1 00:00:00,840 --> 00:00:03,920 Speaker 1: John, I want to give one example of what like 2 00:00:03,920 --> 00:00:05,920 Speaker 1: a honey tramp would look like, and that's something that 3 00:00:05,920 --> 00:00:07,240 Speaker 1: happened to me, and pretty so. 4 00:00:07,280 --> 00:00:08,680 Speaker 2: Much further here. But do you know what you're going 5 00:00:08,760 --> 00:00:10,360 Speaker 2: to say, Like, yeah, exactly what. 6 00:00:10,280 --> 00:00:10,959 Speaker 1: I'm going to say. 7 00:00:11,039 --> 00:00:16,319 Speaker 2: Yes, Yeah, I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry o'she. I 8 00:00:16,480 --> 00:00:19,479 Speaker 2: served in the CIA's Clandestine Service for twenty eight years, 9 00:00:19,520 --> 00:00:22,040 Speaker 2: living undercover all around the world. 10 00:00:21,760 --> 00:00:24,119 Speaker 1: And in my thirty three years with the CIA, I 11 00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:27,040 Speaker 1: served in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. 12 00:00:27,200 --> 00:00:29,440 Speaker 2: Although we don't usually look at it this way, we 13 00:00:29,560 --> 00:00:31,640 Speaker 2: created conspiracies. 14 00:00:31,080 --> 00:00:34,080 Speaker 1: In our operations. We got people to believe things that 15 00:00:34,159 --> 00:00:34,839 Speaker 1: weren't true. 16 00:00:34,960 --> 00:00:37,879 Speaker 2: Now we're investigating the conspiracy theories we see in the 17 00:00:37,920 --> 00:00:39,120 Speaker 2: news almost every day. 18 00:00:39,320 --> 00:00:41,599 Speaker 1: We'll break them down for you to determine whether they 19 00:00:41,640 --> 00:00:44,000 Speaker 1: could be real or whether we're being manipulated. 20 00:00:44,280 --> 00:00:52,080 Speaker 2: Welcome to Mission Implausible, Jerry. As usual, Adam has boguarded 21 00:00:52,159 --> 00:00:54,360 Speaker 2: us and left us. But I think if we talk 22 00:00:54,400 --> 00:00:57,760 Speaker 2: about enough interesting things, since his wife is a big listener, 23 00:00:57,840 --> 00:00:58,680 Speaker 2: maybe she'll get to them. 24 00:00:58,720 --> 00:01:01,400 Speaker 1: Yeah. I was worried about Adam. I thought he might 25 00:01:01,400 --> 00:01:04,480 Speaker 1: have been involved in the big explosion at the cheese 26 00:01:04,520 --> 00:01:07,759 Speaker 1: factory in Vermont, because I heard there was debris all 27 00:01:07,800 --> 00:01:12,400 Speaker 1: over the place. I heard there was debris all over 28 00:01:12,440 --> 00:01:12,920 Speaker 1: the place. 29 00:01:13,200 --> 00:01:16,119 Speaker 2: Yeah, okay, yeah, I get it. Okay, So since it's 30 00:01:16,160 --> 00:01:18,640 Speaker 2: you and I, let's see. So, is there anything that 31 00:01:18,720 --> 00:01:20,759 Speaker 2: comes to mind about recently? It was in the press 32 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:21,800 Speaker 2: about conspiracy theories. 33 00:01:22,000 --> 00:01:24,360 Speaker 1: Yeah. I think it's a conspiracy that there's so many 34 00:01:24,360 --> 00:01:27,959 Speaker 1: conspiracies that we can't even remember them or keep them straight. 35 00:01:28,000 --> 00:01:30,760 Speaker 1: But I'll tell you one one really stood out for 36 00:01:30,880 --> 00:01:35,520 Speaker 1: me for being both crazy and awful at the same time. 37 00:01:35,600 --> 00:01:37,560 Speaker 1: And I don't know if people have heard about this 38 00:01:37,640 --> 00:01:39,280 Speaker 1: is it? But it ran in the post and it's 39 00:01:39,319 --> 00:01:42,559 Speaker 1: something called med beds, and it ties into a whole 40 00:01:42,600 --> 00:01:46,240 Speaker 1: bunch of other conspiracies. And basically, if I got this right, 41 00:01:46,480 --> 00:01:52,440 Speaker 1: the US military or the US government has this alien technology, 42 00:01:52,560 --> 00:01:58,480 Speaker 1: and with it they've developed beds when our quote military grade, 43 00:01:58,600 --> 00:02:02,520 Speaker 1: we can put our soul in or advanced senior politicians 44 00:02:03,080 --> 00:02:06,760 Speaker 1: and it will grow back limbs, and it will cure cancer, 45 00:02:07,200 --> 00:02:11,919 Speaker 1: and it will help whatever ails you and including aging. 46 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:17,720 Speaker 1: But because this technology is so sensitive, it's not available 47 00:02:17,800 --> 00:02:22,119 Speaker 1: to the average people except and there's some terrible scammers 48 00:02:22,160 --> 00:02:25,239 Speaker 1: out there. That are pushing this conspiracy theory and telling 49 00:02:25,280 --> 00:02:29,280 Speaker 1: people that they have the civilian version of this state somehow, 50 00:02:29,400 --> 00:02:32,000 Speaker 1: either it smuggled it out or figured it out. And 51 00:02:32,040 --> 00:02:36,320 Speaker 1: they're charging hundreds or thousands of dollars to these desperate 52 00:02:36,360 --> 00:02:41,800 Speaker 1: people with cancer or backaches or broken bones, broken spirits, 53 00:02:41,880 --> 00:02:44,320 Speaker 1: and they're laying them basically in these beds with like 54 00:02:44,600 --> 00:02:48,840 Speaker 1: lights over them and the bedshakes, and the FDA said, 55 00:02:48,919 --> 00:02:52,880 Speaker 1: there's nothing to this. They're basically preying on people who 56 00:02:52,919 --> 00:02:56,000 Speaker 1: believe in conspiracies, who believe in these alien conspiracies, and 57 00:02:56,760 --> 00:02:59,800 Speaker 1: I don't know how some of these people sleep at night. 58 00:03:00,120 --> 00:03:00,919 Speaker 1: Isn't an innocent crise? 59 00:03:01,080 --> 00:03:03,720 Speaker 2: Very typical? You just look at the down side of this, now, 60 00:03:03,960 --> 00:03:09,559 Speaker 2: I see so true. Apparently these scientists are reverse engineering 61 00:03:09,600 --> 00:03:14,600 Speaker 2: alien science to secure diseases, and liberal billionaires have been 62 00:03:14,680 --> 00:03:16,560 Speaker 2: keeping it from the public, is what my understanding. 63 00:03:16,600 --> 00:03:18,560 Speaker 1: If I read that's exactly right. Yeah. 64 00:03:18,639 --> 00:03:20,880 Speaker 2: Don't you see this though, as a good example of 65 00:03:20,960 --> 00:03:25,079 Speaker 2: bipartisanship among billionaires, because you got Elon Musk and Peter 66 00:03:25,200 --> 00:03:27,480 Speaker 2: Thiel and Harlan Crowe and David Sex, all the guys 67 00:03:27,480 --> 00:03:30,480 Speaker 2: on the right, along with the typical left wing billionaires 68 00:03:30,560 --> 00:03:33,800 Speaker 2: obviously working together to keep themselves healthy and keep it 69 00:03:33,800 --> 00:03:36,120 Speaker 2: from the public. And if Adam's wife is listening, can 70 00:03:36,160 --> 00:03:38,000 Speaker 2: pass this on to Edam, maybe he can ask us 71 00:03:38,040 --> 00:03:40,200 Speaker 2: questions about it for future episodes. So the three that 72 00:03:40,320 --> 00:03:43,480 Speaker 2: I just noticed it today when I'm rage scrolling through 73 00:03:43,520 --> 00:03:47,840 Speaker 2: Twitter is one the QAnon and pizzagate folks are saying 74 00:03:47,880 --> 00:03:50,640 Speaker 2: that the CIA is behind all of the memes about 75 00:03:50,720 --> 00:03:55,480 Speaker 2: Vance and Trump being weird. Separately, Tucker Carlson has said 76 00:03:55,600 --> 00:04:00,720 Speaker 2: that Bitcoin and the Signal messaging app are CIA honeytraps. First, 77 00:04:00,760 --> 00:04:02,360 Speaker 2: one of the qan on piece of Gate folks talk 78 00:04:02,360 --> 00:04:06,320 Speaker 2: about how CIA has brainwashed people. So brainwashing is a 79 00:04:06,360 --> 00:04:08,680 Speaker 2: thing that's often tied with intelligence and the history, and 80 00:04:08,720 --> 00:04:10,640 Speaker 2: there is a long and an interesting history there. The 81 00:04:10,720 --> 00:04:14,560 Speaker 2: Tucker Carlson talking about honey traps, that's also an intelligence term, 82 00:04:14,600 --> 00:04:16,360 Speaker 2: and I think it's something we can talk about. And 83 00:04:16,400 --> 00:04:20,280 Speaker 2: then James Comer, the right wing congressman, said that Tim 84 00:04:20,320 --> 00:04:23,360 Speaker 2: Waltz is a Communist party of China's sleeper agent. 