WEBVTT - TechStuff Classic: Hack That Auto 2.0

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio

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<v Speaker 1>and how the tech are you? It's time for a

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<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff classic episode. This episode originally published May two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand fifteen. It is called Hack That Auto two point

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<v Speaker 1>oh and I had a special guest co host on

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<v Speaker 1>that show, Joe McCormick. Joe is one of the co

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<v Speaker 1>hosts of Stuff to Blow Your Mind. He was also

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<v Speaker 1>one of my co hosts on Forward Thinking, the audio podcast,

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<v Speaker 1>and he was also a writer on the video series

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<v Speaker 1>Forward Thinking. Joe is one incredibly intelligent person, even if

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<v Speaker 1>he doesn't recognize Douglas Adams quotes. And let's have them

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<v Speaker 1>take it away. Hacking can mean any thing, right like,

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't necessarily the connotation we typically assigned to it

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<v Speaker 1>is someone is trying to gain unauthorized access to something,

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<v Speaker 1>which really is a subset of hacking exactly. Hacking really

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<v Speaker 1>could mean that you are building stuff, like you could

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<v Speaker 1>be a maker. You're trying to create a device that

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<v Speaker 1>does a very specific thing, and it maybe to do

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<v Speaker 1>it in a way that no one has done before it,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe to increase efficiency efficiency maybe the furthest thing from

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<v Speaker 1>your mind. It might just be to do something creatively.

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<v Speaker 1>And in that previous episode of Hack that Auto, Ben

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<v Speaker 1>and I covered lots of ways where you could use

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<v Speaker 1>technology to alter a vehicle in order to make it

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<v Speaker 1>do something that it was either not intended to do

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<v Speaker 1>or that had been limitations that have been placed upon

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<v Speaker 1>it at the manufacturing stage. WHOA, So you mean like

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<v Speaker 1>you could overclock your car the same way you can

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<v Speaker 1>overclock your CPU. Well, maybe not the same way, but

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<v Speaker 1>getting a very similar response. Because there are governors and

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<v Speaker 1>speed limitters vehicles right where it is set so that

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<v Speaker 1>the engine might be capable of producing enough power to

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<v Speaker 1>get you to a speed above the quote unquote top

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<v Speaker 1>speed of your vehicle, but there are are elements inside

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<v Speaker 1>the vehicle that limit those speeds, like you can't go

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<v Speaker 1>beyond them because they essentially cut the power, so you're

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<v Speaker 1>not going to be able to get more out of it.

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<v Speaker 1>But if you hack your vehicle, you could, in theory,

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<v Speaker 1>remove said limitations at your own peril and be able

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<v Speaker 1>to go faster than what the vehicle's manufacturer had intended,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, at the risk of sounding like a gullible sheep.

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<v Speaker 1>I bet those limitations are there for a decent reason.

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<v Speaker 1>They tend to be yeah, like I could probably damage

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<v Speaker 1>your vehicle or do something unsafe if you exceed them.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know if you have you ever been in

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<v Speaker 1>a car where it reached a certain speed and the

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<v Speaker 1>car was beginning to feel like it was not enjoying

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<v Speaker 1>that experience. Yeah, the first car I had, if you

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<v Speaker 1>got up to about fifty five or so, it felt

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<v Speaker 1>like it was about to come apart. Yeah. Yeah. And

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<v Speaker 1>there are some cars where, even right off the lot,

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<v Speaker 1>if you are pushing it at towards the top speed,

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<v Speaker 1>you start to feel like, yeah, this vehicle is not

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<v Speaker 1>really meant to maintain this for any length of time.

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<v Speaker 1>But there are people who want to have that full

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<v Speaker 1>control of their vehicle, and they want to be able

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<v Speaker 1>to do things with their vehicle that perhaps the manufacturer

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<v Speaker 1>had put limitations on, and they will hack their their cars.

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<v Speaker 1>And this is made possible by well a couple of things.

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<v Speaker 1>If you have a car that's more than twenty years old,

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<v Speaker 1>then you might be able to mechanically alter that vehicle. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>But as vehicles have become more and more complex More

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<v Speaker 1>and more of those uh, those those systems have become computerized,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's falling into what some people call the black

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<v Speaker 1>box problem, which is where you have a system that

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<v Speaker 1>is essentially contained within a black box, and it is

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<v Speaker 1>very difficult, if not impossible, to get access inside that

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<v Speaker 1>black box. You can alter what happens once this is

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<v Speaker 1>what what whatever the output is of that system, you

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<v Speaker 1>can alter that, and you can alter the arrangement of

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<v Speaker 1>various black box systems. But if you don't have that

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<v Speaker 1>special diagnostic computer right or any other means of tapping

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<v Speaker 1>into it, then you're kind of stuck. And and the

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<v Speaker 1>argument is that the technology is reaching a level of

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<v Speaker 1>complexity where the tinker is becoming more and more rarefied,

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<v Speaker 1>Like it's it's harder to be a tinker in that

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<v Speaker 1>world because things are getting so specialized and so advanced

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<v Speaker 1>that it requires a good deal of specialization just to

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<v Speaker 1>alter one thing, let alone all the other related systems.

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<v Speaker 1>I feel like we talked about this in an early

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<v Speaker 1>episode of the Forward Thinking podcast. This sounds very familiar.

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<v Speaker 1>But okay, so that's how you hack your own vehicle

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<v Speaker 1>to improve or maybe not improve but change it. Sure,

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<v Speaker 1>but what about the more you know. The more popular

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<v Speaker 1>sense of hacking these days where talking about violating a

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<v Speaker 1>supposedly secure system making it work for you. So Ben

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<v Speaker 1>and I talked about this as well, and overwhelmingly the

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<v Speaker 1>most prevalent version of that kind of hacking required physical

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<v Speaker 1>access to the vehicle and that you would have a

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<v Speaker 1>laptop that you would plug in with an adapter to

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<v Speaker 1>your your cars computer system, and with that laptop you

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<v Speaker 1>could alter things with the vehicle. In fact, you could

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<v Speaker 1>even set it up so that you could have remote

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<v Speaker 1>control of the vehicle through the laptop that's still physically

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<v Speaker 1>attached to the car. Oh wow, I wouldn't. I wouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>really expect that with it. I mean, I could see

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<v Speaker 1>how that could be coming with autonomous cars. But I'm

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<v Speaker 1>so you could control like gas and break and steering.

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<v Speaker 1>You could certainly control things like brakes and steering. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>not necessarily acceleration, although you could do that too, I assume,

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<v Speaker 1>but you could certainly alter things like you could you

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<v Speaker 1>could make the brakes stopped working, and in fact, there

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<v Speaker 1>have been demonstrations where people have done that where it

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<v Speaker 1>was done in a safe way. But to show that,

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<v Speaker 1>like the anti lock brake system would be disconnected, so

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<v Speaker 1>that hitting the brake would do nothing and the car

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<v Speaker 1>would continue on as if you hadn't hit the brake

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<v Speaker 1>at all. Just kind of terrifying to think about. But

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<v Speaker 1>there was a laptop computer sitting right there, plugged into

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<v Speaker 1>the dashboard. It was just that the commands. Like, think

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<v Speaker 1>of it this way, it's the same thing as if

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<v Speaker 1>someone were sitting in the passenger seat sending the commands

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<v Speaker 1>from the laptop directly to your car's computer. Only you

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<v Speaker 1>have removed the need for a person to be sitting

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<v Speaker 1>there because you have a remote system sitting the commands

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<v Speaker 1>to the laptop, which then send the commands to the

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<v Speaker 1>car computer. Well, if you're gonna do that, you might

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<v Speaker 1>as well just say, well, somebody sitting in the passenger

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<v Speaker 1>seat could reach over and grab the steering wheel, right,

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<v Speaker 1>And that was the point, right, That was the point

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<v Speaker 1>that allot of the car manufacturers were making, that a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of security experts were making. They said, these examples

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<v Speaker 1>require somebody to have physical access to your vehicle in

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<v Speaker 1>order for them to make these alterations, and therefore it's

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<v Speaker 1>not necessarily something to go out and panic over. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so that doesn't really bother me? What would really bother me?

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<v Speaker 1>And and a quick digression, I think you and I

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<v Speaker 1>are both on the record as being pretty pro autonomous vehicle.

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<v Speaker 1>I am on it would be harder for me to

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<v Speaker 1>be more pro autonomous vehicle. I am also very pro

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<v Speaker 1>autonomous vehicle despite all these concerns, And one of these

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<v Speaker 1>concerns is what if somebody could wirelessly hack an autonomous vehicle?

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<v Speaker 1>And that seems like, I mean, hopefully the industry will

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<v Speaker 1>take all the proper steps to prevent that from happening,

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<v Speaker 1>But autonomous vehicles do need to be able to communicate

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<v Speaker 1>with each other, so it seems like they may possibly

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<v Speaker 1>have some wireless based vulnerabilities. And there are cars out

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<v Speaker 1>there right now that have wireless vulnerabilities, and we'll talk

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<v Speaker 1>more about specifics in a little bit. So you are

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<v Speaker 1>at slutely right that autonomous cars will have these because

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<v Speaker 1>we have cars right now that have these these wireless

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<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities from from various systems. Uh, there have been examples

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<v Speaker 1>of people using the entertainment systems within certain cars to

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<v Speaker 1>hack into the rest of the vehicle. Now you would

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<v Speaker 1>think that these should be networks within a car that

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<v Speaker 1>are completely separate that don't have anything to do with

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<v Speaker 1>one another. But there are times where, either because the

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<v Speaker 1>design is simpler or because of well intentioned reasons, the

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<v Speaker 1>they are coupled more closely. Like imagine that you have

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<v Speaker 1>an entertainment system that is wired in such a way

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<v Speaker 1>where the volume of the system will automatically adjust based

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<v Speaker 1>upon your acceleration. So if you accelerate more, the volume

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<v Speaker 1>goes up because it figures, hey, now it's going to

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<v Speaker 1>be a noisier environment, so I need to balance out

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<v Speaker 1>by becoming louder so that the person can continue to

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<v Speaker 1>have the same experience listening to whatever they're listening to,

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<v Speaker 1>whether they're going slowly or quickly. Well, that means that

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<v Speaker 1>there needs to be some data coming from the drive

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<v Speaker 1>system of the vehicle, and it may just be data,

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<v Speaker 1>and it may just flow one way, which would be

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<v Speaker 1>the best way to implement that, but it may mean

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<v Speaker 1>that these systems are more connected than you had first imagined.

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<v Speaker 1>So as we get into more WiFi based entertainment systems,

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<v Speaker 1>that is a potential point of vulnerability for vehicles. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and a thing that just occurs to me is that

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<v Speaker 1>hopefully anybody who made these would sort of have entertainment

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<v Speaker 1>systems running on what's essentially a different computer than the

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<v Speaker 1>computer that controls the engine. Otherwise it seems like it

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<v Speaker 1>could be vulnerable to the kind of buffer overflow attack

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<v Speaker 1>or something where you, uh, you have some kind of

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<v Speaker 1>like you max out the memory on something and then

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<v Speaker 1>you start and then once you've maxed out that area,

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<v Speaker 1>it overflows into a place where you can just execute

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<v Speaker 1>some code. Right. Yeah, that's a good example. I mean that,

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<v Speaker 1>that's certainly so something that that needs to be thought

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<v Speaker 1>about when designing these systems. And to make this more complicated,

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<v Speaker 1>we have things like, you know, the wireless entry systems

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<v Speaker 1>which can be spoofed, although it's not easy to do so.

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<v Speaker 1>So wireless obviously that's when you've got, you know, your

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<v Speaker 1>little key fob and you push a button and it

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<v Speaker 1>unlocks the door so you can get into your car. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>Those work on little radio signals, and it is possible

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<v Speaker 1>to broadcast radio signals at a car and activate it's

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<v Speaker 1>unlocking mechanism. It's not easy, and the reason it's not

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<v Speaker 1>easy is that you need to know generally what frequency

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<v Speaker 1>this thing is broadcasting over, so it may require you

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<v Speaker 1>to be in the presence of the key fob being used.

