WEBVTT - Tech Stories of 2019 - The Bummer Episode

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Text Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios

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<v Speaker 1>How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to text Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host job in Strickland. I'm an executive producer

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<v Speaker 1>with iHeart Radio and a lot of all things tech.

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<v Speaker 1>And boy feels good to say those words, because you know,

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<v Speaker 1>I've been running around traveling doing lots of stuff for

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<v Speaker 1>another show called The Restless Ones, which you may have heard, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>And it means that I've had a lot of time

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<v Speaker 1>away from the studio. But I'm back today, and it's

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<v Speaker 1>that time of year when I take a look back

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<v Speaker 1>at the previous twelve months and consider some of the

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<v Speaker 1>biggest text stories to come out over the course of

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<v Speaker 1>the year. Now, this year, twenty nineteen, it was a

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<v Speaker 1>pretty darn packed one when it comes to news, and

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<v Speaker 1>things changed so quickly, and there are so many high

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<v Speaker 1>level stories that it can actually be pretty easy to

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<v Speaker 1>good stuff that happened earlier in the year. So I'm

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<v Speaker 1>gonna walk us through some of the big themes of

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<v Speaker 1>the year and some of the stories that center on

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<v Speaker 1>those themes. And there are so many things to talk

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<v Speaker 1>about that I'm actually gonna have to do two episodes

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<v Speaker 1>about it. I originally was going to really try and

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<v Speaker 1>cram it into one, but that just wasn't very practical.

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<v Speaker 1>I would just be rattling off headlines, and what good

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<v Speaker 1>is that. So this one's going to be filled with

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of stories about mistakes and things going wrong

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<v Speaker 1>in the world of tech. So I'm calling this episode

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<v Speaker 1>the Bummers of twenty nineteen. But um, here's the bad news.

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<v Speaker 1>There were a lot of bummer stories, So some of

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<v Speaker 1>those are gonna probably spill into the next episode two,

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<v Speaker 1>but I'll do my best to to to lighten the

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<v Speaker 1>mood of it in the next one occasionally. Now, one

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<v Speaker 1>of the big themes has actually become a pretty common

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<v Speaker 1>one over the last several years is the theme of

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<v Speaker 1>data breaches. Like I have previously called earlier years like

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<v Speaker 1>the Year of the Data Breach, but I think the

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<v Speaker 1>same thing can be said of twenty nineteen. So a

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<v Speaker 1>couple of years ago, the credit reporting company Equifax dealt

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<v Speaker 1>with a massive data breach that resulted in a host

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<v Speaker 1>of investigations in the United States both the state and

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<v Speaker 1>federal levels, and the company ultimately agreed to pay out

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<v Speaker 1>somewhere between five and seven hundred million dollars as a

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<v Speaker 1>result in fines. They were also giving people the opportunity

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<v Speaker 1>to lay a claim for at least some sort of

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<v Speaker 1>compensation for this data breach. People were invited to apply

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<v Speaker 1>for a payout of one hundred twenty five dollars, not

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<v Speaker 1>exactly a princely sum when you consider having your personal

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<v Speaker 1>information rated due to insufficient protections on a corporate level.

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<v Speaker 1>In September two tho nineteen, Equifax announced that people claiming

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<v Speaker 1>a payout would need to provide proof that they had

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<v Speaker 1>also enrolled in a credit monitoring service by October, because

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<v Speaker 1>that would show that the people had concern about their

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<v Speaker 1>own credit rating and their own personal information, that they

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<v Speaker 1>weren't just looking for money to get money, but that

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<v Speaker 1>they actually were actively trying to keep track of this stuff,

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<v Speaker 1>or else the claim could be denied, and the FTC

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<v Speaker 1>had previously already warned that due to the number of claims,

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<v Speaker 1>people were likely to get far less than a hundred

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<v Speaker 1>twenty five dollars because there was only a pool of

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<v Speaker 1>around thirty one million dollars that had been set aside

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<v Speaker 1>for these payouts. You know that five d seventy five

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<v Speaker 1>to seven million dollars that wasn't set aside for payouts.

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<v Speaker 1>Only thirty one million was set aside for payouts. And

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<v Speaker 1>I know it's crazy to say only thirty one million,

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<v Speaker 1>but when you look at the scale of this data breach,

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<v Speaker 1>you realize that that means if everyone who was affected

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<v Speaker 1>lays claim to a payout, you don't get very much.

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<v Speaker 1>But this whole mess has prompted more conversations about data

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<v Speaker 1>secure and corporate accountability, which is a good thing. It's

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<v Speaker 1>sad that it comes at the expense of this terrible mistake,

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<v Speaker 1>but at least people are talking more seriously about this.

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<v Speaker 1>Hopefully something will actually happen because of it. Now, we've

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<v Speaker 1>seen lots of these stories over the last several years,

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<v Speaker 1>and they really do show no sign of slowing down

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<v Speaker 1>right now, which is unfortunate. In twenty nineteen, there were

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<v Speaker 1>some truly notable examples across different industries. I pulled data

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<v Speaker 1>from Norton, the information security company to look at some

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<v Speaker 1>of the big ones. One of those would be Capital One,

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<v Speaker 1>the financial company, reported that hackers were able to access

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<v Speaker 1>a large amount of data, affecting one hundred six million

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<v Speaker 1>records in the company's files. Most of those records were

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<v Speaker 1>for a credit card applications rather than established accounts. So

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<v Speaker 1>it wasn't like the hackers necessarily got a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>credit card info, but they got a lot of application information.

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<v Speaker 1>And when you think about the info you need to

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<v Speaker 1>provide hide when you apply for a credit card, it

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<v Speaker 1>includes stuff like, you know, personal information that is really

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<v Speaker 1>important to you. And it might be mundane stuff like

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<v Speaker 1>your name, which, hey, you know, no big deal, someone

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<v Speaker 1>knows your name, okay, But it might include your email,

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<v Speaker 1>which again maybe that's more frustrating or or irritating. But

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<v Speaker 1>then there's also your physical address, which gets a little

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<v Speaker 1>more spooky scary, your credit score, your income, maybe your

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<v Speaker 1>Social Security number, essentially all the stuff it would take

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<v Speaker 1>for someone to steal your identity and sell it off

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<v Speaker 1>on the dark web, which is not very cool. Capital

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<v Speaker 1>one hacker named Page Thompson targeted a third party cloud

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<v Speaker 1>computing company that Capital One had relied upon to host

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<v Speaker 1>the credit application services. She exploited a vulnerability in a

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<v Speaker 1>web at firewall to get illegal access to the data.

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<v Speaker 1>She was arrested for the data intrusion, and then she

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<v Speaker 1>was held in a men's detention center. Uh, she's transgender,

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<v Speaker 1>and this gets into a whole thing with criminal justice

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<v Speaker 1>systems and the treatment of people who are transgender, which

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<v Speaker 1>honestly goes way beyond the scope of this podcast. But

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<v Speaker 1>I'll just say that when I read that she was

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<v Speaker 1>held in a men's detention center, that really upset me. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't disagree with her being detained she broke the law,

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<v Speaker 1>or allegedly broke the law. She denies this. I more

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<v Speaker 1>object that it wasn't in a more appropriate setting. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>She's awaiting trial for the case. That trial is scheduled

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<v Speaker 1>right now for March twenty. She has pled not guilty

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<v Speaker 1>to the charges. Another company to experience a data breach

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<v Speaker 1>was door Dash, the food delivery service. The company experienced

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<v Speaker 1>the breach in May, but didn't disclose it until September

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<v Speaker 1>twenty nineteen. A third party access the information of nearly

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<v Speaker 1>five million drivers and customers without permission. The information they

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<v Speaker 1>were able to access included personal information, including the last

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<v Speaker 1>few digits of credit card and bank account numbers, but

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<v Speaker 1>not the whole number. It was just that last little string.

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<v Speaker 1>It also included the hashed passwords of many account holders,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's always good to change your password if you

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<v Speaker 1>make use of services that later reveal that they've been hacked,

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<v Speaker 1>it's always a good idea to change that information. And also, well,

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<v Speaker 1>I'll get to it, but don't use the same password everywhere.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a little spoiler alert for a future discussion. So

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<v Speaker 1>early in the year, the service Evite had a data

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<v Speaker 1>breach that affected one hundred million records, again exposing customer

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<v Speaker 1>information like names, addresses, phone numbers, and the password that

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<v Speaker 1>they used for the account. And again the exposure of

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<v Speaker 1>passwords drives home that importance right use unique passwords with

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<v Speaker 1>different services. That way, if one service is compromised, you

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<v Speaker 1>don't have to worry about the hackers accessing everything else

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<v Speaker 1>you use using the same password. If you're using one

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<v Speaker 1>password for everything, then you're essentially opening up the door.

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<v Speaker 1>As soon as one breach is effective, all of your

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<v Speaker 1>services have been breached. So don't use the same password

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<v Speaker 1>for everything. Use a password vault, UH, use stuff like

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<v Speaker 1>two factor authentication. All of that will help minimize your risk.

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<v Speaker 1>It doesn't eliminate it, but it minimizes it. And if

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<v Speaker 1>you find out one of the services you use was compromised,

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<v Speaker 1>change all that log and information right away. Now. The

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<v Speaker 1>medical industry also saw its share of data breaches the

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<v Speaker 1>American Medical Collection Agency, which is a company that collects

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<v Speaker 1>overdue payments for various medical labs. So essentially, these are

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<v Speaker 1>the folks who come after you if you haven't paid

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<v Speaker 1>certain medical bills. They also had a breach. Hackers access

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<v Speaker 1>more than twenty million records, and the information included not

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<v Speaker 1>just personal information, but even stuff like credit card information.

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<v Speaker 1>The actual breach began back in the summer of eighteen,

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<v Speaker 1>but the vulnerability remain unpatched until Arch twenty nineteen. In

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<v Speaker 1>June of this year, the company filed for bankruptcy protection.

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<v Speaker 1>So you know, things are just going great for them.

