Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio News.
Speaker 2: Dan Kurtzer, now with Princeton University, where he's Professor of
Speaker 2: Middle East Policy, is former US Ambassador to Israel and
Speaker 2: has been in the room for talks like the ones
Speaker 2: we're describing today in Geneva. Mister ambassador, welcome back to
Speaker 2: Bloomberg TV and Radio. It's great to have you. Do
Speaker 2: you share the optimism of the UK Foreign Minister when
Speaker 2: it comes to these talks today in Geneva.
Speaker 1: Well, there's no basis to be optimistic unless they've heard
Speaker 1: something from the Iranians that they'll communicate to the President.
Speaker 1: What they need to hear, and what the President would
Speaker 1: need to hear is that the Iranians are ready to
Speaker 1: come back to the talks and understand that they will
Speaker 1: have to give up Enrichmond on the Iranian soil. If
Speaker 1: the Europeans can produce that kind of a commitment, then
Speaker 1: the President can talk to Nitanyahu about holding up a
Speaker 1: little bit and giving diplomacy a chance. But otherwise, aspirations
Speaker 1: are nice, but we're really far down the road beyond
Speaker 1: simply hope.
Speaker 2: Well, you hear the phrase unfettered access and it brings
Speaker 2: you back to the nuclear deal with Iran in two
Speaker 2: years long before that, and even to Iraq. You remember
Speaker 2: how this goes with weapons inspectors, and it's typically not
Speaker 2: to meet expectations. With Iran, They've turned back on a
Speaker 2: number of promises before. Why would this time be any different?
Speaker 1: Well, the reality is that in twenty fifteen, with the
Speaker 1: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for three years, the Iranians
Speaker 1: adhered to that agreement and each time a small violation
Speaker 1: was uncovered, it was fixed right away. So there is
Speaker 1: at least a small track record of Iranian compliance, which
Speaker 1: of course ended when the United States pulled out of
Speaker 1: the Now I think that we would need a much
Speaker 1: stronger JCPOA two point zero. We'd have to have no
Speaker 1: end date. You remember the JCPOA was supposed to come
Speaker 1: to an end within twelve to fifteen years, So no
Speaker 1: end date, better assurances with regard to the reconstitution of
Speaker 1: the program. But you know, a tougher agreement could lead
Speaker 1: to Iranian compliance and end of the war, and therefore
Speaker 1: an end of the Iranian nuclear program.
Speaker 2: Is Iran more or less likely to agree to stop
Speaker 2: enriching uranium as it is being bombed by Israel. Is
Speaker 2: this maximum pressure campaign the type of thing that works
Speaker 2: in this scenario or moves Iran further away from an
Speaker 2: agreement like that.
Speaker 1: Well, it's a great question and the answer is unknown.
Speaker 1: Before the Israeli bombing, Iran was stuck on the idea
Speaker 1: that it would not give up the right to enrich uranium.
Speaker 1: So we don't know whether the debilitation of Iran's military capabilities,
Speaker 1: its missile program, and its nuclear program will now make
Speaker 1: a convincing argument otherwise, I think much of this is
Speaker 1: going to depend on what's happening within the opaque system
Speaker 1: in Tehran. The ietola still is calling the shots, but
Speaker 1: there are quite a few different factions playing in this,
Speaker 1: including more extreme elements in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and
Speaker 1: the so called Besiege who have argued for years that
Speaker 1: Iran should simply develop a nuclear weapon, so they will
Speaker 1: be pressing for that. Others might say, look, we invested
Speaker 1: a lot, we lost a lot, we have no allies
Speaker 1: in the region, and it's time to give it up.
Speaker 2: It's been some interesting reporting on US intelligence estimates when
Speaker 2: it comes to Uran's ability to end motivation to make
Speaker 2: a nuclear weapon. We are frequently not on the same
Speaker 2: page as Israel when it comes to this, ambassador, and
Speaker 2: I wonder your thoughts about the assessment we're reading about
Speaker 2: today that Iran has yet to decide whether to make
Speaker 2: a nuclear bomb, even though it does in fact have
Speaker 2: a large stockpile of enriched uranium. The idea is that
Speaker 2: it would be more likely to shift toward producing a
Speaker 2: bomb if the US decides to get involved offensively with Israel.
Speaker 2: Do you believe that to be true?