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<v Speaker 1>In order to pick up on this frequency, you really

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<v Speaker 1>need to know probably the beginning of the code, which

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<v Speaker 1>again you can sometimes glean by listening in essentially on

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<v Speaker 1>that key fob um and then you have to brute

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<v Speaker 1>force attack because the way key fobs work is it

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<v Speaker 1>works with a rolling algorithm, So every time you press

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<v Speaker 1>that button, it changes the code, so the cook but

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<v Speaker 1>it's changed based upon an algorithm, so it's based upon

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<v Speaker 1>specific rules. It's not random, because if it were random,

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<v Speaker 1>no car would ever know when it's key is being used, right,

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<v Speaker 1>but it But that means that if you are using

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<v Speaker 1>a remote attack to try and get access to a vehicle,

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<v Speaker 1>then you have to do a brute force so this

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<v Speaker 1>can take minutes up to hours, depending upon uh the

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<v Speaker 1>system and depending upon your luck based upon where you're

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<v Speaker 1>starting from the code. And also it means that if

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<v Speaker 1>you have a keyless entry and you go to your

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<v Speaker 1>car and you try and use it and someone has

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<v Speaker 1>remotely accessed your vehicle, one of the only ways you

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<v Speaker 1>might be able to tell, assuming that your vehicle is

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<v Speaker 1>still there, is that is that it takes a couple

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<v Speaker 1>of presses before anything works, because it will take a

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<v Speaker 1>while for the the code on your key fob to

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<v Speaker 1>match up with the code that's in the car. So

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<v Speaker 1>in other words, of press it and you're like, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>nothing's happening, and you pressed a couple more times, then

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<v Speaker 1>it it'll synchronize up again and then you can have access. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>this is something that has been done already. Security experts

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<v Speaker 1>have shown. There's one in particular who used his own

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<v Speaker 1>vehicle to demonstrate that you could gain access, but it

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<v Speaker 1>could take hours and it takes a huge amount of effort,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's not something that is is probably easier to

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<v Speaker 1>just get a brick and bash the window. Yeah, it's

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<v Speaker 1>definitely not likely to happen, right, I get like the

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<v Speaker 1>likelihood of it happening is incredibly low because there are

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<v Speaker 1>other ways of getting access to a vehicle that require

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<v Speaker 1>far less work and far less access to set vehicle

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<v Speaker 1>for a given length of time. We'll be back with

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<v Speaker 1>more of this classic episode of tech stuff after this

0:12:45.559 --> 0:12:56.800
<v Speaker 1>quick break. There are other examples of someone having a

0:12:56.880 --> 0:13:01.800
<v Speaker 1>remote control of a vehicle, but was it was by

0:13:01.840 --> 0:13:05.760
<v Speaker 1>exploiting a system that was intended to have this remote

0:13:05.800 --> 0:13:08.840
<v Speaker 1>shutdown feature. So you you know that a lot of

0:13:08.920 --> 0:13:13.559
<v Speaker 1>vehicles have this ability for for a an entity to

0:13:14.400 --> 0:13:17.160
<v Speaker 1>either remotely shut down the engine or do things like

0:13:17.200 --> 0:13:20.000
<v Speaker 1>hawk the horn, right, yeah, I think, uh, well, I

0:13:20.040 --> 0:13:23.520
<v Speaker 1>know one scenario in which this occurs would be like,

0:13:24.200 --> 0:13:27.520
<v Speaker 1>so let's say you take out a loan on a

0:13:27.520 --> 0:13:30.280
<v Speaker 1>car and the person who sells you the car is

0:13:30.360 --> 0:13:33.000
<v Speaker 1>not very confident that you will pay back that loan.

0:13:33.760 --> 0:13:36.640
<v Speaker 1>They can put equipment on the car that prevents it

0:13:36.720 --> 0:13:39.320
<v Speaker 1>from starting up, right, so they can say, this person

0:13:39.400 --> 0:13:42.440
<v Speaker 1>isn't paying on their financing, we need to shut down

0:13:42.480 --> 0:13:44.880
<v Speaker 1>the car's ability to run. Yeah, it's essentially a remote

0:13:45.000 --> 0:13:48.200
<v Speaker 1>kill switch, and your car will not start at that point.

0:13:48.440 --> 0:13:51.200
<v Speaker 1>And uh, yeah, it could be hopefully they wouldn't be

0:13:51.200 --> 0:13:53.880
<v Speaker 1>able to turn off the engine while you're driving. No,

0:13:54.720 --> 0:13:57.800
<v Speaker 1>I don't think that's that's a possibility, but they could

0:13:57.840 --> 0:14:00.679
<v Speaker 1>certainly do it, you know, so that the next time

0:14:00.720 --> 0:14:02.400
<v Speaker 1>you try to start up your car it doesn't work.

0:14:03.000 --> 0:14:05.520
<v Speaker 1>And uh, it can be used in that case where

0:14:05.800 --> 0:14:07.760
<v Speaker 1>someone's not keeping up with their payments. It can also

0:14:07.800 --> 0:14:09.920
<v Speaker 1>be used in the case of a stolen car. So

0:14:09.960 --> 0:14:12.040
<v Speaker 1>if your car stolen, you report it to the police.

0:14:12.559 --> 0:14:15.000
<v Speaker 1>You work with the dealership, you explain, hey, my vehicle

0:14:15.040 --> 0:14:18.360
<v Speaker 1>was stolen, they can actually activate this remote kill switch

0:14:18.480 --> 0:14:20.880
<v Speaker 1>so that the criminals who have possession of your car

0:14:20.920 --> 0:14:23.400
<v Speaker 1>are no longer able to drive it, and then the

0:14:23.400 --> 0:14:26.520
<v Speaker 1>police can hopefully locate your vehicle and you get it back,

0:14:27.120 --> 0:14:29.840
<v Speaker 1>uh Right. So there are legitimate reasons why you would

0:14:29.880 --> 0:14:32.480
<v Speaker 1>want that technology install on your vehicle. However, there was

0:14:32.560 --> 0:14:37.720
<v Speaker 1>at least one case where a person who had access

0:14:37.760 --> 0:14:43.240
<v Speaker 1>to said system uh accessed it for personal reasons and

0:14:43.840 --> 0:14:49.400
<v Speaker 1>out of vindictiveness, was essentially harassing somebody using the system

0:14:49.440 --> 0:14:52.600
<v Speaker 1>to mess with their vehicle. So if you look at

0:14:52.440 --> 0:14:56.760
<v Speaker 1>a discussions about car hacking and they always say, like,

0:14:57.160 --> 0:14:59.960
<v Speaker 1>what are the examples of malicious car hacking, they said, well,

0:15:00.040 --> 0:15:03.280
<v Speaker 1>outside of research and development, where where security researchers are

0:15:03.320 --> 0:15:07.520
<v Speaker 1>trying their best to do this to see if it's viable,

0:15:08.080 --> 0:15:11.000
<v Speaker 1>there's only one example of it ever actually happening. And

0:15:11.040 --> 0:15:14.080
<v Speaker 1>in that case, it wasn't hacking in the sense of

0:15:14.120 --> 0:15:15.800
<v Speaker 1>someone setting down at their computer and trying to get

0:15:15.800 --> 0:15:19.480
<v Speaker 1>access to a vehicle, someone exploiting an existing system that

0:15:19.600 --> 0:15:24.280
<v Speaker 1>was already attached to that vehicle. But that being said,

0:15:24.840 --> 0:15:30.360
<v Speaker 1>with all those caveats laid out the issue of wireless

0:15:30.440 --> 0:15:34.560
<v Speaker 1>hacking a vehicle of remotely accessing a vehicle is by

0:15:34.560 --> 0:15:39.320
<v Speaker 1>no means a dead issue. It is something that is

0:15:39.400 --> 0:15:43.200
<v Speaker 1>continuously brought up, and as of the time that we're

0:15:43.200 --> 0:15:47.720
<v Speaker 1>recording this podcast, which is in May of twenty, there's

0:15:48.520 --> 0:15:52.720
<v Speaker 1>increasing interest in this because of a pair of researchers

0:15:52.800 --> 0:15:55.560
<v Speaker 1>and what they claim they are able to do and

0:15:55.600 --> 0:15:59.720
<v Speaker 1>what they will show off at the black Hat Conference

0:16:00.000 --> 0:16:04.200
<v Speaker 1>in August. What is that? Well, first I should explain

0:16:04.240 --> 0:16:06.720
<v Speaker 1>what the black Hat Conference is, So it's a um

0:16:07.480 --> 0:16:11.000
<v Speaker 1>it's essentially it's a hacker convention. It's all about discussing

0:16:11.040 --> 0:16:16.200
<v Speaker 1>security vulnerabilities and uh the ways to exploit them. Now,

0:16:17.160 --> 0:16:20.080
<v Speaker 1>in hacker circles, you have white hats and black hats,

0:16:20.080 --> 0:16:23.320
<v Speaker 1>and sometimes you can argue gray hats. White hat hackers

0:16:23.400 --> 0:16:27.080
<v Speaker 1>are people who are looking for security vulnerabilities with the

0:16:27.120 --> 0:16:31.040
<v Speaker 1>intent to have those security vulnerabilities patched so that they

0:16:31.080 --> 0:16:36.080
<v Speaker 1>are no longer vulnerable. Black hat hackers UH tend to

0:16:36.160 --> 0:16:39.160
<v Speaker 1>be the folks who find security vulnerabilities in order to

0:16:39.200 --> 0:16:42.480
<v Speaker 1>exploit them, whether that is to exploit them directly or

0:16:42.520 --> 0:16:46.040
<v Speaker 1>to exploit them by selling that information to other interested parties,

0:16:46.600 --> 0:16:49.600
<v Speaker 1>and whether they're doing it for cash or for leverage

0:16:49.600 --> 0:16:52.160
<v Speaker 1>over somebody, or just for fun, Yeah, just to build

0:16:52.160 --> 0:16:54.960
<v Speaker 1>their own reputation, as opposed to, you know, a genuine

0:16:55.000 --> 0:16:57.440
<v Speaker 1>desire to help other folks. So even though it's called

0:16:57.480 --> 0:16:59.680
<v Speaker 1>the black Hat Conference, it doesn't necessarily mean that these

0:16:59.680 --> 0:17:01.680
<v Speaker 1>are all people who are gathering around trying to figure

0:17:01.680 --> 0:17:04.080
<v Speaker 1>out how to control the world through their laptops. Often

0:17:04.160 --> 0:17:08.040
<v Speaker 1>its actual discussions about these are serious concerns that we

0:17:08.119 --> 0:17:10.680
<v Speaker 1>need to address in order to make sure that they

0:17:10.680 --> 0:17:16.320
<v Speaker 1>don't become huge problems go beyond concern to an enormous problem.

0:17:16.400 --> 0:17:20.560
<v Speaker 1>So the the researchers were talking about actually, I think

0:17:20.560 --> 0:17:23.840
<v Speaker 1>Ben and I mentioned them to Charlie Miller and Chris

0:17:24.000 --> 0:17:29.520
<v Speaker 1>valisek Uh, their two security experts who had talked about

0:17:29.520 --> 0:17:33.800
<v Speaker 1>hacking cars previously. They had uh shown in two thousand

0:17:33.840 --> 0:17:37.040
<v Speaker 1>thirteen and two thousand and fourteen various ways to hack

0:17:37.200 --> 0:17:41.199
<v Speaker 1>vehicles UH, and now they are talking that in the

0:17:41.240 --> 0:17:45.199
<v Speaker 1>two thousand fifteen conference in August they will reveal a

0:17:45.280 --> 0:17:48.760
<v Speaker 1>way of remotely gaining access to a vehicle. It does

0:17:48.800 --> 0:17:52.600
<v Speaker 1>not require you to plug a laptop into a computer.

