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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of My Heart Rating. Welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Nol. They called

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Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined us always with our super producer

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Speaker 1: Alexis code named Doc Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you are you,

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Speaker 1: You are here, and that makes this the stuff they

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Speaker 1: don't want you to know. It is time for a

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Speaker 1: weekly Listener Male segment. We're going a lot of places here, folks. UH.

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Speaker 1: First off, as we said earlier this week, we want

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Speaker 1: to thank everybody who is able to meet us in

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Speaker 1: Atlanta for our book launch. It was so cool to

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Speaker 1: UH to meet in person several people that at least

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Speaker 1: I have been talking to for years at this point

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Speaker 1: over social media or email or so on. Just you know,

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Speaker 1: there's an importance with putting putting yourself in the physical

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Speaker 1: presence of people who become close friends. I would say,

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Speaker 1: we're going to hear from some of our fellow conspiracy realists.

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Speaker 1: We're going to learn about the ins and outs of

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Speaker 1: competitive fishing. We are going and it won't spoil that,

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Speaker 1: but we'll get some terminology in there. We're going to

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Speaker 1: learn about, uh, some firsthand experience from law enforcement officer

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Speaker 1: with the shot spot or system, which is going to

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Speaker 1: be uh the top of the subject of an upcoming

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Speaker 1: episode in the near future. And before we do that,

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Speaker 1: we wanted to ease into this week's segment with a

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Speaker 1: wonderful letter that is I would say revelatory coming from

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Speaker 1: someone calling themselves Arkle's the Tooth Fairy. So, Sparkles, if

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Speaker 1: you hear this big big fan a lot of people,

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Speaker 1: you know, I can always tell when we do an

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Speaker 1: episode that resonates with a lot of people, because a

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Speaker 1: lot of our fellow listeners will hit me up on

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Speaker 1: like Twitter, Bimbo and hs W or Instagram Ben Bowl

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Speaker 1: and in a burst of creativity and just give us

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Speaker 1: this inside look at something that we might be very

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Speaker 1: unfamiliar with. And that's what Sparkles did. So I think

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Speaker 1: we were all all three of us, and many of

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Speaker 1: us listening were surprised that the Glitter episode is proof

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Speaker 1: that almost any imaginable thing might have some secrets lurking

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Speaker 1: deep in the story. Glitter is no different. Quick recap

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Speaker 1: before we get into this letter. Boy found in our

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Speaker 1: episode is that the two biggest glitter manufacturers in the

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Speaker 1: United States, who are both in New Jersey, are named

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Speaker 1: glitter X and Meadowbrook, and they are in credibly cartoonishly

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Speaker 1: secretive about their customer base. They will tell you it

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Speaker 1: is common knowledge that there is one industry or one

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Speaker 1: genre of industry that is by far the largest consumer

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Speaker 1: of glitter in the US, but they will not These

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Speaker 1: companies will absolutely not reveal who that is. Um. We

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Speaker 1: received a lot of correspondence to this in the show.

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Speaker 1: H A lot of people were writing to me about this,

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Speaker 1: and I think what was beautiful As we're all kind

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Speaker 1: of collaborating together to figure this out. I want to

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Speaker 1: shout out one place in particular, the podcast Endless Thread.

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Speaker 1: Have you guys heard of Endless Thread. It's a great show.

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Speaker 1: No I like to name them, so go good. Uh So,

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Speaker 1: Endless threaded an episode on the glitter mystery as well.

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Speaker 1: What is it that Big Glitter does want us to know?

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Speaker 1: And several of our listeners have forwarded this to me

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Speaker 1: and I had I had listened to it in doing

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Speaker 1: some research for our our glitter episode. But I and

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Speaker 1: I say this with absolute affection. Endless Threat is an

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Speaker 1: awesome show, but I just in this case happened to

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Speaker 1: not be a persuaded that they had found the answer. Um,

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Speaker 1: if you are okay with spoilers, give you a spoiler

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Speaker 1: warning three to one. Uh. Their episode ends concluding that

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Speaker 1: this is the main genre of industry for glitter is

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Speaker 1: boat paint uh, and they make an okay case for it. Honestly, again,

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Speaker 1: they do very good work. I just I personally wasn't persuaded,

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Speaker 1: and I get the feeling Matt Knowl that none of

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Speaker 1: us were persuaded in our own episode that boat paint

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Speaker 1: could be the answer. Is that on base talk about

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Speaker 1: paint candy paint, you know, for like kind of hot

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Speaker 1: rods and stuff that sparkly kind of you know, the

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Speaker 1: kind of things you see on bumper cars at amusement parks.

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Speaker 1: We did talk about both paint pretty briefly because we

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Speaker 1: got more uh. I think we we got deeper into

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Speaker 1: the idea of micro tagg ins and UH commercial and

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Speaker 1: military explosives. But with that being said, Endless Thread they

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Speaker 1: felt pretty secure and sane that they thought the primary

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Speaker 1: consumer of glitter, the big conspiracy of glitter was that

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Speaker 1: they were selling boat paint and and there's some good

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Speaker 1: arguments for that. There's some good evidence like the idea

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Speaker 1: that you know, any water craft, any maritime craft is

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Speaker 1: it's absolutely brutal when it comes to maintenance. And so

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Speaker 1: maybe there are huge cruise ships that have to uh

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Speaker 1: constantly be repainted or apply new paint for wear and tear,

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Speaker 1: and maybe that stuff's leading in the ocean and they

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Speaker 1: would rather families not think about that when they're going

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Speaker 1: on a cruise. Like that's understandable. But Sparkles, yeahs, Sparkles,

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Speaker 1: the tooth fairy gave us uh something much. I don't know.

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Speaker 1: Let me let let me just read this. We'll see

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Speaker 1: what we think. We'll stop any time along the way.

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Speaker 1: All right, Hey guys, So I work in regulatory and

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Speaker 1: have worked for government contractor company and can give you

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Speaker 1: some insight into how glitter was making its way into

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Speaker 1: their hands. Number One, the government and military are the

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Speaker 1: majority of consumers military planes, ships, drones, weapons, tent and

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Speaker 1: building covers. They all purchased specific and patented glitter to

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Speaker 1: mix into their paints. For counter intelligence, they have developed

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Speaker 1: certain glitters that, when suspended in a paint or coding

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Speaker 1: form specific change to either scramble receivers, trackers, and satellites

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Speaker 1: or entirely disappear in the sky from photographs by blending

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Speaker 1: into their surroundings some form specific chains. It will also

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Speaker 1: form mirror like properties to invade other governments. It's wild.

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Speaker 1: What do you just answer our question? Maybe not explosives,

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Speaker 1: but that is fabulous. It reminds me of dazzle camo,

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Speaker 1: like an old school kind of way of ships like destroyers.

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Speaker 1: They're kind of painting with these like zebra stripe kind

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Speaker 1: of things that were sort of like not fully aligned

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Speaker 1: and it was just a very analog cloaking device essentially,

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Speaker 1: like they essentially just blend into the horizon because of

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Speaker 1: these uh you know kind of stripes. What do zebras do? Right?

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Speaker 1: And also human beings do have stripes, they're just not

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Speaker 1: as visible. Checkout stuff you should know short stuff on that.

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Speaker 1: I think it just came out recently, but it's it's wild. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: this is the claim by someone who worked in regular

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Speaker 1: Asian and also gave us some other info that we're

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Speaker 1: not shared on here. Well, it also reminds me of

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Speaker 1: like heat shimmers and the idea of mirages you know

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Speaker 1: where like certain things can reflect off of things in

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Speaker 1: the desert and you know, create these kind of like

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Speaker 1: optical illusions. It's just a kind of human way of

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Speaker 1: harnessing that and it really, you know, it's very similar

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Speaker 1: to the dams. And also, like I imagine there would

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Speaker 1: be different areas that maybe have different types of glitter

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Speaker 1: and when you combine them, they sort of create this

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Speaker 1: sort of like greater than the some of their parts effect. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: like microbes and fun guy, so in your mouth just

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Speaker 1: so check check out the Strangen segment from earlier. Uh.

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Speaker 1: Next point that Sparkles races to working in regulatory I

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Speaker 1: can tell you that compostable glitter is made mostly with

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Speaker 1: a p l A plastic that can degrade, but is

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Speaker 1: expensive and can only be used with certain colors. Plus,

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Speaker 1: I could amia is finding out that p l A

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Speaker 1: actually degrades into micro plastic stock. Can we get a

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Speaker 1: whamp wamp where it is so compostable glitter may not

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Speaker 1: be in the market much longer. And Sparkles has linked

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Speaker 1: to UH some some interesting information about that third point.

