1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,840 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:12,200 Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,280 --> 00:00:13,960 Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio. 5 00:00:24,280 --> 00:00:27,080 Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt, 6 00:00:27,480 --> 00:00:28,360 Speaker 2: my name is Nola. 7 00:00:28,640 --> 00:00:31,440 Speaker 3: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our 8 00:00:31,520 --> 00:00:36,199 Speaker 3: super producer Paul Mission Control decad. Most importantly, you are you. 9 00:00:36,200 --> 00:00:39,760 Speaker 3: You are here. That makes this the stuff they don't 10 00:00:39,800 --> 00:00:43,560 Speaker 3: want you to know. Tonight's tale is taking us across 11 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:47,400 Speaker 3: the world to the nation of India, and on the way, 12 00:00:47,479 --> 00:00:49,440 Speaker 3: we want to give a big thanks to our fellow 13 00:00:49,479 --> 00:00:53,720 Speaker 3: conspiracy realist people like Maya M and Sean C who 14 00:00:53,800 --> 00:00:56,720 Speaker 3: took the time to reach out to us about this topic. 15 00:00:56,840 --> 00:01:03,800 Speaker 3: We're exploring a tragic, twisted tale of corruption, crime, chemicals, and, 16 00:01:03,880 --> 00:01:08,319 Speaker 3: according to some, the greatest industrial accident in human history. 17 00:01:08,360 --> 00:01:11,920 Speaker 3: It's a story that was largely unfamiliar to a lot 18 00:01:11,959 --> 00:01:15,800 Speaker 3: of people in the West. Here are the facts. Have 19 00:01:15,880 --> 00:01:19,880 Speaker 3: you guys ever heard of Beaupaul Bhopl. 20 00:01:19,280 --> 00:01:23,400 Speaker 4: Just to hear the name, very little knowledge of its geography, 21 00:01:23,880 --> 00:01:27,280 Speaker 4: as is often the case with me in geographical location. Yeah. 22 00:01:27,480 --> 00:01:31,520 Speaker 2: With regards to this disaster that's really, at least in 23 00:01:31,560 --> 00:01:34,679 Speaker 2: the West. The major reason it's even written about or 24 00:01:34,680 --> 00:01:35,600 Speaker 2: spoken about. 25 00:01:35,600 --> 00:01:37,560 Speaker 4: I was not familiar with this disaster at all, and 26 00:01:37,720 --> 00:01:39,200 Speaker 4: boy was I educated. 27 00:01:39,760 --> 00:01:42,400 Speaker 3: Yeah, we're not going to spend too too much time 28 00:01:42,480 --> 00:01:46,360 Speaker 3: on the facts because the story itself is factual and 29 00:01:46,440 --> 00:01:49,080 Speaker 3: so crazy. So just for a bit of background here, 30 00:01:50,080 --> 00:01:55,400 Speaker 3: bopol Is Boupaul is the capital city of an Indian state, 31 00:01:55,720 --> 00:01:59,640 Speaker 3: Madhya Pradesh. And if you look at this city on 32 00:01:59,680 --> 00:02:02,720 Speaker 3: the map app, you'll see its smack dab in the 33 00:02:02,720 --> 00:02:06,320 Speaker 3: middle of the country in central India, surrounded by natural 34 00:02:06,520 --> 00:02:12,480 Speaker 3: artificial lakes alike. It is the sixteenth largest city in 35 00:02:12,520 --> 00:02:15,320 Speaker 3: the nation of India and it's the one hundred and 36 00:02:15,400 --> 00:02:20,079 Speaker 3: thirty first largest in the world. It's a big, big place. 37 00:02:20,480 --> 00:02:22,880 Speaker 4: Oh man. Remember when we were hanging out with our 38 00:02:22,880 --> 00:02:25,799 Speaker 4: buddy Mangesh in New York over the weekend. He was 39 00:02:25,840 --> 00:02:28,880 Speaker 4: talking about he had a relative who is the head 40 00:02:28,919 --> 00:02:33,120 Speaker 4: of forestry for the entire country of India, and we asked, 41 00:02:33,200 --> 00:02:35,360 Speaker 4: you know what, wow, is that in like urban centers 42 00:02:35,480 --> 00:02:37,600 Speaker 4: or mainly kind of more out in the sticks. And 43 00:02:37,639 --> 00:02:40,880 Speaker 4: it's definitely out more in areas like this where you're 44 00:02:40,880 --> 00:02:44,120 Speaker 4: going to have these very dense, kind of forested regions. 45 00:02:44,520 --> 00:02:48,200 Speaker 3: Yeah, you know, and we can identify with that because 46 00:02:48,320 --> 00:02:52,359 Speaker 3: here in our fair metropolis of Atlanta, we live in 47 00:02:52,400 --> 00:02:55,480 Speaker 3: a place that is sometimes called the city in a forest. 48 00:02:55,800 --> 00:03:02,600 Speaker 3: Atlanta has an enormous expanse ofage. It's a green city 49 00:03:03,120 --> 00:03:05,640 Speaker 3: in that regard, and that's kind of the story with 50 00:03:05,760 --> 00:03:10,360 Speaker 3: this city. It has its own history dating back millennia. 51 00:03:10,400 --> 00:03:14,000 Speaker 3: According to the legends, it's named after an ancient king, 52 00:03:14,520 --> 00:03:17,960 Speaker 3: Raja Bojah. And if you look at the etymology, the 53 00:03:18,120 --> 00:03:23,640 Speaker 3: paul in the name Beaupaul means something like reservoir or dam, 54 00:03:23,960 --> 00:03:26,440 Speaker 3: so we could translate the name of this city to 55 00:03:26,680 --> 00:03:30,359 Speaker 3: the city of the King Raja Boja or the city 56 00:03:30,440 --> 00:03:34,320 Speaker 3: of lakes. That's awesome, yeah, and it probably was for 57 00:03:34,400 --> 00:03:37,800 Speaker 3: quite some time. I mean, it's a beautiful place, you know. 58 00:03:37,880 --> 00:03:41,600 Speaker 3: It's it's also almost paradoxically, it's home to a lot 59 00:03:41,640 --> 00:03:47,440 Speaker 3: of industry. There are pharmaceutical manufacturers there, the automotive industry 60 00:03:47,480 --> 00:03:52,280 Speaker 3: has a presence, as well as textiles manufacturers of electronic goods. 61 00:03:53,000 --> 00:03:57,680 Speaker 3: But as heartbreaking as it is to admit, Bopaul isn't 62 00:03:57,760 --> 00:04:03,920 Speaker 3: best known for its ancient history or it's beguiling attractions, Nords, greenery, nords, 63 00:04:03,920 --> 00:04:10,320 Speaker 3: healthier industry. Instead, the city has become synonymous with disaster. 64 00:04:11,200 --> 00:04:15,160 Speaker 3: Here's where it gets crazy. Sorry, folks, heads up told 65 00:04:15,200 --> 00:04:16,280 Speaker 3: you we were getting to that early. 66 00:04:16,760 --> 00:04:19,080 Speaker 4: Yeah, I may as well just rip the band aid off. 67 00:04:19,000 --> 00:04:24,800 Speaker 2: Right, So this disaster begins on December third, nineteen eighty four. 68 00:04:25,560 --> 00:04:29,320 Speaker 2: As we were recording this in December this year, it 69 00:04:29,400 --> 00:04:33,280 Speaker 2: will have been what, guys, forty years since this disaster. 70 00:04:35,279 --> 00:04:36,560 Speaker 2: Let's describe the disaster. 71 00:04:36,680 --> 00:04:40,320 Speaker 4: What happened so shortly after midnight on December third, nineteen 72 00:04:40,360 --> 00:04:44,800 Speaker 4: eighty four in the neighborhood of forty tons of dangerous 73 00:04:45,279 --> 00:04:51,520 Speaker 4: methyl iso cyanate or MIC, a very lethal gas, escaped 74 00:04:51,640 --> 00:04:55,960 Speaker 4: from an insecticide plant that was owned and operated by 75 00:04:56,400 --> 00:05:01,880 Speaker 4: an Indian subsidiary of the American firm Union in Carbide Corporation. 76 00:05:02,520 --> 00:05:06,560 Speaker 4: This division was done as Union Carbide India Limited, which 77 00:05:06,600 --> 00:05:09,719 Speaker 4: was huge at this time, and the company itself was actually 78 00:05:09,720 --> 00:05:14,080 Speaker 4: founded back in nineteen seventy one of those legacy kind 79 00:05:14,120 --> 00:05:17,560 Speaker 4: of chemical interests, right, and the Indian subsidiary was the 80 00:05:17,680 --> 00:05:23,200 Speaker 4: very first petrochemical producer in the entirety of India, as 81 00:05:23,240 --> 00:05:25,839 Speaker 4: you know, as you mentioned Ben since that point, a 82 00:05:25,839 --> 00:05:29,400 Speaker 4: lot more have joined the party. They made all kinds 83 00:05:29,400 --> 00:05:29,840 Speaker 4: of stuff. 84 00:05:30,480 --> 00:05:35,520 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, they chemically stuff, mainly right, chemical products, plastic goods, 85 00:05:36,360 --> 00:05:43,599 Speaker 3: photographic plates, films, industrial electrodes, laminated glass, machine tools, all 86 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:47,279 Speaker 3: kinds of things. And they also, unfortunately had a long 87 00:05:47,400 --> 00:05:51,440 Speaker 3: standing shoddy track record when it came to safety. 88 00:05:51,880 --> 00:05:53,560 Speaker 2: Shoddy, I think is understating it. 89 00:05:53,839 --> 00:05:56,760 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I mean calling it a track record is 90 00:05:56,800 --> 00:05:57,960 Speaker 3: probably understating it. 91 00:05:58,040 --> 00:05:58,280 Speaker 4: Yeah. 92 00:05:58,320 --> 00:06:02,200 Speaker 3: But from nineteen eighty to nineteen eighty four alone, just 93 00:06:02,240 --> 00:06:05,599 Speaker 3: in those four years leading up to the disaster, more 94 00:06:05,640 --> 00:06:11,359 Speaker 3: than sixty seven different leakages of this substance methyl isocyanate 95 00:06:11,520 --> 00:06:17,359 Speaker 3: or MC occurred, and management made sure to downplay these 96 00:06:17,520 --> 00:06:20,960 Speaker 3: reports when they were asked by the public or the press, 97 00:06:21,080 --> 00:06:24,280 Speaker 3: or indeed the Indian government. They said, look, you know, 98 00:06:24,480 --> 00:06:27,559 Speaker 3: accidents happened. None of these events are a real threat 99 00:06:27,600 --> 00:06:31,160 Speaker 3: to health. And even when something does go sideways, it 100 00:06:31,240 --> 00:06:35,440 Speaker 3: never exceeds the legal standards for toxic emissions in the air. 101 00:06:35,920 --> 00:06:38,320 Speaker 2: Yeah. Well, and let's talk about these chemicals where they 102 00:06:38,320 --> 00:06:43,159 Speaker 2: were stored. At this location, they had these huge storage tanks. 103 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:47,280 Speaker 2: There were three stories high, guys, three stories worth of 104 00:06:47,320 --> 00:06:51,680 Speaker 2: this deadly toxic chemical that they, you know, would would 105 00:06:52,160 --> 00:06:53,960 Speaker 2: take out just little bits at a time for the 106 00:06:54,000 --> 00:06:57,159 Speaker 2: manufacturing process to make the products they were making. But 107 00:06:57,279 --> 00:07:00,960 Speaker 2: they just kept that stuff just sitting there. It's so volatile. 108 00:07:01,040 --> 00:07:05,080 Speaker 2: If it interacts with water at all, you will get 109 00:07:05,240 --> 00:07:08,640 Speaker 2: explosive literally explosive chemical reaction results. 110 00:07:09,080 --> 00:07:11,679 Speaker 3: Yeah, we should also mention that they have been doing 111 00:07:11,760 --> 00:07:16,240 Speaker 3: this since nineteen sixty nine, so they were around for decades. 