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<v Speaker 1>And close to home, Georgia Tech suffered a data breach

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<v Speaker 1>when some third party gained access to a university owned database.

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<v Speaker 1>The database had tons of personal information on current and

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<v Speaker 1>former students, as well as staff and faculty at the college,

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<v Speaker 1>including things like social security numbers. In total, one point

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<v Speaker 1>to six five million people were affected by that data breach.

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<v Speaker 1>The college is reaching out to offer credit monitoring and

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<v Speaker 1>identity theft protection services for those affected by it, but

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<v Speaker 1>still yikes. The U. S Government also was not immune

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<v Speaker 1>to data breaches. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA

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<v Speaker 1>had a data breach, not because some hacker broke into

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<v Speaker 1>the system, but because the agency accidentally released files containing

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<v Speaker 1>sensitive information, such as the personal info of more than

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<v Speaker 1>two million people. So ad trombone noise insert here now.

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<v Speaker 1>According to the US Inspector General, FEMA violated the Privacy

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<v Speaker 1>Act of nineteen seventy four by releasing this data to

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<v Speaker 1>a third party contractor. The contractor was in charge of

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<v Speaker 1>securing temporary lodging for people who are affected by emergencies

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<v Speaker 1>and disasters, so like a fire or a flood. But

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<v Speaker 1>the data FEMA provided was far more extensive than what

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<v Speaker 1>was actually needed for this contractor to do its job,

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<v Speaker 1>and so that data included stuff like banking information and

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<v Speaker 1>bank transit numbers and stuff like that, stuff that did

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<v Speaker 1>not need to be shared. Now, considering that this breach

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<v Speaker 1>affected people who are already dealing with emergency situations that

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<v Speaker 1>were bad enough to necessitate a relocation, that's a that's

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<v Speaker 1>a big, big ouch. Making matters worse is that even

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<v Speaker 1>some of the companies that are dedicated towards security and

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<v Speaker 1>privacy have had data breaches in twenty nineteen. Take nord

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<v Speaker 1>VPN for example. That was a service that I've used

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<v Speaker 1>in the past. A VPN is a virtual private network,

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<v Speaker 1>and the purpose of a VPN is to allow a

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<v Speaker 1>user to log into a remote server and then use

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<v Speaker 1>various internet services so that they can't be traced back

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<v Speaker 1>to the end user. Now, at first glance, that might

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<v Speaker 1>sound like it's shady, but it's actually a really useful service.

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<v Speaker 1>If you're concerned about your own data security, you can

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<v Speaker 1>use a VPN when you're in areas where you can't

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<v Speaker 1>be certain of the security of the network, and that

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<v Speaker 1>helps improve your own security. But then this year, word

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<v Speaker 1>came out that nord vpn had an internal private key

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<v Speaker 1>exposed back in which created the possibility for hackers to

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<v Speaker 1>create a server and host it on the nord vpn

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<v Speaker 1>service as if it were a valid Nord VPN server. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>that would mean that an end user who was relying

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<v Speaker 1>on nord vpn might end up logging into one of

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<v Speaker 1>the hackers computers thinking it was a secure VPN server,

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<v Speaker 1>and the hacker we get to see all the traffic

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<v Speaker 1>coming through that computer. Nord vpn has stated that since

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<v Speaker 1>the breach, the company has patched this problem and that

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<v Speaker 1>the company doesn't keep a log of any user activity,

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<v Speaker 1>So hackers would only capture any traffic that happened on

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<v Speaker 1>their own server during that breach. They wouldn't have gotten

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<v Speaker 1>traffic information from any other servers on the nord VPN network.

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<v Speaker 1>They wouldn't be able to look at historic data because

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<v Speaker 1>the company doesn't keep any Still, that might come as

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<v Speaker 1>a little comfort to a community of users who presumably

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<v Speaker 1>have subscribed to the service out of a desire to

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<v Speaker 1>maintain privacy and security. Now, these stories are pretty discouraging,

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<v Speaker 1>and to be honest, it's just the tip of a

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<v Speaker 1>huge iceberg. According to a report from Javelin Strategy and Research,

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<v Speaker 1>there were five thousand, one hundred eighty three reported data

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<v Speaker 1>breaches in the first nine months of two thousand nineteen alone.

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<v Speaker 1>Now keep in mind those are reported data breaches. There

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<v Speaker 1>are likely many more that have either gone discovered or unreported.

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<v Speaker 1>Now those breaches represent nearly eight billion records exposed. The

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<v Speaker 1>rate shows a thirty three increase in breaches compared to

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand eighteen. Most of those breaches happened to companies

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<v Speaker 1>with fewer than one employees, so these weren't like the

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<v Speaker 1>big big news items like Capital One or door Dash.

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<v Speaker 1>There were some good news items in the report. However,

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<v Speaker 1>not everything was dour. Credit Card security has improved thanks

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<v Speaker 1>to chip technology, so there was actually a decline in

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<v Speaker 1>credit card frauds. That's something to be thankful for. Now.

0:13:35.760 --> 0:13:38.800
<v Speaker 1>It can be a hassle just to practice good secure

0:13:38.920 --> 0:13:42.240
<v Speaker 1>internet habits, as I've covered in previous episodes of tech Stuff.

0:13:42.520 --> 0:13:46.240
<v Speaker 1>As users, we all have a responsibility to protect our

0:13:46.320 --> 0:13:49.080
<v Speaker 1>data as best we can, But if we want to

0:13:49.080 --> 0:13:53.080
<v Speaker 1>do useful stuff with that data, ultimately we eventually have

0:13:53.240 --> 0:13:56.120
<v Speaker 1>to hand it over to other entities, and when these

0:13:56.200 --> 0:14:00.119
<v Speaker 1>other entities have data breaches, it's also a breach of trust.

0:14:00.520 --> 0:14:04.800
<v Speaker 1>If we don't trust in the systems, things fall apart. Now,

0:14:04.880 --> 0:14:07.480
<v Speaker 1>I think it highly unlikely that we're going to see

0:14:07.640 --> 0:14:11.200
<v Speaker 1>fewer attempts at data breaches as time goes on. It

0:14:11.280 --> 0:14:13.760
<v Speaker 1>only makes sense we're gonna keep seeing them and probably

0:14:13.840 --> 0:14:17.640
<v Speaker 1>see efforts increase over time. So hopefully we'll have more

0:14:17.679 --> 0:14:22.040
<v Speaker 1>success stories revolving around foiling a data breach. But the

0:14:22.080 --> 0:14:25.240
<v Speaker 1>world of information security is typically a see saw type

0:14:25.240 --> 0:14:28.120
<v Speaker 1>of thing. The hackers get better at cracking systems and

0:14:28.160 --> 0:14:32.480
<v Speaker 1>exploiting vulnerabilities, companies get better at patching the holes, but

0:14:32.520 --> 0:14:35.520
<v Speaker 1>then the hackers look for different holes, and the entire

0:14:35.560 --> 0:14:39.440
<v Speaker 1>cycle repeats itself. Meanwhile, people like you and me get

0:14:39.480 --> 0:14:42.520
<v Speaker 1>caught up with our data potentially at risk, which is

0:14:42.600 --> 0:14:46.280
<v Speaker 1>kind of gross. Well, let's stick with some more bummers.

0:14:46.440 --> 0:14:50.160
<v Speaker 1>Um I figured if I frontload the episodes with bummers,

0:14:50.160 --> 0:14:52.600
<v Speaker 1>then I can make some space in the back half

0:14:52.760 --> 0:14:54.960
<v Speaker 1>for some more fun stuff. But first, let's talk about

0:14:55.000 --> 0:14:58.800
<v Speaker 1>financial performance. So two thousand nineteen saw some pretty rough

0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:02.320
<v Speaker 1>quarters for a you companies. One of those was Uber.

0:15:02.400 --> 0:15:04.840
<v Speaker 1>Now I mentioned this in an earlier episode this year

0:15:04.880 --> 0:15:07.560
<v Speaker 1>about fake it until you Make it, but Uber leads

0:15:07.600 --> 0:15:10.640
<v Speaker 1>the way among ride hailing companies in a category you

0:15:10.760 --> 0:15:13.400
<v Speaker 1>don't want to appear in, which is the most money

0:15:13.560 --> 0:15:17.160
<v Speaker 1>lost per quarter. Now, to be clear, all ride hailing

0:15:17.200 --> 0:15:20.760
<v Speaker 1>companies are losing money. None of them are profitable. No

0:15:20.800 --> 0:15:23.520
<v Speaker 1>one has figured out how to make a business model

0:15:23.720 --> 0:15:27.000
<v Speaker 1>that has a profitable side as of yet. But Uber

0:15:27.120 --> 0:15:30.240
<v Speaker 1>is losing money on a scale that's pretty monumental. During

0:15:30.240 --> 0:15:33.080
<v Speaker 1>the second quarter of twenty nineteen, the company posted revenues

0:15:33.080 --> 0:15:36.480
<v Speaker 1>of three billion dollars, which, come on, that's that's a

0:15:36.520 --> 0:15:41.960
<v Speaker 1>lot of chadder, But they posted losses of five billion dollars.

0:15:42.480 --> 0:15:46.480
<v Speaker 1>Wolf Uber CEO stated that a large part of those

0:15:46.520 --> 0:15:49.400
<v Speaker 1>losses came from the I P O process that Uber

0:15:49.440 --> 0:15:52.640
<v Speaker 1>went through the initial public offering. The company had bought

0:15:52.680 --> 0:15:56.520
<v Speaker 1>back shares that belonged to employees, which posted in the

0:15:56.520 --> 0:15:59.280
<v Speaker 1>company records as an expense, but that was a one

0:15:59.320 --> 0:16:02.400
<v Speaker 1>time expen Uber won't be buying back shares again in

0:16:02.400 --> 0:16:06.120
<v Speaker 1>the future. Still, analysts say that even taking into account

0:16:06.240 --> 0:16:09.320
<v Speaker 1>the stock compensation cost, Uber would have lost more than

0:16:09.360 --> 0:16:12.760
<v Speaker 1>a billion dollars. And that's just one quarter. That's not

0:16:12.800 --> 0:16:15.400
<v Speaker 1>all of twenty nineteen, So if my math is right,

0:16:15.800 --> 0:16:18.960
<v Speaker 1>there are four quarters every year. So the question is,

0:16:19.080 --> 0:16:21.840
<v Speaker 1>can Uber find a way to be profitable in the

0:16:21.960 --> 0:16:25.120
<v Speaker 1>right hailing and related businesses or will it have to

0:16:25.160 --> 0:16:28.480
<v Speaker 1>bank on investors bailing the company out again. I'm worried

0:16:28.520 --> 0:16:31.040
<v Speaker 1>we're looking at another bubble that's just about to burst.

