WEBVTT - What's Really Standing in the Way of a Nuclear Renaissance? 0:00:10.039 --> 0:00:13.720 Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. 0:00:13.800 --> 0:00:16.160 I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. 0:00:16.360 --> 0:00:19.560 Tracy, you know, we recently did that episode down in 0:00:19.600 --> 0:00:23.079 Austin with a Jigger Shaw of the Department of Energy, 0:00:23.760 --> 0:00:26.920 and he said a bunch of interesting things about nuclear. 0:00:26.960 --> 0:00:28.680 I mean, we talked about a lot of stuff related 0:00:28.720 --> 0:00:32.400 to electrification, decarbonization, but I think both of us found 0:00:32.440 --> 0:00:34.760 like the nuclear comments to be particularly interesting. 0:00:34.920 --> 0:00:37.920 Well absolutely so, there were a couple things to pull 0:00:37.960 --> 0:00:40.960 out there. On the one hand, he sounded positive in 0:00:41.040 --> 0:00:44.120 the sense that maybe nuclear is getting more traction than 0:00:44.120 --> 0:00:48.559 it has previously. You have these new types of was. 0:00:48.520 --> 0:00:51.240 It smaller modular reactor at. 0:00:51.840 --> 0:00:55.080 Which he described as neither small nor modular, So I 0:00:55.120 --> 0:00:58.640 have questions about that, and you know, a sort of 0:00:58.960 --> 0:01:04.399 ground swell potentially of support for cleaner energy technology in 0:01:04.560 --> 0:01:07.959 which nuclear, you know, theoretically could fall. But on the 0:01:07.959 --> 0:01:13.280 other hand, he also described these long running structural roadblocks 0:01:13.360 --> 0:01:16.240 to nuclear, at least in the US, So this idea 0:01:16.319 --> 0:01:20.480 that there isn't really a nuclear industry. There are utilities 0:01:20.600 --> 0:01:24.440 that my own nuclear plants, but no one's really pushing 0:01:24.560 --> 0:01:28.240 for it. And then also if you're a utility CEO, 0:01:28.680 --> 0:01:32.040 You're probably not going to be that incentivized to build 0:01:32.200 --> 0:01:35.880 a massive nuclear plant because historically it's been a massive 0:01:35.959 --> 0:01:39.120 risk and responsible for a number of bankruptcies in the sector. 0:01:39.160 --> 0:01:41.360 Right, And so I think this was really like the 0:01:41.400 --> 0:01:43.600 key thing to me too. It's like, why did the 0:01:43.720 --> 0:01:46.679 US stop building nuclear And in my mind, and I 0:01:46.720 --> 0:01:48.880 think probably in the minds of a lot of at 0:01:48.960 --> 0:01:52.080 least the rhetoric of a lot of advocates of nuclear power, 0:01:52.480 --> 0:01:55.120 it is a clean, carbon free source of energy that 0:01:55.160 --> 0:01:59.160 has a bad reputation and environmentalists stymy it because of 0:01:59.360 --> 0:02:00.000 you know, outdoates. 0:02:00.720 --> 0:02:02.240 Are you going to say the three eyed fish in 0:02:02.360 --> 0:02:03.360 the Persons again. 0:02:03.200 --> 0:02:05.920 Three eyed fish on the Simpsons. His view is like, actually, 0:02:06.000 --> 0:02:09.200 that's not the story that as you say that, you know, 0:02:09.400 --> 0:02:13.160 because of historical cost over runs, there's real financial risk 0:02:13.240 --> 0:02:16.000 in financing these and that part of the reason these 0:02:16.000 --> 0:02:19.200 cost overruns happen is that there's really no domestic nuclear 0:02:19.240 --> 0:02:22.080 construction industry or nuclear industry, and so no one is 0:02:22.080 --> 0:02:24.200 good at building plants, and that's why you have these 0:02:24.240 --> 0:02:27.800 cost overruns. And then ultimately these are the stumbling blocks, 0:02:27.800 --> 0:02:31.040 the impediments towards like this nuclear renaissance that many people 0:02:31.040 --> 0:02:31.880 would like to see. 0:02:32.080 --> 0:02:36.480 Yeah, it's kind of this like muscle memory effect. For 0:02:36.520 --> 0:02:39.400 some reason, it reminds me of like the lumber industry 0:02:39.560 --> 0:02:41.680 post two thousand and seven two thousand and eight, where 0:02:41.800 --> 0:02:44.880 no one wanted to have over capacity anymore, so they 0:02:45.120 --> 0:02:48.040 just became incredibly lean, and then when we did need 0:02:48.080 --> 0:02:52.520 more lumber in twenty twenty, we didn't have enough capacity. 