85 00:04:23,880 --> 00:04:25,920 Speaker 1: I want to maybe just go to honey traps real quick, 86 00:04:25,920 --> 00:04:28,880 Speaker 1: because I think that's something that people think CIA does 87 00:04:28,960 --> 00:04:32,720 Speaker 1: and we don't because it generally doesn't work, and you've 88 00:04:32,720 --> 00:04:35,680 Speaker 1: gone what it is. Yeah, So a honeytrap is basically 89 00:04:35,760 --> 00:04:39,680 Speaker 1: you entrap someone in a sexual encounter, right, especially if 90 00:04:39,720 --> 00:04:41,720 Speaker 1: it's something that they don't want to come out. If 91 00:04:41,720 --> 00:04:45,240 Speaker 1: somebody's gay and they travel to some authority on country 92 00:04:45,279 --> 00:04:48,119 Speaker 1: and they have a tryst with another man or another woman, 93 00:04:48,160 --> 00:04:51,159 Speaker 1: and then the intelligence service comes to you and says, 94 00:04:51,320 --> 00:04:54,840 Speaker 1: will you're basically blackmailed with that? Or will tell your 95 00:04:54,839 --> 00:04:58,800 Speaker 1: wife about this? And generally those things don't work, or 96 00:04:58,839 --> 00:05:00,719 Speaker 1: they work briefly, the. 97 00:05:00,640 --> 00:05:03,560 Speaker 2: Long history of the Soviets and Russians and others right 98 00:05:03,680 --> 00:05:05,920 Speaker 2: in the cities of doing that. So you show up there, 99 00:05:05,920 --> 00:05:08,520 Speaker 2: you're working there, someone shows up in your hotel room 100 00:05:08,560 --> 00:05:11,040 Speaker 2: at night or whatever, or you start a relationship with 101 00:05:11,080 --> 00:05:13,080 Speaker 2: someone when but it turns out the intelligence service has 102 00:05:13,120 --> 00:05:15,600 Speaker 2: been choreographing it, and then they come to you and say, oh, 103 00:05:15,680 --> 00:05:17,360 Speaker 2: you're pregnant, you don't want this to come out. 104 00:05:17,440 --> 00:05:18,440 Speaker 1: You need to work with us. 105 00:05:18,560 --> 00:05:20,440 Speaker 2: Some US Marines got caught up in this. If you 106 00:05:20,480 --> 00:05:21,880 Speaker 2: remember in the nineteen eighties. 107 00:05:21,680 --> 00:05:23,440 Speaker 1: It's right, loan Tree, that's exactly right. 108 00:05:23,560 --> 00:05:27,800 Speaker 2: Our embassies abroad are protected by marine security guards. That's 109 00:05:27,800 --> 00:05:30,440 Speaker 2: a part of the Marines that they're trained as security 110 00:05:30,440 --> 00:05:33,120 Speaker 2: guards and they make sure that the classified material and 111 00:05:33,160 --> 00:05:36,119 Speaker 2: embassies is protected. So they are there twenty four hours 112 00:05:36,120 --> 00:05:39,479 Speaker 2: a day guarding the area where our classified material is. 113 00:05:39,600 --> 00:05:42,280 Speaker 2: And it's always been a target because they're young, oftentimes 114 00:05:42,320 --> 00:05:45,800 Speaker 2: young men also and a women now that a foreign service, 115 00:05:45,839 --> 00:05:48,360 Speaker 2: the Russians for example, could use to try to compromise 116 00:05:48,400 --> 00:05:49,560 Speaker 2: and get in. So there was a story in the 117 00:05:49,600 --> 00:05:53,279 Speaker 2: nineteen eighties where a young Native American named Clayton Loan 118 00:05:53,360 --> 00:05:57,160 Speaker 2: Tree was an embassy guard marine security guard at Moscow. 119 00:05:57,320 --> 00:06:00,520 Speaker 2: But essentially he fell in love with the young Russian 120 00:06:00,960 --> 00:06:03,800 Speaker 2: and as part of the process, this young Russian woman 121 00:06:03,880 --> 00:06:06,880 Speaker 2: introduced him to her uncle Sasha. And uncle Sasha, as 122 00:06:06,920 --> 00:06:09,680 Speaker 2: you can imagine, was a KGB officer who told him 123 00:06:09,680 --> 00:06:11,240 Speaker 2: that he's going to get all kinds of trouble and 124 00:06:11,320 --> 00:06:13,279 Speaker 2: if you want to stay with her, you need to 125 00:06:13,320 --> 00:06:16,000 Speaker 2: provide us information from the embassy. What do the security 126 00:06:16,000 --> 00:06:18,280 Speaker 2: guards do, when are they there? How can we And 127 00:06:18,320 --> 00:06:20,960 Speaker 2: there was a time after Clayton low Tree moved to 128 00:06:21,000 --> 00:06:23,839 Speaker 2: his next post in Vienna, he went to the CIA 129 00:06:23,920 --> 00:06:26,200 Speaker 2: station chief and told him what had happened. For a 130 00:06:26,240 --> 00:06:28,200 Speaker 2: period of time, this was a big issue. We thought 131 00:06:28,200 --> 00:06:30,800 Speaker 2: that the Russians had actually gotten into the embassy, had 132 00:06:30,839 --> 00:06:33,080 Speaker 2: broken in, gotten into safes and that type of thing, 133 00:06:33,560 --> 00:06:36,880 Speaker 2: all helped by Clayton Loan Tree. I don't think they 134 00:06:36,880 --> 00:06:39,200 Speaker 2: had gotten that far, but Clayton low Tree certainly was 135 00:06:39,279 --> 00:06:42,280 Speaker 2: helping the Russians there. And that was a classic honey trap. 136 00:06:42,360 --> 00:06:44,839 Speaker 2: So this Holmo's name is Violetta and he fell in 137 00:06:44,839 --> 00:06:46,480 Speaker 2: love with it, and the Russians used that against it. 138 00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:49,120 Speaker 1: It was only sort of a honey trip because it 139 00:06:49,160 --> 00:06:51,880 Speaker 1: wasn't just a sexual encounter. He actually fell in love, right, 140 00:06:51,960 --> 00:06:54,719 Speaker 1: That was something that was more long. But John, you 141 00:06:54,760 --> 00:06:56,720 Speaker 1: were in Indonesia for a while, and I want to 142 00:06:56,760 --> 00:06:59,240 Speaker 1: ask you this story's true. I've never actually asked you 143 00:06:59,279 --> 00:07:02,000 Speaker 1: this in all these years. So I'd always heard this 144 00:07:02,120 --> 00:07:06,760 Speaker 1: story that Suharto from fifty years ago, the dictator. 145 00:07:06,240 --> 00:07:08,360 Speaker 2: Of actually was Sukarno Sokarna. 146 00:07:09,400 --> 00:07:12,760 Speaker 1: That's right. I mixed it up that Sukarno the strong 147 00:07:12,800 --> 00:07:15,680 Speaker 1: man of Indonesia, that he went to Moscow and he's 148 00:07:15,720 --> 00:07:18,280 Speaker 1: this old guy and he ends up in bed with 149 00:07:18,440 --> 00:07:22,320 Speaker 1: two beautiful young women frolicking, right, And when he went 150 00:07:22,480 --> 00:07:26,040 Speaker 1: back to Jakarta, I went back to Indonesia. The Russians 151 00:07:26,080 --> 00:07:29,600 Speaker 1: approached him and this handhanded attempt, they pulled out like 152 00:07:29,800 --> 00:07:32,600 Speaker 1: all these photographs of him in bed with these women, 153 00:07:32,640 --> 00:07:35,160 Speaker 1: and he went through them, and the Russians are thinking, ah, 154 00:07:35,200 --> 00:07:37,920 Speaker 1: we've got him now, and he's like going through and 155 00:07:37,960 --> 00:07:39,720 Speaker 1: he says, looks at them and says, yeah, I'll have 156 00:07:39,800 --> 00:07:42,320 Speaker 1: two more of these and give me like this one. 157 00:07:42,560 --> 00:07:44,400 Speaker 1: And he says, can you blow this one up for me? 158 00:07:44,440 --> 00:07:47,760 Speaker 1: I want to show my friends, And yeah, that didn't work. 159 00:07:48,960 --> 00:07:49,600 Speaker 1: Is that true? 160 00:07:49,800 --> 00:07:52,680 Speaker 2: That is very true. Sarno was the first leader of 161 00:07:52,720 --> 00:07:56,240 Speaker 2: Indonesia after World War Two, after the Japanese were in 162 00:07:56,280 --> 00:07:58,880 Speaker 2: the dutchy s Indies and Indonesia became independent, and he 163 00:07:59,000 --> 00:08:01,400 Speaker 2: was famously ladies man. In fact, I have a poster 164 00:08:01,440 --> 00:08:04,400 Speaker 2: here behind me of Shukarna with Marilyn Monroe and he's 165 00:08:04,400 --> 00:08:07,400 Speaker 2: staring longingly at her. And he took great pride in 166 00:08:07,400 --> 00:08:09,680 Speaker 2: the fact that he was quite the ladies man, and 167 00:08:09,720 --> 00:08:12,080 Speaker 2: the Russians tried to blackmail him and it didn't work 168 00:08:12,080 --> 00:08:12,440 Speaker 2: in this. 169 00:08:12,440 --> 00:08:15,240 Speaker 1: So epic fail on the honey trap front. But I 170 00:08:15,280 --> 00:08:17,160 Speaker 1: do have a story, so I don't want to say 171 00:08:17,160 --> 00:08:19,880 Speaker 1: the country, but on the honey trap that I know 172 00:08:19,960 --> 00:08:22,280 Speaker 1: of a story. I know of an account where a 173 00:08:22,520 --> 00:08:26,360 Speaker 1: US businessman goes to this country and it's a really 174 00:08:26,480 --> 00:08:31,800 Speaker 1: repressive authoritarian government and he meets this young woman and 175 00:08:31,880 --> 00:08:35,760 Speaker 1: they spend the night together and the next day the 176 00:08:35,800 --> 00:08:38,080 Speaker 1: police show up at his door and they like show 177 00:08:38,120 --> 00:08:40,719 Speaker 1: a picture of her, and they say, do you know her, 178 00:08:41,000 --> 00:08:43,959 Speaker 1: and he's like, no, I member as a conceder for 179 00:08:44,080 --> 00:08:46,840 Speaker 1: he says, we've got pictures of you with her and 180 00:08:46,880 --> 00:08:49,400 Speaker 1: the guy you know. As he's talking to the FBI 181 00:08:49,559 --> 00:08:53,680 Speaker 1: and CIA afterwards, he says, at that moment, I thought, okay, 182 00:08:53,880 --> 00:08:56,840 Speaker 1: I'm not going to allow myself to be blackmailed. I'm 183 00:08:56,880 --> 00:08:58,200 Speaker 1: just going to