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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech stuff, a production from my heart radio.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech stuff. I'm your host,

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I heart radio,

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Speaker 1: and how the Tech Are you? It's time for the

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Speaker 1: Tech News for Thursday September, twenty two, two thousand twenty two. And,

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Speaker 1: just as a reminder, I will actually be on vacation

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Speaker 1: next week. We will have some reruns playing next week,

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Speaker 1: so we will have episodes up. Uh, and if you

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Speaker 1: haven't been listening for more than a couple of years,

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Speaker 1: it'll be new to you and I'll be recording new

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Speaker 1: intros and stuff for those episodes. But yes, I'll be

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Speaker 1: back in early October. Just taking a week off to

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Speaker 1: celebrate my anniversary. But let's get to the Tech News.

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Speaker 1: That's more than enough about me. Earlier this week I

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Speaker 1: talked about how hackers infiltrated Uber's corporate systems and accessed

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Speaker 1: an unknown amount of data, though they did post a

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Speaker 1: message to the company's Slack Channel, and I also mentioned

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Speaker 1: that another company, Rock Star Games, had also been hit

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Speaker 1: by a hacker, reportedly the same one, at least according

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Speaker 1: to the claims of the hacker themselves. UH, well, one

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Speaker 1: thing I did not mention is that that hacker, who

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Speaker 1: used the handle t pot Uber Hacker, over on G

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Speaker 1: T A forums, uploaded more than ninety videos showing gameplay

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Speaker 1: footage of a developer build of the next grand theft

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Speaker 1: auto game, A K A G T A six. The

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Speaker 1: previous installment of the game, G t a five, came

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Speaker 1: out nearly ten years ago, back in two thousand thirteen,

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Speaker 1: and fans have been eager to get a new entry

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Speaker 1: in the series for years. Rock Star in two K

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Speaker 1: Games were clearly not ready to show off anything about

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Speaker 1: the game yet. They had not made any details public,

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Speaker 1: but there had been lots of rumors circulating for a

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Speaker 1: while that the next entry would see a return to

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Speaker 1: vice city, that's the G T A stand in for

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Speaker 1: Miami Florida, and that at least one main character would

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Speaker 1: be a woman, which is kind of a departure for

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Speaker 1: the series, as of like most of the protagonists, in

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Speaker 1: fact really all the protagonists in the recent games, have

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Speaker 1: been mailed. The downloaded footage confirmed those rumors. Uh. It

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Speaker 1: also shows that you'll actually be playing as two different

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Speaker 1: characters throughout the story, and a kind of a Bonnie

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Speaker 1: and Clyde style criminal relationship. It also was very much

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Speaker 1: a developer build right, not anything close to a final product.

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Speaker 1: It included videos that had stuff like debugging data on

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Speaker 1: screen during Gameplay, and you think that those would be

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Speaker 1: enough indicators for people to chill the heck out before

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Speaker 1: they passed judgment on this. But no, there were lots

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Speaker 1: of reactions that mentioned things like the graphics quality. But, y'all,

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Speaker 1: that's just silly. This game is nowhere close to being finished,

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Speaker 1: so judging it on things like that is absolutely ridiculous. Reportedly,

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Speaker 1: one reason the game has taken sort of the scenic

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Speaker 1: route as far as development is concerned is that rock

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Speaker 1: star and two K are trying to avoid the issue

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Speaker 1: of crunch. That's where game developer companies pressure employees to

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Speaker 1: work grueling hours, often with no days off, in an

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Speaker 1: effort to get a title finished and out the door. Personally,

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Speaker 1: I think it's okay to wait a little longer for

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Speaker 1: a game if it means developers have a chance to

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Speaker 1: unwind in their off time and see their families and,

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Speaker 1: you know, do something other than debug code for sixteen

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Speaker 1: hours straight every day. Anyway, when the companies began issuing

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Speaker 1: D M C, a takedowns on posted videos of this

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Speaker 1: leaked footage, it became clear that the videos must be

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Speaker 1: legit because if you are going to issue a D

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Speaker 1: M C, a takedown, then presumably you have ownership of

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Speaker 1: the material in question. You can't do a D M C,

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Speaker 1: a takedown of something you don't own, or at least

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Speaker 1: it will get overturned, at least in theory, because you