0:02:52.560 --> 0:02:55.200 So if it kind of feels like that, like it 0:02:55.240 --> 0:02:59.080 feels like everyone's been so scarred by the experience in 0:02:59.480 --> 0:03:02.720 the seven the eighties and nineties that it's hard to 0:03:02.800 --> 0:03:06.000 kind of get people within the industry excited about it again. 0:03:06.120 --> 0:03:08.480 Absolutely, so we wanted to follow up and actually like 0:03:08.560 --> 0:03:11.480 explore some of these themes. So I'm very excited we 0:03:11.520 --> 0:03:13.920 have the perfect guest to do. So we are going 0:03:13.919 --> 0:03:16.840 to be speaking with Mark Nelson. He is a founder 0:03:16.880 --> 0:03:20.239 and managing director at Radiant Energy Group, which is does 0:03:20.360 --> 0:03:24.399 energy analytics. He is an advocate, I believe, for nuclear 0:03:24.440 --> 0:03:26.120 and he is going to talk us through as he 0:03:26.160 --> 0:03:29.560 sees some of these issues that Jigger raised. So Mark, 0:03:29.600 --> 0:03:31.399 thank you so much for coming on oud. Lots good 0:03:31.400 --> 0:03:34.000 to be here at Tracy. You are an advocate for 0:03:34.160 --> 0:03:36.080 nuclear energy. I said, I believe, but you. 0:03:36.040 --> 0:03:37.280 Know, yes, definitely. 0:03:37.480 --> 0:03:39.760 What is radiant energy group? What do you do? Why 0:03:39.800 --> 0:03:41.160 should we listen to you? Why are you here? 0:03:41.840 --> 0:03:45.200 Well, I didn't start out as a as a consultant. 0:03:45.280 --> 0:03:49.960 I started out as an energy analytics expert. I'm working 0:03:50.040 --> 0:03:53.280 for a nonprofit out in California that was attempting to 0:03:53.280 --> 0:03:55.800 figure out why nuclear plants were closing around the world 0:03:56.120 --> 0:03:58.600 and how to stop it. So I was working with 0:03:58.640 --> 0:04:02.200 Michael Schallenberger at environment Progress where there had been a 0:04:02.880 --> 0:04:07.400 sudden growth in environmentalists turning towards nuclear in the Bay 0:04:07.440 --> 0:04:12.360 Area of California, practically where they first turned against nuclear 0:04:12.480 --> 0:04:15.840 energy back in the sixties. And the thinking was, on 0:04:15.920 --> 0:04:20.200 one hand, if you developed an academic basis and a 0:04:20.440 --> 0:04:24.800 scientific basis for understanding nuclear energy properly, people and other 0:04:24.920 --> 0:04:27.560 environmentalists would come around. On the other hand, there was 0:04:27.600 --> 0:04:29.720 a crisis. There was a fire in the house, which 0:04:29.839 --> 0:04:34.039 was nuclear reactors were being closed around the world. We're 0:04:34.040 --> 0:04:37.240 not talking about nuclear reactors that people were proposing and 0:04:37.279 --> 0:04:40.480 needing to find financing for. These were nuclear reactors where 0:04:40.480 --> 0:04:43.800 the hard part was already done. They were constructed, they 0:04:43.800 --> 0:04:48.040 were making super cheap, reliable, carbon free electricity, and they 0:04:48.040 --> 0:04:51.160 were being shut down all over the world. So at 0:04:51.279 --> 0:04:53.880 environmental progress we needed to figure out how to stop that, 0:04:54.320 --> 0:04:57.400 and the first step was figuring out what was going on, 0:04:57.600 --> 0:04:59.800 and so I came in as a nuclear engineer to 0:04:59.800 --> 0:05:00.000 do that. 0:05:00.320 --> 0:05:02.800 I'll take the bait, what was going on? Why were 0:05:02.839 --> 0:05:05.719 all these reactors shutting down? Because I imagine on the 0:05:05.720 --> 0:05:08.760 one hand, maybe you had environmental pushback, but on the 0:05:08.800 --> 0:05:11.440 other hand, we have heard a lot of stuff about 0:05:11.720 --> 0:05:14.279 how difficult some of these are to finance to maintain 0:05:14.400 --> 0:05:15.080 things like that. 0:05:15.440 --> 0:05:17.760 The broadest possible thing I could say is there was 0:05:17.839 --> 0:05:21.320 not enough appreciation for nuclear reactors if we needed to 0:05:21.360 --> 0:05:23.560 break it up. Though, some places in the world, like 0:05:23.560 --> 0:05:27.360 the United States, had extremely cheap natural gas and had 0:05:27.440 --> 0:05:32.920 installed governing systems for electricity that used extremely temporary, cheap 0:05:32.960 --> 0:05:36.760 fossil fuels as an excuse to shut down nuclear reactors 0:05:36.760 --> 0:05:40.240 that could last for another thirty forty to fifty sixty years. 