1 00:00:04,440 --> 00:00:12,320 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 2 00:00:12,360 --> 00:00:16,120 Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 3 00:00:16,239 --> 00:00:19,560 Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer at iHeart Podcasts and How the 4 00:00:19,600 --> 00:00:23,680 Speaker 1: Tech are You? So? On Fridays, I typically will do 5 00:00:23,720 --> 00:00:27,600 Speaker 1: a news roundup of the tech news that happened over 6 00:00:27,640 --> 00:00:31,360 Speaker 1: the previous week, and today we're going to do something 7 00:00:31,360 --> 00:00:33,440 Speaker 1: a little different. We're going to cover one story in 8 00:00:33,479 --> 00:00:36,879 Speaker 1: particular that really requires a lot more time and attention 9 00:00:37,520 --> 00:00:41,120 Speaker 1: than what I would normally give, so we're gonna really 10 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:44,159 Speaker 1: dive into it. Also, we will continue the story of 11 00:00:44,240 --> 00:00:47,800 Speaker 1: rooster Teeth. I do have at least two more parts 12 00:00:48,240 --> 00:00:49,479 Speaker 1: for that. I thought it was just going to be 13 00:00:49,479 --> 00:00:52,320 Speaker 1: a two parter, but man covering what happened over the 14 00:00:52,400 --> 00:00:56,440 Speaker 1: last few years requires a lot more care and effort 15 00:00:56,560 --> 00:01:00,800 Speaker 1: as well. So let's get to today's topic, which of course, 16 00:01:01,200 --> 00:01:05,120 Speaker 1: is the United States ban on TikTok, which isn't a 17 00:01:05,160 --> 00:01:08,080 Speaker 1: sure thing yet. I want to be sure to say 18 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:10,880 Speaker 1: that right up front, but the US House of Representatives 19 00:01:11,120 --> 00:01:15,240 Speaker 1: passed a bill this week that ultimately could lead to 20 00:01:15,280 --> 00:01:18,080 Speaker 1: a ban on TikTok if the bill ends up being 21 00:01:18,160 --> 00:01:20,759 Speaker 1: passed into law and there are a couple of steps 22 00:01:20,760 --> 00:01:25,560 Speaker 1: that have to happen before that becomes reality. But there's 23 00:01:25,600 --> 00:01:28,600 Speaker 1: a ton of stuff going on here, including things that 24 00:01:28,680 --> 00:01:32,320 Speaker 1: have nothing to do with tech, but everything that happens 25 00:01:32,360 --> 00:01:35,440 Speaker 1: with money and politics. This is why you can't separate 26 00:01:35,560 --> 00:01:37,360 Speaker 1: tech out from those things. I know there are a 27 00:01:37,400 --> 00:01:41,360 Speaker 1: lot of people who complain about news stories where they're like, 28 00:01:41,520 --> 00:01:44,399 Speaker 1: just cover the tech, don't talk about politics. That's not 29 00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:46,480 Speaker 1: the way the world works. The world doesn't work with 30 00:01:46,520 --> 00:01:50,080 Speaker 1: everything being in these separate silos that have no connection 31 00:01:50,200 --> 00:01:54,560 Speaker 1: with each other. Politics and tech shape each other. Now, 32 00:01:54,920 --> 00:01:59,040 Speaker 1: I would say that this particular story gets really gross because, 33 00:01:59,720 --> 00:02:06,320 Speaker 1: in my opinion, the entirety of this focus on TikTok 34 00:02:06,760 --> 00:02:10,239 Speaker 1: is misguided. I'm not saying that TikTok is good, I'm 35 00:02:10,240 --> 00:02:13,120 Speaker 1: not saying it's bad, but I am saying that this 36 00:02:13,320 --> 00:02:17,960 Speaker 1: whole thing misses the point. In my opinion, I also 37 00:02:18,080 --> 00:02:22,360 Speaker 1: think it really exposes a ton of problems with America's 38 00:02:22,400 --> 00:02:25,800 Speaker 1: political system. But these aren't things that I think anyone 39 00:02:25,880 --> 00:02:29,000 Speaker 1: finds surprising. I think everyone, at least on some level, 40 00:02:29,160 --> 00:02:34,200 Speaker 1: is aware that America's political system has issues. But we're 41 00:02:34,200 --> 00:02:37,320 Speaker 1: going to get to all that first. What is this 42 00:02:37,560 --> 00:02:40,680 Speaker 1: bill and how did we get here? Well, the bill 43 00:02:41,280 --> 00:02:45,399 Speaker 1: is h R. Seven five two one. It's also known 44 00:02:45,440 --> 00:02:50,960 Speaker 1: as the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, 45 00:02:51,440 --> 00:02:55,440 Speaker 1: And to quote the text of the bill directly, it 46 00:02:55,520 --> 00:02:59,200 Speaker 1: is quote to protect the national security of the United 47 00:02:59,240 --> 00:03:02,680 Speaker 1: States from I'm the threat posed by foreign adversary controlled 48 00:03:02,720 --> 00:03:08,120 Speaker 1: applications such as TikTok and any successor application or service, 49 00:03:08,400 --> 00:03:12,720 Speaker 1: and any other application or service developed or provided by 50 00:03:12,840 --> 00:03:17,080 Speaker 1: Byteedance Limited or any entity under the control of byte 51 00:03:17,200 --> 00:03:20,800 Speaker 1: Edance Limited end quote. So it's clear that this bill 52 00:03:20,919 --> 00:03:26,600 Speaker 1: specifically targets TikTok's parent company, Byteedance Limited, not just any 53 00:03:27,160 --> 00:03:31,440 Speaker 1: Chinese owned parent company or foreign owned company. However, the 54 00:03:31,480 --> 00:03:34,840 Speaker 1: text of the actual bill does get far more general, 55 00:03:35,240 --> 00:03:40,040 Speaker 1: and ultimately it does cover quote foreign adversary controlled applications 56 00:03:40,120 --> 00:03:44,000 Speaker 1: end quote. So it's not just for TikTok, but it 57 00:03:44,120 --> 00:03:48,880 Speaker 1: uses TikTok as sort of the primary example the paradigm, 58 00:03:49,120 --> 00:03:53,440 Speaker 1: if you will. And foreign adversary in this context doesn't 59 00:03:53,520 --> 00:03:57,120 Speaker 1: just mean a country that is on particularly unfriendly terms 60 00:03:57,120 --> 00:03:59,280 Speaker 1: with the good old US of A. It's not just 61 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:05,400 Speaker 1: countries we've got beef with. It covers any entity, person, organization, company, 62 00:04:05,440 --> 00:04:10,120 Speaker 1: et cetera that resides within the borders of such a country. So, 63 00:04:10,240 --> 00:04:13,600 Speaker 1: while the phrase foreign adversary seems to suggest like a 64 00:04:13,760 --> 00:04:20,120 Speaker 1: nation or state controlled entity, it's actually more broad than that. 65 00:04:20,880 --> 00:04:25,880 Speaker 1: It's really any person or company that exists in such 66 00:04:26,080 --> 00:04:29,400 Speaker 1: a country that then would be identified in the context 67 00:04:29,400 --> 00:04:33,599 Speaker 1: of this bill as a foreign adversary. So essentially, the 68 00:04:33,600 --> 00:04:37,400 Speaker 1: bill would require any APP that ultimately belongs to an 69 00:04:37,520 --> 00:04:40,440 Speaker 1: entity that resides or exists within a country that had 70 00:04:40,440 --> 00:04:43,760 Speaker 1: been identified as a foreign adversary to the United States. 71 00:04:43,800 --> 00:04:49,120 Speaker 1: And there's a whole code that explains how that designation happens. Well, 72 00:04:49,760 --> 00:04:52,560 Speaker 1: if this bill is enacted into law, then any such 73 00:04:52,600 --> 00:04:56,120 Speaker 1: app currently available within the United States would have one 74 00:04:56,240 --> 00:04:59,520 Speaker 1: hundred and eighty days before a ban is imposed by 75 00:04:59,560 --> 00:05:04,440 Speaker 1: the US government. To avoid the ban, the foreign adversary 76 00:05:04,640 --> 00:05:08,640 Speaker 1: can divest itself of the APP, that is, sell the 77 00:05:08,680 --> 00:05:12,719 Speaker 1: APP or some version part of the APP to some 78 00:05:12,880 --> 00:05:16,039 Speaker 1: other entity that is not a foreign adversary to the 79 00:05:16,080 --> 00:05:19,080 Speaker 1: United States. Also, in the future, should the US President 80 00:05:19,200 --> 00:05:22,640 Speaker 1: identify a new country as a foreign adversary, let's just 81 00:05:22,680 --> 00:05:27,520 Speaker 1: say that for some reason the President says that I 82 00:05:27,560 --> 00:05:32,160 Speaker 1: don't know France is a foreign adversary. At that point, 83 00:05:32,320 --> 00:05:36,040 Speaker 1: then apps that originated out of France would have one 84 00:05:36,120 --> 00:05:39,480 Speaker 1: hundred and eighty days to comply with this law before 85 00:05:40,320 --> 00:05:45,000 Speaker 1: a ban would fall upon them like a bag of hammers. 