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Speaker 1: This is something we talked about as well. Cosmetics and

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Speaker 1: personal care use specific metallics that do not harm your

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Speaker 1: skin in certain uses. Metallics and glitter used near the

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Speaker 1: eye or glitters rather have to be a specific shape,

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Speaker 1: while mica is put into I creams and face creams

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Speaker 1: to give you that glow where it tricks you into

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Speaker 1: thinking your skin is glowing when it's light reflecting. So

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Speaker 1: we've got confirmation about glitter and makeup, which I think

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Speaker 1: we all think that was pretty public knowledge too. But

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Speaker 1: what about this next one? This is a doozy number. Four.

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Speaker 1: Mica is also approved to be put into food and

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Speaker 1: is often found used as a whitener to make bread

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Speaker 1: appear brighter. It is in so many foods you would

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Speaker 1: never think of pasta, cheese, bread, cookies, marshmallows, etcetera. And

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Speaker 1: mica is that silvery kind of almost shell like looking

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Speaker 1: stuff that you see occurring naturally and sentiments and rocks. Right, yeah,

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Speaker 1: we kind of got to me, you know what I mean, Like,

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Speaker 1: I'm not an expert on bread, but I like it

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Speaker 1: without you know, mica in it. But anyway, Sparkles ends

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Speaker 1: on saying five, all that shimmers isn't always gold. Best

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Speaker 1: Sparkles the tooth fairy. So what do you guys think

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Speaker 1: this sounds? Like someone who is speaking with insider information. Yes,

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Speaker 1: we were definitely locking into the whole proprietary angle of it, uh,

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Speaker 1: in terms of the explosives, in terms of using it

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Speaker 1: to track explosives. I think this seems a little less

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Speaker 1: far fetched and the proprietary thing still holds true because

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Speaker 1: you know these combinations. I mean, it's sort of like

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Speaker 1: having a very specific mix of of colors to make

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Speaker 1: a proprietary paint that you can copyright or trademark, or

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Speaker 1: like a glaze if you're a potter or something. A

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Speaker 1: lot of potters bread and butter is literally having a

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Speaker 1: very unique combination of materials that creates a certain glaze

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Speaker 1: that anyone can't just copy because they and they won't

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Speaker 1: make it, you know public. This really rings true to me.

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Speaker 1: I think this whole message is a cipher. I think

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Speaker 1: all we need to know about this message and what

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Speaker 1: this person is trying to say is in the name

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Speaker 1: uh okay, identificius of some sort. Yes, yes, it's something

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Speaker 1: with a tooth, fairy, something that sparkles. This is a

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Speaker 1: secret coded message. Guys. Uh, you know what, I will

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Speaker 1: play your reindeer games or these dental games. In this case,

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Speaker 1: I U there's a lot. I know, there's a lot

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Speaker 1: of material science that go was into dentistry. Um And

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Speaker 1: I guess you know what we could do is if

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Speaker 1: we did some quick cocktail napkin math, then all we

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Speaker 1: would need to do is get the the current population

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Speaker 1: of the United States and then multiply that by the

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Speaker 1: average number of teeth that people have, and then account for,

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Speaker 1: you know, people who can regularly see a dentist. I

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Speaker 1: think I'm going in the wrong rabbit hole. I think

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Speaker 1: I think I'm in the wrong rabbit hole. Guys. But

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Speaker 1: I like, I like the idea. It's just so weird.

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Speaker 1: I mean, I've got so many responses, people reaching out

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Speaker 1: directly with with their guesses, um, and I just don't

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Speaker 1: feel like I feel like they are really good points

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Speaker 1: to the boat paint or the boating industry paint argument.

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Speaker 1: But I the military spends so much money and it's

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Speaker 1: so huge, and it would all so need boat paint.

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Speaker 1: So I don't know. I'm more persuaded by sparkles unless,

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Speaker 1: as you said, Matt, it is a cipher and the

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Speaker 1: real message is to watch out for sparkly teeth. Yeah. Man,

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Speaker 1: uh so it sounds like we're we're persuaded here. I

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Speaker 1: want to hear your take, folks, especially if you like sparkles,

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Speaker 1: are able to confirm your firsthand familiarity with this sort

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Speaker 1: of stuff. Uh. And also I would love it right

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Speaker 1: to the show or you can always you know, hit

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Speaker 1: me up direct land social media. Let us know what

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Speaker 1: other seemingly wholesome industries have a dark side about them,

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Speaker 1: cover up a bit of stuff they don't want you

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Speaker 1: to know while you're while you're thinking through that, uh,

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Speaker 1: why not join us for a break for we're from

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Speaker 1: our sponsors and we'll be back with more messages from

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Speaker 1: you and we're back and uh, I think we've all

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Speaker 1: been super fascinated by both the chess cheating scandal, which

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Speaker 1: I did see. Ben, you pointed out there was a

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Speaker 1: paper or like a pdf that was released that was

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Speaker 1: quite in depth, um analyzing that this guy, Hans Niemen,

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Speaker 1: this chess master uh in question, has likely cheated and

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Speaker 1: online matches more than a hundred times. UM. So that

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Speaker 1: was interesting. UM. But I did get a direct message

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Speaker 1: on Instagram from someone would like to be referred to

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Speaker 1: as Curveball, giving us a little bit more details surrounding

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Speaker 1: the phishing scandal that we recently discussed where a two

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Speaker 1: person team was discovered to have been loading their fish

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Speaker 1: with weights and and uh pre cut or store pot

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Speaker 1: fish file AT's with that that that one just keeps

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Speaker 1: cracking me up because like, what do they think was

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Speaker 1: gonna happen? Like, why why did it? Why does it

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Speaker 1: even have to be fish Filet's like if someone was

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Speaker 1: going to open it up and be like, oh, it's look,

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Speaker 1: it's it's the same thing, it's the same material, It's fine,

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Speaker 1: and then pairing them with the weights. It's just comical.

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Speaker 1: But UM had a couple of really interesting points from curveball.

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Speaker 1: The first of which is a referee. I think I

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Speaker 1: asked this question in the segment at a fishing tournament

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Speaker 1: is a way master. So that's literally the person that's like,

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Speaker 1: you know, the assigning the official results by weighing the halls. UM.

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Speaker 1: And then we mentioned the idea of polygraph tests being

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Speaker 1: used in fishing, and I think I was a little

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Speaker 1: bit broad and I don't think I fully understood how

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Speaker 1: that was UM integrated into the proceedings, and we got

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Speaker 1: some really good detail around that and several other things.

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Speaker 1: So curveball rights cheating at tournaments is more common. The

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Speaker 1: general public is a care off. My dad is a

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Speaker 1: pro king mackerel tournament fish urban I won Junior Angler

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Speaker 1: of the year on the circuit more than anyone else

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Speaker 1: last I checked. Polygraphs are only done when someone protests

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Speaker 1: the wind. The most common thing people do to cheat

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Speaker 1: is take bait fish and make it look like it's

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Speaker 1: been chewed up, then shove it down the throat and

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Speaker 1: use something to push it down. It can be done

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Speaker 1: when the fish is still partially alive and it will

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Speaker 1: start to digest it if it doesn't throw it up. You. Uh,

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Speaker 1: we didn't cheat. We didn't cheat when I fish with

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Speaker 1: my dad, but it definitely happens. Putting weights in a

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Speaker 1: fish is not smart, as usually the fish are gutted

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Speaker 1: after weighing, or at the very least, all the fish

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Speaker 1: are sold or donated to local charities and will be

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Speaker 1: fil aid so the cheater will be discovered. Also, those

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Speaker 1: weights are standard weights used on fishing rigs, commonly referred

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Speaker 1: to as an egg sinker. Um. So that's yeah, I

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Speaker 1: mean all of that stuff sense, but it really calls

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Speaker 1: into question how these guys got away with it for

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Speaker 1: so long. Um, And if if they had gotten away

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Speaker 1: with it for so long to the point where it

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Speaker 1: made them kind of comfortable, and then they maybe just

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Speaker 1: like pushed it to the next level, uh with adding

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Speaker 1: the weights in, because it's a good point, like something's

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Speaker 1: gonna happen to the fish that they give them back

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Speaker 1: to you if it's out of your hands, eventually someone's

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Speaker 1: gonna go digging around in there and find things that

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Speaker 1: don't belong. But obviously this didn't happen for some time

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Speaker 1: because these two folks that we're talking about, whose names

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Speaker 1: are escaping me at the moment, had one many of

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Speaker 1: these types of tournaments um and and hauled in quite

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Speaker 1: a lot of fish and a lot of prize money.

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Speaker 1: I think it was in the hundreds of thousands of

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Speaker 1: dollars um the first time, right, that is their claim.

