Speaker 1: From Bloomberg News and iHeartRadio. It's the big take. I'm
Speaker 1: West Cassova today. A landmark deal between Iran and Saudi
Speaker 1: Arabia is reshaping power in the Middle East and beyond.
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia and Iran took a lot of people by
Speaker 1: surprise when they announced in March that they would restore
Speaker 1: diplomatic relations, ending a seven year freeze. Equally unexpected, the
Speaker 1: deal was brokeren not by the US or even the EU,
Speaker 1: but by China. The details are still being worked out,
Speaker 1: but already the agreement is expected to have wide ranging
Speaker 1: consequences for the region and to elevate China's standing as
Speaker 1: a rival to the US in global affairs. Bloomberg corresponds
Speaker 1: Golnar Motavali, having this deal with Saudi Arabia is all
Speaker 1: about shoring up legitimacy overseas, and Sam Dagger it seems
Speaker 1: like there's a lot of goodwill here, but at the
Speaker 1: same time, there are a lot of spoilers. Had been
Speaker 1: reporting on how the deal came together and what each
Speaker 1: side hopes to gain, and later in the show, Jonathan
Speaker 1: Fulton for China, it's definitely in their interest to have
Speaker 1: a more stable golf. They don't want to have to
Speaker 1: deal with a region that's constantly on the precipice of conflict.
Speaker 1: He's an authority on the region's relationship with China, and
Speaker 1: he explains what this agreement means for the shifting balance
Speaker 1: of power between East and West. Goldner, how did this
Speaker 1: deal come together? Saudi and Iran had been talking for
Speaker 1: some time for about two years, basically since the Biden
Speaker 1: administration came in and we saw the end of the
Speaker 1: Trump era for now and the end of the maxim
Speaker 1: and pressure policy on Iran, and that dialogue had been
Speaker 1: broken by Iraq and had taken place in the form
Speaker 1: of talks on a security level and deputy ministerial level
Speaker 1: in Baghdad. Now, those talks were frozen and halted around
Speaker 1: this time last year, and then what we saw last
Speaker 1: month on much a tenth as you said, was this
Speaker 1: kind of surprise entry of China into this dialogue between
Speaker 1: Saudi in Iran, this tentative effort between both countries to
Speaker 1: cool their relationship, to repair ties, to fix kind of
Speaker 1: what's been I think about ten years probably of real
Speaker 1: tension and animosity and quite at sometimes high octane hostility
Speaker 1: between the two countries and the deal itself. If you
Speaker 1: look at the text, there's a lot in there about
Speaker 1: reviving the trade relationship between the two working on that,
Speaker 1: fixing that cooperating in the region. We know that Saudi Arabia,
Speaker 1: with a lot of countries in the Middle East, particularly
Speaker 1: in the Gulf Corporation Council and more broadly around the
Speaker 1: Arab world, are very concerned about Iran's footprint in the region,
Speaker 1: it's influence in different countries in the Middle East. And
Speaker 1: we're going to be talking more about China's rule and
Speaker 1: what this means for the US and Israel in other
Speaker 1: countries a little bit later on. But sam I wanted
Speaker 1: to ask you, at the heart of this deal between
Speaker 1: the two nations, is this agreement to restore diplomatic relations,
Speaker 1: what does that actually look like. Saudi Arabia is majority
Speaker 1: Sunni and Iran is ruled by the Shiah creed. It's
Speaker 1: majority Shia, and Saudi Arabia does have a Shia minority,
Speaker 1: and this is actually one of the many long running
Speaker 1: grievances between the two countries, which even go back to
Speaker 1: the foundation of the Islamic republican seventy nine. So Saudi
Speaker 1: Arabia has always accused Iran of staring trouble in the
Speaker 1: eastern province of Saudi Arabia, where the Shias mainly reside.