112 00:07:16,600 --> 00:07:17,160 Speaker 4: Yeah. 113 00:07:17,280 --> 00:07:19,200 Speaker 2: Well, and well, I'm sure we'll get into it. But 114 00:07:19,320 --> 00:07:22,800 Speaker 2: it wasn't just this one chemical. They had all kinds 115 00:07:22,800 --> 00:07:25,600 Speaker 2: of chemicals that were just stored on site, a lot 116 00:07:25,600 --> 00:07:28,480 Speaker 2: of times improperly. Other times they had them in these 117 00:07:28,520 --> 00:07:34,000 Speaker 2: evaporation ponds where they're just sitting there and leeching into 118 00:07:34,040 --> 00:07:37,640 Speaker 2: the water supplies that's around the area. It's so weird 119 00:07:37,720 --> 00:07:43,120 Speaker 2: because it is the company, right, Union Carbide, but it's 120 00:07:43,200 --> 00:07:47,680 Speaker 2: also this specific site because they run a bunch of 121 00:07:47,760 --> 00:07:52,400 Speaker 2: different Union Carbide factories and places like this, but this 122 00:07:52,440 --> 00:07:55,840 Speaker 2: one in particular, it just seems that the safety was superlax. 123 00:07:56,200 --> 00:08:01,040 Speaker 3: Yeah, and Union Carbide India Limited was at the time 124 00:08:01,080 --> 00:08:04,840 Speaker 3: of this operation. The actual company, the US based Union 125 00:08:04,920 --> 00:08:08,560 Speaker 3: Carbide owned a little bit more like a smidge more 126 00:08:08,640 --> 00:08:12,520 Speaker 3: than fifty percent of United Carbide India and the other 127 00:08:12,720 --> 00:08:15,880 Speaker 3: forty nine point something percent. Forty nine point one percent 128 00:08:16,320 --> 00:08:19,760 Speaker 3: is owned by Indian investors, some of whom are individuals, 129 00:08:20,080 --> 00:08:24,920 Speaker 3: some of whom are factions of the government. So there's 130 00:08:25,360 --> 00:08:28,400 Speaker 3: a lot of There are a lot of stakeholders, we 131 00:08:28,440 --> 00:08:32,280 Speaker 3: should say, and they're printing money making these products. So 132 00:08:32,559 --> 00:08:37,000 Speaker 3: it is unfortunately no surprise that workers and activists who 133 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:42,560 Speaker 3: would repeatedly raise concern about these problems were roundly ignored. 134 00:08:42,679 --> 00:08:46,400 Speaker 3: Perhaps in some cases they found themselves to be victims 135 00:08:46,440 --> 00:08:52,480 Speaker 3: of retaliation because miic is not something you sell to 136 00:08:52,520 --> 00:08:57,199 Speaker 3: the public. The public is never supposed to touch this. It's 137 00:08:57,559 --> 00:09:03,600 Speaker 3: what's called an intermediary chemical in pesticide production. And longtime listeners, 138 00:09:03,679 --> 00:09:07,440 Speaker 3: as you all know, pesticide is its own bag of 139 00:09:07,480 --> 00:09:10,960 Speaker 3: badgers as far as health effects go. But even back 140 00:09:11,000 --> 00:09:15,040 Speaker 3: in the nineteen eighties, even before the nineteen eighties, everybody 141 00:09:15,120 --> 00:09:18,520 Speaker 3: who was read up on mic knew it was nasty, 142 00:09:18,760 --> 00:09:19,640 Speaker 3: nasty stuff. 143 00:09:20,120 --> 00:09:23,880 Speaker 2: Yeah again, just let's let's say one more time. Methyl 144 00:09:23,960 --> 00:09:28,000 Speaker 2: isocyanate isociety, the cionate part. 145 00:09:28,000 --> 00:09:31,200 Speaker 4: It should be a tip. It's probably not great. I 146 00:09:31,200 --> 00:09:33,880 Speaker 4: can only assume it's related to cyanide or maybe that's 147 00:09:33,920 --> 00:09:37,320 Speaker 4: just me and my etymological year. 148 00:09:37,720 --> 00:09:38,560 Speaker 2: I don't think you're wrong. 149 00:09:38,640 --> 00:09:43,280 Speaker 3: No, okay, Well, methyl is also something that we don't 150 00:09:43,360 --> 00:09:46,239 Speaker 3: love to see. 151 00:09:45,320 --> 00:09:48,800 Speaker 4: Put together double not good, double one plus whatever the 152 00:09:48,800 --> 00:09:51,880 Speaker 4: one is from the thing from nineteen eighty four. Yeah 153 00:09:52,160 --> 00:09:52,880 Speaker 4: plus un good? 154 00:09:53,040 --> 00:09:56,920 Speaker 3: Yes, there it is. So this leak results in a 155 00:09:57,000 --> 00:10:02,959 Speaker 3: gas that drifts out of the plant and envelops densely 156 00:10:03,040 --> 00:10:04,959 Speaker 3: populated neighborhoods in the. 157 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:07,000 Speaker 4: Area and poisoned fog. 158 00:10:07,400 --> 00:10:11,200 Speaker 3: Yes, just so, and it kills Like World War One 159 00:10:11,400 --> 00:10:16,720 Speaker 3: mustard gas warfare. This stuff kills thousands of people immediately, 160 00:10:17,040 --> 00:10:20,320 Speaker 3: and then it creates a panic because people who don't 161 00:10:20,360 --> 00:10:24,679 Speaker 3: immediately die, tens of thousands of other people are attempting 162 00:10:24,679 --> 00:10:26,280 Speaker 3: to flee the city en mass. 163 00:10:26,880 --> 00:10:31,240 Speaker 2: Well, let's talk about what happened. Something pretty standard there was, 164 00:10:31,360 --> 00:10:33,679 Speaker 2: at least according to the official story. There was a 165 00:10:33,840 --> 00:10:37,160 Speaker 2: worker who was flushing water through one of the systems, 166 00:10:37,640 --> 00:10:41,240 Speaker 2: and it was a pipe, a long pipe series that 167 00:10:41,520 --> 00:10:45,439 Speaker 2: was I guess rusted and corroding a bit, and somehow 168 00:10:45,480 --> 00:10:49,320 Speaker 2: the water that he was flushing through that system entered 169 00:10:49,360 --> 00:10:53,560 Speaker 2: into one of these storage tanks. Again, according to the story, 170 00:10:53,559 --> 00:10:56,960 Speaker 2: there were pieces of the equipment that malfunctioned that allowed 171 00:10:56,960 --> 00:10:59,880 Speaker 2: that water to shoot off into the storage tank. But 172 00:11:00,240 --> 00:11:03,280 Speaker 2: immediately upon that water hitting it, it's set off that 173 00:11:03,920 --> 00:11:07,560 Speaker 2: chain chemical reaction and the it exploded. One of those 174 00:11:07,559 --> 00:11:12,079 Speaker 2: storage tanks exploded, and that's where all of those chemicals 175 00:11:12,160 --> 00:11:16,160 Speaker 2: just started leaking out and then hugging the ground like 176 00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:18,240 Speaker 2: some kind of I'd like a horror move, like a 177 00:11:18,320 --> 00:11:20,800 Speaker 2: zombie bribe. You'll see where there's a mist on the 178 00:11:20,840 --> 00:11:23,360 Speaker 2: ground or something that's you know, in this case, it's 179 00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:26,360 Speaker 2: above a human head, but it's just floating. 180 00:11:25,960 --> 00:11:31,000 Speaker 3: Outwards, like the fog or the mist. Other horror stories 181 00:11:31,000 --> 00:11:34,760 Speaker 3: that would be comparable. This is real life. The final 182 00:11:34,960 --> 00:11:39,560 Speaker 3: death toll is estimated to be somewhere between fifteen thousand 183 00:11:39,600 --> 00:11:43,040 Speaker 3: to twenty thousand people. But there's something tricky about that 184 00:11:43,480 --> 00:11:47,440 Speaker 3: because that quote unquote final death toll only counts the 185 00:11:47,520 --> 00:11:51,160 Speaker 3: people who died immediately in the first few days. The 186 00:11:51,440 --> 00:11:56,520 Speaker 3: actual number, the actual toll in blood is much higher. 187 00:11:56,800 --> 00:11:59,520 Speaker 3: And also, oh, we didn't even mention this. As this 188 00:11:59,760 --> 00:12:04,280 Speaker 3: gas is drifting over these populated neighborhoods at the same time, 189 00:12:04,800 --> 00:12:09,640 Speaker 3: communication lines with the larger nation of India have have 190 00:12:10,000 --> 00:12:13,959 Speaker 3: gone caput. They shut down, so when the accident occurs, 191 00:12:14,360 --> 00:12:16,959 Speaker 3: but Paul itself is cut off from civilization. 192 00:12:17,200 --> 00:12:19,880 Speaker 4: Does this feel a little Chernobyl asked to you guys, 193 00:12:20,480 --> 00:12:23,320 Speaker 4: one hundred percent. Yeah, just in terms of the community, 194 00:12:23,320 --> 00:12:26,080 Speaker 4: I mean all of it, but like the communication part 195 00:12:26,160 --> 00:12:29,120 Speaker 4: was key. That was I guess more perpetrated by the 196 00:12:29,160 --> 00:12:33,400 Speaker 4: Soviet government at the time in terms of siloing information 197 00:12:33,600 --> 00:12:36,079 Speaker 4: and not telling the rest of the world. But I'm 198 00:12:36,120 --> 00:12:37,160 Speaker 4: sensing a theme. 199 00:12:37,280 --> 00:12:40,640 Speaker 3: And they show up later in tonight's show The Soviets, 200 00:12:40,640 --> 00:12:42,920 Speaker 3: so if you're wondering how they play a role, you'll 201 00:12:42,960 --> 00:12:46,680 Speaker 3: seum don't worry. Spoiler also want to give a special 202 00:12:46,720 --> 00:12:51,319 Speaker 3: shout out since you mentioned Chernobyl. There is an excellent 203 00:12:51,679 --> 00:12:56,720 Speaker 3: four part series on Netflix now called The Railwaymen, The 204 00:12:56,800 --> 00:13:00,480 Speaker 3: Untold Story of Bopaul in nineteen eighty four, and do 205 00:13:00,720 --> 00:13:03,559 Speaker 3: check that out especially, you know, I don't want to 206 00:13:03,559 --> 00:13:08,760 Speaker 3: say enjoyed, but if you found chernobyl the series fascinating, 207 00:13:08,880 --> 00:13:13,280 Speaker 3: then you'll see a lot of thematic unfortunate similarities in 208 00:13:13,320 --> 00:13:14,000 Speaker 3: The Railwaymen. 209 00:13:14,559 --> 00:13:17,880 Speaker 2: Yeah. I think one of the differences. Well, you tell me, guys, 210 00:13:17,920 --> 00:13:22,360 Speaker 2: I don't know that much about Chernobyl. But in this case, 211 00:13:22,160 --> 00:13:26,600 Speaker 2: this facility, this factory was supposed to have at least 212 00:13:27,120 --> 00:13:31,440 Speaker 2: six alarm systems and alert systems that would be triggered 213 00:13:31,520 --> 00:13:34,600 Speaker 2: if any of their chemicals were released, and at least 214 00:13:34,600 --> 00:13:38,360 Speaker 2: to everything I've seen, that none of those systems functioned. 215 00:13:38,840 --> 00:13:42,880 Speaker 3: Also, I would note thattt that the factory was not 216 00:13:42,920 --> 00:13:46,320 Speaker 3: supposed to be located where it was in the first place. 217 00:13:47,240 --> 00:13:51,560 Speaker 3: It's because what we say it deployed in nineteen sixty nine, 218 00:13:52,360 --> 00:13:56,200 Speaker 3: being as close to densely populated areas as it was, 219 00:13:56,200 --> 00:13:59,520 Speaker 3: was a violation of a later thing called the Beaupual 220 00:13:59,600 --> 00:14:01,839 Speaker 3: develop Plan from seventy five. 221 00:14:02,120 --> 00:14:05,040 Speaker 2: Well, just because of how fast the gas could travel, 222 00:14:05,120 --> 00:14:08,040 Speaker 2: right if if it caught wind and just started expelling 223 00:14:08,080 --> 00:14:11,760 Speaker 2: from the facility, And well but even then, if there 224 00:14:11,840 --> 00:14:14,280 Speaker 2: was any kind of system involved, they even just set 225 00:14:14,320 --> 00:14:16,839 Speaker 2: off a siren right the way like you might hear 226 00:14:16,920 --> 00:14:18,400 Speaker 2: a tornado siren in your. 227 00:14:18,320 --> 00:14:20,960 Speaker 4: Town or something good old lasim just. 228 00:14:20,920 --> 00:14:24,640 Speaker 2: To alert that, oh, something's wrong, right, But in this case, 229 00:14:25,160 --> 00:14:27,360 Speaker 2: nobody had any idea anything was wrong. 