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Speaker 1: But that's the problem, right. I Mean, it's the same

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Speaker 1: thing with the with the chess cheating, where when someone

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Speaker 1: is discovered, it calls into question everything they've done in

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Speaker 1: the past. And if you go back and look for patterns,

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Speaker 1: like they did with the chest cheating, you start to

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Speaker 1: find them. Um, you know it's it's it's when you're

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Speaker 1: caught the first time it's usually not the first time.

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Speaker 1: It's usually after you've kind of gotten a little bit sloppy, right.

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Speaker 1: That's a hard thing to maintain, you know what I mean.

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Speaker 1: It's like if you were a cop and you pulled

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Speaker 1: someone over for speeding and they said, I'm sorry, you

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Speaker 1: got me. It's my first time speeding, even though I've

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Speaker 1: driven a car for years. You would need some extra proof,

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Speaker 1: like I would file. I would file this claim of

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Speaker 1: not cheating or cheating only once and getting caught. I

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Speaker 1: would file it under extraordinary claims, require extraordinary evidence. You

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Speaker 1: have to go through improve everything. I would say, you know, Curball.

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Speaker 1: One thing that's been on my mind here since we

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Speaker 1: originally cover that story is whether or not it's possible

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Speaker 1: that these guys knew the way masters in previous competitions.

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Speaker 1: Would it be possible for there to be collusion between

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Speaker 1: the authorities and the competitors. I don't know. I'm just

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Speaker 1: it's interesting because I don't know if that's a question

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Speaker 1: we asked last time we talked about this, What do

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Speaker 1: you guys think we did not make Uh, it's certainly

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Speaker 1: a reasonable question to ask, since you know, again, where

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Speaker 1: wherever there's money, there are deals to be cut and uh,

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Speaker 1: if someone's a sure thing, chances are they've got some

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Speaker 1: in with the way master or the referee or whatever

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Speaker 1: who are getting cut in. Um. But I can't imagine

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Speaker 1: that it would be the same person every time, so

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Speaker 1: it would be pretty hard to know who it's gonna be.

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Speaker 1: But maybe maybe I'm wrong, curb ball. Let us know

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Speaker 1: in these types of tournaments that are in the same

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Speaker 1: you know, parts of the state. Uh, is it going

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Speaker 1: to be the same person that's uh that's weighing the

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Speaker 1: fish every time? And you know, it'll be interesting to

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Speaker 1: see if any collusion is uncovered because obviously now there

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Speaker 1: is an investigation and one people start sniffing around, you know,

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Speaker 1: these kinds of connections start to reveal themselves. Yeah, I

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Speaker 1: mean this is this is the thing. Okay, this is

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Speaker 1: gonna sound like a weird stories. So one of my

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Speaker 1: old grade school friends had, I guess, one of those

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Speaker 1: sudden changes in life situations, and he relocated to Colorado

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Speaker 1: where he is a professional uh fisherman I think a

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Speaker 1: professional like competitive fisherman uh and travels around doing this

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Speaker 1: And I actually wrote to him to ask about this.

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Speaker 1: So I'm gonna be talking with him, I think later

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Speaker 1: over the over the weekend. Well, you have to understand, uh,

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Speaker 1: present company excluded. The vast majority of my friends are

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Speaker 1: very very strange people. So I will send you guys, Hey,

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Speaker 1: we're strange people don't want to be excluded. Okay, did

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Speaker 1: you guys are up? Word to? Uh? What I'll do

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Speaker 1: is on a group chat. I will just I'll drop

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Speaker 1: you guys a line before uh, not a fish joke.

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Speaker 1: I'll drop you guys a line before we meet, and

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Speaker 1: then I'll will like buddy system and now if you

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Speaker 1: don't hear from me, seek the fisherman. But it is, Uh,

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Speaker 1: the cool thing is, this is such an uber competitive thing.

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Speaker 1: And I know I can't speak for everybody on the show,

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Speaker 1: but I know I was definitely not super aware of

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Speaker 1: almost anything. Like I know how to fish, I have fish,

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Speaker 1: but I I have no idea how competitive fishing works.

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Speaker 1: What about you guys? My buddy Nick is a competitive

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Speaker 1: fisher up in Augusta or over in Augusta? Is it

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Speaker 1: over in Augusta? Okay? But yeah, I know a little

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Speaker 1: bit from him, uh, and it's it seems super super cool.

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Speaker 1: A lot of the um oh man, he would he

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Speaker 1: would correct me, and I would probably be wrong. I

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Speaker 1: I thought that some of the tournaments were catching release,

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Speaker 1: so you catch a fish, you can get it weighed

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Speaker 1: and then you release it or you report self report,

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Speaker 1: and some of them, I don't know how it functions.

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Speaker 1: Never mind, I don't know anything. No, No, let's go

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Speaker 1: with this because I've got an idea. Let's just extend

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Speaker 1: some empathy to what what if there is one fish

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Speaker 1: that has been continually caught an annual catch and release

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Speaker 1: competitions and it is somehow just accepted that it is

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Speaker 1: abducted once a year. Right, Maybe that's what's happening with

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Speaker 1: UFO abductees. People feel like they've been abducted multiple times.

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Speaker 1: Maybe it's like a competitive fishing thing for extra terrestrials.

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Speaker 1: I think I'm solving the wrong problem here. Sorry, you're

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Speaker 1: You're right, Matt. It depends on the area or the

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Speaker 1: state laws you know, in the d n d n

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Speaker 1: R or whatever. But in Georgia it does appear that

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Speaker 1: most bass turnament and anyway are catching release. And um,

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Speaker 1: I've got a friend who lives in Savannah who fishes

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Speaker 1: a lot, and I'm always confused when he's like showing

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Speaker 1: off fishes, fish fishes, fish that he caught and then

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Speaker 1: he's releasing them, but then sometimes he keeps them. I

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Speaker 1: think when you have a fishing license, you're supposed to

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Speaker 1: report how many you keep or something, and if you

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Speaker 1: catch and release them, then that doesn't enter into your quota.

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Speaker 1: Perhaps I'm not sure. I mean, surely over fishing is

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Speaker 1: something to be considered. So you can't just fish willy

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Speaker 1: nilly and just keep them all. I would think there

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Speaker 1: would be some rules around that. My son wants to

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Speaker 1: start fishing, which is really exciting to me, and I've

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Speaker 1: never caught a fish before in my life, so, oh,

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Speaker 1: you canna see what happens. You're gonna have fun when

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Speaker 1: you catch your first fish and you can totally do

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Speaker 1: the catch a release thing. You know, there's absolutely nothing

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Speaker 1: wrong with it. I would say for children, uh, learning

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Speaker 1: to fish is like a great way to explore uh

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Speaker 1: quiet focus. That's definitely something that could be uh at

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Speaker 1: least it was challenging to me all those many there's

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Speaker 1: many moons to go. When I was learning to fish,

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Speaker 1: I was like, does this just mean you you sit

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Speaker 1: by your dad's friends as they drink in silence on

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Speaker 1: a boat that's what I understood it. Yeah, yeah, it'll

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Speaker 1: just be me getting drunk on a boat and my

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Speaker 1: son just they're being quiet. I'll get too drunk. You

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Speaker 1: gotta pilot the boat back to you don't want to

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Speaker 1: be marooned. Yeah, I'm only joking. I would never do that.

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Speaker 1: My uncle is a is an outdoorsman, and I went

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Speaker 1: fishing with him once when I was like probably seven,

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Speaker 1: and there's a picture of me holding a tiny little

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Speaker 1: fish that I got and it was very very pathetic.

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Speaker 1: But I do remember that, and I remember at the

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Speaker 1: time even he had all the newest bells and whistles

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Speaker 1: and like, you know things that could almost like GPS

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Speaker 1: type things that could you know, plumb the depths on

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Speaker 1: a little screen kind of show you a little bogies

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Speaker 1: and whatnot. Well, this one could be a quick one

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Speaker 1: because we are still waiting for kind of updates on

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Speaker 1: the story. UM. But thank you curb all for the

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00:25:10,960 --> 00:25:15,119
Speaker 1: inside uh scoop on on fishing, um and in tournaments

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Speaker 1: and uh and the polygraph thing is very interting. That

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Speaker 1: makes sense that it would only be instituted if there

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Speaker 1: was you know, someone protested. Yeah, I agree, but then

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Speaker 1: you know, I've been talking about this a lot with friends,

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Speaker 1: and I was at a party the other night and

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Speaker 1: this came up. I overheard some people talking about the

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Speaker 1: fishing things. I literally heard someone say we got weights.

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Speaker 1: They were quoting the video, you know, where people were

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Speaker 1: like losing their mind and like it was almost like

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Speaker 1: a lynch mob was assembly um. But the question came up,

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Speaker 1: what do you ask them in the polygraph? Like just

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Speaker 1: is it just as simple as like did you cheat?

