Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another edition of the Odd Thoughts podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe wisnal So Joe. We
Speaker 1: obviously talk a lot about markets on the show, and
Speaker 1: we talk a lot about stock markets, but do we
Speaker 1: ever stop and consider how stock markets came into being.
Speaker 1: We really don't talk about the origins of these markets
Speaker 1: all that much, why the stock market created was created.
Speaker 1: We sort of take it for granted. I'm very interested
Speaker 1: in the subject because I often wonder, you know, if
Speaker 1: you were to go around to market participants and ask them,
Speaker 1: why do we have a stock market in the first place?
Speaker 1: Why did we invent this thing? I'm always curious what
Speaker 1: the answers would be, because I still don't think I
Speaker 1: have a stelid grip on why they exist. Yeah, and
Speaker 1: if you think about it, if you think real hard
Speaker 1: about it, it's kind of a weird construction, right, the
Speaker 1: idea that a bunch of strangers are going to get
Speaker 1: together and share or sell each other shares in particular companies,
Speaker 1: or things like why do we do that? And why
Speaker 1: do we trust the other participants involved? Totally? Like every
Speaker 1: time there's an I P O or something and It's like, wait,
Speaker 1: if you're selling and you know more about the company,
Speaker 1: If you think the insiders and the company are selling,
Speaker 1: why should I be buying? I guess of that a
Speaker 1: bad sign. And of course there's various mechanisms that we've
Speaker 1: built to learn about companies, mandatory regulatory disclosures, quarterlia reports,
Speaker 1: earnings calls, presentations, outside auditors, but we're still essentially buying
Speaker 1: into companies that at best we only have partial information
Speaker 1: of what's really going on. Right, So that's the other
Speaker 1: side of the story, Right, There's two things. There's trust
Speaker 1: and there's information involved. So we are going to take
Speaker 1: a journey back in time for this particular edition of
Speaker 1: Odd Lots and figure out how those two things kind
Speaker 1: of came together at a particular moment in time to
Speaker 1: create some of the first modern markets. Really, I can't wait,
Speaker 1: because as hard as it is right now to really
Speaker 1: have a grip on what's going on with the companies
Speaker 1: we invest in, you know, you think back to hundreds
Speaker 1: of years ago and how much worse disclosure would have been,
Speaker 1: and auditing and standards of data reporting. Right now, we
Speaker 1: all basically all counting think about accounting in like the
Speaker 1: sixteen hundreds accounting and P and L statements and balance sheets.
Speaker 1: We have the we have machines that can part this
Speaker 1: in very standard ways of reporting this stuff. But at
Speaker 1: the beginning, how did anyone believe anything exactly? All right?
Speaker 1: So I'm glad you're on board. So to discuss all
Speaker 1: of this, we have Partique Raj for our guest. He
Speaker 1: is a PhD student over at the University College London.
Speaker 1: He's also a research fellow at the Stickler Center for
Speaker 1: the Study of the Economy and the State at the
Speaker 1: University of Chicago Booth School of Business. And he is
Speaker 1: also the author of a paper called the Origins of
Speaker 1: Impersonal Markets in Commercial and Communication Revolutions of Europe. And
Speaker 1: it's going to be really interesting, I promise. Let's bring
Speaker 1: him on all right, Critique, thanks for joining us today. Hi,
Speaker 1: Tracy and Joe. Great to be here. So, uh, did
Speaker 1: we get the intro? Right? Were trust and information kind
Speaker 1: of the two pillars of importance when it came to
Speaker 1: creating the first modern market? So when you think about trust,
Speaker 1: trust is generally a much more complicated construct, right, because
Speaker 1: you can have trust in your family members and you
Speaker 1: can have trust in strangers. So I think trust it's
Speaker 1: created when you have one some incentives to really trust strangers.
Speaker 1: So if you don't have any incentive to go out
Speaker 1: and do business with people who you don't know, why
Speaker 1: why would you need to trust them? So incentives really mattered.