0:16:31.240 --> 0:16:34.200
<v Speaker 1>But I hold out hope that companies like Uber Left

0:16:34.240 --> 0:16:36.720
<v Speaker 1>and other right hailing services are able to turn things

0:16:36.800 --> 0:16:40.760
<v Speaker 1>around preferably while also treating their employees well and ensuring

0:16:40.800 --> 0:16:44.560
<v Speaker 1>the safety of their customers, which are also ongoing issues

0:16:44.600 --> 0:16:47.680
<v Speaker 1>with many of these right hailing companies. More to say

0:16:47.720 --> 0:16:49.480
<v Speaker 1>about that in just a moment, but first let's take

0:16:49.760 --> 0:17:00.480
<v Speaker 1>a quick break now. Speaking of safety and right inhaling,

0:17:00.560 --> 0:17:03.440
<v Speaker 1>it's also important to hold up Lift to the magnifying

0:17:03.480 --> 0:17:07.000
<v Speaker 1>glass and not give that company a free pass while

0:17:07.240 --> 0:17:11.159
<v Speaker 1>raking Uber over the coals. Numerous women have come forward

0:17:11.200 --> 0:17:14.400
<v Speaker 1>in lawsuits against Lift, stating that they were the victims

0:17:14.400 --> 0:17:17.199
<v Speaker 1>of assault. They also say the company did nothing to

0:17:17.240 --> 0:17:20.159
<v Speaker 1>prevent those assaults, and they didn't do enough to ensure

0:17:20.200 --> 0:17:23.800
<v Speaker 1>passengers safety. And on top of all that, they say

0:17:23.840 --> 0:17:28.080
<v Speaker 1>that Lift ignored complaints filed after the assaults took place

0:17:28.440 --> 0:17:32.080
<v Speaker 1>and then downplayed the events to the media. One lawyer

0:17:32.160 --> 0:17:36.360
<v Speaker 1>states that there's evidence that Lift purposefully withheld cooperation from

0:17:36.400 --> 0:17:40.520
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement officers who are investigating these claims. Now Lift

0:17:40.600 --> 0:17:43.000
<v Speaker 1>is not the only right hailing company to come under

0:17:43.000 --> 0:17:46.560
<v Speaker 1>scrutiny due to safety concerns and reports of assault, and

0:17:46.600 --> 0:17:49.639
<v Speaker 1>there are also cases in which drivers have been assaulted

0:17:49.680 --> 0:17:53.439
<v Speaker 1>by passengers. This is an ongoing story, and there are

0:17:53.440 --> 0:17:56.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot of discussions about measures that could help protect

0:17:56.359 --> 0:17:59.639
<v Speaker 1>passengers and drivers alike. But the rollout is likely to

0:17:59.640 --> 0:18:03.479
<v Speaker 1>be re regional and staggered over weeks or months, so

0:18:03.520 --> 0:18:07.840
<v Speaker 1>it's not exactly the super fast response you would hope for. Necessarily,

0:18:08.200 --> 0:18:10.520
<v Speaker 1>all right, let's keep that bummer train of moving. In

0:18:10.680 --> 0:18:15.639
<v Speaker 1>January two thousand, nineteen, the utility company Pacific Gas and

0:18:15.720 --> 0:18:19.840
<v Speaker 1>Electric or pg n E, declared bankruptcy. Now, this company

0:18:19.920 --> 0:18:23.160
<v Speaker 1>serves customers along the West Coast, and in twenty seventeen,

0:18:23.520 --> 0:18:27.000
<v Speaker 1>it was found guilty of starting a series of wildfires

0:18:27.040 --> 0:18:31.400
<v Speaker 1>in California, which then put the company thirty billion dollars

0:18:31.600 --> 0:18:34.800
<v Speaker 1>in debt. That's billion with a b P. G n

0:18:34.880 --> 0:18:38.800
<v Speaker 1>E emerged from bankruptcy in September twenty nineteen after agreeing

0:18:38.880 --> 0:18:43.240
<v Speaker 1>on an eleven billion dollar settlement with insurance companies. Now,

0:18:43.240 --> 0:18:45.960
<v Speaker 1>this is the same utility company that would shut down

0:18:46.000 --> 0:18:49.879
<v Speaker 1>power to California residents in a series of planned blackouts

0:18:49.960 --> 0:18:53.119
<v Speaker 1>during a particularly windy season in order to avoid a

0:18:53.200 --> 0:18:56.840
<v Speaker 1>similar situation and which perhaps a broken power line might

0:18:56.960 --> 0:19:00.359
<v Speaker 1>start a wildfire. The blackouts affected more than half a

0:19:00.359 --> 0:19:03.919
<v Speaker 1>million people in the San Francisco region. So that was

0:19:03.960 --> 0:19:07.760
<v Speaker 1>not a great story, and the tech sector obviously covered

0:19:07.760 --> 0:19:10.520
<v Speaker 1>it quite a bit, with so many tech companies located

0:19:10.560 --> 0:19:13.879
<v Speaker 1>in the Bay Area. Now, at least seven coal mining

0:19:13.920 --> 0:19:17.520
<v Speaker 1>companies in the United States have declared bankruptcy in twenty nineteen,

0:19:17.680 --> 0:19:20.639
<v Speaker 1>which marked the first year in which more US citizens

0:19:20.680 --> 0:19:24.480
<v Speaker 1>got electricity from renewable sources than from coal powered plants.

0:19:25.119 --> 0:19:28.160
<v Speaker 1>At least thirty three oil and gas producers have gone

0:19:28.160 --> 0:19:31.520
<v Speaker 1>bankrupt as well, and the Zoo might imagine this has

0:19:31.560 --> 0:19:35.000
<v Speaker 1>made lots of folks in the coal and oil industries upset.

0:19:35.400 --> 0:19:37.760
<v Speaker 1>And while I definitely don't want to see people face

0:19:37.840 --> 0:19:40.400
<v Speaker 1>hardship as companies closed down, I don't want to see

0:19:40.440 --> 0:19:43.359
<v Speaker 1>people out of work. I also think the move away

0:19:43.400 --> 0:19:47.000
<v Speaker 1>from fossil fuels is a necessity. So it's my hope

0:19:47.480 --> 0:19:50.159
<v Speaker 1>that employees of these companies can find work in the

0:19:50.240 --> 0:19:54.000
<v Speaker 1>renewable energy sector. I think it's imperative we rid ourselves

0:19:54.000 --> 0:19:56.280
<v Speaker 1>of our dependence upon fossil fuels. But we also have

0:19:56.320 --> 0:19:59.480
<v Speaker 1>to make sure that the people who were employed by

0:19:59.520 --> 0:20:03.040
<v Speaker 1>that into tree can find good work elsewhere and they're

0:20:03.040 --> 0:20:05.640
<v Speaker 1>not just left in the lurch. We have to make

0:20:05.680 --> 0:20:08.440
<v Speaker 1>sure that whatever plans we have to transition away from

0:20:08.480 --> 0:20:12.800
<v Speaker 1>fossil fuels also take into account the people whose livelihoods

0:20:12.800 --> 0:20:16.840
<v Speaker 1>depend upon those industries. Now, speaking of going elsewhere, what

0:20:16.880 --> 0:20:19.840
<v Speaker 1>do you do when your company is in financial crisis

0:20:20.200 --> 0:20:23.119
<v Speaker 1>and the company's main product is renting out office space

0:20:23.200 --> 0:20:26.480
<v Speaker 1>to tech startups. That's the question that we Work has

0:20:26.520 --> 0:20:29.600
<v Speaker 1>been trying to answer for much of twenty nineteen. So

0:20:29.640 --> 0:20:33.480
<v Speaker 1>we Work was launched back in. The company leases out

0:20:33.600 --> 0:20:36.919
<v Speaker 1>office space to tenants and markets around the globe, So

0:20:37.000 --> 0:20:41.159
<v Speaker 1>essentially at leases out space and buildings and then sublets

0:20:41.240 --> 0:20:44.280
<v Speaker 1>that space to smaller companies. And in that regard, it's

0:20:44.320 --> 0:20:48.200
<v Speaker 1>not really a tech company in of itself, but it's

0:20:48.320 --> 0:20:52.800
<v Speaker 1>clients are in largely the startup tech space. It's kind

0:20:52.800 --> 0:20:57.119
<v Speaker 1>of the market that we Work targets. Specifically, we Work

0:20:57.160 --> 0:20:59.720
<v Speaker 1>offices tend to have amenities that you might find in

0:20:59.760 --> 0:21:02.080
<v Speaker 1>a art up that has a lot of venture capital

0:21:02.080 --> 0:21:04.439
<v Speaker 1>and angel investors behind it. So, you know, a lot

0:21:04.440 --> 0:21:08.280
<v Speaker 1>of tech journals have covered the company's rather tumultuous twenty nineteen.

