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Speaker 1: Hey, folks, I want to take a minute to ask

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Speaker 1: for your help. This show is a labor of love

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Speaker 1: for all of us here on the team at calling BS.

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Speaker 1: We debate which organizations to investigate. We carefully consider how

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Speaker 1: to best tell these stories. Our goal is to create

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Speaker 1: a show that exposes purpose washing and the real harm

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Speaker 1: it does in the world. But we also want to

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Speaker 1: create a show that's fun to listen to and serves

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Speaker 1: as a practical guide for entrepreneurs and leadership teams about

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Speaker 1: how to do purpose right. We're really proud of what

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Speaker 1: we've made so far, and we're super excited about getting

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Speaker 1: season three into production so we can share it with

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Speaker 1: all of you now to the help we need. So far,

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Speaker 1: we are self funded. We need a sponsor or sponsors

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Speaker 1: to help us with the cost of production. But, and

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Speaker 1: this is important, we feel like it would be disingenuous

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Speaker 1: given the theme of the show to accept money from

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Speaker 1: just anybody. It's important to us that the sponsors of

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Speaker 1: this show shared of shows values. We're looking for partners

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Speaker 1: who are purpose led themselves, Companies or organizations that truly

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Speaker 1: walk their talk. Companies who understand the harm that purpose

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Speaker 1: washing does and who understand how important it is for

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Speaker 1: all of us that more companies embrace the path to purpose.

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Speaker 1: If you're a part of an organization like that, or

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Speaker 1: you know one that seems like a good fit, don't

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Speaker 1: hesitate to drop us a line. You can reach me

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Speaker 1: directly at Team Montague at Calling Bullshit podcast dot com.

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Speaker 1: Thanks for listening, and let's get on with the show.

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Speaker 1: When powerful organizations do wrong, who stands up for what's right?

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Speaker 1: Francis how Good is thirty seven, a data scientist from Iowa.

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Speaker 1: The thing I saw Facebook over and over again was

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Speaker 1: there were conflicts of interest between what was good for

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Speaker 1: the public and what was good for Facebook. And Facebook

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Speaker 1: and over again shows to optimize for its own interests,

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Speaker 1: like making more money. It's people, in most cases, just

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Speaker 1: regular folks. Tyler Schultz says he quit out for Holmes

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Speaker 1: and her partner, Sonny Balwani ignored his complaints about falsified

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Speaker 1: research right off the bat. I realized that there's this

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Speaker 1: open secret that the technology didn't really exist. So all

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Speaker 1: these red flags were just piling up insiders who see

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Speaker 1: something and aren't afraid to say something, even when they

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Speaker 1: know it may cost them dearly Snowdon said he saw

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Speaker 1: firsthand and became increasingly concerned about the reach of the

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Speaker 1: n S, a electronic surveillance of innocent America. These are

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Speaker 1: public issues. These are not my issues, you know, these

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Speaker 1: are everybody's issues. There's a name for people like this, Whistleblowers.

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Speaker 1: Welcome to Calling Bullshit, the podcast about purpose washing, the

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Speaker 1: gap between what an organization says they stand for and

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Speaker 1: what they actually do, and what they would need to

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Speaker 1: change to practice what they preach. I'm your host, Time

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Speaker 1: onto you, and I've spent over a decade helping organizations

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Speaker 1: define what they stand for, their purpose and then help

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Speaker 1: them to use that purpose to drive transformation throughout their business. Today,

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Speaker 1: for the finale of season two, we're devoting the entire

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Speaker 1: episode to a special kind of BS detector, the whistleblower.

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Speaker 1: I'm speaking with three experts on the topic who will

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Speaker 1: explain why these people are so important and why, rather

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Speaker 1: than fearing them and shunning them, organizations should actually do

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Speaker 1: everything they can to protect them. Imagine you work for

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Speaker 1: a biotech company, a Silicon Valley unicorn with a charismatic

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Speaker 1: founder and a ten billion dollar valuation. You work there

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Speaker 1: because you believe this company is doing the right thing

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Speaker 1: changing health care for the better. Plus your grandfather's on

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Speaker 1: the board of directors. He's how you were introduced to

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Speaker 1: the company in the first place. But one day you

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Speaker 1: realize that this promising new technology that you're selling is

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Speaker 1: no more complicated than a bio student running tests with

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Speaker 1: a pipette, That the data you're publishing is misleading investors

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Speaker 1: into thinking you have an invention that doesn't actually exist,

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Speaker 1: and that the patients you're testing your technology on, some

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Speaker 1: of whom have life threatening conditions, are getting inaccurate results.

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Speaker 1: When you talk to your superiors, they dismiss you, and

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Speaker 1: when you talk to your grandfather, he dismisses you. So

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Speaker 1: what do you do. Do you just quietly quit or

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Speaker 1: are you ethnically pelled to say something publicly? A jury

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Speaker 1: convicted that Parinis, founder of four counts of defrauding investors yesterday.

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Speaker 1: One of her former employees was the first to blow

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Speaker 1: the whistle about the problems at the company. He then

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Speaker 1: shared his concerns with a state regulator, and then he

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Speaker 1: went to the Wall Street Journal. We all like to

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Speaker 1: think will do the right thing, that when confronted with

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Speaker 1: a problem that goes against our morals, we'll speak up

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Speaker 1: or act. But what if calling out the bullshit means

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Speaker 1: damaging your career, or your family relationships, or even your

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Speaker 1: personal safety. The fact is it is definitely easier in

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Speaker 1: a situation like this to just look the other way.

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Speaker 1: But if you raise the issue internally and management won't

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Speaker 1: address a problem, you are literally the last line of defense.

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Speaker 1: We all rely on and benefit from whistleblowers who take

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Speaker 1: on risks like this. Without whistleblowers, the public never have

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Speaker 1: learned that therein nosis blood tests were built around a lie,

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Speaker 1: or that Boeing had a toxic culture that ignored basic

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Speaker 1: safety precautions, and that hundreds of people died as a

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Speaker 1: direct result. Without whistleblowers speaking truth to power, it would

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Speaker 1: be a lot harder to detect bs in the world.

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Speaker 1: And here on the show, Francis Hogan was an important

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Speaker 1: part of the very first company we covered. Her insider

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Speaker 1: knowledge showed the world just how nefarious Facebook actually is.

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Speaker 1: A few episodes later, we spoke with whistleblower Tarick Fancy

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Speaker 1: about sustainable investing at Black Rock, and most recently, we

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Speaker 1: looked into the consulting firm McKenzie with two former employees

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Speaker 1: who helped us to understand the culture and the scope

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Speaker 1: of BS. At one of the world's most influential companies,

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Speaker 1: we rely on whistleblowers because they are a special kind

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Speaker 1: of BS detector, people with inside information and the courage

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Speaker 1: to go public. When whistleblowers need help, they often turn

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Speaker 1: to attorneys like my first guest today, Mary Inman. Mary

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Speaker 1: understands the unique challenges of coming forward because she's devoted

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Speaker 1: her career to protecting people who do. She's a partner

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Speaker 1: in Constantine Canon, a law firm that specializes in representing whistleblowers,

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Speaker 1: and over the years, she's built up an impressive resume,

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Speaker 1: defending many names you've heard of and countless others that

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Speaker 1: you may not have. Mary, Welcome to the show. TI,

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Speaker 1: thank you so much for having me today. It's a

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Speaker 1: real honor to be on your show. It's great to

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Speaker 1: have you here. So for the benefit of our listeners,

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Speaker 1: let's start off with an introduction. If you could just

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Speaker 1: tell folks a little bit about your background and how

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Speaker 1: you found your way into being an attorney for I

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Speaker 1: guess you know many of the most famous whistleblowers in

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Speaker 1: the world. So um, I went to law school, like

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Speaker 1: many lawyers trying to change the world. Didn't really know

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Speaker 1: how I was going to do that. I did some

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Speaker 1: work in the public Defender's office in law school, UM

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Speaker 1: and then clerked for a couple of judges, and I

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Speaker 1: just had the most amazing opportunity to drop in my lap.

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Speaker 1: A friend of mine referred me to a headhunter that said,

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Speaker 1: there's this little boutique law firm that's opening a San

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Speaker 1: Francisco office and they specialized in representing whistleblowers. So this

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Speaker 1: was like twenty four years ago, and that was a

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Speaker 1: time when there really weren't whistle blowers, weren't really the

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Speaker 1: esteemed place that they sit in our society today, part

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Speaker 1: of every news cycle, it seems like. And I was

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Speaker 1: just really really lucky. At the time I started, the

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Speaker 1: Supreme Court had not even yet said that the whistleblower

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Speaker 1: primary whistle blower program called the False Claim Sect something

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Speaker 1: we'll talk about later today. It wasn't even held to

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Speaker 1: be constitutional yet. So I remember getting advice from people saying,

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Speaker 1: what you want to specialize in this one statue that

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Speaker 1: the Supreme Court hasn't even said is legitimate, is constitutional?

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Speaker 1: And I said, well, um, it sounds really intriguing I'm

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Speaker 1: gonna roll the dice, and I did, And boy, I

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Speaker 1: did I have any idea that this was going to

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Speaker 1: become an amazing growth field and that the United States

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Speaker 1: government in particular has come to see whistle blowers as

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Speaker 1: their most effective law enforcement tool. So who are some

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Speaker 1: of the folks that you have represented in your career?

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Speaker 1: You know a lot of them. I do know a

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Speaker 1: lot of them, and it's been an enormous privilege every

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Speaker 1: day I kind of jumped out of bed to represent

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Speaker 1: people who really have the intestinal fortitude and the strength

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Speaker 1: to speak truth to power. So I think some of

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Speaker 1: your listeners probably most familiar. Tyler Schultz says Sarani's whistle

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Speaker 1: blower is one of my clients. Um. I've had a

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Speaker 1: number of health air fraud whistleblowers, including a gentleman by

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Speaker 1: the name of Dr James Taylor, who will be front

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Speaker 1: page news in the in the New York Times soon

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Speaker 1: exposing Medicare fraud by health insurers. I've also represented another

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Speaker 1: gentleman by the name of Benjamin Paling, who has also

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Speaker 1: shown a light on United Health Group for Medicare fraud,

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Speaker 1: as well as Dr Taylor shining a light on Kaiser permanente.

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Speaker 1: So there's been a huge group of them. But the

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Speaker 1: one I like to talk about the most is a

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Speaker 1: whistle blower that was the subject of a story in

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Speaker 1: The New Yorker magazine a few years ago called The

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Speaker 1: Personal Toll of whistle Blowing. His name was Dr Darren

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Speaker 1: sewell Um, and he's one that I like to talk

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Speaker 1: about a lot because I think he might still be

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Speaker 1: with us today had he not made the choice to

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Speaker 1: be a whistleblower. Tell us that story, what happened there? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: So I think it's it's something that we're gonna explore.

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Speaker 1: I'm I'm confident today is this idea what are the

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Speaker 1: repercussions of speaking out? And I'm sure a lot of

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Speaker 1: your listeners are well all aware that it can be

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Speaker 1: a career defining moment, in fact that it's often considered

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Speaker 1: career suicide. And so we're pretty familiar with the fact

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Speaker 1: that in certain industries, particularly healthcare or defense, you may

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Speaker 1: never work again if you speak out. But I think

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Speaker 1: what people are less aware of, and we're becoming more

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Speaker 1: sensitized too, is the psychosocial impacts of speaking out. The

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Speaker 1: New England Journal of Medicine did a research study a

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Speaker 1: number of years ago now that basically looked at whistlers

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Speaker 1: in the pharmaceutical industry who had reported off label marketing fraud,

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Speaker 1: and the study showed that the health effects were such

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Speaker 1: that whistlers have higher incidences of divorce, of alcoholism, of depression.

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Speaker 1: And I think so much of that comes from this

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Speaker 1: really primal notion that when you speak up and speak out,

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Speaker 1: you lose your tribe. You speak out against your tribe,

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Speaker 1: and your tribe tends to close ranks around you, and

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Speaker 1: there's really strong psychological circumstances to losing your support network.

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Speaker 1: So in the case of Dr Seol, he exposed health

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Speaker 1: care fraud at health Insure in Florida, and he really

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Speaker 1: could never work again because of his personal situation where

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Speaker 1: his daughter lived in Florida. He really couldn't just go

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Speaker 1: live somewhere else. And so all the health insurers community

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Speaker 1: and health care community was aware of him. And so

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Speaker 1: when he would get a job interests, you know, when

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Speaker 1: they called for references, all of a sudden they didn't

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Speaker 1: want to talk to him again. Um, And that became

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Speaker 1: a really difficult circumstance for him. Um. He actually wore

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Speaker 1: a wire for the FBI on that case. So and

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Speaker 1: a lot of stress that goes along with that, and

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Speaker 1: you know, and he and he passed away after UM,

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Speaker 1: just a long series of circumstances of not being employed.

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Speaker 1: So they really do, UM put a lot on the line.

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Speaker 1: And it was interesting. I wasn't aware that healthcare and

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Speaker 1: defense are particularly that way. I can understand the company, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, maybe uh not being in a hurry to

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Speaker 1: hire you back, but the whole industry that you're in

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Speaker 1: shutting you is a completely different matter, you know what

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Speaker 1: I mean. That's UM, that's that's really dire. UM. So

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Speaker 1: just just before we get further into some of the

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Speaker 1: impacts on the lives of whistleblowers, how do you decide

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Speaker 1: how you take clients or whether you take a client

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Speaker 1: or not. We represent whistle blowers under what we call

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Speaker 1: the US Whistleblower Reward Programs, so that all of a

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Speaker 1: sudden narrows the universe. We wish that we could represent

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Speaker 1: all whistle blowers. We don't do national security whistlers, for instance,

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Speaker 1: in the United States were fairly hypocritical. We're one of

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Speaker 1: the most advanced societies for having this notion that in law,

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Speaker 1: law enforcement settings we pay whistle blowers for information, recognizing

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Speaker 1: what they're giving up by speaking out. That's when these

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Speaker 1: whistle blowers are helpful and exposing fraud against the government

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Speaker 1: or fraud that impact our regulatory agencies missions like the

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Speaker 1: SEC fraud against investors. But when it's fraud by the government,

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Speaker 1: when we have those kinds of whistlers, when they're exposing

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Speaker 1: wrongdoing by the government, it's a very different setting. We

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Speaker 1: don't pay whistlers. In fact, we are just as bad

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Speaker 1: and medieval in terms of shooting the messenger. And so

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Speaker 1: just to make sure I understand, if I blow the

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Speaker 1: whistle on the government for some kind of malfeasance, there's

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Speaker 1: no financial reward in that for me, which makes it

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Speaker 1: very hard for you to take them on as as

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Speaker 1: a client, right right, right. So one of these we

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Speaker 1: do is we represent our clients. And this is something

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Speaker 1: that became really apparent to me when I moved to

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Speaker 1: London and sort of looked at the UK legal system

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Speaker 1: is to get to the brass tacks and gets kind

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Speaker 1: of boring to people. But I think it's important to

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Speaker 1: understand that. Um in the United States, a lot of

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Speaker 1: plane emplawyers like myself represent their clients on a contingency

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Speaker 1: fee or a success fee basis, so that means we

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Speaker 1: only get paid aid if we're successful in returning and

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Speaker 1: helping our client get a reward that actually facilitates access

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Speaker 1: to justice because in the UK they don't really like

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Speaker 1: that kind of a model, and as a result, lots

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Speaker 1: of whistlers and other people can't get lawyers because it's

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Speaker 1: very difficult to pay you know, six hundred seven hundred

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Speaker 1: dollars an hour when um, that's not within your budget.