Speaker 1: And then on the other hand, of course, you need
Speaker 1: to know about something about them, something about the markets
Speaker 1: they work in. You need to have certain trust in
Speaker 1: the markets and so forth. So yes, trust is really important,
Speaker 1: but then the key question is how do you create
Speaker 1: that trust. So in your paper, and before we talk
Speaker 1: about how impersonal markets or stock markets were created, you
Speaker 1: talk about the pre existing structures that were in place
Speaker 1: to essentially solve the trust problem or to partially solve it,
Speaker 1: and you talk about the role of I think trade
Speaker 1: guilds in this. So can you explain what these guilds were,
Speaker 1: what they did and they're important to comers. So not
Speaker 1: just in Europe but around the world. Traditionally business has
Speaker 1: happened through networks. So you have kabilahs in Arabic world,
Speaker 1: you have jattas in India, you have guangs or clans
Speaker 1: in China, and you have had guilds in Europe. And
Speaker 1: the central role that they play is that one you
Speaker 1: generally are interacting with people you know, or at least
Speaker 1: people you know who know other people. So what it
Speaker 1: does is that it creates a repeated interaction and that
Speaker 1: kind of creates trust. So that's the simplest reason why
Speaker 1: you can have you want to do business in networks.
Speaker 1: Can you give an example to really help us understand
Speaker 1: it of an industry you know, a lot of your
Speaker 1: writing is in europe An industry that would have been
Speaker 1: dominated by a guild and how specifically it would have
Speaker 1: facilitated trade within that area. Basically all sorts of trading
Speaker 1: industries would be dominated by guilds or networks. I think
Speaker 1: an sample in the modern world is like these taxi
Speaker 1: associations you are These are associations where basically entering is
Speaker 1: rather difficult. You need to have a high license fee
Speaker 1: to pay if you wanted to enter these taxi associations.
Speaker 1: And one of the reasons you have these was because
Speaker 1: you wanted reliable people to enter the taxi industry, because
Speaker 1: who knows if you have a taxi driver who is
Speaker 1: not very reliable. So taxi associations are an example of
Speaker 1: a good modern day guild. And then you have something
Speaker 1: like Uber or Lift disrupting that. So in a modern world,
Speaker 1: I think taxi associations are like a favorite example that
Speaker 1: I like to use. So in the sixteen hundreds in Europe,
Speaker 1: you have these powerful merchant guilds and there's a lot
Speaker 1: of influence and a lot of money presumably tied to
Speaker 1: them because it's almost a monopoly. I suppose that they
Speaker 1: have over particular areas of trade in a similar way
Speaker 1: to the taxi medallions have a monopoly nowadays, with the
Speaker 1: exception of the disruptive forces that are Uber and Left.
Speaker 1: What happened in the sixteen hundreds to dislodge the power
Speaker 1: of the merchant guilds. So generally, when people think about
Speaker 1: guilts or any of such network institutions, there tends to
Speaker 1: be these two extreme views. The one view is that
Speaker 1: all guilts were really nice institutions which were building, which
Speaker 1: were communities in which people would do business and rely
Speaker 1: on each other, and um kind of capitalism came in
Speaker 1: and created this very atomist world. That's one way of
Speaker 1: looking at guilts. And then the other way of looking
Speaker 1: at gils is that, well, these guilts were these networks
Speaker 1: of nepotism and monopoly, and basically free market comes in
Speaker 1: and rains in their power, and you have people who
Speaker 1: can come from anywhere or any background can enter a
Speaker 1: business and excel in it. So when you want to
Speaker 1: understand why the guilts deadline, we have to identify the
Speaker 1: things that they were really good at, which is providing
Speaker 1: information to people or basically protecting people from a lot
Speaker 1: of risks because you were basically trading with people who
Speaker 1: if they cheated on you, you could kind of ostracize
Speaker 1: them or make their reputation go bad. So this kind
Speaker 1: of reliability and information helped guilts survive for so long.
Speaker 1: So when you think about how would guilds deadline, you
Speaker 1: have to go back and look at situations where people
Speaker 1: had suddenly a new incentive to start to do business
Speaker 1: with new people, because guilts were not very good at
Speaker 1: providing you with new opportunities or situations where you could
Speaker 1: get new information. So you have to look at the
Speaker 1: interaction between incentives to go outside of guilts and the
Speaker 1: need to they wily did to get information. And so
Speaker 1: in your paper you identify two key factors that sort
Speaker 1: of demonstrated grand unified theory, and you look at where
Speaker 1: these impersonal networks took off, and the two factors seemed
Speaker 1: to be a in the cities that had an opportunity
Speaker 1: to trade with the outside world, so key trading ports,
Speaker 1: geographic exposure to trade routes, and then the other thing
Speaker 1: is proximity to the town where Guttenberg invented the printing press.
