1 00:00:01,760 --> 00:00:10,320 Speaker 1: All Zone Media. Welcome back to It Could Happen Here 2 00:00:10,600 --> 00:00:17,360 Speaker 1: a podcast about things falling apart, and also about militant resistance, 3 00:00:17,760 --> 00:00:20,920 Speaker 1: which is an aspect of things falling apart. As things 4 00:00:21,000 --> 00:00:24,120 Speaker 1: fall apart any country, you get people who crawl out 5 00:00:24,120 --> 00:00:28,479 Speaker 1: of the woodwork to either accelerate that process or try 6 00:00:28,480 --> 00:00:30,639 Speaker 1: to reverse it in their own lives, and some of 7 00:00:30,680 --> 00:00:34,240 Speaker 1: those people use weapons to do that. Now, we've talked 8 00:00:34,280 --> 00:00:36,800 Speaker 1: a bunch on this show about the various forms that 9 00:00:36,880 --> 00:00:42,239 Speaker 1: militant resistance can take. We've chatted extensively on this network 10 00:00:42,320 --> 00:00:45,680 Speaker 1: about Rojava. We've talked a fair amount James Stout and I. 11 00:00:45,840 --> 00:00:48,360 Speaker 1: James is on the show today, by the way, Hello James, 12 00:00:48,479 --> 00:00:51,120 Speaker 1: Hi Robert. We've talked a lot about me and mar 13 00:00:51,840 --> 00:00:55,640 Speaker 1: and the gin Z Revolution, there three D printing of 14 00:00:56,040 --> 00:01:00,440 Speaker 1: firearms and kind of this war that these people have 15 00:01:00,480 --> 00:01:05,280 Speaker 1: been waging in the Jungles successfully in order to overthrow 16 00:01:05,400 --> 00:01:08,760 Speaker 1: the military dictatorship of their country. But we haven't talked 17 00:01:08,760 --> 00:01:12,120 Speaker 1: a whole lot about naval warfare. And this is because 18 00:01:12,240 --> 00:01:14,720 Speaker 1: for most of history, for most of at least our 19 00:01:14,760 --> 00:01:18,840 Speaker 1: recent history, naval warfare was not really a thing insurgents 20 00:01:18,880 --> 00:01:21,440 Speaker 1: could engage in, right you know, you could every now 21 00:01:21,440 --> 00:01:23,000 Speaker 1: and then, if a ship was docked or something, you 22 00:01:23,080 --> 00:01:24,520 Speaker 1: might be able to get off a bombing, right, like 23 00:01:24,520 --> 00:01:27,800 Speaker 1: what happened to us as coal. And I'm not expressing 24 00:01:27,840 --> 00:01:32,679 Speaker 1: general sympathy for everybody who does a militant insurgent act, 25 00:01:32,720 --> 00:01:34,480 Speaker 1: but I am talking about like the overall kind of 26 00:01:34,520 --> 00:01:37,560 Speaker 1: like tactics and strategy that underline how that stuff works. 27 00:01:37,800 --> 00:01:39,880 Speaker 1: And one of the things that's really changed in the 28 00:01:39,959 --> 00:01:42,560 Speaker 1: last couple of years, since twenty twenty two, you can 29 00:01:42,640 --> 00:01:46,560 Speaker 1: really mark it out, is that irregular non state groups 30 00:01:46,800 --> 00:01:50,400 Speaker 1: can now to an extent never before possible, challenged the 31 00:01:50,520 --> 00:01:54,080 Speaker 1: sea power of nations like the United States, which has 32 00:01:54,160 --> 00:01:58,240 Speaker 1: an unquestioned, previously at least unquestioned level of dominance in 33 00:01:58,320 --> 00:02:01,560 Speaker 1: sort of conventional naval power. And we talked about conventional 34 00:02:01,680 --> 00:02:04,800 Speaker 1: naval power in the twenty first century. That means aircraft 35 00:02:04,840 --> 00:02:07,840 Speaker 1: carrier groups. Right, the US has eleven of them, which, 36 00:02:07,840 --> 00:02:09,560 Speaker 1: if I'm not mistaken, is more than the rest of 37 00:02:09,560 --> 00:02:12,320 Speaker 1: the world. We have a lot of fucking aircraft carriers. 38 00:02:12,480 --> 00:02:16,160 Speaker 1: And previously that was believed to be you know, a 39 00:02:16,200 --> 00:02:18,919 Speaker 1: guarante of book dominance on sea. And if a carrier 40 00:02:18,919 --> 00:02:21,760 Speaker 1: group or two is in the area. You generally, we generally, 41 00:02:21,760 --> 00:02:25,000 Speaker 1: the United States generally could count on having air supremacy. 42 00:02:25,520 --> 00:02:28,680 Speaker 1: You certainly wouldn't expect it to be countered. You know, 43 00:02:28,760 --> 00:02:30,679 Speaker 1: you could expect, like, for example, if we were to 44 00:02:30,680 --> 00:02:34,400 Speaker 1: have a conflict over Taiwan, the Chinese navy could or 45 00:02:34,440 --> 00:02:38,520 Speaker 1: the Chinese army could potentially interdict a carrier group using 46 00:02:38,600 --> 00:02:41,880 Speaker 1: ground based you know, ground to see anti ship missiles 47 00:02:41,919 --> 00:02:44,280 Speaker 1: or something like that. But we're increasingly in an era 48 00:02:44,400 --> 00:02:47,360 Speaker 1: in which these kind of irregular non state groups have 49 00:02:47,480 --> 00:02:50,280 Speaker 1: access to similar technology and have access to kind of 50 00:02:50,360 --> 00:02:54,560 Speaker 1: even more bespoke technology like drone swarms that poses a 51 00:02:54,639 --> 00:02:57,840 Speaker 1: unique threat to the naval dominance of the United States. 52 00:02:57,919 --> 00:02:59,919 Speaker 1: And I wanted to start, you know, we've got a 53 00:03:00,000 --> 00:03:01,760 Speaker 1: two part of here. We're going to be talking about 54 00:03:02,000 --> 00:03:04,280 Speaker 1: the Huthi's in Yemen. We're going to be talking about 55 00:03:04,400 --> 00:03:07,200 Speaker 1: the Ukrainian navy, which does not really have much in 56 00:03:07,240 --> 00:03:10,040 Speaker 1: the way of boats, but is still challenging the Russian navy. 57 00:03:10,280 --> 00:03:13,240 Speaker 1: And we're going to be talking about rebels in Myanmar. 58 00:03:13,639 --> 00:03:15,880 Speaker 1: We're going to start today, we'll be talking about the 59 00:03:15,960 --> 00:03:19,240 Speaker 1: Huthi and to understand Huthi resistance to the United States 60 00:03:19,240 --> 00:03:22,200 Speaker 1: and why a militant group has had such success challenging 61 00:03:22,320 --> 00:03:25,400 Speaker 1: US naval power. You first have to understand how they 62 00:03:25,440 --> 00:03:27,440 Speaker 1: got to the point that they're at right now, where 63 00:03:27,480 --> 00:03:28,960 Speaker 1: they are kind of, in a lot of ways a 64 00:03:29,000 --> 00:03:32,800 Speaker 1: near state actor, you know, not a world power actor, 65 00:03:32,840 --> 00:03:35,640 Speaker 1: but near state actor. You know, they're probably more capable 66 00:03:35,640 --> 00:03:38,040 Speaker 1: in some ways than the State of Yemen, which they 67 00:03:38,040 --> 00:03:41,200 Speaker 1: are at war with. Yeah, yeah, And to get how 68 00:03:41,240 --> 00:03:43,160 Speaker 1: they got to that point, you have to understand what 69 00:03:43,280 --> 00:03:47,080 Speaker 1: happened with their fight against the Saudis. So, the Huthi 70 00:03:47,160 --> 00:03:50,680 Speaker 1: Movement or ansar Allah, which means Supporters of God, is 71 00:03:50,680 --> 00:03:54,160 Speaker 1: a Zaidi Shia Islamist movement run primarily by members of 72 00:03:54,200 --> 00:03:57,440 Speaker 1: the Huthi tribe. Zadi Islam is a bit of an 73 00:03:57,520 --> 00:03:59,600 Speaker 1: odd duck. You'll hear it described as, yeah, like a 74 00:03:59,840 --> 00:04:03,800 Speaker 1: sh a Shia segment. It's really probably more accurate to 75 00:04:03,840 --> 00:04:06,280 Speaker 1: look at it as like it's kind of in between 76 00:04:06,360 --> 00:04:10,200 Speaker 1: Shia and Sunni of like the Shia kind of denominations, 77 00:04:10,200 --> 00:04:13,320 Speaker 1: it's kind of closest to being Sunni. I'm not an 78 00:04:13,320 --> 00:04:15,280 Speaker 1: expert on any of this, but it comes out of 79 00:04:15,320 --> 00:04:18,159 Speaker 1: a guy named Zaid Iban Ali's rebellion against the Umi 80 00:04:18,240 --> 00:04:21,160 Speaker 1: Yad caliphate, which did not succeed, but we still have 81 00:04:21,240 --> 00:04:24,760 Speaker 1: the Zadi. What matters for our purposes today is that 82 00:04:24,880 --> 00:04:28,159 Speaker 1: the Huthi as a movement came out of opposition to 83 00:04:28,240 --> 00:04:33,320 Speaker 1: the Yemen's president Abi Abdullah Salah, who was corrupt as hell. 84 00:04:33,600 --> 00:04:35,320 Speaker 1: He was seen as corrupt, and he was in fact 85 00:04:35,360 --> 00:04:38,479 Speaker 1: corrupt as hell, and it was specifically they were accusing 86 00:04:38,520 --> 00:04:41,400 Speaker 1: him of basically being bribed by the Saudis. That's where 87 00:04:41,720 --> 00:04:43,960 Speaker 1: like the Huthi started the rebellion in around two thousand 88 00:04:43,960 --> 00:04:46,919 Speaker 1: and three. So they began as a resistance movement to 89 00:04:46,920 --> 00:04:50,680 Speaker 1: this corrupt president Salah. They adopted the slogan God is 90 00:04:50,680 --> 00:04:53,760 Speaker 1: the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, and a 91 00:04:53,800 --> 00:04:56,719 Speaker 1: curse upon the Jews, which is still their slogan. So 92 00:04:56,720 --> 00:05:01,640 Speaker 1: they are not what you would call unproblematic again, but 93 00:05:01,760 --> 00:05:05,400 Speaker 1: now that they are fighting out there, they're not hiding it, 94 00:05:05,440 --> 00:05:07,120 Speaker 1: you know, dig for this stuff. 