0:17:52.760 --> 0:17:55.400
<v Speaker 1>They say that you could do this with an unmodified

0:17:55.480 --> 0:17:59.760
<v Speaker 1>vehicle as soon as it rolls off the dealership. Scary,

0:18:00.119 --> 0:18:04.920
<v Speaker 1>very scary. Um, that's an excellent question. I think that

0:18:05.320 --> 0:18:11.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure that they have something. The extent of that, yeah, no, no, no,

0:18:11.400 --> 0:18:15.280
<v Speaker 1>the extent of what they have I do not know. Now. Previously,

0:18:15.320 --> 0:18:18.359
<v Speaker 1>they have published lists of vehicles that they have looked

0:18:18.359 --> 0:18:24.240
<v Speaker 1>at that they say represent, you know, the most hackable

0:18:24.640 --> 0:18:26.760
<v Speaker 1>kind of vehicles, and the very top of the list,

0:18:26.760 --> 0:18:31.520
<v Speaker 1>where the Jeep Cherokee was number one. That's the most table,

0:18:31.720 --> 0:18:36.960
<v Speaker 1>most tackable, most tackical. But they they had identify three

0:18:37.040 --> 0:18:42.720
<v Speaker 1>different criteria for hackability, including things like are the systems

0:18:42.760 --> 0:18:46.160
<v Speaker 1>interconnected with one with one another? How many wireless points

0:18:46.200 --> 0:18:50.560
<v Speaker 1>of entry are are potentially there? That sort of stuff,

0:18:50.960 --> 0:18:54.199
<v Speaker 1>And out of the various criteria, the Jeep Cherokee had

0:18:54.240 --> 0:18:57.720
<v Speaker 1>the most of them, the most examples. Uh, the Infinity

0:18:57.800 --> 0:19:00.000
<v Speaker 1>Q fifty was also up there in the Cattle I

0:19:00.320 --> 0:19:06.520
<v Speaker 1>Escalade as ah as the the SNL Southern character would say,

0:19:07.119 --> 0:19:11.240
<v Speaker 1>was also up there. And uh, when we're talking about

0:19:11.280 --> 0:19:15.920
<v Speaker 1>wireless points of vulnerability, really you're talking about any system

0:19:16.200 --> 0:19:22.280
<v Speaker 1>that has that wireless communication capability. So one example, which

0:19:22.359 --> 0:19:26.160
<v Speaker 1>is perfectly innocent in of itself, is the tire monitoring

0:19:26.240 --> 0:19:29.000
<v Speaker 1>system the tire pressure monitoring system. So if you have

0:19:29.040 --> 0:19:31.760
<v Speaker 1>a vehicle that has this, then like you get in

0:19:31.760 --> 0:19:34.080
<v Speaker 1>your car, you turn your you know, you put the

0:19:34.119 --> 0:19:37.200
<v Speaker 1>key in the ignition you or if it's key less ignition,

0:19:37.240 --> 0:19:39.840
<v Speaker 1>you turn on your car, however that may be. And

0:19:39.840 --> 0:19:42.960
<v Speaker 1>there might be an indicator on your dashboard that tells you,

0:19:42.960 --> 0:19:45.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, if your tires are overinflated, underinflated, what the

0:19:46.160 --> 0:19:48.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, how the pressure is? Uh, which is kind

0:19:48.960 --> 0:19:51.120
<v Speaker 1>of cool. You're like, oh, awesome, I don't need to

0:19:51.160 --> 0:19:53.439
<v Speaker 1>get out of my vehicle, you know, pull over to

0:19:53.480 --> 0:19:56.600
<v Speaker 1>a gas station or whatever and get the air pressure

0:19:56.640 --> 0:19:58.840
<v Speaker 1>gauge out and see how it's doing. It's telling me

0:19:58.960 --> 0:20:01.679
<v Speaker 1>right here, um, which is useful. But it's doing so

0:20:01.760 --> 0:20:06.840
<v Speaker 1>with wireless sensors that communicate back to the the computer

0:20:06.960 --> 0:20:10.520
<v Speaker 1>system that is governing all the other systems in the car. Yeah.

0:20:10.680 --> 0:20:13.679
<v Speaker 1>I can see why you wouldn't want wires going to

0:20:13.720 --> 0:20:18.200
<v Speaker 1>the tires. Yeah, yeah, no, it would It would be problematic, right.

0:20:18.240 --> 0:20:22.240
<v Speaker 1>So the the wireless system is likely communicating with the

0:20:22.359 --> 0:20:26.280
<v Speaker 1>what was called the controller area network bus or can bus,

0:20:26.880 --> 0:20:30.199
<v Speaker 1>which is kind of like the the traffic controller of

0:20:30.200 --> 0:20:33.080
<v Speaker 1>all the different systems that feed information into the car's

0:20:33.119 --> 0:20:36.800
<v Speaker 1>computer the master control program. Yeah, if not the master

0:20:36.880 --> 0:20:40.320
<v Speaker 1>control program, it's got to be like the master control programs.

0:20:40.720 --> 0:20:47.119
<v Speaker 1>Uh executive assistant, Right, yeah, yeah, it's a it's good

0:20:47.160 --> 0:20:50.960
<v Speaker 1>old David uh not Yeah, Stark controlling this. So yeah, exactly,

0:20:50.960 --> 0:20:53.720
<v Speaker 1>it's it's this this traffic controller that sends the information

0:20:53.760 --> 0:20:57.680
<v Speaker 1>to the computer. Well, you know, that's a potential point

0:20:57.680 --> 0:21:01.840
<v Speaker 1>of vulnerability. And there have been example of being able

0:21:01.880 --> 0:21:05.959
<v Speaker 1>to track a vehicle based upon tracking the unique monitoring

0:21:06.800 --> 0:21:12.280
<v Speaker 1>frequency for that that tire pressure system. So you could

0:21:12.600 --> 0:21:16.879
<v Speaker 1>potentially track where a vehicle has gone by keeping note

0:21:17.000 --> 0:21:22.680
<v Speaker 1>of this particular this particular wireless communication system. If you could,

0:21:22.920 --> 0:21:27.320
<v Speaker 1>can you get access to more critical systems like breaking

0:21:27.600 --> 0:21:31.480
<v Speaker 1>or steering through that? That remains to be seen. So

0:21:32.160 --> 0:21:38.359
<v Speaker 1>Miller and uh and Valask have said that they have

0:21:38.520 --> 0:21:43.760
<v Speaker 1>found some interesting stuff through their experiments. Um, they haven't

0:21:43.800 --> 0:21:46.640
<v Speaker 1>had this discussion, so we can't say exactly what they revealed,

0:21:46.640 --> 0:21:48.960
<v Speaker 1>but they have said that UH or at least the

0:21:49.000 --> 0:21:53.800
<v Speaker 1>black Hat website says that the presentation will include starting

0:21:53.800 --> 0:21:56.640
<v Speaker 1>with remote exploitation, we will show how to pivot through

0:21:56.760 --> 0:22:00.320
<v Speaker 1>different pieces of the vehicle's hardware in order to be

0:22:00.359 --> 0:22:03.760
<v Speaker 1>able to send messages on the can bus to critical

0:22:03.960 --> 0:22:08.320
<v Speaker 1>electronic control units e c U s. We will conclude

0:22:08.320 --> 0:22:12.159
<v Speaker 1>by showing several can messages that affect physical systems of

0:22:12.200 --> 0:22:15.760
<v Speaker 1>the vehicle. So that that's pretty vague, right. It doesn't

0:22:15.800 --> 0:22:21.040
<v Speaker 1>specifically say that it could do something like break the

0:22:21.119 --> 0:22:24.200
<v Speaker 1>car as it b R a k E the car,

0:22:24.280 --> 0:22:28.600
<v Speaker 1>like apply the brakes. Doesn't say that, uh, you know, explicitly,

0:22:28.640 --> 0:22:33.160
<v Speaker 1>so maybe their methodology will be limited. And in fact,

0:22:33.160 --> 0:22:37.000
<v Speaker 1>they say that they plan on showing both the reality

0:22:37.040 --> 0:22:42.520
<v Speaker 1>and the limitations of remote hacking on vehicles. So a

0:22:42.560 --> 0:22:45.840
<v Speaker 1>lot of security experts have said, listen, this is something

0:22:45.840 --> 0:22:48.840
<v Speaker 1>to be concerned about, yes, but not something to panic

0:22:48.920 --> 0:22:53.840
<v Speaker 1>over because one, they have not indicated how extensive these

0:22:54.440 --> 0:22:58.120
<v Speaker 1>these messages can go, like what what the effects can be. Two,

0:22:58.200 --> 0:23:01.760
<v Speaker 1>they haven't discussed their methodology of coming up with the ability,

0:23:01.840 --> 0:23:04.679
<v Speaker 1>the way of doing it, or if whether or not

0:23:04.720 --> 0:23:09.879
<v Speaker 1>they plan on sharing in detail how it's done. And three,

0:23:10.040 --> 0:23:13.760
<v Speaker 1>it may require so much effort to do this that,

0:23:14.600 --> 0:23:17.600
<v Speaker 1>just like the keyless entry, no one would ever bother

0:23:17.720 --> 0:23:19.920
<v Speaker 1>to do it, because they are easier ways to sabotage

0:23:19.920 --> 0:23:23.520
<v Speaker 1>a vehicle than going through these processes but showing that

0:23:24.080 --> 0:23:28.720
<v Speaker 1>it's possible means that further like the future generations of

0:23:28.800 --> 0:23:34.640
<v Speaker 1>vehicles could be built and designed to counteract this sort

0:23:34.640 --> 0:23:38.400
<v Speaker 1>of stuff from the from the get go, so that

0:23:38.560 --> 0:23:44.280
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't become attempting enough target to make further investigation

0:23:44.400 --> 0:23:46.800
<v Speaker 1>into that that line of attack. Right, Like, if you

0:23:47.080 --> 0:23:50.119
<v Speaker 1>if you find a vulnerability and you find a really

0:23:50.200 --> 0:23:54.040
<v Speaker 1>hard way that you can exploit that vulnerability, that might

0:23:54.080 --> 0:23:55.919
<v Speaker 1>lead to other people saying maybe I can find an

0:23:55.960 --> 0:23:58.520
<v Speaker 1>easier way to exploit that same vulnerability. As long as

0:23:58.520 --> 0:24:02.040
<v Speaker 1>that vulnerability exists, it's a it's a target, and if

0:24:02.040 --> 0:24:05.159
<v Speaker 1>we ever get to a point where it's easier to

0:24:05.240 --> 0:24:10.199
<v Speaker 1>attack the target than other methods of messing with a vehicle,

0:24:10.800 --> 0:24:14.640
<v Speaker 1>then you're in trouble. So the hope is that these

0:24:14.680 --> 0:24:20.880
<v Speaker 1>systems one could be addressed by updating firmware on existing vehicles,

0:24:20.920 --> 0:24:25.600
<v Speaker 1>and two could be prevented in future vehicle design. Uh.

0:24:25.800 --> 0:24:27.919
<v Speaker 1>That being said, of course, we still don't know what

0:24:28.200 --> 0:24:31.560
<v Speaker 1>they're gonna say yet. It may it may be that

0:24:31.720 --> 0:24:36.199
<v Speaker 1>this is all uh, you know, largely, you know, the

0:24:36.200 --> 0:24:39.400
<v Speaker 1>speculation that we're having is largely harmless. That could be

0:24:39.480 --> 0:24:42.840
<v Speaker 1>that's best case scenario. Worst case would be, Yeah, we

0:24:42.960 --> 0:24:45.040
<v Speaker 1>figured out that we could with a laptop and a

0:24:45.040 --> 0:24:47.320
<v Speaker 1>wireless transmitter, we can make your card do whatever we

0:24:47.359 --> 0:24:50.080
<v Speaker 1>wanted to do. That would be bad. Well, I would say, actually,

0:24:50.080 --> 0:24:53.200
<v Speaker 1>the best case scenario would be that, um, that they

0:24:53.240 --> 0:24:57.959
<v Speaker 1>actually do turn up whatever are the most critical vulnerabilities

0:24:58.000 --> 0:25:01.119
<v Speaker 1>that exist, and that leads manufact trurers to take better

0:25:01.200 --> 0:25:04.320
<v Speaker 1>steps to protect their cars. Yeah, assuming that there are

0:25:04.359 --> 0:25:07.280
<v Speaker 1>in fact critical vulnerabilities, that is the best case scenario.