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Speaker 1: Like what what do you think ben? Knowing what you

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Speaker 1: know about the procedure again, highly fallible procedure of polygraphs,

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Speaker 1: what kind of line of questioning do you think a

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Speaker 1: protested fishing um the situation would well, yeah, let's crowdsource this,

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Speaker 1: so for let's think tank it. So there are a

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Speaker 1: lot of hilarious answers, but the first thing is, yes,

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Speaker 1: I'm really glad you pointed out polygraphs are at best

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Speaker 1: an assessment tool and it worse their junk science. So

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Speaker 1: what you would want to do, if you can, if

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Speaker 1: you're administering it in a legit way, is you want

428
00:26:25,400 --> 00:26:28,920
Speaker 1: to ask what are called baseline questions, and that will

429
00:26:28,960 --> 00:26:32,720
Speaker 1: show you what a person's natural state is, you know,

430
00:26:32,800 --> 00:26:35,800
Speaker 1: like their heart rate, other signals, and so on. So

431
00:26:35,880 --> 00:26:39,480
Speaker 1: you would ask them stuff that everybody in the conversation

432
00:26:39,520 --> 00:26:42,679
Speaker 1: already knows the answer to, what's your name? Right? Is

433
00:26:42,680 --> 00:26:44,840
Speaker 1: it true you live at blah blah blah blah blah?

434
00:26:45,080 --> 00:26:48,480
Speaker 1: And then you would start amplifying that a little bit.

435
00:26:48,520 --> 00:26:52,040
Speaker 1: Once you've got the baseline, then you would start asking

436
00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:55,880
Speaker 1: them things that they would have to confirm to be untrue, right,

437
00:26:56,080 --> 00:27:00,640
Speaker 1: like um, you would say, uh, is it that you're

438
00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:04,320
Speaker 1: from New York And they might say no, I'm from Kentucky.

439
00:27:04,600 --> 00:27:07,000
Speaker 1: And then you see how they react to that kind

440
00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:10,280
Speaker 1: of stuff. So once you have this is my understanding

441
00:27:10,280 --> 00:27:14,560
Speaker 1: of this, I am not a professional polygraph administrator. Administrator.

442
00:27:15,000 --> 00:27:16,719
Speaker 1: If you are in the audience, please write to us.

443
00:27:16,720 --> 00:27:19,680
Speaker 1: We'd love to hear your experience. But after that, I think,

444
00:27:19,720 --> 00:27:23,119
Speaker 1: after you somehow established that baseline, you move to those

445
00:27:23,200 --> 00:27:26,640
Speaker 1: questions that might be cheating. So you want to see

446
00:27:26,640 --> 00:27:30,280
Speaker 1: how they react to stuff like, um, how much did

447
00:27:30,560 --> 00:27:35,480
Speaker 1: each fish you caught? Way, like each fish you caught today? Well,

448
00:27:35,520 --> 00:27:38,119
Speaker 1: how many fish did you catch? Right? And then you

449
00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:42,040
Speaker 1: start it's similar to um an interrogation, you asked the

450
00:27:42,080 --> 00:27:46,040
Speaker 1: same question phrase different ways and see if they trip up.

451
00:27:46,480 --> 00:27:48,680
Speaker 1: Does that make sense? We could try it, we could

452
00:27:48,680 --> 00:27:51,160
Speaker 1: polygraph each other. No, it totally, it totally makes sense.

453
00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:53,399
Speaker 1: And that's you know, I knew the answer would probably

454
00:27:53,440 --> 00:27:56,600
Speaker 1: be pretty unremarkable. Um, you have the baseline obviously is

455
00:27:56,720 --> 00:27:58,400
Speaker 1: very important, and then it would just have to be

456
00:27:59,040 --> 00:28:02,120
Speaker 1: something very pacific. You know, no one's gonna know exactly

457
00:28:02,119 --> 00:28:04,040
Speaker 1: what their fish are going to weigh, so it had

458
00:28:04,080 --> 00:28:08,080
Speaker 1: to be something like did you stuff your fish or

459
00:28:08,119 --> 00:28:11,119
Speaker 1: did you did you you know, throw these fish in?

460
00:28:11,200 --> 00:28:14,000
Speaker 1: Did you use cheat bait or whatever it might be.

461
00:28:14,640 --> 00:28:16,600
Speaker 1: I always remember the episode of King of the Hill

462
00:28:16,680 --> 00:28:21,480
Speaker 1: where Hank Hill, you know, accidentally was using crack as

463
00:28:21,720 --> 00:28:24,520
Speaker 1: as fish bait and then he was super you know,

464
00:28:24,680 --> 00:28:27,440
Speaker 1: it was very successful, and then he ended up having

465
00:28:27,480 --> 00:28:30,280
Speaker 1: to uh, I think he ended up getting caught with

466
00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:33,280
Speaker 1: with crack and then he had to repair before a judge,

467
00:28:33,280 --> 00:28:35,119
Speaker 1: and then he had to convince the judge that he

468
00:28:35,200 --> 00:28:38,000
Speaker 1: was actually believed that he was using it for bait.

469
00:28:38,080 --> 00:28:39,920
Speaker 1: And then in order to do that, the judge, being

470
00:28:39,960 --> 00:28:42,480
Speaker 1: one of those kind of outside the box judge thinkers,

471
00:28:42,760 --> 00:28:44,480
Speaker 1: that he took him out on the boat and showed

472
00:28:44,520 --> 00:28:46,520
Speaker 1: him that it worked. And that's that's then he's like, okay,

473
00:28:46,640 --> 00:28:50,600
Speaker 1: but Mr Show has one of the best, uh polygraph

474
00:28:50,720 --> 00:28:53,800
Speaker 1: sketches to those guys are great, that's a fun one,

475
00:28:54,000 --> 00:28:56,680
Speaker 1: you know what? Uh, Noel, maybe the good question to

476
00:28:56,720 --> 00:29:00,040
Speaker 1: ask would be how much did the fish way and

477
00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:04,000
Speaker 1: you caught it? How much would you guess? And then

478
00:29:04,080 --> 00:29:06,440
Speaker 1: they would like, I don't know that. You don't want

479
00:29:06,480 --> 00:29:08,960
Speaker 1: to ask people to guess stuff that goes against it.

480
00:29:09,040 --> 00:29:11,080
Speaker 1: I don't know, It's just it's a way to fish people.

481
00:29:11,080 --> 00:29:13,360
Speaker 1: But how about are you a lying son of a gun?

482
00:29:13,800 --> 00:29:16,280
Speaker 1: You know? That could be a how many weights do

483
00:29:16,320 --> 00:29:19,160
Speaker 1: you usually put in fish? How many did you put

484
00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:23,120
Speaker 1: in today? Right? Yeah? And also like you know a

485
00:29:23,120 --> 00:29:25,760
Speaker 1: lot of these uh these tournaments take place in kind

486
00:29:25,760 --> 00:29:27,760
Speaker 1: of rural parts of the country, Like where do you

487
00:29:28,040 --> 00:29:31,720
Speaker 1: get you a professional polygraph person? You know, on on

488
00:29:31,720 --> 00:29:35,320
Speaker 1: on gun demand? You'd be surprised. I mean. And also

489
00:29:36,160 --> 00:29:38,560
Speaker 1: do they just are they just calling them? Are they

490
00:29:38,600 --> 00:29:42,040
Speaker 1: a self appointed polygraph expert? Is it just like Dwayne,

491
00:29:42,200 --> 00:29:47,400
Speaker 1: Dwayne's got a polygraph someone called Dwayne get him up here. Yeah,

492
00:29:46,800 --> 00:29:51,440
Speaker 1: that's a new thing. Uh, this is this is gonna happen.

493
00:29:51,600 --> 00:29:54,480
Speaker 1: We need this. This is like I'm gonna start a

494
00:29:54,480 --> 00:29:58,600
Speaker 1: business we're hiring. We're gonna do polygraph tests of fishing

495
00:29:58,920 --> 00:30:02,480
Speaker 1: tournaments all across the country. Let's do it traveling kind

496
00:30:02,480 --> 00:30:06,040
Speaker 1: of you know, salesman style. I like that. UM, let's

497
00:30:06,320 --> 00:30:10,360
Speaker 1: let's um throw this one back, released this one into

498
00:30:10,400 --> 00:30:13,600
Speaker 1: the wild for now, and UM take a quick break

499
00:30:13,640 --> 00:30:15,160
Speaker 1: and here we're from our sponsor, and then come back

500
00:30:15,160 --> 00:30:24,680
Speaker 1: with one more piece of listener mail and we're back.