0:05:40.680 --> 0:05:43.520 And that's really stupid. Those electricity markets are some of 0:05:43.520 --> 0:05:46.880 the worst things we've ever done to our infrastructure, but 0:05:47.320 --> 0:05:49.280 they were in place and they were leading to a 0:05:49.320 --> 0:05:50.320 wave of retirements. 0:05:50.440 --> 0:05:54.880 Do you mean that the competition from even cheaper electricity 0:05:55.080 --> 0:05:58.400 was like that electricity from fossil fuels was even easier 0:05:58.440 --> 0:06:01.200 and cheaper compared to nuclear, and so the preference was 0:06:01.360 --> 0:06:02.400 for that at the time. 0:06:02.960 --> 0:06:06.160 It's simply wrong to say that it was cheaper electricity. 0:06:06.440 --> 0:06:11.400 It was one aspect of the total electricity system that 0:06:11.600 --> 0:06:15.320 was cheaper on the margin at that moment at those times, 0:06:15.520 --> 0:06:19.120 and sometimes wasn't even cheaper. You just had a natural 0:06:19.120 --> 0:06:22.000 gas folks that were willing to take a temporary loss 0:06:22.040 --> 0:06:24.240 to drive nuclear plants out of business. 0:06:24.480 --> 0:06:26.200 Oh so like a market share fight. 0:06:26.400 --> 0:06:29.000 Yeah, yeah, Basically there was a market share fight. There 0:06:29.080 --> 0:06:32.640 wasn't as much growth for electricity demand. There was extremely 0:06:32.720 --> 0:06:35.800 cheap natural gas, making losses for the natural gas producers 0:06:36.279 --> 0:06:40.520 and needing to find more markets, and people arranged ways 0:06:40.560 --> 0:06:45.000 to build new natural gas plants so close to nuclear 0:06:45.040 --> 0:06:49.400 plants or near enough in location on the grid to 0:06:49.640 --> 0:06:51.800 drive them out of business. And then that's not like 0:06:51.880 --> 0:06:55.360 the cost savings would be passed on consumers. No, no, no, no, 0:06:55.520 --> 0:06:58.080 you drive the nuclear plant out and then you get the. 0:06:58.440 --> 0:06:59.680 New race prices. 0:06:59.760 --> 0:07:02.800 Well, well you can't really raise the prices go up 0:07:02.839 --> 0:07:06.559 once the nuclear's gone, right, But then the nuclear's gone. 0:07:06.600 --> 0:07:10.160 And as we've discussed in the intro, it's hard to build. 0:07:10.520 --> 0:07:12.560 So you had a one way ratcheting effect. 0:07:12.880 --> 0:07:14.720 I want to jump in very quickly to the hard 0:07:14.760 --> 0:07:17.680 to build, but just this dynamic because the fall up. 0:07:17.720 --> 0:07:18.960 I was going to ask you, just like you said, 0:07:18.960 --> 0:07:23.320 like electricity markets have just been this damaging phenomenon. And 0:07:23.360 --> 0:07:26.040 I think generally like people like think like markets are 0:07:26.080 --> 0:07:29.640 good things, and markets produce abundance and et cetera. What 0:07:29.800 --> 0:07:33.840 is it about electricity that, in your view, either markets 0:07:33.920 --> 0:07:36.920 or at least markets as they're currently structured, have this 0:07:36.960 --> 0:07:38.040 pernicious effect. 0:07:38.320 --> 0:07:41.680 Well, first of all, electricity is not a commodity. And 0:07:41.760 --> 0:07:45.360 the analogy that the economists use to think about electricity 0:07:45.400 --> 0:07:48.520 and setting up these markets was that electricity is a commodity, 0:07:48.640 --> 0:07:51.480 as commodity like properties that are close enough that you 0:07:51.480 --> 0:07:53.680 can sort of squint and say it's, you know, a 0:07:53.720 --> 0:07:56.960 standardized unit one megawat hour, one kill a watt hour. 0:07:57.560 --> 0:08:00.320 And so they came up with a system to break 0:08:00.320 --> 0:08:04.200 apart the carrying of electricity with the building of power plants. 