Speaker 1: And so the combination of places that sort of had
Speaker 1: access to printing press the new vector of information and
Speaker 1: places that were on these trade routes. Combining those two
Speaker 1: is where you see the first impersonal networks germinated, yes, exactly.
Speaker 1: So that's that's the story. The big question is that
Speaker 1: why is it that it's northwestern Europe where the first
Speaker 1: stock markets or the first joint stock companies immerged. Why
Speaker 1: not Spain or why not in Italy or why not
Speaker 1: in Germany? And that's where you want to look at
Speaker 1: this combination of factors. For example, Spain had all the
Speaker 1: benefits of Atlantic trade. So when it comes to the
Speaker 1: incentive to go out of gills and do business, I
Speaker 1: think like Amsterdam, even in southern cities of Spain, you
Speaker 1: had such incentives. On the other hand, if you want
Speaker 1: to go after a theory that oh, well, access to
Speaker 1: information made it easier for people to talk to each
Speaker 1: other and to talk to strangers. Then you would have
Speaker 1: to ask why did this not happen in Germany where
Speaker 1: basically that's the hub for the printing press. And so
Speaker 1: it is the combination of these two things that, well,
Speaker 1: you need to have incentives to go out and do
Speaker 1: business with people you don't know, and you need to
Speaker 1: have information about the markets and the commodities you're trading
Speaker 1: and somewhat the people you're working with. That's really important.
Speaker 1: So it's the two things when they come together that
Speaker 1: at least in this paper, I argue, create the uh
Speaker 1: conditions that are favorable for the rise of such markets. Okay,
Speaker 1: so if I'm a trader in Antwerp or Amsterdam and
Speaker 1: I'm looking at all these opportunities taking place in the
Speaker 1: new world, is the basic idea that in addition to
Speaker 1: having that exposure to new types of trade or new
Speaker 1: potential businesses, I can now pick up a printed book
Speaker 1: or pamphlet and I can learn how to trade or
Speaker 1: I can learn more information about those particular businesses. Yes,
Speaker 1: so that's sort of the idea. So obviously, when the
Speaker 1: printing press came in, all sorts of things were being printed. UM.
Speaker 1: A lot of it was religious books, and the smallest
Speaker 1: part of it was things like merchant manuals and books
Speaker 1: in economics, etcetera, etcetera. And what was happening is that
Speaker 1: when you happen to be at a place where trade
Speaker 1: is really desirable, the content that gets produced in these
Speaker 1: kind of places are related to those which helped trade
Speaker 1: or out. For example, Amsterdam was emerging as a good
Speaker 1: hub where a lot of navigation related UM books were
Speaker 1: being printed. Or for example, in Antwerp, uh there was
Speaker 1: a lot of printing of economics books, or it emerged
Speaker 1: as a hub for double entry bookkeeping. So basically the
Speaker 1: incentives to do trade was driving once you had the
Speaker 1: access to printing, it was driving the content that was
Speaker 1: helpful for creation of information that could help with trade.
Speaker 1: What happened to the merchant guilds in these areas, in
Speaker 1: areas like Antwerp and Amsterdam, did they try to fight
Speaker 1: the change or was it just sort of a slow
Speaker 1: dissolving of the role that they played in facilitating trade.
Speaker 1: So it could differ from place to place. Like one
Speaker 1: of the interesting historical stories that I learned while doing
Speaker 1: this research was this virgence between Hamburg and Lubeck, and
Speaker 1: which kind of tells you how. For example, in Lubek,
Speaker 1: guilts tried to push back on the idea of opening
Speaker 1: of impersonal markets, while in Hamburg they were not able
Speaker 1: to have that kind of resistance. And the reason why
Speaker 1: I think that was the case is because these two
Speaker 1: cities happened to be at a very interesting geography. So
Speaker 1: they are on two sides of the Jutland Peninsula in
Speaker 1: the northern Germany, and Hamburg is on the Atlantic coast
Speaker 1: while Luebeck is on the Baltic coast. So the basic
Speaker 1: idea is that because Hamburg was at the Atlantic coast,
Speaker 1: so this side of the of the Jutland Peninsula had
Speaker 1: greater incentives to basically or exposure to the Atlantic trade
Speaker 1: and its benefits. While Luebeck, while it was a major city,
Speaker 1: it didn't get that kind of exposure because it was
Speaker 1: on the Baltic side of the sea. And these two
Speaker 1: cities were just sixty five apart from each other. So
Speaker 1: in Lubec you have a lot of resistance to new
Speaker 1: merchants coming in and they start to proper privileges, they
Speaker 1: start to fight against the Danish and the Dutch who
Speaker 1: are giving them competition. So yes, um, the guilts in
Speaker 1: more established cities fight to fight back, while in a
Speaker 1: place like Hamburg this slowly basically dissolved a way. You know,
Speaker 1: I noticed particularly kind of introduced this as talking about
Speaker 1: the origins of the stock market. You've been very specific
Speaker 1: using this term in personal markets. Can you talk just
Speaker 1: a little bit about what sort of the distinction is.
