1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:25,560 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,600 --> 00:00:28,760 Speaker 1: My name is Matt. Our colleague Nol is on an adventure, 6 00:00:28,840 --> 00:00:31,840 Speaker 1: but he will be returning very soon. They called me Ben. 7 00:00:31,960 --> 00:00:36,120 Speaker 1: We're joined as always with our super producer, all Michigantroll Decade. 8 00:00:36,360 --> 00:00:39,519 Speaker 1: Most importantly, you are you. You are here, and that 9 00:00:39,560 --> 00:00:43,520 Speaker 1: makes this the stuff they don't want you to know, Matt. 10 00:00:44,080 --> 00:00:47,920 Speaker 1: As you know, this week, we're diving into something very 11 00:00:47,960 --> 00:00:51,879 Speaker 1: special to both of us, the history and the future 12 00:00:52,200 --> 00:00:56,240 Speaker 1: of spying. It's a long story, even if we're just 13 00:00:56,400 --> 00:00:59,279 Speaker 1: treating it as a primer, and so you and I 14 00:00:59,400 --> 00:01:03,280 Speaker 1: decided off air to make this a two part episode. 15 00:01:03,280 --> 00:01:06,839 Speaker 1: We're spending the entirety of the week, at least episode wise, 16 00:01:07,400 --> 00:01:12,360 Speaker 1: on this topic. As you may imagine, fellow conspiracy realists, 17 00:01:12,880 --> 00:01:17,280 Speaker 1: a great many parts of this story are by design 18 00:01:17,800 --> 00:01:22,080 Speaker 1: loss to history, because when spine works out, no one 19 00:01:22,160 --> 00:01:27,120 Speaker 1: knows about it right. But what this will do is 20 00:01:27,160 --> 00:01:30,160 Speaker 1: cause a great deal of paranoia in both us and 21 00:01:30,240 --> 00:01:35,600 Speaker 1: you and everyone else and yes sometimes. Uh, you know, 22 00:01:35,680 --> 00:01:38,960 Speaker 1: the primary criticism of paranoia is that there's something inherently 23 00:01:39,040 --> 00:01:43,240 Speaker 1: narcissistic about it. But being paranoid does not make you wrong, 24 00:01:43,680 --> 00:01:46,880 Speaker 1: nor does it make you crazy, and you should Uh 25 00:01:46,680 --> 00:01:50,560 Speaker 1: you may indeed look at things a little bit differently 26 00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:54,520 Speaker 1: after going with us on this journey, depending on you know, 27 00:01:54,640 --> 00:01:57,680 Speaker 1: where you are in your personal life, kind of stuff 28 00:01:57,680 --> 00:01:59,960 Speaker 1: you have on your phone, Let's see what else you're 29 00:02:00,040 --> 00:02:05,720 Speaker 1: political associates, your friends and families associates, Let's see anywhere 30 00:02:05,720 --> 00:02:10,480 Speaker 1: you've ever traveled, anything you've ever purchased, anything you've said 31 00:02:10,520 --> 00:02:14,799 Speaker 1: on social media, anybody who has a phone number that 32 00:02:14,880 --> 00:02:18,040 Speaker 1: you used to have. We'll get into it. But there's 33 00:02:18,080 --> 00:02:20,959 Speaker 1: a lot of stuff, even stuff that you may be 34 00:02:21,120 --> 00:02:26,399 Speaker 1: on track to achieve later on in life. Very well said, yes, 35 00:02:26,480 --> 00:02:31,600 Speaker 1: the predictive capabilities. Uh So, first things first, Uh, we 36 00:02:31,800 --> 00:02:34,960 Speaker 1: need to before we really begin, we need to bust 37 00:02:35,040 --> 00:02:38,160 Speaker 1: a couple of quick myths. I think, uh, Matt, as 38 00:02:38,320 --> 00:02:43,079 Speaker 1: you know, the real life of a spy is nowhere 39 00:02:43,280 --> 00:02:47,959 Speaker 1: near a school, as is portrayed to be in fiction 40 00:02:48,200 --> 00:02:53,679 Speaker 1: and in film, and sometimes by alleged X spies when 41 00:02:53,680 --> 00:02:55,600 Speaker 1: they have a book deal on the way a lot 42 00:02:55,639 --> 00:02:58,320 Speaker 1: of it is like a lot of its paperwork. Man, 43 00:02:58,400 --> 00:03:00,880 Speaker 1: A lot of it's a desk job. And uh. There 44 00:03:00,960 --> 00:03:05,720 Speaker 1: was one former spy, admitted former spy who described the 45 00:03:05,760 --> 00:03:12,320 Speaker 1: work as incredibly monotonous and uncommonly useless. In many cases. Well, 46 00:03:12,360 --> 00:03:15,040 Speaker 1: they didn't know, They didn't know if it would be right, 47 00:03:15,120 --> 00:03:18,280 Speaker 1: like useful to know where diplomat A was going and 48 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:20,720 Speaker 1: what they were talking about. Maybe they just went to 49 00:03:20,760 --> 00:03:24,600 Speaker 1: that pizza store at the same time every week because 50 00:03:24,639 --> 00:03:28,480 Speaker 1: they like pizza. Yeah, yeah, but now you know where 51 00:03:28,520 --> 00:03:31,680 Speaker 1: they are if you ever need them for any reason 52 00:03:31,880 --> 00:03:34,760 Speaker 1: or you need to get something from them. So I 53 00:03:34,760 --> 00:03:39,440 Speaker 1: don't know. In the end, any spy that says it's 54 00:03:39,480 --> 00:03:42,960 Speaker 1: not very useful, I don't trust. There we go, there 55 00:03:43,000 --> 00:03:46,160 Speaker 1: we go in a healthy dose of paranoia is good 56 00:03:46,200 --> 00:03:48,760 Speaker 1: for the soul and in some cases it's good for 57 00:03:48,800 --> 00:03:52,760 Speaker 1: your physical health as well. So here are the facts. 58 00:03:52,800 --> 00:03:57,360 Speaker 1: We have to ask ourselves what is a spy exactly? 59 00:03:57,560 --> 00:03:59,920 Speaker 1: Because you'll notice when you see this stuff for poor 60 00:04:00,160 --> 00:04:05,200 Speaker 1: did that perspective matters? So China will, for instance, insists 61 00:04:05,240 --> 00:04:09,920 Speaker 1: they've caught us by or like Iran caught three um 62 00:04:09,960 --> 00:04:12,800 Speaker 1: three people in their early twenties, A while back crossing 63 00:04:12,800 --> 00:04:15,280 Speaker 1: the border on foot, and they said, look, these folks 64 00:04:15,280 --> 00:04:18,480 Speaker 1: are US spies. And the US said, oh no, no, no, no, 65 00:04:18,640 --> 00:04:22,880 Speaker 1: they're hikers. If you remember that story, the stories pop 66 00:04:22,960 --> 00:04:26,240 Speaker 1: up and they disappear in the news um on a 67 00:04:26,360 --> 00:04:32,080 Speaker 1: strange level, but at the most basic definition, a spy, 68 00:04:32,200 --> 00:04:35,640 Speaker 1: whatever euphemism you want to use for them, is anyone 69 00:04:35,880 --> 00:04:41,880 Speaker 1: who uses subterfuge to obtain information for someone else, or 70 00:04:42,320 --> 00:04:44,960 Speaker 1: in the next step, to take actions that would be 71 00:04:45,000 --> 00:04:48,240 Speaker 1: to the benefit of their employers or their handlers. And 72 00:04:48,240 --> 00:04:50,520 Speaker 1: we'll we'll get to the idea of handlers in a 73 00:04:50,600 --> 00:04:55,800 Speaker 1: moment that Matt. When we're talking about obtaining information, what 74 00:04:55,800 --> 00:05:00,599 Speaker 1: what do we mean exactly? Well, yeah, in formation is 75 00:05:00,640 --> 00:05:04,119 Speaker 1: so many things, right, and obtaining it just means getting 76 00:05:04,160 --> 00:05:07,640 Speaker 1: your eyes, ears, or some recording device to capture whatever 77 00:05:07,680 --> 00:05:09,719 Speaker 1: that thing is. It could be something as little as 78 00:05:10,360 --> 00:05:13,400 Speaker 1: the example here would be an itinerary for an upcoming 79 00:05:13,800 --> 00:05:17,160 Speaker 1: trip or event that's going to happen. Maybe seeing a 80 00:05:17,400 --> 00:05:21,159 Speaker 1: list of people who will be attending said event. Maybe 81 00:05:21,160 --> 00:05:24,000 Speaker 1: that's all you need for this particular thing. Maybe it's 82 00:05:24,040 --> 00:05:27,279 Speaker 1: just you know, laying out let's say, in my office 83 00:05:27,360 --> 00:05:30,080 Speaker 1: right now, is just laying out here next to my desk, 84 00:05:30,160 --> 00:05:32,640 Speaker 1: and someone was able to snap a photo of that 85 00:05:32,720 --> 00:05:36,680 Speaker 1: thing an itinerary that could be very helpful. Maybe it's 86 00:05:36,680 --> 00:05:39,880 Speaker 1: in an email that I send out, so all you'd 87 00:05:39,880 --> 00:05:41,599 Speaker 1: have to do is find a way to intercept that 88 00:05:41,680 --> 00:05:45,080 Speaker 1: email or phone conversation. It could be a meeting between 89 00:05:45,080 --> 00:05:47,960 Speaker 1: two people and one of whom is a target or 90 00:05:48,000 --> 00:05:52,960 Speaker 1: a party that you're interested in. Yeah, and that's that's interesting. 91 00:05:53,320 --> 00:05:57,880 Speaker 1: Those two examples are great exercise and contrasts. So in 92 00:05:57,960 --> 00:06:03,120 Speaker 1: the itinerary example, it could literally just be something left 93 00:06:03,160 --> 00:06:06,120 Speaker 1: out on someone's desk because they were a little too 94 00:06:06,200 --> 00:06:10,200 Speaker 1: nonchalant with rob sect. But in the second example, what 95 00:06:10,279 --> 00:06:13,159 Speaker 1: I like about that is the focus may not necessarily 96 00:06:13,240 --> 00:06:15,600 Speaker 1: be on the conversation. The focus might be on a 97 00:06:15,680 --> 00:06:18,960 Speaker 1: high value target. And so you could get some of 98 00:06:18,960 --> 00:06:22,480 Speaker 1: those off the record conversations from some v I p 99 00:06:22,680 --> 00:06:26,479 Speaker 1: s that don't have state secrets, but they do put 100 00:06:26,520 --> 00:06:30,840 Speaker 1: the speaker in a super uncool light, and that is 101 00:06:31,080 --> 00:06:35,560 Speaker 1: very useful for later character attacks, smear campaigns, or propaganda, 102 00:06:36,200 --> 00:06:40,960 Speaker 1: as anybody listening to the Nixon tapes would later find 103 00:06:41,120 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 1: because when that guy thought he was not around a 104 00:06:43,760 --> 00:06:47,599 Speaker 1: hot mike, he was had some hot takes. Yeah, I 105 00:06:47,640 --> 00:06:51,680 Speaker 1: mean having having compromise on anybody, just something that could 106 00:06:51,680 --> 00:06:54,359 Speaker 1: put someone in a compromising position is very helpful for 107 00:06:54,440 --> 00:06:57,080 Speaker 1: us by oh yeah, and it could also it could 108 00:06:57,160 --> 00:07:02,880 Speaker 1: also be critical and for nation classified stuff about new weapons, 109 00:07:02,920 --> 00:07:08,240 Speaker 1: internal strategies, a nation's fears, their ambitions, and on and on. 110 00:07:08,680 --> 00:07:12,640 Speaker 1: And the weird thing is you don't