1 00:00:10,480 --> 00:00:14,880 Speaker 1: What does it take to affect a significant career change? 2 00:00:15,280 --> 00:00:19,040 Speaker 1: How do you shift from a fairly safe, but perhaps 3 00:00:19,360 --> 00:00:23,959 Speaker 1: someone unsatisfying job into something that you really love. A 4 00:00:24,079 --> 00:00:28,480 Speaker 1: major career change does require some skills, some hard work, 5 00:00:28,720 --> 00:00:31,319 Speaker 1: and a little bit of luck. Today we're speaking with 6 00:00:31,400 --> 00:00:36,000 Speaker 1: Cass Sunstein. He is a professor at Harvard Law School. Previously, 7 00:00:36,159 --> 00:00:41,000 Speaker 1: he clerked for Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshal. He was 8 00:00:41,040 --> 00:00:44,680 Speaker 1: an attorney advisor in the US Department of Justice. He 9 00:00:44,800 --> 00:00:48,720 Speaker 1: spent over two decades teaching at the University of Chicago 10 00:00:48,800 --> 00:00:53,040 Speaker 1: Law School before joining Harvard, but he has also become 11 00:00:53,680 --> 00:00:59,120 Speaker 1: an author and a student of behavioral economics. So, Cass, 12 00:00:59,200 --> 00:01:02,960 Speaker 1: let's just jump into this. What was your original career plan? 13 00:01:03,160 --> 00:01:06,000 Speaker 1: Was the thinking I'm going to go be an attorney 14 00:01:06,240 --> 00:01:07,199 Speaker 1: and practice law. 15 00:01:08,000 --> 00:01:10,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, that's what I thought. So I went to law school, 16 00:01:10,560 --> 00:01:12,880 Speaker 2: I got to clerk for the Supreme Court, and then 17 00:01:13,000 --> 00:01:15,600 Speaker 2: after that I worked for the Justice Department. And at 18 00:01:15,600 --> 00:01:18,000 Speaker 2: that point I thought I'd probably work for the Justice 19 00:01:18,000 --> 00:01:19,360 Speaker 2: Department in a good long time. 20 00:01:20,360 --> 00:01:23,840 Speaker 1: And so what was the moment where you said, you know, 21 00:01:24,240 --> 00:01:27,280 Speaker 1: I'm going to play with teaching law and see where 22 00:01:27,319 --> 00:01:29,839 Speaker 1: that goes. Which is I don't know if I would 23 00:01:29,880 --> 00:01:34,600 Speaker 1: call that a career change, but certainly a pivot from 24 00:01:34,600 --> 00:01:35,640 Speaker 1: the practice of law. 25 00:01:36,520 --> 00:01:40,640 Speaker 2: It was relatively early the law schools come to the 26 00:01:40,680 --> 00:01:43,440 Speaker 2: Supreme Court to interview the clerks to see if they 27 00:01:43,520 --> 00:01:47,120 Speaker 2: might be teaching material, and the University of Chicago Law 28 00:01:47,120 --> 00:01:50,480 Speaker 2: School knocked my socks off. And the way they did 29 00:01:50,520 --> 00:01:55,880 Speaker 2: that was their energy and engagement with problems that really 30 00:01:55,960 --> 00:02:01,120 Speaker 2: are intellectually super interesting and are also practically important. So 31 00:02:01,200 --> 00:02:03,960 Speaker 2: I thought they were all firecrackers there. And then when 32 00:02:03,960 --> 00:02:06,200 Speaker 2: I was in the Justice Department after a year, I thought, 33 00:02:06,240 --> 00:02:09,280 Speaker 2: maybe I'll go into teaching. I'll kind of explore Chicago, 34 00:02:09,720 --> 00:02:12,840 Speaker 2: And I thought this would be not a way of retiring, 35 00:02:12,919 --> 00:02:15,400 Speaker 2: but a way of doing something that was continuous with 36 00:02:15,560 --> 00:02:18,600 Speaker 2: my law practice but had a little more theory in it. 37 00:02:19,200 --> 00:02:23,680 Speaker 1: So you spend twenty years teaching at the University of Chicago, 38 00:02:23,840 --> 00:02:29,080 Speaker 1: which is known for really fostering the entire field of 39 00:02:29,160 --> 00:02:33,120 Speaker 1: behavioral economics. You have Dick Faylor there, and you very 40 00:02:33,160 --> 00:02:37,520 Speaker 1: famously have Eugene Fama teaching there talking about market efficiency. 