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Speaker 1: Welcome to tex Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio.

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Speaker 1: And how the tech are you. It's time for the

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Speaker 1: tech news for Thursday, June twenty twenty two. Let's get

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Speaker 1: to it here. In the United States, Senator Elizabeth Warren

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Speaker 1: has introduced the Health and Location Protection Act. This proposed legislation,

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Speaker 1: if it's passed into law, would place tight restrictions on

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Speaker 1: companies regarding user location and health data. As it stands,

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Speaker 1: Warrent argues, data brokers can buy and sell that kind

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Speaker 1: of information, which obviously compromises people's privacy. And in light

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Speaker 1: of the expected Supreme Court decision to overturn Row versus Wade,

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Speaker 1: there's also a concern women who live in states that

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Speaker 1: outlaw abortion might be persecuted should they seek an abortion

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Speaker 1: in another part of the country. In fact, some states

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Speaker 1: might consider passing laws that would make it illegal for

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Speaker 1: citizens to leave the state in order to get an abortion,

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Speaker 1: which is a complicated topic. It would undoubtedly face multiple

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Speaker 1: tests in court, but in the meantime, Senator Warren is

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Speaker 1: concerned that people will be struggling while the political system

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Speaker 1: actually hashes everything out. So part of the impetus for

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Speaker 1: this legislation is the desire to protect those who need

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Speaker 1: to travel in order to seek out a medical procedure

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Speaker 1: that would otherwise be illegal for them. But generally speaking,

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Speaker 1: there's been a need for better protections for data for

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Speaker 1: a very long time for US citizens. We've seen other

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Speaker 1: parts of the world, notably the European Union past broad

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Speaker 1: legislation aimed at protecting citizen data, but here in the

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Speaker 1: US that really hasn't been a thing, at least not

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Speaker 1: at the federal level. Warren's proposal would give the FTC

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Speaker 1: the power to enforce rules regarding location and health data,

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Speaker 1: and it would also give citizens a path to sue

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Speaker 1: data brokers that are found to violate that law. Of course,

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Speaker 1: a lot has to happen before a proposal becomes law,

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Speaker 1: so there's no guarantee that this will actually get to

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Speaker 1: a point where you know, we can rely on it.

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Speaker 1: We'll have to see. While we're on the subject of

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Speaker 1: data brokers and user privacy, let's talk about a change

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Speaker 1: that Firefox has made recently. The browser has been employing

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Speaker 1: numerous protective features for several years now, back in Tighten

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Speaker 1: it launched the Enhanced Tracking Protection or e t P feature,

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Speaker 1: and initially that was an option you could activate, but

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Speaker 1: Firefox later would turn it on by default. ETP blocks

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Speaker 1: web cookies from known trackers. These are entities that attempt

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Speaker 1: to track user brow your behavior from site to site

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Speaker 1: in an effort to build out dossiers on those users,

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Speaker 1: typically so that the tracker can then sell that data

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Speaker 1: to data brokers, and they in turn typically sell the

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Speaker 1: information advertisers. Of course, there are a lot of other

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Speaker 1: things that can happen with your data, most of them

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Speaker 1: are not good. But the most recent feature that Firefox

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Speaker 1: has turned on by default is one that protects against

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Speaker 1: cross site tracking. That means this feature prevents cookies from

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Speaker 1: tracking where you came from and where you're going to

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Speaker 1: across different sites, and it's called total cookie protection. The

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Speaker 1: concept is that each website cookie will be siloed from

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Speaker 1: everything else. In fact, bleeping computer dot com has a

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Speaker 1: great way of putting this that each websites cookies will

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Speaker 1: be kept in that website's own cookie jar and they

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Speaker 1: won't mix with the other websites, so you'll still be

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Speaker 1: able to take advantage of what cookies can offer on

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Speaker 1: an individual site. So for example, uh, it could keep

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Speaker 1: your browsing history on a specific site, like a shopping site,

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Speaker 1: so that way you can easily navigate to stuff that

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Speaker 1: you had shown interest in, or it might keep you

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Speaker 1: logged into a site between sessions. Those are useful things.