0:25:07.760 --> 0:25:10.280
<v Speaker 1>The true best case scenario is to discover there are

0:25:10.280 --> 0:25:14.360
<v Speaker 1>no critical vulnerabilities. But the likelihood of that, I mean,

0:25:14.520 --> 0:25:18.320
<v Speaker 1>if someone's really determined to get access to a system,

0:25:18.359 --> 0:25:21.800
<v Speaker 1>there hasn't been a system made that is crack proof.

0:25:22.760 --> 0:25:29.400
<v Speaker 1>You know, eventually, given enough time, resources and willpower, any

0:25:29.480 --> 0:25:33.800
<v Speaker 1>system that has been made can will eventually be be breached.

0:25:34.080 --> 0:25:40.439
<v Speaker 1>Speak for yourself. I'm behind seven proxies. I tracked him

0:25:40.480 --> 0:25:43.320
<v Speaker 1>all the all the way to a pub in Ireland.

0:25:43.320 --> 0:25:45.480
<v Speaker 1>It turned out he was at least three more hops away.

0:25:47.040 --> 0:25:49.320
<v Speaker 1>We've got more to say in this classic episode of

0:25:49.320 --> 0:26:06.400
<v Speaker 1>tech stuff. After these quick messages, Uh well as scary

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<v Speaker 1>was not the actual voice of a win for driving

0:28:07.640 --> 0:28:10.680
<v Speaker 1>is Yeah. About the only thing I could imagine scarier

0:28:10.720 --> 0:28:14.879
<v Speaker 1>than that is somebody hacking the airplane you're writing in. Yeah,

0:28:14.960 --> 0:28:18.960
<v Speaker 1>that would that is a a sobering thought right now.

0:28:19.080 --> 0:28:23.080
<v Speaker 1>Of course, we would hope that nothing like that is possible,

0:28:23.119 --> 0:28:26.760
<v Speaker 1>That airplanes are designed to be as secure as possible,

0:28:26.800 --> 0:28:29.320
<v Speaker 1>and that they don't really have any vulnerabilities that you

0:28:29.320 --> 0:28:33.080
<v Speaker 1>could exploit, like like these, you know, tire pressure gauges

0:28:33.200 --> 0:28:37.080
<v Speaker 1>or anything like that. We would hope, but that might

0:28:37.160 --> 0:28:42.840
<v Speaker 1>not necessarily be the case, because this month, in May,

0:28:43.240 --> 0:28:45.800
<v Speaker 1>if you haven't seen yet, some media outlets have been

0:28:45.840 --> 0:28:50.600
<v Speaker 1>reporting that a security researcher named Chris Roberts may have

0:28:50.800 --> 0:28:54.920
<v Speaker 1>hacked an airplane and sent it off course. Yeah. Now,

0:28:55.560 --> 0:28:58.400
<v Speaker 1>the reason why you're building so many qualifiers into this

0:28:58.480 --> 0:29:01.960
<v Speaker 1>statement is because, as a turns out, there's there are

0:29:01.960 --> 0:29:05.520
<v Speaker 1>a lot of differing accounts about what exactly was done

0:29:05.560 --> 0:29:08.600
<v Speaker 1>and or happened. Yeah, well, our information is a kind

0:29:08.600 --> 0:29:12.080
<v Speaker 1>of like he said, he said, he said issue. So

0:29:12.440 --> 0:29:14.960
<v Speaker 1>I'll explain that as we go forward. But who is

0:29:15.040 --> 0:29:19.000
<v Speaker 1>Chris Roberts. So for years he has been known as

0:29:19.040 --> 0:29:21.560
<v Speaker 1>a white hat hacker. We talked about black hats and

0:29:21.560 --> 0:29:23.560
<v Speaker 1>white hats earlier. If you're a listener to the show,

0:29:23.600 --> 0:29:27.280
<v Speaker 1>you're probably familiar anyway. But the white hat is somebody who,

0:29:27.360 --> 0:29:31.840
<v Speaker 1>at least ostensibly uh goes out and looks for vulnerabilities

0:29:31.880 --> 0:29:35.600
<v Speaker 1>and systems in order to improve security, to show you, hey,

0:29:35.640 --> 0:29:38.840
<v Speaker 1>here's where you're weak. You should shore up your defenses

0:29:38.880 --> 0:29:42.280
<v Speaker 1>in this area. And so Roberts for years has been

0:29:42.320 --> 0:29:46.440
<v Speaker 1>known as a white hat hacker, especially in a vionic

0:29:46.600 --> 0:29:51.400
<v Speaker 1>sort of publicly denouncing alleged security problems and vulnerabilities in

0:29:51.680 --> 0:29:57.240
<v Speaker 1>networks airline manufacturers put into their aircraft. So keeping in

0:29:57.280 --> 0:29:59.720
<v Speaker 1>mind that, you know, as the aircraft experience has a

0:29:59.800 --> 0:30:03.840
<v Speaker 1>al it over time, Roberts would argue, it has introduced

0:30:04.200 --> 0:30:08.560
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities from an electronic standpoint computer standpoint, So things like

0:30:09.040 --> 0:30:11.520
<v Speaker 1>the in flight entertainment systems, the i f E s,

0:30:11.680 --> 0:30:13.800
<v Speaker 1>or the fact that a lot of a lot of

0:30:14.040 --> 0:30:18.240
<v Speaker 1>airlines offer WiFi on their flights. Yeah, that these could

0:30:18.280 --> 0:30:23.080
<v Speaker 1>potentially be vulnerabilities. Yeah, And so you know, you would

0:30:23.120 --> 0:30:26.680
<v Speaker 1>just hope that, well, I mean, if a plane's showing

0:30:26.760 --> 0:30:30.680
<v Speaker 1>me movies on some central computer system, surely that computer

0:30:30.880 --> 0:30:34.200
<v Speaker 1>is not linked to the computers that control things like

0:30:35.080 --> 0:30:38.800
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, life support systems inside the airplane. Yeah,

0:30:38.920 --> 0:30:43.280
<v Speaker 1>the the engine, the navigating computer. You would hope that

0:30:43.320 --> 0:30:47.640
<v Speaker 1>there's no involvement there. But I'm gonna tell a little story. Okay,

0:30:47.880 --> 0:30:51.600
<v Speaker 1>So in April, I think it was on April fifteen,

0:30:52.720 --> 0:30:57.320
<v Speaker 1>sometimes in the middle of April. Yeah, Roberts, the same guy,

0:30:57.400 --> 0:31:01.000
<v Speaker 1>Chris Roberts. He was removed from a fly by FBI

0:31:01.200 --> 0:31:05.520
<v Speaker 1>agents after the flight landed in Syracuse, New York. And

0:31:05.720 --> 0:31:08.959
<v Speaker 1>the supposed reason that everybody figured this happened was because

0:31:09.080 --> 0:31:13.920
<v Speaker 1>Roberts had tweeted a joke about hacking an airplane in

0:31:13.920 --> 0:31:18.360
<v Speaker 1>which he was riding earlier that day, and has at

0:31:18.440 --> 0:31:22.240
<v Speaker 1>least on one subsequent occasion said he was essentially poking

0:31:22.240 --> 0:31:27.240
<v Speaker 1>the bear. Yeah, so the tweet read as follows, find

0:31:27.280 --> 0:31:31.640
<v Speaker 1>myself on a seven hundred. Let's see box I F

0:31:31.680 --> 0:31:35.120
<v Speaker 1>E ice dot com. Shall we start playing with E

0:31:35.240 --> 0:31:39.600
<v Speaker 1>I C A S messages pass oxygen on anyone smiley face.

0:31:40.560 --> 0:31:44.680
<v Speaker 1>So he's using some some acronyms there. One of them

0:31:44.720 --> 0:31:47.960
<v Speaker 1>is I F E that's in flight entertainment. Another one

0:31:48.080 --> 0:31:51.000
<v Speaker 1>is E I C A S that's Engine indicating and

0:31:51.080 --> 0:31:55.600
<v Speaker 1>crew alerting system. At the past oxygen on. What it

0:31:55.640 --> 0:31:58.640
<v Speaker 1>seems to be saying there is he's suggesting it would

0:31:58.680 --> 0:32:02.120
<v Speaker 1>be funny to to trigger a command that makes the

0:32:02.160 --> 0:32:05.920
<v Speaker 1>oxygen masks descend on all the passengers, whereupon you would

0:32:06.600 --> 0:32:09.680
<v Speaker 1>adjust your own mask before helping others. Yes, that's important

0:32:09.680 --> 0:32:12.760
<v Speaker 1>to remember. Now. Of course, it's important to point out

0:32:12.800 --> 0:32:16.400
<v Speaker 1>that Roberts did not do anything. He was just tweeting

0:32:16.440 --> 0:32:21.120
<v Speaker 1>a joke. Right. Still, one could and probably has, argued

0:32:21.160 --> 0:32:23.959
<v Speaker 1>that such a joke was at best in poor taste

0:32:24.040 --> 0:32:27.960
<v Speaker 1>and at worst, really dumb. Yeah, well, especially because the

0:32:28.040 --> 0:32:33.160
<v Speaker 1>FBI acted on it. The FBI agents detained him, interrogated him,

0:32:33.280 --> 0:32:36.960
<v Speaker 1>and confiscated his electronics. He even tweeted out a picture

0:32:37.280 --> 0:32:41.200
<v Speaker 1>of the electronics that were confiscated and said, well they're

0:32:41.200 --> 0:32:45.720
<v Speaker 1>all encrypted, but they're all gone now. Yeah. So that

0:32:45.800 --> 0:32:48.600
<v Speaker 1>was last month in April. But in May of a

0:32:48.640 --> 0:32:52.080
<v Speaker 1>Canadian news organization published I guess what must have been

0:32:52.120 --> 0:32:56.640
<v Speaker 1>a leaked copy um of a warrant application for the

0:32:56.640 --> 0:33:00.400
<v Speaker 1>search and seizure of Robert's devices. This was itt up

0:33:00.400 --> 0:33:05.240
<v Speaker 1>by FBI special Agent Mark Hurley. According to this document,

0:33:05.840 --> 0:33:10.360
<v Speaker 1>Roberts had already voluntarily spoken with the FBI in February

0:33:10.400 --> 0:33:13.960
<v Speaker 1>and March of so a few months ago to inform

0:33:14.080 --> 0:33:18.120
<v Speaker 1>them about basically what he claimed were security vulnerabilities in

0:33:18.200 --> 0:33:21.400
<v Speaker 1>these in flight entertainment systems that we were talking about before.