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Speaker 1: So I think that's part of it is that these

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Speaker 1: bounties do, and I like, I don't like to call

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Speaker 1: them bounties because they almost suggest we're pirates. Um. These

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Speaker 1: these rewards and these awards go to whistleblowers to recognize

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Speaker 1: what they're giving up and to entice them to undertake

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Speaker 1: the risk in speaking out. But what's interesting is these

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Speaker 1: programs do a lot more than just pay the whistleblowers.

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Speaker 1: They actually create offices of the whistleblower. In the SEC,

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Speaker 1: the CFTC, I know we're going through alphabet soup in

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Speaker 1: the I r S, they actually have offices that are

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Speaker 1: staffed with people who are prepared to receive information from whistleblowers.

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Speaker 1: It sounds undane, but it isn't because a lot of

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Speaker 1: people don't know where to bring their information, and these

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Speaker 1: programs create, you know, staffed experts who are there with

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Speaker 1: special forms and web portals to upload your information, and

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Speaker 1: they're obligated to report back to Congress and tell them

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Speaker 1: how they're doing with this whistle lower information. And that's

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Speaker 1: really what's revolutionary here. It's not just that, it's it's

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Speaker 1: rolling out the welcome at to whistleblowers in a way

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Speaker 1: that clearly signposts where they should go and ensuring that

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Speaker 1: the information that they bring is actually looked at. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that's important work. So you've touched on a little bit

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Speaker 1: already in some of the stories you've told what risks

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Speaker 1: whistleblowers take by deciding to shine a light on you know,

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Speaker 1: let's call it organizational malfeasance. Can you talk more about

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Speaker 1: those risks? You know, what are some of the other

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Speaker 1: aspects of it. I can think of one other for instance,

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Speaker 1: like Tyler Schultz was in a bizarre situation where his grandfather,

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Speaker 1: who was the ex Secretary of State. Is that right?

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Speaker 1: Is his grandfather was was also an investor in the

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Speaker 1: company that Tyler worked in and on the board, I believe,

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Speaker 1: and and so he risked not only, you know, terminating

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Speaker 1: his relationship with the leadership of Sarais, but also with

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Speaker 1: his own members of his own family, and he put

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Speaker 1: a lot on the line there. I think his story

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Speaker 1: is a great one to spotlight in terms of what

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Speaker 1: are the effects of whistle bling that we haven't necessarily

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Speaker 1: explored yet. And one of them, it's what I call

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Speaker 1: the inequality of arms that a whistleblower goes against a

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Speaker 1: large corporation like Saranos, which was the darling of all investors.

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Speaker 1: You know, Elizabeth was on the cover of Forbes magazine.

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Speaker 1: And what happens is when you sign up as an employee,

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Speaker 1: you signed confidentiality agreements that often include nondisclosure and non

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Speaker 1: disparagement clauses. And what happened in Tyler's case is he

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Speaker 1: was visiting his grandfather and attorneys from Boy Schiller, who

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Speaker 1: were representing sara No Nos, basically served him with a

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Speaker 1: restraining order telling him stop violating your confidentiality agreement. UM.

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Speaker 1: They had come to understand that he had been giving

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Speaker 1: information to John Careyrew with the Wall Street Journal reporter

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Speaker 1: who exposed it all. But what happened is his parents

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Speaker 1: ended up, he's a young person at the time, ended

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Speaker 1: up taking out a mortgage on their home to pay

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Speaker 1: four hundred thousand dollars to pay for the attorneys to

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Speaker 1: defend against this lawsuit. We're saying he violated their trade secrets,

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Speaker 1: their proprietary confidentiality and agreement. And one of the most

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Speaker 1: famous things that Tyler said is he said, fraud is

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Speaker 1: not a trade secret, right, and that seems intuitive to

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Speaker 1: all that that seems intuitive to all of us, right,

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Speaker 1: But that doesn't mean that he didn't have to suffer

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Speaker 1: through an immense amount of litigation in order to get

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Speaker 1: that right result, which is that you know, in public policy,

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Speaker 1: we want certain information to get out to law enforcement,

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Speaker 1: which is what he did. So it's that these huge

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Speaker 1: corporations have a corporate playbook which is to basically destroy

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Speaker 1: the whistleblower. And and it's not just to silence them's

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Speaker 1: to silence all the employees who are watching everyone else. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that's right, scare scare everybody else, absolutely, So you know,

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Speaker 1: that's just one of the things is that they will

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Speaker 1: often sue them for theft of documents. They will sue

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Speaker 1: them for violations of the confidentiality agreement because they're so intent,

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Speaker 1: these companies on digging up dirt with this theory that

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Speaker 1: if you besmirched the whistleblower, it diverts attention from the

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Speaker 1: message that the whistleblower is is giving right, We'll shoot

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Speaker 1: the messenger to divert attention from the pr scandal that's

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Speaker 1: happening in front of their very eyes. And unfortunately, that's

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Speaker 1: that is the playbook. It makes me wonder because you know,

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Speaker 1: I've worked in a bunch of companies and I'm I've

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Speaker 1: signed a bunch of n d A. S Is it

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Speaker 1: there should be language protecting the person signing if the

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Speaker 1: company is committing fraud as as Tyler said, does that exist? Well,

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Speaker 1: you have you have put your finger on one of

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Speaker 1: to me, one of the best topics, which is UM.

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Speaker 1: There is a marvelous whistler who is because of her

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Speaker 1: experience of pinterest. Her names of Foma a Zoma. She

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Speaker 1: actually broke her n d A to speak out about

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Speaker 1: race and sex discrimination at pintrist. She's an African American

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Speaker 1: woman UM and she actually went ahead to have two

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Speaker 1: laws passed, one in California and one an Oregon called

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Speaker 1: the Silence No More Act, And what they seek to

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Speaker 1: do is hold those provisions unenforceable. So that's the insidious

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Speaker 1: part about these provisions as a lot of people see

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Speaker 1: the consequences of violating it. If they signed a severance

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Speaker 1: degree with this part of a severance package and you

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Speaker 1: have to give back all of that money, there can

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Speaker 1: be you know, damages on top of that. So it

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Speaker 1: has an enormous chilling effect of the things companies do.

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Speaker 1: They've gotten hip to the fact that these whistleblowers can

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Speaker 1: get rewards. They put in the separation agreement when you're signing,

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Speaker 1: you know, to get your you know years severance for

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Speaker 1: working there. How many years they say, I waived my

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Speaker 1: right to a reward under any of the whistleblower programs,

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Speaker 1: which is only shouldn't that shouldn't be legal. Yeah, well

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Speaker 1: that's good. The only way it stops when it is

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Speaker 1: when the SEC comes in and finds them. I was

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Speaker 1: reading an article today in publication called The Information that

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Speaker 1: said that reports to the SEC whistle blowing reports to

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Speaker 1: the SEC are up seventy six percent in over which

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Speaker 1: was already a record setting year from what do you

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Speaker 1: think is causing that. What's what's going on there? Well,

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Speaker 1: it's really interesting. Um, what might cause some of the

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Speaker 1: numbers is that we saw during the pandemic whistle blowing

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Speaker 1: just increasing across US sectors. Um, the SEC I think

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Speaker 1: saw fort rise. You know, we're all speculating here, but

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Speaker 1: is it because we're no longer in the workplace? You know,

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Speaker 1: there was a great resignation or people feeling less attached

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Speaker 1: to their employers. Are we having you know, these moments

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Speaker 1: of what really matters? So I think it started very much.

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Speaker 1: We have to look at the pandemic a little bit

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Speaker 1: um to understand some of these numbers. But as to

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Speaker 1: the SEC specifically, it's their success so um. I think

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Speaker 1: it was last year they crossed the billion dollar threshold

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Speaker 1: that they've paid over a billion dollars in rewards to whistleblowers.

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Speaker 1: And you know, it's a very controversial topic outside the

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Speaker 1: United States, and the United States were very comfortable with

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Speaker 1: this idea of paying rewards to whistleblowers UM in commonwealth

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Speaker 1: countries in the UK, it's anothema and a lot of

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Speaker 1: that comes from very strong cultural stereotypes. I think there's

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Speaker 1: a notion that Americans are mercenary and were transactional and

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Speaker 1: we have to be paid to do the right thing,

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Speaker 1: whereas British people do the right thing right upright, upstanding. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: but those rewards say something. I mean they basically, um

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Speaker 1: have a ripple effect around the globe when you pay

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Speaker 1: two fifty million dollars to a whistleblower, and then that

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Speaker 1: means that we really really value them. And so when

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Speaker 1: we say you get ten to you know, ten to

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Speaker 1: thirty percent of our recovery, we mean it regardless of

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Speaker 1: what size there you know penalty was. Whistleblowers trust the

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Speaker 1: American regulators because they believe we're aggressive. So international whistle

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Speaker 1: blowers have a lot more faith bringing their information to

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Speaker 1: US regulators because they know it won't be a feudal act.

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Speaker 1: The SEC gets twelve thousand tips a year now. They

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Speaker 1: come from ninety nine countries around the globe. Last year

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Speaker 1: of the people receiving awards came from overseas. So it's

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Speaker 1: really a beacon. Um. We always say it's like Lady

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Speaker 1: Liberties torch saying give us your give us your give

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Speaker 1: us your poor, you're you're tired, and your whistleblowers. I'm

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Speaker 1: want to follow a thread that you you started to

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Speaker 1: pull out there a little bit, which was, you know,

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Speaker 1: the the results of whistle blowing. I wonder if you

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Speaker 1: could talk just about any examples that you have or

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Speaker 1: data that you have on whistleblowers whose actions have resulted

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Speaker 1: in real change, you know, in things really improving. So

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Speaker 1: I can't not start with the Ukraine whistle blower who

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Speaker 1: exposed President Trump. I mean in terms of holding powerful

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Speaker 1: people to account, that was an extraordinary result and one

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Speaker 1: of the oddest things happening. There was of course that

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Speaker 1: his identity was exposed by Trump and certain other politicians,

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Speaker 1: which is yeah, I mean incredibly like there should be

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Speaker 1: sanctions for that kind of a thing because obviously that

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Speaker 1: threatens his life and livelihood and safety. So that was extraordinary.

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Speaker 1: But I mean, I think some of the other whistleblowers,

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Speaker 1: I mean, look at the Me Too movement. You know,

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Speaker 1: it caused shock waves around the world world, and it

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Speaker 1: also caused us all to rethink what an n DA

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Speaker 1: is and should we have these kinds of agreements in place,

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Speaker 1: and so you know, you look at Francis, it makes

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Speaker 1: us relook social media. You look at these healthcare fraud

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Speaker 1: whistle lowers, You know, health insurance companies now think differently

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Speaker 1: before they upcode these diagnoses that they're doing to get

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Speaker 1: more money from Medicare. I mean, it is an incrediblely

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Speaker 1: powerful tool to shake corporations out of their slumber and

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Speaker 1: into being held accountable for wrongdoing. And I think part

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Speaker 1: of it is the deterrent effect. Right. You see these

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Speaker 1: big penalties and fines that are levied, and I think

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Speaker 1: it does have a deterrent effect. And you know, I

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Speaker 1: know from my European experience, a lot of companies choose

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Speaker 1: not to list on the U S stock exchanges that

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Speaker 1: of fear of having the jurisdiction of the SEC. Really

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Speaker 1: oh yeah, oh yeah. Um. So they want access, they

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Speaker 1: want access to our capital markets, but there's scared what

430
00:26:00,640 --> 00:26:04,959
Speaker 1: that comes? Right? Interesting? That makes me think there is

431
00:26:05,240 --> 00:26:10,000
Speaker 1: maybe some problems there. So I'm gonna ask you to

432
00:26:10,040 --> 00:26:14,879
Speaker 1: talk about or explain the False Claims Act. What is

433
00:26:14,920 --> 00:26:18,560
Speaker 1: that about, What what is it for? What does it do? Yeah,

434
00:26:18,680 --> 00:26:21,760
Speaker 1: so it is the touchstone of you can't talk about

435
00:26:21,800 --> 00:26:24,639
Speaker 1: whistleblower reward programs in the United States without going to

436
00:26:24,680 --> 00:26:27,320
Speaker 1: the False Claims Act. It's actually called Lincoln's Law. It

437
00:26:27,480 --> 00:26:30,480
Speaker 1: was enacted in the wake of the Civil War, and

438
00:26:30,560 --> 00:26:33,800
Speaker 1: it recognized something that is now more true than ever

439
00:26:33,880 --> 00:26:36,880
Speaker 1: today than it was back then, that um, it's very

440
00:26:36,960 --> 00:26:41,240
Speaker 1: difficult for the government to investigate and to detect fraud.

441
00:26:41,560 --> 00:26:44,720
Speaker 1: The United States pours tons of money into medicare and

442
00:26:44,800 --> 00:26:48,000
Speaker 1: into defense, and it's hard to police that from the

443
00:26:48,080 --> 00:26:51,479
Speaker 1: outside and that there's no substitute for a well placed

444
00:26:51,520 --> 00:26:55,719
Speaker 1: insider to bring that information forward. So we want to

445
00:26:55,760 --> 00:26:59,760
Speaker 1: incentivize these people because they have an insiders have incredibly

446
00:27:00,119 --> 00:27:03,639
Speaker 1: valuable information that basically creates a roadmap to the fraud

447
00:27:03,680 --> 00:27:06,399
Speaker 1: for any prosecutor. We often say to the prosecutors, and

448
00:27:06,440 --> 00:27:09,240
Speaker 1: I've heard prosecutors say this does key tam cases are

449
00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:11,960
Speaker 1: like cake in a box delivered to our office. Is

450
00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:20,640
Speaker 1: we just add water? Because the key tam for asking

451
00:27:20,680 --> 00:27:24,399
Speaker 1: that key tam is short for a Latin phrase that

452
00:27:24,480 --> 00:27:27,320
Speaker 1: basically stands for he who stands on the shoes of

453
00:27:27,359 --> 00:27:31,760
Speaker 1: the king as well as himself, and this comes from

454
00:27:31,840 --> 00:27:33,720
Speaker 1: English common I don't want to get too nerdy, but

455
00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:36,480
Speaker 1: there was an idea in England before they had police

456
00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:42,679
Speaker 1: forces that individuals could basically service police. And so we

457
00:27:42,840 --> 00:27:45,560
Speaker 1: took this concept in the United States and we said

458
00:27:45,600 --> 00:27:48,960
Speaker 1: We're going to make these people private attorney generals. They

459
00:27:49,000 --> 00:27:51,920
Speaker 1: will stand in the shoes of the United States government

460
00:27:51,920 --> 00:27:54,840
Speaker 1: and launch lawsuits in their names. So what I think

461
00:27:54,920 --> 00:27:57,680
Speaker 1: so powerful about the false claims because people seem familiar

462
00:27:57,720 --> 00:27:59,959
Speaker 1: with the tip program, with the sec ree file. It's

463
00:28:00,040 --> 00:28:02,960
Speaker 1: hup anonymously and if if they act on your information,

464
00:28:03,000 --> 00:28:05,520
Speaker 1: you can get a reward. Under the False Claims Act,

465
00:28:05,560 --> 00:28:09,879
Speaker 1: we deputize a whistleblower to launch a lawsuit in the

466
00:28:09,960 --> 00:28:13,000
Speaker 1: name of the government. You can imagine how I am

467
00:28:13,080 --> 00:28:15,680
Speaker 1: received when we show up and say, um, we're now

468
00:28:15,760 --> 00:28:20,520
Speaker 1: suing Boeing for you know, something defective planes to the U.