have to go home and tell my 184 00:08:58,240 --> 00:09:00,959 Speaker 1: wife that this happened, Like, not going to blackmail me. 185 00:09:01,640 --> 00:09:06,080 Speaker 1: And then they had another picture and they showed her dead, 186 00:09:06,480 --> 00:09:08,760 Speaker 1: like laying at the bottom of stairs with blood coming 187 00:09:08,800 --> 00:09:11,079 Speaker 1: out of her head, and they said, we're going to 188 00:09:11,200 --> 00:09:15,319 Speaker 1: charge you with murder. She was just found dead, and 189 00:09:15,559 --> 00:09:19,120 Speaker 1: we've got CCTV footage of her going up into the 190 00:09:19,120 --> 00:09:21,840 Speaker 1: hotel to your room, coming out, and then she was 191 00:09:21,880 --> 00:09:24,760 Speaker 1: found dead directly afterwards, and we're going to charge you 192 00:09:24,840 --> 00:09:28,199 Speaker 1: with murder unless you let us look at your computer 193 00:09:28,400 --> 00:09:30,680 Speaker 1: for an hour, right, and then we'll let you leave 194 00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:34,280 Speaker 1: the country. And that's where he snapped. And he was 195 00:09:34,320 --> 00:09:36,600 Speaker 1: a businessman doing there was some like some really big 196 00:09:36,640 --> 00:09:40,600 Speaker 1: business deals that they wanted to have a competitive advantage over, 197 00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:44,280 Speaker 1: and he did it. And he was so frightened of 198 00:09:44,600 --> 00:09:46,840 Speaker 1: this take on honeytrap. And when he got out, to 199 00:09:46,880 --> 00:09:49,920 Speaker 1: his credit, he did go to the FBI and they 200 00:09:49,960 --> 00:09:52,160 Speaker 1: warned him that if he did this that they would 201 00:09:52,240 --> 00:09:53,959 Speaker 1: charge him with murder and they would put his name 202 00:09:54,000 --> 00:09:55,640 Speaker 1: in the newspaper and all the rest of this. And 203 00:09:55,840 --> 00:09:57,600 Speaker 1: so this was a take on the honey trick that 204 00:09:57,679 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 1: I had and had, but it's pretty frightening. 205 00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:02,480 Speaker 2: There's a number of Cold War journalists, American journalists who 206 00:10:02,520 --> 00:10:05,320 Speaker 2: were trapped in honey traps in Russia in places like that. 207 00:10:05,760 --> 00:10:07,880 Speaker 2: Some that went came back home and informed the FBI 208 00:10:07,960 --> 00:10:10,520 Speaker 2: of what happened, and some who didn't and worked for 209 00:10:10,559 --> 00:10:14,120 Speaker 2: the other side. Okay, I'm a bit old. I'm going 210 00:10:14,160 --> 00:10:15,720 Speaker 2: to need to go to the bathroom, so let's take 211 00:10:15,760 --> 00:10:23,719 Speaker 2: a quick break and we'll be back shortly. All right, 212 00:10:23,760 --> 00:10:29,240 Speaker 2: welcome back. But you started by saying with honey traps, 213 00:10:29,320 --> 00:10:30,920 Speaker 2: and we didn't really go into it as we don't 214 00:10:30,920 --> 00:10:34,040 Speaker 2: do them, And by we meaning the CIA, and I 215 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:35,679 Speaker 2: think a lot of people will be surprised to hear that, 216 00:10:35,760 --> 00:10:38,600 Speaker 2: and I think that's it's in fact very true. Sex 217 00:10:38,760 --> 00:10:41,240 Speaker 2: is something you could use to either blackmail someone or 218 00:10:41,280 --> 00:10:43,080 Speaker 2: get them in a compromising position that you could take 219 00:10:43,080 --> 00:10:46,320 Speaker 2: advantage of. So it'd be surprising why wouldn't we use it? 220 00:10:46,360 --> 00:10:48,439 Speaker 2: And it is indeed true that over the years we've 221 00:10:48,480 --> 00:10:52,040 Speaker 2: learned maybe in the early years of the OSSCI. 222 00:10:51,679 --> 00:10:54,280 Speaker 1: Yeah, fifty years ago, the fifties or something like that. 223 00:10:54,360 --> 00:10:56,679 Speaker 2: Yeah, but it's stopped doing it for a number is 224 00:10:56,679 --> 00:10:58,920 Speaker 2: because number one is if you are put in a 225 00:10:58,920 --> 00:11:01,840 Speaker 2: compromising position and if you are blackmailed, you're going to 226 00:11:01,840 --> 00:11:03,280 Speaker 2: try to get out of that. And so what we 227 00:11:03,320 --> 00:11:04,960 Speaker 2: want when we recruit a source is we want someone 228 00:11:04,960 --> 00:11:07,199 Speaker 2: who is motivated to work for us and stay working 229 00:11:07,200 --> 00:11:09,640 Speaker 2: for us and not turn on us. Whereas if you 230 00:11:09,679 --> 00:11:11,600 Speaker 2: put someone in that kind of situation, yeah, you may 231 00:11:11,640 --> 00:11:13,880 Speaker 2: get them to do something for you in the short term, 232 00:11:13,960 --> 00:11:16,360 Speaker 2: but they're always going to be distrusting you and hating 233 00:11:16,360 --> 00:11:17,520 Speaker 2: you and looking for a reason. 234 00:11:17,320 --> 00:11:17,840 Speaker 1: To get out of it. 235 00:11:17,880 --> 00:11:20,520 Speaker 2: And of course, just morally in the United States and 236 00:11:20,559 --> 00:11:23,520 Speaker 2: our laws, it's something that you don't do, but others 237 00:11:23,600 --> 00:11:25,680 Speaker 2: do it. But when we start with the term honeytrap, 238 00:11:25,720 --> 00:11:28,360 Speaker 2: we're thinking of this thing of using sex, But there 239 00:11:28,400 --> 00:11:30,280 Speaker 2: are you know, I can think of law enforcement things 240 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:33,080 Speaker 2: where we use traps to catch criminals and things like that, 241 00:11:33,120 --> 00:11:35,800 Speaker 2: like we tell some criminal that he's won an award 242 00:11:36,080 --> 00:11:39,040 Speaker 2: or that he's invited to some party, and that person 243 00:11:39,040 --> 00:11:41,040 Speaker 2: can show up and then be arrested that type of thing. 244 00:11:41,080 --> 00:11:44,520 Speaker 2: So there's a way of using deception to trap someone 245 00:11:44,559 --> 00:11:47,560 Speaker 2: into doing something you want. But in fact, the security 246 00:11:47,559 --> 00:11:50,560 Speaker 2: services out the CIA doesn't use sex as a trap. 247 00:11:50,679 --> 00:11:54,160 Speaker 1: I want to maybe just touch on the positive evolution 248 00:11:54,280 --> 00:11:57,360 Speaker 1: of the agency. So when we came in the early eighties, 249 00:11:57,480 --> 00:12:00,360 Speaker 1: early to mid eighties, being gay and so of the 250 00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:02,640 Speaker 1: CIA was they wouldn't hire you. 251 00:12:03,440 --> 00:12:06,040 Speaker 2: And in fact, when you went through the security thing, 252 00:12:06,080 --> 00:12:08,520 Speaker 2: they would ask you you're going through polygraph that's a 253 00:12:08,559 --> 00:12:10,760 Speaker 2: regular question, have you had a homosexual relationship? 254 00:12:10,800 --> 00:12:14,000 Speaker 1: And yet we did hire a number of closeted gays, 255 00:12:14,000 --> 00:12:16,400 Speaker 1: including one individual I won't say his name. We all 256 00:12:16,400 --> 00:12:18,040 Speaker 1: know who is. Who is like one of the most 257 00:12:18,080 --> 00:12:21,080 Speaker 1: senior guys in the agency. Back when we lived in 258 00:12:21,200 --> 00:12:24,319 Speaker 1: tear of him, a guy who's involved in Russian things, 259 00:12:24,320 --> 00:12:28,520 Speaker 1: and the agency changed that thankfully, because that simply led 260 00:12:28,559 --> 00:12:32,000 Speaker 1: to people being more black mailable by not allowing that. 261 00:12:32,120 --> 00:12:34,120 Speaker 1: So it's a really positive thing. 262 00:12:34,200 --> 00:12:36,960 Speaker 2: That individual was a very powerful individual in the Clindestin 263 00:12:37,000 --> 00:12:40,280 Speaker 2: Services oversaw all of our activities in Moscow and when 264 00:12:40,280 --> 00:12:42,720 Speaker 2: I went there it was famously he told all of us. 265 00:12:43,080 --> 00:12:45,440 Speaker 2: Number one, you're not allowed to date Russians or anybody. 266 00:12:45,480 --> 00:12:49,120 Speaker 2: Number two, there will be no dancing. He wouldn't allowed 267 00:12:49,200 --> 00:12:52,080 Speaker 2: dancing because he says dancing leads to sex, and sex 268 00:12:52,160 --> 00:12:53,760 Speaker 2: leads the potential to be blackmail. 269 00:12:54,320 --> 00:12:56,960 Speaker 1: That's not like a Baptist. But the agency has evolved. 