0:21:08.840 --> 0:21:12.199
<v Speaker 1>We Work initially planned to hold an initial public offering

0:21:12.240 --> 0:21:15.520
<v Speaker 1>in September twenty nineteen, when it would become a publicly

0:21:15.560 --> 0:21:17.920
<v Speaker 1>traded company on the stock market. Only things did not

0:21:18.119 --> 0:21:22.240
<v Speaker 1>go quite as planned. First, something that would have made

0:21:22.280 --> 0:21:25.840
<v Speaker 1>my eyebrows go up was that the founder or co founder,

0:21:25.880 --> 0:21:30.320
<v Speaker 1>Adam Newman, liquidated around seven hundred million dollars worth of

0:21:30.359 --> 0:21:35.320
<v Speaker 1>we Work stock before it went into its initial public offering. Now,

0:21:35.800 --> 0:21:40.359
<v Speaker 1>that does not necessarily mean that Newman lacked confidence about

0:21:40.400 --> 0:21:43.280
<v Speaker 1>how the stock market would treat his company, but a

0:21:43.320 --> 0:21:46.720
<v Speaker 1>lot of folks tend to interpret those types of moves

0:21:47.160 --> 0:21:50.320
<v Speaker 1>as kind of a message that the founder doesn't think

0:21:50.440 --> 0:21:53.720
<v Speaker 1>things are gonna go well, so they're cashing out before

0:21:53.840 --> 0:21:57.399
<v Speaker 1>the value of their stock tanks. Now, when the I

0:21:57.520 --> 0:22:01.439
<v Speaker 1>p O paperwork became public in August twenty nineteen, journalists

0:22:01.480 --> 0:22:04.240
<v Speaker 1>pointed out that the company had been experiencing some pretty

0:22:04.280 --> 0:22:08.240
<v Speaker 1>massive losses, not unlike the right hailing businesses I talked

0:22:08.280 --> 0:22:11.760
<v Speaker 1>about earlier in this episode, there were questions about whether

0:22:11.840 --> 0:22:15.480
<v Speaker 1>or not we Work would ever be profitable, so also

0:22:15.760 --> 0:22:17.800
<v Speaker 1>like the right hailing services. In fact, I think there

0:22:17.840 --> 0:22:20.400
<v Speaker 1>are a lot of parallels between the two. There's also

0:22:20.440 --> 0:22:22.919
<v Speaker 1>a report that in some we Work offices the company

0:22:22.920 --> 0:22:26.000
<v Speaker 1>had included stuff like these little phone cubbies or phone

0:22:26.000 --> 0:22:29.879
<v Speaker 1>booths that had equipment in them that was emitting for

0:22:30.000 --> 0:22:33.760
<v Speaker 1>malde hyde fumes, which isn't a great thing either. We

0:22:33.800 --> 0:22:36.119
<v Speaker 1>Work ended up scuttling its plans for an I p

0:22:36.240 --> 0:22:41.200
<v Speaker 1>O and postponed those plans UH to late twenty nineteen, which,

0:22:41.240 --> 0:22:44.800
<v Speaker 1>as far as this recording is concerned, UH still hasn't

0:22:44.840 --> 0:22:48.000
<v Speaker 1>happened those those I p O plans. Newman actually would

0:22:48.000 --> 0:22:51.320
<v Speaker 1>step down as CEO shortly thereafter. He reportedly got a

0:22:51.400 --> 0:22:56.000
<v Speaker 1>one point seven billion dollar buyout from soft Bank, which

0:22:56.280 --> 0:23:00.160
<v Speaker 1>effectively controls we Work. Now, we Work began to all

0:23:00.160 --> 0:23:03.560
<v Speaker 1>off some other companies it had acquired over recent years,

0:23:03.880 --> 0:23:07.240
<v Speaker 1>and it also laid off about twenty percent of its workforce.

0:23:07.560 --> 0:23:10.280
<v Speaker 1>Reporters noted that the company had also started to explore

0:23:10.280 --> 0:23:14.080
<v Speaker 1>ways it might back out of some leases in various regions,

0:23:14.440 --> 0:23:21.000
<v Speaker 1>while simultaneously announcing plans about opening news space in different cities. Also,

0:23:21.200 --> 0:23:25.160
<v Speaker 1>just here's a personal note to soft Bank. You can

0:23:25.200 --> 0:23:28.479
<v Speaker 1>pay me a billion dollars and I won't even settle

0:23:28.560 --> 0:23:32.119
<v Speaker 1>you with a company that has no known pathway to profitability.

0:23:32.359 --> 0:23:36.440
<v Speaker 1>It's a bargain. Just show me the money now. Not

0:23:36.480 --> 0:23:39.120
<v Speaker 1>to get too sidetracked by all this, but I feel

0:23:39.160 --> 0:23:42.440
<v Speaker 1>like we Work and the ride hailing services really fall

0:23:42.480 --> 0:23:44.600
<v Speaker 1>into that fake it until you make it category I

0:23:44.640 --> 0:23:46.639
<v Speaker 1>covered on a recent episode of Tech Stuff, you know,

0:23:46.680 --> 0:23:49.040
<v Speaker 1>the one where I ranted for like forty five minutes.

0:23:49.480 --> 0:23:52.680
<v Speaker 1>I find it perplexing that the motivating factor for investment

0:23:53.280 --> 0:23:57.760
<v Speaker 1>isn't profitability but just company growth, as in, a company

0:23:57.800 --> 0:24:00.760
<v Speaker 1>doesn't need to show it can be profitable if it

0:24:00.840 --> 0:24:05.000
<v Speaker 1>can continue to expand rapidly. But in my mind, that

0:24:05.119 --> 0:24:08.920
<v Speaker 1>just means that now instead of a small, unprofitable company,

0:24:09.040 --> 0:24:13.199
<v Speaker 1>you've got a large, more complex, unprofitable company. And I

0:24:13.240 --> 0:24:16.240
<v Speaker 1>suppose the hope is that you will eventually quote unquote

0:24:16.320 --> 0:24:19.560
<v Speaker 1>make it up in volume, meaning that whenever you achieve

0:24:20.200 --> 0:24:25.520
<v Speaker 1>some predetermined magical scale, your operations will become profitable. But

0:24:25.600 --> 0:24:29.280
<v Speaker 1>from my perspective, it seems that that very rarely happens,

0:24:29.320 --> 0:24:32.280
<v Speaker 1>and that you're more likely to find yourself pouring money

0:24:32.359 --> 0:24:35.560
<v Speaker 1>into a sinking ship, and then people like Newman get

0:24:35.600 --> 0:24:39.879
<v Speaker 1>the benefit of a lifeboat that's loaded down with cash. Anyway,

0:24:39.920 --> 0:24:42.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm not an expert in corporate finance, so it's entirely

0:24:42.960 --> 0:24:46.480
<v Speaker 1>possible that I'm overlooking something obvious. It's just to me,

0:24:47.240 --> 0:24:51.320
<v Speaker 1>this model doesn't make much sense. I get the desire

0:24:51.400 --> 0:24:55.200
<v Speaker 1>to grow year over year, although I'm not crazy about it,

0:24:55.240 --> 0:24:59.960
<v Speaker 1>but without the profitability part in there, and growth is unsustained,

0:25:00.080 --> 0:25:03.080
<v Speaker 1>bowl you'll eventually collapse in on yourself because no one's

0:25:03.080 --> 0:25:06.639
<v Speaker 1>gonna keep giving you money just to grow. All right,

0:25:06.680 --> 0:25:09.800
<v Speaker 1>how about we chat a bit about everyone's favorite social

0:25:09.840 --> 0:25:13.640
<v Speaker 1>media platform that continues to play an increasingly pivotal role

0:25:13.720 --> 0:25:17.600
<v Speaker 1>in how we access information and misinformation. So it's time

0:25:17.600 --> 0:25:19.919
<v Speaker 1>to check in on what Facebook was up to in

0:25:19.960 --> 0:25:23.280
<v Speaker 1>twenty nineteen. And boy howdy, there was a lot going on.

0:25:23.560 --> 0:25:25.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm not even going to cover all of it, because

0:25:26.000 --> 0:25:28.800
<v Speaker 1>you could do a full episode on just the shenanigans

0:25:28.800 --> 0:25:32.360
<v Speaker 1>Facebook got up to in nineteen, But anyway, let's look

0:25:32.400 --> 0:25:34.399
<v Speaker 1>at some of the big ones. For one thing, the

0:25:34.440 --> 0:25:37.920
<v Speaker 1>company received a hefty fine for the Cambridge Analytica scandal,

0:25:38.119 --> 0:25:41.560
<v Speaker 1>in which Facebook's app permissions allowed a data collection company

0:25:41.600 --> 0:25:44.720
<v Speaker 1>to access not just the information of people who downloaded

0:25:44.880 --> 0:25:48.080
<v Speaker 1>the app or who installed the app, but also the

0:25:48.200 --> 0:25:52.080
<v Speaker 1>data of all of their contacts on Facebook who did

0:25:52.119 --> 0:25:55.920
<v Speaker 1>not opt in. The fine was five billion dollars of

0:25:56.040 --> 0:25:59.600
<v Speaker 1>princely some no doubt about it, But there are critics

0:25:59.640 --> 0:26:03.440
<v Speaker 1>who said that's not nearly severe enough of a penalty

0:26:03.520 --> 0:26:07.159
<v Speaker 1>considering the scope of the betrayal of trust and user information.