95 00:05:07,400 --> 00:05:10,440 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, and I using the triple parentheses 96 00:05:10,480 --> 00:05:12,000 Speaker 2: they say the thing. 97 00:05:12,320 --> 00:05:14,360 Speaker 1: Yeah, and it's you know, part of why we're talking 98 00:05:14,400 --> 00:05:16,880 Speaker 1: about a regular naval warfare is that who knows what 99 00:05:16,920 --> 00:05:20,720 Speaker 1: the next few years are going to include it's always 100 00:05:20,720 --> 00:05:23,000 Speaker 1: a long shot, but there's not a zero percent chance 101 00:05:23,000 --> 00:05:25,760 Speaker 1: that people listening to this will wind up engaged in 102 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:29,520 Speaker 1: some sort of irregular conflict. And that's it's important to 103 00:05:29,600 --> 00:05:33,320 Speaker 1: understand how modern technology has changed the dimensions of how 104 00:05:33,320 --> 00:05:35,440 Speaker 1: that works from like a naval perspective. So that's why 105 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:39,359 Speaker 1: we're talking about this now. Who they armed activities against 106 00:05:39,360 --> 00:05:42,920 Speaker 1: the Saudis really kicked off and hit a major level 107 00:05:42,960 --> 00:05:46,599 Speaker 1: after the mini civil war, which officially started in twenty fourteen. 108 00:05:47,120 --> 00:05:49,720 Speaker 1: The new president of Yemen, who was not Salah at 109 00:05:49,720 --> 00:05:52,960 Speaker 1: this point, asked for military support from the international community, 110 00:05:53,240 --> 00:05:56,159 Speaker 1: which in this case meant the Saudis right. So the Saudis. 111 00:05:56,839 --> 00:05:59,760 Speaker 1: It's called a coalition. There's technically some other people involved, 112 00:05:59,760 --> 00:06:02,960 Speaker 1: but it's the Saudis right. And the president of Yemen 113 00:06:03,040 --> 00:06:05,599 Speaker 1: calls in the Saudis when his forces are kicked out 114 00:06:05,640 --> 00:06:09,320 Speaker 1: of the capital of Yemen, Sana by hoothy fighters. By 115 00:06:09,360 --> 00:06:11,680 Speaker 1: the way, when the Houthi take sna Is, when they 116 00:06:11,720 --> 00:06:14,880 Speaker 1: get their first cruise missiles, largely just like a bunch 117 00:06:14,920 --> 00:06:17,640 Speaker 1: of scuds and stuff, so like old Soviet shit, right. 118 00:06:18,160 --> 00:06:21,919 Speaker 1: Operation Decisive Storm is the name that Saudi Arabia gives 119 00:06:21,960 --> 00:06:24,159 Speaker 1: to their intervention in Yemen, and a lot of people 120 00:06:24,200 --> 00:06:27,640 Speaker 1: will say this is basically Saudi Arabia's Vietnam, not an 121 00:06:27,720 --> 00:06:31,479 Speaker 1: inappropriate comparison to make. So the Saudis start bombing the 122 00:06:31,520 --> 00:06:33,800 Speaker 1: shit out of the Huthi and then they send in 123 00:06:33,880 --> 00:06:36,360 Speaker 1: ground forces, because bombing the shit out of people who 124 00:06:36,440 --> 00:06:39,280 Speaker 1: are motivated never really works as well as you want 125 00:06:39,279 --> 00:06:39,600 Speaker 1: it to. 126 00:06:39,839 --> 00:06:41,800 Speaker 2: Right, Yeah, a lot of people have been bombing a 127 00:06:41,800 --> 00:06:44,600 Speaker 2: lot of people. I mean, you can destroy a lot 128 00:06:44,600 --> 00:06:47,120 Speaker 2: of shit, you can kill a load of civilians, and 129 00:06:47,320 --> 00:06:51,280 Speaker 2: kill a shitload of civilians. Yeah, but many, many such cases. 130 00:06:51,480 --> 00:06:53,799 Speaker 2: If you're if you're looking around the world right now. 131 00:06:54,040 --> 00:06:56,400 Speaker 2: But yeah, one thing that doesn't tend to do is 132 00:06:56,400 --> 00:06:58,279 Speaker 2: really get rid of motivated fighters. 133 00:06:58,520 --> 00:07:01,640 Speaker 1: Yeah, when you've got an air force, everything looks like dressden. 134 00:07:02,040 --> 00:07:04,400 Speaker 1: So the Saudis try that for a while. They send 135 00:07:04,440 --> 00:07:07,960 Speaker 1: them ground forces, they carry out naval blockades. None of 136 00:07:07,960 --> 00:07:10,520 Speaker 1: this does much but make the Houthies more determined, and 137 00:07:10,560 --> 00:07:13,160 Speaker 1: they exit this conflict. I mean they're not it's not 138 00:07:13,240 --> 00:07:15,920 Speaker 1: like you wouldn't say completely done, but they exit this 139 00:07:16,040 --> 00:07:18,600 Speaker 1: conflict with the Saudis a lot stronger, right, a lot 140 00:07:18,640 --> 00:07:21,640 Speaker 1: more organized, with a lot better weapons, right, and a 141 00:07:21,640 --> 00:07:23,360 Speaker 1: lot of this, you know. So by the way, I 142 00:07:23,360 --> 00:07:25,240 Speaker 1: should also state that, like now, the Houthies are on 143 00:07:25,280 --> 00:07:28,800 Speaker 1: the side of former President Sala. It's a complicated conflict, right, 144 00:07:29,360 --> 00:07:30,560 Speaker 1: but at the end of this all they have a 145 00:07:30,640 --> 00:07:34,880 Speaker 1: shitload of Iranian weapons because Iran is a geopolitical enemy 146 00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:37,760 Speaker 1: of Saudi Arabia and they see the Houthis as allies, 147 00:07:37,840 --> 00:07:39,920 Speaker 1: and so they spend a lot of time this during 148 00:07:39,920 --> 00:07:43,480 Speaker 1: this conflict shipping in agtms, which are wire guided missiles 149 00:07:43,640 --> 00:07:47,000 Speaker 1: that are just aces and blasting holes in Saudi Arabia's tanks, 150 00:07:47,040 --> 00:07:50,240 Speaker 1: which are US supplied, if I'm not mistaken as a general. 151 00:07:50,040 --> 00:07:52,840 Speaker 2: Yeah, a lot of Saudi Arabia stuff is US and like, yeah, 152 00:07:52,960 --> 00:07:55,240 Speaker 2: base most of it, right, much of it. Yeah, Yeah, 153 00:07:55,280 --> 00:07:56,840 Speaker 2: there are a lot of contractors over there. 154 00:07:57,000 --> 00:07:59,440 Speaker 1: Yeah. And you know, the Houthis they make a lot 155 00:07:59,440 --> 00:08:02,600 Speaker 1: in like waves and kind of people who are following 156 00:08:02,600 --> 00:08:05,200 Speaker 1: a regular conflicts during this period in the late aughts 157 00:08:05,280 --> 00:08:08,320 Speaker 1: because they're so successful and taking out these tanks that 158 00:08:08,320 --> 00:08:11,200 Speaker 1: had previously been pretty hard to fuck up, and it's 159 00:08:11,280 --> 00:08:14,280 Speaker 1: kind of you know, now, agtms in Ukraine are like 160 00:08:14,320 --> 00:08:16,520 Speaker 1: one of the dominant weapons systems that has shaped the 161 00:08:16,520 --> 00:08:18,840 Speaker 1: battlefield environment. But this is kind of when people start 162 00:08:18,840 --> 00:08:22,120 Speaker 1: to realize, oh, fuck, you know Syria as well, this 163 00:08:22,240 --> 00:08:24,520 Speaker 1: is really going to change a lot about how armor 164 00:08:24,560 --> 00:08:26,720 Speaker 1: gets used. And this is also where we start to 165 00:08:26,720 --> 00:08:30,800 Speaker 1: see the first Hothi deployments of ballistic missiles, which were 166 00:08:30,880 --> 00:08:34,240 Speaker 1: used sort of they initially use them, not dissimilarly to 167 00:08:34,360 --> 00:08:38,520 Speaker 1: how the Germans used V two's right in World War Two. 168 00:08:38,760 --> 00:08:41,840 Speaker 1: There are terror weapons and they're used in retaliation for 169 00:08:41,920 --> 00:08:44,800 Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia's use of a terror weapon, which is US 170 00:08:44,920 --> 00:08:47,640 Speaker 1: jets and missiles. Right, So Saudi Arabia is terror bombing Yemen, 171 00:08:47,880 --> 00:08:51,440 Speaker 1: and Yemen starts firing missiles back at Saudi Arabia because 172 00:08:51,640 --> 00:08:54,920 Speaker 1: you know that's what you do, right, yeah, yeah, yeah. 173 00:08:54,920 --> 00:08:56,559 Speaker 1: And I'm going to quote here from an article in 174 00:08:56,600 --> 00:09:00,360 Speaker 1: the National News, quote Huthi militias and Yemen launched and 175 00:09:00,360 --> 00:09:02,439 Speaker 1: this is from twenty twenty two, who the militia's and 176 00:09:02,480 --> 00:09:05,360 Speaker 1: Yemen launched ballistic missiles at Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia 177 00:09:05,360 --> 00:09:08,000 Speaker 1: on Monday and the latest attack on neighboring states. Two 178 00:09:08,080 --> 00:09:10,800 Speaker 1: missiles were destroyed in midflight during the attempted terrorist attack 179 00:09:10,800 --> 00:09:13,320 Speaker 1: on Abu Dhabi, while in Saudi Arabia one was shot 180 00:09:13,360 --> 00:09:16,480 Speaker 1: down and another missile wounded two civilians in an industrial area. 181 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:19,240 Speaker 1: So that gives you an idea of like where they 182 00:09:19,240 --> 00:09:21,160 Speaker 1: are a couple of years ago. And these are not 183 00:09:21,559 --> 00:09:24,560 Speaker 1: super advanced cruise missiles, as you can see by that 184 00:09:24,640 --> 00:09:27,760 Speaker 1: kind of like casualty rate. Right, they're not doing massive 185 00:09:27,760 --> 00:09:29,760 Speaker 1: amounts of damage, but they caused terror. 