86 00:05:45,279 --> 00:05:49,240 Speaker 1: So how do you ban an app? How does that work? Well, 87 00:05:49,720 --> 00:05:52,960 Speaker 1: this bill says the US would go after essentially the 88 00:05:53,000 --> 00:05:57,600 Speaker 1: distribution infrastructure for apps, like the app stores. In other words, 89 00:05:58,000 --> 00:06:02,119 Speaker 1: Section A of this bill states that quote it shall 90 00:06:02,160 --> 00:06:06,560 Speaker 1: be unlawful for any entity to distribute, maintain, or update, 91 00:06:06,800 --> 00:06:11,000 Speaker 1: or enable the distribution, maintenance, or updating of a foreign 92 00:06:11,160 --> 00:06:15,400 Speaker 1: adversary controlled application end quote, and then the section goes on. 93 00:06:15,680 --> 00:06:19,719 Speaker 1: But essentially this bill would target stuff like the iOS 94 00:06:19,760 --> 00:06:23,520 Speaker 1: app Store or the Android App Store. It also includes 95 00:06:23,600 --> 00:06:27,159 Speaker 1: internet hosting services that would allow for the updating and 96 00:06:27,279 --> 00:06:30,799 Speaker 1: maintenance of those apps. So not only would the app 97 00:06:30,920 --> 00:06:34,080 Speaker 1: disappear from app stores within the United States, the apps 98 00:06:34,080 --> 00:06:38,040 Speaker 1: would essentially lose all functionality because what the US is 99 00:06:38,080 --> 00:06:42,359 Speaker 1: saying is you can't allow traffic to go to these apps. 100 00:06:42,640 --> 00:06:45,359 Speaker 1: At the very least, you wouldn't be able to update 101 00:06:45,400 --> 00:06:49,000 Speaker 1: the apps anymore within the United States, and presumably that 102 00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:52,000 Speaker 1: would mean that you wouldn't get notifications you wouldn't be 103 00:06:52,040 --> 00:06:55,159 Speaker 1: able to access new material, et cetera. Now, if these 104 00:06:55,240 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 1: companies failed to comply with the law, they face a 105 00:06:59,400 --> 00:07:04,080 Speaker 1: fine of five five thousand dollars per US user of 106 00:07:04,120 --> 00:07:07,599 Speaker 1: that app. So for TikTok, that's more than one hundred 107 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:11,080 Speaker 1: and fifty million American users. So by my math, that's 108 00:07:11,120 --> 00:07:15,360 Speaker 1: like seven hundred and fifty billion dollars in fines, which 109 00:07:15,400 --> 00:07:19,640 Speaker 1: means that obviously these companies that are largely US based, 110 00:07:20,440 --> 00:07:25,240 Speaker 1: would end all support for TikTok rather than face a 111 00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:30,280 Speaker 1: nearly one trillion dollar fine. The bill also calls for 112 00:07:30,400 --> 00:07:34,320 Speaker 1: the foreign adversary controlled app to provide user data upon 113 00:07:34,440 --> 00:07:37,400 Speaker 1: request so that the user would be able to port 114 00:07:37,440 --> 00:07:41,680 Speaker 1: their information to some alternative application. Now I'm not entirely 115 00:07:41,760 --> 00:07:44,559 Speaker 1: certain how that could be achieved in a reasonable way. 116 00:07:45,000 --> 00:07:52,320 Speaker 1: I suspect that this from a technical perspective, is largely difficult, 117 00:07:52,360 --> 00:07:56,280 Speaker 1: at the very least possibly impossible to achieve so that 118 00:07:56,360 --> 00:08:01,200 Speaker 1: you could port your TikTok profile well to something else. 119 00:08:01,640 --> 00:08:04,080 Speaker 1: It doesn't just work that way. It's not apples to apples. 120 00:08:04,440 --> 00:08:07,320 Speaker 1: To me, this seems like a pretty feeble attempt to 121 00:08:07,760 --> 00:08:11,920 Speaker 1: playcate TikTok users who would otherwise be really upset to 122 00:08:11,960 --> 00:08:14,680 Speaker 1: lose the content that they had created and consumed on 123 00:08:14,720 --> 00:08:17,880 Speaker 1: an app like TikTok. So the implication seems to be, 124 00:08:18,440 --> 00:08:21,760 Speaker 1: don't worry, We've put in a legal requirement that TikTok 125 00:08:21,800 --> 00:08:23,960 Speaker 1: would have to give you all your stuff so that 126 00:08:24,040 --> 00:08:26,920 Speaker 1: you can head on over to Instagram reels and do 127 00:08:27,040 --> 00:08:29,840 Speaker 1: it all over there, or something like that. If the 128 00:08:29,880 --> 00:08:32,839 Speaker 1: foreign adversary fails to comply with this part of the law, 129 00:08:33,200 --> 00:08:36,199 Speaker 1: then they would be fined five hundred dollars per active 130 00:08:36,240 --> 00:08:38,880 Speaker 1: user in the US, which is not nearly as hefty 131 00:08:38,920 --> 00:08:42,280 Speaker 1: a hit obviously, but also I'm not sure how the 132 00:08:42,360 --> 00:08:46,000 Speaker 1: US would ever collect on that, because again, if it's 133 00:08:46,040 --> 00:08:50,040 Speaker 1: a foreign adversary controlled app, I don't know that there's 134 00:08:50,120 --> 00:08:52,920 Speaker 1: the leverage to force the foreign adversary to pay up 135 00:08:53,000 --> 00:08:57,240 Speaker 1: the fine. You could definitely go off against the US 136 00:08:57,360 --> 00:09:00,679 Speaker 1: infrastructure that the government would be able to do, at 137 00:09:00,760 --> 00:09:05,160 Speaker 1: least initially. I'm sure it would be immediately challenged in court, 138 00:09:05,320 --> 00:09:08,599 Speaker 1: but this bill would at least allow for that approach. 139 00:09:08,840 --> 00:09:10,200 Speaker 1: I don't know how you would do it for a 140 00:09:10,240 --> 00:09:13,360 Speaker 1: foreign adversary, Like you could point to the company and 141 00:09:13,400 --> 00:09:15,520 Speaker 1: say you owe us X amount of money, and the 142 00:09:15,559 --> 00:09:18,720 Speaker 1: company says, okay, but we're over here, then you're over there, 143 00:09:19,320 --> 00:09:22,320 Speaker 1: so I don't know. The bill goes on to single 144 00:09:22,360 --> 00:09:26,000 Speaker 1: out TikTok and byte Dance again, but also states that 145 00:09:26,040 --> 00:09:28,840 Speaker 1: the President can send a report to Congress identifying other 146 00:09:28,920 --> 00:09:33,280 Speaker 1: apps that meet certain criteria, including specific threats to US 147 00:09:33,360 --> 00:09:36,320 Speaker 1: national security, as well as what aspects of the app 148 00:09:36,360 --> 00:09:40,000 Speaker 1: would need to be divested in order to avoid a ban. 149 00:09:40,559 --> 00:09:44,400 Speaker 1: So if the President says, hey, this other app also 150 00:09:44,920 --> 00:09:48,480 Speaker 1: I want to put under this same list of restrictions, 151 00:09:49,000 --> 00:09:52,319 Speaker 1: you would have to have the President send that message 152 00:09:52,400 --> 00:09:57,000 Speaker 1: to Congress and say specifically how this app represents a 153 00:09:57,000 --> 00:09:59,920 Speaker 1: threat to national security. You can't just have a blank 154 00:10:00,080 --> 00:10:05,720 Speaker 1: it approach. Presumably after a public report and the detailed 155 00:10:05,760 --> 00:10:09,080 Speaker 1: account to Congress, the designation would then be acknowledged and 156 00:10:09,160 --> 00:10:11,920 Speaker 1: the clock would begin to tick for that app. Now 157 00:10:11,920 --> 00:10:14,800 Speaker 1: there's a bit more to the bill, including what measures 158 00:10:14,840 --> 00:10:18,000 Speaker 1: a party can take to challenge the bill, but I 159 00:10:18,040 --> 00:10:22,560 Speaker 1: think that's enough to have a conversation about this. By 160 00:10:22,600 --> 00:10:25,480 Speaker 1: the way, the bill is just thirteen pages long, and 161 00:10:25,520 --> 00:10:27,679 Speaker 1: by thirteen pages long, I mean like you've got to 162 00:10:27,720 --> 00:10:31,920 Speaker 1: remember bills have lots of indented segments. So it's not 163 00:10:31,960 --> 00:10:35,040 Speaker 1: even a full page of material. It's a pretty easy read. 164 00:10:35,160 --> 00:10:38,280 Speaker 1: By the way, there's hardly any jargon in it. It 165 00:10:38,320 --> 00:10:40,800 Speaker 1: isn't like one of those where you're like, whereas and 166 00:10:40,840 --> 00:10:43,360 Speaker 1: so forth and a fourthwith and et cetera, et cetera. 167 00:10:43,640 --> 00:10:46,240 Speaker 1: It doesn't come across like that. So I urge all 168 00:10:46,280 --> 00:10:49,000 Speaker 1: of y'all to check it out if you prefer to 169 00:10:49,040 --> 00:10:52,360 Speaker 1: have firsthand knowledge of a text as opposed to just 170 00:10:52,440 --> 00:10:55,440 Speaker 1: relying on news articles and opinion pieces, some of which 171 00:10:55,440 --> 00:10:58,040 Speaker 1: I suspect the writers never read the bill in the 172 00:10:58,040 --> 00:11:03,240 Speaker 1: first place. Again, that's Hr. Five two one, and yeah, 173 00:11:03,240 --> 00:11:06,000 Speaker 1: it's a quick read. It's not a fun read, but 174 00:11:06,120 --> 00:11:11,040 Speaker 1: it is quick, So check it out now. For TikTok specifically, 175 00:11:11,600 --> 00:11:16,000 Speaker 1: this bill essentially says either Byte Dance sells TikTok to 176 00:11:16,120 --> 00:11:19,440 Speaker 1: some other entity, an entity that does not reside or 177 00:11:19,480 --> 00:11:24,640 Speaker 1: exist inside an adversarial country, or we will bring down 178 00:11:24,679 --> 00:11:28,400 Speaker 1: the power of the US government on the distribution infrastructure 179 00:11:28,760 --> 00:11:30,840 Speaker 1: for the app to make sure that no one in 180 00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:33,720 Speaker 1: the US can get it or use it. That's a 181 00:11:34,040 --> 00:11:39,920 Speaker 1: pretty massive ultimatum, you know, divest TikTok or the TikTok 182 00:11:39,960 --> 00:11:42,920 Speaker 1: will face a national band. So how did we get here? 183 00:11:44,120 --> 00:11:47,560 Speaker 1: Now that question is actually super complex because there are 184 00:11:47,559 --> 00:11:50,640 Speaker 1: a lot of different reasons why various political leaders have 185 00:11:50,720 --> 00:11:55,360 Speaker 1: taken aim at TikTok in particular. Now, chief among them 186 00:11:55,760 --> 00:11:58,959 Speaker 1: is that byte Dance is a Chinese company, and the 187 00:11:59,040 --> 00:12:02,280 Speaker 1: Chinese government has been known to get very involved with 188 00:12:02,440 --> 00:12:06,440 Speaker 1: Chinese enterprises. It's common in China for large companies to 189 00:12:06,520 --> 00:12:09,920 Speaker 1: reserve a spot at the highest levels of company oversight 190 00:12:09,960 --> 00:12:13,880 Speaker 1: and governance for a representative of the Chinese Communist Party. 