Speaker 1: So Saudi Arabia had accused this cleric of ties to
Speaker 1: terrorism and then sentenced him to death, and this sparked
Speaker 1: protests in Iran. The Saudi embassy ablaze in Tehran. Iranians
Speaker 1: are furious after our leading Shia cleric was among forty
Speaker 1: seven men executed in Saudi Arabia on charges of plotting
Speaker 1: and carrying out terrorist attacks, and a mob attacked the
Speaker 1: Saudi embassy and this upset Saudi Arabia and its Gulf
Speaker 1: Arab allies, and that led to the rupture of the
Speaker 1: diplomatic relationship. And they'll basically recallage of the ambassador and
Speaker 1: they're shutting down of the embassies. And obviously Iran reciprocated
Speaker 1: what you described. Happened in twenty sixteen at seven years ago,
Speaker 1: and the two countries remained isolated from each other until now. Goldnar.
Speaker 1: If we fast forward to today, can you explain why
Speaker 1: Iran wanted to renew ties. From Iran's point of view,
Speaker 1: Iran domestically is facing a major crisis of legitimacy, and
Speaker 1: we've seen over the past couple of months it's on
Speaker 1: this diplomatic push, traveling hopping from country to country, really
Speaker 1: trying to shore up support with people that haven't shut
Speaker 1: the door on Iran's face. Having this deal with Saudi
Speaker 1: Arabia is all about shoring up legitimacy overseas, shoring up
Speaker 1: political legitimacy as a regional power, because it's losing that
Speaker 1: at home, and that's very deeply tied to the economy
Speaker 1: right now for Iran. Iran's economy is in dire straits,
Speaker 1: and this is also all about defending the real the currency,
Speaker 1: which has hit successive lows against the dollar for the
Speaker 1: past year. It's really a major crisis. So Iran can
Speaker 1: fight internal opposition using brutal force and executions to suppress protests,
Speaker 1: but it can't really do the same when it comes
Speaker 1: to a runaway economic crisis. What worries them more is
Speaker 1: economic turmoil and a type of economic collapse that they
Speaker 1: cannot control and that is completely out of their hands.
Speaker 1: So a lot of this not just outreach with Saldi,
Speaker 1: although it's a big part of it, but also an
Speaker 1: effort to build this relationship with Russia, really try to
Speaker 1: push China to engage more when it comes to trade
Speaker 1: and economic ties with Iran, going to countries like Armenia.
Speaker 1: This is all about Iran trying to save itself from
Speaker 1: an economic crisis and much more recently a major crisis
Speaker 1: of legitimacy domestically in same on the other side of
Speaker 1: the equation, way did Sarai Arabia want to renew ties
Speaker 1: with Iran right now? The number one thing that Saudi Arabia,
Speaker 1: or to be more precise, Crown Prince Muhammad that the
Speaker 1: factor ruler cares about is securing his twenty thirty vision,
Speaker 1: this multi chillion dollar project to reinvent the kingdom's economy
Speaker 1: turn it into a major tourism and business hub, and
Speaker 1: he felt that one way to do it would be
Speaker 1: to make peace with Israel and have all these guarantees
Speaker 1: from the United States. He wasn't able to get those
Speaker 1: guarantees from the US, so he felt the next best
Speaker 1: thing at the moment to tap down tensions, at least
Speaker 1: in the short term, would be to make a deal
Speaker 1: with Iran that would be guaranteed by the Chinese. I
Speaker 1: mean here his logic is China being the largest buyer
Speaker 1: of Iranian crude, they have more leverage over the Iranians
Speaker 1: to keep them in check. So really that's the logic.