0:08:04.240 --> 0:08:08.840 And they said, there's all these different parts of making electricity, 0:08:08.840 --> 0:08:12.160 and if we divide it up disaggregate it. We can 0:08:12.200 --> 0:08:15.760 come up with competition and maybe start with the power plants, 0:08:15.760 --> 0:08:18.800 but then we can move to other aspects like competition 0:08:18.880 --> 0:08:22.080 and bundling up electricity contracts to sell to consumers with 0:08:22.120 --> 0:08:25.320 different packaging. And it just turns out that, to cut 0:08:25.400 --> 0:08:27.280 a very long story short, that could be its own 0:08:27.360 --> 0:08:30.960 series of episodes. Yeah, it doesn't really work, and it 0:08:31.080 --> 0:08:35.840 leads to either enormous risk taking that ends with massive 0:08:35.920 --> 0:08:39.680 market failure like we saw briefly in Texas and we're 0:08:39.679 --> 0:08:43.120 seeing in other places that have instituted markets or the 0:08:43.240 --> 0:08:47.559 market manager. The market system ends up taking on both 0:08:47.600 --> 0:08:50.480 the attributes and many of the criticisms of the old 0:08:50.600 --> 0:08:53.080 utility system that it was supposed to break up. 0:08:53.920 --> 0:08:55.720 I can tell this is already going to be one 0:08:55.760 --> 0:08:58.719 of those episodes that leads to like five other episodes. 0:08:59.080 --> 0:09:01.600 But just it's going back to something you said. I 0:09:01.600 --> 0:09:06.199 think you mentioned nuclear is hard to build, and Jiggershaw 0:09:06.520 --> 0:09:10.679 might very politely disagree with you, because in our conversation 0:09:10.800 --> 0:09:12.720 with him, he was talking about how there is this 0:09:12.800 --> 0:09:16.040 perception that like, oh, it's so difficult to build these things, 0:09:16.400 --> 0:09:21.360 but actually his point was we've built them before, you know, 0:09:21.559 --> 0:09:24.439 we've done it. A lot of our technology has been 0:09:24.480 --> 0:09:27.520 exported to other places in the world where they're building them. 0:09:28.000 --> 0:09:30.120 Is it that hard to build a nuclear plant? 0:09:30.840 --> 0:09:33.679 Yes, So I visit construction sides and nuclear plants around 0:09:33.679 --> 0:09:36.400 the world. I mean, I this is this is something 0:09:36.440 --> 0:09:38.600 that I thought was going to be the main problem. 0:09:38.679 --> 0:09:40.920 We just don't know how to build nuclear plants, and 0:09:40.960 --> 0:09:43.360 sure enough, it is quite hard. Here's what I'd say 0:09:43.400 --> 0:09:47.760 about nuclear plants. They're premium energy, and they take your 0:09:47.760 --> 0:09:50.560 best people to build, and they take your best effort, 0:09:50.600 --> 0:09:53.680 and they need to be done right because they are 0:09:53.920 --> 0:09:57.280 that difficult. I mean, I've been to nuclear side. So, 0:09:57.440 --> 0:10:00.560 for example, the biggest construction site in Europe is a 0:10:00.760 --> 0:10:06.920 massive two reactor nuclear plant on the west coast of 0:10:07.200 --> 0:10:11.719 southern England, and that site you cannot possibly go there 0:10:11.720 --> 0:10:15.400 and think nuclear is easy. Now, some of the best 0:10:15.440 --> 0:10:19.839 people in the country, the best contractors, the best engineers, 0:10:19.920 --> 0:10:23.040 the best managers are over there and they're going to 0:10:23.080 --> 0:10:26.280 be working for a decade on that massive nuclear plant, 0:10:26.320 --> 0:10:29.280 and then it's going to provide the best electricity service 0:10:29.320 --> 0:10:32.160 in the country. Like it's going to be extraordinary. Okay, 0:10:32.360 --> 0:10:35.199 but it is really hard to build. The argument maybe 0:10:35.200 --> 0:10:39.800 he was making was what compared to the immense factories 0:10:40.000 --> 0:10:43.360 that go into the supply chain for solar and wind, 0:10:44.000 --> 0:10:47.040 it's not that hard. But actually what we're seeing is, say, 0:10:47.120 --> 0:10:50.280 offshore wind is extremely hard to So is this a 0:10:50.320 --> 0:10:53.560 comparison question or is this a contrast. 