186 00:09:29,840 --> 00:09:30,000 Speaker 2: Right. 187 00:09:30,040 --> 00:09:31,960 Speaker 1: It's scary to know that a missile could come out 188 00:09:32,000 --> 00:09:34,080 Speaker 1: of the sky and kill some of you, and it's 189 00:09:34,280 --> 00:09:36,480 Speaker 1: you know, from their perspective, how else are they going 190 00:09:36,559 --> 00:09:38,199 Speaker 1: to strike back. They don't have an air force in 191 00:09:38,240 --> 00:09:40,760 Speaker 1: the conventional sense, but what we do see here is 192 00:09:40,880 --> 00:09:43,520 Speaker 1: by being able to carry out these attacks back on 193 00:09:43,640 --> 00:09:46,240 Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia who's bombing them, despite not having an air 194 00:09:46,280 --> 00:09:50,280 Speaker 1: force of their own. You already see how new technology 195 00:09:50,320 --> 00:09:53,880 Speaker 1: and cruise missiles aren't new technology, but them being available 196 00:09:54,280 --> 00:09:57,800 Speaker 1: to a non state actor is fairly new. You see 197 00:09:57,840 --> 00:10:00,640 Speaker 1: how that has already changed the game in terms of 198 00:10:00,679 --> 00:10:03,160 Speaker 1: like you can't really say the Saudis don't have the 199 00:10:03,640 --> 00:10:06,640 Speaker 1: air supremacy. You can still say they have air supremacy 200 00:10:06,679 --> 00:10:09,199 Speaker 1: because again, the Houthies don't have much in the way 201 00:10:09,200 --> 00:10:13,760 Speaker 1: of airpower at this point, but they can't stop missiles 202 00:10:13,800 --> 00:10:16,480 Speaker 1: from hitting their cities entirely, which is a different game 203 00:10:16,679 --> 00:10:19,360 Speaker 1: than when you know that's not really a possibility. The 204 00:10:19,440 --> 00:10:24,040 Speaker 1: Houthi arsenal today includes a dizzying array of different Iranian, Soviet, Syrian, 205 00:10:24,120 --> 00:10:28,800 Speaker 1: and indigenously produced rockets, including the Burkhan three missiles. These 206 00:10:28,800 --> 00:10:31,439 Speaker 1: are for long range strikes up to twelve hundred kilometers, 207 00:10:31,640 --> 00:10:34,200 Speaker 1: and the Botter P one rockets, which have one hundred 208 00:10:34,240 --> 00:10:36,920 Speaker 1: and twenty two one hundred and sixty kilometer range. They 209 00:10:36,960 --> 00:10:39,599 Speaker 1: also have old Soviet Frog sevens which are useful to 210 00:10:39,640 --> 00:10:43,400 Speaker 1: about sixty five kilometers. None of these are accurate in 211 00:10:43,480 --> 00:10:46,520 Speaker 1: cruise missile terms, you know, but they work well enough 212 00:10:46,559 --> 00:10:50,440 Speaker 1: for the Houthis' purposes. The Botter Pa is indigenously produced. 213 00:10:50,440 --> 00:10:52,760 Speaker 1: It's made by the Houthies. It's thought to be based 214 00:10:52,800 --> 00:10:56,760 Speaker 1: on the Syrian Kaibar rocket. It is unguided, and experts 215 00:10:56,800 --> 00:10:59,640 Speaker 1: will say it's closer to being functioning as just like 216 00:11:00,280 --> 00:11:04,000 Speaker 1: artillery than an actual cruise missile. U and inspectors claim 217 00:11:04,080 --> 00:11:07,280 Speaker 1: quote it is produced locally from steel tubing, very likely 218 00:11:07,320 --> 00:11:10,240 Speaker 1: sourced from the oil industry. You hear this a lot 219 00:11:10,400 --> 00:11:12,560 Speaker 1: in a regular conflict in the Middle East. When I 220 00:11:12,640 --> 00:11:16,280 Speaker 1: was in Mosel covering the fighting with Isis, their mortars 221 00:11:16,280 --> 00:11:18,400 Speaker 1: were made off out of tubing that was like part 222 00:11:18,440 --> 00:11:20,720 Speaker 1: of construction projects. I think that traced back to the 223 00:11:20,760 --> 00:11:23,240 Speaker 1: oil industry, at least some of it. Now. There are 224 00:11:23,280 --> 00:11:26,000 Speaker 1: several variants of this rocket, like the Botter F and 225 00:11:26,040 --> 00:11:28,319 Speaker 1: the P one. It's not really useful going through all 226 00:11:28,400 --> 00:11:31,439 Speaker 1: of them. You can find some interesting studies on this, 227 00:11:31,920 --> 00:11:35,120 Speaker 1: but it's not necessary to understand their capabilities. Their most 228 00:11:35,160 --> 00:11:37,040 Speaker 1: accurate missile, as far as I can tell, is the 229 00:11:37,040 --> 00:11:40,680 Speaker 1: OTR twenty one Totchka, which has a range of about 230 00:11:40,720 --> 00:11:43,000 Speaker 1: seventy two one hundred and twenty kilometers and a four 231 00:11:43,120 --> 00:11:46,400 Speaker 1: hundred and eighty kilogram payload. They only are believed to 232 00:11:46,480 --> 00:11:48,600 Speaker 1: have a few dozen of these, although that's an estimate 233 00:11:48,600 --> 00:11:51,040 Speaker 1: from an earlier report, and these were the ones they 234 00:11:51,040 --> 00:11:53,960 Speaker 1: would use most regularly on ground targets during the Saudi 235 00:11:53,960 --> 00:11:56,160 Speaker 1: intervention when they needed a precise strike. And I'm going 236 00:11:56,200 --> 00:11:58,520 Speaker 1: to quote from an article and an analysis of their 237 00:11:58,520 --> 00:12:02,240 Speaker 1: missile capability. The Houthis first fired a Tachka missile in 238 00:12:02,240 --> 00:12:06,319 Speaker 1: September twenty fifteen, targeting the coalitions, that's the Saudi's Soffa 239 00:12:06,440 --> 00:12:09,160 Speaker 1: military base in Marib, Yemen. The strike hit a weapons 240 00:12:09,200 --> 00:12:12,720 Speaker 1: storage depot and killed sixty coalition soldiers. The Houthis fired 241 00:12:12,720 --> 00:12:16,040 Speaker 1: another Toatchka on December fourteenth, twenty fifteen, targeting a coalition 242 00:12:16,120 --> 00:12:19,240 Speaker 1: base south of Taia's City in Taia's Yemen. The strike 243 00:12:19,320 --> 00:12:22,320 Speaker 1: reportedly killed over one hundred and twenty coalition soldiers. The 244 00:12:22,360 --> 00:12:25,280 Speaker 1: most recently recorded tachka fire took place on November nineteenth, 245 00:12:25,320 --> 00:12:28,800 Speaker 1: twenty sixteen, landing in a desert in eastern Marab Province. 246 00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:31,640 Speaker 1: The target was unclear, but was likely the Arab Coalition's 247 00:12:31,679 --> 00:12:35,360 Speaker 1: all weak military camp. So those are significant casualties. These 248 00:12:35,360 --> 00:12:38,000 Speaker 1: are very effective weapons that do a lot of damage. 