1 00:00:04,440 --> 00:00:07,840 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:11,720 --> 00:00:14,319 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:14,400 --> 00:00:17,520 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 4 00:00:17,720 --> 00:00:21,119 Speaker 1: and how the tech are you? It's time for a 5 00:00:21,239 --> 00:00:26,840 Speaker 1: tech Stuff classic episode. This episode originally published May two 6 00:00:26,920 --> 00:00:31,240 Speaker 1: thousand fifteen. It is called Hack That Auto two point 7 00:00:31,320 --> 00:00:34,360 Speaker 1: oh and I had a special guest co host on 8 00:00:34,400 --> 00:00:37,879 Speaker 1: that show, Joe McCormick. Joe is one of the co 9 00:00:38,000 --> 00:00:41,400 Speaker 1: hosts of Stuff to Blow Your Mind. He was also 10 00:00:41,479 --> 00:00:45,400 Speaker 1: one of my co hosts on Forward Thinking, the audio podcast, 11 00:00:45,440 --> 00:00:47,680 Speaker 1: and he was also a writer on the video series 12 00:00:47,720 --> 00:00:52,639 Speaker 1: Forward Thinking. Joe is one incredibly intelligent person, even if 13 00:00:52,680 --> 00:00:57,080 Speaker 1: he doesn't recognize Douglas Adams quotes. And let's have them 14 00:00:57,080 --> 00:01:00,600 Speaker 1: take it away. Hacking can mean any thing, right like, 15 00:01:01,720 --> 00:01:05,839 Speaker 1: it doesn't necessarily the connotation we typically assigned to it 16 00:01:05,920 --> 00:01:09,320 Speaker 1: is someone is trying to gain unauthorized access to something, 17 00:01:09,800 --> 00:01:14,240 Speaker 1: which really is a subset of hacking exactly. Hacking really 18 00:01:14,240 --> 00:01:17,119 Speaker 1: could mean that you are building stuff, like you could 19 00:01:17,160 --> 00:01:20,760 Speaker 1: be a maker. You're trying to create a device that 20 00:01:20,840 --> 00:01:23,080 Speaker 1: does a very specific thing, and it maybe to do 21 00:01:23,200 --> 00:01:25,720 Speaker 1: it in a way that no one has done before it, 22 00:01:25,760 --> 00:01:29,399 Speaker 1: maybe to increase efficiency efficiency maybe the furthest thing from 23 00:01:29,440 --> 00:01:31,640 Speaker 1: your mind. It might just be to do something creatively. 24 00:01:32,040 --> 00:01:34,479 Speaker 1: And in that previous episode of Hack that Auto, Ben 25 00:01:34,480 --> 00:01:37,319 Speaker 1: and I covered lots of ways where you could use 26 00:01:37,720 --> 00:01:41,319 Speaker 1: technology to alter a vehicle in order to make it 27 00:01:41,400 --> 00:01:44,160 Speaker 1: do something that it was either not intended to do 28 00:01:44,680 --> 00:01:47,800 Speaker 1: or that had been limitations that have been placed upon 29 00:01:47,800 --> 00:01:50,560 Speaker 1: it at the manufacturing stage. WHOA, So you mean like 30 00:01:50,600 --> 00:01:53,360 Speaker 1: you could overclock your car the same way you can 31 00:01:53,440 --> 00:01:55,960 Speaker 1: overclock your CPU. Well, maybe not the same way, but 32 00:01:56,240 --> 00:01:59,000 Speaker 1: getting a very similar response. Because there are governors and 33 00:01:59,040 --> 00:02:03,280 Speaker 1: speed limitters vehicles right where it is set so that 34 00:02:03,440 --> 00:02:06,480 Speaker 1: the engine might be capable of producing enough power to 35 00:02:07,480 --> 00:02:10,920 Speaker 1: get you to a speed above the quote unquote top 36 00:02:10,919 --> 00:02:14,360 Speaker 1: speed of your vehicle, but there are are elements inside 37 00:02:14,400 --> 00:02:17,600 Speaker 1: the vehicle that limit those speeds, like you can't go 38 00:02:17,680 --> 00:02:21,280 Speaker 1: beyond them because they essentially cut the power, so you're 39 00:02:21,280 --> 00:02:23,280 Speaker 1: not going to be able to get more out of it. 40 00:02:23,320 --> 00:02:26,280 Speaker 1: But if you hack your vehicle, you could, in theory, 41 00:02:26,400 --> 00:02:31,760 Speaker 1: remove said limitations at your own peril and be able 42 00:02:31,880 --> 00:02:36,040 Speaker 1: to go faster than what the vehicle's manufacturer had intended, 43 00:02:36,240 --> 00:02:38,680 Speaker 1: you know, at the risk of sounding like a gullible sheep. 44 00:02:38,760 --> 00:02:41,320 Speaker 1: I bet those limitations are there for a decent reason. 45 00:02:41,560 --> 00:02:44,680 Speaker 1: They tend to be yeah, like I could probably damage 46 00:02:44,720 --> 00:02:47,440 Speaker 1: your vehicle or do something unsafe if you exceed them. 47 00:02:47,520 --> 00:02:49,160 Speaker 1: I don't know if you have you ever been in 48 00:02:49,200 --> 00:02:51,720 Speaker 1: a car where it reached a certain speed and the 49 00:02:51,760 --> 00:02:54,320 Speaker 1: car was beginning to feel like it was not enjoying 50 00:02:54,360 --> 00:02:57,680 Speaker 1: that experience. Yeah, the first car I had, if you 51 00:02:57,720 --> 00:02:59,760 Speaker 1: got up to about fifty five or so, it felt 52 00:02:59,800 --> 00:03:02,440 Speaker 1: like it was about to come apart. Yeah. Yeah. And 53 00:03:02,480 --> 00:03:04,880 Speaker 1: there are some cars where, even right off the lot, 54 00:03:05,040 --> 00:03:07,840 Speaker 1: if you are pushing it at towards the top speed, 55 00:03:08,280 --> 00:03:10,880 Speaker 1: you start to feel like, yeah, this vehicle is not 56 00:03:10,960 --> 00:03:13,440 Speaker 1: really meant to maintain this for any length of time. 57 00:03:13,800 --> 00:03:16,080 Speaker 1: But there are people who want to have that full 58 00:03:16,120 --> 00:03:18,680 Speaker 1: control of their vehicle, and they want to be able 59 00:03:18,720 --> 00:03:21,560 Speaker 1: to do things with their vehicle that perhaps the manufacturer 60 00:03:21,560 --> 00:03:25,600 Speaker 1: had put limitations on, and they will hack their their cars. 61 00:03:25,639 --> 00:03:29,200 Speaker 1: And this is made possible by well a couple of things. 62 00:03:29,200 --> 00:03:31,480 Speaker 1: If you have a car that's more than twenty years old, 63 00:03:31,960 --> 00:03:36,320 Speaker 1: then you might be able to mechanically alter that vehicle. Right. 64 00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:40,000 Speaker 1: But as vehicles have become more and more complex More 65 00:03:40,000 --> 00:03:44,920 Speaker 1: and more of those uh, those those systems have become computerized, 66 00:03:45,720 --> 00:03:49,600 Speaker 1: and it's falling into what some people call the black 67 00:03:49,640 --> 00:03:52,520 Speaker 1: box problem, which is where you have a system that 68 00:03:52,640 --> 00:03:55,080 Speaker 1: is essentially contained within a black box, and it is 69 00:03:55,200 --> 00:03:59,080 Speaker 1: very difficult, if not impossible, to get access inside that 70 00:03:59,120 --> 00:04:03,400 Speaker 1: black box. You can alter what happens once this is 71 00:04:03,440 --> 00:04:05,680 Speaker 1: what what whatever the output is of that system, you 72 00:04:05,680 --> 00:04:09,680 Speaker 1: can alter that, and you can alter the arrangement of 73 00:04:09,840 --> 00:04:12,480 Speaker 1: various black box systems. But if you don't have that 74 00:04:12,520 --> 00:04:17,000 Speaker 1: special diagnostic computer right or any other means of tapping 75 00:04:17,040 --> 00:04:20,240 Speaker 1: into it, then you're kind of stuck. And and the 76 00:04:20,360 --> 00:04:22,919 Speaker 1: argument is that the technology is reaching a level of 77 00:04:22,960 --> 00:04:28,800 Speaker 1: complexity where the tinker is becoming more and more rarefied, 78 00:04:28,960 --> 00:04:31,920 Speaker 1: Like it's it's harder to be a tinker in that 79 00:04:31,960 --> 00:04:35,000 Speaker 1: world because things are getting so specialized and so advanced 80 00:04:35,400 --> 00:04:38,320 Speaker 1: that it requires a good deal of specialization just to 81 00:04:38,400 --> 00:04:41,680 Speaker 1: alter one thing, let alone all the other related systems. 82 00:04:41,800 --> 00:04:44,000 Speaker 1: I feel like we talked about this in an early 83 00:04:44,040 --> 00:04:47,440 Speaker 1: episode of the Forward Thinking podcast. This sounds very familiar. 