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Speaker 1: So cookies are not all bad, but it will prevent

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Speaker 1: trackers from being able to build a browsing profile or

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Speaker 1: fingerprint on you. So this has led to some people

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Speaker 1: declaring Firefox as being the most secure browser when it

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Speaker 1: comes to user data, that there are the most protections

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Speaker 1: in place, many of them on by default that will

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Speaker 1: prevent your data from falling into the wrong hands, especially

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Speaker 1: without your knowledge, because a lot of that stuff happens

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Speaker 1: without us necessarily being aware of it. I don't often

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Speaker 1: talk about benchmark tests on this show, but I've got

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Speaker 1: a couple of stories that relate to them today. So

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Speaker 1: a benchmark test is one in which the test administrator

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Speaker 1: puts whatever technology it happens to be through a series

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Speaker 1: of tasks to measure it's actual output. Because sometimes actual

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Speaker 1: output and what was, you know, theoretically possible on paper

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Speaker 1: are two very different things. So Our first benchmark story

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Speaker 1: is about Apple's mto processor. Apple had been relying on

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Speaker 1: Intel up until a couple of years ago to provide

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Speaker 1: the processors for Apple's computers. But now the second generation

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Speaker 1: of Apple's own processor, the M two UH, is out,

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Speaker 1: and the tests say that the new one is twelve

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Speaker 1: percent faster than the M one processor in the same

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Speaker 1: sort of machine if it's used in a single core

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Speaker 1: processor mode, but when used in multi core functions, the

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Speaker 1: M two processor is twenty percent faster. That's actually even

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Speaker 1: better than what Apple was saying. And it's w w

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Speaker 1: d C presentation about its upcoming computers it had more

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Speaker 1: conservatively placed the M two as being eighteen percent faster

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Speaker 1: than the M one, So this is really good news

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Speaker 1: for folks rely on Apple machines. Now we just have

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Speaker 1: to hope that Worth's law doesn't muck things up. And

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Speaker 1: in case you're unfamiliar, Worth's law is actually a kind

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Speaker 1: of a cheeky observation that says software is getting slower

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Speaker 1: at a rate that outpaces how computers are getting faster.

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Speaker 1: Essentially that programmers, when they're given the leverage of better hardware,

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Speaker 1: end up making even more bloated software. The other benchmark

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Speaker 1: test story I wanted to cover is about Samsung and

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Speaker 1: it's television's Vincent Teo of h D TV Test discovered

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Speaker 1: that the s nine five b q d O led

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Speaker 1: TV that he was testing in gosh, I just I

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Speaker 1: love model names, don't you. It's so easy anyway, that

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Speaker 1: this particular television he was testing was acting a little peculiar.

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Speaker 1: You see, Typically, the way that test administrators check on

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Speaker 1: televisions is that they create a test window that only

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Speaker 1: takes up a certain percentage age of the full screen

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Speaker 1: of the television. You know, they're focusing on a sector

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Speaker 1: of the TV screen in order to do their tests,

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Speaker 1: and the typical test uses ten percent of a television screen.

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Speaker 1: These tests tend to measure everything from luminosity as in

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Speaker 1: how bright the images can get, to contrast which is

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Speaker 1: the range of colors between true black and true white,

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Speaker 1: and resolution, among other things. Teo documented that the Samsung

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Speaker 1: TV he tested appeared to be boosting performance within the

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Speaker 1: test area, which meant that the television was inflating its score.

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Speaker 1: It was cheating, in other words, was using an algorithm

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Speaker 1: to give unrealistic results that could not be replicated on

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Speaker 1: the television as a whole. This actually reminds me of

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Speaker 1: Diesel gait, which was the Volkswagen scandal from a few

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Speaker 1: years ago, if case you don't remember that. In that scandal,

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Speaker 1: people discovered that several diesel powered Volkswagen models would switch

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Speaker 1: into kind of a low emissions mode when the car's

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Speaker 1: computer system detected that the car was being tested for emissions,

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Speaker 1: But then once it was disconnected from the test system,

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Speaker 1: the car would then switch into a performance mode, presumably

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Speaker 1: one that would not have passed the emissions test because

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Speaker 1: it was going to create more emissions, it was going

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Speaker 1: to output more power. Well, Samsung sounds like it was

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Speaker 1: doing something similar, and when tested, the television would send