249 00:12:38,080 --> 00:12:52,840 Speaker 1: Right Yeah, Now, international experts, and especially if you read 250 00:12:52,960 --> 00:12:55,480 Speaker 1: just kind of like think tank analysis of what the 251 00:12:55,520 --> 00:12:58,120 Speaker 1: Houthis are doing, we generally say all of this is 252 00:12:58,160 --> 00:13:02,319 Speaker 1: only possible because of aid from his Belah and Iran. Right, 253 00:13:02,360 --> 00:13:05,520 Speaker 1: That's the only reason the Hoothies have these weapons. Right now, 254 00:13:05,600 --> 00:13:08,000 Speaker 1: there is an arms embargo on Yemen. This has not 255 00:13:08,080 --> 00:13:11,640 Speaker 1: stopped anyone from getting weapons to Yemen. It also, to 256 00:13:11,720 --> 00:13:14,640 Speaker 1: be very fair here, didn't stop anyone from didn't stop 257 00:13:14,679 --> 00:13:16,640 Speaker 1: us from selling arms to the Saudis even though they're 258 00:13:16,640 --> 00:13:23,439 Speaker 1: bringing those arms to Yemen. Right, yeah, yeah, it possible, Yeah, don't. 259 00:13:23,480 --> 00:13:25,000 Speaker 1: I don't know who you want to get angry or 260 00:13:25,040 --> 00:13:28,120 Speaker 1: at here. I'm not really convinced either side is you know, 261 00:13:28,520 --> 00:13:31,400 Speaker 1: better than the other. Certainly the Saudis are not better, 262 00:13:31,559 --> 00:13:34,960 Speaker 1: right right? Yeah that matters. I don't know. 263 00:13:35,040 --> 00:13:37,559 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, it's just a shit situation for people who 264 00:13:37,559 --> 00:13:39,960 Speaker 2: are trying to get home with me to not get 265 00:13:40,000 --> 00:13:40,480 Speaker 2: blown up. 266 00:13:40,600 --> 00:13:45,160 Speaker 1: Yes, yeah, really bad situation. I think that is over 267 00:13:45,280 --> 00:13:48,760 Speaker 1: selling it a bit. Obviously, Iranian aid is critical to 268 00:13:48,800 --> 00:13:50,760 Speaker 1: the Hoothies and that that has gotten them a lot 269 00:13:50,760 --> 00:13:53,120 Speaker 1: of their advanced weapons systems, so I don't want to 270 00:13:53,200 --> 00:13:56,360 Speaker 1: undersell it. But at this point, they are making a 271 00:13:56,440 --> 00:13:59,800 Speaker 1: significant chunk of these of these cruise missiles, specifically some 272 00:13:59,840 --> 00:14:04,040 Speaker 1: of the less advanced ones, indigenously, So because of the 273 00:14:04,040 --> 00:14:06,360 Speaker 1: state things you could, I think it is accurate to 274 00:14:06,400 --> 00:14:09,040 Speaker 1: say that Iran was crucial to them getting to that state. 275 00:14:09,120 --> 00:14:12,000 Speaker 1: But even without Iranian aid, there's a there's a signet 276 00:14:12,040 --> 00:14:14,080 Speaker 1: probably a significant degree of time to which they could 277 00:14:14,120 --> 00:14:16,400 Speaker 1: continue to produce some of these weapons because they are 278 00:14:16,520 --> 00:14:17,679 Speaker 1: making them themselves. 279 00:14:17,960 --> 00:14:20,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, they make three fifty eight missiles, right, like Lloyd 280 00:14:20,600 --> 00:14:24,640 Speaker 2: terrain anti aircraft. Yeah. Yes, even if Iran is not supplying, 281 00:14:24,840 --> 00:14:28,600 Speaker 2: it's probably worth noting that like this is like an 282 00:14:28,600 --> 00:14:33,120 Speaker 2: Iranian design or concept at least, and it allows for 283 00:14:33,120 --> 00:14:36,440 Speaker 2: a lot of testing, a lot of like real world 284 00:14:36,760 --> 00:14:39,440 Speaker 2: kind of verses the NATO US. 285 00:14:39,880 --> 00:14:43,440 Speaker 1: Let's the Iranians. Yeah, test their weaponry. And again I'm 286 00:14:43,480 --> 00:14:46,360 Speaker 1: not trying to undersell how important they are, just you 287 00:14:46,400 --> 00:14:47,720 Speaker 1: get a lot of like, well, if we can just 288 00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:51,040 Speaker 1: cut off Iranian trade, the hoothies will collapse, and they 289 00:14:51,080 --> 00:14:54,760 Speaker 1: think that's accurate anymore. Yeah, maybe, you know, I can't 290 00:14:54,760 --> 00:14:56,920 Speaker 1: say that to a point a certainty, but yeah, I 291 00:14:56,960 --> 00:14:59,240 Speaker 1: think that that's kind of wishful thinking on behalf of 292 00:14:59,280 --> 00:15:01,880 Speaker 1: some people. So these are great weapons for a non 293 00:15:01,920 --> 00:15:04,480 Speaker 1: state militant group. Again, this is this stuff. If you 294 00:15:04,480 --> 00:15:07,360 Speaker 1: think back ten fifteen years, the idea of a non 295 00:15:07,440 --> 00:15:11,280 Speaker 1: state insurgent group having access to a cruise missile library 296 00:15:11,320 --> 00:15:13,680 Speaker 1: like this, you know, not to say about like the 297 00:15:13,720 --> 00:15:15,560 Speaker 1: other weapons they have, the drones and stuff they have, 298 00:15:15,880 --> 00:15:18,560 Speaker 1: It would have been kind of unprecedented. That said, these 299 00:15:18,560 --> 00:15:21,360 Speaker 1: are not good weapons in the modern military sense of 300 00:15:21,400 --> 00:15:23,560 Speaker 1: the word. Bosh. I mean, they are not very accurate 301 00:15:23,600 --> 00:15:26,400 Speaker 1: for the most part, and compared to more advanced missiles 302 00:15:26,400 --> 00:15:28,920 Speaker 1: like the kind of the United States, Russia and China have, 303 00:15:29,320 --> 00:15:31,720 Speaker 1: they are easy to shoot down with the kind of 304 00:15:31,760 --> 00:15:36,040 Speaker 1: weapons systems aboard say, US aircraft carriers. We will discuss 305 00:15:36,080 --> 00:15:39,440 Speaker 1: that more later. This is largely inconsequential to what's been 306 00:15:39,440 --> 00:15:41,720 Speaker 1: happening in the Red Sea because the vast majority of 307 00:15:41,840 --> 00:15:44,720 Speaker 1: naval traffic that passes by Huthi territory does not have 308 00:15:44,800 --> 00:15:50,080 Speaker 1: access to say FAYLANKX, FELANX systems. Yeah, you don't have 309 00:15:50,160 --> 00:15:52,120 Speaker 1: much in the way of anti missile systems on a 310 00:15:52,120 --> 00:15:53,000 Speaker 1: normal containers. 311 00:15:53,320 --> 00:15:58,520 Speaker 2: Yeah, no, you have fanti bridge antiah rhyming devices. But like, yeah, 312 00:15:58,560 --> 00:16:00,880 Speaker 2: it doesn't matter if your missile's not super accurate, if 313 00:16:00,880 --> 00:16:03,720 Speaker 2: it can't defeat these expensive systems, if you're just eating 314 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:06,760 Speaker 2: them into a narrow channel or anything that goes past. 315 00:16:06,600 --> 00:16:09,480 Speaker 1: Right right right, Yeah, And the Houthis are aware of that, 316 00:16:09,560 --> 00:16:12,320 Speaker 1: and this is again an intelligent strategy on their part. 317 00:16:12,560 --> 00:16:14,360 Speaker 1: You know, sometimes people get angry when you say that 318 00:16:14,400 --> 00:16:17,000 Speaker 1: because they point out horrible things the Hoothies have done, 319 00:16:17,040 --> 00:16:18,400 Speaker 1: which I don't want to deny it but we're not 320 00:16:18,440 --> 00:16:20,800 Speaker 1: talking about the overall morality of this conflict. We're talking 321 00:16:20,840 --> 00:16:22,600 Speaker 1: about how these tactics work, right. 322 00:16:22,600 --> 00:16:25,720 Speaker 2: Right, Like the Nazis had intelligent and strategies as well. 323 00:16:25,760 --> 00:16:27,840 Speaker 2: They were terrible fucking people and I'm glad they lost 324 00:16:27,880 --> 00:16:30,680 Speaker 2: them are mostly dead, but like, yeah, yeah, we would 325 00:16:30,720 --> 00:16:33,000 Speaker 2: be unwise to just dismiss everything that they've been No. 326 00:16:33,560 --> 00:16:36,360 Speaker 1: No, And likewise, the fact that the Houthi's right now 327 00:16:36,400 --> 00:16:38,520 Speaker 1: that this interdiction of the Red Sea is based on 328 00:16:38,560 --> 00:16:41,200 Speaker 1: an attempt to stop the genocide in Gaza, which I 329 00:16:41,240 --> 00:16:44,200 Speaker 1: don't think it's going to work, but I would like 330 00:16:44,240 --> 00:16:47,400 Speaker 1: it if somehow it did. That also does not have 331 00:16:47,440 --> 00:16:50,040 Speaker 1: an impact on how this is working strategically, right, you 332 00:16:50,080 --> 00:16:52,200 Speaker 1: are kind of setting all of that aside to just 333 00:16:52,200 --> 00:16:56,080 Speaker 1: talk about how this is functioning, you know. Yeah, So 334 00:16:56,240 --> 00:16:59,000 Speaker 1: in recent years, the Houthis have expanded their stock of 335 00:16:59,040 --> 00:17:02,240 Speaker 1: anti ship missile. In an article for the International Institute 336 00:17:02,280 --> 00:17:05,720 Speaker 1: for Strategic Studies, a guy named Fabian hens Rights quote 337 00:17:05,920 --> 00:17:08,920 Speaker 1: the parades these are Huthi military parades also featured a 338 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:12,679 Speaker 1: variety of anti ship ballistic missiles ASBMs and guided rockets 339 00:17:12,680 --> 00:17:16,640 Speaker 1: employing Iranian infrared or imaging infrared seeker technology. The four 340 00:17:16,720 --> 00:17:19,399 Speaker 1: hundred and fifty kilometer range SEF appears to be a 341 00:17:19,440 --> 00:17:22,960 Speaker 1: rebranded ASBM version of Iran's FATA three one three missile, 342 00:17:23,200 --> 00:17:26,160 Speaker 1: while the Tongue Kill represents a previously unseen anti ship 343 00:17:26,280 --> 00:17:31,040 Speaker 1: version of the IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guardcore developed five hundred 344 00:17:31,080 --> 00:17:34,840 Speaker 1: kilometer range SO higher. The two designs constitute the heaviest 345 00:17:34,880 --> 00:17:37,320 Speaker 1: hoothy anti ship missiles, both with warheads of more than 346 00:17:37,359 --> 00:17:41,520 Speaker 1: three hundred kilograms and are of Iranian origin. Three smaller ASBMs. 