230 00:14:28,080 --> 00:14:32,360 Speaker 3: No, especially given the late hour of the incident. Something 231 00:14:32,520 --> 00:14:38,320 Speaker 3: like half a million survivors suffered respiratory problems, continue to 232 00:14:38,640 --> 00:14:42,960 Speaker 3: suffer these today, ie irritation, straight up blindness, other maladies, 233 00:14:43,120 --> 00:14:51,240 Speaker 3: especially cancer, and it's all from exposure to this toxic gas. Eventually, survivors, 234 00:14:51,640 --> 00:14:56,160 Speaker 3: many of them, received monetary compensation, but it's peanuts in 235 00:14:56,200 --> 00:14:58,520 Speaker 3: comparison to what's happened to them. It's something like the 236 00:14:58,560 --> 00:15:02,760 Speaker 3: equivalent of three high hundred and ten dollars US per person. 237 00:15:03,280 --> 00:15:07,800 Speaker 3: And this, you know, we also know that forty thousand 238 00:15:08,160 --> 00:15:11,520 Speaker 3: individuals of the five hundred thousand believed to be exposed 239 00:15:12,280 --> 00:15:16,280 Speaker 3: are permanently disabled or maimed as a result of this. 240 00:15:16,480 --> 00:15:21,600 Speaker 3: It is enormously difficult to articulate the magnitude of this calamity, 241 00:15:21,840 --> 00:15:25,120 Speaker 3: and that's why it remains, even now in twenty twenty four, 242 00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:30,240 Speaker 3: remains considered the worst industrial accident in all of human history. 243 00:15:30,760 --> 00:15:33,280 Speaker 3: And you know, we're throwing numbers out, we're talking a 244 00:15:33,280 --> 00:15:37,360 Speaker 3: little bit about chemistry, we're talking about zoning. Weirdly enough, 245 00:15:38,360 --> 00:15:41,560 Speaker 3: maybe the best way to convey the impact of this 246 00:15:41,760 --> 00:15:46,920 Speaker 3: hellish situation is to look directly at the stories of survivors. 247 00:15:46,960 --> 00:15:49,960 Speaker 3: And with this I suggest we go to an excellent 248 00:15:50,280 --> 00:15:52,840 Speaker 3: MPR piece from November of last year. 249 00:15:53,520 --> 00:15:58,880 Speaker 4: Absolutely a journalist retoo Shotterjy tells the story of Rihanna 250 00:15:59,120 --> 00:16:04,000 Speaker 4: b who was just sixteen years old when this catastrophe 251 00:16:04,120 --> 00:16:06,640 Speaker 4: took place, and she and her family lived in a 252 00:16:06,640 --> 00:16:11,800 Speaker 4: neighborhood near the plant. She her three brothers, her father, 253 00:16:11,920 --> 00:16:15,520 Speaker 4: and her mother, who was eight months pregnant at the time, 254 00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:18,680 Speaker 4: all were living there together, and like most of the 255 00:16:18,720 --> 00:16:23,080 Speaker 4: folks in the neighborhood, her family all were asleep at 256 00:16:23,080 --> 00:16:25,880 Speaker 4: the time of the incident, and the neighbors came and 257 00:16:25,960 --> 00:16:29,160 Speaker 4: woke the family up. When Bee's parents opened the door, 258 00:16:29,520 --> 00:16:34,960 Speaker 4: they were understandably very startled and shaken by what they saw. 259 00:16:36,240 --> 00:16:40,920 Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, they walk out, and all of their neighbors 260 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:45,040 Speaker 3: are running around outside or looking around in confusion because 261 00:16:45,320 --> 00:16:50,160 Speaker 3: the majority of people had just woken up. Suddenly they're coughing, cough, cough. 262 00:16:50,160 --> 00:16:53,440 Speaker 3: They're rubbing their eyes, and their eyes and their lungs 263 00:16:53,520 --> 00:16:56,880 Speaker 3: are burning with whatever this substance is in the air. 264 00:16:56,960 --> 00:16:59,320 Speaker 3: And these people know there is a factory, but they 265 00:16:59,320 --> 00:17:02,640 Speaker 3: don't know what I see is No one knew what 266 00:17:02,720 --> 00:17:05,639 Speaker 3: was happening, none of the civilians unless they were directly 267 00:17:05,680 --> 00:17:08,359 Speaker 3: working at the plant, and so B notes it was 268 00:17:08,480 --> 00:17:12,679 Speaker 3: quote as if someone was burning chili's meaning chili pepper. 269 00:17:12,840 --> 00:17:17,600 Speaker 3: If you've ever had chili pepper pepper spray, yeah, yeah. 270 00:17:17,760 --> 00:17:20,359 Speaker 2: Not healing as it inhaling. It is one of the 271 00:17:20,359 --> 00:17:23,360 Speaker 2: worst things. Sometimes when I'm just cleaning off the dishes 272 00:17:23,359 --> 00:17:25,720 Speaker 2: and I've got hot water hitting you know, the ghost 273 00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:28,040 Speaker 2: peppers that i was just eating, I'm like, when it 274 00:17:28,040 --> 00:17:31,520 Speaker 2: gets aerosolized, it's not a fun time. And in this 275 00:17:31,560 --> 00:17:33,840 Speaker 2: case we're talking about it's the miic, right, but it's 276 00:17:33,840 --> 00:17:39,000 Speaker 2: also hydrogen cyanide and monomethylamine, which are two other crazy 277 00:17:39,119 --> 00:17:43,879 Speaker 2: dangerous chemicals that are making the oil burning. The oil 278 00:17:43,880 --> 00:17:47,800 Speaker 2: burning lamps that are outside burn brown because of the 279 00:17:47,840 --> 00:17:50,199 Speaker 2: substances that are getting into the flame. 280 00:17:50,480 --> 00:17:53,720 Speaker 3: It looks like an evil spell. And also I know 281 00:17:53,840 --> 00:17:58,639 Speaker 3: there were a lot of people nodding, probably in unfortunate sympathy, 282 00:17:58,680 --> 00:18:00,160 Speaker 3: with the idea of burning ChIL. 283 00:18:00,400 --> 00:18:01,000 Speaker 2: In the air. 284 00:18:01,400 --> 00:18:03,840 Speaker 3: I want to give a shout out to my cousin, 285 00:18:03,960 --> 00:18:07,800 Speaker 3: one of my cousins who doesn't listen to the show, thankfully, 286 00:18:07,840 --> 00:18:11,520 Speaker 3: because he showed me the dangers of chili's When he 287 00:18:11,600 --> 00:18:15,560 Speaker 3: was cutting some and I think being lazy, he scratched 288 00:18:15,640 --> 00:18:20,080 Speaker 3: himself and he touched his eyes and while. 289 00:18:20,080 --> 00:18:24,320 Speaker 4: Recover scratched himself in a middle gentleman. 290 00:18:25,080 --> 00:18:25,760 Speaker 3: Yeah, I got him. 291 00:18:25,920 --> 00:18:26,600 Speaker 4: I got him bad. 292 00:18:28,000 --> 00:18:31,880 Speaker 3: And so back to the wee hours of nineteen eighty four, 293 00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:37,359 Speaker 3: December third, Bee's family, Rihanna Bee's family is trying to 294 00:18:37,560 --> 00:18:41,040 Speaker 3: flee this gas, but the problem is everyone else is 295 00:18:41,080 --> 00:18:44,240 Speaker 3: attempting to flee as well, and her mother, again is 296 00:18:44,320 --> 00:18:47,159 Speaker 3: eight months pregnant. So with all the crowds, the chaos, 297 00:18:47,280 --> 00:18:52,160 Speaker 3: the pandemonium, and her mother's vulnerable condition, the family elects 298 00:18:52,280 --> 00:18:55,200 Speaker 3: to sit on the side of a nearby road and 299 00:18:55,400 --> 00:18:58,080 Speaker 3: try to wake things out until the morning. And you've 300 00:18:58,160 --> 00:19:00,840 Speaker 3: seen this pretty often if you've ever or if you've 301 00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:04,360 Speaker 3: ever been in an area where a natural disaster is occurring, 302 00:19:04,600 --> 00:19:07,560 Speaker 3: you see something similar. Like when people try to exit 303 00:19:07,640 --> 00:19:10,560 Speaker 3: the path of a hurricane on the interstate. The inner 304 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:13,920 Speaker 3: states can be choked and they can become unusable. So 305 00:19:14,119 --> 00:19:17,640 Speaker 3: this is what we're seeing happen here as a pedestrian 306 00:19:18,160 --> 00:19:22,800 Speaker 3: version of that. And sadly, look, this is incredibly disturbing, folks, 307 00:19:22,880 --> 00:19:26,040 Speaker 3: But sadly, in the case of Be's family alone, not 308 00:19:26,200 --> 00:19:29,080 Speaker 3: everybody made it. By the end of the day, Both 309 00:19:29,119 --> 00:19:32,040 Speaker 3: of her parents and one of her brothers, a younger 310 00:19:32,080 --> 00:19:35,280 Speaker 3: when three years old, they had all died. They joined 311 00:19:35,320 --> 00:19:37,720 Speaker 3: the thousands of victims who fell to the gas. 312 00:19:38,320 --> 00:19:42,600 Speaker 2: Yeah, and just imagine there are thousands of people around 313 00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:44,879 Speaker 2: you in that moment, if you are going through this, 314 00:19:45,160 --> 00:19:48,480 Speaker 2: they are choking to death, they're vomiting themselves to death. 315 00:19:48,600 --> 00:19:51,879 Speaker 2: They are it is I think you described it as 316 00:19:51,920 --> 00:19:54,960 Speaker 2: hell That is probably what it looked and felt like 317 00:19:55,960 --> 00:19:56,640 Speaker 2: in that moment. 318 00:19:57,280 --> 00:20:00,159 Speaker 4: I'm sorry to keep being that guy that's like in 319 00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:02,240 Speaker 4: this movie or tvach or whatever, but there. I recently 320 00:20:02,280 --> 00:20:05,639 Speaker 4: saw the new spin off of The Walking Dead and 321 00:20:05,800 --> 00:20:08,440 Speaker 4: there's a really I'd never seen it depicted. Like there's 322 00:20:08,480 --> 00:20:11,960 Speaker 4: a really intense scene where there's a chemical attack, like 323 00:20:13,040 --> 00:20:18,120 Speaker 4: a mustard gas type attack, and it was really done 324 00:20:18,280 --> 00:20:21,879 Speaker 4: with such intensity and ferocity and people are like, you know, 325 00:20:22,040 --> 00:20:24,720 Speaker 4: throwing up white stuff and their eyes are running, and 326 00:20:24,880 --> 00:20:26,240 Speaker 4: you know a lot of people just die, but some 327 00:20:26,320 --> 00:20:29,680 Speaker 4: people escape, but they their lungs are damaged for like 328 00:20:30,280 --> 00:20:32,600 Speaker 4: months and they have to recover. And it was just 329 00:20:33,000 --> 00:20:34,840 Speaker 4: I mean, I know it's a TV show, but I'd 330 00:20:34,880 --> 00:20:37,399 Speaker 4: never really seen this depicted in that way before, and 331 00:20:37,480 --> 00:20:39,320 Speaker 4: I found it really, you know, hard to watch. 