see this too 111 00:07:12,680 --> 00:07:14,920 Speaker 1: too often in fiction. But the weird thing is a 112 00:07:15,040 --> 00:07:19,720 Speaker 1: spy or an asset, because if they're working for you, 113 00:07:19,720 --> 00:07:22,600 Speaker 1: you don't want to call them spies. And asset may 114 00:07:22,600 --> 00:07:25,720 Speaker 1: not know exactly what they're getting, and they may not 115 00:07:25,840 --> 00:07:29,120 Speaker 1: know why. They're just supposed to go to where half 116 00:07:29,160 --> 00:07:32,480 Speaker 1: of the peanut butter sandwiches and take it and then 117 00:07:32,680 --> 00:07:35,679 Speaker 1: drop that, you know, drop that SD cards somewhere else. 118 00:07:36,480 --> 00:07:40,400 Speaker 1: It's also not uncommon for spying operations to focus on 119 00:07:41,200 --> 00:07:44,000 Speaker 1: this quickly gets in like catch Twain two territory. It's 120 00:07:44,000 --> 00:07:47,800 Speaker 1: not uncommon for spies to focus on the other side 121 00:07:47,920 --> 00:07:51,760 Speaker 1: spying operation. That's where we get to one of my 122 00:07:51,880 --> 00:07:58,120 Speaker 1: favorite government phrases, counter intelligence mirrors facing mirrors. I love 123 00:07:58,160 --> 00:08:02,640 Speaker 1: it endlessly. And and a funny thing about counterintelligence, especially 124 00:08:02,760 --> 00:08:06,240 Speaker 1: if you have learned English as a second language. Is 125 00:08:06,280 --> 00:08:09,840 Speaker 1: it sounds like a synonym for stupid. It sounds like 126 00:08:10,160 --> 00:08:14,200 Speaker 1: make dumb. That's not what it means, but that's that's 127 00:08:14,200 --> 00:08:17,760 Speaker 1: certainly what it sounds like. And I I still I 128 00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:20,720 Speaker 1: still crack I know counterintelligence folks, and I still crack 129 00:08:20,800 --> 00:08:24,320 Speaker 1: up when I hear it. And uh, you know, they 130 00:08:24,360 --> 00:08:27,640 Speaker 1: don't all think it's as funny as I do. But 131 00:08:28,480 --> 00:08:31,559 Speaker 1: we have very different lives. So when we talk about 132 00:08:31,560 --> 00:08:35,000 Speaker 1: how this info can be collected, you can imagine any 133 00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:38,920 Speaker 1: number of possibilities and at at least some point has 134 00:08:38,960 --> 00:08:43,920 Speaker 1: probably happened in real life, you know, secret identities cover which, 135 00:08:43,960 --> 00:08:46,720 Speaker 1: as we'll find in Part two, a secret identity or 136 00:08:46,720 --> 00:08:49,560 Speaker 1: a cover idea is much more difficult to do now 137 00:08:50,120 --> 00:08:53,839 Speaker 1: in the places that matter. And then you see honey 138 00:08:53,920 --> 00:08:57,280 Speaker 1: pot tactics. By the way, that's the places that matter, 139 00:08:58,000 --> 00:09:02,760 Speaker 1: I'm assuming with regards to you US interests, right of 140 00:09:02,880 --> 00:09:05,960 Speaker 1: like the places that we would want as a country 141 00:09:06,000 --> 00:09:07,920 Speaker 1: to be in. Is that what you mean? I would? 142 00:09:07,920 --> 00:09:13,120 Speaker 1: I would say. The weird thing is that globally speaking, 143 00:09:13,520 --> 00:09:19,240 Speaker 1: a lot of intelligence agencies are at least currently focused 144 00:09:19,280 --> 00:09:25,400 Speaker 1: on the same general regions. So if there's something and 145 00:09:25,600 --> 00:09:30,240 Speaker 1: it may not be for given nations particular domestic interest. 146 00:09:30,400 --> 00:09:35,719 Speaker 1: Like like I assure you if uh sigin signals intelligence 147 00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:39,439 Speaker 1: indicates to Russia that the US is for some reason 148 00:09:39,800 --> 00:09:44,000 Speaker 1: getting super into Peru, then they're going to make sure 149 00:09:44,040 --> 00:09:46,840 Speaker 1: they have some folks in Peru just to figure out 150 00:09:46,840 --> 00:09:50,120 Speaker 1: what's going on. Got it? And you can mislead people. 151 00:09:50,120 --> 00:09:53,000 Speaker 1: It becomes a grand rabbit chase or what was what 152 00:09:53,040 --> 00:09:54,400 Speaker 1: was that thing theys to call it here in the 153 00:09:54,640 --> 00:09:57,200 Speaker 1: a snipe hunt. It becomes a snipe hunt to find 154 00:09:57,200 --> 00:10:00,400 Speaker 1: the missing thing. But that you want to talk to 155 00:10:00,480 --> 00:10:03,600 Speaker 1: us a little bit about a honeypot tactics or honey traps. 156 00:10:03,880 --> 00:10:08,720 Speaker 1: Oh those are my favorite, Oh my gosh, favorite until 157 00:10:08,800 --> 00:10:15,560 Speaker 1: the very end. There, everybody's favorite, except maybe the trapper. Yeah, yeah, 158 00:10:15,600 --> 00:10:20,520 Speaker 1: you're right. That would be someone using coercive techniques to 159 00:10:20,600 --> 00:10:26,080 Speaker 1: get very very very close to someone. Uh, let's just 160 00:10:26,120 --> 00:10:29,120 Speaker 1: put it like that. There's also, you know, blackmail. They 161 00:10:29,160 --> 00:10:33,520 Speaker 1: could come out of that in blackmail. Honey pots and 162 00:10:33,559 --> 00:10:36,800 Speaker 1: blackmail really go well together. I think that's a matchmate 163 00:10:36,920 --> 00:10:41,360 Speaker 1: in an undisclosed location. There you go, there we go. 164 00:10:41,640 --> 00:10:49,360 Speaker 1: So yeah, honeypot describes describes weaponized seduction essentially and it's 165 00:10:49,400 --> 00:10:52,880 Speaker 1: happening now as we record this episode. It does inevitably 166 00:10:53,040 --> 00:10:56,320 Speaker 1: lead to its ugly or cousin blackmail, as you said, 167 00:10:56,400 --> 00:10:59,920 Speaker 1: matt Um. And then sometimes you can just skip the honeypot. 168 00:11:00,040 --> 00:11:03,240 Speaker 1: You can just threaten people, or you can just misrepresent 169 00:11:04,040 --> 00:11:08,680 Speaker 1: something in order to acquire information. Then of course the 170 00:11:08,720 --> 00:11:12,920 Speaker 1: real movie stuff is like infiltration. Oh no, it turns 171 00:11:12,960 --> 00:11:17,920 Speaker 1: out that Johnny p America is not actually American and 172 00:11:18,000 --> 00:11:20,000 Speaker 1: he's been you know. That's where you get the lines 173 00:11:20,040 --> 00:11:23,439 Speaker 1: where like someone someone finds out and they're like, oh, 174 00:11:23,480 --> 00:11:27,520 Speaker 1: what you were at my daughter's wedding, and they're like 175 00:11:27,640 --> 00:11:31,320 Speaker 1: the strow of your bro But the list goes on, 176 00:11:31,600 --> 00:11:33,800 Speaker 1: you know, like if you if you just made up, 177 00:11:34,120 --> 00:11:37,440 Speaker 1: if you just made up a scenario vaguely like a 178 00:11:37,480 --> 00:11:42,720 Speaker 1: plot line to how info could be collected. Uh, it 179 00:11:42,720 --> 00:11:45,640 Speaker 1: it probably has been collected that way up to and 180 00:11:45,720 --> 00:11:51,400 Speaker 1: including like going through trash and painstakingly pasting together stuff 181 00:11:51,480 --> 00:11:56,000 Speaker 1: from a shredder. It's it's nuts, but that's all a 182 00:11:56,040 --> 00:11:59,040 Speaker 1: lot of that can just be passive action, just like 183 00:11:59,120 --> 00:12:02,760 Speaker 1: you said, just snapping a little photo of a piece 184 00:12:02,800 --> 00:12:06,080 Speaker 1: of paper on the table, and that's still I imagine 185 00:12:06,480 --> 00:12:10,839 Speaker 1: very stressful for the people involved. But but what happens 186 00:12:11,040 --> 00:12:15,000 Speaker 1: when we go beyond the passive? What happens when we 187 00:12:15,080 --> 00:12:20,280 Speaker 1: get to the the spy hits the fans moment? What 188 00:12:20,280 --> 00:12:23,840 Speaker 1: would we call that? Oh? Like, um, the actions like 189 00:12:23,880 --> 00:12:26,679 Speaker 1: taking action, discrete action, that kind of like thing, I 190 00:12:27,679 --> 00:12:33,400 Speaker 1: don't know, uh, moving from clandestine observance to covert activity. 191 00:12:33,720 --> 00:12:35,880 Speaker 1: There we go. That's what it is. Okay, Yes, and 192 00:12:35,920 --> 00:12:39,040 Speaker 1: this is dude. You can do so much stuff here. Um. 193 00:12:39,120 --> 00:12:43,360 Speaker 1: If we're talking about collecting evidence, you can also plant things, right, 194 00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:46,480 Speaker 1: you can put stuff where it's going to be found, 195 00:12:46,840 --> 00:12:49,760 Speaker 1: maybe in a place where it feels like, oh, I've 196 00:12:49,760 --> 00:12:53,000 Speaker 1: stumbled upon this the secret thing that I'm not supposed 197 00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:55,280 Speaker 1: to have, but now I have it and now I 198 00:12:55,360 --> 00:12:57,600 Speaker 1: can use it. But you can do a lot of 199 00:12:57,600 --> 00:13:01,559 Speaker 1: stuff with that intelligence too, talking dis info here, miss info. 200 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:03,880 Speaker 1: Things you can do to really stir the enemy's pot, 201 00:13:04,160 --> 00:13:10,280 Speaker 1: whoever that enemy is. Um full on sabotage, like destroying 202 00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:14,400 Speaker 1: equipment or a system that's needed to to have some 203 00:13:14,440 --> 00:13:20,320 Speaker 1: goal achieved by the opposition, or even assassinations like this 204 00:13:20,400 --> 00:13:22,439 Speaker 1: is where you see stuff happening. There's a story that 205 00:13:22,480 --> 00:13:26,560 Speaker 1: came out not long ago where Massad assassinated in Iranian 206 00:13:26,880 --> 00:13:30,440 Speaker 1: nuclear scientist when they were not in the country, and 207 00:13:30,480 --> 00:13:34,319 Speaker 1: they did it with a remote controlled machine gun. Insane. 