191 00:12:14,200 --> 00:12:18,120 Speaker 1: So there's this perception that the Chinese Communist Party has 192 00:12:18,280 --> 00:12:22,080 Speaker 1: literally a seat at the table of all these massive 193 00:12:22,240 --> 00:12:26,840 Speaker 1: companies in China. Famously, China enacted a national intelligence law 194 00:12:26,880 --> 00:12:31,600 Speaker 1: in twenty seventeen that compels Chinese citizens and organizations to 195 00:12:31,880 --> 00:12:36,400 Speaker 1: quote support national intelligence work end quote, and that the 196 00:12:36,400 --> 00:12:40,040 Speaker 1: government can actually demand cooperation that they do so. That's 197 00:12:40,040 --> 00:12:45,079 Speaker 1: covered under articles seven and fourteen of that twenty seventeen law. 198 00:12:45,480 --> 00:12:48,400 Speaker 1: So one interpretation of this law is that the Chinese 199 00:12:48,440 --> 00:12:51,840 Speaker 1: government could go to byte Dance and demand that the 200 00:12:51,840 --> 00:12:55,160 Speaker 1: companies share all the data it has through an app 201 00:12:55,280 --> 00:12:58,600 Speaker 1: like TikTok, and byte Dance would be required by Chinese 202 00:12:58,679 --> 00:13:00,520 Speaker 1: law to do so. They would have have to hand 203 00:13:00,559 --> 00:13:03,200 Speaker 1: that data over to the Chinese Communist Party. Now, if 204 00:13:03,240 --> 00:13:07,199 Speaker 1: that information included sensitive data that could compromise the national 205 00:13:07,280 --> 00:13:10,720 Speaker 1: security of the United States, that's a problem. If in fact, 206 00:13:10,960 --> 00:13:14,680 Speaker 1: this would serve as a type of espionage, that's a 207 00:13:14,760 --> 00:13:18,240 Speaker 1: huge issue. But that's a big if. And here's the thing. 208 00:13:18,679 --> 00:13:24,280 Speaker 1: If the possibility exists, unfortunately, that's enough. It's kind of 209 00:13:24,360 --> 00:13:28,120 Speaker 1: like trying to undermine democracy. You don't actually have to 210 00:13:28,240 --> 00:13:32,480 Speaker 1: compromise voting machines to undermine democracy. All you have to 211 00:13:32,480 --> 00:13:37,320 Speaker 1: do is prove that it's possible to compromise a voting machine. 212 00:13:37,600 --> 00:13:40,840 Speaker 1: If you prove it's possible, well then you insert doubt 213 00:13:41,080 --> 00:13:45,360 Speaker 1: into the minds of citizens. Because if it's possible to 214 00:13:45,480 --> 00:13:51,240 Speaker 1: manipulate votes, well, then you can never be sure that 215 00:13:51,640 --> 00:13:54,520 Speaker 1: the votes that came out actually reflect the will of 216 00:13:54,559 --> 00:13:57,480 Speaker 1: the people, right, you can't be sure that the results 217 00:13:57,520 --> 00:14:02,400 Speaker 1: of any election are legitimate, And by undermining the confidence 218 00:14:02,440 --> 00:14:07,000 Speaker 1: people have in the process, you undermine democracy itself. Democracy 219 00:14:07,080 --> 00:14:11,560 Speaker 1: with a big d the doubt is all that's needed. So, 220 00:14:12,000 --> 00:14:17,000 Speaker 1: if it's possible the Chinese Communist Party could force Byteedance 221 00:14:17,080 --> 00:14:20,440 Speaker 1: to hand over gobs of data belonging to American citizens. 222 00:14:20,920 --> 00:14:23,280 Speaker 1: That's all that's needed to serve as a threat, even 223 00:14:23,320 --> 00:14:29,280 Speaker 1: if the actual scenario never happens. So you could argue, well, technically, yeah, 224 00:14:29,800 --> 00:14:34,600 Speaker 1: it's possible, but it hasn't happened, and everyone at Might 225 00:14:34,760 --> 00:14:38,840 Speaker 1: Dance has expressed that this would never happen. That's not 226 00:14:38,920 --> 00:14:41,760 Speaker 1: good enough, at least not in the eyes of the 227 00:14:41,960 --> 00:14:45,600 Speaker 1: leaders who are concerned about this. Okay, I've been ranting 228 00:14:45,640 --> 00:14:47,440 Speaker 1: for a bit, but we've got a ton more to 229 00:14:47,480 --> 00:14:50,680 Speaker 1: get through about this issue, So let's take a quick 230 00:14:50,720 --> 00:15:03,120 Speaker 1: break to thank our sponsors. Okay. So I was talking 231 00:15:03,200 --> 00:15:07,280 Speaker 1: earlier about how the perception of a threat is the 232 00:15:07,320 --> 00:15:11,080 Speaker 1: same thing as a threat in the eyes of politics, 233 00:15:11,240 --> 00:15:14,360 Speaker 1: like it doesn't matter if the threat is real or not, 234 00:15:14,720 --> 00:15:20,000 Speaker 1: which is infuriating, but it's also unfortunately true. TikTok and 235 00:15:20,080 --> 00:15:25,400 Speaker 1: Byte Dance representatives have said numerous times that China's Communist 236 00:15:25,400 --> 00:15:28,480 Speaker 1: Party has never interfered, has never been able to access 237 00:15:28,520 --> 00:15:32,800 Speaker 1: this information, and that in fact, TikTok has taken steps 238 00:15:32,840 --> 00:15:36,920 Speaker 1: to make sure to prevent that eventuality. So, for example, 239 00:15:37,360 --> 00:15:41,160 Speaker 1: TikTok moved all US citizen data to servers within the 240 00:15:41,240 --> 00:15:46,040 Speaker 1: United States that would not be accessible by Chinese Communist 241 00:15:46,040 --> 00:15:50,400 Speaker 1: Party representatives. These servers belonged to the US company Oracle, 242 00:15:50,840 --> 00:15:55,000 Speaker 1: so the company that actually is overseeing the servers is 243 00:15:55,000 --> 00:15:58,440 Speaker 1: an American company that does not have ties to byte Dance. 244 00:15:58,880 --> 00:16:03,680 Speaker 1: This was all part of Project Texas. As TikTok explains, 245 00:16:04,080 --> 00:16:08,640 Speaker 1: that project has five pillars that encompass independent governance, data 246 00:16:08,640 --> 00:16:14,920 Speaker 1: protection and access control, software assurance, content assurance, and monitoring 247 00:16:14,960 --> 00:16:19,320 Speaker 1: and compliance. TikTok says, it quote spent the last two 248 00:16:19,400 --> 00:16:22,800 Speaker 1: years developing a framework through discussions with the Committee on 249 00:16:22,960 --> 00:16:26,480 Speaker 1: Foreign Investment in the United States, and we've spent roughly 250 00:16:26,600 --> 00:16:31,480 Speaker 1: one point five billion dollars to date on implementation end quote. 251 00:16:31,640 --> 00:16:34,400 Speaker 1: So what TikTok is saying is, hey, we've been working 252 00:16:34,440 --> 00:16:37,200 Speaker 1: in good faith with the US government for years now 253 00:16:37,440 --> 00:16:40,640 Speaker 1: to ensure that this data remains safe and secure and 254 00:16:40,680 --> 00:16:44,160 Speaker 1: within the boundaries and borders of the United States. Part 255 00:16:44,240 --> 00:16:47,800 Speaker 1: of those efforts included the formation of a subsidiary called 256 00:16:47,880 --> 00:16:52,880 Speaker 1: TikTok Us Data Security, which is quote an entirely independent 257 00:16:53,000 --> 00:16:57,240 Speaker 1: business entity tasked with managing all business functions that require 258 00:16:57,280 --> 00:17:00,400 Speaker 1: access to user data identified by the US god government 259 00:17:00,640 --> 00:17:04,879 Speaker 1: as needing additional protection and safeguarding the systems that deliver 260 00:17:05,000 --> 00:17:07,520 Speaker 1: content on the app in the US to ensure that 261 00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:11,280 Speaker 1: it is free from foreign manipulation end quote. Now there's 262 00:17:11,320 --> 00:17:14,440 Speaker 1: a ton more to say about TikTok's efforts to avoid 263 00:17:14,520 --> 00:17:17,159 Speaker 1: the situation that would fall on the company if this 264 00:17:17,320 --> 00:17:19,720 Speaker 1: bill were to get passed into law, but I urge 265 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:22,240 Speaker 1: you to check out TikTok's post on the matter. You 266 00:17:22,280 --> 00:17:27,080 Speaker 1: can find it at USDs dot TikTok dot com slash 267 00:17:27,440 --> 00:17:31,760 Speaker 1: USDs dash about. That's a lot, but that's where you 268 00:17:31,800 --> 00:17:35,720 Speaker 1: can read up on TikTok's policies here. Now, I will 269 00:17:35,760 --> 00:17:40,600 Speaker 1: also add there have been reports, whether you know, legitimate 270 00:17:40,680 --> 00:17:46,480 Speaker 1: or not, people in China allegedly accessing TikTok data, not 271 00:17:46,520 --> 00:17:50,840 Speaker 1: always US citizen data, but that in fact Byteedance employees 272 00:17:50,960 --> 00:17:57,439 Speaker 1: have been able to access user information through TikTok. So 273 00:17:58,359 --> 00:18:02,320 Speaker 1: there are a lot of conflicting reports about whether or 274 00:18:02,400 --> 00:18:08,240 Speaker 1: not TikTok's infrastructure is sort of air gapped from China 275 00:18:08,440 --> 00:18:11,840 Speaker 1: or not, and their conflicting reports about whether ByteDance has 276 00:18:11,920 --> 00:18:16,920 Speaker 1: access to the information. That uncertainty has further fueled the 277 00:18:17,240 --> 00:18:23,000 Speaker 1: political scenario that we're in today. Now, why did Project 278 00:18:23,040 --> 00:18:25,679 Speaker 1: Texas happen? In the first place. Well, it became a 279 00:18:25,760 --> 00:18:30,000 Speaker 1: necessity because back in twenty twenty, the then US President 280 00:18:30,200 --> 00:18:34,919 Speaker 1: Donald Trump had identified TikTok as a threat to national security. Now, 281 00:18:35,000 --> 00:18:37,800 Speaker 1: in many ways, this was really a part of a 282 00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:41,959 Speaker 1: larger trade conflict that the United States had with China. 