469
00:28:20,600 --> 00:28:23,800
Speaker 1: S Military or something like that. Can you imagine? There

470
00:28:23,800 --> 00:28:26,399
Speaker 1: are now thirty states that have False Claims Act. So

471
00:28:26,560 --> 00:28:29,880
Speaker 1: I have been in the position of suing on behalf

472
00:28:29,960 --> 00:28:34,879
Speaker 1: of thirty cities in California, right because if private contractors

473
00:28:34,880 --> 00:28:38,520
Speaker 1: are cheating the the FISK in California, then they can

474
00:28:38,520 --> 00:28:40,680
Speaker 1: bring these kinds of cases. And I show up at

475
00:28:40,720 --> 00:28:44,120
Speaker 1: the city attorney's office and you know, San Francisco and say,

476
00:28:44,160 --> 00:28:47,640
Speaker 1: I've just folowed a lawsuit in your name. Let's talk.

477
00:28:48,200 --> 00:28:50,640
Speaker 1: Let's talk about how do we go about discovery, Like

478
00:28:50,640 --> 00:28:52,720
Speaker 1: how are we going to prosecute this thing? Right? So

479
00:28:53,040 --> 00:28:55,840
Speaker 1: it's an enormously powerful tool, and it's something that is

480
00:28:55,920 --> 00:28:57,960
Speaker 1: unique to the United States. Although I always say to

481
00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:00,440
Speaker 1: the UK that we stole it for view and now

482
00:29:00,480 --> 00:29:02,640
Speaker 1: we're trying to sell it back to you as our own.

483
00:29:03,800 --> 00:29:08,440
Speaker 1: That's funny. Well, what goes around comes around. So I'm

484
00:29:08,440 --> 00:29:11,040
Speaker 1: gonna pivot here in just a second. But the last

485
00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:16,800
Speaker 1: question on this sort of theme of of whistleblower repression. Um.

486
00:29:16,840 --> 00:29:20,880
Speaker 1: You know, CEOs and HR departments often see whistleblowers as traders.

487
00:29:21,160 --> 00:29:23,720
Speaker 1: You know, they do things like right anti whistle blowing

488
00:29:23,760 --> 00:29:27,120
Speaker 1: language into the contracts, as you've mentioned, to prevent it.

489
00:29:27,200 --> 00:29:29,840
Speaker 1: Can you talk about some of the other strategies that

490
00:29:29,920 --> 00:29:34,440
Speaker 1: companies use to discourage whistle blowing. Sure, and so I

491
00:29:34,440 --> 00:29:37,120
Speaker 1: think it really comes back to more of this idea

492
00:29:37,400 --> 00:29:41,960
Speaker 1: of the medieval mindset, the corporate playbook that is in

493
00:29:42,040 --> 00:29:46,120
Speaker 1: place that basically shames whistle blowers who speak out. To me,

494
00:29:46,440 --> 00:29:49,560
Speaker 1: that is one of the biggest things that they do. UM.

495
00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:52,560
Speaker 1: And what's interesting is that in the wake of the

496
00:29:52,760 --> 00:29:58,920
Speaker 1: enron Um scandal, we adopted Sarbanes Oxley legislation that basically

497
00:29:58,960 --> 00:30:05,600
Speaker 1: requires companies of certain sizes to include a designated anonymous

498
00:30:05,680 --> 00:30:10,640
Speaker 1: internal whistle blowing mechanism. So we recognize that maybe if

499
00:30:10,680 --> 00:30:12,880
Speaker 1: there had been a mechanism like that that had been

500
00:30:12,880 --> 00:30:16,520
Speaker 1: clearly signposted, that could have maybe stop and Ron in

501
00:30:16,600 --> 00:30:20,000
Speaker 1: its tracks. Right. So I think that's that's one of

502
00:30:20,040 --> 00:30:22,880
Speaker 1: the things that has been imposed upon companies because they

503
00:30:23,000 --> 00:30:26,880
Speaker 1: haven't created a situation where people feel safe to speak up.

504
00:30:26,920 --> 00:30:30,080
Speaker 1: So I think those those kinds of mechanisms are fine,

505
00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:32,920
Speaker 1: But those mechanisms are only as good as the culture

506
00:30:33,000 --> 00:30:36,040
Speaker 1: that's behind it. Right, You know, it has to start

507
00:30:36,480 --> 00:30:38,360
Speaker 1: with the tone of the top. It has to start

508
00:30:38,400 --> 00:30:42,720
Speaker 1: with creating an environment where, um, people feel safe to

509
00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:46,160
Speaker 1: speak out and you value it. That's the thing, right,

510
00:30:46,360 --> 00:30:51,080
Speaker 1: is culture change within corporations. And there's an irony to this,

511
00:30:51,240 --> 00:30:53,160
Speaker 1: which you pointed out to me in one of our

512
00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:57,680
Speaker 1: first conversations. At your suggestion, I read to Harvard Business

513
00:30:57,720 --> 00:31:02,280
Speaker 1: Review articles about the late data on whistleblowing, and there

514
00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:05,400
Speaker 1: were just a number of eye opening revelations in that data.

515
00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:12,560
Speaker 1: For instance, companies that don't attack whistleblowers actually do better financially. Um,

516
00:31:12,600 --> 00:31:17,600
Speaker 1: So why why is that? So? What this research is

517
00:31:17,640 --> 00:31:20,640
Speaker 1: showing is that companies that create a space where whistleblowers

518
00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:25,160
Speaker 1: feel safe to speak out. Those companies have fewer lawsuits

519
00:31:25,200 --> 00:31:30,200
Speaker 1: against them, fewer federal investigations, with the assumption being whistler

520
00:31:30,280 --> 00:31:34,160
Speaker 1: serve the function and actually helped them stop and correct

521
00:31:34,240 --> 00:31:39,760
Speaker 1: course before some wrongdoing metastasized into the next big PR scandal.

522
00:31:40,280 --> 00:31:43,440
Speaker 1: So I really love it because it tells us that

523
00:31:43,640 --> 00:31:46,360
Speaker 1: not only do we need to change how we think

524
00:31:46,400 --> 00:31:49,640
Speaker 1: about whistleblowers, we need to celebrate them as almost the

525
00:31:49,720 --> 00:31:52,720
Speaker 1: CEO's best friend. I mean, it's such a brain drain

526
00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:57,560
Speaker 1: when you let these people go, because they are really, um,

527
00:31:57,640 --> 00:32:02,280
Speaker 1: your most disruptive in the best possible way employees. Um,

528
00:32:02,280 --> 00:32:05,600
Speaker 1: And why are we creating a yes culture and not

529
00:32:05,680 --> 00:32:08,240
Speaker 1: allowing people, you know, creating a culture where people feel

530
00:32:08,280 --> 00:32:11,040
Speaker 1: safe to challenge what's going on. Aren't we all better

531
00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:14,720
Speaker 1: in our relationships when someone calls us out for doing

532
00:32:14,760 --> 00:32:19,520
Speaker 1: something wrong. Yeah. In addition, they're your bravest employees. They're

533
00:32:19,520 --> 00:32:22,200
Speaker 1: the ones that are at some level the most honest

534
00:32:22,880 --> 00:32:26,360
Speaker 1: of your employees. Like and yet people are drumming them

535
00:32:26,400 --> 00:32:28,960
Speaker 1: out of their companies. They should be, as you say,

536
00:32:29,040 --> 00:32:33,959
Speaker 1: celebrated and protected by the CEO. And and and certainly the

537
00:32:34,040 --> 00:32:36,920
Speaker 1: board if it is true and that and it is

538
00:32:37,160 --> 00:32:40,400
Speaker 1: that these companies do better financially, and it's the job

539
00:32:40,440 --> 00:32:44,280
Speaker 1: of the board of directors to look after investors, and

540
00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:49,080
Speaker 1: boards of directors should be whistleblowers best friends. It feels

541
00:32:49,160 --> 00:32:53,560
Speaker 1: like maybe that is beginning to happen a little bit more.

542
00:32:53,640 --> 00:32:56,600
Speaker 1: It feels like maybe the worm is being beginning to turn.

543
00:32:56,720 --> 00:32:58,800
Speaker 1: But you know you would know this better than I do.

544
00:32:58,840 --> 00:33:01,000
Speaker 1: You feel like the culture is headed in a better

545
00:33:01,040 --> 00:33:04,920
Speaker 1: direction now I do, actually, And one of the reasons

546
00:33:05,000 --> 00:33:09,400
Speaker 1: I think, um, we're seeing this change, of course, is

547
00:33:09,440 --> 00:33:15,360
Speaker 1: because chief compliance officers are starting to relate to whistlowers.

548
00:33:15,360 --> 00:33:17,760
Speaker 1: So if you're a chief compliance officer in a corporation,

549
00:33:18,360 --> 00:33:20,920
Speaker 1: you're not dissimilar to a whistle blower. You're not a

550
00:33:20,920 --> 00:33:23,680
Speaker 1: cost you're not a profit generating center. You're seeing as

551
00:33:23,680 --> 00:33:25,920
Speaker 1: the people who put the brakes on it tell you

552
00:33:26,040 --> 00:33:29,720
Speaker 1: shouldn't do it this way. And I think now we're

553
00:33:29,880 --> 00:33:33,160
Speaker 1: recognizing that for a lot of the scandals, compliance officers

554
00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:36,720
Speaker 1: were made compliant officers and we're told to go along.

555
00:33:37,240 --> 00:33:41,560
Speaker 1: And now there's an elevation of compliance officers where there's

556
00:33:41,600 --> 00:33:43,160
Speaker 1: more of a sense that they should be reporting to

557
00:33:43,200 --> 00:33:47,080
Speaker 1: the board board level. You know, they appreciate whistlers in

558
00:33:47,080 --> 00:33:50,080
Speaker 1: a way that a lot of people in organizations don't.

559
00:33:50,280 --> 00:33:54,440
Speaker 1: So what advice would you have for leadership at companies

560
00:33:54,440 --> 00:33:57,000
Speaker 1: to help their company be more open to whistle blowing

561
00:33:57,160 --> 00:34:00,680
Speaker 1: and therefore, you know, kind of open to open to change.

562
00:34:02,120 --> 00:34:04,080
Speaker 1: I really think one of the best things the company

563
00:34:04,080 --> 00:34:08,000
Speaker 1: can do is actually hire a former whistleblower. What signals

564
00:34:08,040 --> 00:34:10,960
Speaker 1: more that you believe in whistle blowers than hiring a

565
00:34:11,040 --> 00:34:13,080
Speaker 1: well known informer whistlel er. I think that's one of

566
00:34:13,120 --> 00:34:16,279
Speaker 1: the things that you can do most um. But I

567
00:34:16,320 --> 00:34:18,720
Speaker 1: think the other thing is we really need to teach

568
00:34:18,800 --> 00:34:22,719
Speaker 1: people how to have difficult conversations. I really think some

569
00:34:22,920 --> 00:34:27,359
Speaker 1: grassroot training on we value difference of opinions and really

570
00:34:27,400 --> 00:34:29,400
Speaker 1: walking the walk and talking to the talk. I always say, like,

571
00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:32,759
Speaker 1: let's put in your performance review that you get a

572
00:34:32,880 --> 00:34:36,600
Speaker 1: certain gold stars right when you expose wrongdoing. Why isn't

573
00:34:36,640 --> 00:34:40,160
Speaker 1: that something that's in our evaluations. Doesn't that also show

574
00:34:40,239 --> 00:34:43,960
Speaker 1: in a very brass tax kind of way, what we value.

575
00:34:44,000 --> 00:34:46,600
Speaker 1: What you put on your performance evaluation for manually is

576
00:34:46,640 --> 00:34:49,520
Speaker 1: what you value. Do you know any whistleblowers who regret

577
00:34:50,280 --> 00:34:54,439
Speaker 1: you know, having made the decision to do it, it's

578
00:34:54,440 --> 00:34:56,920
Speaker 1: a great question. I don't, and I find that to

579
00:34:57,000 --> 00:35:01,040
Speaker 1: be extraordinary. Even after they've been through the ringer, they

580
00:35:01,080 --> 00:35:03,239
Speaker 1: still look back and I feel like it was the

581
00:35:03,320 --> 00:35:04,920
Speaker 1: right thing to do. And a lot of my clients

582
00:35:04,920 --> 00:35:09,400
Speaker 1: are like, I can't exist at an organization where I

583
00:35:09,520 --> 00:35:12,480
Speaker 1: have fear that I may be wearing an orange jumpsuit

584
00:35:12,520 --> 00:35:14,880
Speaker 1: because I could be found to be a co conspirator

585
00:35:14,880 --> 00:35:17,640
Speaker 1: for going along um. And I think with a lot

586
00:35:17,680 --> 00:35:20,640
Speaker 1: of whistleblowers, they feel like they don't want to leave

587
00:35:20,680 --> 00:35:23,960
Speaker 1: it for the next person, and so even after they've

588
00:35:23,960 --> 00:35:25,800
Speaker 1: suffered it, I think a lot of them talk about

589
00:35:25,840 --> 00:35:28,000
Speaker 1: I have to look my children in the eye, I

590
00:35:28,080 --> 00:35:31,319
Speaker 1: have to look myself in the mirror, And so to

591
00:35:31,400 --> 00:35:34,200
Speaker 1: a person, they will always say, it was a hellish journey.

592
00:35:34,239 --> 00:35:37,480
Speaker 1: And we need to change how whistlers are viewed. We

593
00:35:37,520 --> 00:35:40,920
Speaker 1: need to normalize whistling and change this perception that we

594
00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:43,799
Speaker 1: have of whistlers as disloyal. But they would all do

595
00:35:43,880 --> 00:35:46,440
Speaker 1: it again, and I just find it remarkable. That is

596
00:35:46,480 --> 00:35:49,759
Speaker 1: remarkable and and kind of wonderful. I love that the

597
00:35:49,840 --> 00:35:53,080
Speaker 1: last question, is there anything else that I haven't touched on?

598
00:35:53,200 --> 00:35:55,640
Speaker 1: Or asked you about that you think we should talk about.