84 00:04:47,480 --> 00:04:50,040 Speaker 1: But okay, so that's how you hack your own vehicle 85 00:04:50,120 --> 00:04:54,839 Speaker 1: to improve or maybe not improve but change it. Sure, 86 00:04:55,440 --> 00:04:58,120 Speaker 1: but what about the more you know. The more popular 87 00:04:58,160 --> 00:05:01,800 Speaker 1: sense of hacking these days where talking about violating a 88 00:05:02,160 --> 00:05:06,800 Speaker 1: supposedly secure system making it work for you. So Ben 89 00:05:06,839 --> 00:05:11,880 Speaker 1: and I talked about this as well, and overwhelmingly the 90 00:05:11,960 --> 00:05:16,000 Speaker 1: most prevalent version of that kind of hacking required physical 91 00:05:16,040 --> 00:05:18,840 Speaker 1: access to the vehicle and that you would have a 92 00:05:18,960 --> 00:05:22,680 Speaker 1: laptop that you would plug in with an adapter to 93 00:05:22,880 --> 00:05:27,120 Speaker 1: your your cars computer system, and with that laptop you 94 00:05:27,160 --> 00:05:30,520 Speaker 1: could alter things with the vehicle. In fact, you could 95 00:05:30,560 --> 00:05:32,479 Speaker 1: even set it up so that you could have remote 96 00:05:32,480 --> 00:05:36,520 Speaker 1: control of the vehicle through the laptop that's still physically 97 00:05:36,520 --> 00:05:39,360 Speaker 1: attached to the car. Oh wow, I wouldn't. I wouldn't 98 00:05:39,400 --> 00:05:41,400 Speaker 1: really expect that with it. I mean, I could see 99 00:05:41,440 --> 00:05:44,400 Speaker 1: how that could be coming with autonomous cars. But I'm 100 00:05:44,839 --> 00:05:47,560 Speaker 1: so you could control like gas and break and steering. 101 00:05:47,920 --> 00:05:51,080 Speaker 1: You could certainly control things like brakes and steering. Uh, 102 00:05:51,120 --> 00:05:55,160 Speaker 1: not necessarily acceleration, although you could do that too, I assume, 103 00:05:55,240 --> 00:05:59,360 Speaker 1: but you could certainly alter things like you could you 104 00:05:59,360 --> 00:06:02,480 Speaker 1: could make the brakes stopped working, and in fact, there 105 00:06:02,480 --> 00:06:05,120 Speaker 1: have been demonstrations where people have done that where it 106 00:06:05,200 --> 00:06:08,320 Speaker 1: was done in a safe way. But to show that, 107 00:06:08,360 --> 00:06:11,440 Speaker 1: like the anti lock brake system would be disconnected, so 108 00:06:11,480 --> 00:06:14,560 Speaker 1: that hitting the brake would do nothing and the car 109 00:06:14,600 --> 00:06:16,640 Speaker 1: would continue on as if you hadn't hit the brake 110 00:06:16,680 --> 00:06:19,280 Speaker 1: at all. Just kind of terrifying to think about. But 111 00:06:19,800 --> 00:06:23,320 Speaker 1: there was a laptop computer sitting right there, plugged into 112 00:06:23,440 --> 00:06:27,000 Speaker 1: the dashboard. It was just that the commands. Like, think 113 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:28,680 Speaker 1: of it this way, it's the same thing as if 114 00:06:28,680 --> 00:06:31,680 Speaker 1: someone were sitting in the passenger seat sending the commands 115 00:06:31,720 --> 00:06:34,719 Speaker 1: from the laptop directly to your car's computer. Only you 116 00:06:34,800 --> 00:06:36,960 Speaker 1: have removed the need for a person to be sitting 117 00:06:36,960 --> 00:06:39,480 Speaker 1: there because you have a remote system sitting the commands 118 00:06:39,520 --> 00:06:41,680 Speaker 1: to the laptop, which then send the commands to the 119 00:06:41,720 --> 00:06:44,360 Speaker 1: car computer. Well, if you're gonna do that, you might 120 00:06:44,360 --> 00:06:46,600 Speaker 1: as well just say, well, somebody sitting in the passenger 121 00:06:46,680 --> 00:06:49,120 Speaker 1: seat could reach over and grab the steering wheel, right, 122 00:06:49,160 --> 00:06:50,800 Speaker 1: And that was the point, right, That was the point 123 00:06:50,839 --> 00:06:52,800 Speaker 1: that allot of the car manufacturers were making, that a 124 00:06:52,800 --> 00:06:56,840 Speaker 1: lot of security experts were making. They said, these examples 125 00:06:57,000 --> 00:07:00,960 Speaker 1: require somebody to have physical access to your vehicle in 126 00:07:01,120 --> 00:07:04,800 Speaker 1: order for them to make these alterations, and therefore it's 127 00:07:05,000 --> 00:07:08,600 Speaker 1: not necessarily something to go out and panic over. Yeah, 128 00:07:08,600 --> 00:07:11,520 Speaker 1: so that doesn't really bother me? What would really bother me? 129 00:07:11,600 --> 00:07:13,760 Speaker 1: And and a quick digression, I think you and I 130 00:07:13,800 --> 00:07:17,240 Speaker 1: are both on the record as being pretty pro autonomous vehicle. 131 00:07:17,840 --> 00:07:21,600 Speaker 1: I am on it would be harder for me to 132 00:07:21,760 --> 00:07:24,920 Speaker 1: be more pro autonomous vehicle. I am also very pro 133 00:07:25,000 --> 00:07:28,680 Speaker 1: autonomous vehicle despite all these concerns, And one of these 134 00:07:28,680 --> 00:07:33,480 Speaker 1: concerns is what if somebody could wirelessly hack an autonomous vehicle? 135 00:07:33,560 --> 00:07:36,560 Speaker 1: And that seems like, I mean, hopefully the industry will 136 00:07:36,560 --> 00:07:39,440 Speaker 1: take all the proper steps to prevent that from happening, 137 00:07:39,560 --> 00:07:43,440 Speaker 1: But autonomous vehicles do need to be able to communicate 138 00:07:43,480 --> 00:07:47,200 Speaker 1: with each other, so it seems like they may possibly 139 00:07:47,240 --> 00:07:52,080 Speaker 1: have some wireless based vulnerabilities. And there are cars out 140 00:07:52,120 --> 00:07:56,360 Speaker 1: there right now that have wireless vulnerabilities, and we'll talk 141 00:07:56,440 --> 00:07:59,720 Speaker 1: more about specifics in a little bit. So you are 142 00:07:59,760 --> 00:08:02,880 Speaker 1: at slutely right that autonomous cars will have these because 143 00:08:02,920 --> 00:08:05,840 Speaker 1: we have cars right now that have these these wireless 144 00:08:05,960 --> 00:08:10,200 Speaker 1: vulnerabilities from from various systems. Uh, there have been examples 145 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:14,640 Speaker 1: of people using the entertainment systems within certain cars to 146 00:08:14,880 --> 00:08:18,480 Speaker 1: hack into the rest of the vehicle. Now you would 147 00:08:18,520 --> 00:08:23,120 Speaker 1: think that these should be networks within a car that 148 00:08:23,160 --> 00:08:25,720 Speaker 1: are completely separate that don't have anything to do with 149 00:08:25,760 --> 00:08:30,640 Speaker 1: one another. But there are times where, either because the 150 00:08:30,720 --> 00:08:35,200 Speaker 1: design is simpler or because of well intentioned reasons, the 151 00:08:35,200 --> 00:08:37,720 Speaker 1: they are coupled more closely. Like imagine that you have 152 00:08:37,920 --> 00:08:41,400 Speaker 1: an entertainment system that is wired in such a way 153 00:08:41,440 --> 00:08:45,680 Speaker 1: where the volume of the system will automatically adjust based 154 00:08:45,760 --> 00:08:50,280 Speaker 1: upon your acceleration. So if you accelerate more, the volume 155 00:08:50,320 --> 00:08:52,599 Speaker 1: goes up because it figures, hey, now it's going to 156 00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:54,960 Speaker 1: be a noisier environment, so I need to balance out 157 00:08:55,000 --> 00:08:57,320 Speaker 1: by becoming louder so that the person can continue to 158 00:08:57,520 --> 00:09:00,480 Speaker 1: have the same experience listening to whatever they're listening to, 159 00:09:01,040 --> 00:09:04,320 Speaker 1: whether they're going slowly or quickly. Well, that means that 160 00:09:04,400 --> 00:09:07,120 Speaker 1: there needs to be some data coming from the drive 161 00:09:07,280 --> 00:09:09,400 Speaker 1: system of the vehicle, and it may just be data, 162 00:09:09,440 --> 00:09:11,440 Speaker 1: and it may just flow one way, which would be 163 00:09:11,480 --> 00:09:14,839 Speaker 1: the best way to implement that, but it may mean 164 00:09:14,920 --> 00:09:17,880 Speaker 1: that these systems are more connected than you had first imagined. 165 00:09:18,360 --> 00:09:23,559 Speaker 1: So as we get into more WiFi based entertainment systems, 166 00:09:24,040 --> 00:09:28,000 Speaker 1: that is a potential point of vulnerability for vehicles. Yeah, 167 00:09:28,040 --> 00:09:30,120 Speaker 1: and a thing that just occurs to me is that 168 00:09:30,240 --> 00:09:34,719 Speaker 1: hopefully anybody who made these would sort of have entertainment 169 00:09:34,760 --> 00:09:38,080 Speaker 1: systems running on what's essentially a different computer than the 170 00:09:38,120 --> 00:09:41,480 Speaker 1: computer that controls the engine. Otherwise it seems like it 171 00:09:41,520 --> 00:09:44,400 Speaker 1: could be vulnerable to the kind of buffer overflow attack 172 00:09:44,559 --> 00:09:47,800 Speaker 1: or something where you, uh, you have some kind of 173 00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:50,520 Speaker 1: like you max out the memory on something and then 174 00:09:50,559 --> 00:09:53,480 Speaker 1: you start and then once you've maxed out that area, 175 00:09:53,520 --> 00:09:56,120 Speaker 1: it overflows into a place where you can just execute 176 00:09:56,160 --> 00:09:59,240 Speaker 1: some code. Right. Yeah, that's a good example. I mean that, 177 00:09:59,240 --> 00:10:01,319 Speaker 1: that's certainly so something that that needs to be thought 178 00:10:01,360 --> 00:10:04,640 Speaker 1: about when designing these systems. And to make this more