283 00:18:42,119 --> 00:18:45,680 Speaker 1: At that time, Trump and China had engaged in sort 284 00:18:45,680 --> 00:18:49,359 Speaker 1: of a trade war with one another, and some argued 285 00:18:49,400 --> 00:18:52,119 Speaker 1: that Trump's reasoning was based more on a desire to 286 00:18:52,119 --> 00:18:57,280 Speaker 1: find leverage against China and not so much about responding 287 00:18:57,359 --> 00:19:00,920 Speaker 1: to a perceived threat to national security. So some were 288 00:19:00,960 --> 00:19:04,080 Speaker 1: saying that the national security message was really just kind 289 00:19:04,119 --> 00:19:07,560 Speaker 1: of a front and that really this was more of 290 00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:10,879 Speaker 1: the trade situation. Others felt that this was just the 291 00:19:10,960 --> 00:19:14,359 Speaker 1: latest in a very long line of xenophobic positions that 292 00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:18,080 Speaker 1: various US leaders have taken over the years, and this 293 00:19:18,160 --> 00:19:22,480 Speaker 1: is not related to any specific party. This has happened 294 00:19:22,480 --> 00:19:27,360 Speaker 1: over and over with leaders across all different political ideologies. 295 00:19:27,680 --> 00:19:30,240 Speaker 1: That despite the fact that America is made up of 296 00:19:30,280 --> 00:19:33,600 Speaker 1: a people who mostly come from other places, apart from 297 00:19:33,680 --> 00:19:37,720 Speaker 1: Native Americans who were here before everybody else, there's still 298 00:19:37,720 --> 00:19:42,120 Speaker 1: a really healthy distrust among some circles of citizens of 299 00:19:42,200 --> 00:19:45,680 Speaker 1: anyone who comes from anywhere other than the United States. 300 00:19:46,000 --> 00:19:48,600 Speaker 1: In order to really see this in action like highlighted 301 00:19:48,640 --> 00:19:53,000 Speaker 1: to an absurd degree, just watch footage of any wrestling 302 00:19:53,040 --> 00:19:56,520 Speaker 1: promotion from the nineteen seventies to the early two thousands 303 00:19:56,720 --> 00:20:00,440 Speaker 1: in which the foreigner gimmick was used to as establish 304 00:20:00,560 --> 00:20:03,160 Speaker 1: a heel or a bad guy. You would get people 305 00:20:03,240 --> 00:20:09,120 Speaker 1: channing USA, USA, USA. It's the jingoism is ridiculous at 306 00:20:09,160 --> 00:20:11,880 Speaker 1: that level, but it does kind of highlight something that 307 00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:15,040 Speaker 1: was present in other parts of society, just to an 308 00:20:15,040 --> 00:20:19,600 Speaker 1: absurd degree. But whatever Trump's motivation was, there were plenty 309 00:20:19,640 --> 00:20:21,639 Speaker 1: of critics who said there were very good reasons to 310 00:20:21,680 --> 00:20:25,199 Speaker 1: be concerned about TikTok, and right away the folks at 311 00:20:25,240 --> 00:20:28,679 Speaker 1: TikTok got to work creating a system that would attempt 312 00:20:28,720 --> 00:20:33,800 Speaker 1: to mollify the concerns of US critics. Now, interestingly, this week, 313 00:20:33,880 --> 00:20:36,800 Speaker 1: Donald Trump has argued that a ban on TikTok would 314 00:20:36,840 --> 00:20:39,560 Speaker 1: be a bad idea. And we'll get into why he 315 00:20:39,640 --> 00:20:43,439 Speaker 1: has reversed his position after he led the charge to 316 00:20:43,520 --> 00:20:48,040 Speaker 1: go after TikTok just four years ago. Spoiler alert, It 317 00:20:48,359 --> 00:20:51,080 Speaker 1: probably has a lot to do with gobs and gobs 318 00:20:51,080 --> 00:20:53,919 Speaker 1: of money as well as an axe he has to 319 00:20:53,960 --> 00:20:58,080 Speaker 1: grind against one of TikTok's competitors, all right, So one 320 00:20:58,160 --> 00:21:01,600 Speaker 1: reason that US leaders have sought ban on TikTok has 321 00:21:01,640 --> 00:21:05,520 Speaker 1: to do with this perceived threat of Chinese espionage. Never 322 00:21:05,560 --> 00:21:08,200 Speaker 1: Mind if it's a real threat or not, the perception 323 00:21:08,320 --> 00:21:12,240 Speaker 1: is all that matters. That American citizens, through their obsession 324 00:21:12,359 --> 00:21:15,240 Speaker 1: and use of this app, would essentially be handing over 325 00:21:15,359 --> 00:21:18,760 Speaker 1: loads of information and intelligence to a foreign adversary, and 326 00:21:18,800 --> 00:21:22,879 Speaker 1: the United States would be weakened from a national security level. 327 00:21:23,160 --> 00:21:26,360 Speaker 1: But that's not the only reason some leaders have their 328 00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:29,800 Speaker 1: sites set on TikTok. Another is a concern that the 329 00:21:29,840 --> 00:21:35,240 Speaker 1: app is manipulating users, particularly young users, either intentionally or 330 00:21:35,280 --> 00:21:41,439 Speaker 1: otherwise by algorithmically sharing misinformation, propaganda, and harmful material. So 331 00:21:41,680 --> 00:21:46,640 Speaker 1: if we assume there's an intentionality to this, that TikTok 332 00:21:46,720 --> 00:21:50,320 Speaker 1: is purposefully doing this, then there's a fear that TikTok, 333 00:21:50,400 --> 00:21:53,720 Speaker 1: through influence from Byteedance and then by extension, the Chinese 334 00:21:53,720 --> 00:21:57,639 Speaker 1: Communist Party, would use this app to deliver, say, Chinese 335 00:21:57,680 --> 00:22:02,320 Speaker 1: propaganda to US users. This is the someone please think 336 00:22:02,359 --> 00:22:06,200 Speaker 1: of the children argument. Now, I would argue that even 337 00:22:06,359 --> 00:22:10,280 Speaker 1: if this were true, it's a dumb reason to specifically 338 00:22:10,320 --> 00:22:13,520 Speaker 1: target TikTok. In fact, it's a dumb reason to target 339 00:22:13,560 --> 00:22:16,720 Speaker 1: apps that are controlled by a foreign adversary. So why 340 00:22:16,720 --> 00:22:18,640 Speaker 1: do I think it's a dumb idea? Well, I think 341 00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:21,360 Speaker 1: it's a dumb idea because China is already doing this 342 00:22:21,680 --> 00:22:25,399 Speaker 1: on all social apps out there. They are flooding social 343 00:22:25,440 --> 00:22:29,280 Speaker 1: apps with propaganda and misinformation. We've actually seen plenty of 344 00:22:29,359 --> 00:22:33,560 Speaker 1: cases in which Chinese backed agents have created and shared 345 00:22:33,600 --> 00:22:39,080 Speaker 1: misinformation across platforms that include Facebook and x formerly known 346 00:22:39,119 --> 00:22:42,840 Speaker 1: as Twitter, among others. China doesn't even need to have 347 00:22:43,040 --> 00:22:46,000 Speaker 1: back end access to any of these platforms to do it. 348 00:22:46,080 --> 00:22:49,520 Speaker 1: They don't have back end access to Meta or to X. 349 00:22:49,560 --> 00:22:52,320 Speaker 1: They don't own those platforms, but they don't need to 350 00:22:52,400 --> 00:22:54,679 Speaker 1: in order to meet the goal of flooding social media 351 00:22:54,720 --> 00:22:58,240 Speaker 1: with misinformation in an attempt to disrupt or manipulate the 352 00:22:58,240 --> 00:23:02,679 Speaker 1: American public. Whether TikTok has a Chinese parent company or not, 353 00:23:03,320 --> 00:23:06,639 Speaker 1: in no way changes how China is using social media 354 00:23:06,680 --> 00:23:11,200 Speaker 1: to target Americans. I guarantee you if this bill became long, 355 00:23:11,440 --> 00:23:15,320 Speaker 1: and if my Dance was compelled to divest itself of TikTok, 356 00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:18,919 Speaker 1: that would not stop China from using TikTok to deliver 357 00:23:19,560 --> 00:23:23,560 Speaker 1: misinformation because they don't need back end access to do that. 358 00:23:23,600 --> 00:23:26,600 Speaker 1: They just post just like anybody else. So yeah, that's 359 00:23:26,680 --> 00:23:30,400 Speaker 1: a really dumb reason to single out TikTok. In my opinion, 360 00:23:30,760 --> 00:23:35,160 Speaker 1: there's a legitimate concern that TikTok's recommendation algorithm can create 361 00:23:35,240 --> 00:23:39,040 Speaker 1: a bad situation or make a bad situation way worse 362 00:23:39,119 --> 00:23:43,040 Speaker 1: than it was, because engaging with content on TikTok essentially 363 00:23:43,160 --> 00:23:45,679 Speaker 1: tells the app, hey, this is the kind of thing 364 00:23:45,720 --> 00:23:48,439 Speaker 1: I'm into now. At that point, the app starts to 365 00:23:48,440 --> 00:23:51,960 Speaker 1: pull similar content to serve up to you. Like, people 366 00:23:52,000 --> 00:23:55,360 Speaker 1: who like this typically like that, So let's serve that 367 00:23:55,720 --> 00:23:58,800 Speaker 1: to this user now. And if you've indicated that you 368 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:01,720 Speaker 1: like a particular kin of content, the app's going to 369 