0:33:21.600 --> 0:33:26.360
<v Speaker 1>And he identified several aircraft in particular the Boeing seven hundred,

0:33:26.760 --> 0:33:30.560
<v Speaker 1>the seven thirty seven, nine hundred, seven fifty seven, two hundred,

0:33:30.800 --> 0:33:33.520
<v Speaker 1>and the Airbus A three twenty. Now, if you'll notice,

0:33:33.800 --> 0:33:36.880
<v Speaker 1>he identified in his tweet that he was on A

0:33:36.960 --> 0:33:39.880
<v Speaker 1>seven hundred, one of the ones that had these in

0:33:39.960 --> 0:33:45.480
<v Speaker 1>flight entertainment system vulnerabilities according to him, and so that's

0:33:45.520 --> 0:33:47.560
<v Speaker 1>sort of the joke he was making. He was like, Okay,

0:33:47.640 --> 0:33:50.240
<v Speaker 1>remember these things I've been talking about. I'm on one

0:33:50.280 --> 0:33:55.520
<v Speaker 1>of these planes now. So the document, the warrant application,

0:33:56.120 --> 0:34:01.440
<v Speaker 1>claims that Roberts told FBI agents on these earlier conversations

0:34:02.160 --> 0:34:06.720
<v Speaker 1>that he had exploited these security flaws and penetrated in

0:34:06.800 --> 0:34:13.799
<v Speaker 1>flight entertainment networks in midflight. So he claims between he

0:34:13.960 --> 0:34:18.560
<v Speaker 1>penetrated i FE systems fifteen to twenty times, and he

0:34:18.600 --> 0:34:22.000
<v Speaker 1>said he gained access to these i FE systems by

0:34:22.080 --> 0:34:25.000
<v Speaker 1>physically plugging in. I thought this was interesting. So he

0:34:25.080 --> 0:34:29.720
<v Speaker 1>said he physically plugged in via a modified Cat six

0:34:29.840 --> 0:34:34.680
<v Speaker 1>Ethernet cable into the seat electronics box or SEB, and

0:34:34.719 --> 0:34:38.160
<v Speaker 1>these are found under the seats in some airplanes, so

0:34:38.360 --> 0:34:40.640
<v Speaker 1>you can imagine his process. Basically, what he said he

0:34:40.680 --> 0:34:42.920
<v Speaker 1>did is he reach under the seat in front of

0:34:43.000 --> 0:34:46.319
<v Speaker 1>him and sort of wiggle this box and squeeze it

0:34:46.400 --> 0:34:51.680
<v Speaker 1>until the cover comes off, which is quite the feat

0:34:51.719 --> 0:34:57.359
<v Speaker 1>because many of these are fixed by screws. Yeah, well,

0:34:57.400 --> 0:35:00.520
<v Speaker 1>we'll go into we'll go into potential object actions to

0:35:00.560 --> 0:35:03.080
<v Speaker 1>the story. Yeah yeah, oh yeah, yeah. So I've never

0:35:03.120 --> 0:35:05.760
<v Speaker 1>tried to get into a seat electronic s box myself,

0:35:06.200 --> 0:35:10.680
<v Speaker 1>have I, nor will I, and nor should you, because

0:35:10.960 --> 0:35:12.560
<v Speaker 1>it's not a good thing to try to mess with.

0:35:12.560 --> 0:35:14.560
<v Speaker 1>But what he said is he got the cover off

0:35:14.880 --> 0:35:17.880
<v Speaker 1>and he'd plug in. It's kind of strange that nobody

0:35:17.880 --> 0:35:20.640
<v Speaker 1>ever seemed to like notice him doing this. One of

0:35:20.680 --> 0:35:24.360
<v Speaker 1>the sections to the story. Yeah, but uh so, and again,

0:35:24.920 --> 0:35:29.600
<v Speaker 1>just to reiterate, this is what the warrant application claims

0:35:29.640 --> 0:35:33.280
<v Speaker 1>he told the FBI earlier this year. So it's several

0:35:33.400 --> 0:35:36.960
<v Speaker 1>levels of hearsay, um, but yeah, they said he so,

0:35:37.040 --> 0:35:39.080
<v Speaker 1>he said he would plug in with this Cat six

0:35:39.120 --> 0:35:43.040
<v Speaker 1>Ethernet cable and that would give him access to the

0:35:43.080 --> 0:35:46.640
<v Speaker 1>plane's i FE system, the inflight entertainment one. And then

0:35:46.800 --> 0:35:49.120
<v Speaker 1>and I'm going to read just a direct quote from

0:35:49.160 --> 0:35:52.239
<v Speaker 1>the warrant application and this next part. It claims that

0:35:52.640 --> 0:35:56.279
<v Speaker 1>Roberts told them he quote connected to other systems on

0:35:56.360 --> 0:36:00.600
<v Speaker 1>the airplane network after he exploited slash, gained access to,

0:36:01.000 --> 0:36:04.680
<v Speaker 1>or quote hacked the i f A system. He stated

0:36:04.719 --> 0:36:09.120
<v Speaker 1>that he then overwrote code on the airplane's thrust management

0:36:09.200 --> 0:36:12.360
<v Speaker 1>computer while a board of flight. He stated that he

0:36:12.440 --> 0:36:16.480
<v Speaker 1>successfully commanded the system. He had accessed to issue the

0:36:16.600 --> 0:36:21.440
<v Speaker 1>CLB or climb command. He stated that he thereby caused

0:36:21.520 --> 0:36:25.120
<v Speaker 1>one of the airplane engines to climb, resulting in a

0:36:25.239 --> 0:36:28.680
<v Speaker 1>lateral or sideways movement of the plane during one of

0:36:28.719 --> 0:36:32.680
<v Speaker 1>these flights. He also stated that he used Vortex software

0:36:33.000 --> 0:36:38.320
<v Speaker 1>after compromising, slash, exploiting, or quote hacking the airplane's networks.

0:36:38.360 --> 0:36:41.480
<v Speaker 1>He used the software to monitor traffic from the cockpit

0:36:41.600 --> 0:36:48.200
<v Speaker 1>system and if true, this is fascinating. The warrant application

0:36:48.280 --> 0:36:52.200
<v Speaker 1>claims Robert said he used default I D s and

0:36:52.320 --> 0:36:58.080
<v Speaker 1>passwords to compromise the network. That was a face palm there.

0:36:59.080 --> 0:37:06.399
<v Speaker 1>If that's true, people change your passwords? Well, I mean, okay, here,

0:37:06.480 --> 0:37:09.560
<v Speaker 1>here's here's one thing I would argue as far as

0:37:09.560 --> 0:37:12.680
<v Speaker 1>the changing of the passwords is yes, as it should

0:37:12.719 --> 0:37:16.239
<v Speaker 1>not be default. At the same time, this is a

0:37:16.320 --> 0:37:22.279
<v Speaker 1>difficult UH scenario because you have multiple flight crews all

0:37:22.360 --> 0:37:26.400
<v Speaker 1>using the same equipment. So how do you do I

0:37:26.560 --> 0:37:30.880
<v Speaker 1>D password management in that case? Like assuming that assuming

0:37:30.920 --> 0:37:35.000
<v Speaker 1>that the idea and password is is unique to the vehicle,

0:37:35.080 --> 0:37:40.560
<v Speaker 1>to the aircraft, and not unique to the crew. So

0:37:40.600 --> 0:37:42.440
<v Speaker 1>if if it's unique to the crew, that's one thing,

0:37:42.760 --> 0:37:44.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, Like if it's if it's the pilot and

0:37:44.200 --> 0:37:46.840
<v Speaker 1>copilot who have to put in this I D and password,

0:37:46.840 --> 0:37:49.680
<v Speaker 1>and it's the same for whichever aircraft are in. That's

0:37:49.719 --> 0:37:52.160
<v Speaker 1>one thing. But I suspect that's not the case. I

0:37:52.200 --> 0:37:57.280
<v Speaker 1>suspect it's more unique to the aircraft. That's more. That's tricky.

0:37:57.400 --> 0:37:59.799
<v Speaker 1>How do you where do you record the information for

0:37:59.840 --> 0:38:03.960
<v Speaker 1>the aircraft so that the crew has access to it? Um?

0:38:04.000 --> 0:38:06.040
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I don't know. I don't know, but you

0:38:06.080 --> 0:38:09.799
<v Speaker 1>can do better than default. I'm sure, I'm sure, And

0:38:10.000 --> 0:38:12.080
<v Speaker 1>I don't know the answer to this question. And I

0:38:12.520 --> 0:38:15.240
<v Speaker 1>mean I would hesitate to ask because I don't think

0:38:15.440 --> 0:38:17.359
<v Speaker 1>I don't need to know. As long as I know

0:38:17.560 --> 0:38:21.160
<v Speaker 1>that they are practicing good security measures, as long as

0:38:21.200 --> 0:38:25.200
<v Speaker 1>they're not doing the default IDE and password. Uh, then

0:38:25.400 --> 0:38:27.799
<v Speaker 1>whatever you know, I'm maybe uh. And then of course

0:38:27.840 --> 0:38:30.720
<v Speaker 1>he claimed he after this that he used a virtual

0:38:30.800 --> 0:38:34.000
<v Speaker 1>environment to build a virtual version of the airplane's network

0:38:34.040 --> 0:38:38.319
<v Speaker 1>that he could then study safely and so to to

0:38:38.440 --> 0:38:43.600
<v Speaker 1>reiterate this, he, according to the FBI document, Roberts claimed

0:38:43.800 --> 0:38:47.560
<v Speaker 1>he steered an airplane, he plugged into an airplane from

0:38:47.560 --> 0:38:51.040
<v Speaker 1>a passenger seat, and caused the airplane to briefly divert

0:38:51.120 --> 0:38:57.560
<v Speaker 1>off course, that's amazing and amazingly scary if true. Yeah,

0:38:57.560 --> 0:39:00.640
<v Speaker 1>that that is that is incredibly sobering if in fact

0:39:00.719 --> 0:39:03.280
<v Speaker 1>it is true. Now, there are some things to consider,

0:39:03.360 --> 0:39:06.280
<v Speaker 1>and we'll get fully into some questions about this story

0:39:06.400 --> 0:39:09.120
<v Speaker 1>later on. One of the things is that I think

0:39:09.160 --> 0:39:12.440
<v Speaker 1>there might be some confusion online in reaction to this story,

0:39:12.480 --> 0:39:15.239
<v Speaker 1>where one of the things is that Roberts was not

0:39:15.400 --> 0:39:18.360
<v Speaker 1>claiming that he did this on the day he was arrested.

0:39:18.440 --> 0:39:22.440
<v Speaker 1>The warrant application is saying that he told them he

0:39:22.480 --> 0:39:25.400
<v Speaker 1>had done this in previous years. Yeah, and they just

0:39:25.400 --> 0:39:27.759
<v Speaker 1>got around to arresting him later. Yeah. Well, I think

0:39:27.760 --> 0:39:30.520
<v Speaker 1>they got around to arresting him because of this tweet

0:39:30.560 --> 0:39:34.800
<v Speaker 1>and then because they suspected that he had been messing

0:39:34.800 --> 0:39:37.760
<v Speaker 1>with the flight he was on that day and in April,

0:39:37.800 --> 0:39:39.920
<v Speaker 1>even though he claims I think he claims that he

0:39:39.960 --> 0:39:43.320
<v Speaker 1>didn't mess with it that day. Yeah, And so there's

0:39:43.480 --> 0:39:46.399
<v Speaker 1>there was I believe there was. Part of the the

0:39:46.440 --> 0:39:50.840
<v Speaker 1>accusation was that the this this electronics box, the seat

0:39:50.920 --> 0:39:55.840
<v Speaker 1>the SEV had been altered, but Robert says, well I didn't,

0:39:56.200 --> 0:39:58.759
<v Speaker 1>that wasn't me. Yeah. Yeah, So the FBI claimed it

0:39:58.840 --> 0:40:02.000
<v Speaker 1>showed signs of TA bring the seat, the one under

0:40:02.040 --> 0:40:03.919
<v Speaker 1>the seat in front of him on the flight he'd

0:40:03.920 --> 0:40:06.680
<v Speaker 1>been on that day looked like it had it had

0:40:06.719 --> 0:40:08.920
<v Speaker 1>been tampered with, but he claimed he didn't do it.