complicated, 179 00:10:05,120 --> 00:10:07,400 Speaker 1: we have things like, you know, the wireless entry systems 180 00:10:07,520 --> 00:10:11,200 Speaker 1: which can be spoofed, although it's not easy to do so. 181 00:10:11,559 --> 00:10:13,880 Speaker 1: So wireless obviously that's when you've got, you know, your 182 00:10:13,880 --> 00:10:15,640 Speaker 1: little key fob and you push a button and it 183 00:10:15,679 --> 00:10:19,079 Speaker 1: unlocks the door so you can get into your car. Uh. 184 00:10:19,320 --> 00:10:23,920 Speaker 1: Those work on little radio signals, and it is possible 185 00:10:24,160 --> 00:10:29,680 Speaker 1: to broadcast radio signals at a car and activate it's 186 00:10:30,080 --> 00:10:33,360 Speaker 1: unlocking mechanism. It's not easy, and the reason it's not 187 00:10:33,440 --> 00:10:36,959 Speaker 1: easy is that you need to know generally what frequency 188 00:10:37,240 --> 00:10:40,840 Speaker 1: this thing is broadcasting over, so it may require you 189 00:10:40,920 --> 00:10:43,439 Speaker 1: to be in the presence of the key fob being used. 190 00:10:43,760 --> 00:10:45,960 Speaker 1: In order to pick up on this frequency, you really 191 00:10:45,960 --> 00:10:48,680 Speaker 1: need to know probably the beginning of the code, which 192 00:10:48,679 --> 00:10:52,800 Speaker 1: again you can sometimes glean by listening in essentially on 193 00:10:53,040 --> 00:10:57,520 Speaker 1: that key fob um and then you have to brute 194 00:10:57,559 --> 00:11:00,080 Speaker 1: force attack because the way key fobs work is it 195 00:11:00,120 --> 00:11:02,960 Speaker 1: works with a rolling algorithm, So every time you press 196 00:11:03,000 --> 00:11:06,839 Speaker 1: that button, it changes the code, so the cook but 197 00:11:07,080 --> 00:11:09,640 Speaker 1: it's changed based upon an algorithm, so it's based upon 198 00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:13,120 Speaker 1: specific rules. It's not random, because if it were random, 199 00:11:13,240 --> 00:11:15,880 Speaker 1: no car would ever know when it's key is being used, right, 200 00:11:15,920 --> 00:11:19,080 Speaker 1: but it But that means that if you are using 201 00:11:19,280 --> 00:11:22,080 Speaker 1: a remote attack to try and get access to a vehicle, 202 00:11:22,200 --> 00:11:23,839 Speaker 1: then you have to do a brute force so this 203 00:11:23,880 --> 00:11:28,640 Speaker 1: can take minutes up to hours, depending upon uh the 204 00:11:29,160 --> 00:11:32,760 Speaker 1: system and depending upon your luck based upon where you're 205 00:11:32,800 --> 00:11:37,080 Speaker 1: starting from the code. And also it means that if 206 00:11:37,160 --> 00:11:39,839 Speaker 1: you have a keyless entry and you go to your 207 00:11:39,840 --> 00:11:42,480 Speaker 1: car and you try and use it and someone has 208 00:11:42,520 --> 00:11:45,559 Speaker 1: remotely accessed your vehicle, one of the only ways you 209 00:11:45,640 --> 00:11:47,640 Speaker 1: might be able to tell, assuming that your vehicle is 210 00:11:47,679 --> 00:11:50,840 Speaker 1: still there, is that is that it takes a couple 211 00:11:50,840 --> 00:11:53,400 Speaker 1: of presses before anything works, because it will take a 212 00:11:53,440 --> 00:11:56,280 Speaker 1: while for the the code on your key fob to 213 00:11:56,360 --> 00:11:59,200 Speaker 1: match up with the code that's in the car. So 214 00:11:59,360 --> 00:12:00,920 Speaker 1: in other words, of press it and you're like, oh, 215 00:12:01,000 --> 00:12:02,880 Speaker 1: nothing's happening, and you pressed a couple more times, then 216 00:12:02,920 --> 00:12:06,440 Speaker 1: it it'll synchronize up again and then you can have access. Uh, 217 00:12:06,480 --> 00:12:09,760 Speaker 1: this is something that has been done already. Security experts 218 00:12:09,800 --> 00:12:13,280 Speaker 1: have shown. There's one in particular who used his own 219 00:12:13,480 --> 00:12:17,920 Speaker 1: vehicle to demonstrate that you could gain access, but it 220 00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:21,120 Speaker 1: could take hours and it takes a huge amount of effort, 221 00:12:21,480 --> 00:12:24,280 Speaker 1: so it's not something that is is probably easier to 222 00:12:24,320 --> 00:12:26,160 Speaker 1: just get a brick and bash the window. Yeah, it's 223 00:12:26,200 --> 00:12:28,640 Speaker 1: definitely not likely to happen, right, I get like the 224 00:12:28,679 --> 00:12:31,959 Speaker 1: likelihood of it happening is incredibly low because there are 225 00:12:32,040 --> 00:12:34,720 Speaker 1: other ways of getting access to a vehicle that require 226 00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:38,520 Speaker 1: far less work and far less access to set vehicle 227 00:12:38,600 --> 00:12:42,800 Speaker 1: for a given length of time. We'll be back with 228 00:12:42,840 --> 00:12:45,480 Speaker 1: more of this classic episode of tech stuff after this 229 00:12:45,559 --> 00:12:56,800 Speaker 1: quick break. There are other examples of someone having a 230 00:12:56,880 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 1: remote control of a vehicle, but was it was by 231 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:05,760 Speaker 1: exploiting a system that was intended to have this remote 232 00:13:05,800 --> 00:13:08,840 Speaker 1: shutdown feature. So you you know that a lot of 233 00:13:08,920 --> 00:13:13,559 Speaker 1: vehicles have this ability for for a an entity to 234 00:13:14,400 --> 00:13:17,160 Speaker 1: either remotely shut down the engine or do things like 235 00:13:17,200 --> 00:13:20,000 Speaker 1: hawk the horn, right, yeah, I think, uh, well, I 236 00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:23,520 Speaker 1: know one scenario in which this occurs would be like, 237 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:27,520 Speaker 1: so let's say you take out a loan on a 238 00:13:27,520 --> 00:13:30,280 Speaker 1: car and the person who sells you the car is 239 00:13:30,360 --> 00:13:33,000 Speaker 1: not very confident that you will pay back that loan. 240 00:13:33,760 --> 00:13:36,640 Speaker 1: They can put equipment on the car that prevents it 241 00:13:36,720 --> 00:13:39,320 Speaker 1: from starting up, right, so they can say, this person 242 00:13:39,400 --> 00:13:42,440 Speaker 1: isn't paying on their financing, we need to shut down 243 00:13:42,480 --> 00:13:44,880 Speaker 1: the car's ability to run. Yeah, it's essentially a remote 244 00:13:45,000 --> 00:13:48,200 Speaker 1: kill switch, and your car will not start at that point. 245 00:13:48,440 --> 00:13:51,200 Speaker 1: And uh, yeah, it could be hopefully they wouldn't be 246 00:13:51,200 --> 00:13:53,880 Speaker 1: able to turn off the engine while you're driving. No, 247 00:13:54,720 --> 00:13:57,800 Speaker 1: I don't think that's that's a possibility, but they could 248 00:13:57,840 --> 00:14:00,679 Speaker 1: certainly do it, you know, so that the next time 249 00:14:00,720 --> 00:14:02,400 Speaker 1: you try to start up your car it doesn't work. 250 00:14:03,000 --> 00:14:05,520 Speaker 1: And uh, it can be used in that case where 251 00:14:05,800 --> 00:14:07,760 Speaker 1: someone's not keeping up with their payments. It can also 252 00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:09,920 Speaker 1: be used in the case of a stolen car. So 253 00:14:09,960 --> 00:14:12,040 Speaker 1: if your car stolen, you report it to the police. 254 00:14:12,559 --> 00:14:15,000 Speaker 1: You work with the dealership, you explain, hey, my vehicle 255 00:14:15,040 --> 00:14:18,360 Speaker 1: was stolen, they can actually activate this remote kill switch 256 00:14:18,480 --> 00:14:20,880 Speaker 1: so that the criminals who have possession of your car 257 00:14:20,920 --> 00:14:23,400 Speaker 1: are no longer able to drive it, and then the 258 00:14:23,400 --> 00:14:26,520 Speaker 1: police can hopefully locate your vehicle and you get it back, 259 00:14:27,120 --> 00:14:29,840 Speaker 1: uh Right. So there are legitimate reasons why you would 260 00:14:29,880 --> 00:14:32,480 Speaker 1: want that technology install on your vehicle. However, there was 261 00:14:32,560 --> 00:14:37,720 Speaker 1: at least one case where a person who had access 262 00:14:37,760 --> 00:14:43,240 Speaker 1: to said system uh accessed it for personal reasons and 263 00:14:43,840 --> 00:14:49,400 Speaker 1: out of vindictiveness, was essentially harassing somebody using the system 264 00:14:49,440 --> 00:14:52,600 Speaker 1: to mess with their vehicle. So if you look at 265 00:14:52,440 --> 00:14:56,760 Speaker 1: a discussions about car hacking and they always say, like, 266 00:14:57,160 --> 00:14:59,960 Speaker 1: what are the examples of malicious car hacking, they said, well, 267 00:15:00,040 --> 00:15:03,280 