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Speaker 1: more power to that little test region to boost stuff

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Speaker 1: like luminosity, But it wouldn't be able to do that

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Speaker 1: for the television screen as a whole, at least not

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Speaker 1: sustainably without risking damaging the TV itself. Teo and others

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Speaker 1: found that by using a non standard test window, one

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Speaker 1: that didn't take up ten percent of the screen, say

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Speaker 1: just nine of the screen, that the television would perform

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Speaker 1: and its normal pacity, and that this the so called

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Speaker 1: cheating algorithm, would be foiled. So Samsung came under fire

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Speaker 1: for trying to fudge its television benchmarks, at least allegedly

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Speaker 1: trying to do that. The company's response has not exactly

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Speaker 1: been an admission of wrongdoing. Rather, when responding to a

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Speaker 1: query posted by flat Panels h D, the company repped

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Speaker 1: from Samsung wrote quote, to provide a more dynamic viewing

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Speaker 1: experience for the consumers, Samsung will provide a software update

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Speaker 1: that ensures consistent brightness of HDR contents across a wider

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Speaker 1: range of windows size beyond the industry standard end quote.

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Speaker 1: Now what they're saying is, oh, we didn't account for

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Speaker 1: people using other sizes besides ten percent window because that standard.

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Speaker 1: So we're just gonna update this so that when you

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Speaker 1: do your test window, no matter what the sizes, you're

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Speaker 1: gonna get the right results. It kind of sounds like

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Speaker 1: they're updating the cheating algorithm, as flat Panels a D

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Speaker 1: called it, in order to fool any kind of test.

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Speaker 1: But you know, maybe maybe that's just a misinterpretation on

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Speaker 1: my part. You know, we'll have to wait and see

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Speaker 1: if there's any follow up to this, and you know,

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Speaker 1: if if it turns out that the whole TV screen

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Speaker 1: actually is capable of the same things that the benchmark

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Speaker 1: tests were saying. There's a moot point, but flat panels,

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Speaker 1: HD and others have suggested that according to their tests,

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Speaker 1: that just wasn't what they were seeing. So we'll have

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Speaker 1: to see if this story develops. We have some more

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Speaker 1: stories for today. Before we get to those, let's take

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Speaker 1: a quick break. We're back. It's time to get boring. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: The Boring Company, which if you weren't familiar, is an

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Speaker 1: Elon musk Endeavor, has received the go ahead to day

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Speaker 1: more tunnels beneath the city of Las Vegas, Nevada. So

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Speaker 1: the Boring Company previously built a tunnel system under the

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Speaker 1: Las Vegas Convention Center with the goal of making it

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Speaker 1: easier to get across the lvc C during busy conferences

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Speaker 1: like C s now way back in the day. In

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Speaker 1: the earliest days of the Boring Company, we largely associated

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Speaker 1: the idea of the Boring Company with the idea of

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Speaker 1: the hyper loop transportation system. But these days that vision

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Speaker 1: has been whittled back to essentially underground roads, at least

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Speaker 1: in the case of the Las Vegas Convention Center, because

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Speaker 1: they're rather than having passengers and cars moved through tunnels

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Speaker 1: on trains or even on sleds within tunnels where much

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Speaker 1: of the air has been pumped out in order to

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Speaker 1: reduce air resistance and increase the rate of travel. Instead,

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Speaker 1: passengers hop into human driven Tesla vehicles. So really it's

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Speaker 1: ride hailing, but underground and with only Tesla vehicles driven

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Speaker 1: by humans. So this isn't even that first compromised vision

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Speaker 1: where we went from the hyperloop train to a moving sled,

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Speaker 1: so that you would drive your vehicle onto a sled

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Speaker 1: which would then take you and your vehicle to wherever

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Speaker 1: it was you wanted to go. Instead, this is just

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Speaker 1: getting into a vehicle and writing to a stop, at

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Speaker 1: least at the convention center. I don't know that that's

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Speaker 1: how it's going to be for Las Vegas as a whole,

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Speaker 1: but the City of Las Vegas has approved the boring

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Speaker 1: company's plan to dig a system that will spend nearly

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Speaker 1: thirty miles and will include more than fifty stops on it.