599
00:35:55,719 --> 00:35:59,000
Speaker 1: Is there anything else you think folks should know? Yeah,

600
00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:00,960
Speaker 1: you know, there's one thing that I really did want

601
00:36:00,960 --> 00:36:04,279
Speaker 1: to talk about UM today, and that relates to this

602
00:36:04,400 --> 00:36:09,600
Speaker 1: idea that I alluded to about them, anonymity of whistleblowers UM.

603
00:36:09,640 --> 00:36:11,960
Speaker 1: And I think we're now accustomed to the idea of

604
00:36:12,080 --> 00:36:17,680
Speaker 1: whistleblowers having, you know, being becoming almost personalities, right, not celebrities,

605
00:36:17,680 --> 00:36:21,320
Speaker 1: but personalities UM. And I think that what we're starting

606
00:36:21,360 --> 00:36:24,000
Speaker 1: to see with the i C i J, the International

607
00:36:24,040 --> 00:36:28,480
Speaker 1: Consortium of Investigative Journalists is UM what I call what

608
00:36:28,520 --> 00:36:29,960
Speaker 1: a lot of people are referred to as sort of

609
00:36:29,960 --> 00:36:33,600
Speaker 1: a leaking culture. Where in the case of the Panama Papers,

610
00:36:33,800 --> 00:36:37,440
Speaker 1: the Mosak Fonseca law firm, all those files were turned

611
00:36:37,480 --> 00:36:41,399
Speaker 1: over to sadutschs iding the reporters there, and they then

612
00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:44,799
Speaker 1: shared it out to the International Consortium and Investigative Journalism.

613
00:36:44,920 --> 00:36:48,279
Speaker 1: And now we have journalists around the world who are

614
00:36:48,320 --> 00:36:52,719
Speaker 1: looking at people who are taking advantage properly and improperly

615
00:36:52,840 --> 00:36:56,360
Speaker 1: of offshore tax havens UM. And the reason I pointed

616
00:36:56,400 --> 00:36:59,320
Speaker 1: out is that there was I mean, the Panama papers

617
00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:02,120
Speaker 1: kind of shook the world and there have since then

618
00:37:02,200 --> 00:37:07,240
Speaker 1: been Paradise papers, um Pandora papers, right. They this model

619
00:37:07,280 --> 00:37:09,680
Speaker 1: has continued to happen and we don't know who those

620
00:37:09,680 --> 00:37:14,240
Speaker 1: whistleblers are. And isn't that just right? So the the

621
00:37:14,280 --> 00:37:17,120
Speaker 1: SA Deutsches i dig reporters just a few weeks ago

622
00:37:17,719 --> 00:37:20,400
Speaker 1: did uh an interview with their source for the Panama

623
00:37:20,440 --> 00:37:23,080
Speaker 1: papers and it was, you know, a robotic voice, the

624
00:37:23,120 --> 00:37:24,960
Speaker 1: person's face was etched out and all of it and

625
00:37:25,040 --> 00:37:29,600
Speaker 1: what that whistlebler said was his her. Their life was

626
00:37:29,719 --> 00:37:33,080
Speaker 1: completely improved by the fact that they were anonymous. They

627
00:37:33,080 --> 00:37:36,520
Speaker 1: could go ahead and continue to live a life um.

628
00:37:36,600 --> 00:37:38,520
Speaker 1: And so I think that that's something we need to

629
00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:40,000
Speaker 1: think about. And that's one of the things when we

630
00:37:40,000 --> 00:37:42,719
Speaker 1: were talking about the SEC program today. That's one of

631
00:37:42,760 --> 00:37:46,080
Speaker 1: the things it affords is that whistlers can actually report

632
00:37:46,120 --> 00:37:49,920
Speaker 1: anonymously um. And that makes it a lot easier for

633
00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:52,080
Speaker 1: all of us to make that kind of a decision

634
00:37:52,120 --> 00:37:55,839
Speaker 1: and the risk reward calculus if you didn't if you can,

635
00:37:56,000 --> 00:37:59,440
Speaker 1: you know, give the information and not be outed, didn't

636
00:37:59,480 --> 00:38:02,919
Speaker 1: have to blow your life up to do it. Yeah,

637
00:38:03,000 --> 00:38:07,880
Speaker 1: I love that. Okay, Mary, this was not unexpectedly a

638
00:38:07,920 --> 00:38:11,560
Speaker 1: fantastic conversation. I want to thank you so much for

639
00:38:11,760 --> 00:38:14,799
Speaker 1: talking with us today, and I want to thank you

640
00:38:14,840 --> 00:38:16,880
Speaker 1: for the work that you do. It's so very important.

641
00:38:16,960 --> 00:38:21,800
Speaker 1: So UM, we really appreciate your spending time with us today. Well, So,

642
00:38:21,920 --> 00:38:24,120
Speaker 1: I cannot tell you what a pleasure it is to

643
00:38:24,120 --> 00:38:27,279
Speaker 1: be on your podcast. In particular, there's such an alignment

644
00:38:27,400 --> 00:38:32,359
Speaker 1: between whistleblowers ultimately UM exposed purpose washing. That's what they

645
00:38:32,400 --> 00:38:34,239
Speaker 1: do for a living, and I know that's what your

646
00:38:34,280 --> 00:38:37,040
Speaker 1: podcast seeks to do. And so I just felt like

647
00:38:37,160 --> 00:38:39,720
Speaker 1: it was the perfect pairing, UM, And what an honor

648
00:38:39,760 --> 00:38:43,080
Speaker 1: to be on your podcast because my clients do call

649
00:38:43,160 --> 00:38:47,759
Speaker 1: bullshit every day. Yes they do, Yes they do, and

650
00:38:47,840 --> 00:38:52,520
Speaker 1: more power to them. After talking with Mary, I'm even

651
00:38:52,600 --> 00:38:56,480
Speaker 1: more impressed with the actions of whistleblowers and convinced that

652
00:38:56,520 --> 00:39:00,120
Speaker 1: the business world should be treating them differently, and not

653
00:39:00,280 --> 00:39:04,720
Speaker 1: just because they deserve better. The research shows that companies

654
00:39:04,760 --> 00:39:08,440
Speaker 1: who deal with problems internally instead of forcing people to

655
00:39:08,520 --> 00:39:13,440
Speaker 1: go public, actually improve their culture and their bottom line.

656
00:39:14,160 --> 00:39:17,640
Speaker 1: It seems like there's a win win scenario here for everybody.

657
00:39:18,600 --> 00:39:22,000
Speaker 1: So how can leadership and companies learn to see internal

658
00:39:22,000 --> 00:39:26,880
Speaker 1: whistleblower reports as an opportunity to fix problems and ultimately

659
00:39:27,000 --> 00:39:30,719
Speaker 1: to make more money. Next up, I talked with two

660
00:39:30,760 --> 00:39:34,560
Speaker 1: experts to discuss ways that that might actually happen. Right

661
00:39:34,600 --> 00:39:58,040
Speaker 1: after a quick break, to continue this conversation, I've invited

662
00:39:58,120 --> 00:40:00,719
Speaker 1: two more experts in whistleblowing to joined me for a

663
00:40:00,760 --> 00:40:05,960
Speaker 1: panel discussion. Dana Gold is the Government Accountability Projects Senior

664
00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:10,960
Speaker 1: counsel and director of Education. Her clients have exposed environmental

665
00:40:10,960 --> 00:40:16,520
Speaker 1: fraud within nuclear power plants and atrocities within immigration detention centers,

666
00:40:16,880 --> 00:40:20,120
Speaker 1: and she has devoted her career to teaching others about

667
00:40:20,120 --> 00:40:25,560
Speaker 1: the critical role of whistleblowers. We're also joined by Kyle Welch,

668
00:40:25,760 --> 00:40:30,000
Speaker 1: professor at George Washington University School of Business and author

669
00:40:30,120 --> 00:40:33,120
Speaker 1: of those HBr papers that Mary sent over to me.

670
00:40:34,040 --> 00:40:37,680
Speaker 1: He is the expert in whistleblower data and has published

671
00:40:37,719 --> 00:40:41,200
Speaker 1: evidence that shows how much they benefit all of us

672
00:40:41,239 --> 00:40:45,120
Speaker 1: and proves that these folks are an asset to organizations

673
00:40:50,200 --> 00:40:53,960
Speaker 1: to start out with today, UM, I thought, you know

674
00:40:54,239 --> 00:40:57,520
Speaker 1: you you both come at this from such different backgrounds,

675
00:40:58,239 --> 00:41:01,799
Speaker 1: and I'm assuming you would both agree that in many

676
00:41:01,880 --> 00:41:06,680
Speaker 1: ways whistle blowing is a really good thing and it

677
00:41:06,760 --> 00:41:10,640
Speaker 1: benefits the world in important ways. But let me start

678
00:41:10,680 --> 00:41:13,440
Speaker 1: by just checking that assumption. Do you both agree with

679
00:41:13,520 --> 00:41:17,480
Speaker 1: that premise? I think you're a little too timid in

680
00:41:17,560 --> 00:41:20,319
Speaker 1: how you talk about it, to be honest with you, No, no, no,

681
00:41:20,719 --> 00:41:23,480
Speaker 1: And I'd be very frank it is you are way

682
00:41:23,480 --> 00:41:25,719
Speaker 1: too timid and how you talk about this. If you

683
00:41:25,719 --> 00:41:28,040
Speaker 1: want to find a problem in an organization, it is

684
00:41:28,080 --> 00:41:31,319
Speaker 1: through humans identifying it and speaking up. There's a lot

685
00:41:31,360 --> 00:41:34,239
Speaker 1: of things that robots are going to replace. I don't

686
00:41:34,239 --> 00:41:36,000
Speaker 1: think robots are going to be able to replace this.

687
00:41:36,480 --> 00:41:39,600
Speaker 1: What is the number one way frauds are caught? It

688
00:41:39,760 --> 00:41:43,239
Speaker 1: is whistle blowing. It's people speaking up and way way

689
00:41:43,280 --> 00:41:46,279
Speaker 1: way way down, less than half like like something like

690
00:41:47,040 --> 00:41:50,080
Speaker 1: it changes every year of the cases are identified through whistleblowers.

691
00:41:50,520 --> 00:41:53,160
Speaker 1: The next is internal lot it. But if you talk

692
00:41:53,239 --> 00:41:55,840
Speaker 1: to anybody in internal lot it or external lot it

693
00:41:55,880 --> 00:41:58,839
Speaker 1: and you ask them, how did you identify the problem?

694
00:41:58,880 --> 00:42:01,040
Speaker 1: They say, well, we were are actually asking for a

695
00:42:01,080 --> 00:42:05,720
Speaker 1: report and somebody spoke to us. And so at its core,

696
00:42:06,400 --> 00:42:10,680
Speaker 1: humans identifying problems and talking about them is how these

697
00:42:10,719 --> 00:42:14,960
Speaker 1: problems get solved. Right And Dana, I see you nodding along.

698
00:42:15,120 --> 00:42:17,279
Speaker 1: Could you speak to that a little bit? Can you

699
00:42:17,320 --> 00:42:20,880
Speaker 1: go into from your perspective, what good do whistleblowers do

700
00:42:21,000 --> 00:42:26,320
Speaker 1: for the world. This is the hundred thousand dollar question

701
00:42:26,440 --> 00:42:30,520
Speaker 1: or million dollar questions or billion dollar questions. So, expanding

702
00:42:30,520 --> 00:42:35,080
Speaker 1: on what Kyle just said, we have systems in place

703
00:42:35,160 --> 00:42:40,160
Speaker 1: in our institutions that make it predictable that they will

704
00:42:40,239 --> 00:42:45,840
Speaker 1: engage in misconduct and wrongdoing. And when you know that

705
00:42:45,920 --> 00:42:50,839
Speaker 1: these systems are broken or incredibly weak, or have these

706
00:42:50,920 --> 00:42:54,759
Speaker 1: problematic drivers. In the corporate sector, we have just the

707
00:42:54,760 --> 00:42:57,960
Speaker 1: profit motive measuring things by the short term, how we

708
00:42:58,040 --> 00:43:02,560
Speaker 1: have shareholder primacy. There all of these drivers that that

709
00:43:02,760 --> 00:43:06,640
Speaker 1: make it difficult to value the public interest, to protect

710
00:43:06,640 --> 00:43:09,920
Speaker 1: the public interests, and the humans, the employees, the workers

711
00:43:10,360 --> 00:43:13,960
Speaker 1: are in the best position to see the problems there there.

712
00:43:14,120 --> 00:43:18,399
Speaker 1: That's why the whistle boor protection laws protect employees predominantly,

713
00:43:18,400 --> 00:43:22,160
Speaker 1: I would say, not completely, but predominantly, because they're in

714
00:43:22,200 --> 00:43:25,920
Speaker 1: the best position to see the problems and to raise concerns.

715
00:43:26,000 --> 00:43:30,160
Speaker 1: And so they are what is standing between us and

716
00:43:30,360 --> 00:43:34,560
Speaker 1: horrific disasters, right. And it's terrifying to me and also

717
00:43:34,680 --> 00:43:39,000
Speaker 1: inspiring at some level because it's the human element of

718
00:43:39,120 --> 00:43:42,799
Speaker 1: how truth and truth telling can actually still make a

719
00:43:42,840 --> 00:43:46,240
Speaker 1: difference and hold abusers of power to account well. Also,

720
00:43:46,320 --> 00:43:51,560
Speaker 1: many of them pay because of the stigmatized environment around whistleblowing.

721
00:43:51,760 --> 00:43:56,240
Speaker 1: They pay off on a terrible price for coming forward,

722
00:43:56,520 --> 00:44:01,560
Speaker 1: career setbacks as well as personal set back. Some people lose,

723
00:44:02,000 --> 00:44:05,319
Speaker 1: you know, their whole support system, they lose relationships with

724
00:44:05,360 --> 00:44:10,040
Speaker 1: their family. You know. It's it's bananas, I would say,

725
00:44:10,239 --> 00:44:13,720
Speaker 1: absolutely it Actually, that makes my point about why it

726
00:44:13,719 --> 00:44:17,560
Speaker 1: it's so terrifying that we're so dependent on whistleblowers because

727
00:44:18,000 --> 00:44:21,560
Speaker 1: the risk that is involved with speaking up against those

728
00:44:21,600 --> 00:44:24,960
Speaker 1: who have far more power. We're all more vulnerable because

729
00:44:25,000 --> 00:44:28,400
Speaker 1: they are vulnerable. It is, it is, It is a

730
00:44:28,440 --> 00:44:32,239
Speaker 1: societal problem that is not that it's why we need

731
00:44:32,280 --> 00:44:35,280
Speaker 1: to care about whistleblowers because they are the one standing

732
00:44:35,360 --> 00:44:38,799
Speaker 1: up for us rather than other rising whistleblowers and um

733
00:44:39,200 --> 00:44:42,319
Speaker 1: thinking of them in some really with with a lot

734
00:44:42,400 --> 00:44:45,799
Speaker 1: of misperceptions that I think, I think are changing. I

735
00:44:45,840 --> 00:44:48,120
Speaker 1: think and I think it's interesting your podcast that talks

736
00:44:48,160 --> 00:44:51,480
Speaker 1: a lot about this erosion of trust in our institutions.

