1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:02,840 Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. 2 00:00:03,160 --> 00:00:07,640 Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you welcome to Stuff you should know 3 00:00:08,200 --> 00:00:11,560 Speaker 1: from House Stuff Works dot Com. Stuff you should know 4 00:00:11,680 --> 00:00:13,920 Speaker 1: is brought to you by Visa. We all have things 5 00:00:13,960 --> 00:00:16,680 Speaker 1: we like to think about. Online fraud shouldn't be one 6 00:00:16,720 --> 00:00:20,760 Speaker 1: of them, because with every purchase, PISA prevents, detects, and 7 00:00:20,800 --> 00:00:26,400 Speaker 1: resolves online fraud safe secure Visa. Hey, and welcome to 8 00:00:26,440 --> 00:00:29,400 Speaker 1: the podcast. Josh Clark, Chuck Bryant. Here. How's it going, Chuck? 9 00:00:29,480 --> 00:00:32,000 Speaker 1: It's going great, Josh. You I'm doing pretty good. I'm 10 00:00:32,040 --> 00:00:35,320 Speaker 1: doing pretty good. I've often wanted, Chuck, if you won 11 00:00:35,400 --> 00:00:38,959 Speaker 1: the lottery, like, who would you share any of your 12 00:00:39,000 --> 00:00:42,320 Speaker 1: proceeds with? I mean, would you? Obviously your wife Emily 13 00:00:42,360 --> 00:00:46,440 Speaker 1: would would reap the benefits of this um, But I mean, 14 00:00:46,680 --> 00:00:48,440 Speaker 1: is there anybody else, like your parents? Would you buy 15 00:00:48,479 --> 00:00:50,520 Speaker 1: him a boat? Or you know who would you share 16 00:00:50,560 --> 00:00:53,280 Speaker 1: it with? In in what amount? Have you ever thought 17 00:00:53,280 --> 00:00:55,720 Speaker 1: about that? Yeah? Yeah, I think everyone kind of thinks 18 00:00:55,720 --> 00:00:57,360 Speaker 1: about this. I don't play the lottery, first of all, 19 00:00:57,360 --> 00:01:00,600 Speaker 1: because I think it's a suckers game. But if I 20 00:01:00,640 --> 00:01:02,840 Speaker 1: found a lottery ticket and won a lot of money, 21 00:01:02,880 --> 00:01:06,000 Speaker 1: I would be pretty generous, I thinky okay. I've always 22 00:01:06,080 --> 00:01:08,240 Speaker 1: liked to think the same thing, um to the to 23 00:01:08,280 --> 00:01:10,120 Speaker 1: the to the point where you know, I kind of 24 00:01:10,160 --> 00:01:13,120 Speaker 1: have allotments of like, you know, who would get what 25 00:01:13,319 --> 00:01:16,200 Speaker 1: based on how much I won? Um. The thing is, 26 00:01:16,240 --> 00:01:19,680 Speaker 1: it's all kind of esoteric at this point. Everyone's generous 27 00:01:19,680 --> 00:01:21,720 Speaker 1: in theory. Yeah, and I wonder how much that would 28 00:01:21,800 --> 00:01:25,760 Speaker 1: change with cash in hand. Um. And I was actually 29 00:01:25,800 --> 00:01:29,720 Speaker 1: reading an article about a guy who's in Melbourne who 30 00:01:29,800 --> 00:01:32,280 Speaker 1: this actually happened to. Uh. One of his friends off 31 00:01:32,319 --> 00:01:35,840 Speaker 1: handedly suggested, uh, he buy a lottery ticket, and the 32 00:01:35,840 --> 00:01:39,520 Speaker 1: guy went in, bought it and actually won thirteen million dollars. 33 00:01:39,560 --> 00:01:42,760 Speaker 1: He's got the money in hand and he's still sharing 34 00:01:42,760 --> 00:01:45,920 Speaker 1: it with his buddy who just suggested he buy a ticket. 