270 00:12:57,000 --> 00:12:59,280 Speaker 1: We have a gay Alliance, Rainbow Alliance inside of the 271 00:12:59,320 --> 00:13:02,480 Speaker 1: agency and it's I think it's something that's really beneficial 272 00:13:02,520 --> 00:13:05,040 Speaker 1: because it makes us less mailable. And the key is 273 00:13:05,040 --> 00:13:06,000 Speaker 1: you have to be open about it. 274 00:13:06,000 --> 00:13:08,000 Speaker 2: So as you're hired going through this process, you have 275 00:13:08,040 --> 00:13:09,880 Speaker 2: to be clear that you're almost going to say that 276 00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:13,920 Speaker 2: it's not something that you're hiding and therefore another service 277 00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:16,360 Speaker 2: could potentially use against that you're hiding this. We know 278 00:13:16,400 --> 00:13:17,600 Speaker 2: what we're going to use it against you. 279 00:13:17,880 --> 00:13:20,000 Speaker 1: And we know of certain cases where people who come 280 00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:23,079 Speaker 1: in as very strict like Mormons or Baptists and their 281 00:13:23,120 --> 00:13:25,920 Speaker 1: closeted days, and it was years later that they finally 282 00:13:25,920 --> 00:13:29,320 Speaker 1: came out. John, I want to give one example of 283 00:13:29,360 --> 00:13:31,439 Speaker 1: what like a honey tramp would look like. And that's 284 00:13:31,480 --> 00:13:33,079 Speaker 1: something that happened to me, And it was in one 285 00:13:33,120 --> 00:13:35,400 Speaker 1: of the stands, right, very much controlled by the. 286 00:13:35,440 --> 00:13:37,120 Speaker 2: Careful before you go much further here, but do you 287 00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:39,160 Speaker 2: know what you're going to say? Like, yeah, exactly what 288 00:13:39,160 --> 00:13:40,760 Speaker 2: I'm going to say, just warning you. 289 00:13:41,080 --> 00:13:43,320 Speaker 1: So I show up at a hotel in one of 290 00:13:43,320 --> 00:13:46,000 Speaker 1: the stands, and as I'm checking. 291 00:13:45,679 --> 00:13:47,959 Speaker 2: In or tell people what the stands are. 292 00:13:47,960 --> 00:13:51,200 Speaker 1: Oh, the stands is like Kazakhstan, turkmenis Stan, it's the 293 00:13:51,400 --> 00:13:52,880 Speaker 1: former Soviet Republic. 294 00:13:52,920 --> 00:13:55,800 Speaker 2: Well, we're supposed to be diplomats and people who support 295 00:13:55,840 --> 00:13:57,640 Speaker 2: the United States foreign policy and we call a group 296 00:13:57,640 --> 00:13:59,840 Speaker 2: of countries the stands because we can't distinguish. 297 00:14:01,520 --> 00:14:04,120 Speaker 1: But this was in one of those countries and right 298 00:14:04,160 --> 00:14:07,000 Speaker 1: where the Russians really held sway. And I show up 299 00:14:07,040 --> 00:14:10,200 Speaker 1: and I check into this nice hotel or at nice 300 00:14:10,200 --> 00:14:14,600 Speaker 1: for that country, and in the lobby are like seven 301 00:14:14,720 --> 00:14:17,800 Speaker 1: or eight clearly Russian women. They're very beautiful and as 302 00:14:17,800 --> 00:14:19,720 Speaker 1: I'm checking in, you know, you look around, and this 303 00:14:19,920 --> 00:14:23,320 Speaker 1: one woman catches my eye and as she does, where 304 00:14:23,360 --> 00:14:25,800 Speaker 1: our eyes touched, and she like raises her eyebrows. I 305 00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:28,640 Speaker 1: raise my eyebrows, like hi, and I go up to 306 00:14:28,680 --> 00:14:32,080 Speaker 1: my room, and sure enough, an hour later, there's a 307 00:14:32,160 --> 00:14:35,600 Speaker 1: knock in the door, and there she is, and she says, 308 00:14:35,720 --> 00:14:38,520 Speaker 1: in perfect English, because she's clearly done this before, she says, 309 00:14:38,760 --> 00:14:41,480 Speaker 1: excuse me. She says, I think we had a moment 310 00:14:41,520 --> 00:14:43,400 Speaker 1: in the lobby and I was just sort of wondering 311 00:14:43,440 --> 00:14:45,360 Speaker 1: if I could come in and maybe we could talk. 312 00:14:46,560 --> 00:14:51,480 Speaker 1: And I said, you know what, I would actually really 313 00:14:52,000 --> 00:14:54,080 Speaker 1: like to sit and talk with you about what your 314 00:14:54,080 --> 00:14:56,440 Speaker 1: life is like. She was clearly Russian, living in this 315 00:14:56,480 --> 00:14:58,920 Speaker 1: country where the Russians are no longer the dominant ethnic 316 00:14:58,920 --> 00:15:02,320 Speaker 1: group anymore. I said, but I understand the pressure's on you, 317 00:15:02,400 --> 00:15:05,200 Speaker 1: and I really don't think that's appropriate. And I said, look, 318 00:15:05,400 --> 00:15:08,160 Speaker 1: I just want to let you know that I've got 319 00:15:08,240 --> 00:15:11,040 Speaker 1: three daughters and they're they're like twelve, ten and eight, 320 00:15:11,080 --> 00:15:13,080 Speaker 1: I think they were at the time, and I love 321 00:15:13,160 --> 00:15:15,280 Speaker 1: my daughters, and I know you're the daughter of somebody else, 322 00:15:15,320 --> 00:15:17,840 Speaker 1: and I want to respect you, and I understand what's 323 00:15:17,880 --> 00:15:20,560 Speaker 1: going on. But really, you know, as a father, I 324 00:15:20,920 --> 00:15:22,880 Speaker 1: really don't think it's a good idea. And she like 325 00:15:23,360 --> 00:15:25,320 Speaker 1: understood and said okay, and she left. 326 00:15:25,480 --> 00:15:26,920 Speaker 2: Oh, I know, I can guess what happens next. 327 00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:31,360 Speaker 1: An hour later, there's another knock on the door, and 328 00:15:31,400 --> 00:15:33,400 Speaker 1: of course I thought, oh, it's going to be a 329 00:15:33,480 --> 00:15:35,960 Speaker 1: dude now, because they're going to think, oh maybe, yeah, 330 00:15:36,280 --> 00:15:39,160 Speaker 1: that's what I was because I know the story is 331 00:15:39,360 --> 00:15:41,160 Speaker 1: you say no to the guy and then somebody shows 332 00:15:41,200 --> 00:15:43,920 Speaker 1: up an hour later with a goat. But that didn't happen. 333 00:15:44,080 --> 00:15:46,720 Speaker 1: I opened the door and there she is, and she's 334 00:15:46,760 --> 00:15:50,080 Speaker 1: got T shirts like you know, my daughter's size, and 335 00:15:50,120 --> 00:15:52,200 Speaker 1: she says, if you don't want to talk, she says, 336 00:15:52,280 --> 00:15:53,960 Speaker 1: would you like maybe to buy a T shirt? And 337 00:15:54,000 --> 00:15:57,240 Speaker 1: it said like you know, Kazakhstan Land of a thousand 338 00:15:57,320 --> 00:16:00,200 Speaker 1: Mountains or so whatever it was. And I said, you 339 00:16:00,240 --> 00:16:03,080 Speaker 1: know what, yeah, I will, I'll buy three T shirts. 340 00:16:03,360 --> 00:16:05,280 Speaker 1: And so I imagine what hippened is she went back 341 00:16:05,320 --> 00:16:07,120 Speaker 1: and said, nah, he didn't go for it, and they 342 00:16:07,200 --> 00:16:09,240 Speaker 1: like he said, but he said, he's got three daughters, 343 00:16:09,360 --> 00:16:11,600 Speaker 1: like maybe he'll buy T shirts for his. 344 00:16:11,640 --> 00:16:14,720 Speaker 2: Daughters if we can't. If we can't sit born them 345 00:16:14,720 --> 00:16:15,760 Speaker 2: to be a spy. At least I can be a 346 00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:17,840 Speaker 2: little cash off them. If you can't have sex with them, 347 00:16:17,840 --> 00:16:20,360 Speaker 2: sell them a T shirt. And so my daughters for 348 00:16:20,360 --> 00:16:22,440 Speaker 2: for a couple of years afterwards ran around with these 349 00:16:22,520 --> 00:16:23,280 Speaker 2: Kazakh T shirts. 350 00:16:23,280 --> 00:16:25,600 Speaker 1: And of course I told my wife like, this was 351 00:16:25,640 --> 00:16:27,520 Speaker 1: sold to me by someone who wanted to have didn't 352 00:16:27,560 --> 00:16:29,720 Speaker 1: want to, but it was willing to have, say for money, 353 00:16:30,240 --> 00:16:32,080 Speaker 1: I say, I'm sure she didn't want to look at 354 00:16:32,120 --> 00:16:34,240 Speaker 1: me for Christ's sake. So yeah, that was a That 355 00:16:34,400 --> 00:16:37,720 Speaker 1: was my like one sort of memorable bump with a 356 00:16:37,720 --> 00:16:39,320 Speaker 1: honey trip. How about you in Moscow? 