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Speaker 1: don't have the right to actually take down anything if

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Speaker 1: you don't own it. So if the videos were fake,

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Speaker 1: then the companies wouldn't have had the authority to order

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Speaker 1: them taken down. So, in other words, by taking measures

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Speaker 1: against the spread of the videos, rock star in two

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Speaker 1: K effectively confirmed that the leaked material was legitimate. Rock

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Speaker 1: star had also already confirmed that it had been hit

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Speaker 1: by a data breach, likely caused by social engineering. That,

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Speaker 1: of course, is when someone convinces a person to hand

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Speaker 1: over access credentials to a system. Sometimes they trick them,

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Speaker 1: sometimes it's a person on the inside who gets ride

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Speaker 1: to do it, but yeah, social engineering is a very

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Speaker 1: popular way to get access to otherwise secure systems. It's

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Speaker 1: very rare that you see hackers doing the Hollywood thing

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Speaker 1: of trying to crack a password, because it's much easier

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Speaker 1: to just convince somebody who already has access to hand

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Speaker 1: it over. Anyway, rock star is currently working with the

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Speaker 1: FBI to investigate this hack. Uber is also doing that,

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Speaker 1: working with the FBI and the Department of Justice. So

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Speaker 1: there are strong powers bearing down on the the hacker Um.

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Speaker 1: So I don't know if the hackers at all concerned

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Speaker 1: about that. But yeah, the the investigations have begun. A

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Speaker 1: whistleblower has come forward saying that multiple US military agencies

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Speaker 1: have spent millions of dollars on a data mining tool

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Speaker 1: from team Simru. I'm not sure I'm saying that right.

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Speaker 1: It's see why, M are you? And this tool claims

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Speaker 1: to give a quote, super majority of all activity on

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Speaker 1: the Internet, end quote, which means that, at least in theory,

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Speaker 1: if you have access to this tool, you can get

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Speaker 1: a look at like nine of all the traffic crossing

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Speaker 1: the Internet, which is mind boggling to say the least.

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Speaker 1: I mean, just think about all the different devices connected

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Speaker 1: to and communicating over the Internet. Senator Ron Widen from Oregon,

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Speaker 1: whom you might remember, I talked about recently because he's

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Speaker 1: the senator who was criticizing US Customs for coercing people

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Speaker 1: into handing over access to their electronic devices, and then

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Speaker 1: U s customs was downloading that information into a massive

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Speaker 1: database that anyone in the customs agency could potentially access anyway.

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Speaker 1: That same senator is now asking some tough questions about

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Speaker 1: the military's use of this tool. And obviously any tool

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Speaker 1: that allows this level of scrutiny over Internet traffic stands

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Speaker 1: as a massive security and privacy threat to hundreds of

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Speaker 1: millions of people and, depending upon the scope and level

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Speaker 1: of focus that the tool allows, it could be truly terrifying. Now,

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Speaker 1: at worst, this could mean that all these military agencies

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Speaker 1: have access to truly enormous amounts of information on people

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Speaker 1: that could compromise their privacy down the road. So, even

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Speaker 1: if you're someone who says I've done nothing wrong, I'm

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Speaker 1: not worried about it, just imagine that's someone who has

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Speaker 1: access to the system also has an ax to grind

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Speaker 1: with you for whatever reason. Maybe it's a neighbor and

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Speaker 1: they didn't like the fact that you didn't mow the

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Speaker 1: lawn last night. You know, something crazy like that. This

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Speaker 1: these sort of things have happened. We saw it happened

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Speaker 1: with the N S A, where people were accessing massive

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Speaker 1: surveillance tools for their own personal use. That does happen.

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Speaker 1: So even if you assume these agencies aren't doing anything malicious,

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Speaker 1: which is a dangerous assumption to make in the first place,

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Speaker 1: there's still massive, massive problems with this kind of surveillance,

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Speaker 1: and that's Whiten's point. But even at the very least,

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Speaker 1: let's just let's say that everyone's being very careful and

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Speaker 1: responsible with all of this, what it suggests is that

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Speaker 1: the military has been looking for loopholes to get around

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Speaker 1: the few protections that the United States grants for privacy.