0:10:53.160 --> 0:10:55.080 It's funny you say that we got to do an 0:10:55.080 --> 0:10:57.800 offshore wind episode at some point too, because every article 0:10:57.840 --> 0:11:01.240 I read just looks like that industry on many levels 0:11:01.400 --> 0:11:05.040 is a total mess. But setting that aside, I wonder 0:11:05.080 --> 0:11:08.359 if maybe like the question of like hard or difficult 0:11:08.800 --> 0:11:11.959 to your point, you know, like a semiconductor fab is 0:11:12.000 --> 0:11:15.040 clearly like a complicated, difficult thing. There are not many 0:11:15.640 --> 0:11:17.880 entities around the world that can build like, you know, 0:11:17.880 --> 0:11:23.560 a seven animeter or five animeter semiconductor manufacturing facility. But 0:11:23.840 --> 0:11:26.040 some people are good at it, and some people become 0:11:26.160 --> 0:11:29.040 practiced at it, And so I guess the question is, like, 0:11:29.320 --> 0:11:31.800 how much of the constraint in the US or in 0:11:31.840 --> 0:11:34.679 places where you would like to see nuclear expand an 0:11:34.720 --> 0:11:37.800 inherent difficulty or maybe like just out of. 0:11:37.760 --> 0:11:42.320 Practice, out of practice, is it we can build nuclear again? 0:11:42.640 --> 0:11:45.680 I mean, look, we didn't a bunch I could fifty 0:11:45.760 --> 0:11:46.680 years ago, right. 0:11:46.559 --> 0:11:49.400 The cost estimates that we're seeing for offshore wind Joe 0:11:49.480 --> 0:11:53.360 are about the same as the extreme blowout over budget 0:11:53.400 --> 0:11:56.840 catastrophe that is Vocal in Georgia. So think about this. 0:11:57.240 --> 0:12:00.120 The wind that's supposedly we're gonna build and it's going 0:12:00.160 --> 0:12:02.320 to go well, and it's going to be on time 0:12:02.320 --> 0:12:05.719 and on budget. If that happens, it will be at 0:12:05.760 --> 0:12:10.080 a cost per delivered megawatt hour that is about the 0:12:10.120 --> 0:12:13.080 same as Vogel in Georgia, depending on what you assume 0:12:13.120 --> 0:12:17.120 with interest rates and assuming they build the wind on time. 0:12:17.400 --> 0:12:20.200 But Vogel wasn't supposed to be that expensive, and it 0:12:20.280 --> 0:12:24.720 provides an electricity, a constant electricity supply that makes the 0:12:24.760 --> 0:12:29.319 rest of the electricity system work even better, which is 0:12:29.360 --> 0:12:31.560 not quite the case for the offshore wind. So the 0:12:31.600 --> 0:12:34.920 offshore wind, even being expensive, even after you pay for it, 0:12:34.960 --> 0:12:38.280 is going to be part of a more expensive electricity 0:12:38.360 --> 0:12:42.800 service overall. So I guess the question I ask is 0:12:43.200 --> 0:12:45.880 Vogel was very hard to do, It continues to be 0:12:45.920 --> 0:12:49.719 difficult to finish, It will be extremely valuable, It will 0:12:49.760 --> 0:12:52.440 be valuable for one hundred years or more. Was it 0:12:52.480 --> 0:12:54.679 Should we not do it again? Because it was hard? 0:12:54.920 --> 0:12:58.400 I think we have to admit that nuclear is hard, 0:12:58.960 --> 0:13:01.880 but unlike many hard things, this is. 0:13:01.840 --> 0:13:15.280 What I'm doing. 0:13:20.160 --> 0:13:22.840 I take the point that it's hard, And you know, 0:13:23.280 --> 0:13:25.199 the knowledge gap was sort of what I was getting 0:13:25.200 --> 0:13:27.360 at when I said that we have a history of 0:13:27.400 --> 0:13:30.080 doing this, so like the knowledge is clearly there, but 0:13:30.600 --> 0:13:35.000 talk to us, like, exactly what the impediments actually are? Like, 0:13:35.120 --> 0:13:39.480 what is it about building It sounds funny when I 0:13:39.520 --> 0:13:43.559 say it building a massive nuclear power plant with dangerous 0:13:43.640 --> 0:13:46.760 radioactive material. What's so difficult about that? Why can't we 0:13:46.800 --> 0:13:48.920 all just do it in our backyards? No, I'm being 0:13:48.960 --> 