0:26:07.400 --> 0:26:11.520
<v Speaker 1>After all, Facebook as a company earned twenty two billion

0:26:11.600 --> 0:26:15.360
<v Speaker 1>dollars in revenue in so yeah, five billions a lot

0:26:15.400 --> 0:26:17.640
<v Speaker 1>of cash, But when you're looking at numbers like twenty

0:26:17.640 --> 0:26:21.000
<v Speaker 1>two billion dollars in revenue, a five billion dollar fine

0:26:21.080 --> 0:26:23.879
<v Speaker 1>might not be enough to make Facebook actually take greater

0:26:23.960 --> 0:26:28.119
<v Speaker 1>steps towards ensuring user security. In June two thousand nineteen,

0:26:28.560 --> 0:26:33.560
<v Speaker 1>Facebook announced the launch of Libra, the cryptocurrency project. Facebook

0:26:33.600 --> 0:26:37.520
<v Speaker 1>also announced the Libra Association, a consortium of twenty eight

0:26:37.560 --> 0:26:41.119
<v Speaker 1>companies that would form the initial group responsible for bringing

0:26:41.119 --> 0:26:45.560
<v Speaker 1>this cryptocurrency into reality, with a promise that more companies

0:26:45.560 --> 0:26:48.879
<v Speaker 1>would soon follow to join the consortium. So think of

0:26:48.880 --> 0:26:52.399
<v Speaker 1>it as a digital currency, not too different from something

0:26:52.440 --> 0:26:56.919
<v Speaker 1>like bitcoin, although the Libra cryptocurrency would be based on

0:26:57.040 --> 0:27:00.920
<v Speaker 1>real world assets and not just its own own uh

0:27:01.240 --> 0:27:06.360
<v Speaker 1>sense of value among the community. However, this announcement Facebook

0:27:06.359 --> 0:27:09.040
<v Speaker 1>made was met with scrutiny, particularly on the part of

0:27:09.119 --> 0:27:11.800
<v Speaker 1>various governmental agencies around the world, and to be fair,

0:27:12.560 --> 0:27:16.159
<v Speaker 1>it's more accurate to say Facebook is the leading voice

0:27:16.800 --> 0:27:21.399
<v Speaker 1>in this project UH and is not the only entity

0:27:21.480 --> 0:27:24.920
<v Speaker 1>behind it, but for the purposes of most reporting, people

0:27:24.960 --> 0:27:28.480
<v Speaker 1>tend to simplify it by saying Facebook now. Governments began

0:27:28.520 --> 0:27:31.879
<v Speaker 1>to call for regulations and rules to guide any sort

0:27:31.920 --> 0:27:35.320
<v Speaker 1>of cryptocurrency effort, particularly in the wake of some high

0:27:35.400 --> 0:27:39.560
<v Speaker 1>profile missteps by Facebook, like the aforementioned Cambridge Analytica scandal.

0:27:40.280 --> 0:27:44.600
<v Speaker 1>By October twenty nineteen, more than of those original companies

0:27:44.640 --> 0:27:48.359
<v Speaker 1>had walked away from the Libra consortium. The first to

0:27:48.440 --> 0:27:52.000
<v Speaker 1>leave was PayPal, and in an interview with Forbes, PayPal

0:27:52.080 --> 0:27:55.240
<v Speaker 1>CEO Dan Shulman said that when they were able to

0:27:55.280 --> 0:27:57.920
<v Speaker 1>see how far the project needed to go before it

0:27:57.960 --> 0:28:01.000
<v Speaker 1>could roll out, and they heard that with the amount

0:28:01.000 --> 0:28:03.160
<v Speaker 1>of work that PayPal needed to do to meet its

0:28:03.160 --> 0:28:07.280
<v Speaker 1>own internal goals that were not related to Libra, they said, oh, well,

0:28:07.400 --> 0:28:09.240
<v Speaker 1>just it makes sense for us to be part of

0:28:09.280 --> 0:28:13.040
<v Speaker 1>the consortium. We needed to focus on us first. Now,

0:28:13.040 --> 0:28:16.600
<v Speaker 1>whether that was the same justification for the other companies

0:28:16.600 --> 0:28:20.000
<v Speaker 1>that bailed on the Libra association, I can't say, but

0:28:20.280 --> 0:28:25.560
<v Speaker 1>companies like Visa, Stripe, MasterCard, and eBay also left the association.

0:28:26.000 --> 0:28:29.479
<v Speaker 1>With the increased interest among various governments to create rules

0:28:29.480 --> 0:28:32.280
<v Speaker 1>to minimize the risk of something like a new cryptocurrency,

0:28:32.560 --> 0:28:34.600
<v Speaker 1>it seems like Libra has a long way to go

0:28:34.960 --> 0:28:38.640
<v Speaker 1>before it becomes a practical currency, if it ever does.

0:28:39.600 --> 0:28:42.840
<v Speaker 1>Another big Facebook story revolves around these social media platforms

0:28:42.960 --> 0:28:47.520
<v Speaker 1>role in disseminating information and misinformation. This was a big

0:28:47.560 --> 0:28:50.920
<v Speaker 1>theme throughout twenty nineteen, Mark Zuckerberg stated before the US

0:28:50.960 --> 0:28:54.120
<v Speaker 1>government that he feels Facebook shouldn't play a role in

0:28:54.200 --> 0:28:58.400
<v Speaker 1>fact checking stuff like political ads. So if a politician

0:28:58.440 --> 0:29:01.160
<v Speaker 1>wanted to post an ad to face Book that contained

0:29:01.440 --> 0:29:05.800
<v Speaker 1>incorrect or outright false information, they could do that and

0:29:05.880 --> 0:29:09.600
<v Speaker 1>Facebook would not intervene. As the company continues to deal

0:29:09.640 --> 0:29:13.200
<v Speaker 1>with accusations that it is profiting from efforts of political

0:29:13.240 --> 0:29:17.360
<v Speaker 1>manipulation and deception, this has been an area of focus

0:29:17.400 --> 0:29:22.120
<v Speaker 1>for a lot of folks. Moreover, Facebook's algorithm favors posts

0:29:22.120 --> 0:29:27.160
<v Speaker 1>that drive a lot of engagement, so likes, shares comments

0:29:27.200 --> 0:29:30.040
<v Speaker 1>that kind of thing. Now, in turn, that generates more

0:29:30.080 --> 0:29:33.680
<v Speaker 1>screen time for Facebook and us more revenue for the company.

0:29:33.760 --> 0:29:37.280
<v Speaker 1>So the company has a financial incentive to give a

0:29:37.360 --> 0:29:40.840
<v Speaker 1>platform for stuff that gets people riled up, which in

0:29:40.920 --> 0:29:44.920
<v Speaker 1>turn contributes to things like political extremism, which I'll talk

0:29:44.960 --> 0:29:49.160
<v Speaker 1>more about in our next episode. It's a pretty ugly situation,

0:29:49.280 --> 0:29:52.320
<v Speaker 1>and Zuckerberg so far seems to be intent on absolving

0:29:52.400 --> 0:29:55.840
<v Speaker 1>himself of any responsibility for creating a platform that can

0:29:55.880 --> 0:29:59.800
<v Speaker 1>be gamed in this way, and the platform itself benefits

0:30:00.200 --> 0:30:05.080
<v Speaker 1>from this. I can't stress that enough. Facebook makes money

0:30:05.280 --> 0:30:09.880
<v Speaker 1>by having these sorts of posts on it because it

0:30:09.920 --> 0:30:13.920
<v Speaker 1>generates a lot of activity, and that activity translates into

0:30:14.000 --> 0:30:17.120
<v Speaker 1>more screen time, which translates into more money for Facebook,

0:30:17.480 --> 0:30:20.720
<v Speaker 1>so they have a financial incentive to keep things going

0:30:20.720 --> 0:30:23.520
<v Speaker 1>the way they are. Towards the end of twenty nineteen,

0:30:23.880 --> 0:30:26.320
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Trade Commission in the United States began to

0:30:26.360 --> 0:30:29.480
<v Speaker 1>take a closer look at Facebook's proposed plan to integrating

0:30:29.520 --> 0:30:34.280
<v Speaker 1>its various properties together, uh those being Facebook, Messenger, WhatsApp,

0:30:34.440 --> 0:30:37.240
<v Speaker 1>and Instagram. So while Facebook is trying to do this,

0:30:37.480 --> 0:30:40.280
<v Speaker 1>it is also under investigation by the US government in

0:30:40.320 --> 0:30:44.720
<v Speaker 1>an antitrust case. A tighter integration between the different platforms

0:30:44.720 --> 0:30:47.480
<v Speaker 1>would make it more difficult to separate down the line,

0:30:47.760 --> 0:30:50.320
<v Speaker 1>and it's possible that the US government will demand Facebook

0:30:50.360 --> 0:30:52.800
<v Speaker 1>to break up its various properties and spin them off

0:30:52.840 --> 0:30:55.880
<v Speaker 1>as independent companies. So there's a chance that by the

0:30:55.880 --> 0:30:58.200
<v Speaker 1>time you hear this, the FTC will have filed an

0:30:58.240 --> 0:31:02.840
<v Speaker 1>injunction against Facebook from integrating these services further. And the

0:31:02.920 --> 0:31:07.240
<v Speaker 1>hits just keep on coming. Between when I started making

0:31:07.320 --> 0:31:10.320
<v Speaker 1>notes for this episode and when I actually sat down

0:31:10.360 --> 0:31:13.000
<v Speaker 1>in the studio to record it right now, you had

0:31:13.040 --> 0:31:16.760
<v Speaker 1>another story about Facebook broke in mid December Facebook sent

0:31:16.880 --> 0:31:19.800
<v Speaker 1>a letter to the United States Senate. The letter revealed

0:31:19.840 --> 0:31:22.640
<v Speaker 1>that the company could locate users even if they had

0:31:22.680 --> 0:31:26.880
<v Speaker 1>opted out of being tracked with location data. Now, I

0:31:26.920 --> 0:31:30.440
<v Speaker 1>would argue that this isn't as big a news story

0:31:30.560 --> 0:31:33.320
<v Speaker 1>as it was made out to be because Facebook stated

0:31:33.360 --> 0:31:36.240
<v Speaker 1>that they could use meta data, such as tagged photos

0:31:36.280 --> 0:31:39.160
<v Speaker 1>that indicated a location and time, as well as who

0:31:39.240 --> 0:31:43.280
<v Speaker 1>was in the tagged photo. But that seems pretty intuitive

0:31:43.320 --> 0:31:45.200
<v Speaker 1>to me. If I go to a party and I

0:31:45.280 --> 0:31:47.240
<v Speaker 1>take a photo of you, you're at the party two,

0:31:47.400 --> 0:31:50.200
<v Speaker 1>and then I post from the party and I tagged

0:31:50.320 --> 0:31:53.600
<v Speaker 1>the location of the party and I tag you, then

0:31:53.600 --> 0:31:56.880
<v Speaker 1>Facebook has data on where I am, where you are,

0:31:57.280 --> 0:32:00.160
<v Speaker 1>what time we were there, and all of that that.