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Speaker 1: My my home country, is pretty darn awful about protecting

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Speaker 1: citizen privacy. According to widen, the whistleblower claimed that people

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Speaker 1: within these agencies had shared their concerns about the use

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Speaker 1: of these tools and they had filed complaints and concerns

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Speaker 1: all up and down the chain of command, but ultimately

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Speaker 1: nothing changed. And so the whistleblower came forward out of

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Speaker 1: concern that the military and the Department of Defense could

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Speaker 1: be violating constitutional rights by sidestepping judiciary oversight. It seems

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Speaker 1: as though the military and other agencies, like law enforcement

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Speaker 1: organizations are getting around barriers in a pretty suss way.

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Speaker 1: So the fourth amendment to the Constitution in the United

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Speaker 1: States gives citizens protection against unread noble search and seizure.

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Speaker 1: See also the story we did on US Customs on Tuesday.

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Speaker 1: And usually you can't just go and demand a company

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Speaker 1: like an Internet service provider to hand over information about

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Speaker 1: someone unless you have an order that's been issued by

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Speaker 1: a court system you've gotten a judge to sign off

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Speaker 1: on it. But if these agencies don't demand information but

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Speaker 1: instead just go out and buy it from data brokers

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Speaker 1: who will sell information to whomever is buying it, well

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Speaker 1: then they kind of got around that, didn't they? Because

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Speaker 1: they didn't demand anything, they just purchased access to this information,

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Speaker 1: which is a big old yuck. Anyway, whether we see

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Speaker 1: the government take action on this and close down these

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Speaker 1: loopholes remains to be seen. So I guess just remember

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Speaker 1: it's not just Santa clause that's watching you. The Iranian

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Speaker 1: government is cracking down on Internet access in the country

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Speaker 1: in the wake of protests that have been prom did

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Speaker 1: by the death of Massa Amini last week. Amini was

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Speaker 1: arrested and charged with wearing unsuitable attire, in violation of

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Speaker 1: Iran's modesty rules, and she died in police custody last week.

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Speaker 1: Her family is UH protesting the reasoning that Iranian authorities

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Speaker 1: have given, saying that the authorities are are lying about

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Speaker 1: Ameni's medical condition and that she died as a result

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Speaker 1: of their direct treatment of her. The tragedy appears to

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Speaker 1: have been the tipping point for social unrest in the nation. Now,

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Speaker 1: I want to add there are a lot of factors

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Speaker 1: that are contributing to social instability in Iran, and the

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Speaker 1: big picture is extremely complex, far more so than we

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Speaker 1: can go into in this podcast, but this incident was

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Speaker 1: sort of an inciting incident. The Iranian government has appeared

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Speaker 1: to order a near total black out of Internet communication,

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Speaker 1: with some people reporting that they were only able to

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Speaker 1: send texts on their phone to each other, but otherwise

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Speaker 1: had no real connectivity. Presumably this is all in an

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Speaker 1: effort to hamper any kind of organizational efforts that would

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Speaker 1: otherwise depend upon the Internet. It's the most extreme crackdown

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Speaker 1: on internet communications in Iran since November two thousand nineteen.

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Speaker 1: That's when Iranian citizens began to protest a whole bunch

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Speaker 1: of different issues, including government corruption increased fuel prices, than

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Speaker 1: the Iranian government in general. We have more news to cover,

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Speaker 1: but first let's take a quick break. We're back over

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Speaker 1: in Russia. A leader of the Russian Foreign Ministry named

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Speaker 1: Constantine Voran Stov or varant solve, I should say sorry

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Speaker 1: for my pronunciation. He said that if countries continue to

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Speaker 1: support Ukraine that Russia might retaliate against, quote unquote, quasi

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Speaker 1: civilian infrastructure. Now, the general interpretation of this statement is

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Speaker 1: that Russian leaders are threatening to shoot down Starlink satellites

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Speaker 1: that are in orbit above Ukraine. So earlier this year

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Speaker 1: the Digital Minister for Ukraine tweeted at Elon Musk essentially

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Speaker 1: asking for Starlink equipment to be sent to the country.