357 00:16:39,360 --> 00:16:41,760 Speaker 2: You must have hit like I said, was in Moscow 358 00:16:41,800 --> 00:16:44,920 Speaker 2: when you serve there, they obviously have video and audio 359 00:16:44,920 --> 00:16:46,320 Speaker 2: in your house and they watch you and they follow 360 00:16:46,320 --> 00:16:48,360 Speaker 2: you everywhere you go, so they're very carefull. They have 361 00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:50,800 Speaker 2: psychologists where you try to figure out what is this 362 00:16:50,840 --> 00:16:53,120 Speaker 2: guy potentially going to fall for, Like if you're there 363 00:16:53,320 --> 00:16:55,480 Speaker 2: visiting at a hotel, they just throw quickly, they throw 364 00:16:55,520 --> 00:16:57,000 Speaker 2: the girl at you, then they throw the guy at you, 365 00:16:57,040 --> 00:16:58,200 Speaker 2: and then they throw the goat at you, and they're 366 00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:00,800 Speaker 2: all trying to make you so you broke the law. 367 00:17:00,880 --> 00:17:02,880 Speaker 1: You did go it is, hey boy. 368 00:17:02,720 --> 00:17:03,760 Speaker 2: Because that's one of the things they used to do 369 00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:05,280 Speaker 2: that they get people like, Oh, you would go down 370 00:17:05,320 --> 00:17:06,760 Speaker 2: or you'd pay for something, and they'd be go, oh, 371 00:17:06,760 --> 00:17:08,080 Speaker 2: that's black marketeering you. 372 00:17:08,119 --> 00:17:09,400 Speaker 1: This person's going to jail. Now. 373 00:17:09,480 --> 00:17:11,480 Speaker 2: You need to work with so anything to try to 374 00:17:11,480 --> 00:17:13,280 Speaker 2: put you in a bad position. But when you work there, 375 00:17:13,800 --> 00:17:15,880 Speaker 2: they're trying to do that in a more sophisticated way, 376 00:17:15,880 --> 00:17:17,760 Speaker 2: and so they're following you and they're trying to pick 377 00:17:17,840 --> 00:17:20,120 Speaker 2: up what's the best way that would work against you. 378 00:17:20,359 --> 00:17:22,639 Speaker 2: So I never had the straight girl thing like that, 379 00:17:23,000 --> 00:17:25,119 Speaker 2: but I think I talked about in a previous episode 380 00:17:25,160 --> 00:17:29,080 Speaker 2: about the women I met. They were then after meeting me, 381 00:17:29,480 --> 00:17:31,480 Speaker 2: they would go and they would threaten their families and 382 00:17:31,520 --> 00:17:33,480 Speaker 2: threaten them and say that they had to be me. 383 00:17:33,520 --> 00:17:35,080 Speaker 2: The even report on me and that type of thing. 384 00:17:35,400 --> 00:17:37,720 Speaker 1: Staying with the theme of the show, though these are 385 00:17:37,720 --> 00:17:41,360 Speaker 1: not conspiracy theories, these are real conspiracies. They actually sit 386 00:17:41,440 --> 00:17:44,280 Speaker 1: down and they have psychiatrists and they're maybe you should 387 00:17:44,320 --> 00:17:47,240 Speaker 1: just touch on what it means to like have people 388 00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:50,639 Speaker 1: with audio and video in your apartment, Like they're watching 389 00:17:50,680 --> 00:17:53,240 Speaker 1: you sleep, They're they're watching you go to the toilet, 390 00:17:53,240 --> 00:17:55,879 Speaker 1: they're watching your shower, they're listening to every sort of 391 00:17:55,960 --> 00:17:59,240 Speaker 1: word and fart that you make. But there's a conspiracy 392 00:17:59,280 --> 00:18:02,439 Speaker 1: they're hiring against us all the time. 393 00:18:02,720 --> 00:18:06,080 Speaker 2: Well, my experience, my experiences is with Russia, but that's 394 00:18:06,119 --> 00:18:09,119 Speaker 2: always been a key part. So the security service, intelligence 395 00:18:09,119 --> 00:18:12,040 Speaker 2: services have always played a key role, that maybe the 396 00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:14,960 Speaker 2: key role in that society. And in fact, it's never 397 00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:17,720 Speaker 2: really going to turn around until they somehow destroy those 398 00:18:17,720 --> 00:18:20,520 Speaker 2: security services because they're in charge of everything more important 399 00:18:20,520 --> 00:18:23,320 Speaker 2: than the military. And even in the days before the 400 00:18:23,320 --> 00:18:26,520 Speaker 2: Soviet Union, they had an Institute of Mosca Roka, which 401 00:18:26,560 --> 00:18:30,400 Speaker 2: is essentially an institute of deception and hybrid warfare, and 402 00:18:30,520 --> 00:18:33,159 Speaker 2: as we know from our previous episodes into talking about this, 403 00:18:33,240 --> 00:18:37,400 Speaker 2: they're experts on deception and disinformation and agitation and all 404 00:18:37,400 --> 00:18:40,440 Speaker 2: these type of things, and so they use them individually 405 00:18:40,480 --> 00:18:45,000 Speaker 2: against people who visit. Their huge apparatus to control people 406 00:18:45,040 --> 00:18:47,119 Speaker 2: who come to visit and try to recruit them as 407 00:18:47,160 --> 00:18:50,640 Speaker 2: sources or to monitor them. Huge effort in trying to 408 00:18:50,760 --> 00:18:55,840 Speaker 2: use disinformation and deception to make foreign countries not understand 409 00:18:55,840 --> 00:18:59,040 Speaker 2: what they're trying to do, or to suborn individuals and 410 00:18:59,080 --> 00:19:02,600 Speaker 2: other countries. What they call this firehood of falsehoods to 411 00:19:02,680 --> 00:19:05,040 Speaker 2: push information out there, so you don't know what's real 412 00:19:05,080 --> 00:19:08,240 Speaker 2: and it's not real or Russian citizen, they just constantly 413 00:19:08,359 --> 00:19:10,720 Speaker 2: are flooded with this type of sort of false information. 414 00:19:10,800 --> 00:19:12,679 Speaker 2: So eventually what you do is you just give up 415 00:19:12,720 --> 00:19:14,760 Speaker 2: on politics. Since there's no way of knowing what's real 416 00:19:14,760 --> 00:19:16,240 Speaker 2: and not real, you give up on it. And that 417 00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:18,560 Speaker 2: helps the Kremlin stay in charge, just because they can 418 00:19:18,600 --> 00:19:20,879 Speaker 2: put out their word and people are like, I have 419 00:19:20,920 --> 00:19:23,320 Speaker 2: no way of knowing whether I'm being lied to or not, 420 00:19:23,480 --> 00:19:25,199 Speaker 2: and there's no way to find out, So I just 421 00:19:25,240 --> 00:19:27,359 Speaker 2: am going to move away from politics and let the 422 00:19:27,480 --> 00:19:30,960 Speaker 2: leadership take care of that. They've been experts at that forever, 423 00:19:31,040 --> 00:19:33,280 Speaker 2: both on the individual level of those of us who've 424 00:19:33,280 --> 00:19:36,679 Speaker 2: lived there. They're around the world trying to go after people. 425 00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:40,320 Speaker 2: We've seen them in fact involved in assassinations recently, and 426 00:19:40,440 --> 00:19:43,520 Speaker 2: so this is something that's central to the way Russia 427 00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:47,679 Speaker 2: does its policy domestically and abroad, and so they are 428 00:19:47,800 --> 00:19:48,800 Speaker 2: very good at it. 429 00:19:48,800 --> 00:19:50,640 Speaker 1: And of course everybody else is getting in the game. 430 00:19:50,720 --> 00:19:53,480 Speaker 1: We've seen that just from the newspaper that the Iranians 431 00:19:53,480 --> 00:19:58,000 Speaker 1: are now involved in stealing hacking into the Trump campaign, 432 00:19:58,359 --> 00:20:01,120 Speaker 1: and I'm sure that they will as the Russians did 433 00:20:01,160 --> 00:20:06,160 Speaker 1: in twenty sixteen and twenty twenty, arguably with Hunter Biden's laptop, 434 00:20:06,600 --> 00:20:08,640 Speaker 1: not that the laptop was made up, but the way 435 00:20:08,680 --> 00:20:11,200 Speaker 1: it was amplified and the charges that were made off 436 00:20:11,200 --> 00:20:13,080 Speaker 1: of it, that the Raetians will probably be trying to 437 00:20:13,080 --> 00:20:14,679 Speaker 1: do the same thing with the Trump campaign. I think 438 00:20:14,680 --> 00:20:19,400 Speaker 1: they'll be interesting to see in October. What October surprises 439 00:20:19,520 --> 00:20:22,320 Speaker 1: come out, pushed by either the Russians or the Iranians 440 00:20:22,560 --> 00:20:25,480 Speaker 1: or whomever. It'll be really interesting. I think it's clear 441 00:20:25,520 --> 00:20:29,159 Speaker 1: that's going to happen. Let's take a break, we'll be 442 00:20:29,240 --> 00:20:41,679 Speaker 1: right back, and boom, we're back. It's funny because Iran 443 00:20:41,960 --> 00:20:45,639 Speaker 1: and the Russians are our allies along with North Korea, 444 00:20:46,000 --> 00:20:49,119 Speaker 1: and yet they've got divergent goals. I think basically on 445 00:20:49,200 --> 00:20:52,520 Speaker 1: this coming election, where the Russians I think would like 446 00:20:52,600 --> 00:20:55,200 Speaker 1: to see Trump win because they've always had a close 447 00:20:55,240 --> 00:20:58,680 Speaker 1: relationship with him, and just ask his former advisors they could. 