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Speaker 1: And maybe that system will incorporate the sled devices we

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Speaker 1: heard about in the past, or maybe it'll just be

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Speaker 1: an underground road system that adds more traffic to Las Vegas.

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Speaker 1: Is just traffic that's happening underneath the city. Many critics

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Speaker 1: have argued that an alternative like a train system would

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Speaker 1: have been a much better option. But I suppose we're

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Speaker 1: just gonna have to wait to find out like it's

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Speaker 1: Once it happens, we'll be able to say more clearly

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Speaker 1: if it was a success or not. Of course, by

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Speaker 1: then it might be too late. But who knows. Maybe

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Speaker 1: the tunnels will be really effective. I'm a little skeptical,

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Speaker 1: but I hope that I'm proven wrong. The Washington Post

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Speaker 1: recently published an article about how the US National Highway

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Speaker 1: Traffic Safety Administration, or n h t s A, released

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Speaker 1: a report showing that within the last year or so,

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Speaker 1: Tesla vehicles in autopilot mode have been involved in two

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Speaker 1: hundred seventy three crashes. That's a lot more than had

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Speaker 1: been previously reported, and according to the nh t s A,

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Speaker 1: Tesla vehicles made up almost seventy percent of all crashes

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Speaker 1: that happened while a vehicle was operating in an advanced

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Speaker 1: driver assistance mode, which is what we would call Tesla's

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Speaker 1: autopilot system. Now, I want to walk through a few

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Speaker 1: things before we really draw any conclusions. Y'all know, I

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Speaker 1: am not a big fan of Tesla the company, but

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Speaker 1: I think it's only fair that we really consider all

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Speaker 1: the different factors before we just say, oh, that means

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Speaker 1: Tesla vehicles are inherently unsafe. I don't think that's a

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Speaker 1: fair conclusion, because one is that you know, of all

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Speaker 1: accidents in driver assistance mode being Tesla vehicles. That is huge,

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Speaker 1: you know, saying that nearly three quarters of all vehicles

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Speaker 1: that are involved in crashes, all vehicles that were in

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Speaker 1: advanced driver assistance mode while being involved in crashes are Tesla's.

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Speaker 1: That does paint a bad picture. But does that actually

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Speaker 1: mean that Tesla system is inherently more dangerous than any

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Speaker 1: other manufacturers system. Not necessarily, because to draw that conclusion

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Speaker 1: we would need a lot more data. For example, you know,

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Speaker 1: Tesla is a really popular car model that has those

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Speaker 1: sorts of features. Not every car has advanced driver assistant features, right,

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Speaker 1: So you would first need to know what percentage of

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Speaker 1: the overall market of vehicles with these features does Tesla occupy, right,

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Speaker 1: Because if Tesla has of the cars with these features

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Speaker 1: on the road, but only accounts for seventy of accidents

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Speaker 1: involved with these features, enabled. That's different than saying, oh, well,

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Speaker 1: Tesla makes up of the market. Right. You have to

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Speaker 1: know all these things in order to be able to

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Speaker 1: draw some conclusions. Tesla maintains that its systems reduced the

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Speaker 1: likelihood of crashes, and it could be that Tesla's driver

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Speaker 1: assistance features have actually prevented way more accidents than otherwise

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Speaker 1: would have happened. So like, there's no way for us

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Speaker 1: to know that, right. We can't look back and say

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Speaker 1: how many accidents didn't happen because of autopilot. It could

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Speaker 1: be that if autopilot had not been a factor, lots

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Speaker 1: more people would have been in a lot more accidents.

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Speaker 1: It's impossible for us to say. So. Again, we can't

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Speaker 1: draw firm conclusions because we lack the data to be

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Speaker 1: able to do it. One other thing I did find interesting.