41 00:02:38,320 --> 00:02:40,720 Speaker 1: Tell us a little bit about how the University of 42 00:02:40,800 --> 00:02:46,520 Speaker 1: Chicago Law School affected how you thought about the practice 43 00:02:46,520 --> 00:02:46,920 Speaker 1: of law. 44 00:02:47,800 --> 00:02:52,240 Speaker 2: When I got to Chicago, I was surrounded by economists 45 00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:58,000 Speaker 2: or economics adjacent lawyers who said, almost like it was 46 00:02:58,040 --> 00:03:02,119 Speaker 2: a prayer, that human beings are rational, they are responsive 47 00:03:02,200 --> 00:03:06,000 Speaker 2: to his incentives a man. And this was Ronald Coost 48 00:03:06,040 --> 00:03:08,480 Speaker 2: who got a Nobel Prize, Gary Becker, who got a 49 00:03:08,520 --> 00:03:11,519 Speaker 2: Nobel Prize, George Stigler who got a Nobel Prize. I 50 00:03:11,560 --> 00:03:14,600 Speaker 2: knew all of them before they got Nobel prizes. They 51 00:03:14,600 --> 00:03:17,160 Speaker 2: seemed to me like giants, and I felt like I 52 00:03:17,280 --> 00:03:20,040 Speaker 2: was two inches tall looking up at these eight foot 53 00:03:20,400 --> 00:03:23,560 Speaker 2: tall people who were amazing. But though I was only 54 00:03:23,919 --> 00:03:27,239 Speaker 2: tiny and they were so big, I felt they were wrong. 55 00:03:27,840 --> 00:03:31,080 Speaker 2: And I was a literature major in college, and I 56 00:03:31,240 --> 00:03:34,800 Speaker 2: knew Shakespeare and Charles Dickens and Thomas Hardy, and I 57 00:03:34,840 --> 00:03:40,640 Speaker 2: also knew how economists play tennis, and it isn't fully rational. 58 00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:43,400 Speaker 2: I would see them and they'd be hitting these fourhands 59 00:03:43,400 --> 00:03:45,840 Speaker 2: they had no reason to try to hit, and it 60 00:03:45,880 --> 00:03:49,280 Speaker 2: would go into the net. And I thought, this rationality 61 00:03:49,320 --> 00:03:53,440 Speaker 2: stuff isn't right. So I started writing papers actually on 62 00:03:53,680 --> 00:03:57,680 Speaker 2: departures from perfect rationality, and during the writing of one 63 00:03:57,720 --> 00:04:02,640 Speaker 2: of them, an economist who was a rational choice economists 64 00:04:02,960 --> 00:04:05,280 Speaker 2: said to me, the paper you're writing is terrible and 65 00:04:05,320 --> 00:04:08,280 Speaker 2: you shouldn't publish it. It's so awful you'll ruin your career. 66 00:04:08,800 --> 00:04:11,200 Speaker 2: But he added, there's someone who's almost as bad and 67 00:04:11,400 --> 00:04:14,640 Speaker 2: idiotic as you are at Cornell named Richard Thaylor. So 68 00:04:14,840 --> 00:04:19,240 Speaker 2: he's a young economist who's hopeless, and your paper sounds 69 00:04:19,279 --> 00:04:21,599 Speaker 2: like his. You should read him, and then you should 70 00:04:21,600 --> 00:04:24,320 Speaker 2: stop writing your paper. And I did read him, but 71 00:04:24,360 --> 00:04:26,800 Speaker 2: then I got more excited about writing my paper. That's 72 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:27,479 Speaker 2: how it started. 73 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:33,600 Speaker 1: So because of criticism of your work from the orthodoxy, 74 00:04:34,200 --> 00:04:37,960 Speaker 1: you were directed to somebody who was a little less heterodox, 75 00:04:38,000 --> 00:04:41,640 Speaker 1: a little more out on the fringe. What happened next? 76 00:04:41,680 --> 00:04:44,160 Speaker 1: Did you reach out to the young Dick thalor or 77 00:04:44,200 --> 00:04:45,360 Speaker 1: how did you guys connect? 