35 00:01:45,959 --> 00:01:49,320 Speaker 1: You know. So, um, it is nice. But at the 36 00:01:49,360 --> 00:01:53,880 Speaker 1: same time, uh, this guy's actions flying in the face 37 00:01:54,120 --> 00:02:00,240 Speaker 1: of all theories and all sorts of different disciplines evolution, economics, games, Arie. 38 00:02:00,760 --> 00:02:03,200 Speaker 1: Have you heard of this guy named Ariel Rubinstein? I 39 00:02:03,280 --> 00:02:07,040 Speaker 1: have I like all Ariel, do you? Yes? He seems 40 00:02:07,040 --> 00:02:09,560 Speaker 1: like a pretty approachable guy from what I understand that 41 00:02:09,600 --> 00:02:11,639 Speaker 1: he came up with this thing called the ultimatum game 42 00:02:12,160 --> 00:02:14,280 Speaker 1: in the early eighties. I think, yeah, something like that, 43 00:02:14,440 --> 00:02:17,680 Speaker 1: uh and he UM. Let me just give a quick 44 00:02:17,720 --> 00:02:20,880 Speaker 1: rundown of the ultimatum game, okay, okay, So basically, uh, 45 00:02:21,000 --> 00:02:23,360 Speaker 1: some guy comes up to you and I chuck and 46 00:02:23,520 --> 00:02:26,440 Speaker 1: uh hands uh hey, hands you twenty one dollar bills 47 00:02:27,000 --> 00:02:30,600 Speaker 1: and he says yeah. I'd say, chuck, come back, and 48 00:02:30,600 --> 00:02:32,400 Speaker 1: that guy would be like, where what's your friend's name? 49 00:02:32,400 --> 00:02:33,959 Speaker 1: And I'd be all like, I don't know, I don't 50 00:02:33,960 --> 00:02:35,960 Speaker 1: know him. You know, I just met him at number 51 00:02:36,000 --> 00:02:40,840 Speaker 1: sixteen bus shelters. Somebody would get those one dollar bills, right. So, well, 52 00:02:40,919 --> 00:02:43,840 Speaker 1: let's say you did stick around. Your curiosity was peaked 53 00:02:44,520 --> 00:02:46,720 Speaker 1: because some stranger came up and gave you twenty one 54 00:02:46,720 --> 00:02:51,160 Speaker 1: dollar bills UM, and he had some instructions that went 55 00:02:51,200 --> 00:02:55,639 Speaker 1: along with it, UM, namely that you had to split 56 00:02:55,680 --> 00:02:58,560 Speaker 1: it with me in any way you saw fit. I 57 00:02:59,200 --> 00:03:02,359 Speaker 1: had the ability need to reject any offer you gave me. 58 00:03:02,680 --> 00:03:06,080 Speaker 1: But if I reject your offer, then neither one of 59 00:03:06,160 --> 00:03:08,800 Speaker 1: us gets squat. He takes the twenty bucks back, right right, 60 00:03:08,919 --> 00:03:11,920 Speaker 1: So I could give you a dollar keep nineteen. You 61 00:03:11,919 --> 00:03:16,280 Speaker 1: could say no, thanks, jerk, and uh, the guy takes 62 00:03:16,280 --> 00:03:19,080 Speaker 1: his money back. Right. But the thing is under under 63 00:03:19,120 --> 00:03:22,720 Speaker 1: this thing called rational maximization, which is an economic theory 64 00:03:22,720 --> 00:03:25,600 Speaker 1: that basically all people are out for the most for themselves. 65 00:03:26,120 --> 00:03:28,840 Speaker 1: You shouldn't even be concerned with the idea that I 66 00:03:28,840 --> 00:03:31,560 Speaker 1: would reject your offer. Number one, you should give me 67 00:03:31,680 --> 00:03:35,680 Speaker 1: one dollar because that's the least amount you have, right um. 68 00:03:35,800 --> 00:03:39,600 Speaker 1: And secondly I should take it. It's found money, and 69 00:03:39,720 --> 00:03:42,280 Speaker 1: that should be that you got nineteen I've got a dollar. 