Speaker 1: And I would just add quickly that one person told
Speaker 1: me that the Crown Prince still has this quote unquote
Speaker 1: visceral hatred from Iran. So let's keep in mind that
Speaker 1: these two countries our trivals. Goldner Sam talked about Saudi's
Speaker 1: relationship with Israel. What does this agreement mean for the
Speaker 1: hostile relationship between Iran in Israel? Yeah, I think, as
Speaker 1: you mentioned, obviously, Iran and Israel have been enemies, to
Speaker 1: put it bluntly, for a very long time, since nineteen
Speaker 1: seventy nine and the Islamic Revolution. From Iran's point of view,
Speaker 1: what this deal with Saudi Arabia does in terms of
Speaker 1: its relationship with Israel is it kind of puts a
Speaker 1: damper on Israel's recent effort to reach out to countries
Speaker 1: in the Persian Gulf. So we saw that with obviously
Speaker 1: the Abraham Accords with the UAE, which was a big
Speaker 1: deal in late twenty twenty. I'm grateful to Crown Prince
Speaker 1: Mohammad Benzaid of the United Arab Emirates and to you
Speaker 1: Foreign Minister Abdalah benzaid I, thank you both for your
Speaker 1: wise leadership. If we're working with the United States and
Speaker 1: Israel to expand the circle of peace, that's of course
Speaker 1: Israel's Prime Minister net and Yahoo. Iran does not want
Speaker 1: to see a normalization of relations between Israel and a
Speaker 1: country like the UAE. And I think what this deal
Speaker 1: does is that it kind of puts the breaks on
Speaker 1: any ideas that anyone may have the read may want
Speaker 1: to go down the same path quickly, Golmar if he remember,
Speaker 1: I mean when the deal was announced, right, a lot
Speaker 1: of Israeli officials came out and said this is a disaster,
Speaker 1: and they blamed the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahoo for really
Speaker 1: being responsible for this quote unquote disaster. I mean it
Speaker 1: was people from the opposition and also even people within
Speaker 1: his own coalition that said, you know, you blew it.
Speaker 1: We could have had a deal with Saudi Arabia, but
Speaker 1: look now they're going into the arms of Iran. No.
Speaker 1: I was just going to say, I think from the
Speaker 1: Saudi point of view, it makes a lot of sense
Speaker 1: from a security perspective, Goner, When you look ahead how
Speaker 1: significant is this arrangement now between Saudi and Iran when
Speaker 1: it comes to relationships in the region and the end.
Speaker 1: It's a very good question. On the one hand, I
Speaker 1: think this is a really big deal. This can be
Speaker 1: hugely significant. Again from the point of view of a
Speaker 1: reporter who's been covering the domestic turmoil and the protests
Speaker 1: in Iran for the past six months, looking at it
Speaker 1: from that prism, it was a kind of real sort
Speaker 1: of stroke of intelligence by the Iranian security establishment to
Speaker 1: get this deal while it was facing this massive, massive,
Speaker 1: major domestic crisis. On the other hand, when it comes
Speaker 1: to economics and trade, there are huge question marks over
Speaker 1: what Saudi can actually do. Iran is still under US sanctions,
Speaker 1: Saudi in the US are still allies, you know, and
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia is going to be very restrict it in
Speaker 1: what it can do economically and trade wise with Iran
Speaker 1: with those sanctions, So that for me is a big
Speaker 1: question mark. And again the other big question mark is
Speaker 1: what is it going to do to Iron's footprint on
Speaker 1: the region in general? Is Iran going to scale back
Speaker 1: elsewhere in the region or not? Sam, do you think
Speaker 1: both countries will follow through and this agreement. They've spoken
Speaker 1: on the phone twice, the foreign ministers, and they're supposed
Speaker 1: to meet soon to discuss implementation of this agreement. And
Speaker 1: Iranians have spoken about an invitation from the King of
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia to the President Raisi to visit Saudi Arabia.
Speaker 1: So it seems like there's a lot of good will here,
Speaker 1: but at the same time, there are a lot of spoilers.
Speaker 1: These two countries are facing one another on many fronts.
Speaker 1: I mean Yemen being one, Syria is another place in Lebanon,
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia backing certain groups and Iran backing other groups.
Speaker 1: In Iraq. Obviously, the Saudis have great interest in investing
Speaker 1: in Iraq and getting closer to Iraq, but Iran obviously
Speaker 1: wants Iraq to remain within its fear of influence or
Speaker 1: part of its orbit of influence. So you could see
Speaker 1: a number of places where things could go wrong, and
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia and Iran could quickly blame one another, and
Speaker 1: you could see this whole thing unravel. Sam Golnar, thanks
Speaker 1: for speaking with me today. Thank you, it's a pleasure.
Speaker 1: Thanks with when we come back. China's key role in
Speaker 1: bringing Saudi and Iran back together. Now, let's get a
Speaker 1: closer look at the other important player in this deal, China.
Speaker 1: Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident Senior Fellow for Atlantic Council's
Speaker 1: Middle East Programs, and he's a specialist in China Middle
Speaker 1: East affairs. Jonathan, one of the surprises of this agreement
Speaker 1: was China's role in brokering it. Can you tell us
Speaker 1: how that came about and why it matters so much?