78 00:04:45,600 --> 00:04:48,559 Speaker 2: I did. I wrote a paper or two, maybe three 79 00:04:49,200 --> 00:04:52,760 Speaker 2: that were kind of informed by behavioral economics about law. 80 00:04:53,320 --> 00:04:56,800 Speaker 2: I did write Taylor a kind of fan letter, like 81 00:04:56,880 --> 00:05:00,200 Speaker 2: writing a rock star. It felt like saying, you know 82 00:05:00,200 --> 00:05:02,839 Speaker 2: you're great, you're amazing, you're incredible, and if you know 83 00:05:03,000 --> 00:05:06,000 Speaker 2: failor you won't be surprised to hear. He never responded 84 00:05:06,040 --> 00:05:08,599 Speaker 2: to my letter, but he did come to the University 85 00:05:08,600 --> 00:05:11,000 Speaker 2: of Chicago, and I think he reached out to me 86 00:05:11,200 --> 00:05:14,240 Speaker 2: and said, you want to have lunch, and we hit 87 00:05:14,320 --> 00:05:18,960 Speaker 2: it off immediately and then started being great friends and collaborators. 88 00:05:19,440 --> 00:05:22,479 Speaker 1: And one of those collaborations was the book you two 89 00:05:22,720 --> 00:05:27,600 Speaker 1: co author, Nudge, Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness. 90 00:05:28,200 --> 00:05:31,120 Speaker 1: Tell us a little bit about what that process was like, 91 00:05:32,000 --> 00:05:35,240 Speaker 1: co authoring a book with Dick Taylor, and what has 92 00:05:35,320 --> 00:05:41,600 Speaker 1: been the fallouts of this really terrible career ending decision 93 00:05:41,640 --> 00:05:42,200 Speaker 1: you made. 94 00:05:42,720 --> 00:05:45,440 Speaker 2: When at one of our first lunches, he said he 95 00:05:45,520 --> 00:05:48,680 Speaker 2: was writing a paper with an economist lawyer named Christine 96 00:05:48,760 --> 00:05:52,400 Speaker 2: Joels on behavioral economics at law. And I was very 97 00:05:52,400 --> 00:05:55,480 Speaker 2: excited about that. And as the weeks went by and 98 00:05:55,520 --> 00:05:59,400 Speaker 2: then months, they hadn't produced a draft, and I said, Dick, 99 00:05:59,440 --> 00:06:02,599 Speaker 2: you better do this paper or else I'm going to 100 00:06:02,680 --> 00:06:05,400 Speaker 2: do it instead, and it won't be as good because 101 00:06:05,400 --> 00:06:08,240 Speaker 2: it's just me. And he said, why don't you join 102 00:06:08,360 --> 00:06:10,680 Speaker 2: us and we'll be a threesome. So we wrote the 103 00:06:10,720 --> 00:06:14,200 Speaker 2: paper together and we had a concluding section called anti 104 00:06:14,279 --> 00:06:18,480 Speaker 2: anti paternalism, in which we said we were in pro paternalism, 105 00:06:18,839 --> 00:06:23,680 Speaker 2: but knowing how human beings blunder, we are anti anti paternalism. 106 00:06:24,080 --> 00:06:27,400 Speaker 2: Now that's very clunky. And then a few years later 107 00:06:27,760 --> 00:06:32,080 Speaker 2: we did a paper at academic paper on libertarian paternalism. 108 00:06:32,240 --> 00:06:35,040 Speaker 2: One was a law paper and one was an economics paper, 109 00:06:35,320 --> 00:06:37,040 Speaker 2: and that was just the two of us, and we 110 00:06:37,040 --> 00:06:39,680 Speaker 2: were very excited about that, and it turned out a 111 00:06:39,680 --> 00:06:43,640 Speaker 2: lot of people were interested in libertarian paternalism as a concept. 112 00:06:43,839 --> 00:06:48,960 Speaker 2: I think a GPS device or a disclosure requirement, or 113 00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:52,480 Speaker 2: maybe automatic enrollment in some kind of plan. All that 114 00:06:52,520 --> 00:06:55,520 Speaker 2: preserves freedom of choice, but it's kind of paternalistic. So 115 00:06:55,560 --> 00:06:58,400 Speaker 2: we wrote these papers, and the interest in the papers 116 00:06:58,480 --> 00:07:01,440 Speaker 2: motivated us to think maybe we should do a book. 117 00:07:01,760 --> 00:07:04,520 Speaker 2: And originally it was going to be called Libertarian Paternalism. 