0:13:52.640 facetious now, but like, what are the actual impediments to 0:13:52.840 --> 0:13:55.400 building these things? And why does there seem to be 0:13:55.880 --> 0:13:58.160 h you mentioned vocal, why does there seem to be 0:13:58.320 --> 0:14:00.880 so many cost overruns in these projects as well? 0:14:01.000 --> 0:14:03.040 In the sixties, seventies and eighties. It's kind of an 0:14:03.080 --> 0:14:05.800 astonishing that we if you look at the interest rate 0:14:05.880 --> 0:14:09.360 charts back in the day, like most of us nuclear 0:14:09.440 --> 0:14:13.720 plants were built and completed at interest rates from five 0:14:13.880 --> 0:14:18.880 to ten percent and above. So that's quite kind of astonishing. 0:14:18.880 --> 0:14:21.480 And they were and they happened during a time when 0:14:21.720 --> 0:14:25.640 the environmental movement was getting immense elite support all over, 0:14:26.280 --> 0:14:30.680 and that popular media turned against nuclear energy also, so 0:14:30.960 --> 0:14:33.520 in a way, I you know, it's quind of astonishing, 0:14:33.520 --> 0:14:34.000 and we did that. 0:14:34.360 --> 0:14:38.120 But so they overcame those hurdles in the nineteen seventies. 0:14:37.720 --> 0:14:40.560 Yes, and they had to overcome the hurdles of the 0:14:40.640 --> 0:14:44.960 earliest plants that were built quickly and cheaply did not 0:14:45.120 --> 0:14:47.920 apparently make money for the builders. That's a problem if 0:14:47.960 --> 0:14:49.520 you're going to keep building. In other words, it had 0:14:49.520 --> 0:14:53.280 the call it the offshore wind problem, where the projects 0:14:53.280 --> 0:14:57.000 seemed to be excellent from a sort of technological perspective 0:14:57.080 --> 0:15:01.040 or from an administrator's eye view, but the people building 0:15:01.080 --> 0:15:04.440 them are burning through capital and not making profit in 0:15:04.520 --> 0:15:07.800 order to make these cheap things. That's not sustainable, right. 0:15:07.920 --> 0:15:10.920 This is kind of the CEO point where like a 0:15:10.960 --> 0:15:15.560 bunch of CEOs have surveyed previous nuclear projects, seen that 0:15:15.640 --> 0:15:20.600 they've been massive financial drains on finances, I guess, and 0:15:20.640 --> 0:15:22.920 then thought maybe not but tracy. 0:15:23.320 --> 0:15:26.720 That brings us to possibly the central paradox of this 0:15:26.760 --> 0:15:31.000 episode of odd lots, which is, there is nothing more 0:15:31.080 --> 0:15:36.720 valuable in the energy world than existing already built nuclear 0:15:36.760 --> 0:15:41.040 plant of traditional design. So as an example, of one 0:15:41.040 --> 0:15:44.440 that I heard recently. Let's take Tennessee Valley Authority had 0:15:44.440 --> 0:15:46.960 one of the all time messes on their hands with 0:15:47.080 --> 0:15:50.400 finished nuclear plants when their Brown's Ferry plant had it 0:15:50.520 --> 0:15:53.120 one of the most famous fires that we have to 0:15:53.200 --> 0:15:56.120 learn about in not just nuclear engineering school, but all 0:15:56.160 --> 0:15:59.240 engineers or mini engineers I know learn about the Browns 0:15:59.280 --> 0:16:02.760 Faery fire as an example of all sorts of things 0:16:02.800 --> 0:16:07.480 not to do. So this is three large reactors that 0:16:07.600 --> 0:16:12.200 are finally working well after decades of tinkering, and together 0:16:12.760 --> 0:16:18.280 they make about let's say five million people's five to 0:16:18.320 --> 0:16:21.880 six million people's worth of electricity at fifteen dollars a 0:16:21.960 --> 0:16:24.800 megawat hour, and they're going to be able to stay 0:16:24.880 --> 0:16:28.760 down near fifteen to twenty dollars a magawat hour costs. 0:16:28.760 --> 0:16:32.120 That's the cost to TVA of generating electricity of the 0:16:32.120 --> 0:16:35.440 course of a year, divided by the amount of power, 0:16:35.520 --> 0:16:38.080 right fifteen dollars a magwat hour, and they're going to 0:16:38.120 --> 0:16:41.160 be able to do that decade after decade after decade. 