501
00:30:25,120 --> 00:30:28,600
Speaker 1: We're gonna jump to some correspondence we've received after we

502
00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:32,880
Speaker 1: discussed shot spot or the exciting law enforcement technology that

503
00:30:32,960 --> 00:30:37,720
Speaker 1: puts microphones all across the city and then pinpoints gun

504
00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:41,200
Speaker 1: shots really within a square mile a certain square mile

505
00:30:41,800 --> 00:30:45,360
Speaker 1: of a city. It's it's on a per square mile basis.

506
00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:47,520
Speaker 1: That's how you buy shot spot Ter tech and get

507
00:30:47,520 --> 00:30:50,360
Speaker 1: it installed and get it working. So let's jump right

508
00:30:50,360 --> 00:30:54,720
Speaker 1: into it. We've got a fairly lengthy email from someone

509
00:30:54,800 --> 00:30:58,240
Speaker 1: who has some experience with the technology, and I'm gonna

510
00:30:58,280 --> 00:31:01,480
Speaker 1: start going through this and then we can and just

511
00:31:01,640 --> 00:31:04,680
Speaker 1: I guess, stop me when we want to talk about it.

512
00:31:04,720 --> 00:31:06,640
Speaker 1: Otherwise I'm just gonna barrel through it because it is

513
00:31:06,640 --> 00:31:11,320
Speaker 1: pretty long. Okay, here we go. Greetings, gentle beings. I

514
00:31:11,400 --> 00:31:14,480
Speaker 1: just finished listening to your listener mail segment on shot Spotter,

515
00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:17,200
Speaker 1: and I thought it would give a little feedback and

516
00:31:17,240 --> 00:31:20,000
Speaker 1: perhaps a channel for potential questions I may be able

517
00:31:20,080 --> 00:31:23,160
Speaker 1: to field as an end user of this system. I

518
00:31:23,160 --> 00:31:25,920
Speaker 1: am a law enforcement officer in New York State, and

519
00:31:25,960 --> 00:31:29,520
Speaker 1: the city in which I work has recently joined shot Spotter.

520
00:31:30,280 --> 00:31:33,480
Speaker 1: For the purposes of this correspondence, law enforcement officer will

521
00:31:33,520 --> 00:31:37,560
Speaker 1: refer to road patrol level law enforcement, the basic street cop,

522
00:31:37,640 --> 00:31:40,440
Speaker 1: which is where all my experience is, as it would

523
00:31:40,440 --> 00:31:43,120
Speaker 1: be naive to pretend the systems used by street cops

524
00:31:43,400 --> 00:31:47,600
Speaker 1: don't potentially have functions not known to us, but maybe

525
00:31:47,640 --> 00:31:51,000
Speaker 1: known by the top level or by the source company.

526
00:31:51,120 --> 00:31:53,680
Speaker 1: For the roughly six years I've been working with shot

527
00:31:53,720 --> 00:31:57,160
Speaker 1: Spotter directly, it is far less scary from a privacy

528
00:31:57,200 --> 00:32:01,880
Speaker 1: perspective as far as law enforcement officer handling goes. Obviously,

529
00:32:02,000 --> 00:32:04,720
Speaker 1: I cannot speak to the company's integrity and handling of

530
00:32:04,720 --> 00:32:08,760
Speaker 1: the recording data because that is outside my scope in

531
00:32:08,840 --> 00:32:12,080
Speaker 1: our city somewhere in New York State, shot Spotter was

532
00:32:12,120 --> 00:32:15,720
Speaker 1: installed only in areas in which gun violence was already prevalent,

533
00:32:15,960 --> 00:32:18,960
Speaker 1: and does not have citywide coverage. As a matter of

534
00:32:19,000 --> 00:32:23,040
Speaker 1: transparency and honesty. The quote map lines for the coverage

535
00:32:23,160 --> 00:32:26,840
Speaker 1: do not follow apparent racial divides within the city directly,

536
00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:30,240
Speaker 1: though the higher wealth areas of the city mostly do

537
00:32:30,400 --> 00:32:34,440
Speaker 1: not have coverage, but also have a far lower prevalence

538
00:32:34,520 --> 00:32:38,520
Speaker 1: of gun violence, obviously a whole separate issue in and

539
00:32:38,560 --> 00:32:42,320
Speaker 1: of itself. I mean, that's super reasonable. It makes sense

540
00:32:42,360 --> 00:32:45,800
Speaker 1: because they're not going to have an infinite budget, and

541
00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:50,760
Speaker 1: as we talked about in our book launch earlier, it's

542
00:32:50,800 --> 00:32:55,440
Speaker 1: pretty expensive to institute this. So I guess it's not surprising,

543
00:32:55,520 --> 00:32:58,560
Speaker 1: right that there would not be citywide coverage. You need

544
00:32:58,600 --> 00:33:01,600
Speaker 1: to sort of triage and ortized stuff. Yeah, just as

545
00:33:01,640 --> 00:33:04,760
Speaker 1: a reminder, it is ten thousand dollars per square mile

546
00:33:04,880 --> 00:33:08,400
Speaker 1: to install the technology, all the microphones, and then it

547
00:33:08,520 --> 00:33:12,960
Speaker 1: is upwards of sixty dollars per year after that to

548
00:33:13,120 --> 00:33:16,880
Speaker 1: run the system. And again that's phones they are, Matt,

549
00:33:17,480 --> 00:33:20,200
Speaker 1: I do not know, like parabolic type microphones like that

550
00:33:20,320 --> 00:33:23,520
Speaker 1: pick up things far away, or the idea of an

551
00:33:23,560 --> 00:33:25,680
Speaker 1: array is interesting, So I would imagine there maybe in

552
00:33:25,680 --> 00:33:29,240
Speaker 1: a cluster of three hundred and sixty degrees. I don't

553
00:33:30,040 --> 00:33:33,400
Speaker 1: I don't know specifically. I just know that they are

554
00:33:33,480 --> 00:33:37,080
Speaker 1: dense enough within that square mile, that anywhere a shot

555
00:33:37,120 --> 00:33:42,280
Speaker 1: is fired, numerous microphones will pick it up. That's really

556
00:33:42,360 --> 00:33:44,080
Speaker 1: just the whole point of it, as long as you

557
00:33:44,120 --> 00:33:47,400
Speaker 1: can triangulate. So guys, let's jump back in here. Law

558
00:33:47,520 --> 00:33:51,800
Speaker 1: enforcement officers cannot tap into microphone feeds and listen to

559
00:33:51,880 --> 00:33:54,760
Speaker 1: what is going on around them. So that's a huge point,

560
00:33:54,760 --> 00:33:59,480
Speaker 1: at least coming from a street level officer. They're saying

561
00:33:59,560 --> 00:34:03,160
Speaker 1: that you cannot just listen in to a microphone, which is,

562
00:34:03,600 --> 00:34:06,920
Speaker 1: you know, we'd have to take this law enforcement officer's

563
00:34:06,960 --> 00:34:09,640
Speaker 1: word for it, but that that is that is like

564
00:34:09,840 --> 00:34:13,919
Speaker 1: good to know if it is true. Um, And then

565
00:34:13,920 --> 00:34:18,880
Speaker 1: the email continues. If gunfire is detected, the system autonomously

566
00:34:19,080 --> 00:34:23,120
Speaker 1: alerts end users. There are web based and app based

567
00:34:23,160 --> 00:34:26,480
Speaker 1: interfaces which law enforcement officers and dispatchers have access to.

568
00:34:27,000 --> 00:34:30,799
Speaker 1: From my experiences, I've heard gunfire nearby for myself then

569
00:34:30,840 --> 00:34:34,800
Speaker 1: received the alert shortly after. The expediency of the alert

570
00:34:34,880 --> 00:34:37,640
Speaker 1: lends me to believe that it is not processed or

571
00:34:37,800 --> 00:34:41,960
Speaker 1: verified at least in the immediate by living, breathing persons.

572
00:34:42,680 --> 00:34:45,560
Speaker 1: The information conveyed by the system to law enforcement officers

573
00:34:45,680 --> 00:34:49,320
Speaker 1: is a longitude latitude coordinate with a pin on a map,

574
00:34:49,800 --> 00:34:53,280
Speaker 1: how many rounds were detected, a wave form of the detection,

575
00:34:53,680 --> 00:34:57,800
Speaker 1: and an audio snip, which is extremely concise, very short.