70 00:03:42,440 --> 00:03:44,840 Speaker 1: I may be mad at you, but still I didn't 71 00:03:44,880 --> 00:03:48,680 Speaker 1: do anything for the buck, right, Um, So that makes 72 00:03:48,760 --> 00:03:52,840 Speaker 1: perfect sense in theory. Uh. And Ariel Rubinstein is very 73 00:03:52,960 --> 00:03:59,320 Speaker 1: very well respected game theorists, except for this one. Just magnificent. Uh, 74 00:03:59,560 --> 00:04:03,200 Speaker 1: just terrible predictions. Right, This is a blot on his record. Right. 75 00:04:03,240 --> 00:04:07,120 Speaker 1: So these German economists put it to the test, put 76 00:04:07,200 --> 00:04:10,880 Speaker 1: the ultimatum game to the test in real life, and 77 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:14,040 Speaker 1: they found that they're they're what they What they found 78 00:04:14,120 --> 00:04:19,040 Speaker 1: was that there was no support for Rubinstein's hypothesis whatsoever. Right, people, 79 00:04:19,080 --> 00:04:21,320 Speaker 1: I think they found gave an average of thirty seven 80 00:04:21,360 --> 00:04:24,000 Speaker 1: percent of the money away. And then what I thought 81 00:04:24,040 --> 00:04:26,960 Speaker 1: was really interesting was that half of the people who 82 00:04:27,320 --> 00:04:32,800 Speaker 1: uh received um or less would not accept it. They 83 00:04:32,839 --> 00:04:36,720 Speaker 1: rejected the offer even though it was found money. And 84 00:04:36,720 --> 00:04:39,840 Speaker 1: and in other cases there's there were more generous offers 85 00:04:39,839 --> 00:04:42,360 Speaker 1: than there needed to be. Right. So if they got uh, 86 00:04:42,440 --> 00:04:44,800 Speaker 1: let's say it was twenty deutsch marks, I guess now 87 00:04:44,800 --> 00:04:46,800 Speaker 1: the euro, but back then it was deutch marks, they 88 00:04:46,800 --> 00:04:48,640 Speaker 1: would give them three and they just threw it right 89 00:04:48,680 --> 00:04:52,080 Speaker 1: back in his face exactly. Um, that doesn't make any 90 00:04:52,080 --> 00:04:55,560 Speaker 1: sense again, right, So it was enough to get the 91 00:04:55,839 --> 00:05:00,680 Speaker 1: curiosity of economists and mathematicians and and uh, you know 92 00:05:00,760 --> 00:05:04,960 Speaker 1: all sorts of other people uh peaked right, um. And 93 00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:06,720 Speaker 1: so they started looking into this and they're like, well, 94 00:05:06,800 --> 00:05:09,560 Speaker 1: game theory, it makes sense, but there's there's a flaw 95 00:05:09,680 --> 00:05:13,240 Speaker 1: here there. Let's tweak it a little bit. They tried variations, right, 96 00:05:13,279 --> 00:05:14,800 Speaker 1: and one of the ones that they came up with 97 00:05:14,920 --> 00:05:17,400 Speaker 1: was the Dictator game. Right. I like this one, Yeah, 98 00:05:17,400 --> 00:05:19,240 Speaker 1: this this one makes a little more sense to me. 99 00:05:19,560 --> 00:05:24,640 Speaker 1: And yet it's still just it doesn't make any sense. Basically, 100 00:05:24,920 --> 00:05:27,279 Speaker 1: under the Dictator game, it's the same thing as the 101 00:05:27,320 --> 00:05:31,599 Speaker 1: Ultimatum game, except uh, they give me twenty bucks to 102 00:05:31,600 --> 00:05:34,800 Speaker 1: share with you. I can either take two dollars and 103 00:05:34,839 --> 00:05:36,880 Speaker 1: give it to you and keep eight team for myself, 104 00:05:37,400 --> 00:05:40,680 Speaker 1: or I can half the twenty dollars with you and 105 00:05:40,480 --> 00:05:43,359 Speaker 1: and and