Speaker 1: How it came about is going to be a really
Speaker 1: interesting history at some point. Right now, everybody scrambling to,
Speaker 1: you know, pull all the threads together and try to
Speaker 1: figure out what the whole story is. Just a little
Speaker 1: bit of background. So Si Jumping went to read in December.
Speaker 1: It was a very well covered event. While he was there,
Speaker 1: there was talk about, you know, China's five point plan
Speaker 1: for Middle East piece which was announced and I believe
Speaker 1: March twenty twenty one, I think that was probably the
Speaker 1: seats of it from the Saudis side. I think that
Speaker 1: the Saudi government was probably asking Chinese government to get
Speaker 1: involved in this. I think that's the case because if
Speaker 1: you look at what happened during that same summit, China
Speaker 1: made a couple of statements about Gulf regional affairs that
Speaker 1: really didn't sit well with Tehran. One was about their
Speaker 1: take on how Iran's nuclear program was destables for the region.
Speaker 1: The other thing was voicing support for the UAE's position
Speaker 1: on this disputed islands that Iran has claimed since taking
Speaker 1: them in the day the UAE became an independent back
Speaker 1: in seventy one. The fact that China made those two
Speaker 1: statements seemed to really anchor Tehran. They called in the
Speaker 1: Chinese ambassador and gave them addressing down and there's a
Speaker 1: lot of really strong statements. So I'm pretty certain that
Speaker 1: Iran wasn't involved at this point. This was something that
Speaker 1: just came up pretty recently. So what it looks like
Speaker 1: to me, and again we're still waiting to find out
Speaker 1: what the whole story is, but it seems like this
Speaker 1: was a regional approach to a regional problem. And why
Speaker 1: it's interesting is because when they got basically to the
Speaker 1: point where it's time to dot the eyes and cross
Speaker 1: the t's, instead of bringing in the US, which the
Speaker 1: Saudis normally would have done, they said, let's go to
Speaker 1: Beijing and do this in China. Now, I believe the
Speaker 1: Saudis were keeping the Americans in the loop throughout the process.
Speaker 1: But it really does into signal, you know, not just
Speaker 1: to China but to the US that, look, the region
Speaker 1: has a lot of moving parts. The US couldn't broker
Speaker 1: this deal because they don't have the relationship with Iran
Speaker 1: that you would need. And you know, the US State
Speaker 1: Department spokesperson has made this point, and every US official
Speaker 1: i think has made the point over and over again.
Speaker 1: Good on China for doing this. We certainly couldn't. But
Speaker 1: then you see, you know, the Saudi's have reached out
Speaker 1: to Russia to help facilitate this rapprochement with Syria. So
Speaker 1: what you're seeing is a region where there's a lot
Speaker 1: of regional issues, which everybody's very well aware of, and
Speaker 1: typically the default has been to rely on extra regional powers,
Speaker 1: usually the US, to play a leading role. And now
Speaker 1: they're saying, look, we'll deal with this stuff on our own,
Speaker 1: but let's bring in these extra regional powers like Russia,
Speaker 1: like China to help facilitate it, so they've got some
Speaker 1: skin in the game. And also just to show that,
Speaker 1: you know, the region is changing and it's not just
Speaker 1: a US Lake anymore. What does China get out of this?
Speaker 1: They've traditionally not involved themselves in this way, and now
Speaker 1: Ji Jinping seems to be doing it quite a bit. Yeah,
Speaker 1: he certainly does. He's making making things exciting for those
Speaker 1: of us who focus on Chinese foreign policy. What is
Speaker 1: trying to get out of a more stable golf is
Speaker 1: what I think most of us get out of it.
Speaker 1: You know, China gets between forty and fifty percent of
Speaker 1: its crude oil imports from the Gulf that they just
Speaker 1: signed this twenty seven year deal with Qatar for a
Speaker 1: liquefied natural gas imports. Both of this is very important
Speaker 1: for China's economic growth, for its own energy security beyond
Speaker 1: the energy which is obvious, I think to most of
Speaker 1: us when we think about the Gulf, regional countries have
Speaker 1: been engaged in these economic diversification projects for quite a while.