0:16:41.200 --> 0:16:44.240 At this point, it's not clear what would actually cause 0:16:44.840 --> 0:16:48.000 these reactors to shut down, and so you have this 0:16:48.080 --> 0:16:52.520 situation where can you survive as a CEO proposing building 0:16:53.200 --> 0:16:58.640 what after built is incomparable in what it can do 0:16:58.720 --> 0:17:01.800 for society and any kind of carbon constrained environment, or 0:17:02.360 --> 0:17:05.720 to heck, with the carbon constraints, nothing beats this power 0:17:05.800 --> 0:17:11.160 plant even without carbon having a prize. I mean, the cheapest, 0:17:11.480 --> 0:17:15.399 most advanced, lowest cost coal plants on planet Earth would 0:17:15.440 --> 0:17:18.160 struggle to get near that cost. 0:17:18.480 --> 0:17:20.480 One of the things that I like talking about, one 0:17:20.480 --> 0:17:23.800 of the reasons that I think we've had good conversations 0:17:23.800 --> 0:17:26.000 with Gigger in the past is he understands the role 0:17:26.040 --> 0:17:31.480 of finance and that yeah, finance and incentives, and that 0:17:31.640 --> 0:17:33.720 just like we could talk about construction, we could talk about, 0:17:34.080 --> 0:17:36.520 you know, fifteen dollars megawat hours for decade after a 0:17:36.560 --> 0:17:39.119 decade after decade, but that you know, we need to 0:17:39.160 --> 0:17:41.720 solve the financing problem. And as he sees it, a 0:17:41.760 --> 0:17:45.520 big issue is with new construction is that nuclear projects 0:17:45.560 --> 0:17:48.720 have been a major contributor to utility bankruptcies. Is that true? 0:17:48.760 --> 0:17:49.440 I mean, is that all? 0:17:49.520 --> 0:17:49.840 Do you? 0:17:49.960 --> 0:17:50.240 Yeah? 0:17:50.240 --> 0:17:51.680 Of course I think he's right there. 0:17:51.920 --> 0:17:54.359 So it sounds like then, you know, like the follow 0:17:54.440 --> 0:17:56.800 on from that is that if we want this sort 0:17:56.800 --> 0:18:02.480 of decade after decade after decade of stable urginally inexpensive electricity, 0:18:03.000 --> 0:18:06.640 that somehow the public balance sheet needs to be involved, 0:18:06.800 --> 0:18:08.240 or that we at least don't have these sort of 0:18:08.280 --> 0:18:14.040 like undermining markets where the cheaper natural gas you know, 0:18:14.200 --> 0:18:16.600 plants can like situate near you and like price you 0:18:16.640 --> 0:18:19.760 out of business. How do you see the financing constraint 0:18:20.080 --> 0:18:21.120 playing out, Well. 0:18:21.000 --> 0:18:24.159 Let me dance overseas for just a second. You can 0:18:24.200 --> 0:18:26.719 say that we have an interesting comparison in countries that 0:18:26.800 --> 0:18:30.679 either like China, are building a bunch of nuclear at 0:18:30.680 --> 0:18:34.240 a low cost, or like France, have decided they need 0:18:34.280 --> 0:18:37.280 to but are doing it very expensively and are having 0:18:37.280 --> 0:18:40.840 a ton of struggles doing almost anything in nuclear. But 0:18:41.400 --> 0:18:48.000 in both cases it's considered vital to state interest that 0:18:48.200 --> 0:18:52.080 nuclear be strong and effective. Now, that wasn't that way 0:18:52.080 --> 0:18:55.400 in France only a few years ago. France was had 0:18:55.400 --> 0:18:58.240 an anti nuclear ruling elite for a number of years, 0:18:58.280 --> 0:19:00.520 and that's part of the immense trouble that they got 0:19:00.560 --> 0:19:02.560 into during the energy crisis when they should have been 0:19:02.600 --> 0:19:05.480 bailing out Europe. Instead they had to be bailed out 0:19:06.080 --> 0:19:10.040 by Germany, sometimes because of their own problems making nuclear. 0:19:10.080 --> 0:19:13.520 But they've decided it as a vital state importance. One 0:19:13.560 --> 0:19:15.760 of the first decisions they had to take was to 0:19:15.960 --> 0:19:19.720 repeal anti nuclear laws, and then they had to decide 0:19:19.760 --> 0:19:22.040 to say renationalize. 