split it equally. Either way, you have to 106 00:05:43,400 --> 00:05:45,520 Speaker 1: accept the offer and I get to keep the money 107 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:49,120 Speaker 1: no matter what. So there's there's there's no loss for me. 108 00:05:49,720 --> 00:05:52,440 Speaker 1: And yet they found that like seventy six percent of 109 00:05:52,480 --> 00:05:55,040 Speaker 1: the people who played the Dictator game split the twenty 110 00:05:55,040 --> 00:05:57,400 Speaker 1: bucks in half, even though they knew that if if 111 00:05:57,440 --> 00:06:00,440 Speaker 1: they gave the other person two bucks they got they 112 00:06:00,560 --> 00:06:02,920 Speaker 1: kept eighteen. And as far as I know, these people 113 00:06:02,920 --> 00:06:05,000 Speaker 1: are actually keeping the money to make this a very 114 00:06:05,080 --> 00:06:09,279 Speaker 1: real thing, to really gauge people's reactions, and and the 115 00:06:09,360 --> 00:06:12,880 Speaker 1: vast majority of the people were splitting things evenly. This 116 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:15,520 Speaker 1: is mind boggling, don't you agree it is? But you 117 00:06:15,560 --> 00:06:18,000 Speaker 1: know it was Germany and it's called the Dictator game, 118 00:06:18,120 --> 00:06:20,760 Speaker 1: so that if they made a little bit of afraid 119 00:06:20,839 --> 00:06:24,839 Speaker 1: on what was to convert exactly with their rib turtleneck sweaters. 120 00:06:24,880 --> 00:06:30,280 Speaker 1: And yeah, so um this further piqus people's curiosity. Like 121 00:06:30,400 --> 00:06:33,719 Speaker 1: Rubinstein inadvertently just set off this huge chain reaction that 122 00:06:33,800 --> 00:06:37,480 Speaker 1: people's entire careers have been built on his one prediction 123 00:06:37,520 --> 00:06:41,360 Speaker 1: of the Ultimatum game. Right, Um, so they start they 124 00:06:41,360 --> 00:06:46,359 Speaker 1: start looking into theories about sharing and altruism. And we 125 00:06:46,400 --> 00:06:50,440 Speaker 1: actually did a podcast how altruism works based on an 126 00:06:50,560 --> 00:06:52,880 Speaker 1: article called is there such a thing as a truly 127 00:06:52,960 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 1: unselfish act? And altruism shouldn't exist, you know, rational maximization 128 00:06:59,480 --> 00:07:03,120 Speaker 1: should be has it falls in line with evolutionary theory. 129 00:07:03,160 --> 00:07:05,440 Speaker 1: But I mean, so, what is that the human spirit? 130 00:07:05,560 --> 00:07:08,960 Speaker 1: Or is that something we've developed? No one has any idea. Um, 131 00:07:09,080 --> 00:07:12,560 Speaker 1: and and they we don't even know if it's human. Actually, um, 132 00:07:12,600 --> 00:07:14,520 Speaker 1: they've done some studies. They did one on chimps and 133 00:07:14,560 --> 00:07:19,680 Speaker 1: they show zero. Uh, they don't show any sense of fairness. 134 00:07:19,680 --> 00:07:23,000 Speaker 1: They don't mind if they're if they're getting screwed out 135 00:07:23,040 --> 00:07:25,200 Speaker 1: of something, as long as they get something. They don't 136 00:07:25,200 --> 00:07:27,880 Speaker 1: care in what amount or how much someone else is getting. 