Speaker 1: You hear about Saudi Vision twenty thirty year, New Kuwait
Speaker 1: twenty thirty five. All of these vision programs are about
Speaker 1: getting beyond a single resource economy. How do you give
Speaker 1: past this energy dependent economy and build something more long term,
Speaker 1: And that's required a lot of foreign direct investment. It's
Speaker 1: involved a lot of infrastructure construction. It's involved a lot
Speaker 1: of other countries companies coming in here and helping them
Speaker 1: develop this stuff. And of course, if you look at
Speaker 1: China's Belton Road initiative, this stuff lines up very very neatly.
Speaker 1: There's a synergy between what China has been doing internationally
Speaker 1: what golf countries need. They also it's an important region
Speaker 1: in global Islam, of course, and China's got a very
Speaker 1: big Muslim population, so working closely with the country like
Speaker 1: Saudi can help them when they're dealing with certain domestic
Speaker 1: pressures with their Muslim populations. So the relations here are
Speaker 1: pretty deep. So for China, it's definitely in their interest
Speaker 1: to have a more stable golf They don't want to
Speaker 1: have to deal with a region that's constantly on the
Speaker 1: precipice of conflict when somebody attacks out I Ramco. In
Speaker 1: September twenty nineteen, China ended up spending about ninety seven
Speaker 1: million dollars a day extra for the same amount of oil.
Speaker 1: That's around the time that the US was applying maximum
Speaker 1: pressure on Iran, putting deeper sanctions on Iran to change
Speaker 1: its economic behavior. Also, America had pulled out of the
Speaker 1: nuclear deal with Iran. That was something that Beijing had
Speaker 1: been involved in the negotiations of to a degree that
Speaker 1: most folks don't really recognize, But they were applying a
Speaker 1: lot of their political leverage in Iran in the lead
Speaker 1: up to that project or that deal. Rather, so, I
Speaker 1: think China looked at the region as quite important to them,
Speaker 1: and they looked at America's role as something that didn't
Speaker 1: necessarily serve Chinese interests in the way it typically had
Speaker 1: in the past, And I think there became this new
Speaker 1: logic of we have to play a bigger role in
Speaker 1: securing our interests in this region. We certainly can depend
Speaker 1: on the US, our chief competitor, especially at a time
Speaker 1: when the trade war is in full force. In the
Speaker 1: relationship between China the US has just reached what at
Speaker 1: the time looked like it's lowest point. Certainly since then
Speaker 1: it's gotten lower. How much do you think that calculation
Speaker 1: from Beijing was Jijmping wanting to show that China is
Speaker 1: a viable alternative to the US, that the East is
Speaker 1: a viable alternative to the West when it comes to
Speaker 1: this sort of diplomacy. Absolutely, that's such an important point,
Speaker 1: and it's something that we really have to understand. And
Speaker 1: I believe April of last year they announced the Global
Speaker 1: Security Initiative, and this is China saying, look, we have
Speaker 1: maybe not all the answers, but we have some answers
Speaker 1: to contribute to global security. That global is an important point.
Speaker 1: They're saying that the way that the West has handled
Speaker 1: global security initiatives has largely focused on the military or
Speaker 1: traditional security approach. China says that their approach is more
Speaker 1: focused on development issues. They think they've got something to
Speaker 1: help the world with, especially the global South, especially countries
Speaker 1: in Africa and the Middle East that have been on
Speaker 1: the outside of a lot of the development that we've
Speaker 1: seen in over the past few decades. Given all of
Speaker 1: what you have just said, how does this complicate the
Speaker 1: situation in Israel, especially between Israel and the Palestinians very
Speaker 1: much so. Now It was interesting to me, i live
Speaker 1: in Abildabby, watching how the region has been changing over
Speaker 1: the past month or so. Five days before this series
Speaker 1: of meetings between China, the Saudi's, and the Rhunians was announced,
Speaker 1: the Wall Street Journal broke a story that Saudi was
Speaker 1: willing to consider joining the Abraham Accords and here's the
Speaker 1: price tag. They wanted certain concessions, especially from the US,
Speaker 1: especially from Israel, if they're going to do this thing.