0:32:00.520 --> 0:32:03.800
<v Speaker 1>It's all there in Facebook's data even if we don't

0:32:03.800 --> 0:32:08.000
<v Speaker 1>have location information turned on regularly. Other ways Facebook could

0:32:08.160 --> 0:32:11.440
<v Speaker 1>make guesses as to where people are depend less on

0:32:11.560 --> 0:32:15.000
<v Speaker 1>direct user input and more and stuff like I P addresses,

0:32:15.320 --> 0:32:19.440
<v Speaker 1>which aren't as exact. They can give you a general idea,

0:32:19.720 --> 0:32:22.880
<v Speaker 1>but they're not full proof. Now, Facebook defended its policies

0:32:22.920 --> 0:32:27.680
<v Speaker 1>by stating that it could detect suspicious logins using this approach,

0:32:27.960 --> 0:32:29.920
<v Speaker 1>such as if a person in one part of the

0:32:29.960 --> 0:32:32.600
<v Speaker 1>country were to suddenly appear as though they were trying

0:32:32.680 --> 0:32:36.440
<v Speaker 1>to log into Facebook, but from an IP address located

0:32:36.520 --> 0:32:38.800
<v Speaker 1>on the other side of the world. That would indicate

0:32:38.840 --> 0:32:41.160
<v Speaker 1>that maybe somebody else had gotten hold of some log

0:32:41.200 --> 0:32:45.360
<v Speaker 1>in information and they were trying to steal someone's Facebook account.

0:32:45.600 --> 0:32:49.800
<v Speaker 1>Of course, stuff like VPNs could also create this scenario.

0:32:50.080 --> 0:32:53.040
<v Speaker 1>You could be using a VPN to log into Facebook

0:32:53.200 --> 0:32:56.440
<v Speaker 1>from the other side of the world for various reasons,

0:32:56.480 --> 0:32:58.400
<v Speaker 1>and that could raise a false flag. But I do

0:32:58.480 --> 0:33:01.280
<v Speaker 1>see what Facebook was trying to say. Now, one last

0:33:01.280 --> 0:33:04.760
<v Speaker 1>Facebook story before I take another break. In mid November,

0:33:05.160 --> 0:33:08.640
<v Speaker 1>a thief stole several hard drives from the car of

0:33:08.680 --> 0:33:13.400
<v Speaker 1>a Facebook employee, and those hard drives included unencrypted payroll

0:33:13.560 --> 0:33:17.760
<v Speaker 1>data for thousands of Facebook employees. The data covered about

0:33:17.800 --> 0:33:21.959
<v Speaker 1>twenty nine thousand people who are working for Facebook, so

0:33:22.000 --> 0:33:26.479
<v Speaker 1>some of those folks presumably no longer work for the company. Now,

0:33:26.520 --> 0:33:29.880
<v Speaker 1>in this case, we're talking about physical hardware taken from

0:33:29.880 --> 0:33:32.080
<v Speaker 1>a car, so this was not a data breach in

0:33:32.080 --> 0:33:35.760
<v Speaker 1>the traditional sense. Now I'm surprised the data was unencrypted.

0:33:36.080 --> 0:33:38.320
<v Speaker 1>I would imagine that in most cases you would want

0:33:38.320 --> 0:33:41.240
<v Speaker 1>to encrypt that information, even on just a physical hard drive,

0:33:41.960 --> 0:33:45.360
<v Speaker 1>but presumably it wasn't because no one ever assumed the

0:33:45.360 --> 0:33:49.640
<v Speaker 1>hard drives would leave the possession of Facebook. Still, yikes,

0:33:50.840 --> 0:33:53.240
<v Speaker 1>we got a few more bummers to go, but before

0:33:53.240 --> 0:34:03.000
<v Speaker 1>we do, let's take another quick break. So a big

0:34:03.040 --> 0:34:05.640
<v Speaker 1>story to play out over the course of twenty nineteen

0:34:06.240 --> 0:34:10.160
<v Speaker 1>was the world's response to the Chinese telecom company Huawei,

0:34:10.400 --> 0:34:13.120
<v Speaker 1>which I've also covered in a previous episode of tech Stuff.

0:34:13.400 --> 0:34:16.440
<v Speaker 1>The company isn't that old, but it already stands to

0:34:16.440 --> 0:34:18.880
<v Speaker 1>be one of the major players in rolling out the

0:34:18.920 --> 0:34:22.920
<v Speaker 1>technology that will enable five G wireless connectivity around the world.

0:34:23.320 --> 0:34:26.560
<v Speaker 1>In fact, with the outstanding orders the company already has

0:34:26.640 --> 0:34:29.600
<v Speaker 1>in Europe, it leads the pack in terms of five

0:34:29.680 --> 0:34:34.080
<v Speaker 1>G equipment sales. This is despite some hefty restrictions placed

0:34:34.120 --> 0:34:38.560
<v Speaker 1>upon Huawei, mostly from the United States. In mid December

0:34:38.640 --> 0:34:42.000
<v Speaker 1>twenty nineteen, it was revealed that Chinese officials had leveraged

0:34:42.120 --> 0:34:46.600
<v Speaker 1>tremendous pressure on European countries to sign contracts to purchase

0:34:46.680 --> 0:34:51.160
<v Speaker 1>five G equipment from Huawei or face consequences such as

0:34:51.239 --> 0:34:56.120
<v Speaker 1>canceled trade agreements. You know, wider trade agreements throughout China.

0:34:56.520 --> 0:34:59.000
<v Speaker 1>Now at the heart of the dispute is a concern

0:34:59.080 --> 0:35:02.239
<v Speaker 1>that Huawei has close ties with the Chinese government and

0:35:02.360 --> 0:35:07.040
<v Speaker 1>that as a provider of telecommunications equipment, it's possible the

0:35:07.040 --> 0:35:10.320
<v Speaker 1>company could potentially build in back doors and other features

0:35:10.360 --> 0:35:14.840
<v Speaker 1>that would allow China to access vital communications channels across

0:35:14.920 --> 0:35:18.680
<v Speaker 1>the globe. In fact, such back doors had previously been found,

0:35:18.680 --> 0:35:23.160
<v Speaker 1>although they could have been vulnerabilities not intentionally placed there,

0:35:23.520 --> 0:35:28.560
<v Speaker 1>but still it raises some eyebrows. Huawei argues that it's

0:35:28.560 --> 0:35:31.440
<v Speaker 1>actually a private company and it doesn't have any direction

0:35:31.480 --> 0:35:35.080
<v Speaker 1>from the Chinese government, and that such fears are unfounded.

0:35:35.640 --> 0:35:38.120
<v Speaker 1>But it hasn't stopped countries like the United States from

0:35:38.120 --> 0:35:42.279
<v Speaker 1>eyeing Huawei with suspicion, And to be fair, China is

0:35:42.719 --> 0:35:46.840
<v Speaker 1>putting some pressure on various countries that are you know,

0:35:46.960 --> 0:35:51.200
<v Speaker 1>conflicted about using Huawei, and that seems to send a

0:35:51.239 --> 0:35:57.239
<v Speaker 1>message that China's kind of deeply integrated with the company's

0:35:57.760 --> 0:36:02.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, day to day operations. Although Huawei says, no, no, no,

0:36:02.239 --> 0:36:05.080
<v Speaker 1>this is just a government looking out for a company

0:36:05.120 --> 0:36:09.160
<v Speaker 1>that exists within its borders. That's it. It's not a

0:36:09.280 --> 0:36:13.160
<v Speaker 1>sign that it's a Chinese government operation. So it's a

0:36:13.200 --> 0:36:16.920
<v Speaker 1>complicated thing, and it all depends upon whose perspective you believe.

0:36:17.120 --> 0:36:20.440
<v Speaker 1>The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. Speaking of China,

0:36:20.960 --> 0:36:24.279
<v Speaker 1>the country's conflicts with Hong Kong have spilled over into

0:36:24.320 --> 0:36:27.400
<v Speaker 1>the tech space in various ways. A large number of

0:36:27.440 --> 0:36:31.680
<v Speaker 1>Hong Kong citizens mobilized against the Chinese government, initially protesting

0:36:31.680 --> 0:36:35.560
<v Speaker 1>a policy that would allow for extradition of Hong Kong

0:36:35.680 --> 0:36:39.279
<v Speaker 1>citizens accused of certain crimes and they would be extradited

0:36:39.320 --> 0:36:43.000
<v Speaker 1>to mainland China. Now, given China's reputation when it comes

0:36:43.000 --> 0:36:47.200
<v Speaker 1>to justice, the too long didn't read version of that is,

0:36:47.719 --> 0:36:52.759
<v Speaker 1>it's a very bad reputation. Many Hong Kong citizens protested

0:36:52.960 --> 0:36:56.520
<v Speaker 1>against this policy. They stated that it was undermining the

0:36:56.560 --> 0:36:59.920
<v Speaker 1>independence of Hong Kong, which was something China had previously

0:37:00.040 --> 0:37:03.719
<v Speaker 1>promised it wouldn't mess around with. While China would ultimately

0:37:03.760 --> 0:37:07.719
<v Speaker 1>withdraw the extradition bill, this was really the push that

0:37:07.840 --> 0:37:11.600
<v Speaker 1>got the ball rolling, and protests continue to this day

0:37:11.640 --> 0:37:14.200
<v Speaker 1>because they extend beyond that. You could think of that

0:37:14.200 --> 0:37:17.799
<v Speaker 1>as the straw that broke the camel's back. Now the

0:37:17.840 --> 0:37:21.160
<v Speaker 1>tech angle of all of this, there's the video game

0:37:21.160 --> 0:37:23.799
<v Speaker 1>company Blizzard that I recently covered on tech stuff. While

0:37:23.840 --> 0:37:28.120
<v Speaker 1>they make a digital card battle game called Hearthstone, and

0:37:28.239 --> 0:37:32.240
<v Speaker 1>during a Hearthstone tournament in Taiwan, a Hong Kong player