332 00:20:40,200 --> 00:20:44,320 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's I do think hellish is the appropriate word 333 00:20:44,480 --> 00:20:48,159 Speaker 3: because gas has been deployed in warfare, and this is 334 00:20:48,400 --> 00:20:52,159 Speaker 3: very similar to that. However, often in the case of 335 00:20:52,480 --> 00:20:57,160 Speaker 3: biological warfare or chemical warfare, excuse me, these soldiers going 336 00:20:57,240 --> 00:21:00,600 Speaker 3: into those situations will ideally be armed with some kind 337 00:21:00,640 --> 00:21:05,160 Speaker 3: of protective gear. You know, we'll check out our episode 338 00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:07,879 Speaker 3: on PB pills to see how that preventative measure can 339 00:21:07,960 --> 00:21:10,760 Speaker 3: go wrong. But the most disturbing thing, and perhaps not 340 00:21:10,880 --> 00:21:13,800 Speaker 3: appropriate for all of us in the audience this evening, 341 00:21:14,359 --> 00:21:17,480 Speaker 3: is this just to drive the impact home. Rahana B 342 00:21:17,840 --> 00:21:21,280 Speaker 3: vividly recalls in her interview with MPR how some of 343 00:21:21,320 --> 00:21:25,879 Speaker 3: her relatives witnessed the eight month old fetus in her 344 00:21:25,960 --> 00:21:30,560 Speaker 3: mother's womb, moving and struggling to survive until the next morning, 345 00:21:30,760 --> 00:21:35,440 Speaker 3: long after the mother had passed. And this is one yeah, 346 00:21:35,560 --> 00:21:39,040 Speaker 3: this is one story of thousands and thousands of people. 347 00:21:39,200 --> 00:21:43,480 Speaker 3: And now Rona B has survived, you know, she started 348 00:21:43,480 --> 00:21:45,639 Speaker 3: a family of her own, but she is haunted by 349 00:21:45,720 --> 00:21:50,480 Speaker 3: the lifelong consequences the shadow of this mic stuff. She 350 00:21:50,560 --> 00:21:54,000 Speaker 3: has high blood pressure and diabetes. In particular, her husband 351 00:21:54,040 --> 00:21:57,320 Speaker 3: that she married a year after the disaster also has 352 00:21:57,400 --> 00:22:01,639 Speaker 3: chronic health conditions. And these conditions are so serious that 353 00:22:01,760 --> 00:22:04,840 Speaker 3: they prevented the couple from working, so they depend on 354 00:22:04,880 --> 00:22:09,520 Speaker 3: their two sons for income. Their lives have been irreparably altered. 355 00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:14,240 Speaker 3: And the worst part is this is so far from unique. 356 00:22:14,640 --> 00:22:19,399 Speaker 3: Multiple studies over intervening decades have proven that survivors of 357 00:22:19,520 --> 00:22:23,560 Speaker 3: this incident have a range of chronic health issues, real 358 00:22:23,720 --> 00:22:27,320 Speaker 3: serious stuff, not like oh my knee aches a little 359 00:22:27,480 --> 00:22:31,720 Speaker 3: when the weather's changing. We're talking about enormously higher rates 360 00:22:31,760 --> 00:22:35,040 Speaker 3: of cancer. This is a real conspiracy. 361 00:22:35,520 --> 00:22:39,840 Speaker 2: Well, we're also talking about like brain damage and birth 362 00:22:39,960 --> 00:22:46,120 Speaker 2: defect issues, breast milk that has been contaminated. I saw 363 00:22:46,320 --> 00:22:49,080 Speaker 2: in the a Guardian article that was mostly in twenty 364 00:22:49,359 --> 00:22:53,560 Speaker 2: twenty three, written by Judah Passau and tim edwards where 365 00:22:53,960 --> 00:22:56,280 Speaker 2: there was a person quoted in there who survived it 366 00:22:56,440 --> 00:23:00,600 Speaker 2: saying the lucky ones were taken that day. We are 367 00:23:00,680 --> 00:23:04,479 Speaker 2: unlucky for surviving. And that's just talking about to everyone 368 00:23:04,560 --> 00:23:07,960 Speaker 2: that they lost individually, you know, in that moment and 369 00:23:08,119 --> 00:23:10,879 Speaker 2: the following days, and all the people who have been 370 00:23:10,960 --> 00:23:14,520 Speaker 2: injured by you know, as the long term effects of 371 00:23:14,600 --> 00:23:17,200 Speaker 2: this thing, and just having to suffer through all of that. 372 00:23:18,160 --> 00:23:23,760 Speaker 2: It's just horrifying, right right. So again, these. 373 00:23:25,320 --> 00:23:28,560 Speaker 3: Claims are backed up by science, as always say, multiple 374 00:23:28,600 --> 00:23:33,200 Speaker 3: studies have proven this, and with all this hard evidence 375 00:23:33,520 --> 00:23:38,080 Speaker 3: about the consequences, it should come as no surprise that India, 376 00:23:38,880 --> 00:23:42,120 Speaker 3: the survivors of the incident, and indeed the world entire 377 00:23:42,440 --> 00:23:46,720 Speaker 3: we're asking themselves, and still are asking themselves what happened. 378 00:23:47,040 --> 00:23:48,640 Speaker 3: We're going to take a break for a word from 379 00:23:48,680 --> 00:23:51,480 Speaker 3: our sponsors, and then we're going to get into that question. 380 00:23:51,960 --> 00:23:55,400 Speaker 3: And spoilers ahead, folks. It gets into some deep water 381 00:23:55,520 --> 00:24:05,399 Speaker 3: pretty quickly. We have returned what happened? This is the 382 00:24:05,520 --> 00:24:09,639 Speaker 3: biggest question I've mentioned earlier. You could watch a fictionalized, 383 00:24:09,800 --> 00:24:12,919 Speaker 3: in depth exploration of the incident in the Netflix series 384 00:24:13,400 --> 00:24:17,480 Speaker 3: The Railwaymen. It's similar to the earlier series on Chernobyl. 385 00:24:17,960 --> 00:24:20,640 Speaker 3: I see we start with the immediate blowback, and then 386 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:23,600 Speaker 3: we get to the theories we've already kind of established. 387 00:24:23,920 --> 00:24:27,760 Speaker 3: There were long standing issues at the chemical factory. Issues 388 00:24:27,840 --> 00:24:31,760 Speaker 3: the workers had flagged time and time again, but we 389 00:24:31,880 --> 00:24:34,280 Speaker 3: didn't say some of them. But let's get a little 390 00:24:34,320 --> 00:24:39,560 Speaker 3: more specific. The workers realized that gas pressure detectors, pipes 391 00:24:40,280 --> 00:24:45,600 Speaker 3: different air scrut like air fence scrubbers, and even their 392 00:24:45,640 --> 00:24:50,119 Speaker 3: own training wasn't adequate. If something went wrong, and things 393 00:24:50,200 --> 00:24:55,920 Speaker 3: were malfunctioning on a regular basis, including the safety alerts. 394 00:24:55,840 --> 00:25:00,240 Speaker 2: And basic valves right that open and close pie pipes 395 00:25:00,880 --> 00:25:04,560 Speaker 2: were malfunctioning on a regular basis, which is something you think, okay, 396 00:25:04,680 --> 00:25:08,080 Speaker 2: that's wear and tear right and a factory, your valves, 397 00:25:08,080 --> 00:25:10,120 Speaker 2: your pipes are going to need to get replaced over time. 398 00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:14,840 Speaker 2: But if your primary things that close off dangerous chemicals 399 00:25:14,920 --> 00:25:18,480 Speaker 2: from being either released or combined with other dangerous chemicals 400 00:25:18,520 --> 00:25:20,639 Speaker 2: aren't working, you've got a serious problem. 401 00:25:20,840 --> 00:25:25,399 Speaker 3: Yeah, in retrospect, indeed, this was a when, not an 402 00:25:25,520 --> 00:25:29,359 Speaker 3: if situation. It was an accident waiting to happen, and 403 00:25:29,440 --> 00:25:34,840 Speaker 3: then in the immediate aftermath, Union Carbide, through its Indian subsidiary, 404 00:25:35,440 --> 00:25:41,160 Speaker 3: tries to disassociate itself from any legal responsibility. It leads 405 00:25:41,200 --> 00:25:45,199 Speaker 3: to differing perspectives of the company, the state of India, 406 00:25:45,320 --> 00:25:49,840 Speaker 3: and the public. It's a divide that continues today. Union 407 00:25:49,920 --> 00:25:53,760 Speaker 3: Carbide floated a theory that we'll get to at a moment. 408 00:25:54,400 --> 00:25:57,520 Speaker 3: But if we look at the scholarship, there's a great 409 00:25:57,640 --> 00:26:01,119 Speaker 3: in depth report you can read for free online today 410 00:26:01,280 --> 00:26:06,440 Speaker 3: called The Beau Paul Saga. The author Ingrid Eckerman from 411 00:26:06,560 --> 00:26:11,760 Speaker 3: Scandinavia delves into four the four mean theories of what 412 00:26:12,040 --> 00:26:16,240 Speaker 3: caused the disaster, and some of them are more plausible 413 00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:18,760 Speaker 3: than others. There are a couple are just very difficult 414 00:26:18,800 --> 00:26:21,200 Speaker 3: to prove, to be honest with you, that's right. And 415 00:26:21,280 --> 00:26:24,240 Speaker 3: first we have what's known as the water washing theory, 416 00:26:24,359 --> 00:26:27,600 Speaker 3: which came from the workers. The argument being made that 417 00:26:27,720 --> 00:26:32,800 Speaker 3: management of the plant during this time in December were 418 00:26:33,040 --> 00:26:37,240 Speaker 3: not familiar with established maintenance protocols and they didn't know 419 00:26:37,880 --> 00:26:41,680 Speaker 3: that leaks could occur even after a production was halted. 420 00:26:42,320 --> 00:26:44,120 Speaker 3: And I guess this kind of fits in Ben, who 421 00:26:44,119 --> 00:26:44,760 Speaker 3: you were talking. 422 00:26:44,560 --> 00:26:48,640 Speaker 4: About, how this had happened before or there were numerous 423 00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:51,720 Speaker 4: instances of this type of leakage, so clearly, I don't 424 00:26:51,760 --> 00:26:55,439 Speaker 4: know how many times the personnel shifted. I would imagine 425 00:26:55,440 --> 00:26:57,200 Speaker 4: maybe there might have been a lot to turnover in 426 00:26:57,280 --> 00:26:59,960 Speaker 4: a situation like this, But that is the theory that 427 00:27:00,200 --> 00:27:03,080 Speaker 4: they the new bosses, didn't know what to do and 428 00:27:03,480 --> 00:27:06,359 Speaker 4: just weren't educated, which I don't know. It seems to 429 00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:07,960 Speaker 4: track to me, yeah. 430 00:27:08,760 --> 00:27:11,600 Speaker 3: Quite possibly, right, Like if they weren't read up on 431 00:27:12,080 --> 00:27:16,040 Speaker 3: the maintenance and the safety protocols, then they may have 432 00:27:16,160 --> 00:27:20,160 Speaker 3: made dangerous assumptions like saying, Hey, a leak can't happen 433 00:27:20,600 --> 00:27:24,119 Speaker 3: because we've stopped the machine, We've halted production, you know 434 00:27:24,160 --> 00:27:24,560 Speaker 3: what I mean. 435 00:27:25,040 --> 00:27:28,320 Speaker 4: But it's being held in a thing, in a pressurized tank. 436 00:27:28,440 --> 00:27:31,200 Speaker 4: I mean leaks. Of course, it could happen your house 437 00:27:31,280 --> 00:27:33,440 Speaker 4: leaks even if you're not running the shower, you know, 438 00:27:33,600 --> 00:27:36,960 Speaker 4: I mean, it comes from any number of places. That's absurd, right. 