Speaker 1: I mean, I imagine that the early impersonal markets aren't
Speaker 1: really recognizably what we would call stock markets today. So
Speaker 1: what precisely was being traded here? So the first stock
Speaker 1: market was the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, which was specifically just
Speaker 1: made to raise capital for the Dutch East India Company.
Speaker 1: So it was for this one giant end company that
Speaker 1: essentially a stock market was created. Before that, there existed,
Speaker 1: for example, these commodity bourses where so for example in Antwerp,
Speaker 1: where people would basically trade commodities in start uh in
Speaker 1: spot kind of situations. So the key, the reason why
Speaker 1: I like to use the term in personal markets is
Speaker 1: because from a historical point of view, Um, my view
Speaker 1: is that sixteenth century and thereafter was a major historical
Speaker 1: break in terms of how the world was doing business,
Speaker 1: which was that while until now you had relationships that
Speaker 1: drove how business was done, but now suddenly at least
Speaker 1: an opportunity emerged that somebody from some part of the
Speaker 1: world could just come in and start to do business
Speaker 1: in some other city. So basically this kind of lowered
Speaker 1: the entry barriers for people who might not have been
Speaker 1: privileged enough in the prior centuries to do trade. So
Speaker 1: it is a major part of this sorry that how
Speaker 1: impersonal markets, by making things more individualistic, make it easier
Speaker 1: for people who are probably more motivated to come and
Speaker 1: do business. So for example, in case of Hamburg, it
Speaker 1: was a major hub for foreign merchants, but Lubec had
Speaker 1: this problem that they didn't want to have foreign merchants
Speaker 1: because they wanted to keep all their privileges for the locals.
Speaker 1: So that's why I like to use the term in
Speaker 1: personal markets, because the rise of stock market can be
Speaker 1: like a side effect of this broader change in history.
Speaker 1: But so for example, when you think about the Wall Street,
Speaker 1: people from all parts of the world just come in
Speaker 1: and then work at these banks, and it's not that
Speaker 1: you have to be it's a pretty diverse place, and
Speaker 1: and it's because your networks don't necessarily need to be
Speaker 1: so important as long as you are really good making money.
Speaker 1: So how much of the rise of impersonal markets had
Speaker 1: to have happened along with strengthening of legal and governmental institutions,
Speaker 1: because I imagine that that took care a part of
Speaker 1: the trust problem as well. Right, Yes, So there's sort
Speaker 1: of a code of evolution that is happening that you
Speaker 1: especially see in cities like Antwerp in Amsterdam and also
Speaker 1: Hamburg and London, where basically, when you already have an
Speaker 1: incentive to attract new people whom you don't have any
Speaker 1: historical or you know, familial ties with to your city,
Speaker 1: then in order to attract these new merchants, you start
Speaker 1: to make your institutions better. You essentially say, well, okay,
Speaker 1: until now, our courts were so designed that you would
Speaker 1: only allow for you will only do provide these legal
Speaker 1: services to a certain group of merchants coming from a
Speaker 1: specific group places, so you will give out privileges. Now
Speaker 1: suddenly you started to build these institutions which were more generalized.
Speaker 1: What it means is that instead of giving legal services
Speaker 1: to a specific set of merchants, all your laws would
Speaker 1: now apply to all merchants that come there, and there
Speaker 1: is no special privilege that exists too a few set
Speaker 1: of merchants. So there's this sort of a democratization of
Speaker 1: institutions where you could simply get the legal services of
Speaker 1: of that particular city if you happen to be a merchant.
Speaker 1: So legal institutions start to evolve, and obviously it takes
Speaker 1: a long time before they start to look the way
Speaker 1: they look now, but that's in my view of time
Speaker 1: when there's a big start of this legal evolution as well.