118 00:07:04,839 --> 00:07:06,920 Speaker 2: I don't know if anyone would have bought that book. 119 00:07:07,520 --> 00:07:10,280 Speaker 2: An editor suggested the name Nudge, and that's what we 120 00:07:10,320 --> 00:07:13,840 Speaker 2: went with. Dick is, you know, I think the most 121 00:07:13,880 --> 00:07:18,840 Speaker 2: creative and important force behind the rise of behavioral economics. 122 00:07:20,120 --> 00:07:22,560 Speaker 2: He's not really mathy, which is good for me because 123 00:07:22,600 --> 00:07:25,840 Speaker 2: I'm not that good at math. I brought law and 124 00:07:25,920 --> 00:07:30,680 Speaker 2: policy focus to the book. So we had lunch like 125 00:07:30,760 --> 00:07:33,400 Speaker 2: all the time about what the chapters would look like, 126 00:07:33,880 --> 00:07:36,880 Speaker 2: and we planned out the chapters and one would write 127 00:07:36,920 --> 00:07:39,280 Speaker 2: one chapter, the other would write another chapter, and then 128 00:07:39,320 --> 00:07:42,280 Speaker 2: we go back and forth like a lot on the editing. 129 00:07:42,720 --> 00:07:46,800 Speaker 2: I think I was faster at chapter production than Dick was. 130 00:07:47,200 --> 00:07:50,960 Speaker 2: I think he was better at chapter production production than 131 00:07:51,000 --> 00:07:53,680 Speaker 2: I was, meaning mine would be quicker, his would be 132 00:07:53,760 --> 00:07:58,120 Speaker 2: more amazing and complete. And we were in our very 133 00:07:58,160 --> 00:08:00,960 Speaker 2: good editors of each other. We had a rule that 134 00:08:01,000 --> 00:08:05,200 Speaker 2: we kind of adopted implicitly early on and explicitly later, 135 00:08:05,680 --> 00:08:08,640 Speaker 2: which is, if we both didn't find the chapter fun, 136 00:08:09,080 --> 00:08:11,120 Speaker 2: we wouldn't put it in the book. So we both 137 00:08:11,160 --> 00:08:13,440 Speaker 2: had to find it really fun. That was our rule 138 00:08:13,480 --> 00:08:14,200 Speaker 2: of inclusion. 139 00:08:14,640 --> 00:08:18,520 Speaker 1: Huh, really really interesting. So I'm kind of fascinated by 140 00:08:18,640 --> 00:08:25,600 Speaker 1: the difference that you identified between on an individual basis, 141 00:08:27,680 --> 00:08:32,040 Speaker 1: especially with all the unforced errors you were describing amongst 142 00:08:32,040 --> 00:08:36,920 Speaker 1: the rational economists playing tennis literally a book Charlie Ellis wrote, 143 00:08:37,320 --> 00:08:39,920 Speaker 1: Winning the Losers Game. Hey, if you want to win 144 00:08:39,960 --> 00:08:43,280 Speaker 1: a tennis and you're not a professional tennis player, well 145 00:08:43,480 --> 00:08:46,400 Speaker 1: just make fewer unforced error. Just hit the ball back 146 00:08:46,440 --> 00:08:49,120 Speaker 1: over the net. Stop trying to kill it. You're not 147 00:08:49,240 --> 00:08:54,440 Speaker 1: that good. Which is a sort of individual dare I say, 148 00:08:54,520 --> 00:09:01,000 Speaker 1: nudge versus libertarian paternalism where you're setting up a society 149 00:09:01,000 --> 00:09:06,760 Speaker 1: wide systematic structure where the default is nudging people into 150 00:09:06,800 --> 00:09:10,160 Speaker 1: the right choice. So, hey, you have to check on 151 00:09:10,400 --> 00:09:14,960 Speaker 1: the organ donor box on your license, yes or no. 152 00:09:15,040 --> 00:09:17,319 Speaker 1: And if you don't check anything, it's going to be yes. 153 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:20,240 Speaker 1: You have to put your four oh one k money. 154 00:09:21,120 --> 00:09:23,480 Speaker 1: It could be in whatever you want, cash, bond stocks. 155 00:09:23,480 --> 00:09:26,200 Speaker 1: But if you don't check the box, well, here's a 156 00:09:26,280 --> 00:09:30,320 Speaker 1: target date fund that's seventy thirty, sixty, forty whatever. How 157 00:09:30,320 --> 00:09:34,880 Speaker 1: do you think about both the individual behavioral options versus 158 00:09:35,640 --> 00:09:37,320 Speaker 1: system wide nudges? 