439 00:27:37,000 --> 00:27:39,159 Speaker 3: And yeah, even like think of a garden hose in 440 00:27:39,200 --> 00:27:41,960 Speaker 3: a backyard. Even if you turn off the faucet, there's 441 00:27:41,960 --> 00:27:46,720 Speaker 3: still water in the hose, that's right. So Eckerman goes 442 00:27:47,040 --> 00:27:50,040 Speaker 3: in depth about some of the issues, writing that a 443 00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:55,000 Speaker 3: supervisor from the day shift left instructions on flushing the 444 00:27:55,080 --> 00:27:59,600 Speaker 3: pipes leading from those enormous three story tanks to the 445 00:27:59,720 --> 00:28:03,159 Speaker 3: vent gas scrubber, so flush this out with water. But 446 00:28:03,280 --> 00:28:07,560 Speaker 3: he forgot to mention a specific thing, something called slip 447 00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:10,800 Speaker 3: binds that have to be placed on each end of 448 00:28:11,080 --> 00:28:14,680 Speaker 3: the pipes. And so when the worker comes in to 449 00:28:15,080 --> 00:28:20,439 Speaker 3: try to try to follow through with these tasks, they 450 00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:24,520 Speaker 3: use these things called stopcocks, and they weren't sure whether 451 00:28:24,600 --> 00:28:29,040 Speaker 3: they had been able to tighten everything to the level 452 00:28:29,080 --> 00:28:32,040 Speaker 3: it needed to be. And that was due to corrosion 453 00:28:32,240 --> 00:28:35,560 Speaker 3: and rust. Because we talked about wear and tear. What's 454 00:28:35,600 --> 00:28:39,160 Speaker 3: happening is these things haven't been replaced in quite some time, 455 00:28:39,680 --> 00:28:42,680 Speaker 3: so the water doesn't come out the way the worker 456 00:28:42,840 --> 00:28:46,239 Speaker 3: is expecting to, and he finds that those filters are 457 00:28:46,320 --> 00:28:49,400 Speaker 3: blocked with metal debris. He cuts off the water. The 458 00:28:49,520 --> 00:28:52,720 Speaker 3: supervisor says, clean the filters, and then when he turns 459 00:28:52,800 --> 00:28:55,760 Speaker 3: the water back on, it's only coming out of three 460 00:28:55,880 --> 00:28:59,840 Speaker 3: of the four drains, and so the supervisor tells him 461 00:29:00,120 --> 00:29:03,760 Speaker 3: to just keep the water running and the night shift 462 00:29:03,840 --> 00:29:04,640 Speaker 3: will turn it off. 463 00:29:05,360 --> 00:29:08,360 Speaker 2: And the idea is we're flushing, we're cleaning out this stuff, 464 00:29:08,480 --> 00:29:12,000 Speaker 2: and potentially we're breaking through whatever blockage there is in 465 00:29:12,120 --> 00:29:14,520 Speaker 2: that fourth one that's not functioning exactly. 466 00:29:14,680 --> 00:29:16,600 Speaker 3: Yeah, we can keep it going, we can wear down 467 00:29:16,680 --> 00:29:20,880 Speaker 3: the blockage, and then things will continue to function per normal, 468 00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:24,800 Speaker 3: meaning with repeated malfunctions that are roundly ignored. 469 00:29:25,240 --> 00:29:29,000 Speaker 2: It's a bit weird because it in this version. I 470 00:29:29,040 --> 00:29:32,000 Speaker 2: guess it is the supervisor, right, It's like, oh man, 471 00:29:32,080 --> 00:29:35,040 Speaker 2: the supervisor didn't know what the supervisor was supposed to 472 00:29:35,160 --> 00:29:38,080 Speaker 2: do and what the process is. Where it's it's his fault. 473 00:29:38,440 --> 00:29:42,400 Speaker 2: There is a worker who does ultimately clean the filters 474 00:29:42,440 --> 00:29:45,320 Speaker 2: and turn on the water. The water that then, if 475 00:29:45,360 --> 00:29:49,080 Speaker 2: this theory is correct, then goes in and causes the explosion. 476 00:29:50,280 --> 00:29:52,040 Speaker 2: But again, it's like placing blame. It's like you'd be 477 00:29:52,080 --> 00:29:57,320 Speaker 2: placing blame on It gets a little weird because ultimately 478 00:29:57,480 --> 00:30:01,560 Speaker 2: it feels like Union Carbide is respon, right, the company 479 00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:04,040 Speaker 2: that owns the factory. So no matter who at the 480 00:30:04,120 --> 00:30:08,600 Speaker 2: factory caused an accident or disaster or tragedy like this, 481 00:30:10,400 --> 00:30:13,240 Speaker 2: it's it's company's fault. But we'll get into that. But 482 00:30:13,400 --> 00:30:16,880 Speaker 2: let's see, because there's another theory with the water too, right, Yeah. 483 00:30:16,760 --> 00:30:20,400 Speaker 3: That's correct. There's the direct entry theory. This is the 484 00:30:20,480 --> 00:30:24,720 Speaker 3: idea that the runaway chain reaction in the tank that 485 00:30:24,840 --> 00:30:28,600 Speaker 3: resulted in the gas leak came about because of the 486 00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:33,000 Speaker 3: introduction of a substantial amount of water. This is another 487 00:30:33,720 --> 00:30:37,760 Speaker 3: theory or allegation placing the blame squarely on the workers. 488 00:30:38,160 --> 00:30:38,280 Speaker 4: Right. 489 00:30:38,600 --> 00:30:42,080 Speaker 3: In other words, what they're saying is someone accidentally or 490 00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:46,760 Speaker 3: deliberately pumped water into the tank, So it's an argument 491 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:52,480 Speaker 3: for either incompetence or sabotage. The workers and their representatives, 492 00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:56,160 Speaker 3: of course, object to this because from their perspective, they're 493 00:30:56,240 --> 00:30:59,920 Speaker 3: the people who have for more than a decade been saying, hey, 494 00:31:00,680 --> 00:31:03,920 Speaker 3: if something goes wrong, we are in trouble because we're 495 00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:07,760 Speaker 3: not doing the right maintenance, please help us bosses. And 496 00:31:07,840 --> 00:31:10,680 Speaker 3: the bosses said, no, well, those. 497 00:31:10,560 --> 00:31:12,520 Speaker 4: Are the folks usually hear that kind of stuff with 498 00:31:12,760 --> 00:31:15,960 Speaker 4: when there's in common sense at upper levels the people 499 00:31:15,960 --> 00:31:18,640 Speaker 4: who are in the trenches and really actually operate the 500 00:31:18,760 --> 00:31:22,240 Speaker 4: machinery and are working the line. You know, it's not 501 00:31:22,400 --> 00:31:25,160 Speaker 4: the suits up in the offices because they don't touch 502 00:31:25,200 --> 00:31:26,760 Speaker 4: the stuff. It's all in theory for them. 503 00:31:27,400 --> 00:31:30,520 Speaker 2: The person who pulled the lever, rather than the group 504 00:31:30,600 --> 00:31:32,600 Speaker 2: of people that went down the chain that told that 505 00:31:32,760 --> 00:31:33,960 Speaker 2: person to pull the lever. 506 00:31:34,000 --> 00:31:37,400 Speaker 3: Right, or the people who designed the lever that doesn't work. 507 00:31:37,760 --> 00:31:39,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, there you go. There you go. And just for 508 00:31:39,960 --> 00:31:43,400 Speaker 2: our purposes here, NPR and the Guardian and several other 509 00:31:43,560 --> 00:31:45,760 Speaker 2: groups we looked at look at that first one, the 510 00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:49,000 Speaker 2: water washing theory as like probably the closest to what 511 00:31:49,560 --> 00:31:53,040 Speaker 2: happened as of right now. Right, that's what people point to, 512 00:31:53,360 --> 00:31:54,800 Speaker 2: at least in the mainstream media. 513 00:31:55,240 --> 00:31:57,840 Speaker 3: Yeah, and again we're going kind of in order of 514 00:31:58,280 --> 00:32:03,160 Speaker 3: plausibility and some thing like the something like that initial theory, 515 00:32:03,200 --> 00:32:07,280 Speaker 3: the water washing does seem to be the most accurate 516 00:32:07,400 --> 00:32:11,400 Speaker 3: based on what we know. With the next few theories 517 00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:17,080 Speaker 3: we verge into the realm of conspiracy, and one of 518 00:32:17,120 --> 00:32:21,160 Speaker 3: the juiciest ones is the idea that this may have 519 00:32:21,440 --> 00:32:25,280 Speaker 3: been to a degree purposeful. And again this is just 520 00:32:25,400 --> 00:32:29,720 Speaker 3: a theory, but the idea is someone at UC said, 521 00:32:30,240 --> 00:32:33,040 Speaker 3: we need a reason to close this factory. 522 00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:38,520 Speaker 2: Well, yeah, they were bleeding money at this facility, right, yeah, yeah, 523 00:32:38,520 --> 00:32:39,760 Speaker 2: I mean that's just a fact. 524 00:32:40,720 --> 00:32:42,240 Speaker 3: That part is true, and you can see on the 525 00:32:42,360 --> 00:32:45,800 Speaker 3: financials that they were indeed running at a loss. 526 00:32:45,920 --> 00:32:46,640 Speaker 4: For some time. 527 00:32:47,320 --> 00:32:48,880 Speaker 3: And I didn't know this. I don't know if you 528 00:32:49,160 --> 00:32:51,600 Speaker 3: guys knew this. But at the time, if you're like 529 00:32:51,760 --> 00:32:54,920 Speaker 3: a if you're a foreign owned company, and again the 530 00:32:55,280 --> 00:32:59,360 Speaker 3: American based Union Carbide, they are the majority shareholder of 531 00:32:59,440 --> 00:33:02,800 Speaker 3: the Indians subsidiary. If you are a company that wants 532 00:33:02,880 --> 00:33:05,720 Speaker 3: to shut down your factory in India at this time 533 00:33:05,760 --> 00:33:08,400 Speaker 3: in the eighties, you have to get permission from the 534 00:33:08,440 --> 00:33:12,360 Speaker 3: government of India to do it. You can't just pull 535 00:33:12,560 --> 00:33:15,280 Speaker 3: out of the country. So if they wanted to shut 536 00:33:15,320 --> 00:33:17,800 Speaker 3: this thing down, if they are hemorrhaging money, then their 537 00:33:17,880 --> 00:33:20,760 Speaker 3: next question becomes how do we make a good case 538 00:33:21,480 --> 00:33:25,440 Speaker 3: to the Government of India in this argument. In this theory, 539 00:33:26,320 --> 00:33:32,160 Speaker 3: management wanted like a p Andac style pearl harbor. They wanted, 540 00:33:32,440 --> 00:33:35,680 Speaker 3: at least in their perspective, they wanted a minor accident, 541 00:33:36,280 --> 00:33:40,240 Speaker 3: something that would give the government enough of a off 542 00:33:40,280 --> 00:33:43,520 Speaker 3: putting vibe or sour taste that they would allow Union 543 00:33:43,600 --> 00:33:46,280 Speaker 3: Carbid to close the plant. And so the idea here 544 00:33:47,000 --> 00:33:49,920 Speaker 3: is that they were going to stage just a little leak. 545 00:33:50,120 --> 00:33:53,440 Speaker 3: They were going to let something kind of dangerous slide through. 