0:40:09.640 --> 0:40:11.920
<v Speaker 1>And so I don't know what to say about that,

0:40:12.000 --> 0:40:16.160
<v Speaker 1>except that another interesting question that comes out of this

0:40:16.280 --> 0:40:20.120
<v Speaker 1>is about the nature of white hat hacking. Right, So, like,

0:40:20.280 --> 0:40:23.440
<v Speaker 1>if you take this story at face value and just say,

0:40:23.520 --> 0:40:27.520
<v Speaker 1>let's assume it's true, and you are a white hat

0:40:27.560 --> 0:40:32.280
<v Speaker 1>hacker who is aware of a very dangerous, very scary

0:40:32.440 --> 0:40:35.799
<v Speaker 1>security vulnerability, whether it's in a vehicle or a piece

0:40:35.840 --> 0:40:39.080
<v Speaker 1>of software on the internet infrastructure, whatever, it may be,

0:40:39.280 --> 0:40:41.720
<v Speaker 1>something that that could really endanger a lot of people,

0:40:42.280 --> 0:40:44.520
<v Speaker 1>and you're aware of how to exploit it, and you

0:40:44.560 --> 0:40:47.200
<v Speaker 1>know that other people could exploit it, and you've been

0:40:47.239 --> 0:40:50.799
<v Speaker 1>trying to warn people about it but getting nowhere. But

0:40:50.800 --> 0:40:54.040
<v Speaker 1>but it's not getting fixed. What do you do? And

0:40:54.120 --> 0:40:55.759
<v Speaker 1>so I know a lot of people would look at

0:40:55.800 --> 0:40:58.440
<v Speaker 1>what he did here, if he in fact did do it,

0:40:58.800 --> 0:41:02.080
<v Speaker 1>and they would say that that's so reckless. How could

0:41:02.120 --> 0:41:04.239
<v Speaker 1>you gamble with the lives of all the people on

0:41:04.280 --> 0:41:07.200
<v Speaker 1>that plane just to sort of like prove something for

0:41:07.239 --> 0:41:11.439
<v Speaker 1>a little research project. On the other hand, I think,

0:41:11.920 --> 0:41:14.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, you could argue that well, you know, he

0:41:14.120 --> 0:41:16.520
<v Speaker 1>didn't tell it to like crash into the ground. He

0:41:16.960 --> 0:41:21.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, maybe executed something that it would have seemed

0:41:21.080 --> 0:41:25.320
<v Speaker 1>to him to be an innocuous test. I don't know. Again,

0:41:25.560 --> 0:41:27.800
<v Speaker 1>we have to say, again, this is all sort of

0:41:27.880 --> 0:41:30.239
<v Speaker 1>hypothetical because we don't know what really happen. We don't

0:41:30.239 --> 0:41:32.360
<v Speaker 1>know the real story. Yeah, so a lot of this

0:41:32.440 --> 0:41:35.720
<v Speaker 1>depends upon what really happened, Right, So I think anything

0:41:35.760 --> 0:41:39.719
<v Speaker 1>that would that results in the diverting at all from

0:41:39.719 --> 0:41:44.399
<v Speaker 1>a flight plan is incredibly reckless, even if even if

0:41:44.400 --> 0:41:47.200
<v Speaker 1>it's too demonstrate, Hey, you really need to pay attention

0:41:47.200 --> 0:41:52.400
<v Speaker 1>to me, these vulnerabilities exist. I think that's it taking

0:41:52.680 --> 0:41:56.600
<v Speaker 1>taking that approach where you are potentially putting the lives

0:41:56.640 --> 0:41:59.400
<v Speaker 1>of everyone on board that flight, not just yourself. I mean,

0:41:59.440 --> 0:42:02.200
<v Speaker 1>if it were just yourself and you were just proving it,

0:42:02.960 --> 0:42:06.760
<v Speaker 1>then that's one thing. But you are taking You're taking

0:42:07.600 --> 0:42:15.239
<v Speaker 1>it's an incredible amount of bravado to say I'm gonna

0:42:15.280 --> 0:42:17.520
<v Speaker 1>put the lives of every single person on this plane

0:42:17.719 --> 0:42:21.960
<v Speaker 1>in danger. I am potentially going to uh to to

0:42:22.280 --> 0:42:26.040
<v Speaker 1>eliminate the lives of everyone here and forever alter the

0:42:26.120 --> 0:42:28.879
<v Speaker 1>lives of all of their loved ones like that, not

0:42:28.920 --> 0:42:32.400
<v Speaker 1>to mention potentially the lives of people on the ground

0:42:32.520 --> 0:42:36.560
<v Speaker 1>as well. I mean, it's just incredible. Yeah, I totally agree.

0:42:36.600 --> 0:42:39.399
<v Speaker 1>But then on the other hand, you could also make

0:42:39.400 --> 0:42:42.719
<v Speaker 1>the argument, like, with this security vulnerability in place and

0:42:42.760 --> 0:42:47.480
<v Speaker 1>them not doing anything to fix it, that are already

0:42:47.520 --> 0:42:50.680
<v Speaker 1>in danger and you're trying to get something done, the

0:42:51.160 --> 0:42:53.319
<v Speaker 1>best I could say is that there has to be

0:42:53.440 --> 0:42:58.080
<v Speaker 1>some means of getting that message across without physically altering

0:42:58.440 --> 0:43:00.920
<v Speaker 1>the pathway of the aircraft, Like you could send a

0:43:00.960 --> 0:43:04.759
<v Speaker 1>message some other way, or you could document what you

0:43:04.800 --> 0:43:08.200
<v Speaker 1>are doing and send that documentation on and say, look,

0:43:08.880 --> 0:43:11.400
<v Speaker 1>this is exactly how it works. If I can do it,

0:43:11.480 --> 0:43:14.879
<v Speaker 1>then potentially other people can do it. And that's why

0:43:14.920 --> 0:43:19.239
<v Speaker 1>you need to address the security vulnerability. I think. I

0:43:19.239 --> 0:43:20.920
<v Speaker 1>think there are other ways that would have gotten just

0:43:20.960 --> 0:43:25.560
<v Speaker 1>as much attention from an official standpoint without potentially harming people.

0:43:25.920 --> 0:43:28.600
<v Speaker 1>Assuming that the story that we hear in the affidavit

0:43:28.640 --> 0:43:30.520
<v Speaker 1>is in fact what happened. Yeah, and so now we

0:43:30.600 --> 0:43:34.360
<v Speaker 1>really do need to get to that point what really happened,

0:43:34.480 --> 0:43:38.880
<v Speaker 1>because there are people who have raised serious concerns about

0:43:38.920 --> 0:43:41.000
<v Speaker 1>the version of this story that's come out, and it's

0:43:41.080 --> 0:43:44.520
<v Speaker 1>it's hard to identify if if it's not true, where

0:43:44.560 --> 0:43:47.000
<v Speaker 1>the fault lies. Was there a problem with the FBI?

0:43:47.160 --> 0:43:52.880
<v Speaker 1>Is retelling of of Robert's supposed story? Did Robert's mislead

0:43:52.920 --> 0:43:56.080
<v Speaker 1>the FBI? Did the FBI not understand what he was

0:43:56.120 --> 0:43:59.200
<v Speaker 1>telling them or did? Or were they misleading in their report?

0:43:59.680 --> 0:44:02.680
<v Speaker 1>But there are places along the line where we could

0:44:02.680 --> 0:44:06.840
<v Speaker 1>have gotten the wrong story from this document. Stay tuned

0:44:06.880 --> 0:44:10.280
<v Speaker 1>for the exciting conclusion of this tex Stuff classic episode

0:44:10.560 --> 0:44:23.920
<v Speaker 1>right after we take this break. So, no matter where

0:44:24.600 --> 0:44:27.040
<v Speaker 1>the fault may lie, there have been a lot of

0:44:27.080 --> 0:44:31.279
<v Speaker 1>people who have pointed out problems with the story. So

0:44:31.400 --> 0:44:34.719
<v Speaker 1>whether it was the original Roberts story or was the retelling,

0:44:35.120 --> 0:44:37.440
<v Speaker 1>that's kind of beside the point. Here are some of

0:44:37.480 --> 0:44:39.400
<v Speaker 1>the objections. One of the big ones is one that

0:44:39.480 --> 0:44:43.440
<v Speaker 1>we've raised already, the idea that if it requires plugging

0:44:43.719 --> 0:44:47.759
<v Speaker 1>a modified cable into an electronic box that typically is

0:44:47.880 --> 0:44:55.880
<v Speaker 1>not accessible by a passenger, why didn't anyone else notice

0:44:56.280 --> 0:45:00.120
<v Speaker 1>or comment on it? Or you know, because again, and

0:45:00.560 --> 0:45:03.320
<v Speaker 1>it requires some manipulation of the box to get access

0:45:03.360 --> 0:45:06.319
<v Speaker 1>to it, even According to the affidavit story of what

0:45:06.440 --> 0:45:09.799
<v Speaker 1>Roberts was saying, um, and a lot of these do

0:45:09.920 --> 0:45:11.960
<v Speaker 1>have screws that are set in, so you would have

0:45:12.000 --> 0:45:17.000
<v Speaker 1>to unscrew a a a panel in order to get

0:45:17.040 --> 0:45:20.479
<v Speaker 1>access to the ports that are inside of it. Why

0:45:20.520 --> 0:45:24.680
<v Speaker 1>would no other pastor or flight attendant have noticed this

0:45:24.719 --> 0:45:28.399
<v Speaker 1>because it's it's you know, it's fairly disruptive. On one hand,

0:45:28.440 --> 0:45:30.480
<v Speaker 1>I agree with that, but then there's a little part

0:45:30.520 --> 0:45:32.920
<v Speaker 1>of my brain that says, yeah, but what's the easiest

0:45:32.960 --> 0:45:35.799
<v Speaker 1>way to rob a bank? Show up and look like

0:45:35.840 --> 0:45:38.000
<v Speaker 1>you know what you're doing. Just walk into the vault

0:45:38.040 --> 0:45:40.960
<v Speaker 1>like you're somebody who's supposed to be going in. Yeah.

0:45:41.600 --> 0:45:44.200
<v Speaker 1>I mean, there's a certain thing to be said for

0:45:44.320 --> 0:45:47.400
<v Speaker 1>if you just don't act like you're doing anything shady,

0:45:47.480 --> 0:45:49.759
<v Speaker 1>but you've got this sort of like aura of yeah,

0:45:49.800 --> 0:45:52.359
<v Speaker 1>this is what I normally do. People just don't really

0:45:52.440 --> 0:45:54.640
<v Speaker 1>question it. They're like, Okay, I assume me knows what

0:45:54.680 --> 0:45:57.880
<v Speaker 1>he's doing. Well, and I suppose if if someone saying

0:45:57.920 --> 0:46:00.799
<v Speaker 1>next to that person just assumes that what they're doing

0:46:00.880 --> 0:46:03.400
<v Speaker 1>is plugging in a device to charge. Because some a

0:46:03.440 --> 0:46:06.239
<v Speaker 1>lot of aircraft now have you know, outlets for that

0:46:06.320 --> 0:46:09.279
<v Speaker 1>sort of thing. Maybe that's the assumption. I still think

0:46:09.280 --> 0:46:14.279
<v Speaker 1>that flight attendants would find it interesting, but maybe. But

0:46:14.360 --> 0:46:16.359
<v Speaker 1>let's let's all right, let's go ahead and say that

0:46:16.360 --> 0:46:18.759
<v Speaker 1>that's one of the objections. But the other one is

0:46:18.800 --> 0:46:22.440
<v Speaker 1>that you have to you know this. This also assumes

0:46:22.480 --> 0:46:26.640
<v Speaker 1>that the i FE is in fact an interconnected network

0:46:27.440 --> 0:46:31.920
<v Speaker 1>with the same computers that control the flight controls, and

0:46:32.280 --> 0:46:37.919
<v Speaker 1>not two separate networks that have limited or no connectivity. Right.

0:46:37.960 --> 0:46:41.600
<v Speaker 1>So this is the objection that I really hope is correct.