137 00:07:28,400 --> 00:07:32,840 Speaker 1: But other monkeys have shown a sense of fairness, specifically 138 00:07:32,920 --> 00:07:35,480 Speaker 1: the cappuccine monkey. Yeah, this is a cool study. Did 139 00:07:35,520 --> 00:07:39,240 Speaker 1: you ever see Monkey Shines? Uh? No, you didn't see 140 00:07:39,240 --> 00:07:42,720 Speaker 1: Monkey Shines? Okay, well, wow, it was pretty good. Actually 141 00:07:42,760 --> 00:07:45,720 Speaker 1: it's a it's a horror movie about a out of 142 00:07:45,720 --> 00:07:50,480 Speaker 1: control helper monkey who just goes on the rampage like 143 00:07:50,680 --> 00:07:53,600 Speaker 1: Silent Night, Deadly Night, except with the monkey. That's exactly 144 00:07:53,600 --> 00:07:57,080 Speaker 1: why I didn't see it. No, thank you, it was okay. Um, well, 145 00:07:57,120 --> 00:07:58,960 Speaker 1: basically this is the same kind of monkey, and they're 146 00:07:59,040 --> 00:08:02,320 Speaker 1: very smart and they're off news for helper monkeys. Um. 147 00:08:02,400 --> 00:08:05,720 Speaker 1: And these researchers just down the road apiece at Emory 148 00:08:05,920 --> 00:08:10,320 Speaker 1: University ran this experiment on them, and so they would 149 00:08:10,360 --> 00:08:13,480 Speaker 1: put some monkeys together and they'd have them get the 150 00:08:13,520 --> 00:08:16,600 Speaker 1: retrieve a pebble, and in return for bringing the researcher 151 00:08:16,640 --> 00:08:21,360 Speaker 1: a pebble, both monkeys would get cucumbers. Uh. Now, I 152 00:08:21,440 --> 00:08:24,840 Speaker 1: for a while, one monkey would would get a grape 153 00:08:24,880 --> 00:08:28,080 Speaker 1: in return for retrieving a pebble, while the others still 154 00:08:28,120 --> 00:08:31,160 Speaker 1: got cucumbers. So one monkey's kind of like, you know 155 00:08:31,200 --> 00:08:33,760 Speaker 1: what's going on. And then after a while, while one 156 00:08:33,760 --> 00:08:36,160 Speaker 1: monkey still had to retrieve a pebble to even get 157 00:08:36,160 --> 00:08:39,360 Speaker 1: a cucumber, the other monkey was getting grapes for doing nothing. 158 00:08:39,840 --> 00:08:43,560 Speaker 1: And this led to monkeys getting upset, yeah, throwing food, 159 00:08:43,800 --> 00:08:47,840 Speaker 1: refusing to play and really, I mean, like capucine monkeys, 160 00:08:48,000 --> 00:08:49,839 Speaker 1: if you've never seen when you really have to go 161 00:08:49,920 --> 00:08:52,640 Speaker 1: onto h what's the ultimatum game on how stuff works? 162 00:08:52,880 --> 00:08:55,160 Speaker 1: If they're the cutest things on the planet, I can't 163 00:08:55,160 --> 00:08:59,079 Speaker 1: imagine seeing one of these just acting hurt. Yeah, it's 164 00:08:59,160 --> 00:09:00,840 Speaker 1: kind of a mean experien a man. It happened just 165 00:09:00,880 --> 00:09:03,800 Speaker 1: down the road. But apparently it let us know that 166 00:09:04,120 --> 00:09:07,080 Speaker 1: humans aren't the only ones with this higher mind sense 167 00:09:07,120 --> 00:09:10,520 Speaker 1: of fairness kind of thing. Ultimately, though, we still have 168 00:09:10,559 --> 00:09:13,080 Speaker 1: no idea what's going on, right. I did think it 169 00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:17,680 Speaker 1: was interesting interesting that um people that participated in the 170 00:09:17,800 --> 00:09:19,840 Speaker 1: in the game, they they found that they looked for 171 00:09:19,880 --> 00:09:23,240 Speaker 1: nonverbal cues from their partner in the game to try 172 00:09:23,280 --> 00:09:26,079 Speaker 1: and pick up what they think they should