Speaker 1: outside of research and development, where where security researchers are 268 00:15:03,320 --> 00:15:07,520 Speaker 1: trying their best to do this to see if it's viable, 269 00:15:08,080 --> 00:15:11,000 Speaker 1: there's only one example of it ever actually happening. And 270 00:15:11,040 --> 00:15:14,080 Speaker 1: in that case, it wasn't hacking in the sense of 271 00:15:14,120 --> 00:15:15,800 Speaker 1: someone setting down at their computer and trying to get 272 00:15:15,800 --> 00:15:19,480 Speaker 1: access to a vehicle, someone exploiting an existing system that 273 00:15:19,600 --> 00:15:24,280 Speaker 1: was already attached to that vehicle. But that being said, 274 00:15:24,840 --> 00:15:30,360 Speaker 1: with all those caveats laid out the issue of wireless 275 00:15:30,440 --> 00:15:34,560 Speaker 1: hacking a vehicle of remotely accessing a vehicle is by 276 00:15:34,560 --> 00:15:39,320 Speaker 1: no means a dead issue. It is something that is 277 00:15:39,400 --> 00:15:43,200 Speaker 1: continuously brought up, and as of the time that we're 278 00:15:43,200 --> 00:15:47,720 Speaker 1: recording this podcast, which is in May of twenty, there's 279 00:15:48,520 --> 00:15:52,720 Speaker 1: increasing interest in this because of a pair of researchers 280 00:15:52,800 --> 00:15:55,560 Speaker 1: and what they claim they are able to do and 281 00:15:55,600 --> 00:15:59,720 Speaker 1: what they will show off at the black Hat Conference 282 00:16:00,000 --> 00:16:04,200 Speaker 1: in August. What is that? Well, first I should explain 283 00:16:04,240 --> 00:16:06,720 Speaker 1: what the black Hat Conference is, So it's a um 284 00:16:07,480 --> 00:16:11,000 Speaker 1: it's essentially it's a hacker convention. It's all about discussing 285 00:16:11,040 --> 00:16:16,200 Speaker 1: security vulnerabilities and uh the ways to exploit them. Now, 286 00:16:17,160 --> 00:16:20,080 Speaker 1: in hacker circles, you have white hats and black hats, 287 00:16:20,080 --> 00:16:23,320 Speaker 1: and sometimes you can argue gray hats. White hat hackers 288 00:16:23,400 --> 00:16:27,080 Speaker 1: are people who are looking for security vulnerabilities with the 289 00:16:27,120 --> 00:16:31,040 Speaker 1: intent to have those security vulnerabilities patched so that they 290 00:16:31,080 --> 00:16:36,080 Speaker 1: are no longer vulnerable. Black hat hackers UH tend to 291 00:16:36,160 --> 00:16:39,160 Speaker 1: be the folks who find security vulnerabilities in order to 292 00:16:39,200 --> 00:16:42,480 Speaker 1: exploit them, whether that is to exploit them directly or 293 00:16:42,520 --> 00:16:46,040 Speaker 1: to exploit them by selling that information to other interested parties, 294 00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:49,600 Speaker 1: and whether they're doing it for cash or for leverage 295 00:16:49,600 --> 00:16:52,160 Speaker 1: over somebody, or just for fun, Yeah, just to build 296 00:16:52,160 --> 00:16:54,960 Speaker 1: their own reputation, as opposed to, you know, a genuine 297 00:16:55,000 --> 00:16:57,440 Speaker 1: desire to help other folks. So even though it's called 298 00:16:57,480 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 1: the black Hat Conference, it doesn't necessarily mean that these 299 00:16:59,680 --> 00:17:01,680 Speaker 1: are all people who are gathering around trying to figure 300 00:17:01,680 --> 00:17:04,080 Speaker 1: out how to control the world through their laptops. Often 301 00:17:04,160 --> 00:17:08,040 Speaker 1: its actual discussions about these are serious concerns that we 302 00:17:08,119 --> 00:17:10,680 Speaker 1: need to address in order to make sure that they 303 00:17:10,680 --> 00:17:16,320 Speaker 1: don't become huge problems go beyond concern to an enormous problem. 304 00:17:16,400 --> 00:17:20,560 Speaker 1: So the the researchers were talking about actually, I think 305 00:17:20,560 --> 00:17:23,840 Speaker 1: Ben and I mentioned them to Charlie Miller and Chris 306 00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:29,520 Speaker 1: valisek Uh, their two security experts who had talked about 307 00:17:29,520 --> 00:17:33,800 Speaker 1: hacking cars previously. They had uh shown in two thousand 308 00:17:33,840 --> 00:17:37,040 Speaker 1: thirteen and two thousand and fourteen various ways to hack 309 00:17:37,200 --> 00:17:41,199 Speaker 1: vehicles UH, and now they are talking that in the 310 00:17:41,240 --> 00:17:45,199 Speaker 1: two thousand fifteen conference in August they will reveal a 311 00:17:45,280 --> 00:17:48,760 Speaker 1: way of remotely gaining access to a vehicle. It does 312 00:17:48,800 --> 00:17:52,600 Speaker 1: not require you to plug a laptop into a computer. 313 00:17:52,760 --> 00:17:55,400 Speaker 1: They say that you could do this with an unmodified 314 00:17:55,480 --> 00:17:59,760 Speaker 1: vehicle as soon as it rolls off the dealership. Scary, 315 00:18:00,119 --> 00:18:04,920 Speaker 1: very scary. Um, that's an excellent question. I think that 316 00:18:05,320 --> 00:18:11,120 Speaker 1: I'm sure that they have something. The extent of that, yeah, no, no, no, 317 00:18:11,400 --> 00:18:15,280 Speaker 1: the extent of what they have I do not know. Now. Previously, 318 00:18:15,320 --> 00:18:18,359 Speaker 1: they have published lists of vehicles that they have looked 319 00:18:18,359 --> 00:18:24,240 Speaker 1: at that they say represent, you know, the most hackable 320 00:18:24,640 --> 00:18:26,760 Speaker 1: kind of vehicles, and the very top of the list, 321 00:18:26,760 --> 00:18:31,520 Speaker 1: where the Jeep Cherokee was number one. That's the most table, 322 00:18:31,720 --> 00:18:36,960 Speaker 1: most tackable, most tackical. But they they had identify three 323 00:18:37,040 --> 00:18:42,720 Speaker 1: different criteria for hackability, including things like are the systems 324 00:18:42,760 --> 00:18:46,160 Speaker 1: interconnected with one with one another? How many wireless points 325 00:18:46,200 --> 00:18:50,560 Speaker 1: of entry are are potentially there? That sort of stuff, 326 00:18:50,960 --> 00:18:54,199 Speaker 1: And out of the various criteria, the Jeep Cherokee had 327 00:18:54,240 --> 00:18:57,720 Speaker 1: the most of them, the most examples. Uh, the Infinity 328 00:18:57,800 --> 00:19:00,000 Speaker 1: Q fifty was also up there in the Cattle I 329 00:19:00,320 --> 00:19:06,520 Speaker 1: Escalade as ah as the the SNL Southern character would say, 330 00:19:07,119 --> 00:19:11,240 Speaker 1: was also up there. And uh, when we're talking about 331 00:19:11,280 --> 00:19:15,920 Speaker 1: wireless points of vulnerability, really you're talking about any system 332 00:19:16,200 --> 00:19:22,280 Speaker 1: that has that wireless communication capability. So one example, which 333 00:19:22,359 --> 00:19:26,160 Speaker 1: is perfectly innocent in of itself, is the tire monitoring 334 00:19:26,240 --> 00:19:29,000 Speaker 1: system the tire pressure monitoring system. So if you have 335 00:19:29,040 --> 00:19:31,760 Speaker 1: a vehicle that has this, then like you get in 336 00:19:31,760 --> 00:19:34,080 Speaker 1: your car, you turn your you know, you put the 337 00:19:34,119 --> 00:19:37,200 Speaker 1: key in the ignition you or if it's key less ignition, 338 00:19:37,240 --> 00:19:39,840 Speaker 1: you turn on your car, however that may be. And 339 00:19:39,840 --> 00:19:42,960 Speaker 1: there might be an indicator on your dashboard that tells you, 340 00:19:42,960 --> 00:19:45,960 Speaker 1: you know, if your tires are overinflated, underinflated, what the 341 00:19:46,160 --> 00:19:48,960 Speaker 1: you know, how the pressure is? Uh, which is kind 342 00:19:48,960 --> 00:19:51,120 Speaker 1: of cool. You're like, oh, awesome, I don't need to 343 00:19:51,160 --> 00:19:53,439 Speaker 1: get out of my vehicle, you know, pull over to 344 00:19:53,480 --> 00:19:56,600 Speaker 1: a gas station or whatever and get the air pressure 345 00:19:56,640 --> 00:19:58,840 Speaker 1: gauge out and see how it's doing. It's telling me 346 00:19:58,960 --> 00:20:01,679 Speaker 1: right here, um, which is useful. But it's doing so 347 00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:06,840 Speaker 1: with wireless sensors that communicate back to the the computer 348 00:20:06,960 --> 00:20:10,520 Speaker 1: system that is governing all the other systems in the car. Yeah. 349 00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:13,679 Speaker 1: I can see why you wouldn't want wires going to 350 00:20:13,720 --> 00:20:18,200 Speaker 1: the tires. Yeah, yeah, no, it would It would be problematic, right. 