208 00:13:34,520 --> 00:13:37,679 Speaker 1: It's real. You can look up that story and find it. Yes, 209 00:13:38,080 --> 00:13:43,840 Speaker 1: it's a true story. And typically when you hear about something, 210 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:47,880 Speaker 1: go if you're listening to this and you're not involved 211 00:13:47,920 --> 00:13:51,400 Speaker 1: in that community. When you hear about an assassination at all, 212 00:13:51,920 --> 00:13:58,400 Speaker 1: it's because either something went wrong or because someone very 213 00:13:58,480 --> 00:14:02,880 Speaker 1: much wants you to know. Like those those anonymous sources 214 00:14:02,880 --> 00:14:06,240 Speaker 1: who talked in New York Times or whatever, they are sanctioned, 215 00:14:06,280 --> 00:14:11,640 Speaker 1: they're allowed to say that. It's it's kind of um there. Uh, 216 00:14:11,920 --> 00:14:15,760 Speaker 1: it's kind of a a a flex like how Russia 217 00:14:16,679 --> 00:14:21,200 Speaker 1: used polonium on purpose because they could deny it all 218 00:14:21,240 --> 00:14:26,760 Speaker 1: the livelong day. But polonium poisoning is kind of an autograph, 219 00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:32,160 Speaker 1: you knows, a little signature, right. They didn't want us 220 00:14:32,240 --> 00:14:36,240 Speaker 1: to know about the whole underwear poisoning of NAVALNI, but 221 00:14:36,360 --> 00:14:38,640 Speaker 1: they did want I think they wanted us to know 222 00:14:38,640 --> 00:14:43,440 Speaker 1: about the polonium yes, agreed. Uh. And when we look 223 00:14:43,480 --> 00:14:47,840 Speaker 1: at when we look at fiction and pop culture, we 224 00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:52,280 Speaker 1: hear about spies and espionage, it's almost always going to 225 00:14:52,440 --> 00:14:57,000 Speaker 1: be focused on state level spying. Right someone in country 226 00:14:57,000 --> 00:15:00,400 Speaker 1: A has been sent to country B to learn about 227 00:15:00,560 --> 00:15:04,280 Speaker 1: something Country B doesn't want you to know. But in 228 00:15:04,400 --> 00:15:08,400 Speaker 1: practice espionage, if you define it, it's just like a 229 00:15:08,440 --> 00:15:13,119 Speaker 1: set of tactics, it exists at every single level of society. 230 00:15:13,200 --> 00:15:19,560 Speaker 1: Corporations are participating in industrial espionage right now. Domestic political 231 00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:24,080 Speaker 1: campaigns without by the way, the approval of the big guys, 232 00:15:25,000 --> 00:15:29,600 Speaker 1: are also participating in similar operations. And if you hop 233 00:15:29,640 --> 00:15:32,720 Speaker 1: on Twitter right now, you'll find all these numerous accounts 234 00:15:32,720 --> 00:15:36,760 Speaker 1: of people accusing each other of tactics like spying, but 235 00:15:36,880 --> 00:15:40,560 Speaker 1: they we usually instead call those disinfo campaigns, stuff like 236 00:15:40,720 --> 00:15:44,960 Speaker 1: spreading rumors or gossip, because people's lives aren't on the line. 237 00:15:45,160 --> 00:15:47,800 Speaker 1: It's just that you don't like that, you know, you 238 00:15:47,800 --> 00:15:50,160 Speaker 1: don't like that your Internet friends said one thing here 239 00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:53,280 Speaker 1: and then said another thing later. But that's still and 240 00:15:53,400 --> 00:15:56,680 Speaker 1: still in this direction. And it's because of one thing, 241 00:15:56,800 --> 00:16:02,280 Speaker 1: one thing they all have in common all of these situations. Secrecy. 242 00:16:02,480 --> 00:16:05,240 Speaker 1: Secrecy is inherent to all these activities. And the hard 243 00:16:05,280 --> 00:16:08,560 Speaker 1: truth of the world is that secrets have an inherent power, 244 00:16:08,840 --> 00:16:12,480 Speaker 1: which means that so long as secrets exist, human beings 245 00:16:12,520 --> 00:16:16,640 Speaker 1: are going to attempt to control them for their own end, 246 00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:21,760 Speaker 1: either disclosing them, either disguising them, or either confusing them. 247 00:16:21,840 --> 00:16:25,600 Speaker 1: And that's it's When you think of it that way, 248 00:16:25,760 --> 00:16:30,520 Speaker 1: it's pretty astonishing how long spine has been around. I 249 00:16:30,560 --> 00:16:34,800 Speaker 1: don't think it's the oldest profession, but it's in like 250 00:16:35,240 --> 00:16:38,440 Speaker 1: the top tent, because it's been around ever since the 251 00:16:38,680 --> 00:16:43,560 Speaker 1: first civilization. Wanted to learn what the second civilization was 252 00:16:43,680 --> 00:16:47,320 Speaker 1: up to, I would say, you know, or since there 253 00:16:47,440 --> 00:16:51,560 Speaker 1: was someone with sufficient power and control over a you know, 254 00:16:51,640 --> 00:16:54,520 Speaker 1: a society, no matter how large or small, and one 255 00:16:54,640 --> 00:16:58,040 Speaker 1: to know what people who oppose them we're doing right, 256 00:16:58,080 --> 00:17:01,920 Speaker 1: even if they were within their own community or village 257 00:17:02,560 --> 00:17:06,480 Speaker 1: or town or castle or society. For podcast Network, Yes, 258 00:17:09,040 --> 00:17:14,840 Speaker 1: so we're gonna pause for a second because we have to. 259 00:17:15,119 --> 00:17:17,320 Speaker 1: We have to adapt the next part of this podcast, 260 00:17:17,400 --> 00:17:19,800 Speaker 1: go off air and figure out a few things. But 261 00:17:19,920 --> 00:17:30,520 Speaker 1: we'll be back after a word from our sponsors. Okay, Matt, 262 00:17:30,600 --> 00:17:35,200 Speaker 1: I think we got it sorted. What do you think? Yeah, sure, 263 00:17:35,440 --> 00:17:41,119 Speaker 1: we got it sorted. Ben, it was always Jonathan Strickland. Dude, 264 00:17:42,200 --> 00:17:46,000 Speaker 1: don't say his name. We've learned that a different show. 265 00:17:46,359 --> 00:17:50,439 Speaker 1: Oh you're right. Oh sorry, you're right, Yeah, it was 266 00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:52,399 Speaker 1: it was him the whole time. I mean, he hopts 267 00:17:52,400 --> 00:17:56,400 Speaker 1: tech stuff. But yes, this is this is crazy. When 268 00:17:56,400 --> 00:18:01,399 Speaker 1: we talk about how old espionage tactics are, it turns 269 00:18:01,400 --> 00:18:05,119 Speaker 1: out that one of the earliest, we would call it 270 00:18:05,160 --> 00:18:10,680 Speaker 1: classified today, one of the earliest classified documents in history, 271 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:14,240 Speaker 1: dates all the way back to the time of Hammer Rabbi. 272 00:18:14,920 --> 00:18:18,000 Speaker 1: And it's a it's a it's a letter from a 273 00:18:18,119 --> 00:18:23,919 Speaker 1: spy who was disguised as a diplomatic employee, a diplomatic envoy, 274 00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:27,520 Speaker 1: and he's reporting back in secret to the king. And 275 00:18:27,680 --> 00:18:32,480 Speaker 1: have Robbie just for reference, I think he died around 276 00:18:32,480 --> 00:18:37,280 Speaker 1: like BC or so that was the end of his reign. 277 00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:40,720 Speaker 1: And if you go back to what the fourth century 278 00:18:40,840 --> 00:18:44,720 Speaker 1: b c e. Then you see the oft quoted military 279 00:18:44,880 --> 00:18:50,000 Speaker 1: genius son Zoo talking about the importance of military intelligence 280 00:18:50,520 --> 00:18:53,000 Speaker 1: in you know, in the book that so many people 281 00:18:53,080 --> 00:18:57,520 Speaker 1: quote the Art of War? Oh yes, and within that 282 00:18:57,640 --> 00:19:03,280 Speaker 1: tone that is in every Rappers bookshelf, at least the 283 00:19:03,640 --> 00:19:10,400 Speaker 1: ones that are like um, he talks about or let's say, 284 00:19:10,400 --> 00:19:14,959 Speaker 1: he categorizes a lot of the different things that that 285 00:19:15,119 --> 00:19:18,679 Speaker 1: modern spies do. And it's really interesting to see it 286 00:19:18,720 --> 00:19:22,080 Speaker 1: written out from way back then. And this is this 287 00:19:22,119 --> 00:19:26,200 Speaker 1: is stuff talking about someone acting as an informant who's 288 00:19:26,280 --> 00:19:29,160 Speaker 1: just listening in. Let's say, has some information, is able 289 00:19:29,200 --> 00:19:33,639 Speaker 1: to share it with you. The penetration agent, now that 290 00:19:33,680 --> 00:19:37,760 Speaker 1: sounds dirty, not as dirty as it seems. This is 291 00:19:37,800 --> 00:19:41,080 Speaker 1: somebody who goes who actually is working on the other side, right, 292 00:19:41,359 --> 00:19:46,360 Speaker 1: pretending to function as an operative for your for your enemies. 293 00:19:46,480 --> 00:19:48,639 Speaker 1: There's also the dis info agent. You know, this is 294 00:19:48,760 --> 00:19:52,280 Speaker 1: the person who's gonna distribute information that is incorrect or 295 00:19:52,359 --> 00:19:55,800 Speaker 1: false on purpose to confuse your enemies. And there's so 296 00:19:55,880 --> 00:19:59,560 Speaker 1: much more in that book. And and none of these 297 00:20:00,280 --> 00:20:03,320 Speaker 1: uh he doesn't use any of these terms. To be clear, 298 00:20:03,480 --> 00:20:05,879 Speaker 1: these are these are broad categories we would use in 299 00:20:05,920 --> 00:20:10,879 Speaker 1: the modern day. And also, any person working in these 300 00:20:10,920 --> 00:20:13,159 Speaker 1: sorts of fields is not going to have it on 301 00:20:13,200 --> 00:20:17,359 Speaker 1: their LinkedIn at least if they do, they're not going 302 00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:19,320 Speaker 1: to be doing this for a very long time. I 303 00:20:19,359 --> 00:20:22,480 Speaker 1: love the idea. Here's my card, Matt Frederick. I'm a 304 00:20:22,560 --> 00:20:32,720 Speaker 1: penetration agent. So what are we penetrating the day? Right? Uh? 305 00:20:32,720 --> 00:20:37,840 Speaker 1: And Ron okay, now yeah, yeah, yeah, we can talk 306 00:20:37,880 --> 00:20:40,120 Speaker 1: about in Ron. Now, I thought you did great work there. 307 00:20:40,800 --> 00:20:47,679 Speaker 1: Uh yeah, So sun Zoo also notes the importance of 308 00:20:47,800 --> 00:20:53,600 Speaker 1: counter intelligence and the danger of double agents, which gets 309 00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:58,120 Speaker 1: so confusing so quickly. Everything he mentioned in this regard 310 00:20:58,400 --> 00:21:02,520 Speaker 1: remains relevant in the modern day, thousands of years later. 