737
00:44:51,560 --> 00:44:54,399
Speaker 1: Right we have a deep erosion of trust in our

738
00:44:54,440 --> 00:44:58,359
Speaker 1: government institutions and our corporate institutions than the past four years.

739
00:44:58,360 --> 00:45:01,840
Speaker 1: Since this past administration. And you've seen whistleblowers come forward

740
00:45:02,040 --> 00:45:08,360
Speaker 1: on on COVID threats right, um, you know, pushing bogus

741
00:45:08,400 --> 00:45:12,320
Speaker 1: therapies um, and not prioritizing vaccines. You've seen climate science

742
00:45:12,320 --> 00:45:15,880
Speaker 1: whistleblowers gagged. You've seen um, you know, Facebook and Twitter,

743
00:45:16,000 --> 00:45:18,560
Speaker 1: and you know the kind of social media whistleblowers come

744
00:45:18,560 --> 00:45:22,200
Speaker 1: forward that people are realizing that it's the humans, it's

745
00:45:22,239 --> 00:45:25,040
Speaker 1: the whistleblowers who are where we're going to get actually

746
00:45:25,080 --> 00:45:29,479
Speaker 1: honest information and protecting our backs. And I think it's changed.

747
00:45:29,520 --> 00:45:31,719
Speaker 1: And you see there's emarrassed poll from a few years

748
00:45:31,719 --> 00:45:35,160
Speaker 1: ago that says like eight sent of people think whistle

749
00:45:35,160 --> 00:45:38,160
Speaker 1: blowers there should be stronger protections for whistleblowers. I mean,

750
00:45:38,200 --> 00:45:41,719
Speaker 1: it's a huge change from viewing them as snitches and

751
00:45:41,760 --> 00:45:46,160
Speaker 1: tattle tales and disloyal there's a sense that that's where

752
00:45:46,160 --> 00:45:48,800
Speaker 1: our information is going to come from when we're in

753
00:45:48,840 --> 00:45:52,840
Speaker 1: a sea of dis and misinformation. Yeah, it's obvious you

754
00:45:52,880 --> 00:45:56,960
Speaker 1: both passionately believe that whistle blowing has multiple positive benefits

755
00:45:56,960 --> 00:45:58,680
Speaker 1: from the world. And I guess the natural place to

756
00:45:58,719 --> 00:46:01,040
Speaker 1: go next is how do we remote more of it?

757
00:46:01,239 --> 00:46:03,680
Speaker 1: Although it does sound like it's moving in the right direction.

758
00:46:04,400 --> 00:46:08,279
Speaker 1: How might we accelerate that process? So, Kyle, I'm gonna

759
00:46:08,280 --> 00:46:11,319
Speaker 1: ask you to go first, what's the one thing we

760
00:46:11,360 --> 00:46:15,680
Speaker 1: ought to do well? So Tie, there's two things that

761
00:46:15,680 --> 00:46:18,000
Speaker 1: that I always talk about. One of the big things

762
00:46:18,280 --> 00:46:21,080
Speaker 1: that could be done is that for leaders that look

763
00:46:21,160 --> 00:46:24,360
Speaker 1: at whistle blowing or people speaking up understanding the value

764
00:46:24,440 --> 00:46:28,760
Speaker 1: derived from it. Um Essentially, our research shows that firms

765
00:46:28,800 --> 00:46:33,160
Speaker 1: that have more reports internally are better in almost every

766
00:46:33,200 --> 00:46:37,239
Speaker 1: regard governance. Uh, you know, they get ahead of future lawsuits,

767
00:46:37,320 --> 00:46:40,440
Speaker 1: future finds, the amount of future lawsuits, amount of future finds.

768
00:46:40,480 --> 00:46:43,240
Speaker 1: It just basically shows that you're able to avoid negative

769
00:46:43,239 --> 00:46:45,520
Speaker 1: outcomes and there's also a lot of positive outcomes that

770
00:46:45,560 --> 00:46:48,520
Speaker 1: come from it. And so that leaders leaders that essentially

771
00:46:48,560 --> 00:46:53,480
Speaker 1: see reports and say, oh, are whistle blowing numbers are up?

772
00:46:54,000 --> 00:46:57,279
Speaker 1: The wrong question is to say what's wrong? Instead, the

773
00:46:57,360 --> 00:46:59,680
Speaker 1: right question is to say do we have enough resources?

774
00:46:59,719 --> 00:47:01,680
Speaker 1: Which leads me to kind of like my second thing,

775
00:47:01,719 --> 00:47:05,640
Speaker 1: and probably more so for the audience here, there is

776
00:47:05,760 --> 00:47:10,480
Speaker 1: frequently a story told about whistle blowing, and it's unfortunate

777
00:47:10,560 --> 00:47:13,880
Speaker 1: because I think it's wrong. I think it's very wrong.

778
00:47:14,440 --> 00:47:18,600
Speaker 1: So Dana comes from the world of like the worst situations.

779
00:47:18,680 --> 00:47:22,319
Speaker 1: She's seen people in nuclear power plants. You know, I

780
00:47:22,360 --> 00:47:26,560
Speaker 1: guess I watched the Chernobyl series, and so my mind

781
00:47:26,560 --> 00:47:29,279
Speaker 1: goes to the worst were stuff ever? Right? And what

782
00:47:29,400 --> 00:47:33,360
Speaker 1: we've what Dana has is a wealth of experience, basically

783
00:47:33,400 --> 00:47:37,239
Speaker 1: in the trauma room associated with whistle blowing. But like,

784
00:47:38,120 --> 00:47:41,120
Speaker 1: there's this other side of the data that nobody sees

785
00:47:41,200 --> 00:47:46,200
Speaker 1: because whistle blowers that actually get problems solved, that don't

786
00:47:46,239 --> 00:47:47,960
Speaker 1: have to go to court, that don't end up in

787
00:47:47,960 --> 00:47:50,759
Speaker 1: the news, we never hear about. We never hear about

788
00:47:50,840 --> 00:47:53,960
Speaker 1: them because companies don't release something saying, hey, we had

789
00:47:54,000 --> 00:47:56,560
Speaker 1: a serial harasser. We got rid of the serial harrass

790
00:47:56,760 --> 00:47:59,160
Speaker 1: They don't do that. Oh we found out that we

791
00:47:59,280 --> 00:48:01,319
Speaker 1: you know, we have ridgulen stuff. They don't report it.

792
00:48:01,360 --> 00:48:05,040
Speaker 1: What I hear over and over and over again, especially

793
00:48:05,040 --> 00:48:06,800
Speaker 1: from defenders, is how hard it is to be a

794
00:48:06,840 --> 00:48:10,480
Speaker 1: whistle blower. But I would say that based on the

795
00:48:10,600 --> 00:48:16,400
Speaker 1: sample of people that actually report that, by and large,

796
00:48:16,480 --> 00:48:20,000
Speaker 1: the average human is not as evil as the type

797
00:48:20,200 --> 00:48:23,399
Speaker 1: that data is prosecuting in a courtroom. And so when

798
00:48:23,400 --> 00:48:25,920
Speaker 1: you think about that, that should frame also whistle blowing.

799
00:48:25,920 --> 00:48:27,839
Speaker 1: When you think about whistle blowing. The reason why we're

800
00:48:27,840 --> 00:48:31,040
Speaker 1: discovering fraud isn't because we have more corrupt politicians now.

801
00:48:31,360 --> 00:48:34,200
Speaker 1: It isn't because we have more problems, and we've always

802
00:48:34,200 --> 00:48:37,960
Speaker 1: had these problems. It's just this tool. It's like in

803
00:48:38,000 --> 00:48:40,799
Speaker 1: the last decade it's been the birth of it, and

804
00:48:40,880 --> 00:48:44,000
Speaker 1: we've all of a sudden realized how valuable this tool

805
00:48:44,120 --> 00:48:47,759
Speaker 1: is to identifying and solving problems. And so I look

806
00:48:47,800 --> 00:48:50,200
Speaker 1: at it, and I I see a lot more hope

807
00:48:50,480 --> 00:48:53,200
Speaker 1: and positivity coming out of this because I just have

808
00:48:53,320 --> 00:48:56,000
Speaker 1: looked at the data and I've seen firms saving millions

809
00:48:56,000 --> 00:48:59,560
Speaker 1: and millions of dollars resolving issues and not going to

810
00:48:59,640 --> 00:49:01,279
Speaker 1: court as a result of it. The ones to go

811
00:49:01,320 --> 00:49:04,600
Speaker 1: to court. It's like, it's kind of like judging driving

812
00:49:04,640 --> 00:49:07,080
Speaker 1: a car based on the E R room and if

813
00:49:07,080 --> 00:49:08,919
Speaker 1: you only if you only look at the R room

814
00:49:09,040 --> 00:49:11,799
Speaker 1: and advertise the ER room. It's good to talk about

815
00:49:11,800 --> 00:49:13,640
Speaker 1: the E R room because it will help people respond

816
00:49:13,719 --> 00:49:18,120
Speaker 1: right to these cases. But I don't think but it

817
00:49:18,640 --> 00:49:21,680
Speaker 1: doesn't represent the sample of driving. It misses many of

818
00:49:21,719 --> 00:49:24,160
Speaker 1: the benefits. That's right, That's right. That's so those are

819
00:49:24,160 --> 00:49:28,279
Speaker 1: the Thank you, Kyle. So Dana, first of all, any

820
00:49:28,320 --> 00:49:32,319
Speaker 1: thoughts on what Kyle said. Yeah, well, I I just

821
00:49:32,320 --> 00:49:34,400
Speaker 1: want to say I totally agree that you know, I

822
00:49:34,440 --> 00:49:38,800
Speaker 1: work on the fringe of extremes. Right, Like, basically, companies

823
00:49:38,880 --> 00:49:41,960
Speaker 1: or governments or agencies have failed by the time when

824
00:49:42,000 --> 00:49:44,799
Speaker 1: I when I'm involved, when I'm involved, right, So like

825
00:49:44,880 --> 00:49:47,480
Speaker 1: it's just like they missed their I always say they

826
00:49:47,480 --> 00:49:50,279
Speaker 1: have multiple chances. That the first chances do the right

827
00:49:50,320 --> 00:49:54,040
Speaker 1: thing in the first place, that doesn't require needing a whistleblower, Right,

828
00:49:54,080 --> 00:49:57,200
Speaker 1: that's your first chance. Then the second chances when a

829
00:49:57,200 --> 00:50:02,040
Speaker 1: whistle blower, an employee speaks out, identifies a problem, a

830
00:50:02,360 --> 00:50:07,120
Speaker 1: deal with that appropriately. And ninety of employees raise concerns

831
00:50:07,160 --> 00:50:10,680
Speaker 1: internally first, I mean that's what they do. People don't want, like,

832
00:50:10,760 --> 00:50:13,640
Speaker 1: it's not true that a whistleblower is only only when

833
00:50:13,640 --> 00:50:16,400
Speaker 1: you go outside the organization. I mean the laws are

834
00:50:16,840 --> 00:50:19,600
Speaker 1: except for one of them, Dodd Frank, which is complicated

835
00:50:19,640 --> 00:50:22,319
Speaker 1: and we can talk about that. But but basically, you know,

836
00:50:22,400 --> 00:50:25,520
Speaker 1: your rights start your your rights attached when you start

837
00:50:25,600 --> 00:50:29,520
Speaker 1: raising concerns internally to management or supervisors or people who

838
00:50:29,520 --> 00:50:33,040
Speaker 1: are responsible for dealing with the problem. And most employees

839
00:50:33,160 --> 00:50:38,080
Speaker 1: do raise concerns internally first before going outside. So so

840
00:50:38,400 --> 00:50:41,040
Speaker 1: this is like a powerful tool. And that's what Kyle's

841
00:50:41,080 --> 00:50:45,279
Speaker 1: data is so important for establishing, is that you have

842
00:50:45,440 --> 00:50:49,600
Speaker 1: this risk management tool sitting in you know, it's this

843
00:50:49,680 --> 00:50:52,360
Speaker 1: is like your most powerful resource they want to report

844
00:50:52,400 --> 00:50:55,879
Speaker 1: internally first you just have the opportunity to respond appropriately.

845
00:50:56,440 --> 00:50:58,440
Speaker 1: You don't even have to validate. I mean, this is

846
00:50:58,440 --> 00:50:59,880
Speaker 1: the other thing that I think it is so interesting

847
00:51:00,040 --> 00:51:02,319
Speaker 1: and one kind of reform tool is that if you

848
00:51:02,400 --> 00:51:07,360
Speaker 1: investigate an employee's concern appropriately, that there's this whole research

849
00:51:07,400 --> 00:51:11,520
Speaker 1: around procedural justice and procedural fairness that if an employee

850
00:51:11,600 --> 00:51:15,719
Speaker 1: raises a concern and the employer has, you know, an

851
00:51:15,719 --> 00:51:19,480
Speaker 1: objectively fair process, they protect the employee from retaliation. They

852
00:51:19,520 --> 00:51:22,719
Speaker 1: communicate with them about the investigation. They you know, and

853
00:51:22,800 --> 00:51:25,680
Speaker 1: like there's a perception that the investigation is fair and

854
00:51:25,760 --> 00:51:29,120
Speaker 1: objective and legitimate. And the employer comes back and says,

855
00:51:29,200 --> 00:51:31,800
Speaker 1: you know, hey, thank you, and this is what we found.

856
00:51:31,800 --> 00:51:35,239
Speaker 1: We actually didn't find that you're just your concern um

857
00:51:35,640 --> 00:51:37,760
Speaker 1: was right actually even though you had a reasonable belief

858
00:51:37,800 --> 00:51:41,839
Speaker 1: about it. Then the employee is like hugely willing to

859
00:51:41,960 --> 00:51:46,040
Speaker 1: accept those results and then becomes an ambassador on behalf

860
00:51:46,040 --> 00:51:49,520
Speaker 1: of other employees and the company that Look, this company

861
00:51:49,600 --> 00:51:52,799
Speaker 1: dealt with my problem in a really effective way. So

862
00:51:52,920 --> 00:51:58,920
Speaker 1: like there's no downside to an employer responding appropriately to

863
00:51:59,280 --> 00:52:02,520
Speaker 1: its employee when they raise concerns. There is only upside.

864
00:52:02,640 --> 00:52:05,879
Speaker 1: You avoid risk, you avoid litigation, you save money, all

865
00:52:05,920 --> 00:52:08,200
Speaker 1: of these things because you have like this best line

866
00:52:08,239 --> 00:52:11,360
Speaker 1: of defense. But it is this internal speak up culture

867
00:52:11,800 --> 00:52:16,160
Speaker 1: that has to be real and legitimate and not used

868
00:52:16,440 --> 00:52:19,040
Speaker 1: which we see sometimes as a tool to actually suss

869
00:52:19,040 --> 00:52:22,880
Speaker 1: out who the reporter is and then retaliate against them.