159 00:09:38,440 --> 00:09:41,600 Speaker 2: Okay, so it might be a good idea to tell 160 00:09:41,679 --> 00:09:44,800 Speaker 2: people you're automatically going to be in a savings plan 161 00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:48,080 Speaker 2: and if you don't want to opt out. Now, note 162 00:09:48,120 --> 00:09:52,240 Speaker 2: that that's not more paternalistic than saying you're not automatically 163 00:09:52,280 --> 00:09:54,920 Speaker 2: in a savings plan and if you want to have 164 00:09:55,000 --> 00:09:58,040 Speaker 2: to opt in. Both have a default which require action, 165 00:09:58,520 --> 00:10:02,640 Speaker 2: and both are completely free to preserving. In lots of domains, 166 00:10:02,760 --> 00:10:07,080 Speaker 2: individuals benefit from, let's say, a choice architecture which has 167 00:10:07,200 --> 00:10:11,560 Speaker 2: a paternalistic feature but also maintains freedom. So I leased 168 00:10:11,559 --> 00:10:14,280 Speaker 2: a new car recently. If I start to go like 169 00:10:14,400 --> 00:10:17,400 Speaker 2: towards somebody that I'm about to hit is going to 170 00:10:17,400 --> 00:10:21,520 Speaker 2: go beat beep, beep, and various unhappy noises or property 171 00:10:21,559 --> 00:10:24,320 Speaker 2: or if I switch lanes, there are various things that 172 00:10:24,640 --> 00:10:28,920 Speaker 2: the car will signal to me which are nodges to 173 00:10:28,960 --> 00:10:31,560 Speaker 2: be more careful or drive more safely, and those are 174 00:10:31,640 --> 00:10:35,160 Speaker 2: at the individual level. At the system level, we can 175 00:10:35,240 --> 00:10:38,080 Speaker 2: imagine a grocery store and this isn't going to be 176 00:10:38,200 --> 00:10:41,160 Speaker 2: very imaginative at all on my part. A grocery store 177 00:10:41,160 --> 00:10:43,480 Speaker 2: that is full of nudges in the sense that it 178 00:10:43,559 --> 00:10:47,120 Speaker 2: might have healthy foods at places that are super visible 179 00:10:47,280 --> 00:10:50,760 Speaker 2: for people, or it might have medicines let's say the 180 00:10:50,800 --> 00:10:57,439 Speaker 2: relevant population benefits from that are extremely easily accessed by 181 00:10:57,440 --> 00:11:00,480 Speaker 2: people who are there, and it might have, say, the 182 00:11:00,559 --> 00:11:03,319 Speaker 2: less healthy stuff there, but you're going to have to 183 00:11:03,360 --> 00:11:05,320 Speaker 2: do a little work to get there. Or it might 184 00:11:05,360 --> 00:11:07,000 Speaker 2: be that the less healthy stuff is going to be 185 00:11:07,080 --> 00:11:10,959 Speaker 2: right there because the grocery shore knows that people really 186 00:11:11,080 --> 00:11:15,360 Speaker 2: like that. And website design is the same way. Investment 187 00:11:15,679 --> 00:11:18,880 Speaker 2: offerings have the same characteristic. If you go to a 188 00:11:18,920 --> 00:11:23,400 Speaker 2: financial advisor, there might be some libertarian paternalism. My financial 189 00:11:23,440 --> 00:11:26,800 Speaker 2: advisor certainly engages in that. It's implicit you can do 190 00:11:26,840 --> 00:11:29,200 Speaker 2: what you want, but if you're going to sell everything 191 00:11:29,280 --> 00:11:34,319 Speaker 2: because the President said something about tariffs, I think you're 192 00:11:34,360 --> 00:11:37,600 Speaker 2: going to regret it and maybe sleep on it. And 193 00:11:37,679 --> 00:11:40,880 Speaker 2: that's not just at the individual level. There can be 194 00:11:40,920 --> 00:11:44,679 Speaker 2: a system of investment advice that is kind of organized 195 00:11:44,720 --> 00:11:47,320 Speaker 2: for people. This is your neck of the woods, not mine, 196 00:11:47,720 --> 00:11:52,080 Speaker 2: which is designed to promote better outcomes for savers. 