546 00:33:53,560 --> 00:33:56,640 Speaker 3: There was precedent, this had happened again more than sixty 547 00:33:56,760 --> 00:34:01,200 Speaker 3: times over the past four years. But the people who 548 00:34:01,960 --> 00:34:06,320 Speaker 3: hatched this conspiracy in this theory, they never meant the 549 00:34:06,520 --> 00:34:11,040 Speaker 3: mic leak to reach this level of danger. Yeah, that's 550 00:34:11,120 --> 00:34:14,000 Speaker 3: a very disturbing allegation. 551 00:34:14,680 --> 00:34:19,200 Speaker 2: Yeah, well okay, but let's look at let's look at 552 00:34:19,239 --> 00:34:22,880 Speaker 2: what Union Carbid did after this disaster. Did they go 553 00:34:23,080 --> 00:34:26,319 Speaker 2: in and clean up the facility and try and get 554 00:34:26,360 --> 00:34:29,800 Speaker 2: it to work again, or try and repair anything. No, 555 00:34:30,400 --> 00:34:34,880 Speaker 2: Union Carbide literally let that factory rocked, didn't touch it, 556 00:34:35,040 --> 00:34:38,040 Speaker 2: didn't go in and clean up anything after themselves. Right, 557 00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:41,239 Speaker 2: they didn't. That's one of the major issues in this 558 00:34:41,400 --> 00:34:44,960 Speaker 2: story is that union CARBI just said, Oh, well, I 559 00:34:45,040 --> 00:34:47,480 Speaker 2: guess that one's broken, so we don't need that anymore. 560 00:34:47,520 --> 00:34:49,160 Speaker 2: We're not going to use it anymore, and we don't 561 00:34:49,160 --> 00:34:53,719 Speaker 2: need to think about it, which is mind blowing to me. 562 00:34:54,600 --> 00:34:57,800 Speaker 2: First of all, it feels like a huge asset. But 563 00:34:57,920 --> 00:35:00,520 Speaker 2: I guess the cleanup costs. Maybe they'd did some kind 564 00:35:00,560 --> 00:35:03,240 Speaker 2: of back room math and they realized that the cleanup 565 00:35:03,280 --> 00:35:07,400 Speaker 2: costs would far exceed any potential profits from the facility, 566 00:35:08,080 --> 00:35:08,920 Speaker 2: which also. 567 00:35:08,840 --> 00:35:13,000 Speaker 3: Makes us wonder how fully they did or did not 568 00:35:13,200 --> 00:35:16,640 Speaker 3: grasp the magnitude of contamination. You know what I mean, 569 00:35:16,800 --> 00:35:20,400 Speaker 3: because even in their official statements there's a lot of 570 00:35:20,520 --> 00:35:21,279 Speaker 3: hedging in the. 571 00:35:21,280 --> 00:35:23,160 Speaker 2: Beginning until they did their secret testing. 572 00:35:23,520 --> 00:35:26,239 Speaker 3: But yeah, the bill comes due. We're going to pause 573 00:35:26,280 --> 00:35:28,320 Speaker 3: for one more break for a word from our sponsors, 574 00:35:28,480 --> 00:35:31,080 Speaker 3: and then will introduce the Soviet element. 575 00:35:31,520 --> 00:35:32,920 Speaker 4: True story. That's a weird. 576 00:35:32,840 --> 00:35:41,839 Speaker 3: Sentence to say, but it is a true story. We've 577 00:35:41,880 --> 00:35:44,359 Speaker 3: returned last. No, this is what we're talking about. Right, 578 00:35:44,440 --> 00:35:49,280 Speaker 3: The very last of the main theory slash conspiracies blames 579 00:35:49,320 --> 00:35:55,320 Speaker 3: the leak on not accidents, not large scale insurance fraud, 580 00:35:55,680 --> 00:35:57,240 Speaker 3: but on actual warfare. 581 00:35:57,520 --> 00:36:02,680 Speaker 4: Right, and we know that when it comes to war, 582 00:36:02,760 --> 00:36:04,960 Speaker 4: you're going to kind of take whatever leg up you 583 00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:08,279 Speaker 4: can get. There are opportunists everywhere, especially when it comes 584 00:36:08,320 --> 00:36:12,120 Speaker 4: to getting an advantage, you know, over an opponent on 585 00:36:12,200 --> 00:36:14,480 Speaker 4: the battlefield. So it should comes no surprise at the 586 00:36:14,520 --> 00:36:17,920 Speaker 4: pro Soviet elements that were active at the time in 587 00:36:18,080 --> 00:36:22,320 Speaker 4: India immediately declared, you know, and this is all in 588 00:36:22,360 --> 00:36:26,240 Speaker 4: the war of public opinion as well, declared the strategy 589 00:36:26,360 --> 00:36:30,040 Speaker 4: to be quote a deliberate chemical warfare experiment on the 590 00:36:30,120 --> 00:36:36,200 Speaker 4: part of the United States, so they're basically waging info war. Here, 591 00:36:37,080 --> 00:36:41,759 Speaker 4: Ekerman provides some really excellent context around this writing. A 592 00:36:41,880 --> 00:36:44,320 Speaker 4: research and development unit was set up in Bopaul in 593 00:36:44,560 --> 00:36:48,520 Speaker 4: nineteen seventy six. The center, the biggest in Asia, had 594 00:36:48,640 --> 00:36:54,560 Speaker 4: five insect rearing laboratories and a two hector experimental farm 595 00:36:54,640 --> 00:36:58,239 Speaker 4: for testing chemical agents. Here new molecules were synthesized and 596 00:36:58,560 --> 00:37:01,200 Speaker 4: tested it along quote maybe someone. 597 00:37:01,000 --> 00:37:03,840 Speaker 3: Else sposed to go on, Yeah, what we can we 598 00:37:03,920 --> 00:37:08,000 Speaker 3: can summarize here It looks like the Indian subsidiary of 599 00:37:09,040 --> 00:37:14,640 Speaker 3: Union Carbide was conducting field studies of their of these 600 00:37:15,200 --> 00:37:18,120 Speaker 3: chemical agents they're creating. And when they were doing these 601 00:37:18,239 --> 00:37:21,080 Speaker 3: field studies, there were being a little off book about it, 602 00:37:21,920 --> 00:37:25,279 Speaker 3: like there wasn't the proper oversight. You could call it 603 00:37:25,400 --> 00:37:28,680 Speaker 3: plausible deniability or just lack of a good chain of 604 00:37:28,680 --> 00:37:33,160 Speaker 3: command for reporting. But apparently upper management wasn't fully aware 605 00:37:33,640 --> 00:37:38,400 Speaker 3: of what they were doing. And the It's strange because 606 00:37:38,480 --> 00:37:40,400 Speaker 3: you know, it makes me think of conversations in the 607 00:37:40,440 --> 00:37:44,560 Speaker 3: past about the gray area between nuclear enrichment for peaceful 608 00:37:44,640 --> 00:37:49,680 Speaker 3: purposes versus nuclear enrichment for weapons of war. You know, 609 00:37:50,360 --> 00:37:55,520 Speaker 3: a chemical factory, civilian chemical factory can very easily cross 610 00:37:56,280 --> 00:38:02,280 Speaker 3: a porous border from civilian research to military research and applications. 611 00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:03,160 Speaker 3: You know what I mean. 612 00:38:03,520 --> 00:38:07,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's gain of function research to prevent the next 613 00:38:07,120 --> 00:38:11,719 Speaker 2: infectious disease from becoming a pandemic when it gets out 614 00:38:12,040 --> 00:38:15,160 Speaker 2: into the world, or using that same research to develop 615 00:38:15,440 --> 00:38:19,480 Speaker 2: an infectious disease that is way way more dangerous. Yeah. 616 00:38:21,560 --> 00:38:25,000 Speaker 3: Yeah, And everybody you talked to, no matter what, everybody 617 00:38:25,080 --> 00:38:29,360 Speaker 3: you talked to will say, well, our guys are working 618 00:38:29,440 --> 00:38:30,320 Speaker 3: on preventing it. 619 00:38:30,520 --> 00:38:31,120 Speaker 2: You know what I mean. 620 00:38:31,440 --> 00:38:33,640 Speaker 3: Department of Defense. 621 00:38:33,440 --> 00:38:35,520 Speaker 2: Uh huh, yeah, yeah, it's in the name. 622 00:38:36,320 --> 00:38:39,400 Speaker 3: In the name. Did you not reat the whole name anyway? 623 00:38:39,600 --> 00:38:43,920 Speaker 3: The the idea here, which is really disturbing is that 624 00:38:44,200 --> 00:38:49,279 Speaker 3: the Indian subsidiary was running a chemical warfare center or 625 00:38:49,440 --> 00:38:55,200 Speaker 3: running chemical warfare experiments outs out of their factory there 626 00:38:55,680 --> 00:39:01,279 Speaker 3: and that. So again there's Soviet propaganda, but this was 627 00:39:01,400 --> 00:39:03,520 Speaker 3: taken as fact by a lot of people in India 628 00:39:03,520 --> 00:39:06,680 Speaker 3: at the time, the belief that the MIC might have 629 00:39:06,760 --> 00:39:11,880 Speaker 3: been purposely deployed similar to other earlier tests in the 630 00:39:12,040 --> 00:39:16,000 Speaker 3: United States and thinking about stuff like Operation Large Area Coverage, 631 00:39:16,360 --> 00:39:22,040 Speaker 3: you know, wherein the US wanted to measure dispersal dispersal 632 00:39:22,200 --> 00:39:26,440 Speaker 3: patterns of aerosol agents. And so what they did is 633 00:39:26,600 --> 00:39:30,480 Speaker 3: they put together something they thought was a pretty innocuous 634 00:39:30,520 --> 00:39:33,799 Speaker 3: substance that they could trace, and they released it over 635 00:39:33,960 --> 00:39:38,920 Speaker 3: vast swathes of the US, targeting poor areas in particular. 636 00:39:39,320 --> 00:39:43,839 Speaker 2: Yeah. Oh, it wasn't completely innocuous for humans though, right 637 00:39:44,200 --> 00:39:44,600 Speaker 2: it was not. 638 00:39:45,040 --> 00:39:49,239 Speaker 3: No, they said it was, but they were thought they 639 00:39:49,280 --> 00:39:52,279 Speaker 3: weren't spraying this over DuPont Circle, let's put it that way. 640 00:39:52,560 --> 00:39:56,000 Speaker 2: No, Yeah, that's a really good point. 641 00:39:56,480 --> 00:39:57,400 Speaker 4: Yeah, I don't know. 642 00:39:59,080 --> 00:40:03,279 Speaker 3: That's the thing though, Like this is tricky because if 643 00:40:03,360 --> 00:40:06,520 Speaker 3: you're the average person you're hearing about this, you're asking 644 00:40:06,560 --> 00:40:09,799 Speaker 3: yourself how on Earth? Could this have happened? And then 645 00:40:09,920 --> 00:40:14,160 Speaker 3: someone tells you it might have been a conspiracy, a 646 00:40:14,280 --> 00:40:20,120 Speaker 3: secret operation, and they're able to point to earlier, like earlier, 647 00:40:20,360 --> 00:40:23,680 Speaker 3: concurrent things the US has done on its own soil. 648 00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:27,239 Speaker 3: Then it starts to look more and more plausible. And 649 00:40:27,360 --> 00:40:30,640 Speaker 3: the Soviets would have been aware of those operations, by 650 00:40:30,680 --> 00:40:33,080 Speaker 3: the way, well before the American public was aware. 651 00:40:33,320 --> 00:40:38,160 Speaker 2: Yeah, it makes you think, it does. I don't like 652 00:40:38,239 --> 00:40:40,319 Speaker 2: the way it makes me think, but it certainly does. 653 00:40:41,320 --> 00:40:41,840 Speaker 4: We do know. 654 00:40:42,040 --> 00:40:45,840 Speaker 3: Also, speaking of disturbing facts, the Pentagon sent a medical 655 00:40:45,920 --> 00:40:51,720 Speaker 3: team after the disaster to collect intelligence on the effects 656 00:40:51,760 --> 00:40:52,560 Speaker 3: of the leaked gas. 657 00:40:53,280 --> 00:40:58,120 Speaker 2: So that's like, get the research. There's a disaster, at 658 00:40:58,200 --> 00:41:03,840 Speaker 2: least have an understanding. Ye at least that is the 659 00:41:03,880 --> 00:41:06,360 Speaker 2: way you'd sell it. From a pr perspective. The Pentagon's 660 00:41:06,400 --> 00:41:09,960 Speaker 2: just going this disaster occurred, We're going to get our 661 00:41:10,040 --> 00:41:14,960 Speaker 2: best understanding what occurred to again maybe prevent an attack. 