351 00:20:18,240 --> 00:20:22,240 Speaker 1: So the the wireless system is likely communicating with the 352 00:20:22,359 --> 00:20:26,280 Speaker 1: what was called the controller area network bus or can bus, 353 00:20:26,880 --> 00:20:30,199 Speaker 1: which is kind of like the the traffic controller of 354 00:20:30,200 --> 00:20:33,080 Speaker 1: all the different systems that feed information into the car's 355 00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:36,800 Speaker 1: computer the master control program. Yeah, if not the master 356 00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:40,320 Speaker 1: control program, it's got to be like the master control programs. 357 00:20:40,720 --> 00:20:47,119 Speaker 1: Uh executive assistant, Right, yeah, yeah, it's a it's good 358 00:20:47,160 --> 00:20:50,960 Speaker 1: old David uh not Yeah, Stark controlling this. So yeah, exactly, 359 00:20:50,960 --> 00:20:53,720 Speaker 1: it's it's this this traffic controller that sends the information 360 00:20:53,760 --> 00:20:57,680 Speaker 1: to the computer. Well, you know, that's a potential point 361 00:20:57,680 --> 00:21:01,840 Speaker 1: of vulnerability. And there have been example of being able 362 00:21:01,880 --> 00:21:05,959 Speaker 1: to track a vehicle based upon tracking the unique monitoring 363 00:21:06,800 --> 00:21:12,280 Speaker 1: frequency for that that tire pressure system. So you could 364 00:21:12,600 --> 00:21:16,879 Speaker 1: potentially track where a vehicle has gone by keeping note 365 00:21:17,000 --> 00:21:22,680 Speaker 1: of this particular this particular wireless communication system. If you could, 366 00:21:22,920 --> 00:21:27,320 Speaker 1: can you get access to more critical systems like breaking 367 00:21:27,600 --> 00:21:31,480 Speaker 1: or steering through that? That remains to be seen. So 368 00:21:32,160 --> 00:21:38,359 Speaker 1: Miller and uh and Valask have said that they have 369 00:21:38,520 --> 00:21:43,760 Speaker 1: found some interesting stuff through their experiments. Um, they haven't 370 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:46,640 Speaker 1: had this discussion, so we can't say exactly what they revealed, 371 00:21:46,640 --> 00:21:48,960 Speaker 1: but they have said that UH or at least the 372 00:21:49,000 --> 00:21:53,800 Speaker 1: black Hat website says that the presentation will include starting 373 00:21:53,800 --> 00:21:56,640 Speaker 1: with remote exploitation, we will show how to pivot through 374 00:21:56,760 --> 00:22:00,320 Speaker 1: different pieces of the vehicle's hardware in order to be 375 00:22:00,359 --> 00:22:03,760 Speaker 1: able to send messages on the can bus to critical 376 00:22:03,960 --> 00:22:08,320 Speaker 1: electronic control units e c U s. We will conclude 377 00:22:08,320 --> 00:22:12,159 Speaker 1: by showing several can messages that affect physical systems of 378 00:22:12,200 --> 00:22:15,760 Speaker 1: the vehicle. So that that's pretty vague, right. It doesn't 379 00:22:15,800 --> 00:22:21,040 Speaker 1: specifically say that it could do something like break the 380 00:22:21,119 --> 00:22:24,200 Speaker 1: car as it b R a k E the car, 381 00:22:24,280 --> 00:22:28,600 Speaker 1: like apply the brakes. Doesn't say that, uh, you know, explicitly, 382 00:22:28,640 --> 00:22:33,160 Speaker 1: so maybe their methodology will be limited. And in fact, 383 00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:37,000 Speaker 1: they say that they plan on showing both the reality 384 00:22:37,040 --> 00:22:42,520 Speaker 1: and the limitations of remote hacking on vehicles. So a 385 00:22:42,560 --> 00:22:45,840 Speaker 1: lot of security experts have said, listen, this is something 386 00:22:45,840 --> 00:22:48,840 Speaker 1: to be concerned about, yes, but not something to panic 387 00:22:48,920 --> 00:22:53,840 Speaker 1: over because one, they have not indicated how extensive these 388 00:22:54,440 --> 00:22:58,120 Speaker 1: these messages can go, like what what the effects can be. Two, 389 00:22:58,200 --> 00:23:01,760 Speaker 1: they haven't discussed their methodology of coming up with the ability, 390 00:23:01,840 --> 00:23:04,679 Speaker 1: the way of doing it, or if whether or not 391 00:23:04,720 --> 00:23:09,879 Speaker 1: they plan on sharing in detail how it's done. And three, 392 00:23:10,040 --> 00:23:13,760 Speaker 1: it may require so much effort to do this that, 393 00:23:14,600 --> 00:23:17,600 Speaker 1: just like the keyless entry, no one would ever bother 394 00:23:17,720 --> 00:23:19,920 Speaker 1: to do it, because they are easier ways to sabotage 395 00:23:19,920 --> 00:23:23,520 Speaker 1: a vehicle than going through these processes but showing that 396 00:23:24,080 --> 00:23:28,720 Speaker 1: it's possible means that further like the future generations of 397 00:23:28,800 --> 00:23:34,640 Speaker 1: vehicles could be built and designed to counteract this sort 398 00:23:34,640 --> 00:23:38,400 Speaker 1: of stuff from the from the get go, so that 399 00:23:38,560 --> 00:23:44,280 Speaker 1: it doesn't become attempting enough target to make further investigation 400 00:23:44,400 --> 00:23:46,800 Speaker 1: into that that line of attack. Right, Like, if you 401 00:23:47,080 --> 00:23:50,119 Speaker 1: if you find a vulnerability and you find a really 402 00:23:50,200 --> 00:23:54,040 Speaker 1: hard way that you can exploit that vulnerability, that might 403 00:23:54,080 --> 00:23:55,919 Speaker 1: lead to other people saying maybe I can find an 404 00:23:55,960 --> 00:23:58,520 Speaker 1: easier way to exploit that same vulnerability. As long as 405 00:23:58,520 --> 00:24:02,040 Speaker 1: that vulnerability exists, it's a it's a target, and if 406 00:24:02,040 --> 00:24:05,159 Speaker 1: we ever get to a point where it's easier to 407 00:24:05,240 --> 00:24:10,199 Speaker 1: attack the target than other methods of messing with a vehicle, 408 00:24:10,800 --> 00:24:14,640 Speaker 1: then you're in trouble. So the hope is that these 409 00:24:14,680 --> 00:24:20,880 Speaker 1: systems one could be addressed by updating firmware on existing vehicles, 410 00:24:20,920 --> 00:24:25,600 Speaker 1: and two could be prevented in future vehicle design. Uh. 411 00:24:25,800 --> 00:24:27,919 Speaker 1: That being said, of course, we still don't know what 412 00:24:28,200 --> 00:24:31,560 Speaker 1: they're gonna say yet. It may it may be that 413 00:24:31,720 --> 00:24:36,199 Speaker 1: this is all uh, you know, largely, you know, the 414 00:24:36,200 --> 00:24:39,400 Speaker 1: speculation that we're having is largely harmless. That could be 415 00:24:39,480 --> 00:24:42,840 Speaker 1: that's best case scenario. Worst case would be, Yeah, we 416 00:24:42,960 --> 00:24:45,040 Speaker 1: figured out that we could with a laptop and a 417 00:24:45,040 --> 00:24:47,320 Speaker 1: wireless transmitter, we can make your card do whatever we 418 00:24:47,359 --> 00:24:50,080 Speaker 1: wanted to do. That would be bad. Well, I would say, actually, 419 00:24:50,080 --> 00:24:53,200 Speaker 1: the best case scenario would be that, um, that they 420 00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:57,959 Speaker 1: actually do turn up whatever are the most critical vulnerabilities 421 00:24:58,000 --> 00:25:01,119 Speaker 1: that exist, and that leads manufact trurers to take better 422 00:25:01,200 --> 00:25:04,320 Speaker 1: steps to protect their cars. Yeah, assuming that there are 423 00:25:04,359 --> 00:25:07,280 Speaker 1: in fact critical vulnerabilities, that is the best case scenario. 424 00:25:07,760 --> 00:25:10,280 Speaker 1: The true best case scenario is to discover there are 425 00:25:10,280 --> 00:25:14,360 Speaker 1: no critical vulnerabilities. But the likelihood of that, I mean, 426 00:25:14,520 --> 00:25:18,320 Speaker 1: if someone's really determined to get access to a system, 427 00:25:18,359 --> 00:25:21,800 Speaker 1: there hasn't been a system made that is crack proof. 428 00:25:22,760 --> 00:25:29,400 Speaker 1: You know, eventually, given enough time, resources and willpower, any 429 00:25:29,480 --> 00:25:33,800 Speaker 1: system that has been made can will eventually be be breached. 430 00:25:34,080 --> 00:25:40,439 Speaker 1: Speak for yourself. I'm behind seven proxies. I tracked him 431 00:25:40,480 --> 00:25:43,320 Speaker 1: all the all the way to a pub in Ireland. 432 00:25:43,320 --> 00:25:45,480 Speaker 1: It turned out he was at least three more hops away. 433 00:25:47,040 --> 00:25:49,320 Speaker 1: We've got more to say in this classic episode of 434 00:25:49,320 --> 00:26:06,400 Speaker 1: tech stuff. 