00:24:01,760 --> 00:24:04,080 Speaker 1: make sure to bring other stuff like that to your 370 00:24:04,119 --> 00:24:06,919 Speaker 1: attention because the app's goal is to keep you on 371 00:24:06,960 --> 00:24:09,640 Speaker 1: the app for as long as possible, or to bring 372 00:24:09,680 --> 00:24:13,000 Speaker 1: you back to the app whenever you stop to go 373 00:24:13,080 --> 00:24:16,959 Speaker 1: do something else. So if the algorithm was just serving 374 00:24:17,000 --> 00:24:19,959 Speaker 1: up random stuff and most of it didn't appeal to you, 375 00:24:20,160 --> 00:24:22,520 Speaker 1: well you would probably lose interest in the app and 376 00:24:22,560 --> 00:24:25,119 Speaker 1: you'd stop using it. That's not good for the app. 377 00:24:25,640 --> 00:24:27,720 Speaker 1: So if you watch a video all the way through, 378 00:24:28,119 --> 00:24:32,720 Speaker 1: and let's say that video promoted misinformation or an extremist 379 00:24:33,119 --> 00:24:36,120 Speaker 1: stance on a particular subject, well, you'd be more likely 380 00:24:36,200 --> 00:24:38,680 Speaker 1: to see similar stuff in the future, and that could 381 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:41,919 Speaker 1: be one factor that could help lead a person to 382 00:24:41,960 --> 00:24:44,840 Speaker 1: adopt more radical views of their own. I'm not going 383 00:24:44,920 --> 00:24:48,320 Speaker 1: to suggest that TikTok on its own is responsible for 384 00:24:48,400 --> 00:24:54,080 Speaker 1: radicalizing populations of people, but it can be a contributing factor. However, 385 00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:58,160 Speaker 1: this is the case with lots of recommendation algorithms, not 386 00:24:58,280 --> 00:25:01,720 Speaker 1: just on TikTok, not just on on foreign controlled apps. 387 00:25:02,160 --> 00:25:06,199 Speaker 1: Algorithms are amorl They don't judge the content. They're just 388 00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:10,080 Speaker 1: looking for stuff that keeps you on the respective platform, 389 00:25:10,400 --> 00:25:13,439 Speaker 1: the stuff that keeps you engaged and your eyeballs glued 390 00:25:13,480 --> 00:25:16,560 Speaker 1: to the screen. It doesn't matter to these apps if 391 00:25:16,680 --> 00:25:20,199 Speaker 1: the content happens to be cute puppies or you know, 392 00:25:20,280 --> 00:25:22,720 Speaker 1: like dude Bros who are pumping out a set of 393 00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:27,120 Speaker 1: tricep dips, or if it's some random person complaining about 394 00:25:27,200 --> 00:25:31,320 Speaker 1: you know, liberal politics or conservative politics. The algorithm doesn't 395 00:25:31,359 --> 00:25:35,560 Speaker 1: care what's in the posts. It just cares that you 396 00:25:35,880 --> 00:25:38,920 Speaker 1: care and that's true on Facebook and other places, not 397 00:25:39,040 --> 00:25:42,199 Speaker 1: just TikTok. So again, it makes no sense to single 398 00:25:42,280 --> 00:25:45,760 Speaker 1: out TikTok for this problem because it's not a problem 399 00:25:46,240 --> 00:25:49,600 Speaker 1: that's just a TikTok problem. This is a bigger issue. 400 00:25:49,800 --> 00:25:53,720 Speaker 1: So either way, singling out TikTok simply because it has 401 00:25:53,760 --> 00:25:57,920 Speaker 1: a Chinese parent company is really short sighted. The problems 402 00:25:57,920 --> 00:26:01,760 Speaker 1: associated with recommendation algorithms are real. In my opinion, I 403 00:26:01,840 --> 00:26:05,760 Speaker 1: do think recommendation algorithms cause a lot of issues or 404 00:26:05,840 --> 00:26:09,160 Speaker 1: exacerbate a lot of problems. Maybe they don't cause them, 405 00:26:09,280 --> 00:26:11,920 Speaker 1: but I think they can make them way worse. If 406 00:26:11,960 --> 00:26:14,800 Speaker 1: there's already a seed there, they can really make that 407 00:26:14,920 --> 00:26:20,760 Speaker 1: seed grow into a pretty toxic plant. They ignore international borders. 408 00:26:20,800 --> 00:26:24,720 Speaker 1: This is not something that's specific to Chinese owned companies. 409 00:26:25,160 --> 00:26:29,080 Speaker 1: It might be possible for Chinese interference to force Byteedance 410 00:26:29,160 --> 00:26:33,600 Speaker 1: to in turn force TikTok to manipulate the recommendation algorithm 411 00:26:33,640 --> 00:26:36,879 Speaker 1: and skew it in some way, but that's not really necessary. 412 00:26:36,920 --> 00:26:39,800 Speaker 1: You don't need to go to that length. The skewing 413 00:26:39,960 --> 00:26:43,320 Speaker 1: just happens through the use of the app itself. However, 414 00:26:43,920 --> 00:26:47,359 Speaker 1: just because there might be a possibility is all it takes, 415 00:26:47,400 --> 00:26:50,960 Speaker 1: because again it's the perceived threat that's important, not whether 416 00:26:51,040 --> 00:26:53,320 Speaker 1: or not the threat is real. Anyway, a ton of 417 00:26:53,320 --> 00:26:56,680 Speaker 1: politicians have expressed concerns that content on TikTok can be 418 00:26:56,760 --> 00:27:00,400 Speaker 1: mentally harmful to users, that it can promote dangerous activities 419 00:27:00,800 --> 00:27:04,120 Speaker 1: and stunts, and it can radicalize individuals, and it can 420 00:27:04,200 --> 00:27:08,880 Speaker 1: reinforce harmful self images, and I can't necessarily argue against 421 00:27:08,880 --> 00:27:12,160 Speaker 1: that other than to say the problem is much bigger 422 00:27:12,400 --> 00:27:15,840 Speaker 1: than just TikTok. As for data collection, I've said this 423 00:27:15,960 --> 00:27:19,840 Speaker 1: on the show before too. Data collection can be a problem. 424 00:27:19,880 --> 00:27:23,040 Speaker 1: But again, it doesn't have to be a foreign owned 425 00:27:23,280 --> 00:27:26,880 Speaker 1: app that creates this problem. All of these different apps 426 00:27:27,040 --> 00:27:30,480 Speaker 1: and platforms are collecting huge amounts of information. Meta is 427 00:27:30,520 --> 00:27:34,080 Speaker 1: collecting truckloads of data on all of its users every 428 00:27:34,119 --> 00:27:36,800 Speaker 1: single day, and a lot of this information ends up 429 00:27:36,880 --> 00:27:40,120 Speaker 1: making its way to markets. There are companies that buy 430 00:27:40,160 --> 00:27:43,919 Speaker 1: and sell information about people, and you don't have to 431 00:27:44,520 --> 00:27:49,360 Speaker 1: be the company behind the platform to access that information. 432 00:27:49,400 --> 00:27:52,639 Speaker 1: You can just purchase it on the market. So arguably 433 00:27:53,800 --> 00:27:56,720 Speaker 1: you don't even have to have any interest in a 434 00:27:56,760 --> 00:27:59,720 Speaker 1: particular app at all in order to take advantage of 435 00:27:59,840 --> 00:28:02,840 Speaker 1: how those apps are collecting data. You can just purchase 436 00:28:02,920 --> 00:28:06,679 Speaker 1: data from data brokers, and that's a problem that is 437 00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:12,520 Speaker 1: independent of ownership of these platforms. So again, to actually 438 00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:15,840 Speaker 1: address the problem of data collection, you can't just look 439 00:28:15,880 --> 00:28:17,520 Speaker 1: at the app itself. You've got to look at the 440 00:28:17,600 --> 00:28:22,119 Speaker 1: larger ecosystem. If all you're doing is stopping one app 441 00:28:22,160 --> 00:28:25,119 Speaker 1: from being owned by a foreign company, you're plugging a 442 00:28:25,200 --> 00:28:28,560 Speaker 1: tiny leak in a dam that has a massive crack 443 00:28:28,640 --> 00:28:31,400 Speaker 1: all the way through the middle of it, and you're 444 00:28:31,440 --> 00:28:37,040 Speaker 1: not really helping again, in my opinion, Okay, we're not 445 00:28:37,160 --> 00:28:41,440 Speaker 1: done yet. We've got more to say about this whole situation. 446 00:28:42,160 --> 00:28:44,160 Speaker 1: But before we get to that, let's take another quick 447 00:28:44,200 --> 00:28:57,600 Speaker 1: break to thank our sponsors. Okay, we're back. So some 448 00:28:57,920 --> 00:29:00,880 Speaker 1: US leaders are worried that TikTok report sense a data 449 00:29:00,960 --> 00:29:04,360 Speaker 1: collection tool for the Chinese Communist Party. Some leaders are 450 00:29:04,400 --> 00:29:07,920 Speaker 1: worried TikTok use is harmful on a more individual level. 451 00:29:08,440 --> 00:29:12,440 Speaker 1: Some are worried that it's a misinformation delivery system. Some 452 00:29:12,480 --> 00:29:15,040 Speaker 1: are arguing that it's a combination of all of these things. 