576
00:34:58,320 --> 00:35:01,840
Speaker 1: The benefit to the audio a snip comes while en route,

577
00:35:02,000 --> 00:35:04,120
Speaker 1: so I guess while you're on your way to whatever

578
00:35:04,160 --> 00:35:08,000
Speaker 1: that location is. As a patrol level officer vetting the

579
00:35:08,040 --> 00:35:11,239
Speaker 1: activation to determine if it was in fact gunfire and

580
00:35:11,320 --> 00:35:15,080
Speaker 1: not fireworks or a dumpster being dropped by waste management,

581
00:35:15,320 --> 00:35:19,400
Speaker 1: to determine if one labeled high capacity or automatic gunfire

582
00:35:19,719 --> 00:35:24,319
Speaker 1: maybe automatic, or if potentially you hear multiple shooters, and

583
00:35:24,480 --> 00:35:28,279
Speaker 1: if there is high caliber gunfire. Depending on the activation's

584
00:35:28,360 --> 00:35:31,759
Speaker 1: proximity to the sensors, you are sometimes able to determine

585
00:35:31,840 --> 00:35:35,960
Speaker 1: between a small caliber handgun or something much larger, or

586
00:35:36,000 --> 00:35:38,880
Speaker 1: if you have something distinct like a shotgun or rifle.

587
00:35:39,560 --> 00:35:43,160
Speaker 1: In no way can you precisely determine quote, Okay, I'll

588
00:35:43,200 --> 00:35:46,560
Speaker 1: be looking for a nine millimeter. It's more like, okay,

589
00:35:46,600 --> 00:35:49,160
Speaker 1: that was a p shooter or oh that's something that

590
00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:53,560
Speaker 1: can chew up my body armor. Again makes sense based

591
00:35:53,600 --> 00:35:58,600
Speaker 1: on what we know about the technology. Uh, this this

592
00:35:58,719 --> 00:36:00,839
Speaker 1: all tracks to me. I don't know about you, guys.

593
00:36:01,120 --> 00:36:04,520
Speaker 1: M yeah, I think this all makes sense. Um, it's

594
00:36:04,560 --> 00:36:08,440
Speaker 1: close to how it's described by spot shotter in all

595
00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:12,040
Speaker 1: of its documentation on his website. It's actually very close,

596
00:36:12,080 --> 00:36:15,120
Speaker 1: if not exactly the same thing. So let's let's continue

597
00:36:15,120 --> 00:36:18,359
Speaker 1: go and just see there any differences here, uh in

598
00:36:18,520 --> 00:36:21,960
Speaker 1: the personal experience and the message continues. When the system

599
00:36:22,000 --> 00:36:24,440
Speaker 1: was new to our city, the rate of activation for

600
00:36:24,480 --> 00:36:29,440
Speaker 1: fireworks and dropped dumpsters, even sometimes car crashes was relatively high.

601
00:36:29,800 --> 00:36:32,200
Speaker 1: Over the last few years, it seems to have become

602
00:36:32,520 --> 00:36:35,640
Speaker 1: much more accurate in separating that out as well as

603
00:36:35,680 --> 00:36:39,920
Speaker 1: improving the accuracy. Oh, here's where we get into the radius.

604
00:36:40,000 --> 00:36:43,680
Speaker 1: This is important. The radius, as you mentioned, is approximately

605
00:36:43,840 --> 00:36:48,040
Speaker 1: nine feet, but is frequently within ten to fifteen feet

606
00:36:48,239 --> 00:36:52,600
Speaker 1: depending on the proximity to microphones and sources of echo nearby.

607
00:36:52,800 --> 00:36:55,480
Speaker 1: The system frequently can tell if the shooter is moving

608
00:36:55,680 --> 00:36:58,600
Speaker 1: I think a drive by, and if different caliber guns

609
00:36:58,600 --> 00:37:02,000
Speaker 1: are being used, and can tell if there are multiple shooters.

610
00:37:02,520 --> 00:37:05,000
Speaker 1: The real perk to the system, at least from a

611
00:37:05,080 --> 00:37:09,480
Speaker 1: road patrol perspective, is the expediency of alert, which cuts

612
00:37:09,560 --> 00:37:12,399
Speaker 1: all the time out of someone calling into dispatch, then

613
00:37:12,440 --> 00:37:14,960
Speaker 1: dispatch typing you all out, and then relaying it to

614
00:37:15,080 --> 00:37:19,000
Speaker 1: us time matters with gunshot wounds. It's not like the

615
00:37:19,040 --> 00:37:22,279
Speaker 1: movies where you get shot and pal you're dead. I

616
00:37:22,320 --> 00:37:27,120
Speaker 1: have personally started for and arrived on scene two gunshot

617
00:37:27,160 --> 00:37:30,600
Speaker 1: wounds before someone on scene had finished giving the information

618
00:37:30,640 --> 00:37:33,799
Speaker 1: to dispatch, which is a great aid in triaging and

619
00:37:33,840 --> 00:37:38,080
Speaker 1: treating injuries. Shot Spotter is less useful for catching the

620
00:37:38,080 --> 00:37:41,920
Speaker 1: shooter at the scene, though does start mobilizing available units

621
00:37:41,920 --> 00:37:46,239
Speaker 1: sooner if suspect information starts being broadcast, which has led

622
00:37:46,280 --> 00:37:49,719
Speaker 1: to arrests. It is important to note that in New

623
00:37:49,800 --> 00:37:53,360
Speaker 1: York State, shot spotter as a piece of evidence holds

624
00:37:53,600 --> 00:38:00,120
Speaker 1: no actionable value. That's important, that's really important. Um, and

625
00:38:00,120 --> 00:38:02,520
Speaker 1: we're actually gonna get into that really quickly at the

626
00:38:02,600 --> 00:38:05,680
Speaker 1: end here, But keep that in your mind. In New

627
00:38:05,800 --> 00:38:09,160
Speaker 1: York State, shot spotter as a piece of evidence holds

628
00:38:09,280 --> 00:38:12,640
Speaker 1: no actionable value, similar to like the way that a

629
00:38:12,880 --> 00:38:17,279
Speaker 1: light detector would not be considered the best evidence in

630
00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:23,640
Speaker 1: some ways. But what he means by actionable is that this, uh,

631
00:38:23,960 --> 00:38:28,319
Speaker 1: this can't function as evidence of functions as a tool, right,

632
00:38:28,440 --> 00:38:33,919
Speaker 1: as a sensory as a sensory process to help save lives. Yeah,

633
00:38:34,000 --> 00:38:37,520
Speaker 1: oh yeah, I do like that. Our law enforcement officer

634
00:38:37,600 --> 00:38:40,840
Speaker 1: here is putting it in the helpful for triage mostly

635
00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:44,440
Speaker 1: right to save somebody who has been wounded well and

636
00:38:44,520 --> 00:38:48,400
Speaker 1: of course recovering ballistics, at least according to shot spotter.

637
00:38:48,960 --> 00:38:52,280
Speaker 1: So let's jump back in right here. Proximity to an activation,

638
00:38:52,320 --> 00:38:55,120
Speaker 1: along with other factors, but not by itself, can raise

639
00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:59,400
Speaker 1: our debor level d E b o u r level

640
00:39:00,120 --> 00:39:03,400
Speaker 1: DeVore being a court case governing police citizen interactions in

641
00:39:03,480 --> 00:39:05,680
Speaker 1: case you're not aware, good reading with a lot of

642
00:39:05,719 --> 00:39:08,480
Speaker 1: rabbit hole potential. Okay, we need to look at that, guys.

643
00:39:08,960 --> 00:39:13,360
Speaker 1: D E space bou r level. But it does not

644
00:39:13,480 --> 00:39:16,520
Speaker 1: provide grounds for charges. That's what he's he's kind of

645
00:39:16,560 --> 00:39:19,440
Speaker 1: explaining there. Further, you can't say like we've got you

646
00:39:19,480 --> 00:39:23,520
Speaker 1: on the shot spotter, yeah exactly. No, No, there's no

647
00:39:23,560 --> 00:39:28,120
Speaker 1: way to identify that person with that shot spotter audio.