0:46:42.080 --> 0:46:45.759
<v Speaker 1>And the objection is the airplanes do not actually have

0:46:45.880 --> 0:46:49.320
<v Speaker 1>this vulnerability, right, Like, he couldn't have done what he

0:46:49.400 --> 0:46:53.359
<v Speaker 1>said because it's not possible. Yeah, Now, there are some

0:46:53.400 --> 0:46:56.840
<v Speaker 1>connections that have to be there for most of these

0:46:56.840 --> 0:47:00.520
<v Speaker 1>i FE systems, because if you've ever been on one

0:47:00.560 --> 0:47:04.239
<v Speaker 1>where you have the track my flight, then obviously the

0:47:04.360 --> 0:47:07.920
<v Speaker 1>track my flight uh app or whatever you want to

0:47:07.960 --> 0:47:11.520
<v Speaker 1>call it in the entertainment system, that feature is gaining

0:47:11.640 --> 0:47:16.279
<v Speaker 1>some information from various systems aboard the aircraft, uh you know,

0:47:16.320 --> 0:47:19.800
<v Speaker 1>things like altitude and air speed and the temperature outside

0:47:19.840 --> 0:47:22.759
<v Speaker 1>all this kind of stuff. Um, how how far are

0:47:22.800 --> 0:47:25.080
<v Speaker 1>you from your point of origin? How far are you

0:47:25.160 --> 0:47:28.919
<v Speaker 1>from your destination? But all that being said, that could

0:47:28.960 --> 0:47:31.680
<v Speaker 1>totally be connected to computer systems that have no other

0:47:32.320 --> 0:47:35.399
<v Speaker 1>connection to anything else. Right, Like, there are a lot

0:47:35.400 --> 0:47:38.359
<v Speaker 1>of redundant systems aboard aircraft for very good reason. You

0:47:38.360 --> 0:47:42.719
<v Speaker 1>want there to be redundantcy for safety. So and it

0:47:42.719 --> 0:47:45.440
<v Speaker 1>could also be that the information that's coming across is

0:47:45.480 --> 0:47:48.600
<v Speaker 1>again traveling in a very specific one way path that

0:47:48.640 --> 0:47:53.239
<v Speaker 1>there's no way to go upstream of that information. Um,

0:47:53.360 --> 0:47:55.960
<v Speaker 1>and that would make the most sense. In fact, Boeing

0:47:56.000 --> 0:47:59.279
<v Speaker 1>says the connections are limited and offer no access to

0:47:59.280 --> 0:48:03.439
<v Speaker 1>flight controls through the i f E. UH, and that

0:48:03.480 --> 0:48:06.279
<v Speaker 1>means that you wouldn't be able to get access to

0:48:06.320 --> 0:48:09.359
<v Speaker 1>this thrust management control using the i f It would

0:48:09.360 --> 0:48:12.320
<v Speaker 1>be impossible. So you know, you might be able to

0:48:12.400 --> 0:48:14.400
<v Speaker 1>hack the i FE and get access to it and

0:48:14.440 --> 0:48:18.880
<v Speaker 1>maybe require everyone to watch biodome, but you wouldn't necessarily

0:48:18.880 --> 0:48:23.600
<v Speaker 1>be able to terrible. It would be awful, yeah, but

0:48:23.680 --> 0:48:28.080
<v Speaker 1>not as awful as having someone altered the flight path plan. Um. Now,

0:48:29.400 --> 0:48:31.560
<v Speaker 1>there have been some folks who said it's it might

0:48:31.560 --> 0:48:34.160
<v Speaker 1>be possible that the i f E has a direct

0:48:34.160 --> 0:48:39.439
<v Speaker 1>connection to climate control, which matters, Yeah, because if it's

0:48:39.440 --> 0:48:41.319
<v Speaker 1>on the same system as climate control, and you shut

0:48:41.320 --> 0:48:43.880
<v Speaker 1>down climate control, then you're going to force that aircraft

0:48:43.880 --> 0:48:47.840
<v Speaker 1>to land. Uh. I don't know how much access to

0:48:47.880 --> 0:48:50.839
<v Speaker 1>climate control the typical i F has. It may only

0:48:50.880 --> 0:48:55.080
<v Speaker 1>have access to vent control, even your vent is on

0:48:55.200 --> 0:48:57.120
<v Speaker 1>or off and that's it. It may not have any

0:48:57.160 --> 0:49:00.719
<v Speaker 1>access to the actual climate control part. I don't know.

0:49:00.840 --> 0:49:02.920
<v Speaker 1>But if it does have access to climate control, that

0:49:02.960 --> 0:49:05.040
<v Speaker 1>could potentially be a point of vulnerability that could be

0:49:05.040 --> 0:49:10.000
<v Speaker 1>exploited to force an aircraft to land prematurely, um most

0:49:10.040 --> 0:49:13.320
<v Speaker 1>likely flying to the closest airport that has availability and landing.

0:49:14.040 --> 0:49:16.640
<v Speaker 1>So it's not like it's not like, you know, a

0:49:17.920 --> 0:49:21.640
<v Speaker 1>drastic emergency, but it would require premature landing, which obviously

0:49:21.680 --> 0:49:25.000
<v Speaker 1>would be problematic at best. Yeah. I also remember seeing

0:49:25.040 --> 0:49:27.799
<v Speaker 1>one criticism of the story that that essentially said that

0:49:28.080 --> 0:49:31.600
<v Speaker 1>pilots would have to review any kind of like review

0:49:31.600 --> 0:49:34.920
<v Speaker 1>and approved any incoming change to the flight path or

0:49:34.960 --> 0:49:39.800
<v Speaker 1>flight control. Yeah, that's the aircraft systems are designed for safety.

0:49:40.160 --> 0:49:43.960
<v Speaker 1>And again that redundancy is meant for not just the systems,

0:49:44.000 --> 0:49:47.880
<v Speaker 1>but for commands given to the system so that you know,

0:49:48.440 --> 0:49:51.160
<v Speaker 1>think of any computer program where you've had, you know,

0:49:51.320 --> 0:49:53.880
<v Speaker 1>something where you you choose a command and it pops

0:49:53.960 --> 0:49:56.960
<v Speaker 1>up and says are you sure, and you hit okay.

0:49:57.160 --> 0:49:59.640
<v Speaker 1>Multiply that by a hundred, and that's what we're talking

0:49:59.680 --> 0:50:02.640
<v Speaker 1>about aircraft systems for good reason that that you know,

0:50:02.760 --> 0:50:05.960
<v Speaker 1>you are meant to review and approve these things, so

0:50:06.040 --> 0:50:09.480
<v Speaker 1>that anything that would affect a key element of the

0:50:09.520 --> 0:50:13.880
<v Speaker 1>aircraft's operation would require approval, review, and approval, and not

0:50:14.080 --> 0:50:20.360
<v Speaker 1>just a command issued by a computer. So that's another objection. Uh.

0:50:20.400 --> 0:50:24.759
<v Speaker 1>There's also a Mashable has an article on this. They

0:50:24.760 --> 0:50:27.680
<v Speaker 1>interviewed a pilot. The pilot requested to remain anonymous in

0:50:27.719 --> 0:50:30.040
<v Speaker 1>the interview, so we don't I trust that it's really

0:50:30.120 --> 0:50:34.040
<v Speaker 1>a pilot. I do too. So the pilot said that

0:50:34.200 --> 0:50:37.520
<v Speaker 1>Robert's claims, according to what the FBI said, at any rate,

0:50:38.360 --> 0:50:41.560
<v Speaker 1>we're false because the systems he had claimed to access

0:50:41.680 --> 0:50:45.560
<v Speaker 1>didn't exist aboard the type of aircraft he was on. Now, granted,

0:50:45.600 --> 0:50:49.400
<v Speaker 1>this might have just been been uh limited to the

0:50:49.400 --> 0:50:53.560
<v Speaker 1>seven story, and it could be that it was a

0:50:53.560 --> 0:50:56.480
<v Speaker 1>different aircraft that he claimed he had gained access to,

0:50:56.560 --> 0:50:59.680
<v Speaker 1>but he said, the pilot says, if Roberts is saying

0:50:59.680 --> 0:51:04.040
<v Speaker 1>he was hundred when he did this, it's impossible because

0:51:04.160 --> 0:51:06.840
<v Speaker 1>the system he claims to have taken advantage of, can't

0:51:06.840 --> 0:51:09.680
<v Speaker 1>do that. He also points out the eye cast system

0:51:09.680 --> 0:51:13.320
<v Speaker 1>you were talking about earlier, that that just displays messages.

0:51:13.440 --> 0:51:16.040
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't have any control over the aircraft at all.

0:51:16.080 --> 0:51:20.080
<v Speaker 1>All it does is tell you stuff. It's a redoubt essentially.

0:51:20.920 --> 0:51:23.960
<v Speaker 1>Ah and be like trying to compromise a computer by

0:51:24.040 --> 0:51:27.480
<v Speaker 1>issuing print commands. Yeah, yeah, you might be able to

0:51:27.520 --> 0:51:31.359
<v Speaker 1>print some naughty words out, but it's not It's not

0:51:31.480 --> 0:51:34.439
<v Speaker 1>affecting any other part of the computer. Uh. And then

0:51:34.440 --> 0:51:36.319
<v Speaker 1>he also pointed out that the I f E and

0:51:36.360 --> 0:51:39.880
<v Speaker 1>cockpit systems had no point of commonality except for the

0:51:39.920 --> 0:51:42.320
<v Speaker 1>fact that they both drew power from the same power source.

0:51:43.239 --> 0:51:45.400
<v Speaker 1>But that's it. They didn't have any crossover. There was

0:51:45.440 --> 0:51:50.279
<v Speaker 1>no connectivity between the two. So it is entirely possible

0:51:50.840 --> 0:51:57.080
<v Speaker 1>that the this is a big fuss over over largely nothing. Um,

0:51:57.120 --> 0:52:00.320
<v Speaker 1>but I mean I certainly hope so yeah, but also

0:52:00.400 --> 0:52:04.000
<v Speaker 1>hope no matter what the true facts of this case,

0:52:04.000 --> 0:52:08.000
<v Speaker 1>where I hope this is at least encouraging airline manufacturers

0:52:08.000 --> 0:52:10.840
<v Speaker 1>and the people who design their their hardware and software

0:52:10.880 --> 0:52:14.719
<v Speaker 1>to re examine the security of their aircraft. Right. Yeah,

0:52:14.719 --> 0:52:17.759
<v Speaker 1>and really put it through vigorous testing. And I don't

0:52:17.800 --> 0:52:20.160
<v Speaker 1>mean to suggest that they don't already do that. I

0:52:20.360 --> 0:52:25.680
<v Speaker 1>imagine that these companies, I mean, obviously they have a

0:52:25.760 --> 0:52:30.480
<v Speaker 1>vested interest in making sure those those systems are tested

0:52:30.560 --> 0:52:35.160
<v Speaker 1>vigorously with lots of different attempts at intrusion. The various

0:52:35.160 --> 0:52:37.800
<v Speaker 1>scenarios have to be run about how likely or possible

0:52:37.880 --> 0:52:41.680
<v Speaker 1>is this? Because I mean, it's it's it's life and death,

0:52:42.000 --> 0:52:45.720
<v Speaker 1>and a company has to be able to rely upon

0:52:46.840 --> 0:52:51.400
<v Speaker 1>having the reputation of being responsible for something as important

0:52:51.960 --> 0:52:56.120
<v Speaker 1>and potentially as dangerous as air travel. Um So I

0:52:56.280 --> 0:53:02.440
<v Speaker 1>I'm fairly confident that that the security vulnerabilities are very

0:53:02.480 --> 0:53:06.760
<v Speaker 1>seriously looked at in these cases. Whether the Roberts case

0:53:07.040 --> 0:53:10.759
<v Speaker 1>is as extreme as has been indicated in that affidavit,

0:53:10.920 --> 0:53:13.799
<v Speaker 1>I don't know. I mean, if that is a possibility,

0:53:13.840 --> 0:53:16.879
<v Speaker 1>then that's certainly warrants a re examination of how these

0:53:16.920 --> 0:53:20.440
<v Speaker 1>network systems are laid out within an aircraft. Now let

0:53:20.440 --> 0:53:22.280
<v Speaker 1>me do let me tell you something. This is background

0:53:22.280 --> 0:53:24.800
<v Speaker 1>on Jonathan Way. Before I worked for How Stuff Works,

0:53:24.960 --> 0:53:27.600
<v Speaker 1>years before I had worked for uh, you know, I

0:53:27.640 --> 0:53:29.560
<v Speaker 1>worked for a couple of consulting firms. Is before that,

0:53:29.600 --> 0:53:31.040
<v Speaker 1>this is way back when I was looking for my

0:53:31.080 --> 0:53:33.560
<v Speaker 1>first job. I landed some contract work with an airline

0:53:34.160 --> 0:53:39.680
<v Speaker 1>and my job was to transcribe audio files that were

0:53:39.719 --> 0:53:43.400
<v Speaker 1>detailing the various systems aboard aircraft into text files so

0:53:43.440 --> 0:53:47.319
<v Speaker 1>that there'll be a text copy of these audios. As

0:53:47.320 --> 0:53:49.480
<v Speaker 1>far as I know, they didn't have the manuals or

0:53:49.520 --> 0:53:54.040
<v Speaker 1>the hard copy anywhere. So it's my job to transcribe

0:53:54.760 --> 0:53:59.920
<v Speaker 1>hours of technical documentation about these aircraft, which included things

0:54:00.040 --> 0:54:02.040
<v Speaker 1>like how the cables were laid out in the systems,

0:54:02.080 --> 0:54:04.920
<v Speaker 1>and it was fascinating to learn at the time. It

0:54:05.040 --> 0:54:09.000
<v Speaker 1>was nothing you know, that was exploitable or anything like that.