347 00:17:41,520 --> 00:17:44,119 Speaker 1: The one hundred and forty kilometer range Fhlek, the Mayun 348 00:17:44,240 --> 00:17:48,000 Speaker 1: and the bar al Amar strongly resemble Iranian design philosophy 349 00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:51,960 Speaker 1: and seeker technology, but do not precisely match known Iranian systems. 350 00:17:52,080 --> 00:17:54,560 Speaker 1: They could either be Iranian systems not observed before in 351 00:17:54,600 --> 00:17:57,800 Speaker 1: smuggle to Yemen, or Huthy produced rockets combined using Iranian 352 00:17:57,840 --> 00:18:01,200 Speaker 1: guidance skits, not unlike developments made by another Iran proxy, 353 00:18:01,240 --> 00:18:04,159 Speaker 1: the Lebanese has Belah and its position guided surface to 354 00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:07,640 Speaker 1: surface missile program. Finally, the Huthis have presented an S 355 00:18:07,640 --> 00:18:10,560 Speaker 1: seventy five s A two surface to air missile, likely 356 00:18:10,600 --> 00:18:13,439 Speaker 1: from pre war Yemeny Army stocks modified for an anti 357 00:18:13,440 --> 00:18:16,760 Speaker 1: ship role using an Iranian guidance kit. So that's a 358 00:18:16,920 --> 00:18:20,240 Speaker 1: that's that's a potent and it's probably more some ways 359 00:18:20,280 --> 00:18:23,560 Speaker 1: more advanced than their general cruise missile stockpile arsenal for 360 00:18:23,640 --> 00:18:26,480 Speaker 1: taking out ships. Now, the Huthis are still a non 361 00:18:26,560 --> 00:18:29,560 Speaker 1: state force, and when people say online that like the 362 00:18:29,720 --> 00:18:33,040 Speaker 1: US is fighting Yemen, not quite accurate, because the Huthis 363 00:18:33,080 --> 00:18:35,439 Speaker 1: are fighting Yemen too, right, like the government if you're 364 00:18:35,480 --> 00:18:37,720 Speaker 1: if you're saying the government, you're talking about the people, Well, 365 00:18:37,720 --> 00:18:40,400 Speaker 1: people in Yemen are fighting each other, right, yeah, it's 366 00:18:40,480 --> 00:18:42,919 Speaker 1: it's that is the situation. They are at war with 367 00:18:43,000 --> 00:18:45,280 Speaker 1: the government of Yemen. Right, that is still the right case. 368 00:18:45,359 --> 00:18:48,480 Speaker 2: We're fighting, we're shooting missiles at Yemen, but yet like 369 00:18:48,720 --> 00:18:50,920 Speaker 2: as a geographical area right in the state. 370 00:18:51,440 --> 00:18:54,960 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, exactly. So the Huthis did not survive years 371 00:18:54,960 --> 00:18:57,639 Speaker 1: of intense bombing by Saudi Arabia and a nation with 372 00:18:57,680 --> 00:19:00,440 Speaker 1: an on paper extremely modern military. By I'm making a 373 00:19:00,480 --> 00:19:03,040 Speaker 1: lot of stupid mistakes. So when they decided to attack 374 00:19:03,080 --> 00:19:05,760 Speaker 1: shipping in the Red Sea after Israel launched their genocidal 375 00:19:05,800 --> 00:19:08,960 Speaker 1: campaign against Gaza, they did so with a competent plan, 376 00:19:09,080 --> 00:19:11,600 Speaker 1: which was to make civilian freight travel in the area 377 00:19:11,720 --> 00:19:15,159 Speaker 1: too dangerous to continue. Their stated goal here is to 378 00:19:15,280 --> 00:19:18,480 Speaker 1: force damage on Israel and the Western nations who support 379 00:19:18,480 --> 00:19:21,120 Speaker 1: it by hitting the only thing they care about, commerce, 380 00:19:21,520 --> 00:19:24,920 Speaker 1: and their actions here have done real damage to international trade, 381 00:19:25,320 --> 00:19:30,120 Speaker 1: not exclusively Western international trade. I should note the latest 382 00:19:30,160 --> 00:19:32,800 Speaker 1: several months have seen them capture or sink a couple 383 00:19:32,840 --> 00:19:36,160 Speaker 1: of merchant vessels. They've sunk one. They've hit at least 384 00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:39,800 Speaker 1: sixteen vessels with drones and missiles. I found a Bloomberg 385 00:19:39,880 --> 00:19:42,679 Speaker 1: report with the telling title Houthy missiles do far more 386 00:19:42,760 --> 00:19:45,439 Speaker 1: damage to trade than to actual ships, which is an 387 00:19:45,480 --> 00:19:48,960 Speaker 1: interesting way to frame it. Yeah, and they're kind of 388 00:19:48,960 --> 00:19:52,120 Speaker 1: trying to minimize what's going on here. While sixteen strikes 389 00:19:52,200 --> 00:19:54,280 Speaker 1: is a large number for the industry to withstand, there 390 00:19:54,320 --> 00:19:56,760 Speaker 1: have been even more failed attempts. Since the Houthies began 391 00:19:56,760 --> 00:19:58,840 Speaker 1: their attacks, there have been more than sixty incidents of 392 00:19:58,880 --> 00:20:01,359 Speaker 1: some kind in and around the world way, including everything 393 00:20:01,359 --> 00:20:04,360 Speaker 1: from near misses to hijackings and harassment by armed militants 394 00:20:04,359 --> 00:20:06,440 Speaker 1: and small boats. If you look at the damage that's 395 00:20:06,440 --> 00:20:09,000 Speaker 1: occurred in most of these incidents, it has not been significant, 396 00:20:09,040 --> 00:20:11,520 Speaker 1: says said Marcus Baker, head of the Marine and Cargo 397 00:20:11,560 --> 00:20:14,600 Speaker 1: at Marsh, one of the world's top insurance brokers. So far, 398 00:20:14,680 --> 00:20:17,119 Speaker 1: we haven't seen a total loss caused by a missile strike. 399 00:20:17,600 --> 00:20:20,600 Speaker 1: That changed in March when the Houthi successfully sank the 400 00:20:20,680 --> 00:20:23,359 Speaker 1: Ruby Mar despite more than a month of US strikes 401 00:20:23,400 --> 00:20:26,679 Speaker 1: to degrade their capability. The vessel was initially wounded and 402 00:20:26,760 --> 00:20:30,760 Speaker 1: drifted unmanned for almost two weeks before sinking. While it listed, 403 00:20:30,800 --> 00:20:33,679 Speaker 1: A Hoothy representative promised the ship could be salvaged if 404 00:20:33,720 --> 00:20:36,320 Speaker 1: aid trucks were allowed to enter Gaza. The Ruby Mar 405 00:20:36,480 --> 00:20:39,480 Speaker 1: wound up sinking. Now Hoothy strikes have also hit at 406 00:20:39,560 --> 00:20:42,320 Speaker 1: least one ship bound for Iran and another that was 407 00:20:42,680 --> 00:20:45,640 Speaker 1: going to be delivering aid supplies to Gimmen. At least 408 00:20:45,840 --> 00:20:48,359 Speaker 1: three civilian sailors have been killed thus far, and a 409 00:20:48,400 --> 00:20:51,399 Speaker 1: strike on a bolt carrier named the True Confidence. Now, 410 00:20:52,080 --> 00:20:54,520 Speaker 1: how you kind of interpret this as a success by 411 00:20:54,520 --> 00:20:57,440 Speaker 1: the Houthy stated goals which is right to inflict enough 412 00:20:57,480 --> 00:21:02,080 Speaker 1: pain on the West and on Israel economically that it 413 00:21:02,240 --> 00:21:06,479 Speaker 1: forces an earlier end to what Israel is doing in Gaza. Right, 414 00:21:06,480 --> 00:21:09,800 Speaker 1: if that's their goal, well, it hasn't happened yet. Right, 415 00:21:09,840 --> 00:21:12,080 Speaker 1: that's one thing we can say, right, it has not yet. 416 00:21:12,880 --> 00:21:14,800 Speaker 1: There's no evidence that I have seen that it has 417 00:21:14,840 --> 00:21:17,960 Speaker 1: affected the tempo of Israeli operations substantially. 418 00:21:18,080 --> 00:21:20,920 Speaker 2: You know, Yeah, it would seem it does not so 419 00:21:21,119 --> 00:21:24,879 Speaker 2: different and obviously as an incentive for the United States 420 00:21:24,920 --> 00:21:30,160 Speaker 2: and other international actors to like not let this tactic succeed, 421 00:21:30,560 --> 00:21:33,679 Speaker 2: because you do not want a world in which I 422 00:21:33,680 --> 00:21:35,760 Speaker 2: think it's not unreasonably. There's a thing called the right 423 00:21:35,760 --> 00:21:38,000 Speaker 2: to protect in international law, which is probably what the 424 00:21:38,040 --> 00:21:40,359 Speaker 2: youth he's a claiming they have of the acting under it, 425 00:21:40,720 --> 00:21:43,760 Speaker 2: and that's not, like, on the face of it, unreasonable. 426 00:21:44,400 --> 00:21:46,399 Speaker 2: But yet I think the US has this very like 427 00:21:46,400 --> 00:21:48,720 Speaker 2: strong incentive to not let it become a thing that 428 00:21:48,800 --> 00:21:49,439 Speaker 2: keeps happening. 