648
00:39:28,680 --> 00:39:31,480
Speaker 1: So let's jump back in here. As was stated in

649
00:39:31,480 --> 00:39:34,040
Speaker 1: the segment, people frequently don't call police when they hear

650
00:39:34,080 --> 00:39:38,320
Speaker 1: gunfire for a myriad of reasons desensitization, fear of retaliation,

651
00:39:38,360 --> 00:39:41,080
Speaker 1: et cetera. One such reason could be because they are

652
00:39:41,120 --> 00:39:44,800
Speaker 1: dead or hiding. A common situation I run into is

653
00:39:44,840 --> 00:39:48,800
Speaker 1: the shot spotter activation, no calls from citizens on scene,

654
00:39:48,880 --> 00:39:52,040
Speaker 1: we find a car or a home riddled with bullet strikes,

655
00:39:52,280 --> 00:39:55,319
Speaker 1: with people hunkered down inside the house, afraid even to

656
00:39:55,360 --> 00:39:59,759
Speaker 1: go get their phone. That makes sense to me, of course. Yeah,

657
00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:02,719
Speaker 1: most people don't like being shot at. I don't think

658
00:40:02,719 --> 00:40:05,919
Speaker 1: that's a hot take. And and and you know, also when

659
00:40:05,920 --> 00:40:09,560
Speaker 1: you go to ground like that in a firearms situation,

660
00:40:10,320 --> 00:40:13,280
Speaker 1: your number one thing is going to be if I move,

661
00:40:13,360 --> 00:40:17,240
Speaker 1: if I expose myself, is it possible that whomever fired

662
00:40:17,239 --> 00:40:20,080
Speaker 1: at me is still out there just waiting to get

663
00:40:20,080 --> 00:40:21,920
Speaker 1: a beat on me, you know what I mean? Like

664
00:40:22,000 --> 00:40:25,560
Speaker 1: it's it's a terrifying thing. And that makes the response time,

665
00:40:25,800 --> 00:40:29,560
Speaker 1: the quick response times so important, right because a police

666
00:40:29,600 --> 00:40:32,799
Speaker 1: officer can show up well then even unless you've got

667
00:40:32,920 --> 00:40:34,600
Speaker 1: lights and sirens going, you may not know it's a

668
00:40:34,600 --> 00:40:38,680
Speaker 1: police officer, which is also a terrifying thing. Um, okay,

669
00:40:38,960 --> 00:40:41,359
Speaker 1: let's finish up right here, guys. In short, there are

670
00:40:41,400 --> 00:40:45,120
Speaker 1: justifiable concerns with who is listening in and where legal

671
00:40:45,160 --> 00:40:47,799
Speaker 1: lines are drawn with this type of technology. When you

672
00:40:47,840 --> 00:40:52,600
Speaker 1: mix a private entity with proprietary technology and public sector applications,

673
00:40:52,880 --> 00:40:56,440
Speaker 1: it's certainly can be alarming or scary, but it isn't

674
00:40:56,480 --> 00:40:59,680
Speaker 1: always nefarious. I have no knowledge of the nuts and

675
00:40:59,719 --> 00:41:02,640
Speaker 1: bolt workings of this technology, but this is my end

676
00:41:02,719 --> 00:41:06,480
Speaker 1: user experience with this system. If I can further clarify anything,

677
00:41:06,600 --> 00:41:08,520
Speaker 1: I would be happy to give it a go. Your

678
00:41:08,560 --> 00:41:12,480
Speaker 1: friendly neighborhood New York State law enforcement officer. That was helpful.

679
00:41:12,920 --> 00:41:18,160
Speaker 1: This has been a great episode of updates and insider information. Yeah,

680
00:41:18,440 --> 00:41:22,160
Speaker 1: let's let's unpack some of this. So with this last uh,

681
00:41:22,280 --> 00:41:26,520
Speaker 1: this last paragraph in particular, you know, I think M

682
00:41:26,680 --> 00:41:29,800
Speaker 1: Y s l e O. I think you're you're hitting

683
00:41:29,800 --> 00:41:33,239
Speaker 1: on something that is the primary concern for a lot

684
00:41:33,239 --> 00:41:38,040
Speaker 1: of people, a private entity with proprietary technology and public

685
00:41:38,080 --> 00:41:41,920
Speaker 1: sector applications. And one thing I really like about the

686
00:41:41,960 --> 00:41:47,120
Speaker 1: approach of this correspondence is it's very well structured. Here

687
00:41:47,160 --> 00:41:49,719
Speaker 1: the things I know I can speak to here are

688
00:41:49,719 --> 00:41:53,400
Speaker 1: the things that are, as you said, outside of my scope.

689
00:41:54,160 --> 00:41:56,840
Speaker 1: You may be interested to learn that a lot of

690
00:41:56,880 --> 00:42:01,360
Speaker 1: the privacy concerns that are being ray regarding shot Spotter

691
00:42:01,719 --> 00:42:06,000
Speaker 1: are exactly about that, a private entity with proprietary technology.

692
00:42:06,640 --> 00:42:09,560
Speaker 1: Another thing we have to point out is that UM

693
00:42:09,800 --> 00:42:16,680
Speaker 1: shot Spotter technology maybe uniform across every area, which it's deployed.

694
00:42:17,160 --> 00:42:22,799
Speaker 1: But those areas, those municipalities, towns and cities, they might,

695
00:42:23,280 --> 00:42:26,960
Speaker 1: uh they might not be using it in the correct way,

696
00:42:27,239 --> 00:42:30,440
Speaker 1: or you know, there may be a bad apple somewhere

697
00:42:30,600 --> 00:42:33,600
Speaker 1: in there. Does that make sense? Like it's a corrupt

698
00:42:33,760 --> 00:42:36,359
Speaker 1: It's like a point of sale thing. It's like any

699
00:42:36,440 --> 00:42:39,920
Speaker 1: kind of company that, like you know, sells things to

700
00:42:40,040 --> 00:42:43,279
Speaker 1: lots of different types of businesses across the country. Uh,

701
00:42:43,360 --> 00:42:45,040
Speaker 1: you have a rep and they come and they show

702
00:42:45,080 --> 00:42:46,759
Speaker 1: it to you and maybe they help you install it

703
00:42:46,800 --> 00:42:49,279
Speaker 1: and maybe help you if it breaks. But they're not

704
00:42:49,320 --> 00:42:51,839
Speaker 1: they're supervising you and making sure you're using it right.

705
00:42:52,360 --> 00:42:54,880
Speaker 1: I think it's not even like on Star or something

706
00:42:54,920 --> 00:42:57,680
Speaker 1: where they've got like dispatchers that are that work for

707
00:42:57,719 --> 00:43:00,480
Speaker 1: the company. I believe this is just an their piece

708
00:43:00,480 --> 00:43:04,360
Speaker 1: of kit that the law enforcement dispatchers have access to.

709
00:43:04,560 --> 00:43:08,400
Speaker 1: So they could be poorly trained, they could be using

710
00:43:08,440 --> 00:43:12,200
Speaker 1: it incorrectly, and there's certainly could be examples of folks

711
00:43:12,320 --> 00:43:16,239
Speaker 1: using it without the best intentions. It's very true, guys.

712
00:43:16,280 --> 00:43:18,840
Speaker 1: I want to get into one more email that we

713
00:43:18,920 --> 00:43:22,040
Speaker 1: got regarding shot Spotter. It's really quick, I promise. I

714
00:43:22,080 --> 00:43:25,960
Speaker 1: just want to give the other side of the response

715
00:43:26,000 --> 00:43:28,839
Speaker 1: that we've been getting from from you out there. Uh.

716
00:43:28,880 --> 00:43:33,319
Speaker 1: This comes from Mr Shadow says Hello, my friends call

717
00:43:33,400 --> 00:43:36,040
Speaker 1: me Mr Shadow. I've been a longtime listener. I love

718
00:43:36,080 --> 00:43:38,400
Speaker 1: the show. The shot spot Or subject was the first

719
00:43:38,400 --> 00:43:41,719
Speaker 1: one to force me to reach out. Attached below is

720
00:43:41,760 --> 00:43:44,320
Speaker 1: a few Twitter threads from a lawyer who battled shot

721
00:43:44,400 --> 00:43:48,320
Speaker 1: Spotter that company is This is the opinion of Mr Shadow.

722
00:43:48,560 --> 00:43:51,919
Speaker 1: That company is using junk science and is almost singularly

723
00:43:52,040 --> 00:43:55,640
Speaker 1: beholden to the police and their desires, lying about shots

724
00:43:55,640 --> 00:44:00,480
Speaker 1: to support bad warrants, manipulating data used in prosecutions suing

725
00:44:00,480 --> 00:44:04,640
Speaker 1: individuals who speak truth about their behavior, and also high

726
00:44:04,719 --> 00:44:07,920
Speaker 1: crime areas are only ever deemed that by police, who

727
00:44:07,960 --> 00:44:11,520
Speaker 1: are also the ones who measure reported crime. Please know

728
00:44:11,600 --> 00:44:13,760
Speaker 1: that I love the show, but being a devil's advocate

729
00:44:13,800 --> 00:44:17,080
Speaker 1: for a company of this nature is very unnecessary. Their

730
00:44:17,160 --> 00:44:19,319
Speaker 1: racism and boot licking has cost the black and brown

731
00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:22,880
Speaker 1: communities lives, freedom and privacy. Show me one shot Spotter

732
00:44:22,960 --> 00:44:26,400
Speaker 1: system in a suburb or a majority white neighborhood. I

733
00:44:26,440 --> 00:44:30,040
Speaker 1: would just say, Mr Shadow, I don't think we're necessarily

734
00:44:30,040 --> 00:44:33,040
Speaker 1: being devil's advocate here. We're trying to analyze this topic

735
00:44:33,040 --> 00:44:35,200
Speaker 1: as we do all of their topics from every side,

736
00:44:35,200 --> 00:44:38,480
Speaker 1: from every angle, and take all information into account. I

737
00:44:38,760 --> 00:44:42,319
Speaker 1: hope that's what you most people hear us doing, because

738
00:44:42,360 --> 00:44:45,920
Speaker 1: that's what our attempted. I'm really glad that we're sharing

739
00:44:46,160 --> 00:44:49,960
Speaker 1: both of those messages. Uh that's only a few of

740
00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:53,120
Speaker 1: the messages we got about shot Spotter, But uh, look

741
00:44:53,200 --> 00:44:57,520
Speaker 1: forward to the episode we're diving into all of this,

742
00:44:58,120 --> 00:44:59,880
Speaker 1: which is going to be a couple of sleepless and

743
00:45:00,040 --> 00:45:02,839
Speaker 1: rights in preparation because there's a there's a lot to do.