0:37:32.320 --> 0:37:36.960
<v Speaker 1>named why Chung or blitz Chung that's his gamer handle,

0:37:37.560 --> 0:37:41.600
<v Speaker 1>showed support for Hong Kong protesters on camera during an

0:37:41.640 --> 0:37:46.160
<v Speaker 1>interview Blizzard band blitz Chung from the tournament. The Blizzard

0:37:46.200 --> 0:37:50.040
<v Speaker 1>also banned the UH the people who were conducting the interview,

0:37:50.080 --> 0:37:52.719
<v Speaker 1>even though they were doing their best to try and

0:37:53.280 --> 0:37:57.759
<v Speaker 1>avoid appearing like they were enabling this UH and that

0:37:57.840 --> 0:38:00.080
<v Speaker 1>band of blitz Chung would prevent him from playing in

0:38:00.239 --> 0:38:02.799
<v Speaker 1>any grand Master tournament for a year, and he would

0:38:02.800 --> 0:38:05.759
<v Speaker 1>have to forfeit the prize money he had accumulated up

0:38:05.800 --> 0:38:09.240
<v Speaker 1>to that point in the tournament. When pressed to explain

0:38:09.440 --> 0:38:13.440
<v Speaker 1>why they leveled such a harsh ban, Blizzards stated that

0:38:13.480 --> 0:38:17.120
<v Speaker 1>blitz Chung had violated a policy that prohibited players from

0:38:17.160 --> 0:38:20.280
<v Speaker 1>doing anything that would tarnish the company's image or within

0:38:20.400 --> 0:38:24.560
<v Speaker 1>the public. Now, that raised a pretty strong counter objection

0:38:24.960 --> 0:38:29.440
<v Speaker 1>among the gaming community at large. Many people hypothesized that

0:38:29.520 --> 0:38:33.359
<v Speaker 1>blizzards response was largely motivated by the fact that ten Cent,

0:38:33.680 --> 0:38:38.080
<v Speaker 1>a Chinese company, owns a stake of ownership in Activision.

0:38:38.120 --> 0:38:41.279
<v Speaker 1>Blizzard they don't own the company outright, they just own

0:38:41.320 --> 0:38:46.040
<v Speaker 1>a percentage. There was also speculation that Blizzard didn't want

0:38:46.080 --> 0:38:50.360
<v Speaker 1>to endanger operations within the Chinese market. The Chinese market

0:38:50.400 --> 0:38:54.160
<v Speaker 1>represents billions of dollars of potential revenue, so they didn't

0:38:54.160 --> 0:38:57.040
<v Speaker 1>want to put that at risk. Critics also pointed out

0:38:57.080 --> 0:39:00.400
<v Speaker 1>that Blizzards punishments toward other gamers around the world in

0:39:00.480 --> 0:39:03.960
<v Speaker 1>response to vulgarity, you know, clear cut cases where someone

0:39:04.040 --> 0:39:08.200
<v Speaker 1>has violated that policy. They were rarely as severe as

0:39:08.239 --> 0:39:13.799
<v Speaker 1>what blitz Chung experienced. Blizzards subsequently walked back the punishment

0:39:13.880 --> 0:39:16.719
<v Speaker 1>a little bit. They returned the prize winnings to blitz Chung,

0:39:17.040 --> 0:39:19.799
<v Speaker 1>but they kept a ban in place for half a

0:39:19.880 --> 0:39:25.120
<v Speaker 1>year rather than a full year. Interestingly, Chinese companies, namely Tencent,

0:39:25.280 --> 0:39:29.160
<v Speaker 1>have partial ownership in other video game companies, not just Blizzard,

0:39:29.600 --> 0:39:32.400
<v Speaker 1>and some of these companies also produce games that have

0:39:32.560 --> 0:39:35.480
<v Speaker 1>a tournament circuit, and in some of those cases, there

0:39:35.480 --> 0:39:38.000
<v Speaker 1>seems to be no restriction on what players can say

0:39:38.040 --> 0:39:41.560
<v Speaker 1>about the situation in Hong Kong. So that raises questions

0:39:41.560 --> 0:39:45.279
<v Speaker 1>about whether Blizzard was being proactively responsive for fear of

0:39:45.400 --> 0:39:49.200
<v Speaker 1>upsetting the Apple cart or if possibly other companies have

0:39:49.360 --> 0:39:53.360
<v Speaker 1>seen the backlash that Blizzard faced and they're setting themselves

0:39:53.360 --> 0:39:56.960
<v Speaker 1>apart by taking a different approach. Oh and I should

0:39:56.960 --> 0:39:59.560
<v Speaker 1>also backtrack just a little bit. So remember how I

0:39:59.600 --> 0:40:02.319
<v Speaker 1>mentioned Whahwei is a leading company when it comes to

0:40:02.360 --> 0:40:05.560
<v Speaker 1>five G technologies. Well, that reminds me I should quickly

0:40:05.560 --> 0:40:08.280
<v Speaker 1>address that a T and T and the company's attempt

0:40:08.360 --> 0:40:10.600
<v Speaker 1>to leverage the concept of five G and how that

0:40:10.880 --> 0:40:14.040
<v Speaker 1>got a lot of scorn in the tech community. Okay,

0:40:14.080 --> 0:40:17.719
<v Speaker 1>so part of this story hinges on the fact that

0:40:17.880 --> 0:40:21.120
<v Speaker 1>five G isn't just a single technology or anything like that.

0:40:21.760 --> 0:40:26.200
<v Speaker 1>You can't just say five G relates to this specific implementation.

0:40:26.480 --> 0:40:29.720
<v Speaker 1>It's really more of a family of technologies and implementations

0:40:29.760 --> 0:40:34.759
<v Speaker 1>that enable wireless data throughput at really impressive levels. And

0:40:34.800 --> 0:40:38.200
<v Speaker 1>we typically describe it as speed, but the data is

0:40:38.239 --> 0:40:41.160
<v Speaker 1>not actually moving faster than it was before. It's just

0:40:41.200 --> 0:40:44.760
<v Speaker 1>that more data can travel all at once through a channel.

0:40:45.000 --> 0:40:48.080
<v Speaker 1>So instead of thinking of it as like a one

0:40:48.160 --> 0:40:50.479
<v Speaker 1>lane road where you can just somehow defy the laws

0:40:50.520 --> 0:40:53.120
<v Speaker 1>of physics and drive faster than the speed of light,

0:40:53.719 --> 0:40:56.920
<v Speaker 1>it's more like you have an ultra wide highway where

0:40:57.120 --> 0:40:59.600
<v Speaker 1>all the cars can travel at the speed of light

0:40:59.640 --> 0:41:03.239
<v Speaker 1>simul taneously, so you get more cars, more data, but

0:41:03.280 --> 0:41:05.759
<v Speaker 1>they're not traveling faster than they were before. There's just

0:41:05.920 --> 0:41:09.160
<v Speaker 1>more of them. The rollout of five G is taking

0:41:09.200 --> 0:41:13.160
<v Speaker 1>time because it requires new infrastructure. You can't just send

0:41:13.200 --> 0:41:16.520
<v Speaker 1>an update out to existing antenna's out there. You actually

0:41:16.560 --> 0:41:19.840
<v Speaker 1>have to go install new ones and make them in

0:41:19.880 --> 0:41:23.560
<v Speaker 1>a different density than older generations of wireless technology. You

0:41:23.600 --> 0:41:26.600
<v Speaker 1>also need to have phones and other devices that can

0:41:26.640 --> 0:41:29.520
<v Speaker 1>actually receive five G signals to take advantage of it.

0:41:29.560 --> 0:41:32.960
<v Speaker 1>They can't just do that with their standard stuff, so

0:41:33.000 --> 0:41:36.719
<v Speaker 1>it requires a whole lot of hardware upgrades across the board. Now,

0:41:36.760 --> 0:41:39.239
<v Speaker 1>A T and T decided to kind of, you know,

0:41:40.600 --> 0:41:44.120
<v Speaker 1>leap frog all of that. The company made a change

0:41:44.480 --> 0:41:47.239
<v Speaker 1>and they pushed out an update that would replace the

0:41:47.480 --> 0:41:51.960
<v Speaker 1>LTE indicator on certain A T and T smartphones with

0:41:52.120 --> 0:41:55.880
<v Speaker 1>a symbol saying five G E, and the E stands

0:41:55.920 --> 0:42:01.399
<v Speaker 1>for evolution, so is a five G evolution network device. Now.

0:42:01.400 --> 0:42:04.360
<v Speaker 1>Critics said that A T and T was purposefully confusing

0:42:04.400 --> 0:42:08.399
<v Speaker 1>the market, that it was positioning these phones as if

0:42:08.440 --> 0:42:11.719
<v Speaker 1>they were already taking advantage of true five G networks,

0:42:11.760 --> 0:42:15.440
<v Speaker 1>and we're operating on actual five G technology, when in

0:42:15.560 --> 0:42:19.480
<v Speaker 1>fact they were actually relying on the older lt E

0:42:19.840 --> 0:42:24.000
<v Speaker 1>four G technology. Making matters more confusing was that A

0:42:24.080 --> 0:42:28.120
<v Speaker 1>T and T was actually rolling out legit five G infrastructure,

0:42:28.320 --> 0:42:31.080
<v Speaker 1>but it was only available in limited areas, and sometimes

0:42:31.080 --> 0:42:33.960
<v Speaker 1>that would just be a small area within an actual city.