448 00:20:58,800 --> 00:21:01,960 Speaker 1: McMasters just came out out and said, telling his wife 449 00:21:01,960 --> 00:21:04,800 Speaker 1: that his book that's coming out, he says, the Russians 450 00:21:04,840 --> 00:21:07,119 Speaker 1: have something on him. I don't understand why it is 451 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:10,000 Speaker 1: he just refuses to like say anything bad about them, 452 00:21:10,440 --> 00:21:14,480 Speaker 1: even privately. And the Iranians I think would prefer to 453 00:21:14,520 --> 00:21:18,080 Speaker 1: see Trump not win because I think that they're concerned 454 00:21:18,119 --> 00:21:22,720 Speaker 1: about his hair trigger finger on the nuclear button, right if. 455 00:21:22,640 --> 00:21:25,280 Speaker 2: You remember correctly Trump. When Trump was president, they killed 456 00:21:25,280 --> 00:21:29,160 Speaker 2: a senior commander in Iraq. He was a going Solimani 457 00:21:29,160 --> 00:21:31,200 Speaker 2: and that's really money in Iraq, and I think they're 458 00:21:31,240 --> 00:21:32,919 Speaker 2: looking to get back at him for this. So if 459 00:21:32,960 --> 00:21:35,560 Speaker 2: you're trying to like get in there and steal things, 460 00:21:35,760 --> 00:21:37,760 Speaker 2: you essentially get what you can get. But the first 461 00:21:37,760 --> 00:21:41,320 Speaker 2: thing to do is get that compromising or that material 462 00:21:41,359 --> 00:21:43,879 Speaker 2: that you can weaponize in one fashion or another. So 463 00:21:43,960 --> 00:21:46,320 Speaker 2: sometimes they don't have stuff on the person they want 464 00:21:46,320 --> 00:21:47,560 Speaker 2: to go after, but they want to They try to 465 00:21:47,640 --> 00:21:48,760 Speaker 2: use what they have, and. 466 00:21:48,760 --> 00:21:51,919 Speaker 1: What they have is it's the grain of truth that 467 00:21:51,920 --> 00:21:55,640 Speaker 1: they can build a conspiracy or a conspiracy theory around. 468 00:21:55,960 --> 00:21:57,640 Speaker 1: But I do want to say, and I think this 469 00:21:57,680 --> 00:22:00,520 Speaker 1: is important for the audience to understand that mind standing 470 00:22:00,600 --> 00:22:04,760 Speaker 1: is in twenty sixteen that the Russians Cozy Bear and 471 00:22:04,800 --> 00:22:09,360 Speaker 1: Fancy Bear, the two entities that were associated with Russian intelligence, 472 00:22:09,840 --> 00:22:13,600 Speaker 1: that they both penetrated both the DNC the Democratic but 473 00:22:13,640 --> 00:22:17,960 Speaker 1: also the Republicans as well, but they never used any 474 00:22:18,040 --> 00:22:21,720 Speaker 1: of what they stole from the Republicans. They only used publicly. 475 00:22:22,520 --> 00:22:24,639 Speaker 1: That is an exit. They may have used it, that's right. 476 00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:29,719 Speaker 1: They may have black people who got me there, but 477 00:22:29,760 --> 00:22:33,200 Speaker 1: that speaks volumes. They stole from both, but they only 478 00:22:33,280 --> 00:22:34,600 Speaker 1: used it against the Democrats. 479 00:22:34,600 --> 00:22:36,040 Speaker 2: Because once you have them, you can use it in 480 00:22:36,080 --> 00:22:38,359 Speaker 2: a variety of ways. You could go to let's go 481 00:22:38,440 --> 00:22:40,120 Speaker 2: back to the twenty sixteen things. So you could either 482 00:22:40,760 --> 00:22:43,159 Speaker 2: use it because you at that case, of course, the 483 00:22:43,160 --> 00:22:46,640 Speaker 2: intelligence commit community and the Senate report and everybody said 484 00:22:46,640 --> 00:22:48,600 Speaker 2: they did this on purpose to help the Trump campaign 485 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:51,760 Speaker 2: because they hated Robie Clinton. But then also you might 486 00:22:51,760 --> 00:22:54,159 Speaker 2: want to use that information just to create friction in 487 00:22:54,600 --> 00:22:56,560 Speaker 2: chaos in the United States because these are your enemy 488 00:22:56,560 --> 00:22:58,919 Speaker 2: and if they're fighting each other, they're not obviously focusing 489 00:22:59,280 --> 00:23:02,720 Speaker 2: on you. Or you can use these things in another way, 490 00:23:02,720 --> 00:23:04,560 Speaker 2: a subtle way, like, for example, yeah, if they use 491 00:23:04,600 --> 00:23:07,960 Speaker 2: it against the Democrats publicly when President Trump was elected, 492 00:23:07,960 --> 00:23:10,000 Speaker 2: they could say, hey, listen, we had stuff on you too, 493 00:23:10,040 --> 00:23:12,320 Speaker 2: because of our good relationship, we didn't use that with 494 00:23:12,359 --> 00:23:15,240 Speaker 2: you. You then have that person like oh, okay, I now 495 00:23:15,280 --> 00:23:17,840 Speaker 2: know they have something on me, and I have to 496 00:23:18,359 --> 00:23:20,760 Speaker 2: behave in my relationship with them so that they don't 497 00:23:20,760 --> 00:23:21,520 Speaker 2: take advantage of this. 498 00:23:21,640 --> 00:23:23,160 Speaker 1: But j let me ask you a question something I've 499 00:23:23,200 --> 00:23:28,399 Speaker 1: never quite understood. Maria Bartona, I got the name wrong. 500 00:23:28,640 --> 00:23:31,439 Speaker 1: The KGB calm with there by their old name is 501 00:23:31,520 --> 00:23:33,920 Speaker 1: conspiring against the United States. So they're going to take 502 00:23:33,960 --> 00:23:38,760 Speaker 1: a lot of resources, time, effort, and risk to take 503 00:23:39,119 --> 00:23:42,560 Speaker 1: a sleeper agent to put them inside of the United States. 504 00:23:43,040 --> 00:23:46,720 Speaker 1: And why would they take this young woman and put 505 00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:50,439 Speaker 1: her up against and insert her into the NRA. But 506 00:23:50,480 --> 00:23:53,000 Speaker 1: there was a Routina, Maria boutin Routina. There we go 507 00:23:53,200 --> 00:23:57,199 Speaker 1: and she was She went into the NRA as a 508 00:23:57,240 --> 00:24:00,800 Speaker 1: gun control as a Second Amendment advocate, but she also 509 00:24:00,840 --> 00:24:02,760 Speaker 1: went in as a Russian citizen, where they do have 510 00:24:02,840 --> 00:24:06,440 Speaker 1: gun control right. And so I never understood why as 511 00:24:06,480 --> 00:24:10,280 Speaker 1: a conspiracy, why would the Russians target the NRA. Why 512 00:24:10,280 --> 00:24:13,000 Speaker 1: would they want to have someone inside there. I've never 513 00:24:13,080 --> 00:24:13,760 Speaker 1: understood that. 514 00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:16,040 Speaker 2: You're assuming that was the attention from the beginning. So 515 00:24:16,080 --> 00:24:17,520 Speaker 2: I think what they did is they had this woman. 516 00:24:18,119 --> 00:24:20,600 Speaker 2: She they clearly had met where there she said, okay, 517 00:24:20,640 --> 00:24:22,959 Speaker 2: I'm in an American university and I'm a student, I'm 518 00:24:22,960 --> 00:24:26,080 Speaker 2: meeting all these people. She was meeting lots of politicians 519 00:24:26,080 --> 00:24:28,879 Speaker 2: and others around power in Washington and sleeping with a 520 00:24:28,960 --> 00:24:31,159 Speaker 2: number of them. And as she became friends that she 521 00:24:31,200 --> 00:24:33,480 Speaker 2: had ended up having more relationships with Republicans. And I 522 00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:35,159 Speaker 2: think they were bringing her to events and so I 523 00:24:35,160 --> 00:24:37,200 Speaker 2: don't know if they planned to get her into the 524 00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:39,879 Speaker 2: NRA or whether the people she was around brought her 525 00:24:39,880 --> 00:24:42,080 Speaker 2: and got her into the NRA. And you know, is 526 00:24:42,080 --> 00:24:43,879 Speaker 2: in a Todales officer Jerry. Once you have a source 527 00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:45,960 Speaker 2: that has access to things, you're going to every time 528 00:24:45,960 --> 00:24:47,119 Speaker 2: you meet her, you're going to be asking them what 529 00:24:47,160 --> 00:24:48,240 Speaker 2: are you learning, what are you doing? 530 00:24:48,240 --> 00:24:48,919 Speaker 1: Who are you meeting? 531 00:24:49,480 --> 00:24:51,960 Speaker 2: And she goes through things. They probably were finding that, hey, 532 00:24:51,960 --> 00:24:54,040 Speaker 2: this is actually interesting. The NRA is a place where 533 00:24:54,080 --> 00:24:55,960 Speaker 2: a lot of right wing people are. They're very angry 534 00:24:56,280 --> 00:24:58,359 Speaker 2: that this is an issue that causes friction in the 535 00:24:58,440 --> 00:25:00,239 Speaker 2: United States, and so they were trying to use as 536 00:25:00,240 --> 00:25:02,239 Speaker 2: best they can. I think they're just taking advantage of 537 00:25:02,280 --> 00:25:05,119 Speaker 2: the access that they gained through this woman. But I 538 00:25:05,160 --> 00:25:07,720 Speaker 2: suspect she was probably more It was more interesting to the Russians. 539 00:25:07,720 --> 00:25:09,560 Speaker 2: The people she was in touch with than it was 540 00:25:10,080 --> 00:25:12,000 Speaker 2: the NRA's institution would be my guess. 