Speaker 1: So listening to all this, it's pretty obvious that the
Speaker 1: lessons that you drew out from this period there are
Speaker 1: so many that apply to markets today and some of
Speaker 1: the changes that we're saying. You already mentioned uber and
Speaker 1: now I could get in someone's car without knowing who
Speaker 1: they are, and I don't have to see that they're
Speaker 1: part of some taxi guild, and I could have a
Speaker 1: pretty good trust that they're going to get me to
Speaker 1: where they are. So that's a big change. But it's
Speaker 1: funny you mentioned Wall Street, which is of course highly
Speaker 1: relevant to us. And even though the stock market and
Speaker 1: all the markets we talk about are on in some sense,
Speaker 1: in personal markets for a long time. Even still there's
Speaker 1: been this important personal element, and people on Wall Street,
Speaker 1: financial advisors, brokers, they're always talking about it. We bring
Speaker 1: you the personal element and we have a personal relationship
Speaker 1: with clients. And if there's one of the biggest tensions
Speaker 1: that we're seeing right now on finance, it's this question
Speaker 1: of whether that's overrated and will we still need financial
Speaker 1: advisors or whether it'll all be robo advisors. So it
Speaker 1: seems to me there's still this very big personal element
Speaker 1: to it, and the same you know, this build up
Speaker 1: of new information is once again, you know, really threatening that.
Speaker 1: So I think relationships are always going to matter. Um,
Speaker 1: that's just always going to be the case, because there
Speaker 1: is always going to be some informational advantage that you're
Speaker 1: going to have with building relationships and building personal trust
Speaker 1: with people. But I think this issue becomes relevant when
Speaker 1: you want to build Wall Street kind of institutions in
Speaker 1: other parts of the world. So, for example, there is
Speaker 1: an interesting paper by Raguram Rajan and Luigi's in Galis
Speaker 1: about the Asian banking crisis in the late nineties where
Speaker 1: they basically talk about how this relationship based nature of
Speaker 1: uh of trade or business in the in Asian stock
Speaker 1: markets was responsible partly for the weakness of the financial
Speaker 1: institutions in that region. And what they need is better
Speaker 1: contract through institutions to make sure that the overreliance on
Speaker 1: relationship kind of goes away. So it is a spectrum
Speaker 1: where certain societies kind of have too much of reliance
Speaker 1: on the relationships versus some which have were limited. So
Speaker 1: it would never be the case that they will all
Speaker 1: go away, but you could be in a world where
Speaker 1: relationships really really matter and you could do nothing without
Speaker 1: having them. What about the information side of things, because
Speaker 1: quite a few people have drawn an analogy between what
Speaker 1: we've seen recently with the power and rise of the
Speaker 1: Internet and fake news and the ability of basically everyone
Speaker 1: to disseminate information at will with the revolution that was
Speaker 1: the printing press. Um So if we have another big
Speaker 1: spurt in the democratization of information or the dissemination of information,
Speaker 1: what does that mean for the development of markets this
Speaker 1: time around? So when you think about the Internet, it's
Speaker 1: obviously has already and the mobile phone it has already
Speaker 1: kind of democratized information for a lot of people. For example,
Speaker 1: in India, um landline phones were available to like a
Speaker 1: very small fraction of people, but now about like a
Speaker 1: lot of majority of Indians have a mobile phone and
Speaker 1: with it access to basic internet spacilities. So there's already
Speaker 1: this democratization of information happening. But one of the conclusions
Speaker 1: that I drew, especially after the last year, of the
Speaker 1: way political economy has evolved, is that there is no
Speaker 1: such thing that information technology would have a blanket positive
Speaker 1: or a negative effect. And once again it goes back
Speaker 1: to the question of incentives. So what kind of content
Speaker 1: people develop once they have Internet in their hands depends
Speaker 1: a lot on other things that is around them. So
Speaker 1: if in case you have economic opportunities, opportunities to do business, etcetera, etcetera,
Speaker 1: you will basically try to seek information that is financially
Speaker 1: relevant for you. But I guess if in case you
Speaker 1: would you are in a place which is economically not growing,
Speaker 1: the same information technology can be used for other stuff.