Speaker 1: That was very, very difficult for them, And it was
Speaker 1: interesting to me because obviously, for Prime Minister not in Yahoo,
Speaker 1: this would have been a tremendous feather in his cap
Speaker 1: to have the biggest, most consequential Arab state that hadn't
Speaker 1: yet established diplomatic relations with Israel. To have the Saudis
Speaker 1: come in would have made this all worth while, and
Speaker 1: it would have been hard for Saudi Arabia to do.
Speaker 1: I don't think it's done yet, but it's something that
Speaker 1: there's tremendous diplomatic pressure in a lot of countries in
Speaker 1: the region to not do this. And the Saudis have
Speaker 1: always said that support for Palestine is one of the
Speaker 1: key pillars of their regional policy. They don't want to
Speaker 1: undermine the Palestinians. So it looked like when the Saudis
Speaker 1: were saying we're warming up to this idea of establishing
Speaker 1: relations with Israel, that seemed to be something that would
Speaker 1: have hardened the regional security atmosphere. This would have been
Speaker 1: creating an even stronger coalition of Arab countries working with
Speaker 1: Israel balancing against Iran. And while that would have probably
Speaker 1: given extra way to those countries, it also wouldn't have
Speaker 1: done anything to lower the temperatures in the region, because,
Speaker 1: if anything, it would have gotten even more hostile I
Speaker 1: think towards Iran, which would have forced Iran to behave aggressively.
Speaker 1: In turn. It's interesting that, you know, five days later
Speaker 1: the saudiast did something completely different and said we're going
Speaker 1: to try to work with Iran. And why this could
Speaker 1: be caused for optimism in the region is when you
Speaker 1: look at a lot of the pressures in the Middle East,
Speaker 1: the warren Yemen. You know, like the Saudis have been
Speaker 1: wanting to solve this for a while. You can't solve
Speaker 1: it by just talking to the yem and he's you
Speaker 1: have to bring in Iran. A lot of the really
Speaker 1: difficult issues that the Saudis were facing. Tehran offers a
Speaker 1: path to alleviating some of those pressures. So it seemed
Speaker 1: like a pretty smart move to me. And again, I
Speaker 1: don't think this means that the door to the Saudi
Speaker 1: entering the abraham Ac court. I don't think that door
Speaker 1: is closed yet, but it certainly got a lot more complicated,
Speaker 1: and the fact that the Israeli domestic situation has gotten
Speaker 1: so complex in recent weeks, I think that makes it
Speaker 1: a lot harder for regional actors regional Arab countries to say, yeah,
Speaker 1: we're going to sign a deal with Israel right now,
Speaker 1: because I think they look at the situation in Israel
Speaker 1: and think it's not looking any better for the Palestinians
Speaker 1: right now, So why would we jump in at this
Speaker 1: particular moment? More with Jonathan Fulton after the break. Yet
Speaker 1: another relationship that this agreement seems to complicate is the
Speaker 1: very fraught relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia. Yeah,
Speaker 1: you know, we could just sit here and name all
Speaker 1: the countries for the rest of this episode because it
Speaker 1: complicates everything. But yeah, it certainly does with the US
Speaker 1: Saudi relationship. While President Biden was campaigning, he made it
Speaker 1: pretty clearer that he had some very strong thoughts about
Speaker 1: the Saudi government. He said he would turn them into
Speaker 1: a pariah state, and I would make it very clear
Speaker 1: we were not going to in fact sell more weapons
Speaker 1: to them. We were going to in fact make them
Speaker 1: pay the price and make them, in fact the pariah
Speaker 1: that they are and also the US government under President
Speaker 1: Biden put a big focus on democracy promotion as part
Speaker 1: of their foreign policy. As somebody's watching from outside, I
Speaker 1: think that looked like, how do we consolidate a block
Speaker 1: of countries that feel threatened by China? Western liberal democracies
Speaker 1: that were threatened by China. During the Trump administration, when
Speaker 1: the US wasn't acting as a leader in this front,
Speaker 1: you could see Australia, Canada, the UK, Europe all were
Speaker 1: quite fragmented in their approach to China at the time,
Speaker 1: and I thought that this democracy promotion was the way
Speaker 1: to say, look, we've got this something in common with
Speaker 1: all these countries. Let's create a block of countries with
Speaker 1: similar concerns and we can create a united front against China.