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Speaker 1: According to the Washington Post, regulators discus heard that Tesla's

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Speaker 1: autopilot system would automatically shut off a second before impact

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Speaker 1: when the system detected an imminent crash. So the implication

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Speaker 1: there is that Tesla may have built in kind of

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Speaker 1: a plausible deniability switch that technically, when a Tesla vehicle

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Speaker 1: gets in a crash, autopilot wasn't in charge because autopilot

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Speaker 1: shut off a second before the truck the crash actually happened. However,

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Speaker 1: the nh T s A accounted for this by demanding

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Speaker 1: data for any accident that happened within thirty seconds of

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Speaker 1: an advanced driver assistant system being active. So you couldn't

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Speaker 1: ignore those cases. Right, if the autopilot shut off one

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Speaker 1: second before an accident, that would still qualify for the

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Speaker 1: nh T s A. UH and a thirty second gap

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Speaker 1: is long enough where you could reasonably say, well, the

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Speaker 1: auto pilot system or whatever the driver assist system was

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Speaker 1: couldn't have been responsible because there was a long enough

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Speaker 1: gap there between when it was on and when it

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Speaker 1: was switched off. So it had to be you know,

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Speaker 1: human responsibility, not not machine responsibility. So that was how

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Speaker 1: the nh T s A kind of got around that issue. Now,

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Speaker 1: this information about these accidents have prompted some lawmakers to

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Speaker 1: say they need to look more closely at this sort

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Speaker 1: of technology, and that does make sense. I don't think

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Speaker 1: anyone is going so far as to say these features

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Speaker 1: are a bad idea, but rather that the implementation and

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Speaker 1: deployment can put people at risk, particularly if people rely

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Speaker 1: too heavily on systems that are meant to assist, but

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Speaker 1: not replace, human attention and action. And now for a

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Speaker 1: couple of stories about censorship the web, misinformation abuse, that

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Speaker 1: kind of thing. And first up is Turkey, which may

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Speaker 1: soon pass a law that will make it illegal to

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Speaker 1: read fake news and misinformation on the Internet, primarily targeting

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Speaker 1: social media companies. And here's where things get really tricky.

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Speaker 1: So on the one hand, yes, misinformation is a very

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Speaker 1: real and global problem. We frequently talk about it on

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Speaker 1: this show, and there are countries all around the world

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Speaker 1: grappling with ways to hold platforms accountable for how they

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Speaker 1: respond to reports of misinformation. I myself am in favor

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Speaker 1: of measures that can detect and respond to misinformation. That

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Speaker 1: being said, we also have to remember that you always

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Speaker 1: have to ask the question who determines what is and

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Speaker 1: isn't misinformation? Because in Turkey that falls to a government

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Speaker 1: that has for years cracked down on various communications platforms

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Speaker 1: in an authoritarian approach to control the narrative. Now, this

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Speaker 1: is the sort of scenario that free speech absolutists often cite,

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Speaker 1: that any frictions on speech are going to be dictated

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Speaker 1: by an authority, and that authority might not have your

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Speaker 1: best interests at heart. So therefore restrictions on free speech

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Speaker 1: are bad and certainly, should this proposed legislation become law

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Speaker 1: and Turkey, I expect the government will use it as

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Speaker 1: a justification to censor any voices that oppose that government

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Speaker 1: in any meaningful way. However, we also have seen the

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Speaker 1: incredible harm that misinformation campaigns can cause, and shrugging your

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Speaker 1: shoulders and saying well, people just need to make up

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Speaker 1: their own minds, as Zuckerberg once said, that absolutely ignores

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Speaker 1: the truckloads of evidence we have gathered about how things

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Speaker 1: like echo chambers can help radicalize people. Anyway, long story short,

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Speaker 1: I am concerned about this law, although I also think

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Speaker 1: the Turkish government has effectively been censoring stuff online for years,

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Speaker 1: so in a way you could just say that this is,

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Speaker 1: you know, just a formality, and I, you know, I

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Speaker 1: also struggle with this. This is a complicated issue where

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Speaker 1: I definitely want to see misinformation get pushed back, but

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Speaker 1: at the same time you have to worry about who's

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Speaker 1: doing the pushing. Meanwhile, over in Japan, there's a new

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Speaker 1: punishment for people who are found guilty of insulting someone online.