870
00:52:22,920 --> 00:52:25,240
Speaker 1: I mean, like there are there is some hotline abuse

871
00:52:25,320 --> 00:52:28,879
Speaker 1: that happens, although I think these third party platforms are

872
00:52:28,960 --> 00:52:32,799
Speaker 1: minimizing some of that dramatically, which is great, But I

873
00:52:32,840 --> 00:52:35,280
Speaker 1: think that's a huge pieces. Like there's so many things

874
00:52:35,280 --> 00:52:37,839
Speaker 1: that companies can do and governments can do to you know,

875
00:52:38,040 --> 00:52:42,040
Speaker 1: institutions can do to internally shore up how they respond

876
00:52:42,600 --> 00:52:45,960
Speaker 1: to their workers, to value and encourage them to speak up.

877
00:52:45,960 --> 00:52:47,960
Speaker 1: And there's like a whole list, not just one. But

878
00:52:48,000 --> 00:52:49,840
Speaker 1: then there are external things that we need to do

879
00:52:49,960 --> 00:52:53,160
Speaker 1: to Like we do need to strainen them with more protections.

880
00:52:53,200 --> 00:52:56,160
Speaker 1: We need to, like the me too movement recognize that

881
00:52:56,200 --> 00:52:59,360
Speaker 1: a whistleblower. When they speak up, they have everything to lose,

882
00:52:59,560 --> 00:53:02,319
Speaker 1: nothing to a gain, and we need to listen to

883
00:53:02,360 --> 00:53:05,400
Speaker 1: them and put the presumption that they're they're putting a

884
00:53:05,400 --> 00:53:07,520
Speaker 1: lot on the line if they're bothering to speak up,

885
00:53:07,640 --> 00:53:10,839
Speaker 1: rather than viewing them in a suspect way, and that

886
00:53:11,400 --> 00:53:15,120
Speaker 1: we need to make it safe for them to speak

887
00:53:15,200 --> 00:53:20,360
Speaker 1: up and to support that conduct as a culture. Yeah, okay,

888
00:53:20,719 --> 00:53:25,080
Speaker 1: so um, that was great. I'll take the floor for

889
00:53:25,120 --> 00:53:28,680
Speaker 1: a moment and um just humbly submit my idea in

890
00:53:28,719 --> 00:53:31,160
Speaker 1: the space, and I'd love to hear what both of

891
00:53:31,200 --> 00:53:35,239
Speaker 1: you think about this, because to me, the problem here

892
00:53:35,480 --> 00:53:41,520
Speaker 1: is education whistle blowing is still culturally stigmatized, although it

893
00:53:41,560 --> 00:53:45,440
Speaker 1: sounds like that may be improving, and and that comes from,

894
00:53:45,480 --> 00:53:48,200
Speaker 1: I think a genuine ignorance about the positive effects that

895
00:53:48,200 --> 00:53:50,840
Speaker 1: both of you have been talking about. And so my

896
00:53:50,920 --> 00:53:55,640
Speaker 1: idea is to figure out how to create whistleblower awards,

897
00:53:56,239 --> 00:54:00,520
Speaker 1: So not rewards, I'm talking about awards that are given

898
00:54:00,520 --> 00:54:04,880
Speaker 1: to recognize the positive benefits to businesses into society and

899
00:54:04,920 --> 00:54:07,400
Speaker 1: maybe get a sponsor. You know, I don't know whether

900
00:54:07,440 --> 00:54:11,440
Speaker 1: the Harvard Business Press would ever, you know, co sponsor

901
00:54:11,560 --> 00:54:13,719
Speaker 1: this or or distribute it. They tend to be a

902
00:54:13,719 --> 00:54:16,560
Speaker 1: little conservative, but it would be great if they would

903
00:54:16,560 --> 00:54:20,200
Speaker 1: get behind this, And why not since it's obviously a

904
00:54:20,320 --> 00:54:23,880
Speaker 1: business success story to promote, you know, whistle blowers. If

905
00:54:23,880 --> 00:54:25,880
Speaker 1: you want to promote better business in the world, you

906
00:54:25,920 --> 00:54:30,200
Speaker 1: ought to promote whistle blowing or you know. Again, possibly

907
00:54:30,200 --> 00:54:32,360
Speaker 1: a fantasy, but the Wall Street Journal as a partner,

908
00:54:32,760 --> 00:54:37,760
Speaker 1: let's celebrate and reward individuals and along the way educate

909
00:54:37,800 --> 00:54:40,520
Speaker 1: the wider world about the clear business benefits and clear

910
00:54:40,560 --> 00:54:44,560
Speaker 1: societal benefits of creating a culture where it is safe

911
00:54:44,640 --> 00:54:50,520
Speaker 1: to come forward. Thoughts on that first of all, as

912
00:54:50,560 --> 00:54:53,000
Speaker 1: as better as it could be, we should recognize that

913
00:54:53,040 --> 00:54:56,920
Speaker 1: the United States, for all our problems, is the best

914
00:54:57,000 --> 00:55:00,319
Speaker 1: in the world at complaining about things. We do the

915
00:55:00,360 --> 00:55:04,200
Speaker 1: best at whistle blowing because we embedded in our culture

916
00:55:04,760 --> 00:55:08,200
Speaker 1: speaking up more so than anywhere else. We actually have

917
00:55:08,520 --> 00:55:13,239
Speaker 1: of huge cultural advantage here. So the whistleblower reports in

918
00:55:13,239 --> 00:55:18,239
Speaker 1: the US are like a mile ahead culturally because in

919
00:55:18,280 --> 00:55:22,279
Speaker 1: our culture, generally speaking, it is not stigmatized nearly as

920
00:55:22,360 --> 00:55:25,480
Speaker 1: much as as it used to be, and people do

921
00:55:25,600 --> 00:55:27,160
Speaker 1: look up to it. And I think that's kind of

922
00:55:27,160 --> 00:55:29,480
Speaker 1: your point, is that we need more people looking up

923
00:55:29,520 --> 00:55:31,680
Speaker 1: to it. I would also push back a little bit too.

924
00:55:32,160 --> 00:55:35,160
Speaker 1: This is not a liberal idea. I mean, this solves

925
00:55:35,200 --> 00:55:39,439
Speaker 1: the problem faster, better and improves it this way better

926
00:55:39,480 --> 00:55:41,920
Speaker 1: than anything else. I agree with that. What are you

927
00:55:41,960 --> 00:55:44,160
Speaker 1: pushing back on, because that was what I was trying

928
00:55:44,160 --> 00:55:47,120
Speaker 1: to say, is that of all the people in the world,

929
00:55:47,360 --> 00:55:50,560
Speaker 1: the hardcore business press are the people who ought to

930
00:55:50,600 --> 00:55:53,640
Speaker 1: be celebrating this, and I don't think they are. But

931
00:55:53,719 --> 00:55:57,000
Speaker 1: it's I would say, though, it's that kind of shooting

932
00:55:57,040 --> 00:56:00,719
Speaker 1: from the hip that creates a problem. We don't know

933
00:56:00,840 --> 00:56:02,560
Speaker 1: that answer because you don't have the data on it,

934
00:56:02,600 --> 00:56:05,080
Speaker 1: and I don't have the date on it. Yeah, it's

935
00:56:05,160 --> 00:56:08,120
Speaker 1: my show. I get to have an opinion. I have

936
00:56:08,160 --> 00:56:10,880
Speaker 1: comanecdotal evidence, which is not the kind of data that

937
00:56:10,880 --> 00:56:13,680
Speaker 1: that Kyle does. But I used to um I used

938
00:56:13,680 --> 00:56:18,960
Speaker 1: to run executive education programs on corporate governance for directors,

939
00:56:18,960 --> 00:56:23,080
Speaker 1: corporate directors and general counsel often. And um I was

940
00:56:23,160 --> 00:56:28,080
Speaker 1: running a program at Boston College Law School and an

941
00:56:28,120 --> 00:56:31,040
Speaker 1: issue came up around a lot of concern and interest

942
00:56:31,080 --> 00:56:34,680
Speaker 1: about Dodd Frank and whistle blowers, and it went to

943
00:56:34,760 --> 00:56:38,319
Speaker 1: a place these are all enlightened nice people. It went

944
00:56:38,360 --> 00:56:41,000
Speaker 1: to a place where what can we do about the whistleblowers?

945
00:56:41,440 --> 00:56:45,759
Speaker 1: Can we can we can we get them for stealing documents,

946
00:56:46,200 --> 00:56:51,000
Speaker 1: you know, or violating gag orders. And I was just like, oh,

947
00:56:51,040 --> 00:56:53,960
Speaker 1: oh dear, oh dear, this is the this is exactly

948
00:56:54,000 --> 00:56:56,440
Speaker 1: the problem. And I think that there is this embedded

949
00:56:57,760 --> 00:57:00,520
Speaker 1: problem of perceiving even though I think this is not

950
00:57:00,600 --> 00:57:03,120
Speaker 1: as true for management. I think with general counsel sometimes

951
00:57:03,120 --> 00:57:05,520
Speaker 1: they see whistle blowers as a potential source of risk,

952
00:57:06,000 --> 00:57:09,600
Speaker 1: rather than realizing that I'm going to create more risk

953
00:57:10,040 --> 00:57:13,440
Speaker 1: if my company doesn't deal effectively with the whistleblower. I'm

954
00:57:13,440 --> 00:57:15,520
Speaker 1: actually going to increase our risk by now we're going

955
00:57:15,560 --> 00:57:17,640
Speaker 1: to have a lawsuit around litigation and not just the

956
00:57:17,720 --> 00:57:20,920
Speaker 1: underlying problem. I was like, oh my gosh, the degree

957
00:57:20,920 --> 00:57:24,880
Speaker 1: of education to your point, Hie, around why whistle blowing

958
00:57:25,080 --> 00:57:29,120
Speaker 1: is a good thing and why responding appropriately to whistleblowers

959
00:57:29,160 --> 00:57:32,840
Speaker 1: and how to do that internally is exactly what is

960
00:57:32,880 --> 00:57:36,760
Speaker 1: beneficial to a company. That's what needs to happen. And

961
00:57:36,840 --> 00:57:39,280
Speaker 1: you know, to your point about the awards, I agree.

962
00:57:39,320 --> 00:57:42,280
Speaker 1: I mean, what you're talking about is is valorizing or

963
00:57:42,400 --> 00:57:45,360
Speaker 1: calling out the right behavior rather than the wrong behavior.

964
00:57:45,440 --> 00:57:48,680
Speaker 1: And so if you're measuring, for instance, we only had

965
00:57:48,880 --> 00:57:53,600
Speaker 1: you know, zero safety problems right as opposed to saying oh,

966
00:57:53,640 --> 00:57:58,160
Speaker 1: because that discourages people from reporting accidents right as opposed

967
00:57:58,200 --> 00:58:01,960
Speaker 1: to how did we respond on to those accidents. I mean,

968
00:58:02,000 --> 00:58:05,320
Speaker 1: we have these perverse performance incentives that I think switched

969
00:58:06,240 --> 00:58:09,400
Speaker 1: for the burden to be on how management responds rather

970
00:58:09,480 --> 00:58:13,280
Speaker 1: than drive to encourage just employees to speak up. They're

971
00:58:13,320 --> 00:58:16,080
Speaker 1: gonna speak up if they feel like they're not going

972
00:58:16,160 --> 00:58:18,720
Speaker 1: to suffer retaliation and something's going to be done about

973
00:58:18,760 --> 00:58:20,800
Speaker 1: the problem. And I also just want to say one

974
00:58:20,800 --> 00:58:26,000
Speaker 1: thing about this, the money problem, is that largely that

975
00:58:26,240 --> 00:58:28,520
Speaker 1: is not what motivates people to speak out. As a

976
00:58:28,520 --> 00:58:30,520
Speaker 1: matter of fact, there's some data that says that money

977
00:58:30,560 --> 00:58:35,720
Speaker 1: depresses reporting right or depresses ethical behavior. And so when

978
00:58:35,760 --> 00:58:39,680
Speaker 1: the SEC, for instance, promotes all of these multimillion dollar

979
00:58:39,760 --> 00:58:42,560
Speaker 1: awards that it's giving to whistleblowers, I think it's just

980
00:58:42,600 --> 00:58:48,200
Speaker 1: sending totally the wrong message personally, um, because like they've

981
00:58:48,200 --> 00:58:51,080
Speaker 1: given out three hundred and twenty eight awards out of

982
00:58:51,360 --> 00:58:54,120
Speaker 1: sixty four thousand, four hundred and twenty one tips that

983
00:58:54,160 --> 00:58:58,160
Speaker 1: they've that they've received since its inception in that means

984
00:58:58,160 --> 00:59:03,360
Speaker 1: you have a point five sent chance, point five percent

985
00:59:03,440 --> 00:59:06,439
Speaker 1: chance of getting an award. It's like you buy buy

986
00:59:06,440 --> 00:59:09,840
Speaker 1: a lottery ticket. I think the success of this program

987
00:59:10,040 --> 00:59:14,120
Speaker 1: is that it's a program that allows for anonymity and

988
00:59:14,240 --> 00:59:19,920
Speaker 1: confidentiality and an opportunity that someone someone responsible might investigate

989
00:59:19,920 --> 00:59:22,240
Speaker 1: and do something about it and yeah, maybe you maybe

990
00:59:22,280 --> 00:59:24,800
Speaker 1: you'll you'll win the lottery and get a payout. But

991
00:59:24,880 --> 00:59:29,640
Speaker 1: it addresses those other two issues that that are motivating

992
00:59:29,680 --> 00:59:33,760
Speaker 1: to an employee who sees wrongdoing, right is that someone's

993
00:59:33,760 --> 00:59:35,640
Speaker 1: going to maybe do something about it and I don't

994
00:59:35,640 --> 00:59:38,600
Speaker 1: have to risk retaliation because I can stay anonymous or

995
00:59:38,640 --> 00:59:41,919
Speaker 1: you know, maintain my confidentiality. Like that's in part why

996
00:59:41,960 --> 00:59:44,800
Speaker 1: this is so successful. So I think it's not about

997
00:59:44,800 --> 00:59:51,000
Speaker 1: this money thing. It's about measuring and incentivizing the right behavior.

998
00:59:51,960 --> 00:59:54,600
Speaker 1: So what are your thoughts, just in general, on the

999
00:59:54,640 --> 00:59:59,440
Speaker 1: idea of rewarding whistleblowers with money at all? Personally, I

1000
00:59:59,480 --> 01:00:03,480
Speaker 1: think we have struck, the regulators have struck a pretty

1001
01:00:03,520 --> 01:00:06,640
Speaker 1: good balance. If you try to resolve something internally and

1002
01:00:06,640 --> 01:00:09,320
Speaker 1: then go external, you have the highest chance for the

1003
01:00:09,360 --> 01:00:13,120
Speaker 1: most reward externally on these bounties. So I I think

1004
01:00:13,160 --> 01:00:16,120
Speaker 1: that balance is a great balance that the US is

1005
01:00:16,160 --> 01:00:21,560
Speaker 1: created because it it doesn't steal this resource away from firms.