453 00:29:15,120 --> 00:29:17,680 Speaker 1: And that's what led to the House of Representatives in 454 00:29:17,720 --> 00:29:22,040 Speaker 1: the United States voting overwhelmingly in favor of passing this 455 00:29:22,160 --> 00:29:26,440 Speaker 1: bill that would ban TikTok unless it was divested from 456 00:29:26,440 --> 00:29:30,160 Speaker 1: byteedance if it becomes law, And by overwhelming, I mean 457 00:29:30,200 --> 00:29:33,760 Speaker 1: it passed three hundred and fifty two to sixty five, 458 00:29:34,240 --> 00:29:37,040 Speaker 1: So three hundred and fifty two representatives voted in favor 459 00:29:37,080 --> 00:29:40,720 Speaker 1: of it, only sixty five voted opposed. Fifty of those 460 00:29:40,760 --> 00:29:44,760 Speaker 1: were Democrats, fifteen were Republican. Now that doesn't mean that 461 00:29:44,800 --> 00:29:47,640 Speaker 1: this automatically becomes law. That's not how it works here 462 00:29:47,640 --> 00:29:50,280 Speaker 1: in the United States. So the bill then must go 463 00:29:50,400 --> 00:29:53,560 Speaker 1: to the US Senate, and the Senate has the opportunity 464 00:29:53,640 --> 00:29:56,640 Speaker 1: to debate the bill, potentially to make changes to it 465 00:29:56,720 --> 00:30:00,360 Speaker 1: before voting on it. And there's no guarantee that if 466 00:30:00,400 --> 00:30:03,160 Speaker 1: the Senate does vote on this, because maybe they don't. 467 00:30:03,440 --> 00:30:05,480 Speaker 1: But if they do vote on it, there's no guarantee 468 00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:08,640 Speaker 1: they're going to follow the lead of the House of Representatives. 469 00:30:08,960 --> 00:30:12,120 Speaker 1: President Joe Biden has indicated that he would sign such 470 00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:14,960 Speaker 1: a bill into law if it makes it to his desk. 471 00:30:15,280 --> 00:30:18,880 Speaker 1: So if the Senate does vote in favor of this bill, 472 00:30:19,200 --> 00:30:22,920 Speaker 1: it's unlikely that Biden would veto it. It seems pretty 473 00:30:23,040 --> 00:30:25,360 Speaker 1: likely that he would sign it into law. But these 474 00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:28,400 Speaker 1: are still big ifs. And here's where we get into 475 00:30:28,440 --> 00:30:32,720 Speaker 1: a whole bunch of politics. So, when this bill was 476 00:30:32,800 --> 00:30:36,040 Speaker 1: coming up for a House vote, TikTok urged some of 477 00:30:36,080 --> 00:30:39,240 Speaker 1: its users to reach out to their local representatives to 478 00:30:39,600 --> 00:30:43,400 Speaker 1: urge them to vote against the bill, and reportedly tons 479 00:30:43,760 --> 00:30:48,760 Speaker 1: of young people followed that request, and many of them 480 00:30:48,920 --> 00:30:51,720 Speaker 1: were under the age of eighteen. That means they're not 481 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:54,480 Speaker 1: legally allowed to vote. You can't vote until you're eighteen, 482 00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:58,040 Speaker 1: and that makes their voices carry far less weight. If 483 00:30:58,040 --> 00:31:02,360 Speaker 1: I'm being honest, a politician will pay if constituents of 484 00:31:02,400 --> 00:31:05,360 Speaker 1: a voting age reach out to express an opinion about 485 00:31:05,360 --> 00:31:09,440 Speaker 1: a particular piece of legislation. This is because politicians, generally speaking, 486 00:31:09,840 --> 00:31:13,680 Speaker 1: liked to get re elected. But if constituents aren't legally 487 00:31:13,760 --> 00:31:16,720 Speaker 1: able to vote, well, there's not really any pressure there. 488 00:31:17,280 --> 00:31:22,000 Speaker 1: Various folks in politics stated that kids were flooding office 489 00:31:22,040 --> 00:31:25,440 Speaker 1: phone lines about this upcoming band, and most of them 490 00:31:25,480 --> 00:31:28,360 Speaker 1: had no clue what Congress is, what the House of 491 00:31:28,440 --> 00:31:32,440 Speaker 1: Representatives happens to be, what a representative is. There was 492 00:31:32,480 --> 00:31:36,000 Speaker 1: a lot of ignorance being reported, and so staffers were 493 00:31:36,040 --> 00:31:38,960 Speaker 1: having to field all these calls from children who were 494 00:31:39,000 --> 00:31:41,920 Speaker 1: just upset that an app they liked was targeted, but 495 00:31:42,000 --> 00:31:44,280 Speaker 1: they clearly had little to no idea what they were 496 00:31:44,280 --> 00:31:47,760 Speaker 1: supposed to actually do, and so this plan backfired. A 497 00:31:47,760 --> 00:31:51,880 Speaker 1: lot of representatives had this experience, and they said, see, 498 00:31:51,960 --> 00:31:55,240 Speaker 1: you can see how this app is manipulating American children. 499 00:31:55,360 --> 00:31:59,440 Speaker 1: That proves that our concerns are valid. So womp womp. 500 00:32:00,080 --> 00:32:04,400 Speaker 1: TikTok's plan ended up kind of cementing one of the 501 00:32:04,480 --> 00:32:08,600 Speaker 1: perceived threats that leaders have about this app. However, that 502 00:32:08,720 --> 00:32:12,640 Speaker 1: being said, a whole bunch of TikTok's users are of 503 00:32:12,720 --> 00:32:15,400 Speaker 1: voting age, like it might have been all the kids 504 00:32:15,400 --> 00:32:18,240 Speaker 1: who are calling in, but that doesn't mean that only 505 00:32:18,320 --> 00:32:21,440 Speaker 1: kids are using TikTok. Like seventy five percent of TikTok's 506 00:32:21,520 --> 00:32:24,760 Speaker 1: users at least are of voting age. This is according 507 00:32:24,800 --> 00:32:29,680 Speaker 1: to Explodingtopics dot Com, which has a page on TikTok's demographics, 508 00:32:30,000 --> 00:32:32,960 Speaker 1: and it says one in four TikTok users are under 509 00:32:32,960 --> 00:32:36,200 Speaker 1: the age of twenty, So even saying seventy five percent 510 00:32:36,320 --> 00:32:39,280 Speaker 1: is being conservative because obviously under the age of twenty, 511 00:32:39,320 --> 00:32:41,880 Speaker 1: anyone who's eighteen or nineteen can still vote in the 512 00:32:41,960 --> 00:32:45,880 Speaker 1: United States, so some of that one in four statistic 513 00:32:46,480 --> 00:32:48,520 Speaker 1: are still a voting age, So at least seventy five 514 00:32:48,520 --> 00:32:52,800 Speaker 1: percent of TikTok users in America are of voting age. 515 00:32:52,880 --> 00:32:55,800 Speaker 1: The majority of users on TikTok are between the ages 516 00:32:55,840 --> 00:32:58,280 Speaker 1: of eighteen and twenty four. That is a lot of 517 00:32:58,360 --> 00:33:01,800 Speaker 1: young people who are eligible to vote. So there is 518 00:33:01,840 --> 00:33:04,960 Speaker 1: a worry among the US Senate that's supporting a bill 519 00:33:05,120 --> 00:33:08,200 Speaker 1: that would ban this app would in turn sour the 520 00:33:08,320 --> 00:33:11,800 Speaker 1: users who are in that age range. In an election year, 521 00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:14,760 Speaker 1: which it is here in the United States, with an 522 00:33:14,840 --> 00:33:18,160 Speaker 1: uncertain outcome where you don't know who's going to come 523 00:33:18,160 --> 00:33:21,760 Speaker 1: out up front, you know, there's a gamble that you 524 00:33:21,800 --> 00:33:24,920 Speaker 1: would take to support a bill that would be incredibly 525 00:33:25,080 --> 00:33:29,360 Speaker 1: unpopular among young voters, and not everyone the Senate is 526 00:33:29,480 --> 00:33:32,880 Speaker 1: really eager to take that gamble. So there's a real 527 00:33:33,000 --> 00:33:37,560 Speaker 1: reason that a lot of Senators, a lot of Democrats 528 00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:41,040 Speaker 1: in particular, are not eager to go along with this 529 00:33:41,120 --> 00:33:44,920 Speaker 1: bill because it could mean losing the support of young voters. Now, 530 00:33:45,200 --> 00:33:48,800 Speaker 1: this doesn't mean that the senators necessarily disagree with the 531 00:33:48,840 --> 00:33:51,400 Speaker 1: premise of the bill. You know that TikTok could pose 532 00:33:51,400 --> 00:33:54,239 Speaker 1: as a potential threat to US national security. Maybe they 533 00:33:54,280 --> 00:33:58,200 Speaker 1: actually believe that, but they wouldn't necessarily like the consequences 534 00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:01,280 Speaker 1: that would come with supporting such a bill. There could 535 00:34:01,280 --> 00:34:05,480 Speaker 1: be a serious political backlash. So would young voters actually 536 00:34:05,520 --> 00:34:09,120 Speaker 1: turn on leaders who voted in favor of banning TikTok? 537 00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:12,320 Speaker 1: That's hard to say. I suspect a lot of senators 538 00:34:12,400 --> 00:34:15,040 Speaker 1: worry that it's all it would take that just by 539 00:34:15,719 --> 00:34:19,680 Speaker 1: opposing this app it would make voters say, that's it, 540 00:34:19,760 --> 00:34:22,879 Speaker 1: I'm switching to the other side, you know, forget all 541 00:34:22,920 --> 00:34:28,080 Speaker 1: the other issues that I disagree with politically or ideologically. 