662 00:41:15,760 --> 00:41:19,640 Speaker 3: In the preventure. And you know, with that, again, it's 663 00:41:19,760 --> 00:41:24,640 Speaker 3: the perspective that's tricky because if you already suspect that 664 00:41:24,800 --> 00:41:29,520 Speaker 3: the US, through a corporate proxy, may engage in these 665 00:41:29,640 --> 00:41:33,160 Speaker 3: kind of heinous acts, then you'll see a lot of 666 00:41:33,920 --> 00:41:37,279 Speaker 3: adjacent facts that tie into that narrative. But if you think, oh, 667 00:41:38,120 --> 00:41:41,320 Speaker 3: you know, these substances are just dangerous, of course you 668 00:41:41,400 --> 00:41:43,239 Speaker 3: want to learn as much as you can about them, 669 00:41:43,520 --> 00:41:47,040 Speaker 3: then that fact also makes sense. One thing's for certain, though, 670 00:41:48,239 --> 00:41:52,160 Speaker 3: regardless of where you fall on the cause, this irreparably 671 00:41:52,600 --> 00:41:56,600 Speaker 3: ruined and ended thousands of innocent lives. These are average 672 00:41:56,640 --> 00:41:59,520 Speaker 3: people living in the neighborhood. They're not super wealthy. They're 673 00:41:59,520 --> 00:42:02,720 Speaker 3: not heads of state, they're not in charge of Union 674 00:42:02,840 --> 00:42:07,520 Speaker 3: Carbide India Limited. And the survivors are not conspiracy theorists, 675 00:42:07,840 --> 00:42:10,560 Speaker 3: you know what I mean. They're not like Bopaul Truthers 676 00:42:10,760 --> 00:42:11,200 Speaker 3: or something. 677 00:42:11,520 --> 00:42:11,560 Speaker 4: No. 678 00:42:11,960 --> 00:42:15,640 Speaker 3: No, And perhaps the most damning thing about it, in 679 00:42:15,760 --> 00:42:20,560 Speaker 3: a very real way, this disaster has never ended. People 680 00:42:20,560 --> 00:42:23,680 Speaker 3: are still researching it today. There was a study we 681 00:42:23,800 --> 00:42:30,600 Speaker 3: found from last year that greatly expands upon the number 682 00:42:30,640 --> 00:42:33,600 Speaker 3: of people affected and the ways of which they were affected. 683 00:42:33,880 --> 00:42:37,799 Speaker 3: And Matt, I think this speaks to something we foreshadowed 684 00:42:37,840 --> 00:42:40,040 Speaker 3: a little bit earlier in the show This Evening. 685 00:42:40,160 --> 00:42:44,360 Speaker 2: Yeah, nineteen eighty four December, this occurs. The company that 686 00:42:44,440 --> 00:42:47,160 Speaker 2: owns the factory, the property on which this disaster occurred, 687 00:42:47,480 --> 00:42:51,439 Speaker 2: they just shut down the factory and walked away. 688 00:42:52,360 --> 00:42:54,320 Speaker 4: They have been around the dusty trail. 689 00:42:54,719 --> 00:43:00,120 Speaker 2: They have been pursued like legally by the country of 690 00:43:00,320 --> 00:43:04,560 Speaker 2: India to come back there and you know, clean up 691 00:43:04,640 --> 00:43:08,120 Speaker 2: the mess that they made. But again they kind of 692 00:43:08,320 --> 00:43:10,480 Speaker 2: argue that they didn't make the mess, it was an 693 00:43:10,520 --> 00:43:14,319 Speaker 2: accident or whatever. They shirk responsibility. But India has been 694 00:43:14,360 --> 00:43:16,160 Speaker 2: trying to get them back to the country and hold 695 00:43:16,160 --> 00:43:20,520 Speaker 2: them accountable since nineteen eighty four and it still hasn't happened. 696 00:43:21,120 --> 00:43:24,479 Speaker 4: Yes, yeah, maybe it's just a difference between the relation. 697 00:43:24,600 --> 00:43:26,640 Speaker 4: I mean, I don't know. We certainly have industries here 698 00:43:26,680 --> 00:43:30,040 Speaker 4: that shirk their responsibilities. But at least when the government 699 00:43:30,160 --> 00:43:34,719 Speaker 4: makes a nuclear waste dump site, they at least create 700 00:43:34,800 --> 00:43:36,839 Speaker 4: a program to clean it up and designate them as 701 00:43:36,920 --> 00:43:38,800 Speaker 4: like super fund sites and things like that. 702 00:43:39,000 --> 00:43:42,520 Speaker 3: Right with some public the p not all the time. 703 00:43:42,800 --> 00:43:44,759 Speaker 3: So I want to get to this twenty twenty three 704 00:43:44,880 --> 00:43:49,280 Speaker 3: study we just mentioned. So this study again greatly expands 705 00:43:49,400 --> 00:43:54,120 Speaker 3: the amount of people affected and it expands our understanding 706 00:43:54,200 --> 00:43:56,920 Speaker 3: of how they were affected. What they found is that 707 00:43:57,440 --> 00:44:02,440 Speaker 3: the medical conditions disabilities that are wrought upon people who 708 00:44:02,480 --> 00:44:05,600 Speaker 3: are exposed to the gas didn't stop with the people 709 00:44:05,680 --> 00:44:09,040 Speaker 3: exposed that night, also the generation of babies, like the 710 00:44:09,120 --> 00:44:12,360 Speaker 3: fetuses that were still in the wombs when this accident happened, 711 00:44:12,719 --> 00:44:16,480 Speaker 3: they're affected too. And if you look at the demographics 712 00:44:16,680 --> 00:44:20,000 Speaker 3: of this city in particular, you'll find that men born 713 00:44:20,400 --> 00:44:24,160 Speaker 3: in nineteen eighty five y're after or like the following 714 00:44:24,200 --> 00:44:27,239 Speaker 3: months after this disaster, they have a much higher risk 715 00:44:27,320 --> 00:44:30,840 Speaker 3: of cancer, they have lower education accomplishment, and they have 716 00:44:30,960 --> 00:44:34,960 Speaker 3: much higher rates of disabilities compared with those born before 717 00:44:35,200 --> 00:44:38,840 Speaker 3: or after nineteen eighty five, So that one year is 718 00:44:38,920 --> 00:44:40,239 Speaker 3: a start outlier. 719 00:44:40,640 --> 00:44:43,680 Speaker 2: Yeah, well, and that's the beginning, right, that's from that 720 00:44:43,960 --> 00:44:48,759 Speaker 2: initial release, and they're already within i don't know what 721 00:44:48,880 --> 00:44:51,960 Speaker 2: you call it, within the impact zone of all the 722 00:44:52,080 --> 00:44:54,520 Speaker 2: other chemicals that have been leaking out of that factory 723 00:44:54,560 --> 00:44:59,080 Speaker 2: for years, and now like they're getting hit by the 724 00:44:59,120 --> 00:45:02,760 Speaker 2: effects of water and soil contamination of all the chemicals 725 00:45:02,800 --> 00:45:05,360 Speaker 2: that were left there just to sit and rot and 726 00:45:05,520 --> 00:45:08,719 Speaker 2: begin to leach again out of those ponds that were 727 00:45:09,120 --> 00:45:11,600 Speaker 2: man made and created to what do they call it 728 00:45:12,120 --> 00:45:15,560 Speaker 2: evaporation ponds, where noxious chemicals are put in there to 729 00:45:15,960 --> 00:45:19,360 Speaker 2: theoretically evaporate at least somewhat into the atmosphere. 730 00:45:19,719 --> 00:45:22,840 Speaker 4: Is that a part of the manufacturing process or is 731 00:45:22,880 --> 00:45:24,040 Speaker 4: that a cleanup mitigation? 732 00:45:24,600 --> 00:45:25,920 Speaker 3: That's a cleanup mitigation. 733 00:45:27,040 --> 00:45:28,720 Speaker 2: Well, there's no cleanup mitigation. 734 00:45:28,920 --> 00:45:31,879 Speaker 4: Well that's like that's in theory, that's what that's meant 735 00:45:32,000 --> 00:45:32,200 Speaker 4: to do. 736 00:45:32,440 --> 00:45:34,840 Speaker 2: I see, that's what the company would do. They'd have 737 00:45:34,960 --> 00:45:37,879 Speaker 2: it on site, so when they're finished using those things, 738 00:45:38,040 --> 00:45:40,759 Speaker 2: it would gradually go back into the atmosphere rather than 739 00:45:40,880 --> 00:45:43,400 Speaker 2: just you know, shout in a cloud. But there's a 740 00:45:43,440 --> 00:45:47,759 Speaker 2: study in nineteen ninety nine that showed ground water and 741 00:45:48,000 --> 00:45:51,920 Speaker 2: well water that's anywhere near that site had six million 742 00:45:52,200 --> 00:45:56,960 Speaker 2: times the mercury that is allowed by the EPA. 743 00:45:57,560 --> 00:45:59,399 Speaker 3: And we're talking about to be clear, we're talking about 744 00:45:59,440 --> 00:46:01,839 Speaker 3: two different studies, because again there are multiples. The one 745 00:46:01,880 --> 00:46:04,680 Speaker 3: you're mentioning, Matt, the well water measured is from a 746 00:46:04,719 --> 00:46:06,680 Speaker 3: study in the nineties. The one i've been ninety nine. 747 00:46:07,000 --> 00:46:09,719 Speaker 3: The one I've been mentioning is from twenty twenty three. 748 00:46:09,920 --> 00:46:12,120 Speaker 3: To show you how long people are looking at this, 749 00:46:12,360 --> 00:46:13,919 Speaker 3: is it? Okay? If I had one more fact about 750 00:46:13,920 --> 00:46:15,520 Speaker 3: the twenty twenty three study. 751 00:46:15,360 --> 00:46:16,439 Speaker 4: Absolutely okay. 752 00:46:16,560 --> 00:46:21,400 Speaker 3: So this study found that the outcomes, the health outcomes 753 00:46:21,480 --> 00:46:24,799 Speaker 3: for people who were affected by this, it ranged much 754 00:46:25,080 --> 00:46:30,200 Speaker 3: farther than previously assumed. It went far beyond what previous 755 00:46:30,239 --> 00:46:34,000 Speaker 3: studies had found about, you know, the surrounding neighborhoods. People 756 00:46:34,120 --> 00:46:37,960 Speaker 3: from as far away as sixty two miles were affected 757 00:46:38,040 --> 00:46:40,600 Speaker 3: by the disaster and continued to be affected today. 758 00:46:40,960 --> 00:46:43,319 Speaker 2: And I guess my only pointment is that I think 759 00:46:43,760 --> 00:46:46,480 Speaker 2: that has less to do with that gas that got 760 00:46:46,560 --> 00:46:50,080 Speaker 2: released and more to do with the overall contamination that 761 00:46:50,200 --> 00:46:53,920 Speaker 2: that site represents from that one leak plus all of 762 00:46:54,000 --> 00:46:58,120 Speaker 2: the other just noxious crap that they left there and 763 00:46:58,239 --> 00:46:59,560 Speaker 2: didn't do anything with. 764 00:47:01,480 --> 00:47:04,800 Speaker 3: And this is the fact that the science and the 765 00:47:04,920 --> 00:47:10,160 Speaker 3: research continues is huge news. The most recent reports are 766 00:47:10,320 --> 00:47:14,840 Speaker 3: some of the first things to demonstrate a clear, provable 767 00:47:14,960 --> 00:47:19,360 Speaker 3: link between this disaster and the effect on children in Utero. 