonna think out of

1:11:36.320 --> 1:11:38.680
<v Speaker 1>what this person because they're gonna blow the whistle on me.

1:11:39.040 --> 1:11:42.640
<v Speaker 1>I just think it's it's so embedded in terms of

1:11:42.640 --> 1:11:45.640
<v Speaker 1>how we and I think it's where like the blacklisting

1:11:45.720 --> 1:11:50.160
<v Speaker 1>comes up again, for a public facing whistle blower, you

1:11:50.240 --> 1:11:54.640
<v Speaker 1>have to either embrace it and may be really enlightened,

1:11:55.920 --> 1:11:58.040
<v Speaker 1>or you're gonna be like, oh, this person is going

1:11:58.080 --> 1:11:59.760
<v Speaker 1>to see all the problems and my we're going to

1:11:59.800 --> 1:12:02.360
<v Speaker 1>say we all, we'll give you, we'll give you the

1:12:02.439 --> 1:12:04.120
<v Speaker 1>last word, and then we get we get a rep.

1:12:04.240 --> 1:12:09.040
<v Speaker 1>We we all agree that it's bad. And uh, the

1:12:09.120 --> 1:12:11.920
<v Speaker 1>one thing that I that's the important that we agree.

1:12:12.479 --> 1:12:15.320
<v Speaker 1>We agree that if somebody is getting blacklisted for this,

1:12:15.520 --> 1:12:19.600
<v Speaker 1>that it's bad. So what I would say and what

1:12:19.720 --> 1:12:22.640
<v Speaker 1>I tell compliance professionals and people that reach out, is

1:12:22.680 --> 1:12:26.720
<v Speaker 1>that first everyone that wants they want to have an

1:12:26.800 --> 1:12:29.920
<v Speaker 1>organization and a great culture. Most leaders do want that,

1:12:29.960 --> 1:12:34.040
<v Speaker 1>I would say, on average, And so we hear about

1:12:34.080 --> 1:12:39.080
<v Speaker 1>these bad stories, and I would say that the Special

1:12:39.160 --> 1:12:43.720
<v Speaker 1>Victims Unit of whistle blowing is important to understand and

1:12:43.800 --> 1:12:48.839
<v Speaker 1>identify and tell stories from. But make sure our narrative

1:12:48.960 --> 1:12:52.560
<v Speaker 1>is is the average human isn't the type of perpetrator

1:12:52.640 --> 1:12:56.320
<v Speaker 1>that makes people go to this SPU unit of whistle blowing,

1:12:56.479 --> 1:12:59.280
<v Speaker 1>And that there is a lot of good that's happening

1:12:59.360 --> 1:13:01.280
<v Speaker 1>and we never hear about it. I don't know that

1:13:01.320 --> 1:13:04.080
<v Speaker 1>we'll ever hear about all of it, but we should

1:13:04.120 --> 1:13:06.600
<v Speaker 1>understand the s V unit, but understand that that is

1:13:06.920 --> 1:13:12.599
<v Speaker 1>the sampling doesn't show the whole population. Okay, sadly we

1:13:12.720 --> 1:13:16.320
<v Speaker 1>have to wrap this up, but this has been a

1:13:16.360 --> 1:13:21.679
<v Speaker 1>fantastic conversation. I so appreciate both of you. Kyle Dana,

1:13:21.840 --> 1:13:25.160
<v Speaker 1>thank you for being on the show. This is super fun.

1:13:25.640 --> 1:13:27.599
<v Speaker 1>It's fun talking to Dana too. I've seen it from

1:13:27.600 --> 1:13:29.840
<v Speaker 1>a distance for so I was like, I'm gonna get

1:13:29.880 --> 1:13:35.759
<v Speaker 1>to do this with Kyle's and now we know tie,

1:13:35.840 --> 1:13:38.560
<v Speaker 1>So this is great. You're doing great work on this podcast.