Speaker 1: Well, our intelligence community has been consistent since two thousand
Speaker 1: and three in saying that Iran is not trying to
Speaker 1: weaponize the capability of using a nuclear weapon, and that
Speaker 1: was something that Tulsey Gobard back in I guess was
Speaker 1: March April testified to Congress, and it's something that the
Speaker 1: President simply said he didn't agree with, even though it's
Speaker 1: his intelligence of people telling him that. So you have
Speaker 1: to just distinguished between the weaponization program, which appears not
Speaker 1: to be in place, as opposed to the preparatory steps
Speaker 1: that Iran has been taking and accelerating since twenty eighteen
Speaker 1: since we pulled out of the JCPOA and they started
Speaker 1: enriching at a much higher level up to sixty percent
Speaker 1: and there's some indication that at least at one point
Speaker 1: they went beyond sixty percent, which would bring them very
Speaker 1: very close to being a threshold nuclear state with a
Speaker 1: breakout time that's essentially days, not even weeks. So they're prepared,
Speaker 1: I think, to move expeditiously. Their capabilities are much less
Speaker 1: today as a result of Israeli bombing. Question is how
Speaker 1: do you make sure that what Israel accomplished militarily is
Speaker 1: sustainable and that Iran cannot reconstitute his program.
Speaker 2: So, Ambassador, what do you expect to take place then
Speaker 2: in the next two weeks, and if the US managed
Speaker 2: to strike a deal with Iran, what Israel trusted?
Speaker 1: Well, what I expect to take place is a lot
Speaker 1: of back channel conversations. We know that the President's envoys,
Speaker 1: Stephen Witkoff, has tried to reach out to the Iranians.
Speaker 1: We now have this European meeting. There's going to be
Speaker 1: a lot of chatter behind the scenes, and I think
Speaker 1: the President will factor that into the equation. Are the
Speaker 1: Iranians really ready as a result of having been bruised,
Speaker 1: Are they really ready to come to the table and
Speaker 1: give up enrichment which would make a jcpoa two point
Speaker 1: zero possible. Whether Nittanyahu would be satisfied with that. Look,
Speaker 1: as far as the Israelis are concerned, unless FORDAW has
Speaker 1: taken out the heavily fortified underground facility, they think their
Speaker 1: job won't be done. As Nick suggested, there may be
Speaker 1: other ways of doing it. I'd simply be too bombing.
Speaker 1: You knock out the electricity, the entrances, the air supply,
Speaker 1: and you keep at it for a while. So you're
Speaker 1: going to see I think in these two weeks back
Speaker 1: channel contacts, sustained Israeli attacks, including against FORDAO, and within
Speaker 1: that two week period, whether the President can put this
Speaker 1: all together in a diplomatic package is literally anyone's guess
Speaker 1: at this point.
Speaker 2: Wow, I wouldn't want to be a worker at Foteaux
Speaker 2: right now, Ambassador, we just ran a headline across the terminal.
Speaker 2: The Iran European nuclear talks in Geneva have come to
Speaker 2: an end. We are standing by for a statement as
Speaker 2: we wait for a readout and in our final moment
Speaker 2: here together, Ambassador, Where's Russia and China on this or
Speaker 2: are we learning right now that they have no influence
Speaker 2: on what's happening.
Speaker 1: Well, they certainly have little influence. The Chinese are heavily
Speaker 1: dependent on Iran's oil and gas, and therefore they're concerned
Speaker 1: whether this war escalates and whether attacks against the energy
Speaker 1: infrastructure take place, or whether Iran in response blocks the
Speaker 1: Straits of Hormuz. So the Chinese are nervous. The Russians
Speaker 1: are incapacitated because of their own war, but nonetheless it
Speaker 1: would behoove the President to think about including them in
Speaker 1: any multilateral diplomatic approach. After all, it was the Russians,
Speaker 1: Chinese and the three Europeans who joined us in twenty
Speaker 1: fifteen to make the jcpoa work at that time. So
Speaker 1: they're not going to be major players in this, but
Speaker 1: they'll be important players if Iran sees that not just
Speaker 1: the Europeans and the Americans, but also their friends in
Speaker 1: Moscow and Beijing are telling them it's time to call quit.
Speaker 2: Great to have you with us, Sir Dan Kurtzer, former
Speaker 2: US Ambassador to Israel, now princeton with us here on
Speaker 2: of power. This is bluebone