Speaker 1: For example, in sixteenth century europ most of the places
Speaker 1: were primarily printing stuff about old religious texts or analysis
Speaker 1: of something that was happening in the past. So the
Speaker 1: incentives drive your content in the end, and the same
Speaker 1: is true today. Was there fake news and Antwerp. So
Speaker 1: what I know is that there's this new book by
Speaker 1: Jared Rubin who talks about the fact that, for example,
Speaker 1: in the Ottoman Empire, they didn't really like the printing
Speaker 1: press a lot because they basically thought that printing would
Speaker 1: lead to a lot of fake religious books and would
Speaker 1: kind of corrupt the existing pristine religious materials. So certainly
Speaker 1: there existed people who would have this concern for fake
Speaker 1: news in a different version, and they were rumors and
Speaker 1: there were things like that, and so yeah, so that's
Speaker 1: something that I got really interested in the last year
Speaker 1: because I honestly didn't really think that fake news and
Speaker 1: this kind of fraudulent information would be so relevant. But
Speaker 1: looking at the way things have moved over time, I
Speaker 1: think that's something which is probably a topic of a
Speaker 1: future paper, that how do institutions deal with our people.
Speaker 1: People trust the media itself, so why did people trust
Speaker 1: the printing present the books being printed in the first place.
Speaker 1: That's an interesting research topic in itself. In my view,
Speaker 1: We'll have to have you back on once you publish
Speaker 1: that paper. Critique. I'll be happy to come, all right. Critique.
Speaker 1: Raja PhD student over at the University College London. Thank
Speaker 1: you so much for joining us today. Thanks a lot,
Speaker 1: Thank you. Critique. That was great, So Joe, I thought
Speaker 1: that was a really fascinating conversation with so many modern parallels,
Speaker 1: especially when it comes to the idea of trust of
Speaker 1: course and of course disseminating information, because the Internet has
Speaker 1: really revolutionized both those things, and so has new technology. Absolutely.
Speaker 1: I mean, I think, like, intuitively, it's not a surprise
Speaker 1: that the rise of the Internet and new communication technologies
Speaker 1: would have a profound effect on trade and disintermediation of trust,
Speaker 1: networks and all that that we sort of get. But
Speaker 1: I think that what's really interesting about critiques research is
Speaker 1: the sort of rigor with which he demonstrates the mechanism
Speaker 1: between the new information technology and the evolution of trade.
Speaker 1: And if you look at his paper, you could see
Speaker 1: that there's sort of some very statistical meat on the bones,
Speaker 1: you could say, in terms of really establishing where these
Speaker 1: impersonal markets flourished and these towns and where they were
Speaker 1: in proximity to the printing press and trade. So it
Speaker 1: really sort of bolsters and really strengthens this sort of
Speaker 1: intuitive idea. Yeah, and there's a really nice map in
Speaker 1: it as well. Where he sort of overlays a lot
Speaker 1: of these ideas on seventeenth century Europe. So it's well
Speaker 1: worth reading that paper when you have a chance. You
Speaker 1: know what, what, I'm surprised about that we didn't go
Speaker 1: over to the blockchain conversation, because blockchain, of course, is
Speaker 1: both about trust and information. Yeah, you know what, I'm
Speaker 1: actually impressed you say that you're surprised that we didn't
Speaker 1: go there. I'm actually impressed with us for not going there,
Speaker 1: because so many conversations do ultimately go back these days
Speaker 1: to something related to block chains or whatever. So we
Speaker 1: actually showed a little bit of restraint. But no, absolutely,
Speaker 1: I'm sorry I ruined it. No, yeah, you did ruin it. No,
Speaker 1: but you're totally right and thinking about the importance of
Speaker 1: bookkeeping and being able to actually believe what a network
Speaker 1: is doing. It seems like a lot of these the
Speaker 1: problems that a lot of people are still looking to solve,
Speaker 1: and a good reminder that for his impersonal as markets
Speaker 1: have gotten, as Partique mentioned, there's still a pretty big
Speaker 1: personal relationship and a lot of these things. Yeah. Absolutely, Okay,
Speaker 1: you know what I'm gonna say, Let's let's leave it there,
Speaker 1: because otherwise we really are going to start doing a
Speaker 1: blockchain episode and then I'll feel really bad. Yeah, we
Speaker 1: got it. We gotta ended there. All right. This has
Speaker 1: been another edition of the Odd Lots Podcast. You can
Speaker 1: follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway, and you can
Speaker 1: follow me on Twitter at the Stalwart, and you should
Speaker 1: follow Critique on Twitter at Critique Raj Underscore, and I
Speaker 1: want to thank our producers to for Foreheads. You can
Speaker 1: follow him on Twitter at Foreheast and the head of
Speaker 1: podcast at Bloomberg, Francescallip, Thanks for listening.