give. And 173 00:09:26,240 --> 00:09:28,800 Speaker 1: it kind of made me think, you know, any study 174 00:09:28,840 --> 00:09:31,880 Speaker 1: where you know you're being studied I kind of have 175 00:09:31,960 --> 00:09:34,360 Speaker 1: not problems with. But you wonder, you know, if I 176 00:09:34,440 --> 00:09:36,600 Speaker 1: knew that someone was giving me this twenty dollar bill, 177 00:09:36,679 --> 00:09:39,199 Speaker 1: I would give away half of it just so wouldn't 178 00:09:39,200 --> 00:09:41,480 Speaker 1: mean it wouldn't seem like a schmuck, right exactly. It's 179 00:09:41,520 --> 00:09:44,960 Speaker 1: like Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. You know, just by observing something 180 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:48,160 Speaker 1: you change its behavior. Uh. And I wonder how much 181 00:09:48,200 --> 00:09:51,679 Speaker 1: that factors into this too, And that that nonverbal cue 182 00:09:51,720 --> 00:09:54,200 Speaker 1: study you were talking about it seemed a little hinky 183 00:09:54,280 --> 00:09:56,760 Speaker 1: to me. I wasn't sure how much faith I put 184 00:09:56,760 --> 00:09:59,000 Speaker 1: in it, But I wonder how much of that lack 185 00:09:59,040 --> 00:10:02,040 Speaker 1: of faith is driving just the the idea that that's 186 00:10:02,080 --> 00:10:05,800 Speaker 1: just such a depressing um notion that we're really all 187 00:10:05,960 --> 00:10:10,040 Speaker 1: always in fact out for ourselves and trying to rationally maximize, 188 00:10:10,040 --> 00:10:12,920 Speaker 1: and we're actually doing it through non verbal cues sizing 189 00:10:13,000 --> 00:10:15,880 Speaker 1: up how generous we think the other person will be 190 00:10:15,960 --> 00:10:18,720 Speaker 1: for a big payoff later on. Like you and I 191 00:10:18,720 --> 00:10:20,480 Speaker 1: are walking down the street and I see a twenty 192 00:10:20,559 --> 00:10:23,400 Speaker 1: on the ground. I looked as I pick it up, 193 00:10:23,400 --> 00:10:25,200 Speaker 1: and then I look to see if you saw me 194 00:10:25,360 --> 00:10:29,600 Speaker 1: pick it up pretty much and maybe if I notice 195 00:10:29,679 --> 00:10:31,280 Speaker 1: you saw me, I'll share it with you. If you 196 00:10:31,280 --> 00:10:34,280 Speaker 1: didn't notice, then what twenty? Right? And even if even 197 00:10:34,320 --> 00:10:36,360 Speaker 1: if you just kind of go across the board and 198 00:10:36,760 --> 00:10:40,040 Speaker 1: help everybody equally, just as a general rule, how much 199 00:10:40,040 --> 00:10:43,240 Speaker 1: of that uh is based on a belief in karma, 200 00:10:43,440 --> 00:10:46,120 Speaker 1: you know, karmic deck, karmic payback, that kind of that 201 00:10:46,200 --> 00:10:48,160 Speaker 1: you think that you're going to ultimately receive a rule 202 00:10:48,480 --> 00:10:50,000 Speaker 1: and that's why you do it, which leads us back 203 00:10:50,040 --> 00:10:54,000 Speaker 1: to you know that altruism definitely, which apparently doesn't exist, 204 00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:56,880 Speaker 1: And I don't know, I figure five ten years down 205 00:10:56,920 --> 00:10:59,600 Speaker 1: the road will have the uh the specific you know, 206 00:11:00,160 --> 00:11:04,600 Speaker 1: edit code for altruism or are faking of altruism down? Well, 207 00:11:04,760 --> 00:11:06,800 Speaker 1: I do know if someone came and gave us twenty 208 00:11:06,800 --> 00:11:08,720 Speaker 1: one dollar bills and we'd probably head down to the 209 00:11:08,760 --> 00:11:11,160 Speaker 1: dance club and every everything would be fine. We'd probably 210 00:11:11,200 --> 00:11:14,000 Speaker 1: we wouldn't split it evenly. We just go ahead and 211 00:11:14,040 --> 00:11:16,720 Speaker 1: throw it on stage at the same time. Exactly, Okay, 212 00:11:16,880 --> 00:11:20,600 Speaker 1: that's yeah, exactly. Well, this is a pretty dense topic. 