429 00:21:49,520 --> 00:21:53,200 Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah, I'm not surprised we sent a carrier group 430 00:21:53,240 --> 00:21:55,160 Speaker 1: into the area. I'm also not surprised that that does 431 00:21:55,200 --> 00:21:57,080 Speaker 1: not seem to be working either. Right, If you are 432 00:21:57,160 --> 00:21:59,960 Speaker 1: judging how the US is acting and how the hooth 433 00:22:00,160 --> 00:22:02,320 Speaker 1: are acting based on their stated goals, the Houthis have 434 00:22:02,400 --> 00:22:05,600 Speaker 1: not yet accomplished their stated goal with these strikes, and 435 00:22:05,800 --> 00:22:08,200 Speaker 1: the US air strikes do not seem to have stopped 436 00:22:08,200 --> 00:22:10,919 Speaker 1: the Houthis from being able to interdict naval traffic in 437 00:22:10,960 --> 00:22:14,679 Speaker 1: the Red Sea. Right, there's I've heard some argument that 438 00:22:14,720 --> 00:22:17,320 Speaker 1: the tempo is reduced since the US got there, But 439 00:22:17,359 --> 00:22:19,240 Speaker 1: it's also unclear to me, is like, well, they only 440 00:22:19,240 --> 00:22:21,080 Speaker 1: have a limited amount of these missiles. Right, has the 441 00:22:21,080 --> 00:22:25,240 Speaker 1: t changed because they need to marshal their ammunition effectively, 442 00:22:25,400 --> 00:22:27,960 Speaker 1: or has it changed because there's been damage done to 443 00:22:28,000 --> 00:22:30,840 Speaker 1: their infrastructure. I don't know that we'll ever really get 444 00:22:31,040 --> 00:22:33,160 Speaker 1: a perfect answer on that, right, I know the US 445 00:22:33,280 --> 00:22:35,199 Speaker 1: claims that it has. You know, we claim that our 446 00:22:35,240 --> 00:22:39,320 Speaker 1: strikes have weakened them, but we always claim that, right, Yeah, 447 00:22:39,480 --> 00:22:43,520 Speaker 1: I mean what we're gonna say, right, Yeah, we all 448 00:22:43,560 --> 00:22:47,320 Speaker 1: lived through Afghanistan. Right, you're aware of what the US 449 00:22:47,440 --> 00:22:48,679 Speaker 1: says about ship like this. 450 00:22:49,240 --> 00:22:50,959 Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean it would look pretty bad if we were, 451 00:22:50,960 --> 00:22:58,640 Speaker 2: like now, dude, maxavel for US. 452 00:22:58,480 --> 00:23:01,680 Speaker 1: It's unclear how much which damaged the Hoothies have actually 453 00:23:01,760 --> 00:23:03,959 Speaker 1: done to the global economy. As a consequence of all this, 454 00:23:04,160 --> 00:23:06,520 Speaker 1: traffic has dropped to the Red Sea by about thirty 455 00:23:06,560 --> 00:23:09,320 Speaker 1: five percent, and since the sea carries about twenty percent 456 00:23:09,359 --> 00:23:12,720 Speaker 1: of global trade, that's a major hit. But it hasn't 457 00:23:12,800 --> 00:23:15,760 Speaker 1: stopped trade through the Red Sea either. Again, most trade 458 00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:18,760 Speaker 1: is still you know, most most of the pre war 459 00:23:18,840 --> 00:23:21,960 Speaker 1: level is still occurring. Thirty five percent is a substantial drop. 460 00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:25,120 Speaker 1: That is a hit, and it's hurt a lot of people. Right. 461 00:23:25,520 --> 00:23:27,600 Speaker 1: It also has not wholly blocked like there's a longer 462 00:23:27,680 --> 00:23:29,800 Speaker 1: route you can take around Africa to get into the 463 00:23:29,840 --> 00:23:32,560 Speaker 1: Red Sea, but that makes everything more expensive too. The 464 00:23:32,600 --> 00:23:35,919 Speaker 1: country hurt most is actually Egypt, because Egypt depends on 465 00:23:35,920 --> 00:23:38,560 Speaker 1: the Suez Canal for about a quarter of its currency earnings, 466 00:23:38,880 --> 00:23:40,840 Speaker 1: and you go through the Red Sea to get to 467 00:23:40,840 --> 00:23:43,600 Speaker 1: the Suez Canal. For reasons that are obvious if you 468 00:23:43,640 --> 00:23:56,760 Speaker 1: look at a map. Right, people who rightly see what's 469 00:23:56,760 --> 00:23:59,360 Speaker 1: happening in Gaza as a crime against humanity are unlikely 470 00:23:59,400 --> 00:24:02,160 Speaker 1: to care too much about the Egyptian economy, nor should 471 00:24:02,200 --> 00:24:05,320 Speaker 1: they necessarily. But the bigger questions here are can the 472 00:24:05,359 --> 00:24:07,919 Speaker 1: hooth He's actually force it into what Israel's doing? And 473 00:24:08,000 --> 00:24:10,320 Speaker 1: how long can they keep this up? The answer to 474 00:24:10,359 --> 00:24:12,520 Speaker 1: the first question, can the hooth He's forcing into his 475 00:24:12,760 --> 00:24:15,760 Speaker 1: Raeli aggression is not yet. And the answer to the 476 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:18,200 Speaker 1: second question is how long can they keep this up? 477 00:24:18,480 --> 00:24:21,120 Speaker 1: I don't know they might be able to eventually bring 478 00:24:21,119 --> 00:24:24,600 Speaker 1: about international pressure through economic damage, but given the state 479 00:24:24,640 --> 00:24:27,080 Speaker 1: of the US presidential election, I don't see that as 480 00:24:27,160 --> 00:24:31,600 Speaker 1: particularly likely a method for changing net Yahuu's behavior. The 481 00:24:31,640 --> 00:24:34,840 Speaker 1: answer to the second question is, you know, you know, 482 00:24:34,880 --> 00:24:37,520 Speaker 1: how long can they keep this up? Probably forever? Right, 483 00:24:38,119 --> 00:24:41,240 Speaker 1: US strikes have been lauded by the US's damaging infrastructure, 484 00:24:41,240 --> 00:24:43,520 Speaker 1: but we don't know that that's true. Our air strikes 485 00:24:43,520 --> 00:24:45,359 Speaker 1: in the region have been launched by the USS. D 486 00:24:45,359 --> 00:24:48,000 Speaker 1: White D. Eisenhower, the head of the carrier strike Group 487 00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:50,200 Speaker 1: in the Red Sea at present. And again, when you 488 00:24:50,240 --> 00:24:52,879 Speaker 1: look at kind of like leftists analyzing this, because they 489 00:24:52,880 --> 00:24:55,520 Speaker 1: don't often know much about the military, you'll get a 490 00:24:55,560 --> 00:24:57,399 Speaker 1: mix of like people being like, ah, the houthis are 491 00:24:57,400 --> 00:24:58,960 Speaker 1: going to kill a carrier because they put out a 492 00:24:59,040 --> 00:25:01,000 Speaker 1: video of like a carrier in their sites and shit, 493 00:25:01,080 --> 00:25:03,760 Speaker 1: and like, I don't think so, guys, doesn't seem likely. 494 00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:07,920 Speaker 1: These are very well defended ships, and they are very 495 00:25:07,960 --> 00:25:10,440 Speaker 1: competently led. Look I have looked into the capital of 496 00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:13,480 Speaker 1: the ship, I've looked into how they have handled the 497 00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:16,520 Speaker 1: considerable tempo of tax against them. I think that these 498 00:25:16,560 --> 00:25:20,160 Speaker 1: guys are operationally competent as the US tends to be. Now, 499 00:25:20,160 --> 00:25:23,639 Speaker 1: that doesn't mean they're going to win. The US soldiers 500 00:25:23,720 --> 00:25:27,679 Speaker 1: tend to be operationally competent most of the time, and 501 00:25:27,760 --> 00:25:31,760 Speaker 1: we also lose a lot, right because operational competence doesn't 502 00:25:31,800 --> 00:25:35,280 Speaker 1: matter if the operations you're being asked to undertake have 503 00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:37,960 Speaker 1: no chance of victory. And that is more or less 504 00:25:37,960 --> 00:25:40,640 Speaker 1: the situation. I think that these sailors are in right 505 00:25:40,920 --> 00:25:44,480 Speaker 1: where they're pretty good at sailing around in an aircraft 506 00:25:44,520 --> 00:25:47,120 Speaker 1: carrier and not getting killed. But that doesn't mean they're 507 00:25:47,119 --> 00:25:49,840 Speaker 1: going to defeat the Houthies in a meaningful way right right, 508 00:25:50,400 --> 00:25:52,280 Speaker 1: And the Hoothies are aware of this. They're in a 509 00:25:52,320 --> 00:25:55,919 Speaker 1: holding pattern. They understand that the primary thing that is 510 00:25:56,119 --> 00:26:01,480 Speaker 1: that all of strategy really hinges around stopping and denying 511 00:26:01,640 --> 00:26:04,560 Speaker 1: terrain to the enemy. And all the Hoothies have to 512 00:26:04,560 --> 00:26:06,959 Speaker 1: do to deny a significant amount of terrain to the 513 00:26:07,119 --> 00:26:11,240 Speaker 1: entire west is keep lobbing missiles, often blindly, in this 514 00:26:11,359 --> 00:26:14,639 Speaker 1: sea and it will make everything more expensive for everybody, 515 00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:17,199 Speaker 1: keep them in the news, and that's a win. And 516 00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:21,760 Speaker 1: it's unlikely, if not basically impossible, that using current methods, 517 00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:27,000 Speaker 1: the US Navy and US you know, airpower in this area, 518 00:26:27,119 --> 00:26:28,680 Speaker 1: based in this carrier group is going to be able 519 00:26:28,680 --> 00:26:30,600 Speaker 1: to do anything but spend a shitload of money. 