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Speaker 1: And first, by insulting, I mean insulting with the intent

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Speaker 1: to harm someone. So presumably the way Ben Bolan and

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Speaker 1: I insult each other would not qualify, because actually we

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Speaker 1: like each other, we're friendly with one another, but we

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Speaker 1: do insult each other on occasion. Secondly, I need to

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Speaker 1: say this isn't a new law. Instead, it's more of

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Speaker 1: an expansion of an existing law that's meant to deter

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Speaker 1: people from insulting each other and for those insults to

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Speaker 1: ultimately cause harm. So this expansion means that now if

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Speaker 1: you were found guilty of insulting someone with the intent

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Speaker 1: to harm that person, you can face up to a

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Speaker 1: year are in jail. Yikes. Now, there's already a plan

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Speaker 1: in place to revisit this law in three years, to

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Speaker 1: review it to see what kind of impact it has

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Speaker 1: on free speech versus civility. So it's possible that in

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Speaker 1: the future Japan will remove the jail time sentence. But yeah,

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Speaker 1: you gotta be careful who you call baca, y'all. All right,

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Speaker 1: we've got a couple more news stories to go before

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Speaker 1: we get to that. Let's take another quick break. We're

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Speaker 1: back so some so nos customers got a little more

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Speaker 1: than what they bargained for, literally after they ordered products

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Speaker 1: from the company. So in a few cases, so nos

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Speaker 1: Is ordering system accidentally sent some customers extra products. So,

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Speaker 1: in one case reported on by the Verge, a customer

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Speaker 1: who ordered like six different things from so Nos ended

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Speaker 1: up receiving six of each of those items. Also, Sonas

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Speaker 1: charged people for the extra stuff it's sent. So this

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Speaker 1: isn't a case of so no Nos makes an error

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Speaker 1: in your favor or anything like that. That's not like

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Speaker 1: Sonas made uh an accidental mistake and as a result

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Speaker 1: charged you for one stereo system but sent you six. No,

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Speaker 1: it's more like it charged you for all six of those.

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Speaker 1: The company said that the system update it recently had

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Speaker 1: on its internal systems accidentally caused quote some orders being

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Speaker 1: processed multiple times end quote. Sonas has said it will

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Speaker 1: refund customers their money, which I mean, of course sons

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Speaker 1: is going to refund customers their money. They have to

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Speaker 1: do that because otherwise they would be breaking a federal

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Speaker 1: law that says you cannot charge customers for products that

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Speaker 1: they didn't order. Now, according to the Verge, for that

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Speaker 1: poor soul who ended up with more than thirty boxes

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Speaker 1: of stuff. It gets more complicated because so Nos, according

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Speaker 1: to the customer who was not named, Sons, has said

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Speaker 1: it will not issue a refund until it receives all

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Speaker 1: of the products that it accidentally sent out, which come

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Speaker 1: on so NOS. I mean, I understand wanting to get

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Speaker 1: the product back because that is a real cost to

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Speaker 1: the company. But this was so nos Is mistake. It

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Speaker 1: was not the customer's mistake, and it sounds to me

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Speaker 1: like the burden of getting everything set right is falling

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Speaker 1: more on the victim of this rather than the company

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Speaker 1: that made the dumb mistake to begin with. So this

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Speaker 1: is me officially wagging my finger at you, Sons. I

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Speaker 1: don't know if you can hear it. It's good audio. Finally,

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Speaker 1: you might have seen some news reports saying that Chinese

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Speaker 1: scientists thought they had detected radio signals that may have

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Speaker 1: come from aliens using a telescope RAO telescope called fast

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Speaker 1: f A s T, and that initial report, which originally

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Speaker 1: published on state sponsored media in China, has subsequently been

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Speaker 1: removed from said media source, so it's no longer up there. Secondly,

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Speaker 1: before we start flipping out that we've picked up I

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Speaker 1: don't know, TV signals from Alpha Centauri or something. We

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Speaker 1: need to employ some critical thinking. Radio antenna often pick

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Speaker 1: up odd signals. Sometimes those radio signals are extraterrestrial in nature,

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Speaker 1: but by that I mean the radio signals originated somewhere

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Speaker 1: other than here on Earth. And there is a lot

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Speaker 1: of stuff out in space that generates radio waves. In fact,

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Speaker 1: that's why we have radio telescopes, is to you know,

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Speaker 1: measure those kind of things and learn more about our galaxy.

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Speaker 1: It's a natural phenomenon. In other words, it's not being

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Speaker 1: generated by an intelligent species out there. And several scientists

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Speaker 1: have already said that what this Chinese group most likely

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Speaker 1: detected was radio frequency interference or r f I, and

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Speaker 1: that was actually something the scientists themselves said was a possibility.