1:13:38.680 --> 1:13:40.679
<v Speaker 1>I appreciate that, and thank you both for the work

1:13:40.720 --> 1:13:44.280
<v Speaker 1>that you're doing so so great and so important. Keep

1:13:44.280 --> 1:13:49.519
<v Speaker 1>it up. Alright, folks, We're not giving anybody a B

1:13:49.800 --> 1:13:51.840
<v Speaker 1>S score today, but I do want to drive this

1:13:51.880 --> 1:13:55.800
<v Speaker 1>point home. In a perfect world, corporate mouthfeasance would be

1:13:55.840 --> 1:13:59.080
<v Speaker 1>stopped as soon as it's discovered. Fraud would be dealt

1:13:59.120 --> 1:14:03.479
<v Speaker 1>with internal, and systems that incentivize poor behavior would be

1:14:03.520 --> 1:14:07.840
<v Speaker 1>redesigned to encourage people to do the right thing. We

1:14:07.920 --> 1:14:11.800
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't need whistle blowers. But the point I want to

1:14:11.840 --> 1:14:16.679
<v Speaker 1>make two leaders of organizations everywhere, you have a massive

1:14:16.760 --> 1:14:20.640
<v Speaker 1>opportunity to embrace and support whistleblowers and see them for

1:14:20.720 --> 1:14:24.599
<v Speaker 1>what they really are. There, in many cases your most

1:14:24.720 --> 1:14:28.960
<v Speaker 1>loyal people. They are your bravest people. They are an

1:14:29.040 --> 1:14:32.639
<v Speaker 1>asset to your company, to your culture, and to your

1:14:32.680 --> 1:14:39.440
<v Speaker 1>bottom line. Treat them that way. If you're a whistleblower

1:14:39.640 --> 1:14:42.840
<v Speaker 1>or looking for support and resources to become one. Here

1:14:42.840 --> 1:14:46.479
<v Speaker 1>are a few organizations in addition to the sec that

1:14:46.560 --> 1:14:52.160
<v Speaker 1>Mary Inman recommends that you check out. The Signals Network

1:14:52.280 --> 1:14:55.719
<v Speaker 1>is a not for profit that assist whistleblowers and connects

1:14:55.760 --> 1:15:02.400
<v Speaker 1>them safely with journalists. Taxpayers Against Fraud supports whistleblowers, and

1:15:02.600 --> 1:15:06.680
<v Speaker 1>Vault is an anonymous reporting tool that allows whistleblowers to

1:15:06.760 --> 1:15:11.679
<v Speaker 1>find each other safely within organizations. You can find details

1:15:11.720 --> 1:15:14.599
<v Speaker 1>about how to contact all of them in our show notes.

1:15:16.160 --> 1:15:19.320
<v Speaker 1>And I want to thank Mary Edman, Kyle Welch, and

1:15:19.479 --> 1:15:22.680
<v Speaker 1>Dana Gold both for the work they do and for

1:15:22.760 --> 1:15:24.760
<v Speaker 1>taking the time to talk with me today for this

1:15:24.880 --> 1:15:29.320
<v Speaker 1>special episode. Links about them and their work are also

1:15:29.400 --> 1:15:33.000
<v Speaker 1>in the show notes. And if this episode made you

1:15:33.080 --> 1:15:35.840
<v Speaker 1>want to do the right thing, subscribe to the Calling

1:15:35.880 --> 1:15:39.640
<v Speaker 1>Bullshit podcast on the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

1:15:39.840 --> 1:15:42.400
<v Speaker 1>or wherever you listen to people speaking to your ears.

1:15:42.880 --> 1:15:45.120
<v Speaker 1>Please take a minute to rate us and let us

1:15:45.120 --> 1:15:48.080
<v Speaker 1>know what you think of the show. More reviews help

1:15:48.120 --> 1:15:51.599
<v Speaker 1>more people find us, And I want to thank you

1:15:51.840 --> 1:15:55.920
<v Speaker 1>for listening. Our listeners are most important stakeholders and we

1:15:56.000 --> 1:15:59.559
<v Speaker 1>appreciate you spending time with us. Hopefully we'll be back

1:15:59.600 --> 1:16:03.599
<v Speaker 1>in your bed very soon and thanks to our production

1:16:03.680 --> 1:16:09.680
<v Speaker 1>team Hannah Beale, Amanda Ginsburg, D S Moss, Hailey Pascalites,

1:16:10.040 --> 1:16:14.880
<v Speaker 1>and Parker Silzer. Calling Bullshit was created by co Collective

1:16:15.280 --> 1:16:19.120
<v Speaker 1>and it's hosted by Me Time onto You. Thanks for listening.