213 00:11:20,679 --> 00:11:23,240 Speaker 1: It's a really interesting article. I suggest you guys go 214 00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:26,920 Speaker 1: read it What's the Ultimatum Game on how Stuff Works 215 00:11:27,000 --> 00:11:30,200 Speaker 1: dot Com and stick around to find out which article 216 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:38,360 Speaker 1: has chucked very nervous for next week? So, Chuck, what 217 00:11:38,640 --> 00:11:41,800 Speaker 1: article has you very nervous? Well, Josh, next week, I'm 218 00:11:41,800 --> 00:11:44,640 Speaker 1: going to visit the in laws in Akron, Ohio, and 219 00:11:44,679 --> 00:11:47,199 Speaker 1: we have plans to go to Cedar Point Suited Point, 220 00:11:47,320 --> 00:11:50,120 Speaker 1: which is the greatest amusement park on the planet. That's 221 00:11:50,120 --> 00:11:52,000 Speaker 1: what I've heard. My wife has been touting it as 222 00:11:52,480 --> 00:11:55,160 Speaker 1: for years. You gotta go on the Millennium Coaster. It 223 00:11:55,320 --> 00:11:58,120 Speaker 1: is the scariest experience you will ever go through. You're 224 00:11:58,160 --> 00:12:01,679 Speaker 1: basically falling four forward as you go down this um, 225 00:12:01,720 --> 00:12:05,320 Speaker 1: I think ninety degree or maybe more than ninety degree hill. 226 00:12:05,720 --> 00:12:08,719 Speaker 1: It's it's mind bending, lee scary. I can't wait, and 227 00:12:08,760 --> 00:12:10,959 Speaker 1: I love roller coasters, but it does have me a 228 00:12:10,960 --> 00:12:13,360 Speaker 1: little worried. In the article that we have on our website, 229 00:12:13,679 --> 00:12:15,360 Speaker 1: what if I were on a roller coaster and the 230 00:12:15,360 --> 00:12:19,920 Speaker 1: safety harness broke by our our veteran writer Katherine Hear, Yeah, 231 00:12:19,920 --> 00:12:21,760 Speaker 1: I don't know that you should read that before you go. 232 00:12:21,800 --> 00:12:24,200 Speaker 1: You might want to save that work for after. Good idea. Yeah, 233 00:12:24,280 --> 00:12:26,599 Speaker 1: so you can find out what would happen if the 234 00:12:26,679 --> 00:12:29,160 Speaker 1: safety harness broke while you're on a roller coaster on 235 00:12:29,200 --> 00:12:32,040 Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com. But again, like Chuck, I 236 00:12:32,080 --> 00:12:34,080 Speaker 1: advise you to read it after you get back from 237 00:12:34,120 --> 00:12:37,560 Speaker 1: the amusement park for more on this and thousands of 238 00:12:37,600 --> 00:12:41,079 Speaker 1: other topics. Is it how stuff works dot com? Let 239 00:12:41,120 --> 00:12:43,760 Speaker 1: us know what you did. Send an email to podcast 240 00:12:44,000 --> 00:12:48,679 Speaker 1: at how stuff works dot com, brought to you by 241 00:12:48,679 --> 00:12:52,160 Speaker 1: the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. It's ready, are you