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Speaker 1: So our i f I is just that's just radio

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Speaker 1: frequency interference that comes from Earth. It's something that all

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Speaker 1: radio observatories have to take into account. That's why a

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Speaker 1: lot of radio observatories, most of them in fact, are

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Speaker 1: located in pretty remote areas where they're far enough out

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Speaker 1: from sources of radio frequencies that though that doesn't end up,

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Speaker 1: you know, interference isn't as big a concern. But that's

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Speaker 1: certainly something that does happen. And if we employ Acam's

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Speaker 1: razor here, which is where we say, if you've got

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Speaker 1: more than one potential explanation for something, it's best to

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Speaker 1: go with the simplest explanation or the one that requires

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Speaker 1: the fewest unproven assumptions. You know, if if you feel

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Speaker 1: a cool breeze in your house, you could think, well,

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Speaker 1: I might have a window open. You know, there could

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Speaker 1: be a draft here, or maybe it's a ghost. Well, drafts,

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Speaker 1: you know, that's something we know that exists. It really

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Speaker 1: does exist. We we are aware of it. Ghosts are

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Speaker 1: unproven to exist, So it makes way more sense to

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Speaker 1: assume that it is a draft, like maybe there's a

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Speaker 1: crack in the wall, or maybe there's a window or

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Speaker 1: door open or something. Then it makes sense to say, oh,

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Speaker 1: it's old Aunt Bertha and she has unfinished business here

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Speaker 1: on this plane. So if you detect strange radio signals

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Speaker 1: and your conclusion is that it could either be aliens

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Speaker 1: or it's radio interference, then r if I is the

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Speaker 1: simplest solution. We know rf I is a thing, we

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Speaker 1: encounter it all the time. It's far more likely that

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Speaker 1: we're picking up radio signals from here on Earth then

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Speaker 1: picking up some sort of radio signal of alien origin.

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Speaker 1: For us to conclude that the signal actually is alien,

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Speaker 1: we would need some sort of incredibly convincing proof, proof

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Speaker 1: that secured our confidence that it could not have originated

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Speaker 1: as our fi. You've probably heard the saying extraordinary claims

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Speaker 1: require extraordinary evidence. This is one of those cases. So

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Speaker 1: while I would love to say we picked up evidence

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Speaker 1: that there are alien intelligences out there that communicate via radio,

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Speaker 1: it's too too early to have said that. It is

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Speaker 1: uh an incredibly unlikely that that is what the Chinese

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Speaker 1: radio telescope picked up. So sad to burst that bubble

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Speaker 1: because I would. I would also love to find out

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Speaker 1: we're not alone out here. I don't think we are alone,

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00:27:54,960 --> 00:27:57,800
Speaker 1: by the way. I just also happen to know. Space

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Speaker 1: is so large that the odd of us picking up

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Speaker 1: radio signals from another intelligent species are just incredibly low,

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Speaker 1: because if that intelligent species is on the other side

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Speaker 1: of the galaxy, it will take hundreds of years for

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Speaker 1: any signal to make its way over to a point

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Speaker 1: where we can detect it. So the odds are very

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Speaker 1: much low for that to happen. All right, that's it

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Speaker 1: for the tech News for Thursday, June two thousand twenty two.

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00:28:27,800 --> 00:28:29,679
Speaker 1: If you have anything you would like to send me,

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Speaker 1: Maybe it's a suggestion for a future episode, maybe it's

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Speaker 1: commentary about aliens. Who knows. Then you can do that

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Speaker 1: in one of a couple of ways. One way is

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Speaker 1: You can just go straight to the tech Stuff page

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Speaker 1: can leave a voice message up to thirty seconds in length,

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Speaker 1: and if you like, you can even let me know

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Speaker 1: if I can use that audio in an episode. I

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Speaker 1: prefer opt in to opt out, so just let me know.

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Speaker 1: Otherwise I will likely just use the audio to you know,

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Speaker 1: launch an episode or answer a question, but I won't

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Speaker 1: actually use the audio within an episode. The other way,

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Speaker 1: of course, is just to send me a message on Twitter.

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