311 00:21:02,680 --> 00:21:04,720 Speaker 1: So we're gonna give him, Paul, I don't know where 312 00:21:04,800 --> 00:21:07,400 Speaker 1: Soundku is here, but we're gonna give son Zoo an 313 00:21:07,440 --> 00:21:16,720 Speaker 1: official not bad award. Good job, good job, dude, Not that, 314 00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:19,679 Speaker 1: not that, it's not the you know, it's not the 315 00:21:19,800 --> 00:21:25,200 Speaker 1: vaunted great work or you know, we can't well, great 316 00:21:25,240 --> 00:21:27,399 Speaker 1: work is something different from us on this show. But 317 00:21:27,840 --> 00:21:30,440 Speaker 1: you know, we don't give that award out often anyway, 318 00:21:30,880 --> 00:21:33,320 Speaker 1: As you know, he's not the only guy who's thinking 319 00:21:33,359 --> 00:21:37,600 Speaker 1: along these lines. We can laundry list ancient kingdoms that 320 00:21:37,720 --> 00:21:40,760 Speaker 1: all had something like spies, even if they were not 321 00:21:41,760 --> 00:21:46,280 Speaker 1: codified or organized into a network that was meant to 322 00:21:46,480 --> 00:21:52,080 Speaker 1: last through like um, through multiple kings or multiple reigns 323 00:21:52,160 --> 00:21:57,359 Speaker 1: or dynasties. We know ancient Egypt had spies. Ancient kingdoms 324 00:21:57,359 --> 00:22:02,159 Speaker 1: in India had spies, and they counter intelligence, and these 325 00:22:02,200 --> 00:22:07,200 Speaker 1: two in particular worked assiduously to maintain this. In ancient Egypt, 326 00:22:07,359 --> 00:22:11,200 Speaker 1: pharaohs would call these folks the eyes and the ears. 327 00:22:11,240 --> 00:22:14,800 Speaker 1: Of the Pharaoh. I would even posit that the importance 328 00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:20,120 Speaker 1: of espionage, spine, and counter intelligence was so well known 329 00:22:20,200 --> 00:22:23,760 Speaker 1: to human civilization that it made it into some mythology. 330 00:22:24,119 --> 00:22:28,320 Speaker 1: Like consider Odin's two ravens, thought and memory, and he 331 00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:31,080 Speaker 1: sends them out to just tell him, you know, what's 332 00:22:31,119 --> 00:22:37,399 Speaker 1: going on, and uh, that to me doesn't come from nowhere. Uh. 333 00:22:37,560 --> 00:22:41,400 Speaker 1: We also know is common in other empires across the world. Yeah, 334 00:22:41,400 --> 00:22:45,040 Speaker 1: this is also common in Greek, Roman, Mongol and the 335 00:22:45,119 --> 00:22:49,040 Speaker 1: Japanese empires, all those places. And you can even look 336 00:22:49,080 --> 00:22:52,680 Speaker 1: to the Bible and find a few spy stories. Uh, 337 00:22:52,920 --> 00:22:56,680 Speaker 1: there's a tale about this fellow, Robb. You ever heard 338 00:22:56,680 --> 00:22:58,600 Speaker 1: of this. I I don't really remember this at all, 339 00:22:58,840 --> 00:23:03,119 Speaker 1: but it's essentially spies that were sent to Jericho, and 340 00:23:03,160 --> 00:23:04,960 Speaker 1: they were sent there before there was going to be 341 00:23:05,000 --> 00:23:07,679 Speaker 1: an attack, and the whole point was to get an 342 00:23:07,720 --> 00:23:11,000 Speaker 1: idea of what's the enemy doing, like how many troops 343 00:23:11,040 --> 00:23:14,200 Speaker 1: are there, where they stationed, where the weak points where 344 00:23:14,200 --> 00:23:18,440 Speaker 1: we could actually infiltrate and and make this thing way 345 00:23:18,440 --> 00:23:21,840 Speaker 1: more effective. Um. It's one of the earliest written records 346 00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:27,280 Speaker 1: of a let's say, successful espionage attempt. Yeah. In this story, 347 00:23:27,560 --> 00:23:32,720 Speaker 1: Joshua's secretly sends two spies two. I believe the quote 348 00:23:32,840 --> 00:23:38,080 Speaker 1: is look over the lad but especially Jericho. So and 349 00:23:38,160 --> 00:23:42,880 Speaker 1: it was successful because Hobbs she had she had hidden 350 00:23:43,359 --> 00:23:49,240 Speaker 1: these two spies away. So she actually misdirected authorities of 351 00:23:49,320 --> 00:23:52,000 Speaker 1: Jericho and they were trying to find the spies, and 352 00:23:52,040 --> 00:23:56,240 Speaker 1: she said she uh uh I want to be clear 353 00:23:56,240 --> 00:24:00,720 Speaker 1: of paraphrasing here. She essentially said, when the cops rocked 354 00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:05,040 Speaker 1: up to her, they went that away. That's that's kind 355 00:24:05,040 --> 00:24:07,240 Speaker 1: of what happens. So we know that it's existed for 356 00:24:07,240 --> 00:24:09,520 Speaker 1: a long time. It's in one of the most popular 357 00:24:09,680 --> 00:24:16,920 Speaker 1: books in human civilization. And often these operations falter and 358 00:24:17,040 --> 00:24:21,040 Speaker 1: cease when the various empires fail or the various rulers 359 00:24:21,040 --> 00:24:24,439 Speaker 1: fall out of favor. But the more conspiratorial in the 360 00:24:24,480 --> 00:24:29,040 Speaker 1: crowd today will maybe point to evidence of former state 361 00:24:29,119 --> 00:24:33,000 Speaker 1: movements that go rogue, like the Knights Templar. When they 362 00:24:33,000 --> 00:24:37,320 Speaker 1: go rogue and fall out of favor, spycraft becomes not 363 00:24:37,480 --> 00:24:40,320 Speaker 1: just a tool in the toolbox, but it becomes a 364 00:24:40,400 --> 00:24:46,920 Speaker 1: necessity for survival going forward. And this this is an amazing, 365 00:24:47,040 --> 00:24:50,040 Speaker 1: like long period of history we're just establishing that has 366 00:24:50,119 --> 00:24:53,359 Speaker 1: been around a long long time. It is a very old, 367 00:24:53,800 --> 00:24:56,960 Speaker 1: oft hidden tradition. But we do know a little bit 368 00:24:57,000 --> 00:25:00,240 Speaker 1: more about spying in the Middle Ages, and we know 369 00:25:00,400 --> 00:25:04,919 Speaker 1: even more about spying in the Cold War era comparatively, 370 00:25:04,960 --> 00:25:07,960 Speaker 1: at least. Again, a lot of this by design is 371 00:25:08,040 --> 00:25:11,760 Speaker 1: lost to history. Uh. And I guess we should say 372 00:25:11,960 --> 00:25:17,719 Speaker 1: to be fair. In the intelligence community, people don't like 373 00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:22,600 Speaker 1: the term spycraft. It's a little contentious. You gotta call 374 00:25:22,680 --> 00:25:28,200 Speaker 1: it tradecraft, which I I understand, you know, the rationale 375 00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:34,000 Speaker 1: behind euphemisms or whatever, but tradecraft feels a little now 376 00:25:34,080 --> 00:25:36,560 Speaker 1: I want to be disrespectful. It just feels like it's 377 00:25:36,600 --> 00:25:40,840 Speaker 1: so vague that we're all just pretending to use this 378 00:25:40,880 --> 00:25:45,000 Speaker 1: word without describing what it actually is. Yeah, I agree. 379 00:25:45,119 --> 00:25:48,840 Speaker 1: And also I wrote out spycraft in my notes app 380 00:25:48,920 --> 00:25:53,960 Speaker 1: over here, and I stylized it like spacecraft, and I 381 00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:56,560 Speaker 1: want to play that game. So I just wish Blizzard 382 00:25:56,680 --> 00:25:59,160 Speaker 1: was in better you know, standing, so that they could 383 00:25:59,200 --> 00:26:03,040 Speaker 1: make a game called spycraft. Oh and I found a 384 00:26:03,080 --> 00:26:06,040 Speaker 1: pretty cool game you can play online if you will. 385 00:26:06,160 --> 00:26:07,639 Speaker 1: We'll tell you how to get to it. A pretty 386 00:26:07,640 --> 00:26:10,720 Speaker 1: cool spy game you can play online if you go 387 00:26:10,880 --> 00:26:15,639 Speaker 1: to h Q dot Every day spy dot com. I 388 00:26:15,720 --> 00:26:20,080 Speaker 1: was scared to click on it. Ben serious, It's called 389 00:26:20,200 --> 00:26:26,520 Speaker 1: Operation real Time. M hmmm, not getting might email address. 390 00:26:28,440 --> 00:26:30,159 Speaker 1: I like the way you're thinking. I do like the 391 00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:33,760 Speaker 1: way you're thinking here. So let's maybe just talk about 392 00:26:33,800 --> 00:26:38,240 Speaker 1: some examples for the Middle Ages. So the English Queen 393 00:26:38,520 --> 00:26:45,360 Speaker 1: Elizabeth the First from fifty three she established or her 394 00:26:45,400 --> 00:26:50,720 Speaker 1: court established what people today recognize as the first long 395 00:26:50,880 --> 00:26:55,480 Speaker 1: term dedicated intelligence network. And over in France, the infamous 396 00:26:55,520 --> 00:27:01,880 Speaker 1: Cardinal Richelieu's sixty two use something he called the Cabinet 397 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:08,080 Speaker 1: Noir to monitor all all correspondence of foreign diplomats and 398 00:27:08,080 --> 00:27:12,640 Speaker 1: then also to keep tabs on anybody he suspected of treason. 399 00:27:13,560 --> 00:27:16,800 Speaker 1: And and this this, this is reading of letters. That's 400 00:27:16,800 --> 00:27:20,040 Speaker 1: what this is. You go into a black cabinet, you 401 00:27:20,080 --> 00:27:22,280 Speaker 1: take the letters in there, you open them up a 402 00:27:22,320 --> 00:27:25,240 Speaker 1: little bit, just really carefully or use some light and 403 00:27:25,320 --> 00:27:27,640 Speaker 1: read what's in there, and put them back, and then 404 00:27:27,680 --> 00:27:30,399 Speaker 1: just send it on off to where you're supposed to go. Right, 405 00:27:30,520 --> 00:27:34,280 Speaker 1: put that little wax seal back perfectly, so no one 406 00:27:34,320 --> 00:27:37,680 Speaker 1: can tell the letter was opened. And there was also 407 00:27:38,080 --> 00:27:43,080 Speaker 1: a postal intelligence network that reached its glory days in 408 00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:47,480 Speaker 1: Vienna in seventeen sixteen or eighteen forty eight was called 409 00:27:47,480 --> 00:27:51,080 Speaker 1: the Secret Cipher Chancellory, which does sound like a cool 410 00:27:51,119 --> 00:27:56,199 Speaker 1: group of people to freestyle with, but but there no, 411 00:27:56,400 --> 00:28:00,440 Speaker 1: they're just reading the mail as well. Takes up though, 412 00:28:01,119 --> 00:28:04,080 Speaker 1: what is uh? I don't know what this has been? 413 00:28:04,160 --> 00:28:08,240 Speaker 1: But what is a cipher? Like when with regards to freestyle, 414 00:28:08,320 --> 00:28:09,960 Speaker 1: what is a cipher? I don't know what that is? 415 00:28:10,119 --> 00:28:14,040 Speaker 1: So typically, UM, A lot of things can be referred 416 00:28:14,040 --> 00:28:17,320 Speaker 1: to as a cipher. Cipher can be a battle or 417 00:28:17,359 --> 00:28:20,959 Speaker 1: a battle can be a kind of cipher. UH, won't 