542 00:34:28,360 --> 00:34:32,920 Speaker 1: I'm gonna swap because they ban TikTok. I don't know 543 00:34:32,960 --> 00:34:36,080 Speaker 1: if that's actually true. That seems to me to not 544 00:34:36,200 --> 00:34:39,920 Speaker 1: give enough credence to individual beliefs, but I don't know. 545 00:34:40,120 --> 00:34:44,239 Speaker 1: I'm also old, so who knows. But anyway, all of 546 00:34:44,280 --> 00:34:47,440 Speaker 1: that discussion is really for a different podcast. So the 547 00:34:47,520 --> 00:34:50,560 Speaker 1: thought that senators would vote against their own convictions in 548 00:34:50,680 --> 00:34:54,520 Speaker 1: order to preserve their political position is not very fun 549 00:34:54,560 --> 00:34:58,080 Speaker 1: to think about. It kind of goes against the idealism 550 00:34:58,640 --> 00:35:03,000 Speaker 1: that Americans are urged to adopt. But we all suspect, 551 00:35:03,239 --> 00:35:06,160 Speaker 1: or at least feel like this is something that happens 552 00:35:06,239 --> 00:35:09,440 Speaker 1: quite a bit, and you could argue that a senator 553 00:35:09,480 --> 00:35:12,360 Speaker 1: is actually just voting in line with their constituents. That 554 00:35:12,440 --> 00:35:14,920 Speaker 1: makes it a little bit easier to swallow. Right, If 555 00:35:14,920 --> 00:35:18,520 Speaker 1: you vote against your own beliefs because the people you 556 00:35:18,640 --> 00:35:22,839 Speaker 1: represent believe something else, that seems far more noble than 557 00:35:23,080 --> 00:35:25,400 Speaker 1: you voting against your own beliefs just so that you 558 00:35:25,480 --> 00:35:28,080 Speaker 1: get re elected in the future. Now, let's get back 559 00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:31,280 Speaker 1: to Donald Trump. As I said earlier. In twenty twenty, 560 00:35:31,320 --> 00:35:35,640 Speaker 1: he famously targeted TikTok. He issued an executive order quote 561 00:35:36,040 --> 00:35:40,960 Speaker 1: addressing the threat posed by TikTok end quote. Now. That 562 00:35:41,040 --> 00:35:44,760 Speaker 1: executive order demanded that byte Edance divest itself of TikTok 563 00:35:44,880 --> 00:35:48,160 Speaker 1: and allow an American company to acquire it or else 564 00:35:48,280 --> 00:35:51,880 Speaker 1: face a ban, which sounds kind of familiar, right. Trump 565 00:35:51,960 --> 00:35:56,160 Speaker 1: cited concerns of Chinese interference in American affairs, including threats 566 00:35:56,160 --> 00:35:59,920 Speaker 1: to US economy and national security, as reasons for this order. 567 00:36:00,200 --> 00:36:03,360 Speaker 1: The executive order never went into effect, partly because of 568 00:36:03,400 --> 00:36:05,759 Speaker 1: a legal challenge against the order that was brought in 569 00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:09,640 Speaker 1: a federal court. But now Trump has reversed his position 570 00:36:09,719 --> 00:36:12,440 Speaker 1: on TikTok. He has said that a ban on TikTok 571 00:36:12,440 --> 00:36:15,680 Speaker 1: would be a bad idea. So what gives what has 572 00:36:15,920 --> 00:36:18,879 Speaker 1: changed in the last four years that would cause such 573 00:36:18,920 --> 00:36:22,479 Speaker 1: a dramatic reversal. Well, a lot of the following would 574 00:36:22,480 --> 00:36:25,440 Speaker 1: be based on assumptions that various people have made, But 575 00:36:25,719 --> 00:36:29,600 Speaker 1: let's start with what Trump has said publicly. One thing 576 00:36:29,640 --> 00:36:31,520 Speaker 1: he has mentioned is that a lot of people love 577 00:36:31,600 --> 00:36:35,120 Speaker 1: TikTok and that quote a lot of young kids on 578 00:36:35,160 --> 00:36:38,480 Speaker 1: TikTok will go crazy without it end quote. But you 579 00:36:38,520 --> 00:36:40,920 Speaker 1: know that was true in twenty twenty two. It's not 580 00:36:41,000 --> 00:36:43,879 Speaker 1: like in twenty twenty. Also, I guess I should say 581 00:36:43,880 --> 00:36:47,040 Speaker 1: not twenty twenty two, but it was true in twenty twenty. 582 00:36:47,080 --> 00:36:49,840 Speaker 1: So that doesn't seem like it should be enough to 583 00:36:49,920 --> 00:36:53,640 Speaker 1: change his position unless over time he's developed more of 584 00:36:53,680 --> 00:36:57,479 Speaker 1: an appreciation for how many people love their ding Dang 585 00:36:57,560 --> 00:37:02,959 Speaker 1: tiktoks like that. That was never in doubt. But here's 586 00:37:03,000 --> 00:37:06,640 Speaker 1: another potential reason for his change of heart. And that 587 00:37:06,680 --> 00:37:09,360 Speaker 1: reason has a name, and that name is Jeff Yas. 588 00:37:09,800 --> 00:37:13,719 Speaker 1: So who is Jeff Yas? He's a conservative billionaire and 589 00:37:13,760 --> 00:37:16,960 Speaker 1: by that I mean he's worth nearly thirty billion dollars 590 00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:22,319 Speaker 1: and he's contributed significantly to multiple conservative political organizations. And 591 00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:25,960 Speaker 1: campaigns over the years. He's also a significant investor in 592 00:37:26,040 --> 00:37:30,000 Speaker 1: Byte Dance. His investment firm reportedly owns a fifteen percent 593 00:37:30,160 --> 00:37:35,800 Speaker 1: stake in Byte Dance. Obviously, Bye Dance's value hinges largely 594 00:37:35,880 --> 00:37:39,760 Speaker 1: on TikTok remaining available in the United States, So Trump, 595 00:37:40,120 --> 00:37:43,400 Speaker 1: as the presumptive nominee for the Republican Party in the 596 00:37:43,400 --> 00:37:47,720 Speaker 1: presidential election, has a very strong incentive to not upset 597 00:37:47,920 --> 00:37:51,480 Speaker 1: Yas's apple cart. Yas has donated a lot of money 598 00:37:51,480 --> 00:37:55,360 Speaker 1: to a political organization called Club for Growth, which earlier 599 00:37:55,680 --> 00:38:01,719 Speaker 1: actually opposed Trump's nomination as the Republican can and it's 600 00:38:01,719 --> 00:38:04,520 Speaker 1: spent a lot of money trying to support alternative candidates, 601 00:38:04,920 --> 00:38:07,680 Speaker 1: but none of that worked because the voters didn't care. 602 00:38:08,440 --> 00:38:11,800 Speaker 1: And I'm pretty sure with a lot of grinding of teeth, 603 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:15,640 Speaker 1: the Club of Growth shifted its stance to align with Trump, 604 00:38:15,880 --> 00:38:19,359 Speaker 1: and Trump has said publicly quote we're back in love. 605 00:38:19,680 --> 00:38:22,520 Speaker 1: In the quote in response, I'm not kidding about that. 606 00:38:22,560 --> 00:38:25,279 Speaker 1: I'm not paraphrasing. That's what Trump has said about his 607 00:38:25,320 --> 00:38:30,480 Speaker 1: relationship with this organization. So you could argue that Trump's 608 00:38:30,880 --> 00:38:33,560 Speaker 1: reversal instance has a lot more to do with him 609 00:38:33,680 --> 00:38:36,919 Speaker 1: aligning with money that would support him in his effort 610 00:38:37,000 --> 00:38:40,440 Speaker 1: to become president again than it does with a fundamental 611 00:38:40,560 --> 00:38:43,680 Speaker 1: change of heart, and to me, it seems like a 612 00:38:43,719 --> 00:38:47,680 Speaker 1: pretty safe bet. But there are also other reasons. Trump 613 00:38:47,760 --> 00:38:50,400 Speaker 1: has said that one consequence of a ban on TikTok 614 00:38:50,840 --> 00:38:54,080 Speaker 1: is that that would be incredibly beneficial to another company, 615 00:38:54,560 --> 00:38:58,600 Speaker 1: namely Meta, and Trump has identified Meta as an enemy 616 00:38:58,719 --> 00:39:01,840 Speaker 1: of the people. Now, a ton of the reason behind 617 00:39:01,880 --> 00:39:06,360 Speaker 1: that deals with perceptions that Meta somehow interfered in the 618 00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:10,759 Speaker 1: twenty twenty election by perhaps suppressing information that would have 619 00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:15,839 Speaker 1: helped Trump or promoting information that would harm Trump politically. Now, 620 00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:19,080 Speaker 1: I'll note that there are Democrat leaders who feel that 621 00:39:19,200 --> 00:39:22,759 Speaker 1: the exact opposite scenario happened, that in fact, Meta was 622 00:39:22,840 --> 00:39:29,600 Speaker 1: responsible for promoting misinformation or promoting Trump and suppressing information 623 00:39:29,800 --> 00:39:33,480 Speaker 1: that would have been critical. So it's interesting to me 624 00:39:33,640 --> 00:39:38,000 Speaker 1: that from both political sides there are completely opposite views 625 00:39:38,040 --> 00:39:42,320 Speaker 1: as to what happened on Meta in the twenty twenty election. 626 00:39:42,880 --> 00:39:46,680 Speaker 1: There's also the whole element of foreign interference using platforms 627 00:39:46,719 --> 00:39:49,480 Speaker 1: like Facebook to manipulate voters. We know that happens. We 628 00:39:49,560 --> 00:39:54,040 Speaker 1: know that Russia and China both have held massive campaigns. 629 00:39:54,480 --> 00:39:56,440 Speaker 1: I guess really, what it boils down to is that 630 00:39:56,480 --> 00:39:59,400 Speaker 1: Meda is a pretty lousy company from a political standpoint. 631 00:39:59,480 --> 00:40:02,320 Speaker 1: Doesn't matter what side of the aisle you're from, Medda's 632 00:40:02,360 --> 00:40:05,600 Speaker 1: not good. So part of Trump's reversal may have nothing 633 00:40:05,600 --> 00:40:10,680 Speaker 1: to do with TikTok directly, but more to do with Meta. Now, personally, 634 00:40:10,760 --> 00:40:13,400 Speaker 1: I'm not a fan of Zuckerberg or his company. I 635 00:40:13,400 --> 00:40:16,200 Speaker 1: think Meta has done a lot of shady things, and 636 00:40:16,280 --> 00:40:19,440 Speaker 1: has over the years leaned very hard on the political 637 00:40:19,480 --> 00:40:22,400 Speaker 1: system to make sure these shady things didn't lead to 638 00:40:23,000 --> 00:40:26,680 Speaker 1: negative consequences for the company. I don't necessarily believe that 639 00:40:26,719 --> 00:40:30,440 Speaker 1: Meta has intentionally tried to sway politics one way or 640 00:40:30,520 --> 00:40:34,880 Speaker 1: the other, apart from, you know, favoring Meda's business practices. 