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Yeah, 470 00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:18,960 Speaker 1: that would that is a a sobering thought right now. 471 00:28:19,080 --> 00:28:23,080 Speaker 1: Of course, we would hope that nothing like that is possible, 472 00:28:23,119 --> 00:28:26,760 Speaker 1: That airplanes are designed to be as secure as possible, 473 00:28:26,800 --> 00:28:29,320 Speaker 1: and that they don't really have any vulnerabilities that you 474 00:28:29,320 --> 00:28:33,080 Speaker 1: could exploit, like like these, you know, tire pressure gauges 475 00:28:33,200 --> 00:28:37,080 Speaker 1: or anything like that. We would hope, but that might 476 00:28:37,160 --> 00:28:42,840 Speaker 1: not necessarily be the case, because this month, in May, 477 00:28:43,240 --> 00:28:45,800 Speaker 1: if you haven't seen yet, some media outlets have been 478 00:28:45,840 --> 00:28:50,600 Speaker 1: reporting that a security researcher named Chris Roberts may have 479 00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:54,920 Speaker 1: hacked an airplane and sent it off course. Yeah. Now, 480 00:28:55,560 --> 00:28:58,400 Speaker 1: the reason why you're building so many qualifiers into this 481 00:28:58,480 --> 00:29:01,960 Speaker 1: statement is because, as a turns out, there's there are 482 00:29:01,960 --> 00:29:05,520 Speaker 1: a lot of differing accounts about what exactly was done 483 00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:08,600 Speaker 1: and or happened. Yeah, well, our information is a kind 484 00:29:08,600 --> 00:29:12,080 Speaker 1: of like he said, he said, he said issue. So 485 00:29:12,440 --> 00:29:14,960 Speaker 1: I'll explain that as we go forward. But who is 486 00:29:15,040 --> 00:29:19,000 Speaker 1: Chris Roberts. So for years he has been known as 487 00:29:19,040 --> 00:29:21,560 Speaker 1: a white hat hacker. We talked about black hats and 488 00:29:21,560 --> 00:29:23,560 Speaker 1: white hats earlier. If you're a listener to the show, 489 00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:27,280 Speaker 1: you're probably familiar anyway. But the white hat is somebody who, 490 00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:31,840 Speaker 1: at least ostensibly uh goes out and looks for vulnerabilities 491 00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:35,600 Speaker 1: and systems in order to improve security, to show you, hey, 492 00:29:35,640 --> 00:29:38,840 Speaker 1: here's where you're weak. You should shore up your defenses 493 00:29:38,880 --> 00:29:42,280 Speaker 1: in this area. And so Roberts for years has been 494 00:29:42,320 --> 00:29:46,440 Speaker 1: known as a white hat hacker, especially in a vionic 495 00:29:46,600 --> 00:29:51,400 Speaker 1: sort of publicly denouncing alleged security problems and vulnerabilities in 496 00:29:51,680 --> 00:29:57,240 Speaker 1: networks airline manufacturers put into their aircraft. So keeping in 497 00:29:57,280 --> 00:29:59,720 Speaker 1: mind that, you know, as the aircraft experience has a 498 00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:03,840 Speaker 1: al it over time, Roberts would argue, it has introduced 499 00:30:04,200 --> 00:30:08,560 Speaker 1: vulnerabilities from an electronic standpoint computer standpoint, So things like 500 00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:11,520 Speaker 1: the in flight entertainment systems, the i f E s, 501 00:30:11,680 --> 00:30:13,800 Speaker 1: or the fact that a lot of a lot of 502 00:30:14,040 --> 00:30:18,240 Speaker 1: airlines offer WiFi on their flights. Yeah, that these could 503 00:30:18,280 --> 00:30:23,080 Speaker 1: potentially be vulnerabilities. Yeah, And so you know, you would 504 00:30:23,120 --> 00:30:26,680 Speaker 1: just hope that, well, I mean, if a plane's showing 505 00:30:26,760 --> 00:30:30,680 Speaker 1: me movies on some central computer system, surely that computer 506 00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:34,200 Speaker 1: is not linked to the computers that control things like 507 00:30:35,080 --> 00:30:38,800 Speaker 1: I don't know, life support systems inside the airplane. Yeah, 508 00:30:38,920 --> 00:30:43,280 Speaker 1: the the engine, the navigating computer. You would hope that 509 00:30:43,320 --> 00:30:47,640 Speaker 1: there's no involvement there. But I'm gonna tell a little story. Okay, 510 00:30:47,880 --> 00:30:51,600 Speaker 1: So in April, I think it was on April fifteen, 511 00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:57,320 Speaker 1: sometimes in the middle of April. Yeah, Roberts, the same guy, 512 00:30:57,400 --> 00:31:01,000 Speaker 1: Chris Roberts. He was removed from a fly by FBI 513 00:31:01,200 --> 00:31:05,520 Speaker 1: agents after the flight landed in Syracuse, New York. And 514 00:31:05,720 --> 00:31:08,959 Speaker 1: the supposed reason that everybody figured this happened was because 515 00:31:09,080 --> 00:31:13,920 Speaker 1: Roberts had tweeted a joke about hacking an airplane in 516 00:31:13,920 --> 00:31:18,360 Speaker 1: which he was riding earlier that day, and has at 517 00:31:18,440 --> 00:31:22,240 Speaker 1: least on one subsequent occasion said he was essentially poking 518 00:31:22,240 --> 00:31:27,240 Speaker 1: the bear. Yeah, so the tweet read as follows, find 519 00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:31,640 Speaker 1: myself on a seven hundred. Let's see box I F 520 00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:35,120 Speaker 1: E ice dot com. Shall we start playing with E 521 00:31:35,240 --> 00:31:39,600 Speaker 1: I C A S messages pass oxygen on anyone smiley face. 522 00:31:40,560 --> 00:31:44,680 Speaker 1: So he's using some some acronyms there. One of them 523 00:31:44,720 --> 00:31:47,960 Speaker 1: is I F E that's in flight entertainment. Another one 524 00:31:48,080 --> 00:31:51,000 Speaker 1: is E I C A S that's Engine indicating and 525 00:31:51,080 --> 00:31:55,600 Speaker 1: crew alerting system. At the past oxygen on. What it 526 00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:58,640 Speaker 1: seems to be saying there is he's suggesting it would 527 00:31:58,680 --> 00:32:02,120 Speaker 1: be funny to to trigger a command that makes the 528 00:32:02,160 --> 00:32:05,920 Speaker 1: oxygen masks descend on all the passengers, whereupon you would 529 00:32:06,600 --> 00:32:09,680 Speaker 1: adjust your own mask before helping others. Yes, that's important 530 00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:12,760 Speaker 1: to remember. Now. Of course, it's important to point out 531 00:32:12,800 --> 00:32:16,400 Speaker 1: that Roberts did not do anything. He was just tweeting 532 00:32:16,440 --> 00:32:21,120 Speaker 1: a joke. Right. Still, one could and probably has, argued 533 00:32:21,160 --> 00:32:23,959 Speaker 1: that such a joke was at best in poor taste 534 00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:27,960 Speaker 1: and at worst, really dumb. Yeah, well, especially because the 535 00:32:28,040 --> 00:32:33,160 Speaker 1: FBI acted on it. The FBI agents detained him, interrogated him, 536 00:32:33,280 --> 00:32:36,960 Speaker 1: and confiscated his electronics. He even tweeted out a picture 537 00:32:37,280 --> 00:32:41,200 Speaker 1: of the electronics that were confiscated and said, well they're 538 00:32:41,200 --> 00:32:45,720 Speaker 1: all encrypted, but they're all gone now. Yeah. So that 539 00:32:45,800 --> 00:32:48,600 Speaker 1: was last month in April. But in May of a 540 00:32:48,640 --> 00:32:52,080 Speaker 1: Canadian news organization published I guess what must have been 541 00:32:52,120 --> 00:32:56,640 Speaker 1: a leaked copy um of a warrant application for the 542 00:32:56,640 --> 00:33:00,400 Speaker 1: search and seizure of Robert's devices. This was itt up 543 00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:05,240 Speaker 1: by FBI special Agent Mark Hurley. According to this document, 544 00:33:05,840 --> 00:33:10,360 Speaker 1: Roberts had already voluntarily spoken with the FBI in February 545 00:33:10,400 --> 00:33:13,960 Speaker 1: and March of so a few months ago to inform 546 00:33:14,080 --> 00:33:18,120 Speaker 1: them about basically what he claimed were security vulnerabilities in 547 00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:21,400 Speaker 1: these in flight entertainment systems that we were talking about before. 