418 00:28:21,000 --> 00:28:24,399 Speaker 1: deploy the maze puzzle comparison just yet. But in a 419 00:28:24,520 --> 00:28:28,359 Speaker 1: in a cipher, you're not necessarily battling. People might just 420 00:28:28,440 --> 00:28:32,760 Speaker 1: be hanging out and trading versus UH. And you know, 421 00:28:32,880 --> 00:28:37,479 Speaker 1: often sadly those verses are now sort of pre written 422 00:28:37,720 --> 00:28:41,800 Speaker 1: and memorized and just recited. It could be considered a 423 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:44,600 Speaker 1: freestyle because someone hasn't heard the beat before, or because 424 00:28:44,640 --> 00:28:47,200 Speaker 1: they're going to a capella. But that's so a cipher 425 00:28:47,280 --> 00:28:51,080 Speaker 1: is you you're not necessarily fighting someone. It's like you me, 426 00:28:51,440 --> 00:28:54,840 Speaker 1: Paul and you listening along at home. We all were 427 00:28:54,840 --> 00:28:59,040 Speaker 1: all gathered around somewhere and we're just it's a display 428 00:28:59,080 --> 00:29:02,920 Speaker 1: of skills about the need to have an opponent, right 429 00:29:03,040 --> 00:29:05,600 Speaker 1: without the need to have a specific opponent. It's still 430 00:29:05,880 --> 00:29:09,400 Speaker 1: it's there's still you know, a lot of like braggadocio 431 00:29:09,560 --> 00:29:13,960 Speaker 1: with the formula of a these people are bad, b 432 00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:19,400 Speaker 1: I'm good. See here's why. Hey, the more you know, 433 00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:25,080 Speaker 1: you know. Thanks that anyway, back in the day, in 434 00:29:25,120 --> 00:29:28,600 Speaker 1: the days of antiquity, the old school spying, days before 435 00:29:28,640 --> 00:29:31,320 Speaker 1: anybody had ever heard of the n esa or sign. 436 00:29:32,480 --> 00:29:38,800 Speaker 1: The spies of ancient days came from specialized parts of 437 00:29:38,840 --> 00:29:43,160 Speaker 1: their various class systems, and they could be they could 438 00:29:43,160 --> 00:29:46,480 Speaker 1: be things like members of the upper class, very very valuable. 439 00:29:46,560 --> 00:29:49,960 Speaker 1: If you want to know what's going on in Bavaria, 440 00:29:50,320 --> 00:29:53,760 Speaker 1: and you have someone who is tight with the rulers 441 00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:56,760 Speaker 1: of Bavaria and hangs out with them in court, then 442 00:29:56,920 --> 00:30:02,080 Speaker 1: that's that's worth a thousand, just middle class people. And 443 00:30:02,280 --> 00:30:04,920 Speaker 1: if you because they have access to restricted areas and 444 00:30:04,960 --> 00:30:09,320 Speaker 1: restricted conversations, restricted people. This is ultimately all about access 445 00:30:09,440 --> 00:30:15,120 Speaker 1: and leverage. That's right, And what's also sometimes equally effective 446 00:30:15,240 --> 00:30:19,040 Speaker 1: is having people who are on staff in a palace 447 00:30:19,480 --> 00:30:24,360 Speaker 1: right or a governor's mansion. Something to that effect because 448 00:30:24,440 --> 00:30:27,960 Speaker 1: they may also have access to those restricted areas because 449 00:30:28,000 --> 00:30:30,920 Speaker 1: they have to claim them or serve drinks in there. 450 00:30:31,920 --> 00:30:35,480 Speaker 1: Very very smart move to do if you're if you're 451 00:30:35,480 --> 00:30:40,640 Speaker 1: ever you know, running a spy network, and they get ignored, right, Like, 452 00:30:40,680 --> 00:30:44,320 Speaker 1: I'm always not to get too far behind the curtain, 453 00:30:44,400 --> 00:30:48,040 Speaker 1: but one of the things that I suggest you always 454 00:30:48,160 --> 00:30:50,680 Speaker 1: do if you are in the new environment and you're 455 00:30:50,720 --> 00:30:53,760 Speaker 1: going to be there for some amount of time is 456 00:30:55,320 --> 00:30:57,080 Speaker 1: like a lot of a lot of people who see 457 00:30:57,080 --> 00:31:01,360 Speaker 1: themselves as networkers or social climbers us up because they 458 00:31:01,400 --> 00:31:04,040 Speaker 1: try to make friends with people they envisioned at the 459 00:31:04,080 --> 00:31:07,760 Speaker 1: top of a hierarchy, right, and sometimes they get unethical 460 00:31:07,760 --> 00:31:09,880 Speaker 1: and they try to take credit for other people's work 461 00:31:09,880 --> 00:31:11,680 Speaker 1: and blah blah blah blah blah. But they've got it 462 00:31:11,720 --> 00:31:14,520 Speaker 1: all back ass words, because what you should be doing 463 00:31:14,840 --> 00:31:18,320 Speaker 1: is you should be befriending and building rapport not with 464 00:31:18,480 --> 00:31:21,160 Speaker 1: just those folks, but with the folks who are always 465 00:31:21,240 --> 00:31:25,640 Speaker 1: there with security, with the people in maintenance, and those 466 00:31:25,800 --> 00:31:28,280 Speaker 1: those are the folks who will tend to know more 467 00:31:28,320 --> 00:31:31,400 Speaker 1: of the day to day than the average person, and 468 00:31:31,480 --> 00:31:34,080 Speaker 1: you can siphon all kinds of information out of them. 469 00:31:34,240 --> 00:31:38,720 Speaker 1: And yes, yes, and in some cases as sad as 470 00:31:38,760 --> 00:31:41,680 Speaker 1: it is to admit, with the way humans let themselves 471 00:31:41,720 --> 00:31:45,960 Speaker 1: be ruled by hierarchies rather than abilities, in some cases 472 00:31:46,000 --> 00:31:49,400 Speaker 1: you can just treat someone like a human being and 473 00:31:49,480 --> 00:31:52,920 Speaker 1: that alone will be enough, even if even if they're 474 00:31:52,920 --> 00:31:55,680 Speaker 1: telling you stuff they know they shouldn't be saying. Anyway, 475 00:31:55,840 --> 00:31:58,600 Speaker 1: You're right, And this stuff continues to the modern day. 476 00:31:58,600 --> 00:32:03,360 Speaker 1: This access, this idea of leveraging hierarchy, this idea of 477 00:32:03,440 --> 00:32:09,800 Speaker 1: leveraging advantage. Uh academia, elite universities. They are breeding grounds 478 00:32:09,840 --> 00:32:15,040 Speaker 1: across the world for potential assets. Um take for instance, 479 00:32:15,320 --> 00:32:20,080 Speaker 1: the Cambridge five. They fed information to the Soviets from 480 00:32:20,120 --> 00:32:24,640 Speaker 1: the United Kingdom in World War Two, and US intelligence 481 00:32:24,680 --> 00:32:30,040 Speaker 1: agencies also actively recruit from elite universities. As we'll learn later, 482 00:32:30,400 --> 00:32:33,640 Speaker 1: going to college is kind of a requirement if you 483 00:32:33,680 --> 00:32:37,520 Speaker 1: want to be if you want to be considered for 484 00:32:37,560 --> 00:32:41,040 Speaker 1: some of the less unpleasant espionage roles, and there are 485 00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:44,000 Speaker 1: plenty of unpleasant ones we'll get to. I'm so excited 486 00:32:44,040 --> 00:32:48,280 Speaker 1: about part two already. Okay, so this is interesting. This 487 00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:51,400 Speaker 1: next thing. We're still back in the day. If let's 488 00:32:51,440 --> 00:32:55,240 Speaker 1: say you can't get you've tried, and you've tried and tried, 489 00:32:55,320 --> 00:33:00,360 Speaker 1: and you just can't get someone inside the court of 490 00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:05,480 Speaker 1: your adversary. The next best thing you do is get 491 00:33:05,560 --> 00:33:08,640 Speaker 1: tight with someone who's a member of a class that 492 00:33:08,680 --> 00:33:12,560 Speaker 1: has an access to a wide array of information. This 493 00:33:12,640 --> 00:33:15,120 Speaker 1: is where like our royal staff comes in. This is 494 00:33:15,160 --> 00:33:19,920 Speaker 1: also where successful traveling merchants or big time business members 495 00:33:19,920 --> 00:33:22,960 Speaker 1: come in, because they are able. There's some of the 496 00:33:23,000 --> 00:33:25,880 Speaker 1: first people in human history who are able to see 497 00:33:26,560 --> 00:33:29,040 Speaker 1: what you would call the forty thousand foot view. They 498 00:33:29,040 --> 00:33:34,760 Speaker 1: could see the forest. They knew that insert country here 499 00:33:35,040 --> 00:33:37,400 Speaker 1: is getting a lot more gunpowder than they used to. 500 00:33:37,920 --> 00:33:40,680 Speaker 1: They knew, you know, they could see these movements. Um 501 00:33:40,800 --> 00:33:43,200 Speaker 1: In the old days, there would be a lot of 502 00:33:44,160 --> 00:33:47,920 Speaker 1: a lot of attention put on how much food someone 503 00:33:48,040 --> 00:33:51,960 Speaker 1: was storing, right, and if it's if it's an out 504 00:33:52,000 --> 00:33:56,560 Speaker 1: of season thing, why are their reserves so high in 505 00:33:56,560 --> 00:33:59,840 Speaker 1: a time of plenty? Why are they saving all that? 506 00:34:00,480 --> 00:34:03,920 Speaker 1: And where would they if they were gonna lay siege 507 00:34:04,040 --> 00:34:09,040 Speaker 1: to something, it would be their draft pick. Merchant merchants 508 00:34:09,080 --> 00:34:11,879 Speaker 1: will know that kind of stuff, and for the right 509 00:34:11,960 --> 00:34:15,080 Speaker 1: price or for the right ideology, they would disclose it. 510 00:34:15,200 --> 00:34:19,480 Speaker 1: So there they had knowledge of inter civilizational trade in 511 00:34:19,600 --> 00:34:23,280 Speaker 1: times when many people lived and died within thirty miles 512 00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:27,040 Speaker 1: of where they were born. So this occurs today even 513 00:34:27,040 --> 00:34:29,600 Speaker 1: on a I would say, on a more accelerated scale, 514 00:34:29,920 --> 00:34:33,800 Speaker 1: because Matt, as you and I know, and we're sometimes 515 00:34:33,840 --> 00:34:36,360 Speaker 1: in a bubble folks, sometimes we don't know what is 516 00:34:36,400 --> 00:34:40,600 Speaker 1: like normal to know. But but as as you and 517 00:34:40,680 --> 00:34:44,239 Speaker 1: I know, and as I hope everybody knows, states and 518 00:34:44,320 --> 00:34:51,479 Speaker 1: corporations have reached an entirely new level of intertwinement. Right, 519 00:34:51,880 --> 00:34:54,920 Speaker 1: it's a great way to put it. And the power 520 00:34:56,640 --> 00:35:01,480 Speaker 1: is shifting, or even has shifted in an interesting way 521 00:35:01,520 --> 00:35:05,160 Speaker 1: as as those things intertwined, and we've together the power 522 00:35:05,280 --> 00:35:07,760 Speaker 1: kind of and oh, the power kind of flows through 523 00:35:07,800 --> 00:35:11,799 Speaker 1: it as one system now rather than the government empowering 524 00:35:11,880 --> 00:35:14,960 Speaker 1: the corporate structures or the you know, in the future, 525 00:35:15,000 --> 00:35:17,920 Speaker 1: I think the corporate structures allowing the governments to exist. 