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Speaker 1: A joint project between the United States Agency for International

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Speaker 1: Development and SPACEX would send thousands of Starlink satellite dishes

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Speaker 1: to Eastern Europe and a small constellation of Starlink satellites

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Speaker 1: moved into position above Ukraine. UH, it's not entirely clear

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Speaker 1: how much of that is funded by SPACEX and private

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Speaker 1: funds and how much of that came from the US agency,

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Speaker 1: largely because the US agency scrubbed a lot of that

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Speaker 1: information off of its sites in the wake of this developing.

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Speaker 1: Maybe it was a way to try and dist the

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Speaker 1: United States support of Ukraine in a delicate situation, but

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Speaker 1: this became a critical part of Ukraine's strategy for fighting Russia,

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Speaker 1: using the communications in order to maintain a chain of command,

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Speaker 1: as well as to do things like guide drones to

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Speaker 1: attack Russian positions. Now fast forward about nine months and

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Speaker 1: Russia's campaign in Ukraine is not going to the countries favor,

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Speaker 1: Russia's favor, I should say. Vladimir Putin faces increasing resistance

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Speaker 1: in Russia as he instituted partial military mobilization. Now, if

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Speaker 1: you're like me, you might want to know what those

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Speaker 1: words actually mean, because if I read partial military mobilization,

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Speaker 1: it just sounds like you're moving military units, but not

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Speaker 1: all of them, just part of them. Now, in this case,

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Speaker 1: what that phrase actually means is that Russia is calling

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Speaker 1: up specific groups of people to serve in the armed forces.

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Speaker 1: So it's not that dissimilar to the draft here in

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Speaker 1: the United States, or you know, or the concept of

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Speaker 1: conscription in general. It just as a different phrasing. I

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Speaker 1: don't know why we use that. I find it confusing.

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Speaker 1: I think it just works better if we say conscription,

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Speaker 1: but maybe maybe I'm just a stickler for that kind

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Speaker 1: of thing. Anyway, as the situation gets more complicated for Putin,

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Speaker 1: the leader has begun making threats against any country that

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Speaker 1: might support Ukraine, and now has seemed to extend that

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Speaker 1: to not just countries but companies in their equipment. Russia

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Speaker 1: does have the capability to shoot down satellites in orbit.

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Speaker 1: In fact, the country demonstrated that last year when it

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Speaker 1: destroyed an old communication satellite in a test of the system,

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Speaker 1: in a move that drew sharp criticism from the scientific

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Speaker 1: community because it could have potentially threatened astronauts aboard the

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Speaker 1: International Space Station by creating lots of space junk traveling

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Speaker 1: at tens of thousands of miles per hour, and even

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Speaker 1: a small piece could spell chaos for other spacecraft. If

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Speaker 1: Russia did make such a move, it would no doubt

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Speaker 1: escalate tensions dramatically in the region. Okay, time to talk

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Speaker 1: about Meta and some recent issues that the company faces.

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Speaker 1: In Texas, a jury found Meta guilty of having infringed

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Speaker 1: upon patents belonging to an APP company called Voxer. Tom

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Speaker 1: cadis founded voxer back in two thousand six in an

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Speaker 1: effort to create better walkie talkie style technology, and he

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Speaker 1: launched an APP in two thousand eleven. Apparently Meta, which

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Speaker 1: back then was just plain old facebook, was interested in

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Speaker 1: either acquiring or partnering with Foxer, but for one reason

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Speaker 1: or another that project never solidified. But boxer's lawyers say

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Speaker 1: that Meta later incorporated technology that came from boxer into

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Speaker 1: facebook features without compensating the company, and that prompted the

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Speaker 1: court case, and that this court case was actually filed

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Speaker 1: two years ago because, like I said earlier this week,

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Speaker 1: justice in the US sure does move swiftly. Meta lawyers

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Speaker 1: argued that the company did not infringe upon the patents,

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Speaker 1: but a jury found otherwise, and the jury also decided

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Speaker 1: that Meta now owes foxer four point five million dollars.