548 00:33:21,600 --> 00:33:26,360 Speaker 1: And he identified several aircraft in particular the Boeing seven hundred, 549 00:33:26,760 --> 00:33:30,560 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven, nine hundred, seven fifty seven, two hundred, 550 00:33:30,800 --> 00:33:33,520 Speaker 1: and the Airbus A three twenty. Now, if you'll notice, 551 00:33:33,800 --> 00:33:36,880 Speaker 1: he identified in his tweet that he was on A 552 00:33:36,960 --> 00:33:39,880 Speaker 1: seven hundred, one of the ones that had these in 553 00:33:39,960 --> 00:33:45,480 Speaker 1: flight entertainment system vulnerabilities according to him, and so that's 554 00:33:45,520 --> 00:33:47,560 Speaker 1: sort of the joke he was making. He was like, Okay, 555 00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:50,240 Speaker 1: remember these things I've been talking about. I'm on one 556 00:33:50,280 --> 00:33:55,520 Speaker 1: of these planes now. So the document, the warrant application, 557 00:33:56,120 --> 00:34:01,440 Speaker 1: claims that Roberts told FBI agents on these earlier conversations 558 00:34:02,160 --> 00:34:06,720 Speaker 1: that he had exploited these security flaws and penetrated in 559 00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:13,799 Speaker 1: flight entertainment networks in midflight. So he claims between he 560 00:34:13,960 --> 00:34:18,560 Speaker 1: penetrated i FE systems fifteen to twenty times, and he 561 00:34:18,600 --> 00:34:22,000 Speaker 1: said he gained access to these i FE systems by 562 00:34:22,080 --> 00:34:25,000 Speaker 1: physically plugging in. I thought this was interesting. So he 563 00:34:25,080 --> 00:34:29,720 Speaker 1: said he physically plugged in via a modified Cat six 564 00:34:29,840 --> 00:34:34,680 Speaker 1: Ethernet cable into the seat electronics box or SEB, and 565 00:34:34,719 --> 00:34:38,160 Speaker 1: these are found under the seats in some airplanes, so 566 00:34:38,360 --> 00:34:40,640 Speaker 1: you can imagine his process. Basically, what he said he 567 00:34:40,680 --> 00:34:42,920 Speaker 1: did is he reach under the seat in front of 568 00:34:43,000 --> 00:34:46,319 Speaker 1: him and sort of wiggle this box and squeeze it 569 00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:51,680 Speaker 1: until the cover comes off, which is quite the feat 570 00:34:51,719 --> 00:34:57,359 Speaker 1: because many of these are fixed by screws. Yeah, well, 571 00:34:57,400 --> 00:35:00,520 Speaker 1: we'll go into we'll go into potential object actions to 572 00:35:00,560 --> 00:35:03,080 Speaker 1: the story. Yeah yeah, oh yeah, yeah. So I've never 573 00:35:03,120 --> 00:35:05,760 Speaker 1: tried to get into a seat electronic s box myself, 574 00:35:06,200 --> 00:35:10,680 Speaker 1: have I, nor will I, and nor should you, because 575 00:35:10,960 --> 00:35:12,560 Speaker 1: it's not a good thing to try to mess with. 576 00:35:12,560 --> 00:35:14,560 Speaker 1: But what he said is he got the cover off 577 00:35:14,880 --> 00:35:17,880 Speaker 1: and he'd plug in. It's kind of strange that nobody 578 00:35:17,880 --> 00:35:20,640 Speaker 1: ever seemed to like notice him doing this. One of 579 00:35:20,680 --> 00:35:24,360 Speaker 1: the sections to the story. Yeah, but uh so, and again, 580 00:35:24,920 --> 00:35:29,600 Speaker 1: just to reiterate, this is what the warrant application claims 581 00:35:29,640 --> 00:35:33,280 Speaker 1: he told the FBI earlier this year. So it's several 582 00:35:33,400 --> 00:35:36,960 Speaker 1: levels of hearsay, um, but yeah, they said he so, 583 00:35:37,040 --> 00:35:39,080 Speaker 1: he said he would plug in with this Cat six 584 00:35:39,120 --> 00:35:43,040 Speaker 1: Ethernet cable and that would give him access to the 585 00:35:43,080 --> 00:35:46,640 Speaker 1: plane's i FE system, the inflight entertainment one. And then 586 00:35:46,800 --> 00:35:49,120 Speaker 1: and I'm going to read just a direct quote from 587 00:35:49,160 --> 00:35:52,239 Speaker 1: the warrant application and this next part. It claims that 588 00:35:52,640 --> 00:35:56,279 Speaker 1: Roberts told them he quote connected to other systems on 589 00:35:56,360 --> 00:36:00,600 Speaker 1: the airplane network after he exploited slash, gained access to, 590 00:36:01,000 --> 00:36:04,680 Speaker 1: or quote hacked the i f A system. He stated 591 00:36:04,719 --> 00:36:09,120 Speaker 1: that he then overwrote code on the airplane's thrust management 592 00:36:09,200 --> 00:36:12,360 Speaker 1: computer while a board of flight. He stated that he 593 00:36:12,440 --> 00:36:16,480 Speaker 1: successfully commanded the system. He had accessed to issue the 594 00:36:16,600 --> 00:36:21,440 Speaker 1: CLB or climb command. He stated that he thereby caused 595 00:36:21,520 --> 00:36:25,120 Speaker 1: one of the airplane engines to climb, resulting in a 596 00:36:25,239 --> 00:36:28,680 Speaker 1: lateral or sideways movement of the plane during one of 597 00:36:28,719 --> 00:36:32,680 Speaker 1: these flights. He also stated that he used Vortex software 598 00:36:33,000 --> 00:36:38,320 Speaker 1: after compromising, slash, exploiting, or quote hacking the airplane's networks. 599 00:36:38,360 --> 00:36:41,480 Speaker 1: He used the software to monitor traffic from the cockpit 600 00:36:41,600 --> 00:36:48,200 Speaker 1: system and if true, this is fascinating. The warrant application 601 00:36:48,280 --> 00:36:52,200 Speaker 1: claims Robert said he used default I D s and 602 00:36:52,320 --> 00:36:58,080 Speaker 1: passwords to compromise the network. That was a face palm there. 603 00:36:59,080 --> 00:37:06,399 Speaker 1: If that's true, people change your passwords? Well, I mean, okay, here, 604 00:37:06,480 --> 00:37:09,560 Speaker 1: here's here's one thing I would argue as far as 605 00:37:09,560 --> 00:37:12,680 Speaker 1: the changing of the passwords is yes, as it should 606 00:37:12,719 --> 00:37:16,239 Speaker 1: not be default. At the same time, this is a 607 00:37:16,320 --> 00:37:22,279 Speaker 1: difficult UH scenario because you have multiple flight crews all 608 00:37:22,360 --> 00:37:26,400 Speaker 1: using the same equipment. So how do you do I 609 00:37:26,560 --> 00:37:30,880 Speaker 1: D password management in that case? Like assuming that assuming 610 00:37:30,920 --> 00:37:35,000 Speaker 1: that the idea and password is is unique to the vehicle, 611 00:37:35,080 --> 00:37:40,560 Speaker 1: to the aircraft, and not unique to the crew. So 612 00:37:40,600 --> 00:37:42,440 Speaker 1: if if it's unique to the crew, that's one thing, 613 00:37:42,760 --> 00:37:44,200 Speaker 1: you know, Like if it's if it's the pilot and 614 00:37:44,200 --> 00:37:46,840 Speaker 1: copilot who have to put in this I D and password, 615 00:37:46,840 --> 00:37:49,680 Speaker 1: and it's the same for whichever aircraft are in. That's 616 00:37:49,719 --> 00:37:52,160 Speaker 1: one thing. But I suspect that's not the case. I 617 00:37:52,200 --> 00:37:57,280 Speaker 1: suspect it's more unique to the aircraft. That's more. That's tricky. 618 00:37:57,400 --> 00:37:59,799 Speaker 1: How do you where do you record the information for 619 00:37:59,840 --> 00:38:03,960 Speaker 1: the aircraft so that the crew has access to it? Um? 620 00:38:04,000 --> 00:38:06,040 Speaker 1: I mean, I don't know. I don't know, but you 621 00:38:06,080 --> 00:38:09,799 Speaker 1: can do better than default. I'm sure, I'm sure, And 622 00:38:10,000 --> 00:38:12,080 Speaker 1: I don't know the answer to this question. And I 623 00:38:12,520 --> 00:38:15,240 Speaker 1: mean I would hesitate to ask because I don't think 624 00:38:15,440 --> 00:38:17,359 Speaker 1: I don't need to know. As long as I know 625 00:38:17,560 --> 00:38:21,160 Speaker 1: that they are practicing good security measures, as long as 626 00:38:21,200 --> 00:38:25,200 Speaker 1: they're not doing the default IDE and password. Uh, then 627 00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:27,799 Speaker 1: whatever you know, I'm maybe uh. And then of course 628 00:38:27,840 --> 00:38:30,720 Speaker 1: he claimed he after this that he used a virtual 629 00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:34,000 Speaker 1: environment to build a virtual version of the airplane's network 630 00:38:34,040 --> 00:38:38,319 Speaker 1: that he could then study safely and so to to 631 00:38:38,440 --> 00:38:43,600 Speaker 1: reiterate this, he, according to the FBI document, Roberts claimed 632 00:38:43,800 --> 00:38:47,560 Speaker 1: he steered an airplane, he plugged into an airplane from 633 00:38:47,560 --> 00:38:51,040 Speaker 1: a passenger seat, and caused the airplane to briefly divert 634 00:38:51,120 --> 00:38:57,560 Speaker 1: off course, that's amazing and amazingly scary if true. Yeah, 635 00:38:57,560 --> 00:39:00,640 Speaker 1: that that is that is incredibly sobering if in fact 636 00:39:00,719 --> 00:39:03,280 Speaker 1: it is true. Now, there are some things to consider, 637 00:39:03,360 --> 00:39:06,280 Speaker 1: and we'll get fully into some questions about this story 638 00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:09,120 Speaker 1: later on. One of the things is that I think 639 00:39:09,160 --> 00:39:12,440 Speaker 1: there might be some confusion online in reaction to this story, 640 00:39:12,480 --> 00:39:15,239 Speaker 1: where one of the things is that Roberts was not 641 00:39:15,400 --> 00:39:18,360 Speaker 1: claiming that he did this on the day he was arrested. 