526 00:35:18,080 --> 00:35:22,840 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, no, no, you're right. Everybody's longtime listeners have 527 00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:26,720 Speaker 1: heard the theory of this, right, the human evolution, human 528 00:35:26,800 --> 00:35:31,800 Speaker 1: social evolution proceeds like this one. He got the family, two, 529 00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:35,480 Speaker 1: you've got the tribe. Three, you've got the religion. Right, 530 00:35:35,600 --> 00:35:38,600 Speaker 1: that is the rationale or the belief system. You nineteen 531 00:35:39,080 --> 00:35:43,799 Speaker 1: disparate tribes, you nineteen disparate families, and then four you've 532 00:35:43,840 --> 00:35:46,880 Speaker 1: got the state, and then five. The level we're going 533 00:35:46,920 --> 00:35:51,920 Speaker 1: to now is the corporate governance, you know, like the 534 00:35:51,920 --> 00:35:54,840 Speaker 1: there's a great sci fi novel called like the United 535 00:35:54,880 --> 00:35:58,200 Speaker 1: States a subsidiary of Exxon stuff like that. We're very 536 00:35:58,280 --> 00:36:00,760 Speaker 1: much on the way there. Shout out to uh, those 537 00:36:00,840 --> 00:36:05,440 Speaker 1: new tech companies. Plans for company towns worked out so 538 00:36:05,560 --> 00:36:10,680 Speaker 1: well in the coal mining days than that. I know. Sorry, 539 00:36:10,719 --> 00:36:13,319 Speaker 1: these are unnecessary pot shots. I don't need to walk 540 00:36:13,400 --> 00:36:16,240 Speaker 1: so far away down the street just to talk trash 541 00:36:16,239 --> 00:36:22,319 Speaker 1: about the company towns are terrible idea anyway. Yeah, yeah, 542 00:36:22,920 --> 00:36:25,759 Speaker 1: let's talk about another another social class we haven't really 543 00:36:25,840 --> 00:36:32,120 Speaker 1: named yet, Matt. Uh, what would our third great demographic 544 00:36:32,160 --> 00:36:35,879 Speaker 1: for spy be in the back in the day, Yes, Ben, 545 00:36:36,000 --> 00:36:38,640 Speaker 1: A great example is one of the things you've just mentioned. 546 00:36:39,080 --> 00:36:44,480 Speaker 1: One of those classes the religious class. So anyone who 547 00:36:45,160 --> 00:36:47,480 Speaker 1: is in charge of a flock of people, like minded 548 00:36:47,520 --> 00:36:52,080 Speaker 1: individuals who all worship the same deity, if you can 549 00:36:52,239 --> 00:36:57,000 Speaker 1: somehow infiltrate that system and get let's say, a Catholic 550 00:36:57,040 --> 00:37:00,399 Speaker 1: priest on your side, get a pastor of a very 551 00:37:00,520 --> 00:37:04,879 Speaker 1: large megachurch on your side. In this person can either 552 00:37:04,920 --> 00:37:08,880 Speaker 1: disseminate information out to the people that they have access to, 553 00:37:09,640 --> 00:37:15,160 Speaker 1: or they can gather information pretty easily. Yeah, I mean, 554 00:37:15,239 --> 00:37:19,400 Speaker 1: think about it in days when the average person struggled 555 00:37:19,440 --> 00:37:22,439 Speaker 1: with literacy or couldn't read it all. We're talking about 556 00:37:22,480 --> 00:37:27,360 Speaker 1: people who are polyglots. They can decipher things written foreign languages, 557 00:37:27,560 --> 00:37:31,520 Speaker 1: They have the power of literacy, and they tend to 558 00:37:31,600 --> 00:37:36,640 Speaker 1: have control over other people due to those religious beliefs. 559 00:37:37,080 --> 00:37:39,360 Speaker 1: This isn't always a bad thing, but it's not always 560 00:37:39,360 --> 00:37:41,560 Speaker 1: a good thing when you consider stuff like the Catholic 561 00:37:41,680 --> 00:37:45,680 Speaker 1: Church's role in assisting Nazis and fascist during World War Two, 562 00:37:46,480 --> 00:37:48,480 Speaker 1: back when it wasn't a hot take to say that 563 00:37:48,520 --> 00:37:52,680 Speaker 1: fascism is a bad thing, which it is anyway, you're 564 00:37:52,760 --> 00:37:55,520 Speaker 1: right now. Yeah, well, it's the same thing if you 565 00:37:55,560 --> 00:37:59,400 Speaker 1: if you imagine, I don't know, let's say you're in 566 00:37:59,480 --> 00:38:03,640 Speaker 1: bad or something. If you can gain sway over and 567 00:38:03,760 --> 00:38:05,840 Speaker 1: a mom that's the head of a mosque in a 568 00:38:05,880 --> 00:38:10,279 Speaker 1: strategic location, that can be very very helpful. Absolutely absolutely, 569 00:38:10,280 --> 00:38:14,359 Speaker 1: and multiple people will try even today. So we could 570 00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:20,160 Speaker 1: spend hours examining known feats of intelligence operatives in the 571 00:38:20,200 --> 00:38:22,920 Speaker 1: Middle East in early Western Europe. We could look at 572 00:38:22,920 --> 00:38:26,160 Speaker 1: all the weird, weird ideas the USSR and the US 573 00:38:26,239 --> 00:38:28,960 Speaker 1: cooked up during the Cold War and folks full of 574 00:38:29,000 --> 00:38:33,040 Speaker 1: conspiracy realists. If you're interested, Uh, I think, Matt, you 575 00:38:33,120 --> 00:38:36,160 Speaker 1: and I are happy to explore more specific ideas in 576 00:38:36,200 --> 00:38:39,600 Speaker 1: the future. But we already know. Despite being a two parter, 577 00:38:39,920 --> 00:38:42,279 Speaker 1: we're running a little along with this. We'll just say. 578 00:38:42,360 --> 00:38:45,200 Speaker 1: If you want to learn more, check out our episodes 579 00:38:45,280 --> 00:38:50,279 Speaker 1: on like non human spy ideas. Check out our episodes 580 00:38:50,320 --> 00:38:54,200 Speaker 1: on the culpra ring Agent three fifty five, who remains 581 00:38:54,280 --> 00:38:57,520 Speaker 1: unidentified the modern day. For now, main takeaway is this 582 00:38:57,880 --> 00:39:00,799 Speaker 1: spy and his ancient a pre day the creation of 583 00:39:00,840 --> 00:39:04,120 Speaker 1: the Bible, and it's likely been around as long as 584 00:39:04,160 --> 00:39:07,719 Speaker 1: civilizations have so our question what is the world of 585 00:39:07,760 --> 00:39:11,360 Speaker 1: tradecraft like in the modern day. We're gonna pause for 586 00:39:11,400 --> 00:39:15,360 Speaker 1: another redaction and we'll be back to explore that together. 587 00:39:21,960 --> 00:39:26,760 Speaker 1: Here's where it gets crazy. The telegraph that's all a fone. 588 00:39:27,960 --> 00:39:33,120 Speaker 1: The moving photography, that's the nineteenth century. We boldly going 589 00:39:33,200 --> 00:39:36,400 Speaker 1: into the future, and spying is coming along. That's the 590 00:39:36,440 --> 00:39:39,520 Speaker 1: only transatlantic I'll do. I know that can get grating 591 00:39:39,680 --> 00:39:43,759 Speaker 1: after a while. That's okay, I love it. Yeah. Well, 592 00:39:43,800 --> 00:39:46,839 Speaker 1: I mean we're talking about the information age kind of 593 00:39:47,080 --> 00:39:51,080 Speaker 1: beginning to bloom, right, I mean, being able to just 594 00:39:51,120 --> 00:39:57,040 Speaker 1: communicate with somebody from a vast distance changes spycraft completely. Yeah, 595 00:39:57,160 --> 00:40:01,200 Speaker 1: and there's there's not really an argument that human spies 596 00:40:01,320 --> 00:40:04,960 Speaker 1: and intelligence agencies found themselves kind of in a John 597 00:40:05,000 --> 00:40:08,960 Speaker 1: Henry situation. In the modern day, they became less relevant 598 00:40:09,000 --> 00:40:11,840 Speaker 1: as electronic sources could replace some of the old tratt 599 00:40:11,880 --> 00:40:16,200 Speaker 1: and true skullduggery. But maybe the most surprising part of 600 00:40:16,640 --> 00:40:19,359 Speaker 1: and we'll call it tradecraft, maybe the most surprising part 601 00:40:19,360 --> 00:40:23,960 Speaker 1: of tradecraft today is that on some level, the majority 602 00:40:24,280 --> 00:40:28,360 Speaker 1: of all those old school analog techniques are still in 603 00:40:28,520 --> 00:40:32,760 Speaker 1: use today all around the world. Dead drops, fake identities, 604 00:40:32,960 --> 00:40:37,320 Speaker 1: cover stories, false info, all that stuff is still around. 605 00:40:37,360 --> 00:40:40,879 Speaker 1: And it might seencounter two intuitive at first, because electronic 606 00:40:40,960 --> 00:40:45,040 Speaker 1: surveillance has become this eye of Sura and that can 607 00:40:45,200 --> 00:40:48,600 Speaker 1: sweep the world. And for the sake of either ignorance 608 00:40:48,719 --> 00:40:54,400 Speaker 1: or convenience, most civilians seem fine ratting on themselves through smartphones, 609 00:40:54,760 --> 00:40:58,600 Speaker 1: social media, GPS, etcetera. So the question is, why would 610 00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:02,760 Speaker 1: you need human operators out there risking their lives for 611 00:41:02,800 --> 00:41:07,120 Speaker 1: those with those old school methods of information disruption or retrieval. 612 00:41:07,360 --> 00:41:11,240 Speaker 1: Short answer, it works. It still works. That's a reason 613 00:41:11,360 --> 00:41:16,360 Speaker 1: like cars still have wheels because wheels work, you know 614 00:41:16,400 --> 00:41:19,040 Speaker 1: what I mean. We can build better wheels, but there's 615 00:41:19,080 --> 00:41:22,360 Speaker 1: still wheels. No, you're correct. I would just give a 616 00:41:22,440 --> 00:41:24,600 Speaker 1: quick example, and I think we're gonna do this, Ben. 617 00:41:24,719 --> 00:41:28,040 Speaker 1: But if I take a picture with my phone, and 618 00:41:28,280 --> 00:41:31,280 Speaker 1: even if it's just let's say I've turned off everything 619 00:41:31,520 --> 00:41:36,640 Speaker 1: on this phone right my uh, there's no WiFi, no Bluetooth, 620 00:41:36,719 --> 00:41:38,920 Speaker 1: I'm not even connected to LT or anything like that, 621 00:41:38,960 --> 00:41:41,040 Speaker 1: turn it all off. I still take a photo with 622 00:41:41,120 --> 00:41:45,799 Speaker 1: this there. It is much easier to get onto this 623 00:41:45,880 --> 00:41:49,839 Speaker 1: phone and get what I have captured than it would 624 00:41:49,880 --> 00:41:52,879 Speaker 1: be if I have let's say, a camera that has 625 00:41:52,960 --> 00:41:55,920 Speaker 1: film in it that you can't access by any digital means. 