0:42:34.040 --> 0:42:38.360
<v Speaker 1>For example, according to analytics company open Signal, the A

0:42:38.440 --> 0:42:41.799
<v Speaker 1>T and T five G E service did not outperform

0:42:41.920 --> 0:42:45.600
<v Speaker 1>either T Mobile or Verizons LTE service, and so the

0:42:45.640 --> 0:42:48.640
<v Speaker 1>general conclusion was that A T and T was trying

0:42:48.640 --> 0:42:51.719
<v Speaker 1>to take advantage of an emerging technology to make it

0:42:51.760 --> 0:42:55.879
<v Speaker 1>seem like their product, which according to tests wasn't superior

0:42:56.160 --> 0:42:59.720
<v Speaker 1>to the competition, was somehow more capable. It was dirty

0:42:59.760 --> 0:43:03.279
<v Speaker 1>pool wool, as go maz Adams would say. Now I

0:43:03.320 --> 0:43:05.880
<v Speaker 1>should also add that while it looks to me like

0:43:05.960 --> 0:43:09.360
<v Speaker 1>A T and T deliberately tried to fool folks with

0:43:09.400 --> 0:43:13.759
<v Speaker 1>this whole five G evolution network approach, the situation does

0:43:13.840 --> 0:43:18.560
<v Speaker 1>actually get pretty complicated because the generations of wireless connectivity

0:43:18.600 --> 0:43:22.080
<v Speaker 1>are kind of lucy goosey. You can't point to say

0:43:22.280 --> 0:43:25.440
<v Speaker 1>three G and give a set of firm specifications on

0:43:25.480 --> 0:43:28.120
<v Speaker 1>how much data could be sent over a network per

0:43:28.239 --> 0:43:32.200
<v Speaker 1>unit of time. The technologies within a generation evolve over

0:43:32.239 --> 0:43:34.879
<v Speaker 1>the course of that generation, and if a company can

0:43:35.000 --> 0:43:38.640
<v Speaker 1>upgrade hardware to take advantage of those evolutions, it can

0:43:38.680 --> 0:43:42.480
<v Speaker 1>see improved data rate. So, in other words, not all

0:43:42.560 --> 0:43:46.200
<v Speaker 1>four G networks or devices are equal. Some are capable

0:43:46.239 --> 0:43:49.879
<v Speaker 1>of much better data transfer rates than others. It's even

0:43:49.920 --> 0:43:53.280
<v Speaker 1>possible to have a really good network and a device

0:43:53.400 --> 0:43:58.359
<v Speaker 1>on an earlier generation outperform a later generation. Example, so

0:43:58.520 --> 0:44:00.520
<v Speaker 1>it's possible for you to have a really good four

0:44:00.560 --> 0:44:04.000
<v Speaker 1>G network and device outperform a five G device on

0:44:04.040 --> 0:44:10.279
<v Speaker 1>a five G network. Possibly it's that the Venn diagram

0:44:10.320 --> 0:44:12.839
<v Speaker 1>is narrow, but it can happen, so it's not as

0:44:12.880 --> 0:44:15.279
<v Speaker 1>simple as saying five G is faster than four G.

0:44:15.800 --> 0:44:19.319
<v Speaker 1>It's definitely true that the potential of five G far

0:44:19.400 --> 0:44:23.360
<v Speaker 1>outpaces that of four G. In other words, the best

0:44:23.400 --> 0:44:26.000
<v Speaker 1>implementation of five G is always going to be better

0:44:26.040 --> 0:44:28.359
<v Speaker 1>than the best implementation of four G as far as

0:44:28.480 --> 0:44:32.560
<v Speaker 1>data throughput is concerned. But potential and reality are two

0:44:32.560 --> 0:44:35.160
<v Speaker 1>different things, so it all depends on how it's implemented

0:44:35.200 --> 0:44:38.000
<v Speaker 1>in the area that you are in. And yes, I

0:44:38.120 --> 0:44:42.080
<v Speaker 1>find this all to be incredibly frustrating because as a consumer.

0:44:42.160 --> 0:44:45.000
<v Speaker 1>I just want my stuff to work really well and

0:44:45.080 --> 0:44:48.280
<v Speaker 1>for it to be really fast, and it's not always

0:44:48.360 --> 0:44:51.279
<v Speaker 1>an easy thing to determine. I'll wrap up with a

0:44:51.280 --> 0:44:55.120
<v Speaker 1>couple of short stories. One is the saga of these

0:44:55.120 --> 0:44:58.040
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven Macs, which I covered in a recent

0:44:58.120 --> 0:45:02.160
<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff episode. After two strop it crashes, governments around

0:45:02.200 --> 0:45:05.200
<v Speaker 1>the world ordered that Boeing's seven thirty seven Max aircraft

0:45:05.239 --> 0:45:08.160
<v Speaker 1>be grounded, pending a full investigation into what went wrong

0:45:08.320 --> 0:45:11.839
<v Speaker 1>and any adjustments that need to be made. Boeing subsequently

0:45:11.880 --> 0:45:15.120
<v Speaker 1>made changes to the aircraft's systems. The particular system at

0:45:15.120 --> 0:45:17.400
<v Speaker 1>fault was meant to be a safety feature, a system

0:45:17.400 --> 0:45:19.640
<v Speaker 1>that would kick in to counter this seven thirty seven

0:45:19.640 --> 0:45:24.200
<v Speaker 1>Max's tendency to tilt its nose upward. The problem was

0:45:24.440 --> 0:45:28.480
<v Speaker 1>that the safety feature could override pilot commands, and if

0:45:28.520 --> 0:45:32.960
<v Speaker 1>you had a single sensor failure sending incorrect information to

0:45:33.120 --> 0:45:37.440
<v Speaker 1>the safety system, that's what could cause tragedy. Now, as

0:45:37.520 --> 0:45:40.480
<v Speaker 1>of this recording, the fleet of aircraft is still grounded

0:45:40.520 --> 0:45:43.279
<v Speaker 1>and Boeing has suspended manufacturing any more of them for

0:45:43.320 --> 0:45:46.000
<v Speaker 1>the time being. The last story I wanted to mention

0:45:46.080 --> 0:45:48.839
<v Speaker 1>quickly is a follow up on a company that I've

0:45:48.880 --> 0:45:52.520
<v Speaker 1>covered in a past episode of Tech Stuff. That company is,

0:45:53.080 --> 0:45:57.279
<v Speaker 1>or rather was, movie Pass. So movie Pass aimed to

0:45:57.280 --> 0:46:00.920
<v Speaker 1>create a subscription based service in which stomers could purchase

0:46:01.000 --> 0:46:04.320
<v Speaker 1>a monthly pass to see first run movies in various

0:46:04.360 --> 0:46:09.160
<v Speaker 1>movie theaters. But movie theater chains weren't super keen on

0:46:09.160 --> 0:46:13.640
<v Speaker 1>this idea. Movie Pass had many notable ups and downs,

0:46:13.680 --> 0:46:16.800
<v Speaker 1>most of which I covered in my episode on the company,

0:46:16.840 --> 0:46:20.080
<v Speaker 1>but somehow managed to hang on longer than anyone really

0:46:20.120 --> 0:46:23.000
<v Speaker 1>thought was possible. This was despite the company having to

0:46:23.400 --> 0:46:26.399
<v Speaker 1>walk back it's unlimited movie Pass for a much more

0:46:26.520 --> 0:46:30.279
<v Speaker 1>modest offering, which I imagine must have led to a

0:46:30.320 --> 0:46:33.960
<v Speaker 1>pretty large number of customers canceling their subscriptions when suddenly

0:46:34.000 --> 0:46:37.160
<v Speaker 1>their unlimited movie Pass became no, you can see three

0:46:37.160 --> 0:46:41.600
<v Speaker 1>movies or you can get discounts on tickets. And thus

0:46:41.680 --> 0:46:44.640
<v Speaker 1>movie Pass had to secure loans from various sources just

0:46:44.719 --> 0:46:48.400
<v Speaker 1>to stay in business. Now, eventually the credits had to

0:46:48.520 --> 0:46:51.919
<v Speaker 1>roll on this company, and in September twenty nine, team

0:46:52.080 --> 0:46:56.040
<v Speaker 1>that's what happened. Movie Pass CEO Mitch Lowe released a

0:46:56.080 --> 0:47:00.920
<v Speaker 1>statement that the company would cease operations immediately, and uh it,

0:47:01.040 --> 0:47:04.160
<v Speaker 1>did you know? Movie Pass had failed to turn a

0:47:04.160 --> 0:47:07.719
<v Speaker 1>profit and the opposition it faced was considerable. While the

0:47:07.760 --> 0:47:10.480
<v Speaker 1>company tried lots of different approaches to right itself, those

0:47:10.520 --> 0:47:15.080
<v Speaker 1>choices ultimately either didn't work or actively worked against the company,

0:47:15.680 --> 0:47:19.520
<v Speaker 1>alienating the users and inviting various lawsuits to come in.

0:47:19.600 --> 0:47:24.000
<v Speaker 1>And it was pretty ugly stuff, all right. That wraps

0:47:24.080 --> 0:47:27.840
<v Speaker 1>up this episode, but in our next episode, I'll continue

0:47:27.880 --> 0:47:30.919
<v Speaker 1>to look back on technology in twenty nineteen. There's still

0:47:30.920 --> 0:47:34.080
<v Speaker 1>a lot of bummers left on that list, including some

0:47:34.239 --> 0:47:39.560
<v Speaker 1>they go beyond bummer too outright disastrous. But there are

0:47:39.560 --> 0:47:42.680
<v Speaker 1>a few cool things in there too, so we'll get

0:47:42.719 --> 0:47:45.840
<v Speaker 1>to those as well. So if you guys have suggestions

0:47:45.840 --> 0:47:47.960
<v Speaker 1>for future episodes of tech Stuff, reach out to me.

0:47:48.400 --> 0:47:51.799
<v Speaker 1>The best place to do so's on social media over

0:47:51.920 --> 0:47:54.239
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter and on Facebook. You can find us at

0:47:54.320 --> 0:47:57.719
<v Speaker 1>text stuff, H s W and I'll talk to you

0:47:57.760 --> 0:48:05.520
<v Speaker 1>again really soon. Text Stuff is a production of I

0:48:05.640 --> 0:48:08.600
<v Speaker 1>Heart Radio's How Stuff Works. For more podcasts from I

0:48:08.719 --> 0:48:12.319
<v Speaker 1>heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

0:48:12.440 --> 0:48:14.400
<v Speaker 1>or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.