520 00:26:31,040 --> 00:26:31,119 Speaker 2: Now. 521 00:26:31,280 --> 00:26:33,920 Speaker 1: US Navy officers in recent weeks have reported attacks by 522 00:26:33,920 --> 00:26:38,320 Speaker 1: both anti ship missiles, regular cruise missiles swarms of unmanned 523 00:26:38,359 --> 00:26:41,280 Speaker 1: aerial drones, which has led to a general conclusion among 524 00:26:41,280 --> 00:26:44,240 Speaker 1: people who analyze this stuff that drone swarms are going 525 00:26:44,280 --> 00:26:47,440 Speaker 1: to be a significant part of naval warfare in the 526 00:26:48,000 --> 00:26:53,080 Speaker 1: immediate future. Right, you can overwhelm the houthies, you know. 527 00:26:53,119 --> 00:26:55,920 Speaker 1: As impressive as their drone swarms are, for a nonstate 528 00:26:56,000 --> 00:26:58,520 Speaker 1: actor cannot put together the kind of a swarm that 529 00:26:58,600 --> 00:27:02,399 Speaker 1: a state actor, for example, could. But people are looking 530 00:27:02,440 --> 00:27:04,960 Speaker 1: at how how close some hits have gotten to the 531 00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:07,000 Speaker 1: carriers and being like, well, shit, if you had a 532 00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:09,240 Speaker 1: lot more of these things, you could really cause some 533 00:27:09,359 --> 00:27:12,920 Speaker 1: fucking problems for these boats. Right. Yeah. They've also used 534 00:27:13,040 --> 00:27:16,720 Speaker 1: unmanned boats and unmanned underwater vessels. These are basically unmanned 535 00:27:16,800 --> 00:27:20,280 Speaker 1: drone boats with explosives in them, right, and again, significantly 536 00:27:20,320 --> 00:27:22,840 Speaker 1: more of these could potentially do some damage. This is, 537 00:27:22,880 --> 00:27:26,399 Speaker 1: by any account, the most direct combat US naval forces 538 00:27:26,400 --> 00:27:28,560 Speaker 1: have seen since World War Two, and one thing. I 539 00:27:28,600 --> 00:27:30,919 Speaker 1: fun thing I've learned reading articles about the operation is 540 00:27:30,920 --> 00:27:33,240 Speaker 1: that our jets now get kill markers for the bombs 541 00:27:33,240 --> 00:27:33,640 Speaker 1: they drop. 542 00:27:33,720 --> 00:27:36,040 Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, yeah, you can be a drone ace or 543 00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:39,680 Speaker 2: not a drone, a missile downing ace. 544 00:27:39,920 --> 00:27:42,359 Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. It's like, I don't know, may I guess 545 00:27:42,359 --> 00:27:45,440 Speaker 1: it makes sense whatever, it just it doesn't look as impressive. 546 00:27:46,040 --> 00:27:49,439 Speaker 2: I did some googling. I guess you could become an 547 00:27:49,440 --> 00:27:51,880 Speaker 2: ace shooting down barrage balloons in World War One. 548 00:27:51,960 --> 00:27:54,080 Speaker 1: But yeah, the stack shooting back. 549 00:27:54,160 --> 00:27:56,840 Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, they're very defense strongly defended. Yeah, it's a 550 00:27:56,880 --> 00:27:59,320 Speaker 2: little different of V two rockets, I guess in World 551 00:27:59,359 --> 00:28:01,720 Speaker 2: War Two. I did also find out that the navel 552 00:28:01,880 --> 00:28:05,680 Speaker 2: some of the unmanned underwater vehicles are replacing. More's the 553 00:28:05,760 --> 00:28:09,080 Speaker 2: pity the seals and dolphins that were previously in US 554 00:28:09,200 --> 00:28:11,919 Speaker 2: Navy service. I don't mean seals like no, no, no, 555 00:28:12,040 --> 00:28:17,720 Speaker 2: literal literal seals heartbreaking, Yeah, very sad. They live in 556 00:28:17,760 --> 00:28:19,800 Speaker 2: San Diego. I often go past them. 557 00:28:21,200 --> 00:28:21,480 Speaker 1: You know what. 558 00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:23,639 Speaker 2: The seals don't want to do war. They well, but 559 00:28:23,800 --> 00:28:26,760 Speaker 2: again added the marine mammals, the other seals very much. 560 00:28:26,760 --> 00:28:30,280 Speaker 1: The dolphins might I remember from the documentary SeaQuest that 561 00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:35,360 Speaker 1: they that they enjoy naval service. I think the Dolphin Quest, James, 562 00:28:35,440 --> 00:28:37,520 Speaker 1: I've not I've not watched SeaQuest. I'm afraid. 563 00:28:37,640 --> 00:28:38,120 Speaker 2: I'm afraid. 564 00:28:38,120 --> 00:28:40,920 Speaker 1: It's It's Star Trek, the next generation Underwater, but the 565 00:28:41,040 --> 00:28:43,600 Speaker 1: role of Picard is played by the sheriff from Jaws. 566 00:28:43,920 --> 00:28:45,520 Speaker 1: It's actually fantastic, great. 567 00:28:45,560 --> 00:28:48,240 Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm looking looking forward to being exposed to more 568 00:28:48,240 --> 00:28:49,040 Speaker 2: of this universe. 569 00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:50,640 Speaker 1: Lock. 570 00:28:51,000 --> 00:28:54,320 Speaker 2: I'm hoping that the dolphins join force with the Orcas 571 00:28:54,360 --> 00:28:57,000 Speaker 2: and take on the super rich with that using the 572 00:28:57,000 --> 00:28:59,840 Speaker 2: skills given to them by the US military in Charage. 573 00:29:00,640 --> 00:29:04,120 Speaker 1: So when it comes to the economics of this conflict, 574 00:29:04,200 --> 00:29:06,360 Speaker 1: and a lot of this does come down to economics, right, 575 00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:10,440 Speaker 1: what the houthy are doing is an incredibly efficient, good 576 00:29:10,560 --> 00:29:14,280 Speaker 1: ass deal for them. These drones, specifically, a lot of 577 00:29:14,320 --> 00:29:17,320 Speaker 1: what they've done. They fired missiles, but like those are expensive, 578 00:29:17,360 --> 00:29:18,680 Speaker 1: they don't have a lot of them. I think that 579 00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:21,240 Speaker 1: at this point they would prefer to use those on 580 00:29:21,680 --> 00:29:24,320 Speaker 1: ships that cannot defend against them. They have since some 581 00:29:24,400 --> 00:29:27,719 Speaker 1: manned boats, which the US has fucking murked immediately, and 582 00:29:27,760 --> 00:29:30,240 Speaker 1: they don't seem to be doing that anymore because it's 583 00:29:30,320 --> 00:29:32,000 Speaker 1: dumb and the Hoothies didn't get where they did by 584 00:29:32,000 --> 00:29:34,600 Speaker 1: repeatedly doing dumb shit. What they seem to have settled 585 00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:37,840 Speaker 1: on is sending out drone swarms. Both of these boats, 586 00:29:37,880 --> 00:29:41,080 Speaker 1: these underwater drones and of aerial drones, and these things 587 00:29:41,120 --> 00:29:43,040 Speaker 1: can cost just a few thousand dollars each. Some of 588 00:29:43,040 --> 00:29:45,240 Speaker 1: the biggest ones are probably only tens of thousands of dollars. 