626 00:41:56,280 --> 00:41:59,759 Speaker 1: I click a button, it gets exposed, I develop it 627 00:41:59,840 --> 00:42:03,000 Speaker 1: my self, and then I deliver it at some drop 628 00:42:03,080 --> 00:42:06,000 Speaker 1: where it needs to go. There's no way for anyone 629 00:42:06,000 --> 00:42:08,400 Speaker 1: to know that I've done that unless they are physically 630 00:42:08,680 --> 00:42:13,640 Speaker 1: watching me through some other probably digital means, right right exactly. 631 00:42:14,280 --> 00:42:18,040 Speaker 1: It can stop newer operations in their tracks. It can 632 00:42:18,040 --> 00:42:22,279 Speaker 1: stop things like hacking or signals intelligence SIGENT, which is 633 00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:25,319 Speaker 1: kind of the future of spying. But yeah, yeah, just 634 00:42:25,400 --> 00:42:28,719 Speaker 1: I picked up my phone to talk about that and 635 00:42:28,760 --> 00:42:30,920 Speaker 1: give that example, and I got I just got a 636 00:42:30,960 --> 00:42:36,640 Speaker 1: call from an unknown number, so great, Okay, we redacted 637 00:42:36,640 --> 00:42:39,120 Speaker 1: everything just to be clear. Everything we're talking about is 638 00:42:39,200 --> 00:42:44,120 Speaker 1: declassified to by the way. So this eliminating a digital 639 00:42:44,160 --> 00:42:49,920 Speaker 1: footprint is the most successful step a modern spy can 640 00:42:49,920 --> 00:42:53,760 Speaker 1: take to avoid discovery because it's one of the first 641 00:42:53,800 --> 00:42:58,080 Speaker 1: steps of counter intelligence agency will take in the identification 642 00:42:58,120 --> 00:43:03,080 Speaker 1: of any operation. And the digital world of spying definitely exists, 643 00:43:03,440 --> 00:43:07,399 Speaker 1: and modern on the ground assets do use it. We've 644 00:43:07,440 --> 00:43:11,200 Speaker 1: got some check out our Lake City Quiet Pills Conversations 645 00:43:11,280 --> 00:43:14,280 Speaker 1: to learn more about how you can communicate with people 646 00:43:14,280 --> 00:43:19,359 Speaker 1: in source code, or think about think about how one 647 00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:23,400 Speaker 1: of the best ways to leverage online communication is to 648 00:43:23,600 --> 00:43:26,600 Speaker 1: blend in. Just like an old school spy would blend 649 00:43:26,640 --> 00:43:31,200 Speaker 1: into a crowd, you blend into maybe nonsensical comments on 650 00:43:31,239 --> 00:43:35,600 Speaker 1: YouTube pages and nobody knows that. Like if you're looking 651 00:43:35,680 --> 00:43:38,279 Speaker 1: at what's the last example used for, Like you're looking 652 00:43:38,320 --> 00:43:43,600 Speaker 1: at an old um an old clip from a three 653 00:43:43,640 --> 00:43:47,440 Speaker 1: Dog Night Live show, and then you drop a comment 654 00:43:47,640 --> 00:43:51,880 Speaker 1: on there that is meant for one person and doesn't 655 00:43:51,880 --> 00:43:55,000 Speaker 1: make sense for anybody else. That's a very effective way 656 00:43:55,040 --> 00:43:57,000 Speaker 1: of doing it. No. I mean, I've got somebody on 657 00:43:57,000 --> 00:44:01,880 Speaker 1: our YouTube channel that just says corking. Okay, I wonder 658 00:44:01,920 --> 00:44:07,520 Speaker 1: what that's about. Spy right. So, also, unless you're in 659 00:44:07,520 --> 00:44:11,640 Speaker 1: a really heavily monitored police state like the DPRK or 660 00:44:11,880 --> 00:44:15,759 Speaker 1: North Korea, or you're in a really sensitive area like 661 00:44:16,360 --> 00:44:20,080 Speaker 1: downtown d C or something, dead drops and chance meetings 662 00:44:20,080 --> 00:44:23,440 Speaker 1: still work really well. The stuff that we will call 663 00:44:23,520 --> 00:44:28,480 Speaker 1: old school spycraft or tradecraft is now often collectively called 664 00:44:28,600 --> 00:44:32,759 Speaker 1: clandestine human ant h U, M, I and T talked 665 00:44:32,800 --> 00:44:38,719 Speaker 1: about before. Human intelligence SIGENT is passive signals collection, sort 666 00:44:38,719 --> 00:44:42,080 Speaker 1: of reading the tea leaves of all those messages that 667 00:44:42,200 --> 00:44:46,160 Speaker 1: everybody sends to each other, from the innocuous um likes 668 00:44:46,239 --> 00:44:52,920 Speaker 1: on an Instagram page to two bigger stuff like diplomatic cables, etcetera, Uh, 669 00:44:53,120 --> 00:44:56,320 Speaker 1: energy signatures, that kind of that kind of stuff. Human 670 00:44:57,120 --> 00:45:02,120 Speaker 1: conversely is collecting intelligence from HU and sources using those 671 00:45:02,160 --> 00:45:05,960 Speaker 1: old cloak and dagger techniques. We can talk just really 672 00:45:06,040 --> 00:45:10,560 Speaker 1: quickly about how what kind of role humans can play 673 00:45:10,560 --> 00:45:13,640 Speaker 1: in this regard, there's the basic spy. But again, if 674 00:45:13,680 --> 00:45:16,880 Speaker 1: they're working with you, you never call them spies. If 675 00:45:16,920 --> 00:45:20,000 Speaker 1: they're working with you, in fact, you don't talk about them. 676 00:45:21,080 --> 00:45:23,680 Speaker 1: They're your girlfriend that goes to another school and you 677 00:45:23,719 --> 00:45:26,960 Speaker 1: don't really don't bring it up. But if you do 678 00:45:27,080 --> 00:45:29,600 Speaker 1: have to talk, then the nomenclature is something more like 679 00:45:29,719 --> 00:45:36,719 Speaker 1: asset or agents, right, and sometimes very secretive, very secretive operations. 680 00:45:36,920 --> 00:45:39,080 Speaker 1: Then you're not going to use those words either, because 681 00:45:39,080 --> 00:45:41,880 Speaker 1: they're a dead giveaway that you're talking about a spy. 682 00:45:42,000 --> 00:45:43,680 Speaker 1: You know what I mean. If you're learning this on 683 00:45:43,719 --> 00:45:47,399 Speaker 1: a podcast, imagine what the professionals are thinking if they 684 00:45:47,840 --> 00:45:52,600 Speaker 1: stumble across something that references an asset in Tehran. Uh 685 00:45:52,960 --> 00:45:58,640 Speaker 1: tout toutt so so we know no, this is another 686 00:45:58,680 --> 00:46:04,440 Speaker 1: thing like we know that for every safe soldier in 687 00:46:04,719 --> 00:46:09,200 Speaker 1: an in a typical conflict, you have a larger number 688 00:46:09,239 --> 00:46:13,239 Speaker 1: of support staff that are enabling that person, whether they 689 00:46:13,320 --> 00:46:17,000 Speaker 1: are an actual soldier or mercenary or I think war 690 00:46:17,120 --> 00:46:20,879 Speaker 1: fighter is the euphemism. Now in the age of privatized militaries, 691 00:46:21,520 --> 00:46:24,759 Speaker 1: they all have a support staff and spies aren't really 692 00:46:24,800 --> 00:46:27,920 Speaker 1: any different. Oh yeah, well, let's say you arguing old 693 00:46:27,920 --> 00:46:30,480 Speaker 1: school and trying to get rid of that digital signature 694 00:46:30,480 --> 00:46:32,839 Speaker 1: in your communications. One of the best things you can 695 00:46:32,880 --> 00:46:37,200 Speaker 1: do is have a human being physically get your communication 696 00:46:37,320 --> 00:46:39,880 Speaker 1: and take it to the person you mean for that 697 00:46:39,920 --> 00:46:44,160 Speaker 1: communication to get to. Uh, that's a courier. Couriers are 698 00:46:44,200 --> 00:46:46,919 Speaker 1: all over the place in Atlanta. Do you remember, Ben, 699 00:46:47,000 --> 00:46:50,759 Speaker 1: we're at our old offices, how often couriers would show 700 00:46:50,880 --> 00:46:53,719 Speaker 1: up at our offices and how often we would send 701 00:46:53,800 --> 00:46:56,800 Speaker 1: for a courier. Yes, I feel like that doesn't happen 702 00:46:56,840 --> 00:46:59,560 Speaker 1: as much now now, well, now it's the gig economy. 703 00:47:00,360 --> 00:47:03,799 Speaker 1: Wait a minute, Um, I'm having I'm having some kind 704 00:47:03,800 --> 00:47:06,080 Speaker 1: of breakthrough, but I'm gonna save it for later, Okay. 705 00:47:06,640 --> 00:47:09,040 Speaker 1: And that's not the only kind of person you've also got. 706 00:47:09,320 --> 00:47:12,759 Speaker 1: Um oh, this is great. Like we're talking about handlers, right, 707 00:47:13,120 --> 00:47:16,360 Speaker 1: that's one one thing. But then there's also access agents. 708 00:47:16,400 --> 00:47:19,759 Speaker 1: And these are also gatekeepers in a lot of way. Uh, 709 00:47:19,800 --> 00:47:23,520 Speaker 1: in a lot of ways where if something goes really 710 00:47:23,600 --> 00:47:27,799 Speaker 1: bad with you as on the ground Asian or someone 711 00:47:27,840 --> 00:47:30,360 Speaker 1: that's working for you and on the ground agent, um, 712 00:47:30,600 --> 00:47:34,520 Speaker 1: you get burned, your identity gets known. These access agents 713 00:47:34,680 --> 00:47:37,840 Speaker 1: kind of function as this error gap between the spy 714 00:47:38,040 --> 00:47:42,480 Speaker 1: and the rest of the major operation. Right, So if 715 00:47:42,520 --> 00:47:49,520 Speaker 1: if spy gets burned, excuse me, asset gets burned, acts, 716 00:47:49,680 --> 00:47:52,080 Speaker 1: it goes, it trails, all the information trails back to 717 00:47:52,120 --> 00:47:56,200 Speaker 1: that access agent and hopefully that's where everything ends if 718 00:47:56,239 --> 00:47:59,160 Speaker 1: you're doing it right. Yeah, and this is also this 719 00:47:59,200 --> 00:48:03,799 Speaker 1: is also sometimes called a cut a cutout. So yeah, 720 00:48:03,880 --> 00:48:08,120 Speaker 1: they're they're human air gap, they're human fire break. And 721 00:48:08,640 --> 00:48:13,720 Speaker 1: this is because the hope is that if if the 722 00:48:13,840 --> 00:48:18,080 Speaker 1: asset is burned, then you know, worse comes to worse 723 00:48:18,200 --> 00:48:23,120 Speaker 1: and they disclose information, the case officer will still be 724 00:48:23,239 --> 00:48:26,320 Speaker 1: able to get away and the trail will go cold 725 00:48:26,440 --> 00:48:32,440 Speaker 1: before it reaches the actual employee. So also we should 726 00:48:32,440 --> 00:48:35,040 Speaker 1: say a lot of this terminology that you hear is 727 00:48:35,040 --> 00:48:39,080 Speaker 1: is often outdated because again in internal documentation, it's a 728 00:48:39,120 --> 