0:54:09.080 --> 0:54:12.319
<v Speaker 1>It was just interesting. But it really displayed to me

0:54:12.400 --> 0:54:16.200
<v Speaker 1>the care that goes into designing these systems to make

0:54:16.280 --> 0:54:19.520
<v Speaker 1>certain that this redundancy is there, and it actually it

0:54:19.640 --> 0:54:23.000
<v Speaker 1>really reassured me quite a bit while I was doing this,

0:54:23.080 --> 0:54:27.759
<v Speaker 1>like it removes some of the the mystery behind aircraft,

0:54:28.160 --> 0:54:35.000
<v Speaker 1>and also displayed exactly how incredibly um detail oriented these

0:54:35.040 --> 0:54:37.560
<v Speaker 1>designers had to be, which you know, makes sense if

0:54:37.560 --> 0:54:40.359
<v Speaker 1>you think about it for more than a second you realize, oh,

0:54:40.400 --> 0:54:42.600
<v Speaker 1>of course they have to be. But it really drove

0:54:42.640 --> 0:54:44.719
<v Speaker 1>that home. So I was very thankful to actually have

0:54:44.760 --> 0:54:47.160
<v Speaker 1>that experience. It's one that not a lot of people

0:54:47.280 --> 0:54:49.840
<v Speaker 1>have necessarily had. Now. I will also say that it

0:54:49.920 --> 0:54:52.920
<v Speaker 1>was for a lot of old aircraft that aren't around anymore,

0:54:52.920 --> 0:54:55.799
<v Speaker 1>because this was many years ago, and those aircraft have

0:54:55.880 --> 0:54:59.919
<v Speaker 1>since been retired from various fleets. But I think there's

0:55:00.120 --> 0:55:03.279
<v Speaker 1>old aircraft still in circulation. Yeah, but you don't see

0:55:03.280 --> 0:55:07.879
<v Speaker 1>a whole lot of these gigantic old war horses. They've

0:55:07.880 --> 0:55:13.400
<v Speaker 1>been they've been replaced by newer more. Um. Yeah, you know,

0:55:14.160 --> 0:55:17.279
<v Speaker 1>you know, back back when uh an aircraft consisted of

0:55:17.320 --> 0:55:20.600
<v Speaker 1>a giant rubber band and a lot of hope. No,

0:55:20.719 --> 0:55:23.000
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't like that. But one other thing I wanted

0:55:23.000 --> 0:55:24.600
<v Speaker 1>to point out, kind of going back to the car

0:55:25.040 --> 0:55:29.640
<v Speaker 1>discussion just briefly, is that whether or not these concerns

0:55:29.880 --> 0:55:33.080
<v Speaker 1>are critical, like whether or not these are things that

0:55:33.120 --> 0:55:36.640
<v Speaker 1>we really need to worry about. Most most security experts

0:55:36.640 --> 0:55:39.880
<v Speaker 1>say right now, the trouble you'd have to go through

0:55:39.960 --> 0:55:42.960
<v Speaker 1>in order to exploit any of these so called vulnerabilities

0:55:42.960 --> 0:55:47.080
<v Speaker 1>would be so great as to render the meaningless. That

0:55:47.440 --> 0:55:51.320
<v Speaker 1>doesn't really matter, because there's been so much public interest

0:55:51.600 --> 0:55:55.200
<v Speaker 1>shown on the story for obvious reasons. That is it

0:55:55.280 --> 0:55:59.200
<v Speaker 1>has prompted politicians to get involved, and Congressman Ed Markey

0:56:00.080 --> 0:56:03.319
<v Speaker 1>sent out a letter to twenty automakers after the two

0:56:03.320 --> 0:56:06.759
<v Speaker 1>thousand thirteen black Hat conference that that are earlier one

0:56:06.840 --> 0:56:11.960
<v Speaker 1>where uh they were demonstrating the ability to hack vehicles

0:56:12.000 --> 0:56:17.720
<v Speaker 1>by directly hooking up computers to the diagnostic system UM

0:56:17.840 --> 0:56:21.520
<v Speaker 1>and he sent these letter to twenty automakers to ask

0:56:21.560 --> 0:56:24.960
<v Speaker 1>about their security measures for wireless attacks. Now, all of

0:56:25.000 --> 0:56:28.520
<v Speaker 1>the automakers that responded, and I think sixteen of twenty

0:56:28.600 --> 0:56:32.400
<v Speaker 1>cent responses something like that, but all of the response

0:56:32.440 --> 0:56:35.320
<v Speaker 1>the ones that responded said their vehicles had wireless points

0:56:35.320 --> 0:56:38.240
<v Speaker 1>of access, so at least one wireless point of access

0:56:38.320 --> 0:56:42.399
<v Speaker 1>that could potentially be used to connect to the car,

0:56:42.520 --> 0:56:46.680
<v Speaker 1>not necessarily exploit a vulnerability, but to connect. Seven of

0:56:46.719 --> 0:56:49.279
<v Speaker 1>the respondents said that they used a third party to

0:56:49.360 --> 0:56:53.320
<v Speaker 1>test their systems for security vulnerabilities, So essentially white hat hackers.

0:56:53.320 --> 0:56:57.240
<v Speaker 1>They went outside their own company to hire contractors and say,

0:56:57.800 --> 0:57:00.640
<v Speaker 1>see if you can gain wireless access were mode access

0:57:00.640 --> 0:57:03.600
<v Speaker 1>to these security systems, and if you can or these

0:57:03.719 --> 0:57:06.520
<v Speaker 1>these what are supposed to be secured systems, and if

0:57:06.520 --> 0:57:07.960
<v Speaker 1>you can, let us know how you did it. So

0:57:08.000 --> 0:57:11.000
<v Speaker 1>we can address that before we release the vehicle as

0:57:11.040 --> 0:57:16.400
<v Speaker 1>a production model. Very responsible, But only two said that

0:57:16.440 --> 0:57:19.880
<v Speaker 1>their vehicles had countermeasures for hacking attacks on stuff like

0:57:19.960 --> 0:57:23.320
<v Speaker 1>breaking and steering systems. So the story that gets out

0:57:23.360 --> 0:57:26.600
<v Speaker 1>from this is that you know, only a couple of

0:57:26.760 --> 0:57:31.520
<v Speaker 1>car manufacturers when they weren't named, actually have the security

0:57:31.520 --> 0:57:36.120
<v Speaker 1>measures in place, and only seven are using third parties

0:57:36.160 --> 0:57:39.240
<v Speaker 1>to test their systems. The flip side of that argument

0:57:39.280 --> 0:57:45.479
<v Speaker 1>could be there's no demonstrable security issue yet that that

0:57:45.560 --> 0:57:49.880
<v Speaker 1>would be enough to create a concern. However, it is

0:57:50.000 --> 0:57:52.760
<v Speaker 1>good to be aware of it and to perhaps start

0:57:52.800 --> 0:57:57.440
<v Speaker 1>building in these kind of safety features moving forward, knowing

0:57:57.520 --> 0:58:00.960
<v Speaker 1>that it's not like the world's going to get less connected, right,

0:58:01.040 --> 0:58:03.280
<v Speaker 1>We're gonna continue to see that trend go, so we

0:58:03.320 --> 0:58:05.520
<v Speaker 1>need to be certain that we're doing so in a

0:58:05.560 --> 0:58:11.240
<v Speaker 1>responsible way, in a safe way. Totally excellent. I'm glad

0:58:11.240 --> 0:58:14.520
<v Speaker 1>you agree. So, yeah, this was This was a fun

0:58:14.680 --> 0:58:17.560
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing to look at, and I mean, ultimately,

0:58:17.800 --> 0:58:22.160
<v Speaker 1>I would always argue, apply critical thinking to the situation.

0:58:22.360 --> 0:58:27.320
<v Speaker 1>Don't react with your initial emotional reaction. I mean, anyone

0:58:27.360 --> 0:58:29.840
<v Speaker 1>who sees anything like this, I'm sure the first emotional

0:58:29.880 --> 0:58:33.600
<v Speaker 1>reaction is a fear, a feeling of unease, if not

0:58:33.760 --> 0:58:37.000
<v Speaker 1>fear right, because I mean, when you are behind the

0:58:37.000 --> 0:58:39.840
<v Speaker 1>wheel of your car, you know you want to be

0:58:39.880 --> 0:58:42.919
<v Speaker 1>in control. You don't get the thought of someone else

0:58:43.120 --> 0:58:45.720
<v Speaker 1>potentially gaining control of the situation that you felt you

0:58:45.760 --> 0:58:49.480
<v Speaker 1>were in control of is that's scary. So, I mean,

0:58:49.520 --> 0:58:53.200
<v Speaker 1>it's understandable, but apply critical thinking. Know that it is

0:58:53.240 --> 0:58:55.880
<v Speaker 1>not likely to happen. There are other things that are

0:58:55.920 --> 0:58:58.440
<v Speaker 1>far more likely to happen, and as long as you

0:58:58.480 --> 0:59:02.160
<v Speaker 1>take those precautions against those, you're probably okay about these

0:59:02.160 --> 0:59:07.520
<v Speaker 1>other more remote possibilities. Um And again, if you are

0:59:07.520 --> 0:59:10.480
<v Speaker 1>in a position to make decisions about these kind of systems,

0:59:10.480 --> 0:59:14.240
<v Speaker 1>whether it's you know, from a car manufacturer or maybe

0:59:14.280 --> 0:59:19.880
<v Speaker 1>you do aftermarket stuff, then keeping that in mind and

0:59:20.240 --> 0:59:23.560
<v Speaker 1>keeping that as as part of your best practices of

0:59:23.560 --> 0:59:27.160
<v Speaker 1>of testing the security of your systems, it's definitely something

0:59:27.200 --> 0:59:31.360
<v Speaker 1>you should look into. I hope you enjoyed that episode

0:59:31.560 --> 0:59:36.760
<v Speaker 1>called Hack that Auto two point oh. Clearly, as cars

0:59:36.840 --> 0:59:41.200
<v Speaker 1>get more and more computerized h there are even more

0:59:41.240 --> 0:59:44.880
<v Speaker 1>literal hacking things we could talk about with vehicles. In fact,

0:59:44.920 --> 0:59:46.920
<v Speaker 1>I have covered some of those in the past, So

0:59:46.960 --> 0:59:48.920
<v Speaker 1>maybe I'll do a follow up to this episode in

0:59:48.960 --> 0:59:51.600
<v Speaker 1>the future. If you have suggestions for topics I should

0:59:51.600 --> 0:59:54.200
<v Speaker 1>cover in episodes of tech Stuff, please reach out to me.

0:59:54.280 --> 0:59:56.720
<v Speaker 1>The best way to do that is on Twitter. The

0:59:56.760 --> 1:00:00.200
<v Speaker 1>handle for the show is tech Stuff hs W and

1:00:00.240 --> 1:00:09.000
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk to you again really soon. Y. Tech Stuff

1:00:09.040 --> 1:00:12.360
<v Speaker 1>is an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from

1:00:12.400 --> 1:00:16.160
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