197 00:11:52,840 --> 00:11:56,640 Speaker 1: So what's so fascinating about this discussion is how far 198 00:11:56,720 --> 00:12:02,360 Speaker 1: afield we are from the traditional practice of law. When 199 00:12:02,400 --> 00:12:06,080 Speaker 1: did it kind of dawn on you that I went 200 00:12:06,160 --> 00:12:09,120 Speaker 1: to law school, I clerked at the Supreme Court, I 201 00:12:09,400 --> 00:12:12,840 Speaker 1: teach law. I'm not really going to be a practicing 202 00:12:12,920 --> 00:12:16,880 Speaker 1: lawyer anymore. How did that realization come to pass? And 203 00:12:17,280 --> 00:12:19,480 Speaker 1: did you have to make peace with it or were 204 00:12:19,559 --> 00:12:21,720 Speaker 1: you very comfortable with that decision? 205 00:12:22,960 --> 00:12:25,720 Speaker 2: Well, the good news is there are twenty four hours 206 00:12:25,720 --> 00:12:28,600 Speaker 2: in a day, and you get to be awake during 207 00:12:28,640 --> 00:12:34,360 Speaker 2: the majority of them. So I teach administrative law most years. 208 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:38,880 Speaker 2: That's kind of my bread and butter law course. I 209 00:12:38,920 --> 00:12:42,760 Speaker 2: write about constitutional law. I'm not going to say most days, 210 00:12:43,120 --> 00:12:46,400 Speaker 2: but most months and maybe even most weeks. So I've 211 00:12:46,440 --> 00:12:50,000 Speaker 2: stayed there and through all the years. Sometimes I think, 212 00:12:50,080 --> 00:12:54,360 Speaker 2: am I in an area that I understand less well 213 00:12:54,800 --> 00:12:58,480 Speaker 2: that is economics, than the area that's kind of home, 214 00:12:58,720 --> 00:13:01,360 Speaker 2: which is law. If I'm feeling like that, I might 215 00:13:01,400 --> 00:13:04,880 Speaker 2: start doing law. But I should say the behavioral economics 216 00:13:04,920 --> 00:13:08,120 Speaker 2: is what I like best. It makes me smile, it 217 00:13:08,160 --> 00:13:14,440 Speaker 2: makes me laugh, It creates a kind of sense of 218 00:13:14,480 --> 00:13:19,520 Speaker 2: excitement that law isn't quite there. I love law a lot, 219 00:13:19,640 --> 00:13:23,160 Speaker 2: I love legal problems a ton, but the behavioral economic 220 00:13:23,280 --> 00:13:27,079 Speaker 2: stuff seems to me the most exciting intellectual development in 221 00:13:27,080 --> 00:13:29,880 Speaker 2: the last fifty years. Part of it is it's a 222 00:13:29,920 --> 00:13:33,640 Speaker 2: little like reading the best Charles Dickens novel that Dickens 223 00:13:33,679 --> 00:13:38,160 Speaker 2: never wrote. That is the behavioral economists are so observant 224 00:13:38,200 --> 00:13:43,080 Speaker 2: of humanity and our foibles, and I think there's comedy 225 00:13:43,120 --> 00:13:45,880 Speaker 2: and warmth in it. So to see that if you say, 226 00:13:45,920 --> 00:13:48,360 Speaker 2: you know ninety people are alive after five years, do 227 00:13:48,400 --> 00:13:51,680 Speaker 2: you want to have their operation, People including doctors say sure. 228 00:13:52,280 --> 00:13:54,520 Speaker 2: If you tell people ten or dead after five years, 229 00:13:54,520 --> 00:13:57,240 Speaker 2: do you want to have the operation, people including doctors 230 00:13:57,240 --> 00:13:58,160 Speaker 2: say probably not. 231 00:13:58,880 --> 00:14:02,400 Speaker 1: But it's the same exist set of circumstances. It's ninety 232 00:14:02,480 --> 00:14:03,800 Speaker 1: ten or ten ninety. 