00:48:41,919 Speaker 1: dead giveaway of what's going on, and you don't want 729 00:48:41,960 --> 00:48:44,600 Speaker 1: people to know what's going on. What is the case 730 00:48:44,640 --> 00:48:48,120 Speaker 1: officer they recruit or they manage the asset, and those 731 00:48:48,160 --> 00:48:52,359 Speaker 1: functions Matt and I just described, they're not always separate, uh, 732 00:48:52,680 --> 00:48:56,600 Speaker 1: And they don't always follow a pattern because a pattern 733 00:48:56,920 --> 00:49:00,919 Speaker 1: is predictable and using the same template over and over 734 00:49:01,040 --> 00:49:03,759 Speaker 1: again can lead to trouble down the road. It's the 735 00:49:03,800 --> 00:49:05,560 Speaker 1: last thing you want to do. It's the last thing 736 00:49:05,560 --> 00:49:09,480 Speaker 1: you want to do. So if this were a nature documentary, 737 00:49:09,719 --> 00:49:14,560 Speaker 1: David Attenborough would describe, well, actually you've got pretty good 738 00:49:14,600 --> 00:49:19,800 Speaker 1: David Attenborough voice, Matt. Human intelligence is the natural enemy 739 00:49:19,880 --> 00:49:25,240 Speaker 1: of counter intelligence. The two operations have diametrically oppositional goals, 740 00:49:25,600 --> 00:49:28,760 Speaker 1: and this line can get weirdly muddled as various agents 741 00:49:28,800 --> 00:49:32,719 Speaker 1: get turned and in some cases turned again, and then 742 00:49:32,760 --> 00:49:38,000 Speaker 1: again and again until they've gone full rogue or meet 743 00:49:38,080 --> 00:49:44,359 Speaker 1: the all two common end for an asset death right right, 744 00:49:44,480 --> 00:49:50,960 Speaker 1: neither particularly pleasant. Also, thank so so most sides in 745 00:49:51,000 --> 00:49:54,920 Speaker 1: an espionage conflict, which is always occurring, which is happening 746 00:49:55,040 --> 00:49:58,360 Speaker 1: right now, Even with countries that say they are friendly 747 00:49:58,960 --> 00:50:02,040 Speaker 1: all the most, I don't really have laws against their 748 00:50:02,120 --> 00:50:07,040 Speaker 1: guys doing something like assassination. Espionage is a covert pursuit. 749 00:50:07,400 --> 00:50:11,040 Speaker 1: It's an ugly open secret in the halls of diplomacy. Instead, 750 00:50:11,600 --> 00:50:15,319 Speaker 1: they have laws against other people anyone else doing it. 751 00:50:15,560 --> 00:50:18,680 Speaker 1: So in the good old US of A espionage is 752 00:50:18,719 --> 00:50:24,120 Speaker 1: a violation of technically eighteen Code eighteen, us A Code 753 00:50:24,200 --> 00:50:28,600 Speaker 1: seven and Article one oh six of the Uniform Code 754 00:50:28,640 --> 00:50:32,480 Speaker 1: of Military Justice. The US has their definition of what 755 00:50:32,760 --> 00:50:37,919 Speaker 1: espionage is. It's the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, 756 00:50:38,000 --> 00:50:41,800 Speaker 1: or receiving information about the national defense with an intent 757 00:50:41,960 --> 00:50:44,799 Speaker 1: or reason to believe this information may be used to 758 00:50:44,840 --> 00:50:47,600 Speaker 1: the injury of the United States or to the advantage 759 00:50:47,600 --> 00:50:50,319 Speaker 1: of any foreign nation. So it's kind of like I'm 760 00:50:50,400 --> 00:50:53,319 Speaker 1: rubber your glue situation, you know what I mean, or 761 00:50:53,400 --> 00:50:59,000 Speaker 1: rules for the but not for me. Uh, every nation 762 00:50:59,320 --> 00:51:04,319 Speaker 1: kind of has something like this. It is also extremely 763 00:51:04,400 --> 00:51:07,560 Speaker 1: extremely rare for any country to make a public comment 764 00:51:07,800 --> 00:51:12,640 Speaker 1: about their own activities, but they will readily and gleefully 765 00:51:12,640 --> 00:51:16,200 Speaker 1: snitch on someone else if they've caught them with a 766 00:51:16,280 --> 00:51:19,879 Speaker 1: shadowy hand in the cookie jars. So yeah, and yet 767 00:51:19,960 --> 00:51:24,400 Speaker 1: all of these countries still allow diplomats into their midst 768 00:51:25,120 --> 00:51:30,560 Speaker 1: and embassies. Man, I know, I know, and don't get 769 00:51:30,560 --> 00:51:33,799 Speaker 1: it started on diplomatic pouches, but it's like it's a 770 00:51:34,160 --> 00:51:38,720 Speaker 1: it's a necessary thing. Everybody has sort of collectively agreed 771 00:51:38,760 --> 00:51:42,160 Speaker 1: at this point in human civilization that it's better to 772 00:51:42,239 --> 00:51:47,080 Speaker 1: have diplomats because it can help make the world the 773 00:51:47,160 --> 00:51:49,840 Speaker 1: one thing most world leaders wanted to be, which is 774 00:51:49,920 --> 00:51:55,880 Speaker 1: more predictable and less unstable. Notice I didn't say, totally stable, 775 00:51:56,120 --> 00:52:00,680 Speaker 1: because unfortunately, for a lot of players, chaos is opportunity. 776 00:52:00,920 --> 00:52:04,320 Speaker 1: Like little Finger said in uh song abce fire, chaos 777 00:52:04,360 --> 00:52:07,560 Speaker 1: is a letter. M hmm. It's much harder to extract 778 00:52:07,640 --> 00:52:12,279 Speaker 1: resources when everything is stable, I know, right anyway, So 779 00:52:12,320 --> 00:52:14,799 Speaker 1: that's that's where this is. This is our close of 780 00:52:14,880 --> 00:52:19,600 Speaker 1: part one. The history of tradecraft and the present remains 781 00:52:19,680 --> 00:52:22,759 Speaker 1: a closely guarded secret for a lot of nations. It's 782 00:52:22,760 --> 00:52:25,200 Speaker 1: a game of smoke and mirrors, with the mirrors, as 783 00:52:25,480 --> 00:52:28,680 Speaker 1: you said, Matt, facing one another, and it becomes so 784 00:52:28,760 --> 00:52:32,800 Speaker 1: complex sometimes that it's difficult to know who was actually 785 00:52:32,800 --> 00:52:37,680 Speaker 1: working for whom and what their end game in actuality 786 00:52:38,080 --> 00:52:41,320 Speaker 1: is now. Part of that's due to the cell structure 787 00:52:41,800 --> 00:52:45,359 Speaker 1: of most of these operations. A cell structure is like 788 00:52:45,480 --> 00:52:51,760 Speaker 1: let's say, let's say Paul Decent is our case officer 789 00:52:52,520 --> 00:52:55,520 Speaker 1: and Matt and I. You and I are both assets, 790 00:52:55,680 --> 00:52:58,600 Speaker 1: but we don't know each other. We both live in 791 00:52:58,960 --> 00:53:03,360 Speaker 1: you know, pitts Burg or Tel Aviv or Santiago or wherever, 792 00:53:03,600 --> 00:53:06,680 Speaker 1: but we've never met or we've met, and we don't 793 00:53:06,680 --> 00:53:10,920 Speaker 1: know that we're you know, spy coworkers. That's it. We 794 00:53:11,000 --> 00:53:14,400 Speaker 1: don't know that we both work for Paul, and Paul 795 00:53:14,480 --> 00:53:18,759 Speaker 1: has us both spying on each other to keep us 796 00:53:18,760 --> 00:53:24,760 Speaker 1: in line. Right, And this is important because most people 797 00:53:25,719 --> 00:53:29,240 Speaker 1: in this tragic but most people under the right circumstances 798 00:53:29,520 --> 00:53:34,080 Speaker 1: will eventually disclose any information they possess if it means 799 00:53:34,160 --> 00:53:37,239 Speaker 1: they can avoid death or maybe more importantly, the death 800 00:53:37,239 --> 00:53:39,360 Speaker 1: of a loved one, or if they can just avoid 801 00:53:39,680 --> 00:53:46,279 Speaker 1: the pain of further torture excuse us enhanced interrogation. So yeah, right, 802 00:53:46,360 --> 00:53:49,560 Speaker 1: So that's our look at That's that's our brief in 803 00:53:49,680 --> 00:53:53,520 Speaker 1: true to the history and some of the present complications 804 00:53:54,120 --> 00:53:58,799 Speaker 1: of spy spionage of tradecraft. And what we're going to 805 00:53:58,840 --> 00:54:02,719 Speaker 1: do now is pause, try our best to make sure 806 00:54:02,719 --> 00:54:06,080 Speaker 1: our assets don't get burned, and return for part two 807 00:54:06,120 --> 00:54:10,200 Speaker 1: when we take a closer look at the future of 808 00:54:10,400 --> 00:54:16,320 Speaker 1: tradecraft and how people become spies in the first place. Oh, 809 00:54:16,600 --> 00:54:20,120 Speaker 1: are we gonna get into those Moscow rules? We can 810 00:54:20,160 --> 00:54:23,520 Speaker 1: talk Moscow. Yeah, oh man, I love those Bostoco rules. 811 00:54:23,560 --> 00:54:26,560 Speaker 1: I get away from that. Okay, Um, yeah, tell us 812 00:54:26,600 --> 00:54:28,800 Speaker 1: what you think. Let us know if you've got maybe 813 00:54:28,840 --> 00:54:33,759 Speaker 1: a family history with the trade. Be careful to disguise 814 00:54:33,840 --> 00:54:37,680 Speaker 1: your voice and or name and or any other information 815 00:54:37,800 --> 00:54:39,920 Speaker 1: if you send anything to us, but we would love 816 00:54:40,000 --> 00:54:43,040 Speaker 1: to hear your stories and your thoughts and can reach 817 00:54:43,120 --> 00:54:47,080 Speaker 1: us on social media. We are conspiracy stuff on YouTube, Twitter, 818 00:54:47,239 --> 00:54:50,359 Speaker 1: and Facebook. We also on Facebook we have Here's where 819 00:54:50,360 --> 00:54:52,480 Speaker 1: it Gets Crazy, a great place where you can go 820 00:54:52,600 --> 00:54:55,759 Speaker 1: and meet other like minded conspiracy realists and have discussions 821 00:54:55,800 --> 00:54:58,440 Speaker 1: about this and any of the other topics that we've covered. 822 00:54:58,760 --> 00:55:02,239 Speaker 1: And if you don't care for social media or your 823 00:55:02,360 --> 00:55:06,240 Speaker 1: current cover I D doesn't allow for it, we totally 824 00:55:06,280 --> 00:55:08,719 Speaker 1: get it. You can give us a call directly and 825 00:55:09,120 --> 00:55:12,719 Speaker 1: speak to us through your mouth. Our number is one 826 00:55:12,840 --> 00:55:16,080 Speaker 1: eight three three st d w y t K three minutes. 827 00:55:16,160 --> 00:55:19,800 Speaker 1: Those three minutes of yours. Give yourself an amazing nickname 828 00:55:20,280 --> 00:55:22,480 Speaker 1: or just one that you like. 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M h H. 839 00:56:09,160 --> 00:56:11,280 Speaker 1: Stuff they Don't want you to know is a production 840 00:56:11,320 --> 00:56:14,399 Speaker 1: of I heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio, 841 00:56:14,560 --> 00:56:17,400 Speaker 1: visit the i heart radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever 842 00:56:17,480 --> 00:56:18,760 Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.