Speaker 1: I don't think that recognized obviously the allies and partners
Speaker 1: the US has that aren't democratic, And in the Gulf
Speaker 1: in particular, that wasn't taken very lightly. There's always a
Speaker 1: concern in the Middle East that the US is leaving,
Speaker 1: so for the Saudis, where the central pillar of their
Speaker 1: foreign and security policy since the mid nineteen forties has
Speaker 1: been cooperation with the US. And then to think, okay,
Speaker 1: the US is consistent in his foreign policy towards the region.
Speaker 1: From one administration to the next. It seems to see
Speaker 1: saw you get kind of a general bipartisan insensus that
Speaker 1: the Saudi government isn't much loved by the Democrats or
Speaker 1: the Republicans outside of the Trump family. I think the
Speaker 1: Saudi's probably looked at the US and thought, you know, hey,
Speaker 1: we've been an important partner to you for a long time.
Speaker 1: Why would you forget all that over some political problems.
Speaker 1: Do you think that behind closed doors, the US does
Speaker 1: think that this is to their advantage. I think they
Speaker 1: probably do with the proviso that, no doubt, they're a
Speaker 1: little worried about what it means long term. I don't
Speaker 1: think anybody's being disingenuous. So when they say that this
Speaker 1: is something that contributes to regional security, you can find
Speaker 1: any number of American leaders, presidents or senators or whatever
Speaker 1: saying over decades, we would like to see China playing
Speaker 1: a more robust role in regional issues or global issues.
Speaker 1: You know, China's certainly benefited from international order that's allowed
Speaker 1: or facilitated rather their dramatic growth and transformation. It's time
Speaker 1: for you to start doing more to pay forward a bit.
Speaker 1: So I think the US government probably does see this
Speaker 1: as something an example of China contributing a public good
Speaker 1: that really only China could. But at the same time,
Speaker 1: I think everybody's a little leary about does China really
Speaker 1: believe that it has the answers to all these regional problems,
Speaker 1: because it's not something obviously one country can't do it.
Speaker 1: America hasn't been able to do it despite all of
Speaker 1: the resources and talent and relationships they have, So as
Speaker 1: a relative newcomer, it would be very presumptuous to assume
Speaker 1: that China can step in and say, oh, yeah, we'll
Speaker 1: fix this. What are you looking for in the months
Speaker 1: and years ahead. So one of the things I'm watching,
Speaker 1: obviously is that within the region, China's presence has been growing,
Speaker 1: its interests have been growing. It's got a lot of assets,
Speaker 1: it's got a lot of expatriate citizens, it does a
Speaker 1: lot of business. And the expectation has always been, given
Speaker 1: this depth of Chinese engagement in the region, is it
Speaker 1: going to step up its presence beyond the economic, beyond
Speaker 1: the political, and start contributing to regional security. That is
Speaker 1: complex because if China were to do this. You know,
Speaker 1: you see a lot of other countries that have interested
Speaker 1: in the Middle East, like the Europeans, the UK, India, Japan, Korea.
Speaker 1: Those are all US allies or partners. When they contribute
Speaker 1: to regional security, they tend to do so in a
Speaker 1: manner that aligns with American interests. The fact that China
Speaker 1: is not a US ally or a partner, but its
Speaker 1: chief rival, means that if China were to come into
Speaker 1: the region and start contributing to regional security, it probably
Speaker 1: would do so in a way that wouldn't necessarily align
Speaker 1: with America's interests. But then, just looking back at an
Speaker 1: even bigger scale, a lot of countries across the end
Speaker 1: of Pacific have deep interests here as well. Most of
Speaker 1: them work with America very closely on security issues, on
Speaker 1: political issues, and a lot of them have trouble with China,
Speaker 1: whether this is India or Japan or any number of countries,
Speaker 1: and a lot of them have deep interest here as well,
Speaker 1: in the Gulf or in the Middle East. Jonathan Fulton,
Speaker 1: thanks for talking with me today, Thanks for having me,
Speaker 1: Thanks for listening to us here at the Big Take.
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