768 00:47:20,040 --> 00:47:22,120 Speaker 3: And we know that there are going to be more 769 00:47:22,200 --> 00:47:26,200 Speaker 3: reports coming, and we know that these problems will continue because, 770 00:47:26,239 --> 00:47:29,520 Speaker 3: as we've mentioned a little bit throughout this episode, it's 771 00:47:29,600 --> 00:47:33,680 Speaker 3: still not clean. There are still something around four hundred 772 00:47:33,800 --> 00:47:37,680 Speaker 3: tons of assortied industrial waste present on the site. Like 773 00:47:37,760 --> 00:47:40,319 Speaker 3: you said, they closed, they turned the key, and they 774 00:47:40,600 --> 00:47:44,080 Speaker 3: clapped their hands and they walked away. The Dow Chemical 775 00:47:44,120 --> 00:47:47,640 Speaker 3: Company bought Union carbide in two thousand and one, and 776 00:47:47,880 --> 00:47:52,280 Speaker 3: neither Dow nor the Indian subsidiary, nor the Indian government 777 00:47:52,400 --> 00:47:55,040 Speaker 3: have properly cleaned the site to this day. 778 00:47:56,120 --> 00:47:59,560 Speaker 2: No I did. It's just so horrifying. There's another study 779 00:47:59,600 --> 00:48:02,719 Speaker 2: two thousand too, that showed the contamination of women's breast 780 00:48:02,800 --> 00:48:06,840 Speaker 2: milk who again, like you're talking sixty two miles like radius, 781 00:48:07,280 --> 00:48:10,120 Speaker 2: who live very far away from this site, but they're 782 00:48:10,160 --> 00:48:13,280 Speaker 2: still being affected because the water flows to everybody. 783 00:48:14,000 --> 00:48:14,160 Speaker 3: You know. 784 00:48:15,560 --> 00:48:16,920 Speaker 2: It's just goddess. 785 00:48:17,080 --> 00:48:19,480 Speaker 4: I mean, I guess the closest thing I can think of, 786 00:48:19,520 --> 00:48:22,840 Speaker 4: I mean, aside from you know, maybe three Mile Island, 787 00:48:22,960 --> 00:48:26,800 Speaker 4: and obviously Chernobyl didn't happen here, but it reminds me 788 00:48:27,040 --> 00:48:29,560 Speaker 4: in a certain way of what happened in Flint, Michigan, 789 00:48:29,640 --> 00:48:32,400 Speaker 4: with the water contamination and just the complete lack of 790 00:48:33,000 --> 00:48:35,560 Speaker 4: doing anything about it for the longest time, and like 791 00:48:36,040 --> 00:48:38,520 Speaker 4: toxic sludge coming out of the you know, faucet, and 792 00:48:38,640 --> 00:48:41,560 Speaker 4: this is way way worse. But that's just I'm trying 793 00:48:41,600 --> 00:48:43,600 Speaker 4: to think of to wrap my head around at any 794 00:48:43,719 --> 00:48:45,719 Speaker 4: kind of parallel And to your point, Ben, it really 795 00:48:46,040 --> 00:48:51,160 Speaker 4: makes sense that this is the most significant biological catastrophe 796 00:48:51,239 --> 00:48:53,640 Speaker 4: in the history of you said, the. 797 00:48:53,719 --> 00:48:55,280 Speaker 3: World, right, human history. 798 00:48:55,360 --> 00:48:59,759 Speaker 4: Yeah, and yet I was woefully unfamiliar with it, which 799 00:48:59,800 --> 00:49:04,920 Speaker 4: I'm maybe speaks to a certain amount of blinders that 800 00:49:05,040 --> 00:49:06,920 Speaker 4: are on and whether in the media or whatever. And 801 00:49:07,000 --> 00:49:08,920 Speaker 4: that it took this long for there to even be 802 00:49:09,040 --> 00:49:11,200 Speaker 4: a Netflix documentary about it, you know. 803 00:49:12,200 --> 00:49:15,920 Speaker 3: Yeah, agreed, and we do have updates, you know, as 804 00:49:16,000 --> 00:49:19,560 Speaker 3: time wends on. A Union car By does reach a 805 00:49:19,719 --> 00:49:24,319 Speaker 3: settlement with the Indian government through mediation in the Supreme Court, 806 00:49:24,640 --> 00:49:30,040 Speaker 3: and they accept moral responsibility. They do have this settlement 807 00:49:30,280 --> 00:49:34,920 Speaker 3: that they pay out. The settlement is controversial because it 808 00:49:35,080 --> 00:49:39,440 Speaker 3: doesn't when it gets down to the per person, per 809 00:49:39,560 --> 00:49:44,239 Speaker 3: survivor per victim basis, it's not enough to help really and. 810 00:49:44,320 --> 00:49:46,640 Speaker 2: It's not to clean up anything. It's just to give 811 00:49:46,680 --> 00:49:48,720 Speaker 2: a little bit of money to victims. 812 00:49:48,840 --> 00:49:52,200 Speaker 3: Right. Yeah, And in nineteen ninety eight, the former factory 813 00:49:52,280 --> 00:49:54,680 Speaker 3: site officially gets turned over to the state that'd be 814 00:49:54,800 --> 00:49:57,920 Speaker 3: Madhya Pradesh. And we have to ask ourselves, you know, 815 00:49:58,160 --> 00:50:02,880 Speaker 3: what happens next. Union Carbide is doing just fine. 816 00:50:03,360 --> 00:50:07,640 Speaker 4: What is their status, Like there's still chemical conglom Okay, 817 00:50:08,239 --> 00:50:10,520 Speaker 4: there's a subsidiary of Dow Chemicals, and isn't that the 818 00:50:10,560 --> 00:50:13,160 Speaker 4: funny thing that happens with those kinds of acquisitions so 819 00:50:13,320 --> 00:50:18,120 Speaker 4: often they're about disguising the sins of the past. Right. 820 00:50:18,880 --> 00:50:23,120 Speaker 3: Yeah, And Dow Chemicals, through its subsidiary Union Carbide, they 821 00:50:23,239 --> 00:50:26,960 Speaker 3: still make a lot of chemicals. They're often chemicals not 822 00:50:27,120 --> 00:50:30,799 Speaker 3: sold directly to the public, but other businesses buy them 823 00:50:31,080 --> 00:50:34,680 Speaker 3: and they use those chemicals to make stuff like pink packaging, 824 00:50:35,120 --> 00:50:41,160 Speaker 3: household products, personal care, pharmaceuticals, textiles, automotive products, agricultural products. 825 00:50:41,239 --> 00:50:44,439 Speaker 3: It goes on and on and on, and yeah, they're 826 00:50:44,440 --> 00:50:45,520 Speaker 3: still making pesticides. 827 00:50:45,880 --> 00:50:50,240 Speaker 2: Well, like, the big players at Dow were very upset 828 00:50:50,960 --> 00:50:53,360 Speaker 2: and a bunch of shareholders were very upset when the 829 00:50:53,480 --> 00:50:57,520 Speaker 2: decision was made to acquire Union Carbide because of this disaster, 830 00:50:58,160 --> 00:51:02,960 Speaker 2: because of the potential lit gation and just all about yeah, 831 00:51:04,120 --> 00:51:06,520 Speaker 2: but they still did it. And then Dow turned around 832 00:51:06,560 --> 00:51:11,000 Speaker 2: and said, no, guys, we accept no responsibility for any 833 00:51:11,040 --> 00:51:13,560 Speaker 2: of this stuff, and uh, we're not going to clean 834 00:51:13,640 --> 00:51:17,040 Speaker 2: up the site. That's y'all's thing. Still, So, but is 835 00:51:17,120 --> 00:51:20,680 Speaker 2: it who's Because it's it was under the control of 836 00:51:21,040 --> 00:51:23,080 Speaker 2: the state then at that point, right, that's. 837 00:51:22,960 --> 00:51:26,439 Speaker 4: Why, So they're just they're just shutting it off. Back 838 00:51:26,480 --> 00:51:31,080 Speaker 4: onto the state. We're saying, yeah, we're no longer involved. 839 00:51:30,760 --> 00:51:33,200 Speaker 2: Because Dow acquired Union Carbone in two thousand and one, 840 00:51:33,400 --> 00:51:36,359 Speaker 2: so at that point it was not They're not our 841 00:51:36,440 --> 00:51:37,280 Speaker 2: problem anymore. 842 00:51:37,400 --> 00:51:40,880 Speaker 3: Bruh, that's correct, and that's this is the thing that 843 00:51:41,080 --> 00:51:43,920 Speaker 3: haunts means a question we would I think it haunts 844 00:51:43,960 --> 00:51:45,680 Speaker 3: all of us. It's a question we would love your 845 00:51:45,760 --> 00:51:50,440 Speaker 3: take on. Fellow conspiracy realist. The question becomes, how powerful 846 00:51:50,760 --> 00:51:55,400 Speaker 3: are these conglomerates. Is it true, as some have accused, 847 00:51:55,880 --> 00:51:58,839 Speaker 3: that a conglomerate could be powerful enough to, if it's 848 00:51:58,880 --> 00:52:02,760 Speaker 3: so wished, so press the real cause of an ongoing 849 00:52:02,840 --> 00:52:06,879 Speaker 3: disaster of this magnitude, effectively burying the stuff they don't 850 00:52:06,920 --> 00:52:09,399 Speaker 3: want you to know, the same way that they bury 851 00:52:09,440 --> 00:52:14,160 Speaker 3: those chemicals in the ground. It's a somber question, but 852 00:52:14,280 --> 00:52:17,040 Speaker 3: these things are important and we would love to hear 853 00:52:17,120 --> 00:52:19,440 Speaker 3: from you. Thanks again to everybody who wrote to us 854 00:52:19,760 --> 00:52:23,640 Speaker 3: hipping us to this tale. Check out The Railwaymen on Netflix. 855 00:52:24,840 --> 00:52:28,440 Speaker 3: It's not a sponsorship or partnership with us. We just 856 00:52:28,560 --> 00:52:31,160 Speaker 3: think this is a great way to get the story 857 00:52:31,360 --> 00:52:34,200 Speaker 3: out into the world. We'd love to hear from you. 858 00:52:34,320 --> 00:52:35,760 Speaker 3: We try to be easy to find online. 859 00:52:36,000 --> 00:52:38,320 Speaker 4: That's right. You can find it at the handle conspiracy Stuff, 860 00:52:38,320 --> 00:52:42,560 Speaker 4: where we exist on Facebook, on YouTube where Boyhatti is 861 00:52:42,600 --> 00:52:45,279 Speaker 4: at George Washington getting up to some fun stuff and 862 00:52:45,640 --> 00:52:51,280 Speaker 4: more fun stuff to come. Spoiler alert, he's going out west. 863 00:52:51,960 --> 00:52:54,759 Speaker 4: We'll see what that. We'll see what that ends up like. 864 00:52:55,800 --> 00:52:59,000 Speaker 4: You can also find us at x FKA Twitter again, 865 00:52:59,120 --> 00:53:02,120 Speaker 4: that's the handlicing space stuff on Instagram and TikTok where 866 00:53:02,160 --> 00:53:03,520 Speaker 4: conspiracy Stuff show. 867 00:53:04,080 --> 00:53:05,479 Speaker 2: Hey, do you like to call people? 868 00:53:05,719 --> 00:53:06,520 Speaker 4: Why not call us? 869 00:53:06,960 --> 00:53:11,200 Speaker 2: Our number is one eight three three STDWYTK. When you 870 00:53:11,320 --> 00:53:13,520 Speaker 2: call in, it's a voicemail system and it gives you 871 00:53:13,680 --> 00:53:16,239 Speaker 2: three minutes. Say whatever you'd like. Just give yourself a 872 00:53:16,320 --> 00:53:17,960 Speaker 2: cold nickname and let us know if we can use 873 00:53:18,200 --> 00:53:20,480 Speaker 2: your name and message on the air. If you got 874 00:53:20,520 --> 00:53:22,640 Speaker 2: more to send, they can fit that message. Why not 875 00:53:22,719 --> 00:53:24,560 Speaker 2: instead send us a good old fashioned email. 876 00:53:24,840 --> 00:53:28,200 Speaker 3: We are the people who read every single email we get. 877 00:53:28,520 --> 00:53:32,440 Speaker 3: Go in depth. Send us the links, send us the photograph, 878 00:53:32,520 --> 00:53:35,000 Speaker 3: send us the audio footage. Take us to the edge 879 00:53:35,040 --> 00:53:38,400 Speaker 3: of the rabbit hole. We'll do the rest. Be careful, folks. 880 00:53:38,680 --> 00:53:42,960 Speaker 3: Sometimes the void writes back conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com. 881 00:54:01,800 --> 00:54:03,840 Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want You to Know is a production 882 00:54:03,960 --> 00:54:08,439 Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. 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