1006
01:00:21,600 --> 01:00:24,480
Speaker 1: Because if we really want to change things, we want

1007
01:00:24,600 --> 01:00:27,080
Speaker 1: the people closest to the problems to fix them. It's

1008
01:00:27,280 --> 01:00:29,120
Speaker 1: much harder to get the government to fix them. But

1009
01:00:29,560 --> 01:00:31,439
Speaker 1: if it has to go to the government, oh man,

1010
01:00:31,480 --> 01:00:34,480
Speaker 1: they better pay. I want to pivot for just a

1011
01:00:34,560 --> 01:00:37,800
Speaker 1: second and and talk a little bit about your work, Kyle.

1012
01:00:38,680 --> 01:00:42,560
Speaker 1: In your work, you use the Peter Drucker quote culture

1013
01:00:42,680 --> 01:00:46,760
Speaker 1: eats strategy for breakfast. Can you explain what you meant

1014
01:00:46,800 --> 01:00:50,440
Speaker 1: by that in the context of whistleblowing When you have

1015
01:00:50,480 --> 01:00:53,520
Speaker 1: a strong culture in your organization, where when your group

1016
01:00:53,640 --> 01:00:57,400
Speaker 1: feels like almost like their kinship with like they're related

1017
01:00:57,440 --> 01:01:00,160
Speaker 1: to each other, they all of a sudden make an

1018
01:01:00,160 --> 01:01:04,360
Speaker 1: investment in their organization that you wouldn't get otherwise. You

1019
01:01:04,400 --> 01:01:08,120
Speaker 1: would not get that otherwise, and so there's all these externalities.

1020
01:01:08,160 --> 01:01:10,760
Speaker 1: And Danta kind of talked about this. One of the

1021
01:01:10,800 --> 01:01:14,040
Speaker 1: tragedies of this of research and this data is that

1022
01:01:14,120 --> 01:01:18,440
Speaker 1: it's very easy to measure negative outcomes. Negative outcomes come

1023
01:01:18,440 --> 01:01:21,720
Speaker 1: in the form of lawsuits, fines, and then news stories.

1024
01:01:21,760 --> 01:01:24,200
Speaker 1: Those are all the negative outcomes. It's very hard to

1025
01:01:24,240 --> 01:01:27,640
Speaker 1: measure the positive outcomes. Somebody that is dealing with harassment.

1026
01:01:27,680 --> 01:01:29,880
Speaker 1: Somebody is dealing with the problem at at work, and

1027
01:01:29,920 --> 01:01:32,400
Speaker 1: the problem gets resolved all of a sudden, they feel

1028
01:01:32,680 --> 01:01:35,120
Speaker 1: a huge weight off of them and working at work

1029
01:01:35,200 --> 01:01:38,000
Speaker 1: environment is much better. You think about somebody being harassed

1030
01:01:38,040 --> 01:01:39,920
Speaker 1: at work and then taking that home with them and

1031
01:01:39,960 --> 01:01:43,320
Speaker 1: how that affects their other relationships with their spouse and kids.

1032
01:01:44,480 --> 01:01:47,400
Speaker 1: It's it, it has. There's huge effects to this, and

1033
01:01:47,400 --> 01:01:51,880
Speaker 1: and I think we're just we're just getting exposing just

1034
01:01:51,920 --> 01:01:56,800
Speaker 1: a little bit of it that it's wide open for us. Yeah. Yeah,

1035
01:01:57,040 --> 01:01:58,880
Speaker 1: I just want to expand on that a little bit

1036
01:01:58,920 --> 01:02:01,520
Speaker 1: because I just think it's it's often hard to measure

1037
01:02:03,160 --> 01:02:06,160
Speaker 1: problems that are prevented, right, Like it's hard when you

1038
01:02:06,320 --> 01:02:10,400
Speaker 1: when you actually can prevent a big safety problem because

1039
01:02:10,520 --> 01:02:13,400
Speaker 1: the company has addressed it, it's hard to say, well,

1040
01:02:13,400 --> 01:02:18,880
Speaker 1: we we prevented a nuclear three mile Island disaster. And

1041
01:02:18,960 --> 01:02:20,600
Speaker 1: this is like why it's a you know, it's a

1042
01:02:20,600 --> 01:02:23,280
Speaker 1: weird data set to to measure, you know, I think

1043
01:02:23,320 --> 01:02:26,240
Speaker 1: about GM. I whish there were more examples like this,

1044
01:02:26,320 --> 01:02:30,360
Speaker 1: but you know, Tony Fernendez, the whistleblower who sued on

1045
01:02:30,440 --> 01:02:33,800
Speaker 1: his own Haliburton and then GM he's an accounting fraud

1046
01:02:34,000 --> 01:02:38,120
Speaker 1: he you know, GM snatched, he blew the whistle on

1047
01:02:38,200 --> 01:02:43,160
Speaker 1: Haliburton and huge accounting fraud, right, and he represented himself.

1048
01:02:43,200 --> 01:02:48,680
Speaker 1: Actually pro se was very successful. General Motors hired him

1049
01:02:48,720 --> 01:02:51,840
Speaker 1: and they brought him on like in a really public way,

1050
01:02:51,880 --> 01:02:54,560
Speaker 1: like we're gonna hire the whistleblower. And I just like

1051
01:02:54,640 --> 01:02:59,360
Speaker 1: this should happen all the time, like this should like this.

1052
01:02:59,720 --> 01:03:01,560
Speaker 1: You know, we've we've touched on this a couple of times,

1053
01:03:01,560 --> 01:03:05,320
Speaker 1: but why doesn't it happen more? Let me can I

1054
01:03:05,360 --> 01:03:07,600
Speaker 1: push back on that? Just a sect to that the

1055
01:03:07,880 --> 01:03:14,240
Speaker 1: name of the show was calling bosh so so so

1056
01:03:14,320 --> 01:03:16,520
Speaker 1: let me push back on that. There's an academic article

1057
01:03:16,640 --> 01:03:19,240
Speaker 1: that was published by a couple of smart, sharp guys.

1058
01:03:19,240 --> 01:03:22,160
Speaker 1: What they did is they looked at uh public keytam

1059
01:03:22,240 --> 01:03:25,720
Speaker 1: lawsuits and then they said, okay, let's find the people

1060
01:03:25,760 --> 01:03:29,160
Speaker 1: that brought the lawsuits and do background checks on them

1061
01:03:29,480 --> 01:03:32,000
Speaker 1: to see where they are in their careers. So, using

1062
01:03:32,040 --> 01:03:34,760
Speaker 1: LinkedIn and private Investor, they spend a ton of money

1063
01:03:34,800 --> 01:03:38,760
Speaker 1: on this. What they found was their careers showed no

1064
01:03:38,960 --> 01:03:42,880
Speaker 1: deviation from their peers. I do know that people's careers,

1065
01:03:43,000 --> 01:03:45,480
Speaker 1: people get fired from jobs. I know that event happens.

1066
01:03:45,840 --> 01:03:48,200
Speaker 1: But when I'm saying this, I'm talking about means. I'm

1067
01:03:48,240 --> 01:03:52,440
Speaker 1: talking about averages and especially means and averages of the population.

1068
01:03:52,520 --> 01:03:55,320
Speaker 1: Even at the extreme. They looked at the extreme, and

1069
01:03:55,440 --> 01:03:58,520
Speaker 1: in that extreme they said, hey, all these people had

1070
01:03:58,640 --> 01:04:00,480
Speaker 1: like similar jobs. They didn't have their set, but they

1071
01:04:00,480 --> 01:04:05,040
Speaker 1: were at similar levels relative appears. So i'miding to read that,

1072
01:04:05,360 --> 01:04:06,760
Speaker 1: and I hope you send it to me, because I

1073
01:04:06,760 --> 01:04:09,360
Speaker 1: think what's interesting about Dodd Frank and the false Claims

1074
01:04:09,360 --> 01:04:10,920
Speaker 1: Act of course, right, is that when you file a

1075
01:04:11,000 --> 01:04:14,320
Speaker 1: false claims at case, you do so under sealed. You

1076
01:04:14,360 --> 01:04:16,800
Speaker 1: file a claim, but the Department of Justice and it's

1077
01:04:16,880 --> 01:04:19,760
Speaker 1: under sealed, like it is under sealed, like the company

1078
01:04:19,800 --> 01:04:22,320
Speaker 1: does not know. Like this is like a quiet thing.

1079
01:04:22,520 --> 01:04:25,680
Speaker 1: But those whistleblowers who blew the whistle not using these

1080
01:04:25,720 --> 01:04:30,240
Speaker 1: confidential systems, that experience for the whistleblower becomes then they

1081
01:04:30,320 --> 01:04:33,640
Speaker 1: become radioactive quite quite frequently if it's public, you know,

1082
01:04:33,800 --> 01:04:37,400
Speaker 1: very very public profile. So I just you know, I think,

1083
01:04:37,440 --> 01:04:39,560
Speaker 1: I mean, again, this is like a really dramatic example

1084
01:04:39,560 --> 01:04:42,440
Speaker 1: because her disclosures went viral. But I represent Don Wootton,

1085
01:04:42,560 --> 01:04:45,960
Speaker 1: who's the nurse at She was the nurse at the

1086
01:04:46,040 --> 01:04:49,920
Speaker 1: Erwin County Detention Center. Whistle. Yeah right, blew the whistle

1087
01:04:50,080 --> 01:04:53,480
Speaker 1: on all kinds of medical mistreatment, including that women were

1088
01:04:53,520 --> 01:04:58,480
Speaker 1: suffering non consensual, unnecessary gynecological procedures that went totally viral.

1089
01:04:59,160 --> 01:05:01,880
Speaker 1: You know, her life is completely changed and she can't

1090
01:05:02,600 --> 01:05:04,760
Speaker 1: she can't either get a job or retain a job

1091
01:05:04,880 --> 01:05:08,280
Speaker 1: as a nurse during a pandemic in her local community

1092
01:05:08,320 --> 01:05:12,120
Speaker 1: because she is blamed right as the one responsible for

1093
01:05:12,360 --> 01:05:15,520
Speaker 1: ending that contract at that facility. Now that's very dramatic

1094
01:05:15,560 --> 01:05:19,320
Speaker 1: example because she's so well known essentially, right, But and

1095
01:05:19,640 --> 01:05:22,280
Speaker 1: I'm not saying that's true for all whistleblowers at all.

1096
01:05:22,560 --> 01:05:26,919
Speaker 1: You know this problem, I mean, I think it's but yeah, yeah,

1097
01:05:26,960 --> 01:05:30,440
Speaker 1: that that praises another question for me because you know,

1098
01:05:30,520 --> 01:05:33,400
Speaker 1: another expert that we spoke to for the show actually

1099
01:05:33,480 --> 01:05:37,320
Speaker 1: mentioned that there are certain industries and and she called

1100
01:05:37,360 --> 01:05:41,760
Speaker 1: out health care and defense where you may never work

1101
01:05:41,800 --> 01:05:45,480
Speaker 1: again if you speak out. And so I guess it

1102
01:05:45,600 --> 01:05:50,560
Speaker 1: does seem like there are some industries where there there

1103
01:05:50,760 --> 01:05:56,040
Speaker 1: is a stigma. I will I'm gonna call both on that.

1104
01:05:56,040 --> 01:05:59,280
Speaker 1: That those are the most regulated industries. I would say

1105
01:05:59,520 --> 01:06:02,600
Speaker 1: your more likely to have a problem in an industry

1106
01:06:02,640 --> 01:06:04,960
Speaker 1: that doesn't have those eyeballs. So let me tell you

1107
01:06:04,960 --> 01:06:07,520
Speaker 1: why I based this opinion on on the claim of

1108
01:06:07,560 --> 01:06:10,480
Speaker 1: health care and defense. In the last year, I've spoken

1109
01:06:10,520 --> 01:06:15,000
Speaker 1: at three defense conferences and three healthcare conferences trying to

1110
01:06:15,120 --> 01:06:19,120
Speaker 1: understand and better like better understand the outcome and positive

1111
01:06:19,200 --> 01:06:22,880
Speaker 1: natures associated with these compliance. Of all the two industries

1112
01:06:22,960 --> 01:06:26,400
Speaker 1: that reach out to my research, No two industries reach

1113
01:06:26,440 --> 01:06:28,960
Speaker 1: out to this research more like I can't even think

1114
01:06:29,000 --> 01:06:32,680
Speaker 1: of a third healthcare and defense. You're hearing the failures

1115
01:06:32,720 --> 01:06:36,000
Speaker 1: of it, and so if you hear censored data, you

1116
01:06:36,040 --> 01:06:38,920
Speaker 1: will always get a censored by as sample from it.

1117
01:06:39,360 --> 01:06:42,840
Speaker 1: And I would say, generally speaking, defense industry. Of all

1118
01:06:42,840 --> 01:06:46,000
Speaker 1: the industries that reach out to me, defense and healthcare

1119
01:06:46,160 --> 01:06:49,400
Speaker 1: over and over and over again have a huge focus

1120
01:06:49,440 --> 01:06:53,000
Speaker 1: on this. I would say compliance in those two industries

1121
01:06:53,040 --> 01:06:56,560
Speaker 1: while there are and it makes sense because the problems

1122
01:06:56,600 --> 01:07:01,080
Speaker 1: if somebody dies, if something goes wrong, or got secrets

1123
01:07:01,080 --> 01:07:03,800
Speaker 1: getting leaked out, it makes sense that compliance would be

1124
01:07:03,880 --> 01:07:06,960
Speaker 1: huge in those industries. Dana, did you have any thoughts

1125
01:07:07,040 --> 01:07:11,480
Speaker 1: about that? Yeah, I mean I think I actually think

1126
01:07:11,520 --> 01:07:14,560
Speaker 1: this could be a both and situation in that I

1127
01:07:14,640 --> 01:07:19,280
Speaker 1: agree that these heavily regulated industries where the stakes are

1128
01:07:19,400 --> 01:07:23,400
Speaker 1: very high, have some of the most sophisticated ethics and

1129
01:07:23,440 --> 01:07:27,920
Speaker 1: compliance systems. They understand why it's important to them, and

1130
01:07:27,960 --> 01:07:31,120
Speaker 1: they have they're they're just far more advanced. I still

1131
01:07:31,120 --> 01:07:35,600
Speaker 1: think even when you hear those outlying pieces of data,

1132
01:07:36,160 --> 01:07:39,400
Speaker 1: it's still a sign of failure in that ethics and

1133
01:07:39,440 --> 01:07:43,200
Speaker 1: compliance system. When you have a Boeing whistleblower who basically

1134
01:07:43,240 --> 01:07:46,240
Speaker 1: said I was raising concerns about safety issues and suffered

1135
01:07:46,280 --> 01:07:49,160
Speaker 1: reprisal and they weren't addressed. And the only reason now

1136
01:07:49,200 --> 01:07:52,200
Speaker 1: that you're hearing about it is because they suffered reprisal

1137
01:07:52,280 --> 01:07:56,560
Speaker 1: and the problem wasn't addressed, and the stakes of that

1138
01:07:56,840 --> 01:08:06,600
Speaker 1: response is endangering people. Right, I'm so like, do you

1139
01:08:06,640 --> 01:08:08,960
Speaker 1: need like? So, You're right, it might be an outlier,

1140
01:08:09,640 --> 01:08:13,160
Speaker 1: but that failure is still a problem. It doesn't mean

1141
01:08:13,280 --> 01:08:16,519
Speaker 1: that everything is bad at that company and that every

1142
01:08:16,600 --> 01:08:20,479
Speaker 1: but it's like if you're talking about one plane fallen

1143
01:08:20,520 --> 01:08:22,840
Speaker 1: from the sky, you kind of want to prevent that,

1144
01:08:23,040 --> 01:08:26,240
Speaker 1: right and no, So, so so let's be clear. What

1145
01:08:26,280 --> 01:08:30,240
Speaker 1: I'm saying is that when they do something wrong, go

1146
01:08:30,439 --> 01:08:33,440
Speaker 1: hard on the paint on them to hold them accountable.