0:19:22.600 --> 0:19:24.080 EDF was sort. 0:19:23.840 --> 0:19:27.080 Of basically owned by the nation, but they needed to 0:19:27.160 --> 0:19:30.840 take on the rest of the responsibility and just understand, 0:19:31.440 --> 0:19:35.960 as many countries do, nuclear is so important. It's a 0:19:36.080 --> 0:19:39.960 vital state interest and it must be done right. And 0:19:40.720 --> 0:19:44.760 at some point it starts uniting the various political interests 0:19:44.760 --> 0:19:47.520 in a country and just starts moving forward. We're big 0:19:47.560 --> 0:19:52.480 and strong, We're America. Do we have to do nuclear well? 0:19:52.560 --> 0:19:56.679 I think that maybe even brings us into this cultural moment, 0:19:56.760 --> 0:20:01.359 which is if people of great talent, great energy, and 0:20:01.480 --> 0:20:07.200 great financial backing want nuclear more badly than they weren't 0:20:07.280 --> 0:20:12.719 anything else, is that going to be something that, in 0:20:12.760 --> 0:20:16.639 my opinion, unveils the path. I think the answer is yes, 0:20:17.200 --> 0:20:20.920 there is a cultural moment. There's a genuine cultural moment 0:20:21.320 --> 0:20:26.199 where almost anybody I meet wants to have a conversation 0:20:26.320 --> 0:20:29.560 about nuclear with me. Whereas before I had very poor 0:20:29.560 --> 0:20:32.199 taste in conversation, it would be me forcing it on 0:20:32.240 --> 0:20:36.520 other people. Nowadays, nowadays, since I work and talking about 0:20:36.600 --> 0:20:39.520 nuclear and thinking about nuclear and writing about nuclear and 0:20:39.560 --> 0:20:43.439 advising about nuclear. I am totally fine to talk about 0:20:43.640 --> 0:20:46.879 every other subject when I meet people, but they want 0:20:46.920 --> 0:20:48.200 to talk about nuclear. 0:20:48.800 --> 0:20:52.119 I like this the idea of you just like walking 0:20:52.160 --> 0:20:54.840 down the street going have you heard about molten salt reacting? 0:20:54.920 --> 0:20:55.760 Have you heard the good news? 0:20:57.720 --> 0:21:00.359 But that moment event of evangelism, that's that's why I 0:21:00.400 --> 0:21:04.240 got into nuclear. A gentleman out in Calgary who just 0:21:04.400 --> 0:21:06.760 was a big fan of molten salt reactors and thorium 0:21:07.040 --> 0:21:09.840 made a video channel. I was trying to figure out 0:21:09.840 --> 0:21:11.520 what to study in grad school. I wanted to do 0:21:11.560 --> 0:21:14.560 an engineering grad degree. I started an aerospace and mechanical 0:21:14.560 --> 0:21:18.120 engineering and it was you know, space flight and big 0:21:18.200 --> 0:21:21.960 machines and stuff like that. And I just saw a 0:21:21.960 --> 0:21:24.280 few minutes of a video at exactly the right time 0:21:24.320 --> 0:21:28.280 in my life, and everything just clicked. It hadn't clicked 0:21:28.320 --> 0:21:31.000 when I'd worked at Los Alamos as an engineering intern. 0:21:31.320 --> 0:21:34.080 It hadn't clicked when I'd been to either the Chernobyl 0:21:34.200 --> 0:21:38.560 Memorial Museum in Kiev or the Hiroshima Peace Museum in Japan. 0:21:39.080 --> 0:21:41.200 I hadn't been scared of nuclear. It had just been 0:21:41.320 --> 0:21:43.639 I hadn't connected it to the future of the world. 0:21:44.080 --> 0:21:47.280 Let's put it that way. I'd had many opportunities to 0:21:47.600 --> 0:21:50.480 be involved with nuclear that I just missed or not 0:21:50.480 --> 0:21:53.359 noticed along the way. And when I saw a have 0:21:53.440 --> 0:21:55.760 you heard the good news video like the guy shouting 0:21:55.800 --> 0:21:58.040 in the street, I saw that. Within a few minutes, 0:21:58.040 --> 0:21:59.960 I knew I was going to be involved in new 0:22:00.200 --> 0:22:02.600 engineering or nuclear energy in some way for the rest 0:22:02.640 --> 0:22:03.199 of my life. 0:22:03.359 --> 0:22:06.600 Well, since we're talking about things that might be changing, 0:22:06.640 --> 0:22:10.200 I take the point from a cultural and political perspective, 0:22:10.240 --> 0:22:13.439 but can you talk also about the technology side? And 0:22:13.600 --> 0:22:17.639 we already mentioned the small modular reactors, which Jickershaw says 0:22:17.680 --> 0:22:20.439