589 00:29:45,480 --> 00:29:48,120 Speaker 1: But the navy missiles that we use to interdict this 590 00:29:48,160 --> 00:29:50,200 Speaker 1: shit and some of these they also have some dumber 591 00:29:50,240 --> 00:29:53,120 Speaker 1: cruise missiles that are pretty cheap. The missiles we use 592 00:29:53,160 --> 00:29:55,440 Speaker 1: to interdict this shit are two point one million dollars 593 00:29:55,440 --> 00:29:57,880 Speaker 1: is shot. Right. This is all in an adition to 594 00:29:57,920 --> 00:30:00,400 Speaker 1: the insane cost of keeping a carrier battle group in 595 00:30:00,440 --> 00:30:03,320 Speaker 1: the field and fighting. It's not at all cheap. I 596 00:30:03,400 --> 00:30:06,520 Speaker 1: found one political article that quotes a DoD official admitting 597 00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:10,000 Speaker 1: the cost offset is not on our side. Now, we 598 00:30:10,080 --> 00:30:12,600 Speaker 1: have some cheaper systems that can work really well on 599 00:30:12,800 --> 00:30:16,200 Speaker 1: particularly drones, that can work on missiles too. We've used 600 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:19,280 Speaker 1: them and that these are air burst shells fired from 601 00:30:19,320 --> 00:30:23,240 Speaker 1: the conventional guns on destroyers. These have worked really well, 602 00:30:23,320 --> 00:30:25,920 Speaker 1: especially against drones and tests, but they're only effective from 603 00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:29,160 Speaker 1: about ten miles or less away. In ballistic missile terms, 604 00:30:29,280 --> 00:30:32,040 Speaker 1: that's extremely close. You don't want to rely on these 605 00:30:32,080 --> 00:30:35,160 Speaker 1: for AICs, and it's not even all that far away 606 00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:38,200 Speaker 1: in drone terms right As a result, the US has 607 00:30:38,240 --> 00:30:41,560 Speaker 1: expanded research into more efficient anti drone and anti missile weapons, 608 00:30:41,560 --> 00:30:44,600 Speaker 1: including what amounts to layer, laser and microwave weapons that 609 00:30:44,640 --> 00:30:47,920 Speaker 1: could be fired indefinitely for the cost of electricity. Given 610 00:30:48,080 --> 00:30:50,600 Speaker 1: the nature of these weapons, that's not insignificant either, but 611 00:30:50,680 --> 00:30:53,560 Speaker 1: it's a lot less than two point one million is shot. 612 00:30:53,840 --> 00:30:55,520 Speaker 1: As is always the case, the kind of fight the 613 00:30:55,560 --> 00:30:58,680 Speaker 1: Huthies are waging right now has an expiration date right now. 614 00:30:59,120 --> 00:31:02,120 Speaker 1: Any group that can put together a few million dollars 615 00:31:02,160 --> 00:31:05,280 Speaker 1: to make hundreds and hundreds of explosive drones right which 616 00:31:05,320 --> 00:31:08,120 Speaker 1: a number of groups are capable of, could at least 617 00:31:08,200 --> 00:31:12,560 Speaker 1: exact a substantial toll on a US carrier battlegroup, make it, 618 00:31:12,640 --> 00:31:16,440 Speaker 1: spend a shitload of money, potentially even do some damage. 619 00:31:16,520 --> 00:31:19,160 Speaker 1: And again, even if this stuff hits an aircraft carrier, 620 00:31:19,240 --> 00:31:21,880 Speaker 1: you're like very unlikely to see that thing sink. There's 621 00:31:21,920 --> 00:31:25,040 Speaker 1: a story that's worth knowing that, Like when we decommissioned 622 00:31:25,080 --> 00:31:27,400 Speaker 1: one of our aircraft carriers fifteen or twenty years ago. 623 00:31:27,840 --> 00:31:30,280 Speaker 1: They started. They shot at a bunch like they just 624 00:31:30,320 --> 00:31:32,920 Speaker 1: to see like how well it would hold up, and 625 00:31:33,000 --> 00:31:36,280 Speaker 1: like they such a great sink and they couldn't sink 626 00:31:36,320 --> 00:31:39,600 Speaker 1: the fucker like you can do you could kill sailors. 627 00:31:39,600 --> 00:31:40,920 Speaker 1: It would be a big deal if they hit a 628 00:31:40,920 --> 00:31:43,000 Speaker 1: fucking aircraft carrier and killed some sailors, even if the 629 00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:45,280 Speaker 1: carrier doesn't go down, that's a huge fucking deal. I 630 00:31:45,320 --> 00:31:47,040 Speaker 1: don't know that they're capable of doing that, but it's 631 00:31:47,120 --> 00:31:49,120 Speaker 1: unlikely they're going to kill one, right. 632 00:31:49,640 --> 00:31:51,720 Speaker 2: Right, Yeah, they got to stand oneted a bondiation. 633 00:31:52,000 --> 00:31:54,760 Speaker 1: Yeah, hard, It's hard to do, right. They're made not 634 00:31:54,960 --> 00:31:57,719 Speaker 1: to sink, and they're pretty fucking big. But one can 635 00:31:57,800 --> 00:32:00,360 Speaker 1: imagine kind of a future in which the war the 636 00:32:00,400 --> 00:32:03,040 Speaker 1: Hoothies are waging right now is rendered kind of impossible 637 00:32:03,120 --> 00:32:06,080 Speaker 1: because weapons like that are positioned permanently around, say the 638 00:32:06,160 --> 00:32:08,600 Speaker 1: Red Sea, blanketing it in an offense grid that basically 639 00:32:08,760 --> 00:32:12,120 Speaker 1: kill anything fired into the sea. That's something that might 640 00:32:12,200 --> 00:32:15,480 Speaker 1: happen in the future if this continues, But that's also 641 00:32:15,760 --> 00:32:17,960 Speaker 1: just the way war works, right. You know, the Hoothies 642 00:32:18,040 --> 00:32:20,280 Speaker 1: ten to fifteen years ago wouldn't have been able to 643 00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:22,719 Speaker 1: wage a war like this against the US Navy. They 644 00:32:22,760 --> 00:32:24,560 Speaker 1: fought the Navy to a stand still. That's the only 645 00:32:24,600 --> 00:32:27,080 Speaker 1: way to analyze this, right, and again, that doesn't mean 646 00:32:27,120 --> 00:32:29,760 Speaker 1: either side is achieving their operational goals. Right, The Houthis 647 00:32:29,800 --> 00:32:32,280 Speaker 1: have not ended the genocide in Gaza, and the US 648 00:32:32,480 --> 00:32:34,880 Speaker 1: doesn't seem to be capable of ending the Houthis. So 649 00:32:35,000 --> 00:32:37,360 Speaker 1: they fought each other to a standstill in this matter. 650 00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:39,959 Speaker 1: And that wouldn't have been possible twenty years ago. So right, 651 00:32:40,320 --> 00:32:43,000 Speaker 1: twenty years from now, what's going on will be different. 652 00:32:43,160 --> 00:32:45,480 Speaker 1: You know, the fact that the US seems to be 653 00:32:45,640 --> 00:32:48,240 Speaker 1: pretty close to developing more efficient anti drone and anti 654 00:32:48,320 --> 00:32:50,840 Speaker 1: missile weapons that are a lot cheaper to use doesn't 655 00:32:50,880 --> 00:32:53,760 Speaker 1: mean that non state actors will not find a way 656 00:32:53,800 --> 00:32:56,040 Speaker 1: around those. But that is the situation we're in right 657 00:32:56,160 --> 00:32:58,960 Speaker 1: now with the Houthis, and that is the end of 658 00:32:59,000 --> 00:33:01,280 Speaker 1: this episode. We're going to get back to you tomorrow 659 00:33:01,560 --> 00:33:03,680 Speaker 1: for part two, where we're going to talk about irregular 660 00:33:03,800 --> 00:33:07,400 Speaker 1: naval warfare in Ukraine and Myanmar. James, you got anything 661 00:33:07,440 --> 00:33:09,800 Speaker 1: else to say? No, No, it didn't, I didn't think 662 00:33:09,840 --> 00:33:11,160 Speaker 1: so you need to be a bad day to be 663 00:33:11,200 --> 00:33:13,800 Speaker 1: a boat. I guess bad day to be a boat. 664 00:33:14,120 --> 00:33:17,320 Speaker 1: Bad day to be a drone. They're really suffering in this. 665 00:33:17,440 --> 00:33:20,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a great day to be a military contractor, 666 00:33:21,000 --> 00:33:23,280 Speaker 2: which is every Oh my god, such a good time 667 00:33:23,320 --> 00:33:26,120 Speaker 2: to be a military contractor. Whether you're doing it for 668 00:33:26,240 --> 00:33:28,760 Speaker 2: a run or the United States. You are, you are, 669 00:33:29,040 --> 00:33:32,240 Speaker 2: you are in Clover right now, which is a massive 670 00:33:32,360 --> 00:33:35,240 Speaker 2: change from the entirety of this century so far. So 671 00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:35,880 Speaker 2: that's nice. 672 00:33:36,400 --> 00:33:39,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's nice to see the military contractors finally pick 673 00:33:39,400 --> 00:33:39,719 Speaker 1: up a win. 674 00:33:40,200 --> 00:33:41,640 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, one for them. 675 00:33:42,240 --> 00:33:44,880 Speaker 1: That's been It could happen here. We'll be back tomorrow. 676 00:33:50,480 --> 00:33:52,800 Speaker 1: It could happen here as a production of cool Zone Media. 677 00:33:53,080 --> 00:33:55,720 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 678 00:33:55,800 --> 00:33:57,960 Speaker 1: cool zonemedia dot com or check us out on the 679 00:33:58,040 --> 00:34:01,400 Speaker 1: iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. 680 00:34:01,840 --> 00:34:03,959 Speaker 1: You can find sources for It could Happen Here, updated 681 00:34:04,040 --> 00:34:07,040 Speaker 1: monthly at coolzonemedia dot com slash sources. 682 00:34:07,240 --> 00:34:08,040 Speaker 2: Thanks for listening.