1147
01:08:33,840 --> 01:08:37,680
Speaker 1: But when we're talking about means and averages in those industries,

1148
01:08:37,800 --> 01:08:41,519
Speaker 1: the mean firm in compliance, the mean firm associated with this.

1149
01:08:41,640 --> 01:08:45,640
Speaker 1: In defense and healthcare, they the reason why they have

1150
01:08:45,680 --> 01:08:47,400
Speaker 1: these advanced systems. They try to get ahead of it.

1151
01:08:47,439 --> 01:08:51,040
Speaker 1: So when somebody in in that network does something wrong,

1152
01:08:51,439 --> 01:08:55,240
Speaker 1: oh my gosh, all the more, all the more should

1153
01:08:55,240 --> 01:08:58,080
Speaker 1: they be held accountable because of how advanced their system

1154
01:08:58,120 --> 01:09:02,800
Speaker 1: should be. Okay, I'm a little confused, So I just

1155
01:09:02,840 --> 01:09:08,360
Speaker 1: want to clarify something because I think lots of companies

1156
01:09:08,360 --> 01:09:13,400
Speaker 1: have like hotline reporting systems for reporting, and I have

1157
01:09:13,479 --> 01:09:16,519
Speaker 1: seen experts who have pointed out that those mechanisms are

1158
01:09:16,560 --> 01:09:21,720
Speaker 1: only as good as the culture behind that system. You

1159
01:09:21,760 --> 01:09:29,439
Speaker 1: agree with that, okay, but you don't agree And I

1160
01:09:29,960 --> 01:09:33,200
Speaker 1: get that data is hard to get here, but you

1161
01:09:33,320 --> 01:09:37,760
Speaker 1: don't agree that there are industries healthcare and defense are

1162
01:09:37,800 --> 01:09:41,160
Speaker 1: two that have been mentioned by other experts where there

1163
01:09:41,280 --> 01:09:48,479
Speaker 1: is a problem, a cultural bias against hiring people who

1164
01:09:48,520 --> 01:09:51,960
Speaker 1: have had a history of whistle blowing. But don't you

1165
01:09:52,000 --> 01:09:54,000
Speaker 1: think it's kind of apples and oranges? And I think

1166
01:09:54,000 --> 01:09:56,360
Speaker 1: this is why I maybe you're struggling and and I

1167
01:09:56,400 --> 01:10:00,200
Speaker 1: am too. Is that it's still about people, Like if

1168
01:10:00,240 --> 01:10:02,960
Speaker 1: you raised a concern internally and it was dealt with

1169
01:10:03,000 --> 01:10:06,240
Speaker 1: through the ethics and compliance system, you're actually not I mean,

1170
01:10:06,280 --> 01:10:08,400
Speaker 1: you're a whistle or because you raised a concern, but

1171
01:10:08,439 --> 01:10:11,360
Speaker 1: it doesn't become a problem because it's about the management

1172
01:10:11,439 --> 01:10:15,679
Speaker 1: response to the report. That's what really becomes the issue.

1173
01:10:16,040 --> 01:10:18,160
Speaker 1: It's how does management respond to the report. That's why

1174
01:10:18,200 --> 01:10:20,200
Speaker 1: we don't hear all of this data that you hear

1175
01:10:20,240 --> 01:10:22,639
Speaker 1: about Kyle. It's like, that's why it's a gold mine

1176
01:10:22,760 --> 01:10:26,400
Speaker 1: because here people that report internally and the company dealt

1177
01:10:26,439 --> 01:10:28,880
Speaker 1: with it, right, So I'm dealing with when the company

1178
01:10:28,920 --> 01:10:32,840
Speaker 1: failed to respond appropriately, right, And it happens a lot.

1179
01:10:32,920 --> 01:10:35,120
Speaker 1: We are so busy, like we have a lot, you

1180
01:10:35,160 --> 01:10:37,519
Speaker 1: know what, we can't help everybody, right, Like there's a

1181
01:10:37,520 --> 01:10:40,160
Speaker 1: lot of failure. And they're in health care and they're

1182
01:10:40,160 --> 01:10:42,720
Speaker 1: in defense, like they're in all of these industries, right,

1183
01:10:42,760 --> 01:10:45,919
Speaker 1: they're all always failures. And so when I think about

1184
01:10:46,120 --> 01:10:48,800
Speaker 1: how we care about the power of an individual who

1185
01:10:48,840 --> 01:10:52,120
Speaker 1: sees a problem, right, and when they it's either experienced

1186
01:10:52,120 --> 01:10:55,280
Speaker 1: retaliation or the problem isn't dealt with. That's when they're

1187
01:10:55,320 --> 01:11:00,719
Speaker 1: prompted to go outside, and once they're public, it becomes

1188
01:11:00,800 --> 01:11:03,720
Speaker 1: very hard. I think even you know, as anyone in

1189
01:11:03,800 --> 01:11:05,759
Speaker 1: a play, you know, here's someone who blew the whistle

1190
01:11:05,800 --> 01:11:09,200
Speaker 1: before publicly, like GM. That's why I made that example.

1191
01:11:09,240 --> 01:11:14,719
Speaker 1: It's like they basically use that as as a way

1192
01:11:14,840 --> 01:11:19,200
Speaker 1: of telegraphing to their culture and to their workers into

1193
01:11:19,280 --> 01:11:22,120
Speaker 1: the world. We like that this person is a whistle blower.

1194
01:11:22,120 --> 01:11:26,040
Speaker 1: We care about our accounting cleanliness. We're not afraid that

1195
01:11:26,200 --> 01:11:29,080
Speaker 1: is like not reflexibly. If you know that someone is sued,

1196
01:11:29,120 --> 01:11:31,720
Speaker 1: you know, has sued an employer in the past, and

1197
01:11:31,760 --> 01:11:36,240
Speaker 1: you're an employer hiring someone, you're gonna think out of

1198
01:11:36,320 --> 01:11:38,680
Speaker 1: what this person because they're gonna blow the whistle on me.

1199
01:11:39,040 --> 01:11:42,640
Speaker 1: I just think it's it's so embedded in terms of

1200
01:11:42,640 --> 01:11:45,640
Speaker 1: how we and I think it's where like the blacklisting

1201
01:11:45,720 --> 01:11:50,160
Speaker 1: comes up again, for a public facing whistle blower, you

1202
01:11:50,240 --> 01:11:54,640
Speaker 1: have to either embrace it and may be really enlightened,

1203
01:11:55,920 --> 01:11:58,040
Speaker 1: or you're gonna be like, oh, this person is going

1204
01:11:58,080 --> 01:11:59,760
Speaker 1: to see all the problems and my we're going to

1205
01:11:59,800 --> 01:12:02,360
Speaker 1: say we all, we'll give you, we'll give you the

1206
01:12:02,439 --> 01:12:04,120
Speaker 1: last word, and then we get we get a rep.

1207
01:12:04,240 --> 01:12:09,040
Speaker 1: We we all agree that it's bad. And uh, the

1208
01:12:09,120 --> 01:12:11,920
Speaker 1: one thing that I that's the important that we agree.

1209
01:12:12,479 --> 01:12:15,320
Speaker 1: We agree that if somebody is getting blacklisted for this,

1210
01:12:15,520 --> 01:12:19,600
Speaker 1: that it's bad. So what I would say and what

1211
01:12:19,720 --> 01:12:22,640
Speaker 1: I tell compliance professionals and people that reach out, is

1212
01:12:22,680 --> 01:12:26,720
Speaker 1: that first everyone that wants they want to have an

1213
01:12:26,800 --> 01:12:29,920
Speaker 1: organization and a great culture. Most leaders do want that,

1214
01:12:29,960 --> 01:12:34,040
Speaker 1: I would say, on average, And so we hear about

1215
01:12:34,080 --> 01:12:39,080
Speaker 1: these bad stories, and I would say that the Special

1216
01:12:39,160 --> 01:12:43,720
Speaker 1: Victims Unit of whistle blowing is important to understand and

1217
01:12:43,800 --> 01:12:48,839
Speaker 1: identify and tell stories from. But make sure our narrative

1218
01:12:48,960 --> 01:12:52,560
Speaker 1: is is the average human isn't the type of perpetrator

1219
01:12:52,640 --> 01:12:56,320
Speaker 1: that makes people go to this SPU unit of whistle blowing,

1220
01:12:56,479 --> 01:12:59,280
Speaker 1: And that there is a lot of good that's happening

1221
01:12:59,360 --> 01:13:01,280
Speaker 1: and we never hear about it. I don't know that

1222
01:13:01,320 --> 01:13:04,080
Speaker 1: we'll ever hear about all of it, but we should

1223
01:13:04,120 --> 01:13:06,600
Speaker 1: understand the s V unit, but understand that that is

1224
01:13:06,920 --> 01:13:12,599
Speaker 1: the sampling doesn't show the whole population. Okay, sadly we

1225
01:13:12,720 --> 01:13:16,320
Speaker 1: have to wrap this up, but this has been a

1226
01:13:16,360 --> 01:13:21,679
Speaker 1: fantastic conversation. I so appreciate both of you. Kyle Dana,

1227
01:13:21,840 --> 01:13:25,160
Speaker 1: thank you for being on the show. This is super fun.

1228
01:13:25,640 --> 01:13:27,599
Speaker 1: It's fun talking to Dana too. I've seen it from

1229
01:13:27,600 --> 01:13:29,840
Speaker 1: a distance for so I was like, I'm gonna get

1230
01:13:29,880 --> 01:13:35,759
Speaker 1: to do this with Kyle's and now we know tie,

1231
01:13:35,840 --> 01:13:38,560
Speaker 1: So this is great. You're doing great work on this podcast.

1232
01:13:38,680 --> 01:13:40,679
Speaker 1: I appreciate that, and thank you both for the work

1233
01:13:40,720 --> 01:13:44,280
Speaker 1: that you're doing so so great and so important. Keep

1234
01:13:44,280 --> 01:13:49,519
Speaker 1: it up. Alright, folks, We're not giving anybody a B

1235
01:13:49,800 --> 01:13:51,840
Speaker 1: S score today, but I do want to drive this

1236
01:13:51,880 --> 01:13:55,800
Speaker 1: point home. In a perfect world, corporate mouthfeasance would be

1237
01:13:55,840 --> 01:13:59,080
Speaker 1: stopped as soon as it's discovered. Fraud would be dealt

1238
01:13:59,120 --> 01:14:03,479
Speaker 1: with internal, and systems that incentivize poor behavior would be

1239
01:14:03,520 --> 01:14:07,840
Speaker 1: redesigned to encourage people to do the right thing. We

1240
01:14:07,920 --> 01:14:11,800
Speaker 1: wouldn't need whistle blowers. But the point I want to

1241
01:14:11,840 --> 01:14:16,679
Speaker 1: make two leaders of organizations everywhere, you have a massive

1242
01:14:16,760 --> 01:14:20,640
Speaker 1: opportunity to embrace and support whistleblowers and see them for

1243
01:14:20,720 --> 01:14:24,599
Speaker 1: what they really are. There, in many cases your most

1244
01:14:24,720 --> 01:14:28,960
Speaker 1: loyal people. They are your bravest people. They are an

1245
01:14:29,040 --> 01:14:32,639
Speaker 1: asset to your company, to your culture, and to your

1246
01:14:32,680 --> 01:14:39,440
Speaker 1: bottom line. Treat them that way. If you're a whistleblower

1247
01:14:39,640 --> 01:14:42,840
Speaker 1: or looking for support and resources to become one. Here

1248
01:14:42,840 --> 01:14:46,479
Speaker 1: are a few organizations in addition to the sec that

1249
01:14:46,560 --> 01:14:52,160
Speaker 1: Mary Inman recommends that you check out. The Signals Network

1250
01:14:52,280 --> 01:14:55,719
Speaker 1: is a not for profit that assist whistleblowers and connects

1251
01:14:55,760 --> 01:15:02,400
Speaker 1: them safely with journalists. Taxpayers Against Fraud supports whistleblowers, and

1252
01:15:02,600 --> 01:15:06,680
Speaker 1: Vault is an anonymous reporting tool that allows whistleblowers to

1253
01:15:06,760 --> 01:15:11,679
Speaker 1: find each other safely within organizations. You can find details

1254
01:15:11,720 --> 01:15:14,599
Speaker 1: about how to contact all of them in our show notes.

1255
01:15:16,160 --> 01:15:19,320
Speaker 1: And I want to thank Mary Edman, Kyle Welch, and

1256
01:15:19,479 --> 01:15:22,680
Speaker 1: Dana Gold both for the work they do and for

1257
01:15:22,760 --> 01:15:24,760
Speaker 1: taking the time to talk with me today for this

1258
01:15:24,880 --> 01:15:29,320
Speaker 1: special episode. Links about them and their work are also

1259
01:15:29,400 --> 01:15:33,000
Speaker 1: in the show notes. And if this episode made you

1260
01:15:33,080 --> 01:15:35,840
Speaker 1: want to do the right thing, subscribe to the Calling

1261
01:15:35,880 --> 01:15:39,640
Speaker 1: Bullshit podcast on the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

1262
01:15:39,840 --> 01:15:42,400
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to people speaking to your ears.

1263
01:15:42,880 --> 01:15:45,120
Speaker 1: Please take a minute to rate us and let us

1264
01:15:45,120 --> 01:15:48,080
Speaker 1: know what you think of the show. More reviews help

1265
01:15:48,120 --> 01:15:51,599
Speaker 1: more people find us, And I want to thank you

1266
01:15:51,840 --> 01:15:55,920
Speaker 1: for listening. Our listeners are most important stakeholders and we

1267
01:15:56,000 --> 01:15:59,559
Speaker 1: appreciate you spending time with us. Hopefully we'll be back

1268
01:15:59,600 --> 01:16:03,599
Speaker 1: in your bed very soon and thanks to our production

1269
01:16:03,680 --> 01:16:09,680
Speaker 1: team Hannah Beale, Amanda Ginsburg, D S Moss, Hailey Pascalites,

1270
01:16:10,040 --> 01:16:14,880
Speaker 1: and Parker Silzer. Calling Bullshit was created by co Collective

1271
01:16:15,280 --> 01:16:19,120
Speaker 1: and it's hosted by Me Time onto You. Thanks for listening.