233 00:14:03,760 --> 00:14:07,280 Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly. So framing effects are really funny. I think 234 00:14:07,600 --> 00:14:12,920 Speaker 2: as well as you know usable and behavioral findings. You know, 235 00:14:12,960 --> 00:14:17,240 Speaker 2: there's a recent paper out that shows that for certain assets, 236 00:14:17,559 --> 00:14:20,600 Speaker 2: people have no idea what the right value is, and 237 00:14:20,640 --> 00:14:24,440 Speaker 2: so their willingness to pay for the assets will be 238 00:14:25,040 --> 00:14:28,880 Speaker 2: very variable because it's not like a shoe where if 239 00:14:28,880 --> 00:14:31,160 Speaker 2: you see certain prices, you think that's a deal or 240 00:14:31,200 --> 00:14:35,720 Speaker 2: that's crazy. For certain assets investors, including sophisticated ones, they 241 00:14:35,760 --> 00:14:38,240 Speaker 2: just have no idea what the right value is, and 242 00:14:38,280 --> 00:14:42,760 Speaker 2: that's very important to know. And we keep coming up 243 00:14:42,800 --> 00:14:47,680 Speaker 2: with streams of behavioral findings which are either small and 244 00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:52,080 Speaker 2: important or large and quite fundamental. I was an international 245 00:14:52,120 --> 00:14:54,720 Speaker 2: conference in n Abu Dhabi not long ago. There were 246 00:14:54,760 --> 00:14:58,240 Speaker 2: seven hundred people approximately from all over the world, and 247 00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:02,360 Speaker 2: the findings they were described ibang were you know, felt 248 00:15:02,400 --> 00:15:04,560 Speaker 2: like a candy store. 249 00:15:05,160 --> 00:15:10,720 Speaker 1: Huh. So final question, you seem to have very comfortably 250 00:15:11,000 --> 00:15:16,320 Speaker 1: shifted your focus from traditional practice of law to teaching 251 00:15:16,440 --> 00:15:22,320 Speaker 1: law to an adjacent field of behavioral economics. What sort 252 00:15:22,320 --> 00:15:25,160 Speaker 1: of advice would you have for anybody, lawyer or not, 253 00:15:25,680 --> 00:15:28,720 Speaker 1: who was thinking about a pivot in their career. 254 00:15:29,880 --> 00:15:34,280 Speaker 2: Great, think what would make your days better? So if 255 00:15:34,320 --> 00:15:39,720 Speaker 2: you think of the pivot, imagine how's Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday? 256 00:15:39,760 --> 00:15:43,240 Speaker 2: Go I look compared to how it's looking now. If 257 00:15:43,280 --> 00:15:46,040 Speaker 2: the pivot makes you think, boy, I'm going to be 258 00:15:46,080 --> 00:15:49,360 Speaker 2: overwhelmed with things I don't understand. I'm going to be anxious, 259 00:15:49,400 --> 00:15:53,040 Speaker 2: and I'm going to be poor, then maybe hesitate. If 260 00:15:53,040 --> 00:15:56,080 Speaker 2: it makes you think rush every day is going to 261 00:15:56,120 --> 00:16:02,840 Speaker 2: be really fun and new and full of discovery and people. 262 00:16:02,920 --> 00:16:06,840 Speaker 2: Maybe if that's what you like, or engagements that are 263 00:16:07,080 --> 00:16:09,680 Speaker 2: something I've not seen before and they're likely to stand 264 00:16:09,760 --> 00:16:12,040 Speaker 2: the test of time, then go for it. 265 00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:16,400 Speaker 1: Huh, really really interesting stuff. Thanks Cas for all your insight. 266 00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:19,400 Speaker 1: So to wrap up, if you're thinking about a career 267 00:16:19,560 --> 00:16:23,440 Speaker 1: change and you have an aptitude towards a particular research 268 00:16:23,520 --> 00:16:27,080 Speaker 1: area or a skill set, see if you're capable of 269 00:16:27,120 --> 00:16:31,000 Speaker 1: performing that and earning a living doing it. Be aware 270 00:16:31,240 --> 00:16:34,840 Speaker 1: merely pursuing your bliss may not pay the bills. You 271 00:16:34,960 --> 00:16:38,080 Speaker 1: have to have both the skills and the tools and 272 00:16:38,120 --> 00:16:42,080 Speaker 1: the abilities to earn a living in your new career. 273 00:16:42,880 --> 00:16:45,320 Speaker 1: If you find you have the aptitude and you're good 274 00:16:45,320 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 1: at it, well why not go for it? I'm Barry Ridults. 275 00:16:50,040 --> 00:17:01,320 Speaker 1: You're listening to Bloomberg's at the money