744
00:45:03,280 --> 00:45:06,040
Speaker 1: But um but yeah, as you said, Matt, we are

745
00:45:06,480 --> 00:45:12,120
Speaker 1: we are attempting to um objectively explore not just the

746
00:45:12,520 --> 00:45:16,560
Speaker 1: present circumstances, but also the future implications of this. There's

747
00:45:16,560 --> 00:45:20,160
Speaker 1: a lot to get into here. Yeah. Absolutely. I'm gonna

748
00:45:20,280 --> 00:45:23,320
Speaker 1: end here with how Mr Shadow ends, who says, also

749
00:45:23,440 --> 00:45:27,319
Speaker 1: investigate who pays for these policing systems in these neighborhoods

750
00:45:27,520 --> 00:45:29,800
Speaker 1: and what is cut out of the budget to allow

751
00:45:29,880 --> 00:45:34,480
Speaker 1: these expensive systems to be put up. Follow the money, right.

752
00:45:34,960 --> 00:45:37,800
Speaker 1: They are a bad company doing junk science to justify

753
00:45:37,880 --> 00:45:40,480
Speaker 1: over policing in black and brown communities. People have been

754
00:45:40,560 --> 00:45:43,960
Speaker 1: killed based on these false claims and have been imprisoned

755
00:45:44,040 --> 00:45:48,880
Speaker 1: and even worse, their overall accuracy rate is garbage. Uh,

756
00:45:48,920 --> 00:45:53,080
Speaker 1: and I guess that's Mr Shadow out. Okay, Well, folks, Uh,

757
00:45:53,280 --> 00:45:56,880
Speaker 1: this is this means that we're odd to something and

758
00:45:56,920 --> 00:45:59,560
Speaker 1: this is the kind of stuff that we love about

759
00:45:59,560 --> 00:46:02,719
Speaker 1: the show. This is also why we are grateful to

760
00:46:02,880 --> 00:46:07,239
Speaker 1: you for tuning in. So thank you to everybody who

761
00:46:07,320 --> 00:46:10,000
Speaker 1: wrote to us. Thank you to everybody who's hit us

762
00:46:10,080 --> 00:46:12,640
Speaker 1: up on our phone line. Thank you to everybody who's

763
00:46:12,680 --> 00:46:16,319
Speaker 1: swung by one way or another to contact us. Uh,

764
00:46:16,560 --> 00:46:19,359
Speaker 1: join up with us. You can be a part of

765
00:46:19,400 --> 00:46:21,960
Speaker 1: the show as well. All you have to do is

766
00:46:22,080 --> 00:46:26,560
Speaker 1: tell us what's on your mind, d N A modeling

767
00:46:26,920 --> 00:46:31,520
Speaker 1: of suspects, what what's going on with that? How do

768
00:46:31,640 --> 00:46:35,880
Speaker 1: you cheat at competitive fishing or light detector tests? You know,

769
00:46:36,040 --> 00:46:39,359
Speaker 1: give us the unethical life pro tips and then of

770
00:46:39,440 --> 00:46:43,200
Speaker 1: course shot spotter. As you know we've been We've been

771
00:46:43,520 --> 00:46:45,880
Speaker 1: going back and forth on this one for a while

772
00:46:45,920 --> 00:46:48,440
Speaker 1: and we do hope you tune into the episode. But

773
00:46:48,600 --> 00:46:52,120
Speaker 1: right now we want you to find us out there

774
00:46:52,160 --> 00:46:55,719
Speaker 1: in the dark of the internet. Yeah, it's you know,

775
00:46:55,880 --> 00:46:58,359
Speaker 1: it's not too hard to do. Shine a light and

776
00:46:58,480 --> 00:47:00,400
Speaker 1: you will find us. You can find us of the

777
00:47:00,400 --> 00:47:04,799
Speaker 1: handle conspiracy Stuff on Twitter, on Facebook, and on our

778
00:47:04,880 --> 00:47:09,680
Speaker 1: YouTube channel on Instagram. We are Conspiracy Stuff Show. We've

779
00:47:09,719 --> 00:47:12,960
Speaker 1: got a YouTube channel that was mentioned. You should go

780
00:47:13,120 --> 00:47:16,319
Speaker 1: there and check it out. That's my song for the day.

781
00:47:16,440 --> 00:47:21,040
Speaker 1: YouTube slash conspiracy. It's hard to search for. You literally

782
00:47:21,040 --> 00:47:24,520
Speaker 1: have to go to YouTube dot com slash conspiracy. I

783
00:47:24,560 --> 00:47:26,920
Speaker 1: can't find it when I search on Google. Guys, I

784
00:47:26,960 --> 00:47:28,759
Speaker 1: don't know what's wrong. I don't know what's going on.

785
00:47:29,000 --> 00:47:31,520
Speaker 1: I find the old house stuff works videos in the channel.

786
00:47:31,840 --> 00:47:35,520
Speaker 1: I can't find conspiracy stuff. I don't know what's wrong

787
00:47:35,520 --> 00:47:37,600
Speaker 1: with me unless I type it right in. So do that,

788
00:47:38,160 --> 00:47:41,360
Speaker 1: and also you can call us the rumors are true.

789
00:47:41,800 --> 00:47:46,879
Speaker 1: You can take your phone and dial a certain set

790
00:47:46,920 --> 00:47:50,640
Speaker 1: of numbers, like casting a spell. The spell is one

791
00:47:50,840 --> 00:47:55,640
Speaker 1: eight three three st d w y t K. If

792
00:47:55,680 --> 00:47:58,560
Speaker 1: your spell is successful, you will hear a familiar voice

793
00:47:58,560 --> 00:48:01,400
Speaker 1: and then a beep like so deep, after which you

794
00:48:01,400 --> 00:48:05,360
Speaker 1: will have three minutes. They're yours, they are magic. Go

795
00:48:05,560 --> 00:48:09,680
Speaker 1: weird with it. Give yourself a nickname, a numb de plume.

796
00:48:10,320 --> 00:48:12,480
Speaker 1: I'm kidding your writing, so it wouldn't be a num

797
00:48:12,560 --> 00:48:14,600
Speaker 1: de plume, but you know, give yourself a cool nickname,

798
00:48:14,640 --> 00:48:16,560
Speaker 1: the kind of thing you always wanted your friends to

799
00:48:16,600 --> 00:48:19,120
Speaker 1: call you. And tell us if it's okay to use

800
00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:21,960
Speaker 1: your name and or message on the air. Most importantly,

801
00:48:22,239 --> 00:48:25,520
Speaker 1: do not censor yourself if you have something that you

802
00:48:25,600 --> 00:48:28,279
Speaker 1: need to get out in the world. As you can tell,

803
00:48:28,520 --> 00:48:32,520
Speaker 1: we love in depth correspondencies. I love being able to

804
00:48:32,760 --> 00:48:35,960
Speaker 1: have everything GrITT now, to read it, to find the links,

805
00:48:36,200 --> 00:48:38,239
Speaker 1: take us to the edge of the rabbit hole. We

806
00:48:38,280 --> 00:48:40,360
Speaker 1: will do the rest. All you have to do is

807
00:48:40,440 --> 00:48:42,239
Speaker 1: drop us a line at our good old fashioned email

808
00:48:42,280 --> 00:49:00,319
Speaker 1: address where we are conspiracy at iHeart radio dot com. Yeah.

809
00:49:04,200 --> 00:49:06,280
Speaker 1: Stuff they don't want you to know. Is a production

810
00:49:06,360 --> 00:49:09,440
Speaker 1: of I heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio,

811
00:49:09,600 --> 00:49:12,440
Speaker 1: visit the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever

812
00:49:12,520 --> 00:49:13,800
Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.