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Speaker 1: Metal lawyers say they plan to appeal the decision, so

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Speaker 1: this ain't over yet. Meanwhile, there's a class action lawsuit

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Speaker 1: that might be taking shape against Meta. According to the

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Speaker 1: site Mac rumors, it is a proposed class action lawsuit

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Speaker 1: at the moment. So what is the issue? Well, the

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Speaker 1: lawsuit claims that Meta used some workarounds to sidestep apple's

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Speaker 1: APP Tracking Transparency Policy, a k a a t t,

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Speaker 1: but not a t and T, just a t t. now,

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Speaker 1: this is the policy that lets IOS users opt out

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Speaker 1: of APP tracking, which Meta had been relying upon to

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Speaker 1: fuel its advertising business. That data is incredibly valuable to

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Speaker 1: Meta and to Meta's advertising clients, so getting cut off

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Speaker 1: from that was a huge blow. The lawsuit claims that

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Speaker 1: Meta has built in browsers in its APPS, like facebook

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Speaker 1: and Instagram, that do all the data gathering that a

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Speaker 1: t t is supposed to prevent should users opt out

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Speaker 1: of it, and that users are not made aware of this.

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Speaker 1: They happens without their consent. There are allegations that medic

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Speaker 1: can even monitor text and puts like payment information, which

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Speaker 1: obviously presents security and privacy concerns. Good news for instagram

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Speaker 1: users out there. The company is reportedly working on a

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Speaker 1: filter that will automatically detect when someone sends you a

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Speaker 1: nude photo. That's actually a huge problem on the platform.

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Speaker 1: There are some folks who get unsolicited nudes frequently. I

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Speaker 1: imagine female presenting influencers get it an awful lot. The

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Speaker 1: tool will detect images containing nudity and will cover those images,

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Speaker 1: and it gives the recipient the option to either just

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Speaker 1: ignore the message so they don't ever have to look

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Speaker 1: at it, or, if they give in to curiosity, they

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Speaker 1: can actually choose to view it, but it becomes an

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Speaker 1: active choice. It's not something that just happens automatically. So

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Speaker 1: for folks who are flooded with this kind of material,

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Speaker 1: I imagine that would be a huge relief. It might

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Speaker 1: even mean they might check their messages more frequently because

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Speaker 1: they wouldn't have a fear of being confronted by the

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Speaker 1: nude form of total strangers. And this is also important

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Speaker 1: to note this tool is supposed to do all of

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Speaker 1: this automatically. No one at instagram will be able to

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Speaker 1: look at or have access to the images. I imagine

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Speaker 1: the AI that has been trained to recognize nudity has

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Speaker 1: a real tough time with all the other image recognition

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Speaker 1: ais when they get together for their virtual softball league.

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Speaker 1: TIKTOK will soon require all accounts connected to US politicians,

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Speaker 1: political parties and government agencies to go through a verification process.

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Speaker 1: In addition, the platform is banning all videos aimed at

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Speaker 1: campaign fundraising. This is a bit of a pushback against

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Speaker 1: the valid criticisms that tiktok has long allowed misinformation, including

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Speaker 1: political misinformation, to proliferate on the Plat form. Once TIKTOK

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Speaker 1: has verified a politically connected account, that account will not

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Speaker 1: be able to access advertising and gifting features, and any

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Speaker 1: videos that mentioned fundraising or that actively solicit donations will

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Speaker 1: be banned. Finally, over on twitch, you've got a lot

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Speaker 1: of twitch streamers who are threatening to strike against the platform,

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Speaker 1: possibly around Christmas week, because of the platform's stance on gambling.

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Speaker 1: That is there is none. Twitch has said that they

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Speaker 1: are evaluating their policies they'll come out with something more

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Speaker 1: coherent in the future, but we have already heard that

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Speaker 1: things like sports betting will not be included in that policy.

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Speaker 1: So that's pretty much guaranteed to take off everybody. The

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Speaker 1: people who are anti gambling are going to be upset

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Speaker 1: because they're gonna be some forms of gambling that will

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Speaker 1: be allowed. The people are pro gambling are going to

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Speaker 1: be upset because it'll feel like certain sectors of the

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Speaker 1: gambling community are being singled out and others are given

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Speaker 1: a free pass. So good job twitch. No one's happy.

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Speaker 1: All right. That's it for this episode. If you would

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Speaker 1: like to reach out to me remember I'll be out

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Speaker 1: for a whole week. It's good luck and I'll talk

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Speaker 1: to you again, Willie soon. Yes, text stuff is an

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Speaker 1: I heart radio production. For more podcasts from my heart radio,

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Speaker 1: visit the I heart radio APP, apple podcasts or wherever

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Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.