641 00:40:35,480 --> 00:40:38,680 Speaker 1: But I do think tons of parties with various motivations 642 00:40:38,760 --> 00:40:43,080 Speaker 1: have leveraged Meta's platforms in order to manipulate voters, and 643 00:40:43,200 --> 00:40:47,480 Speaker 1: Meta has not done enough to counter that anyway. It's 644 00:40:47,520 --> 00:40:51,399 Speaker 1: interesting to see that Donald Trump hasn't addressed TikTok's link 645 00:40:51,440 --> 00:40:54,520 Speaker 1: to China, which of course is what he cited as 646 00:40:54,600 --> 00:40:58,320 Speaker 1: his concern back in that executive order in twenty twenty. 647 00:40:58,520 --> 00:41:01,160 Speaker 1: He hasn't talked about that really, at all. Instead, he's 648 00:41:01,200 --> 00:41:04,640 Speaker 1: talked about how kids love the app and how TikTok's 649 00:41:04,680 --> 00:41:08,560 Speaker 1: absence would benefit META. It actually would be pretty easy 650 00:41:08,840 --> 00:41:12,440 Speaker 1: for Donald Trump to acknowledge TikTok's efforts to comply with 651 00:41:12,600 --> 00:41:15,800 Speaker 1: US concerns, you know, with Project Texas. I think that 652 00:41:15,840 --> 00:41:18,080 Speaker 1: would actually go a long way to stop people from 653 00:41:18,160 --> 00:41:22,360 Speaker 1: asking how his view could change so dramatically in four years. 654 00:41:22,800 --> 00:41:26,319 Speaker 1: And if he just said, look, TikTok took strides to 655 00:41:26,400 --> 00:41:31,440 Speaker 1: protect US interests, like they spent more than a billion 656 00:41:31,480 --> 00:41:33,640 Speaker 1: dollars to do so. If he said that, I think 657 00:41:33,680 --> 00:41:37,239 Speaker 1: that would go a long way to assuaging the concerns 658 00:41:37,280 --> 00:41:42,200 Speaker 1: about potential hypocrisy. And that's where we are. That's the 659 00:41:42,239 --> 00:41:44,920 Speaker 1: technical and political situation here in the United States with 660 00:41:45,000 --> 00:41:48,320 Speaker 1: regard to TikTok. Will the Senate follow the House of 661 00:41:48,400 --> 00:41:52,000 Speaker 1: Representatives lead and pass the bill. That's not certain. I 662 00:41:52,120 --> 00:41:54,600 Speaker 1: have my doubts because again, I think senators are going 663 00:41:54,640 --> 00:41:57,960 Speaker 1: to worry about the political fallout if they make that 664 00:41:58,040 --> 00:42:01,040 Speaker 1: kind of decision. If it weren't an allection year, I 665 00:42:01,040 --> 00:42:03,920 Speaker 1: think things could potentially go a lot differently. But because 666 00:42:03,920 --> 00:42:07,000 Speaker 1: it's an election year, because people are worried that would 667 00:42:07,040 --> 00:42:10,320 Speaker 1: have an impact on the elections. I'm not entirely sure. 668 00:42:10,640 --> 00:42:13,000 Speaker 1: I don't know that this bill's going to go any further. 669 00:42:13,480 --> 00:42:15,719 Speaker 1: As for the idea of the US government stepping in 670 00:42:15,760 --> 00:42:18,680 Speaker 1: to force a foreign owned company to divest itself of 671 00:42:18,680 --> 00:42:23,120 Speaker 1: a property that is within the United States borders that 672 00:42:23,160 --> 00:42:26,200 Speaker 1: actually has a precedence, like, it might seem like that's 673 00:42:26,400 --> 00:42:30,600 Speaker 1: overstepping your bounds to like wrench assets from a company 674 00:42:30,600 --> 00:42:35,560 Speaker 1: that is foreign based, but it's happened in America before. Famously, 675 00:42:35,640 --> 00:42:38,960 Speaker 1: during World War One, the United States Navy essentially took 676 00:42:39,000 --> 00:42:43,360 Speaker 1: over civilian radio stations that belonged to the Marconi Company, 677 00:42:43,719 --> 00:42:46,880 Speaker 1: America's branch of the Marconi Company, which was based largely 678 00:42:46,920 --> 00:42:50,080 Speaker 1: out of the UK, but also in other places. And 679 00:42:50,520 --> 00:42:55,200 Speaker 1: after World War One, instead of returning those stations to 680 00:42:55,280 --> 00:42:59,279 Speaker 1: the American Marconi Company, the Navy at first wanted to 681 00:42:59,320 --> 00:43:03,080 Speaker 1: retain cont of those radio stations. They were not allowed 682 00:43:03,120 --> 00:43:06,680 Speaker 1: to do that, and so ultimately General Electric stepped in 683 00:43:07,080 --> 00:43:11,719 Speaker 1: and formed the Radio Corporation of America, and these previously 684 00:43:11,840 --> 00:43:15,680 Speaker 1: foreign owned radio stations became American owned. There's an entire 685 00:43:15,680 --> 00:43:18,440 Speaker 1: Tech Stuff episode about that in the archives if you 686 00:43:18,480 --> 00:43:20,880 Speaker 1: want to learn more. About the Radio Corporation of America 687 00:43:20,960 --> 00:43:24,520 Speaker 1: or RCA. So yeah, there is precedence for this. It's 688 00:43:24,600 --> 00:43:29,160 Speaker 1: not like this kind of thing is completely unheard of. Again, 689 00:43:29,760 --> 00:43:32,680 Speaker 1: in my own personal opinion, although I'm not a fan 690 00:43:32,719 --> 00:43:36,120 Speaker 1: of TikTok, I feel like it does a lot of harm. 691 00:43:36,480 --> 00:43:41,040 Speaker 1: I also have to admit one the ACLU argues that 692 00:43:41,600 --> 00:43:46,120 Speaker 1: TikTok has First Amendment rights and that a lot of 693 00:43:46,160 --> 00:43:50,400 Speaker 1: this bill essentially is ignoring that, and so it's unconstitutional. 694 00:43:50,719 --> 00:43:52,680 Speaker 1: I acknowledge that there are a lot of people who 695 00:43:52,760 --> 00:43:56,000 Speaker 1: make a living on TikTok, and it does seem unfair 696 00:43:56,200 --> 00:43:59,719 Speaker 1: to just deny them their living. I don't really like that. 697 00:44:00,400 --> 00:44:03,120 Speaker 1: And also, as I've said multiple times in this episode, 698 00:44:03,239 --> 00:44:07,080 Speaker 1: the problems that leaders cite with TikTok are so much 699 00:44:07,120 --> 00:44:11,120 Speaker 1: bigger than TikTok, and they go so far beyond a 700 00:44:11,160 --> 00:44:14,840 Speaker 1: single platform and have nothing to do with you. Whether 701 00:44:14,880 --> 00:44:18,440 Speaker 1: the ownership is domestic or foreign, it's such a smoke screen. 702 00:44:18,560 --> 00:44:21,840 Speaker 1: It doesn't really matter, because we have this much larger 703 00:44:21,960 --> 00:44:26,200 Speaker 1: issue with the way our data gets collected and bought 704 00:44:26,239 --> 00:44:30,640 Speaker 1: and sold that have nothing to do directly with the 705 00:44:30,640 --> 00:44:33,279 Speaker 1: platforms themselves. Apart from the fact that the platforms are 706 00:44:33,400 --> 00:44:36,719 Speaker 1: sort of the siphon pulling all the data into the system. 707 00:44:36,960 --> 00:44:40,359 Speaker 1: So yeah, I think this bill's misplaced. And it's not 708 00:44:40,400 --> 00:44:42,960 Speaker 1: because I'm a TikTok fan, but because I think it's 709 00:44:43,040 --> 00:44:47,160 Speaker 1: not looking at the real issue. It's not looking at 710 00:44:47,200 --> 00:44:50,880 Speaker 1: the big picture, and I worry that it'll be ages 711 00:44:51,000 --> 00:44:54,319 Speaker 1: before the United States takes a serious look at the 712 00:44:54,320 --> 00:44:58,200 Speaker 1: big picture, largely because a lot of the leaders in 713 00:44:58,239 --> 00:45:01,680 Speaker 1: the US government are old and they don't have a 714 00:45:01,800 --> 00:45:07,640 Speaker 1: full understanding or appreciation for the tech ecosystem that exists 715 00:45:07,680 --> 00:45:10,759 Speaker 1: that powers all of this, and it's going to take 716 00:45:11,040 --> 00:45:13,920 Speaker 1: a while before you have folks who do have that 717 00:45:14,000 --> 00:45:18,840 Speaker 1: appreciation to be in seats of power. So yeah, pretty 718 00:45:19,040 --> 00:45:23,719 Speaker 1: rough week in tech from the US political perspective. And 719 00:45:24,160 --> 00:45:26,840 Speaker 1: it'll be interesting to see how this plays out over 720 00:45:26,920 --> 00:45:31,400 Speaker 1: the following months, whether or not senators will handle this 721 00:45:31,520 --> 00:45:34,120 Speaker 1: or back away from it like it's radioactive, if it 722 00:45:34,160 --> 00:45:37,319 Speaker 1: will have any impact in the actual election process later 723 00:45:37,360 --> 00:45:40,440 Speaker 1: in the year. But that's it. That was our one 724 00:45:40,880 --> 00:45:43,719 Speaker 1: big news item for this week that I really wanted 725 00:45:43,760 --> 00:45:46,160 Speaker 1: to tackle. I originally was going to put in some 726 00:45:46,200 --> 00:45:48,440 Speaker 1: other news items at the end, but I realized that 727 00:45:48,520 --> 00:45:51,240 Speaker 1: this was just such a huge topic that I wouldn't 728 00:45:51,239 --> 00:45:53,160 Speaker 1: really have space for it. But next week we should 729 00:45:53,160 --> 00:45:56,239 Speaker 1: be back to doing other tech news episodes. We'll also 730 00:45:56,400 --> 00:45:59,480 Speaker 1: have parts two and three of the rooster Teeth story, 731 00:46:00,160 --> 00:46:04,520 Speaker 1: and my dog will hopefully apply to be an official 732 00:46:04,560 --> 00:46:08,560 Speaker 1: correspondent as opposed to just insisting that he be part 733 00:46:08,560 --> 00:46:12,200 Speaker 1: of this. I hope you are all well, and I'll 734 00:46:12,239 --> 00:46:21,640 Speaker 1: talk to you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an 735 00:46:21,719 --> 00:46:27,240 Speaker 1: iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, 736 00:46:27,360 --> 00:46:30,520 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.