541 00:25:12,240 --> 00:25:16,040 Speaker 1: Being inside the NRA and being trusted there gave her 542 00:25:16,280 --> 00:25:20,480 Speaker 1: access to a number of high level Republican or. 543 00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:21,960 Speaker 2: Should be invited to other events. 544 00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:24,920 Speaker 1: Congressman, that's right, I think too. She had a back 545 00:25:24,920 --> 00:25:27,560 Speaker 1: to the honey trip. She had a love interest as well. 546 00:25:27,680 --> 00:25:30,960 Speaker 1: There was a CEO that she was certainly involved with. 547 00:25:31,080 --> 00:25:33,359 Speaker 2: And some politicians and others. Yeah, she was sweeping with 548 00:25:33,359 --> 00:25:33,960 Speaker 2: a number of people. 549 00:25:34,040 --> 00:25:36,560 Speaker 1: Yeah, that was also a way to set up a 550 00:25:36,640 --> 00:25:37,760 Speaker 1: number of honey traps. 551 00:25:37,840 --> 00:25:41,000 Speaker 2: I would think in intelligence terms, I would call her, 552 00:25:41,280 --> 00:25:44,200 Speaker 2: instead of a honey trap, an access agent. So when 553 00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:46,520 Speaker 2: we were overseas and we were working in a foreign 554 00:25:46,560 --> 00:25:49,560 Speaker 2: country and we're trying to look at the community, the network, 555 00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:52,640 Speaker 2: who's out there, who's important, who has influence, who can influence, 556 00:25:52,760 --> 00:25:54,920 Speaker 2: you know, to get into that, it often if we 557 00:25:54,960 --> 00:25:58,280 Speaker 2: can meet someone who is in that network, who can 558 00:25:58,280 --> 00:26:01,080 Speaker 2: provide us feedback on what happening and who's there, so 559 00:26:01,119 --> 00:26:02,600 Speaker 2: that we can figure out who are the people to 560 00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:05,680 Speaker 2: go after. So Maria Bettina, there's this Russian woman, she's 561 00:26:05,680 --> 00:26:07,920 Speaker 2: in Washington. She's very outgoing, She's meet a lot of 562 00:26:07,920 --> 00:26:09,520 Speaker 2: people she's sleeping with a lot of people. She's in 563 00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:12,000 Speaker 2: all of these events. That's useful to the Russian embassy. Okay, 564 00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:13,439 Speaker 2: tell us who you're meeting, tell them who's out there, 565 00:26:13,480 --> 00:26:15,479 Speaker 2: who are the and they can divert her and aim 566 00:26:15,600 --> 00:26:18,119 Speaker 2: or in certain ways. Oh this person is very interesting, 567 00:26:18,200 --> 00:26:20,080 Speaker 2: why you continue to meet that person? And if that 568 00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:22,280 Speaker 2: person is someone's interesting enough to them, maybe she could 569 00:26:22,320 --> 00:26:24,800 Speaker 2: introduce a Russian intelligence officer to one of those people, 570 00:26:24,920 --> 00:26:27,720 Speaker 2: or she could get into that person's computer at their 571 00:26:27,720 --> 00:26:29,840 Speaker 2: house while she's sleeping with them and pass that on 572 00:26:29,920 --> 00:26:31,280 Speaker 2: too the Russians. And so what we call they call 573 00:26:31,320 --> 00:26:34,240 Speaker 2: that an access agent. That's a person who is providing 574 00:26:34,320 --> 00:26:36,720 Speaker 2: us general information about a network or a group of people, 575 00:26:37,080 --> 00:26:39,880 Speaker 2: to provide us access to others who might be more important. 576 00:26:39,880 --> 00:26:41,560 Speaker 2: So it's a first step on the chain up to 577 00:26:41,560 --> 00:26:42,320 Speaker 2: where you want to get. 578 00:26:42,480 --> 00:26:45,760 Speaker 1: And this is important too, getting back to stop the steal. 579 00:26:45,840 --> 00:26:48,879 Speaker 1: So Buttina, who now is? I think she's in the 580 00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:52,520 Speaker 1: Russian parliament, but according to the media that she was 581 00:26:52,640 --> 00:26:57,080 Speaker 1: in a romantic relationship with Patrick Byrne, who. 582 00:26:56,960 --> 00:27:00,640 Speaker 2: Was the CEO of Overstock A big report. 583 00:27:00,720 --> 00:27:03,639 Speaker 1: Yeah, it was a lot of donations to the Republican Party, 584 00:27:03,960 --> 00:27:06,720 Speaker 1: and he was also at the center of the Stop 585 00:27:06,840 --> 00:27:10,960 Speaker 1: the Steel movement to overthrow our election. It's only one. 586 00:27:11,200 --> 00:27:14,399 Speaker 1: It's not a conspiracy theory. It's just a couple of points. 587 00:27:14,480 --> 00:27:19,240 Speaker 1: Is she's a Russian sleeper agent with a influential donor 588 00:27:19,280 --> 00:27:22,639 Speaker 1: to the Republican Party who is involved sitting in the 589 00:27:22,680 --> 00:27:25,639 Speaker 1: Oval Office with Trump trying to figure out how to 590 00:27:25,640 --> 00:27:28,359 Speaker 1: overthrow our elections. So I guess, if I'm Vladimir Putin, 591 00:27:28,720 --> 00:27:31,159 Speaker 1: I've got a sleeper agent inside of the NRA. She 592 00:27:31,240 --> 00:27:34,600 Speaker 1: moves to burn, she meets other Republican operatives, and now 593 00:27:34,640 --> 00:27:38,080 Speaker 1: you've got a guy who she is like romantically involved 594 00:27:38,080 --> 00:27:41,600 Speaker 1: with the bonds of Affection and so forth, with a 595 00:27:41,640 --> 00:27:44,200 Speaker 1: guy who is sitting with the president talking about how 596 00:27:44,240 --> 00:27:46,639 Speaker 1: to overthrow the election. For me, that's more than just 597 00:27:46,680 --> 00:27:49,520 Speaker 1: a conspiracy theory. That is a counterintelligence issue. 598 00:27:49,600 --> 00:27:52,000 Speaker 2: She was also a girlfriend of Paul Erickson was a 599 00:27:52,040 --> 00:27:52,879 Speaker 2: big NRA. 600 00:27:53,560 --> 00:27:56,560 Speaker 1: There you go. Yeah, but she got hers in the end, right, 601 00:27:56,640 --> 00:27:58,360 Speaker 1: she's now a fit. I think she's got her own 602 00:27:58,359 --> 00:28:01,360 Speaker 1: talk famous she has her own talk show. 603 00:28:01,400 --> 00:28:03,560 Speaker 2: And he wouldn't get her on the podcast, and she said, yeah, 604 00:28:03,600 --> 00:28:04,160 Speaker 2: And she's. 605 00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:06,640 Speaker 1: In the Russian Parliament, I think, right, So, I think 606 00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:08,679 Speaker 1: she did less than a year John and made her 607 00:28:08,680 --> 00:28:10,200 Speaker 1: fame and fortune bick in Russia. 608 00:28:10,520 --> 00:28:12,239 Speaker 2: She was found guilty and she was supposed to be 609 00:28:12,440 --> 00:28:14,480 Speaker 2: that's like eighteen months in prison and obviously got out 610 00:28:14,640 --> 00:28:16,000 Speaker 2: earlier than that was sent back. 611 00:28:16,359 --> 00:28:18,720 Speaker 1: Arguably, yeah, I think she's definitely an excess agent, but 612 00:28:18,760 --> 00:28:20,879 Speaker 1: she's also an access agent involved in honey tramps, and 613 00:28:21,160 --> 00:28:23,840 Speaker 1: arguably those honey traps really worked. 614 00:28:23,920 --> 00:28:26,280 Speaker 2: The Russians operate differently. If you're yeah, I think if 615 00:28:26,280 --> 00:28:28,200 Speaker 2: we had an excess agent, we wouldn't try to get 616 00:28:28,200 --> 00:28:30,120 Speaker 2: them to sleep with people were interested in. We'd probably 617 00:28:30,119 --> 00:28:31,560 Speaker 2: try to get them just the friend that I'll go 618 00:28:31,600 --> 00:28:32,600 Speaker 2: to dinner and report to us. 619 00:28:32,760 --> 00:28:33,040 Speaker 1: Right. 620 00:28:33,119 --> 00:28:35,080 Speaker 2: Questions are like, sure, go sleep with those guys, tell 621 00:28:35,160 --> 00:28:36,280 Speaker 2: us their secrets, and we'll. 622 00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:38,200 Speaker 1: Find a way to use it against them, right right, 623 00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:38,840 Speaker 1: right right. 624 00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:41,480 Speaker 2: And as Paul Erickson, as you recall, he was also 625 00:28:42,000 --> 00:28:45,560 Speaker 2: convicted of fraud and thrown in prison and then was 626 00:28:45,640 --> 00:28:46,760 Speaker 2: pardoned by Donald Trump. 627 00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:50,520 Speaker 1: And I think the Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee later came 628 00:28:50,520 --> 00:28:54,640 Speaker 1: out with a report that she was trying to arrange 629 00:28:54,680 --> 00:28:59,400 Speaker 1: a link between the Trump campaign and a bad channel 630 00:28:59,520 --> 00:29:02,080 Speaker 1: to the unclear how successful she was. 631 00:29:02,360 --> 00:29:03,600 Speaker 2: That's just the one we know about. 632 00:29:03,840 --> 00:29:05,760 Speaker 1: I think the rest of the other sleeper agents, like 633 00:29:05,800 --> 00:29:08,360 Speaker 1: the ones that the Americans were based on, were much 634 00:29:08,440 --> 00:29:10,280 Speaker 1: less successful as far as we know. I mean, I 635 00:29:11,080 --> 00:29:12,000 Speaker 1: wasn't read into the case. 636 00:29:12,200 --> 00:29:14,920 Speaker 2: So there's been a war in Ukraine. Europeans and Americans 637 00:29:15,000 --> 00:29:18,240 Speaker 2: are kicking out Russian intelligence officers and diplomats out of embassies. 638 00:29:18,280 --> 00:29:20,560 Speaker 2: These are the people who normally run spy cases like 639 00:29:20,600 --> 00:29:23,120 Speaker 2: we did, and we worked in embassies abroad. So what 640 00:29:23,160 --> 00:29:25,160 Speaker 2: you do is these deep cover people who are pretending 641 00:29:25,160 --> 00:29:27,840 Speaker 2: to be Americans or South Americans or Europeans that are 642 00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:31,520 Speaker 2: actually Russian intelligence officers. Right, they're still here under granted 643 00:29:31,560 --> 00:29:34,040 Speaker 2: theyge So if there's an important spy, say there's a 644 00:29:34,080 --> 00:29:36,480 Speaker 2: spy working in the White House that they're trying to 645 00:29:36,480 --> 00:29:39,280 Speaker 2: meet secretly, and the Russian intelligence officers and the embassy 646 00:29:39,320 --> 00:29:42,560 Speaker 2: are kicked out. These people are the strategic reserve who 647 00:29:42,560 --> 00:29:45,239 Speaker 2: were there to handle those really sensitive cases, and like 648 00:29:45,640 --> 00:29:48,440 Speaker 2: during wartime, they bury weapons that be prepared to dig 649 00:29:48,520 --> 00:29:51,080 Speaker 2: up during wartime, or they handle the most sensitive cases. 650 00:29:51,120 --> 00:29:53,560 Speaker 2: That so because the FBI conceive he doesn't know who 651 00:29:53,560 --> 00:29:54,760 Speaker 2: they are, they're not following them. 652 00:29:54,640 --> 00:29:56,720 Speaker 1: So there's different level. So Patina was in the US 653 00:29:56,760 --> 00:29:58,800 Speaker 1: as a Russian. I think she was here was just 654 00:29:58,800 --> 00:30:00,840 Speaker 1: a student, right, she was a student. And then the 655 00:30:00,920 --> 00:30:03,720 Speaker 1: Russian who you know, back to the twenty sixteen election, 656 00:30:04,280 --> 00:30:08,920 Speaker 1: the Russian who met with Don Junior and Jared Kushner 657 00:30:09,520 --> 00:30:12,840 Speaker 1: saying that initially saying it was the meeting was about 658 00:30:12,880 --> 00:30:15,800 Speaker 1: at Trump Tower, the meeting that was initially about orphans, 659 00:30:16,160 --> 00:30:18,360 Speaker 1: and it turned out no, she was saying that we've 660 00:30:18,400 --> 00:30:21,040 Speaker 1: stolen democratic. 661 00:30:20,640 --> 00:30:23,000 Speaker 2: They they had information on Hillary, on. 662 00:30:22,960 --> 00:30:25,720 Speaker 1: Hillary's emails, I think that was it. And she said 663 00:30:26,240 --> 00:30:28,200 Speaker 1: I'm from the Russian government. We're here to commit a 664 00:30:28,200 --> 00:30:32,080 Speaker 1: criminal act to help the Trump campaign. And they said hooray, 665 00:30:32,320 --> 00:30:35,800 Speaker 1: and did not go to the FBI. That was arguably 666 00:30:35,840 --> 00:30:38,360 Speaker 1: another sort of honey tramp, right, because even the fact 667 00:30:38,360 --> 00:30:40,560 Speaker 1: that they didn't go to the FBI makes them culpable. 668 00:30:40,800 --> 00:30:43,720 Speaker 1: I'm surprised that they weren't charged with a crime. Kushner 669 00:30:43,720 --> 00:30:45,800 Speaker 1: in them. If the Russians came to US and made 670 00:30:45,880 --> 00:30:49,240 Speaker 1: us a deal saying hey, we've broken US law and 671 00:30:49,280 --> 00:30:52,680 Speaker 1: we want to rest American elections and so forth, if 672 00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:55,960 Speaker 1: you know of a crime like that, your honor bound 673 00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:57,400 Speaker 1: to report us if you know of a murder, your 674 00:30:57,440 --> 00:31:00,400 Speaker 1: honor bound to go to authorities, and they chose not today. 675 00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:03,280 Speaker 2: As I recall from the Muller Report and the Senate report, 676 00:31:03,680 --> 00:31:07,280 Speaker 2: essentially they did not bring chargers against Don Junior because 677 00:31:07,320 --> 00:31:09,800 Speaker 2: they just thought he was too dumb and didn't. 678 00:31:09,720 --> 00:31:10,440 Speaker 1: Really It's true. 679 00:31:11,680 --> 00:31:13,840 Speaker 2: Yeah, she said, listen, we could charge this guy, but 680 00:31:14,080 --> 00:31:16,520 Speaker 2: I don't think he even understands what he's brought up in. 681 00:31:16,680 --> 00:31:20,560 Speaker 2: And I think dealing with presidents and presidential elections, our 682 00:31:20,640 --> 00:31:22,640 Speaker 2: law enforcement system, if we're going to be really careful 683 00:31:22,640 --> 00:31:24,800 Speaker 2: about those things, and so I think per in retrospect, 684 00:31:24,880 --> 00:31:25,960 Speaker 2: maybe they were too careful. 685 00:31:26,120 --> 00:31:29,000 Speaker 1: And I have to say, because this is important, there's 686 00:31:29,040 --> 00:31:32,240 Speaker 1: a difference here between what happened in twenty sixteen what 687 00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:34,640 Speaker 1: we talked about, the Trump Towers and Russia. If you're 688 00:31:34,680 --> 00:31:38,680 Speaker 1: out there, get me the emails. Trump actually asking publicly 689 00:31:38,800 --> 00:31:41,560 Speaker 1: for Russian intelligence to break the law, and he already 690 00:31:41,640 --> 00:31:43,800 Speaker 1: knew that they had and he needed this to get 691 00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:46,920 Speaker 1: out of the grab by the pussy saying. It came 692 00:31:46,960 --> 00:31:50,760 Speaker 1: out the next day. But what the Iranians have taken Apparently, 693 00:31:50,920 --> 00:31:54,880 Speaker 1: according to the press from the Trump campaign, Politico, the 694 00:31:55,000 --> 00:31:56,760 Speaker 1: Washington Posts in New York Times. They have not gone 695 00:31:56,800 --> 00:31:59,280 Speaker 1: to print with that material. They've not used it against 696 00:31:59,400 --> 00:32:02,280 Speaker 1: the Trump can pain, at least not yet, and the 697 00:32:02,320 --> 00:32:05,560 Speaker 1: Hairs campaign hasn't used it either. They certainly have that 698 00:32:05,760 --> 00:32:09,880 Speaker 1: material is available to them from inside the Trump campaign 699 00:32:09,880 --> 00:32:11,600 Speaker 1: that they can use, and they haven't done it. So 700 00:32:11,920 --> 00:32:14,720 Speaker 1: I think that's a good thing, and I think it's 701 00:32:14,720 --> 00:32:17,680 Speaker 1: hopefully show some growth. But it's very different than how 702 00:32:17,800 --> 00:32:20,560 Speaker 1: when she was on the other foot, Trump wanted and 703 00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:23,600 Speaker 1: exploited and used it against the Democrats, and as yet 704 00:32:23,680 --> 00:32:25,320 Speaker 1: the Democrats haven't used that against me. 705 00:32:25,400 --> 00:32:28,280 Speaker 2: And my understanding is they hacked into Roger Stone's emails. 706 00:32:28,360 --> 00:32:30,400 Speaker 1: That's right there, the man with a Nixon tattoo on 707 00:32:30,480 --> 00:32:30,880 Speaker 1: his back. 708 00:32:31,760 --> 00:32:33,600 Speaker 2: Like many of our discussions, we ended up going in 709 00:32:33,680 --> 00:32:35,640 Speaker 2: ways I didn't expect, and we ended up talking about 710 00:32:35,640 --> 00:32:36,320 Speaker 2: the honey traps. 711 00:32:36,400 --> 00:32:38,479 Speaker 1: I think the only way we're going to get Adam 712 00:32:38,520 --> 00:32:41,040 Speaker 1: back on this podcast is using a honey trap. Right. 713 00:32:41,080 --> 00:32:45,280 Speaker 2: So, But so that's all for today's episode of Mission Plausible. 714 00:32:45,360 --> 00:32:46,160 Speaker 2: Join us next time. 715 00:32:51,040 --> 00:32:56,080 Speaker 1: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'shay, John Cipher, 716 00:32:56,400 --> 00:33:00,800 Speaker 1: and Jonathan Sterner. The associate producer is Rachel Harry Mission 717 00:33:00,840 --> 00:33:04,840 Speaker 1: Implausible is a production of honorable mention and abominable pictures 718 00:33:04,920 --> 00:33:06,280 Speaker 1: for iHeart Podcasts.