642 00:39:18,440 --> 00:39:22,440 Speaker 1: The warrant application is saying that he told them he 643 00:39:22,480 --> 00:39:25,400 Speaker 1: had done this in previous years. Yeah, and they just 644 00:39:25,400 --> 00:39:27,759 Speaker 1: got around to arresting him later. Yeah. Well, I think 645 00:39:27,760 --> 00:39:30,520 Speaker 1: they got around to arresting him because of this tweet 646 00:39:30,560 --> 00:39:34,800 Speaker 1: and then because they suspected that he had been messing 647 00:39:34,800 --> 00:39:37,760 Speaker 1: with the flight he was on that day and in April, 648 00:39:37,800 --> 00:39:39,920 Speaker 1: even though he claims I think he claims that he 649 00:39:39,960 --> 00:39:43,320 Speaker 1: didn't mess with it that day. Yeah, And so there's 650 00:39:43,480 --> 00:39:46,399 Speaker 1: there was I believe there was. Part of the the 651 00:39:46,440 --> 00:39:50,840 Speaker 1: accusation was that the this this electronics box, the seat 652 00:39:50,920 --> 00:39:55,840 Speaker 1: the SEV had been altered, but Robert says, well I didn't, 653 00:39:56,200 --> 00:39:58,759 Speaker 1: that wasn't me. Yeah. Yeah, So the FBI claimed it 654 00:39:58,840 --> 00:40:02,000 Speaker 1: showed signs of TA bring the seat, the one under 655 00:40:02,040 --> 00:40:03,919 Speaker 1: the seat in front of him on the flight he'd 656 00:40:03,920 --> 00:40:06,680 Speaker 1: been on that day looked like it had it had 657 00:40:06,719 --> 00:40:08,920 Speaker 1: been tampered with, but he claimed he didn't do it. 658 00:40:09,640 --> 00:40:11,920 Speaker 1: And so I don't know what to say about that, 659 00:40:12,000 --> 00:40:16,160 Speaker 1: except that another interesting question that comes out of this 660 00:40:16,280 --> 00:40:20,120 Speaker 1: is about the nature of white hat hacking. Right, So, like, 661 00:40:20,280 --> 00:40:23,440 Speaker 1: if you take this story at face value and just say, 662 00:40:23,520 --> 00:40:27,520 Speaker 1: let's assume it's true, and you are a white hat 663 00:40:27,560 --> 00:40:32,280 Speaker 1: hacker who is aware of a very dangerous, very scary 664 00:40:32,440 --> 00:40:35,799 Speaker 1: security vulnerability, whether it's in a vehicle or a piece 665 00:40:35,840 --> 00:40:39,080 Speaker 1: of software on the internet infrastructure, whatever, it may be, 666 00:40:39,280 --> 00:40:41,720 Speaker 1: something that that could really endanger a lot of people, 667 00:40:42,280 --> 00:40:44,520 Speaker 1: and you're aware of how to exploit it, and you 668 00:40:44,560 --> 00:40:47,200 Speaker 1: know that other people could exploit it, and you've been 669 00:40:47,239 --> 00:40:50,799 Speaker 1: trying to warn people about it but getting nowhere. But 670 00:40:50,800 --> 00:40:54,040 Speaker 1: but it's not getting fixed. What do you do? And 671 00:40:54,120 --> 00:40:55,759 Speaker 1: so I know a lot of people would look at 672 00:40:55,800 --> 00:40:58,440 Speaker 1: what he did here, if he in fact did do it, 673 00:40:58,800 --> 00:41:02,080 Speaker 1: and they would say that that's so reckless. How could 674 00:41:02,120 --> 00:41:04,239 Speaker 1: you gamble with the lives of all the people on 675 00:41:04,280 --> 00:41:07,200 Speaker 1: that plane just to sort of like prove something for 676 00:41:07,239 --> 00:41:11,439 Speaker 1: a little research project. On the other hand, I think, 677 00:41:11,920 --> 00:41:14,080 Speaker 1: you know, you could argue that well, you know, he 678 00:41:14,120 --> 00:41:16,520 Speaker 1: didn't tell it to like crash into the ground. He 679 00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:21,040 Speaker 1: you know, maybe executed something that it would have seemed 680 00:41:21,080 --> 00:41:25,320 Speaker 1: to him to be an innocuous test. I don't know. Again, 681 00:41:25,560 --> 00:41:27,800 Speaker 1: we have to say, again, this is all sort of 682 00:41:27,880 --> 00:41:30,239 Speaker 1: hypothetical because we don't know what really happen. We don't 683 00:41:30,239 --> 00:41:32,360 Speaker 1: know the real story. Yeah, so a lot of this 684 00:41:32,440 --> 00:41:35,720 Speaker 1: depends upon what really happened, Right, So I think anything 685 00:41:35,760 --> 00:41:39,719 Speaker 1: that would that results in the diverting at all from 686 00:41:39,719 --> 00:41:44,399 Speaker 1: a flight plan is incredibly reckless, even if even if 687 00:41:44,400 --> 00:41:47,200 Speaker 1: it's too demonstrate, Hey, you really need to pay attention 688 00:41:47,200 --> 00:41:52,400 Speaker 1: to me, these vulnerabilities exist. I think that's it taking 689 00:41:52,680 --> 00:41:56,600 Speaker 1: taking that approach where you are potentially putting the lives 690 00:41:56,640 --> 00:41:59,400 Speaker 1: of everyone on board that flight, not just yourself. I mean, 691 00:41:59,440 --> 00:42:02,200 Speaker 1: if it were just yourself and you were just proving it, 692 00:42:02,960 --> 00:42:06,760 Speaker 1: then that's one thing. But you are taking You're taking 693 00:42:07,600 --> 00:42:15,239 Speaker 1: it's an incredible amount of bravado to say I'm gonna 694 00:42:15,280 --> 00:42:17,520 Speaker 1: put the lives of every single person on this plane 695 00:42:17,719 --> 00:42:21,960 Speaker 1: in danger. I am potentially going to uh to to 696 00:42:22,280 --> 00:42:26,040 Speaker 1: eliminate the lives of everyone here and forever alter the 697 00:42:26,120 --> 00:42:28,879 Speaker 1: lives of all of their loved ones like that, not 698 00:42:28,920 --> 00:42:32,400 Speaker 1: to mention potentially the lives of people on the ground 699 00:42:32,520 --> 00:42:36,560 Speaker 1: as well. I mean, it's just incredible. Yeah, I totally agree. 700 00:42:36,600 --> 00:42:39,399 Speaker 1: But then on the other hand, you could also make 701 00:42:39,400 --> 00:42:42,719 Speaker 1: the argument, like, with this security vulnerability in place and 702 00:42:42,760 --> 00:42:47,480 Speaker 1: them not doing anything to fix it, that are already 703 00:42:47,520 --> 00:42:50,680 Speaker 1: in danger and you're trying to get something done, the 704 00:42:51,160 --> 00:42:53,319 Speaker 1: best I could say is that there has to be 705 00:42:53,440 --> 00:42:58,080 Speaker 1: some means of getting that message across without physically altering 706 00:42:58,440 --> 00:43:00,920 Speaker 1: the pathway of the aircraft, Like you could send a 707 00:43:00,960 --> 00:43:04,759 Speaker 1: message some other way, or you could document what you 708 00:43:04,800 --> 00:43:08,200 Speaker 1: are doing and send that documentation on and say, look, 709 00:43:08,880 --> 00:43:11,400 Speaker 1: this is exactly how it works. If I can do it, 710 00:43:11,480 --> 00:43:14,879 Speaker 1: then potentially other people can do it. And that's why 711 00:43:14,920 --> 00:43:19,239 Speaker 1: you need to address the security vulnerability. I think. I 712 00:43:19,239 --> 00:43:20,920 Speaker 1: think there are other ways that would have gotten just 713 00:43:20,960 --> 00:43:25,560 Speaker 1: as much attention from an official standpoint without potentially harming people. 714 00:43:25,920 --> 00:43:28,600 Speaker 1: Assuming that the story that we hear in the affidavit 715 00:43:28,640 --> 00:43:30,520 Speaker 1: is in fact what happened. Yeah, and so now we 716 00:43:30,600 --> 00:43:34,360 Speaker 1: really do need to get to that point what really happened, 717 00:43:34,480 --> 00:43:38,880 Speaker 1: because there are people who have raised serious concerns about 718 00:43:38,920 --> 00:43:41,000 Speaker 1: the version of this story that's come out, and it's 719 00:43:41,080 --> 00:43:44,520 Speaker 1: it's hard to identify if if it's not true, where 720 00:43:44,560 --> 00:43:47,000 Speaker 1: the fault lies. Was there a problem with the FBI? 721 00:43:47,160 --> 00:43:52,880 Speaker 1: Is retelling of of Robert's supposed story? Did Robert's mislead 722 00:43:52,920 --> 00:43:56,080 Speaker 1: the FBI? Did the FBI not understand what he was 723 00:43:56,120 --> 00:43:59,200 Speaker 1: telling them or did? Or were they misleading in their report? 724 00:43:59,680 --> 00:44:02,680 Speaker 1: But there are places along the line where we could 725 00:44:02,680 --> 00:44:06,840 Speaker 1: have gotten the wrong story from this document. Stay tuned 726 00:44:06,880 --> 00:44:10,280 Speaker 1: for the exciting conclusion of this tex Stuff classic episode 727 00:44:10,560 --> 00:44:23,920 Speaker 1: right after we take this break. So, no matter where 728 00:44:24,600 --> 00:44:27,040 Speaker 1: the fault may lie, there have been a lot of 729 00:44:27,080 --> 00:44:31,279 Speaker 1: people who have pointed out problems with the story. So 730 00:44:31,400 --> 00:44:34,719 Speaker 1: whether it was the original Roberts story or was the retelling, 731 00:44:35,120 --> 00:44:37,440 Speaker 1: that's kind of beside the point. Here are some of 732 00:44:37,480 --> 00:44:39,400 Speaker 1: the objections. One of the big ones is one that 733 00:44:39,480 --> 00:44:43,440 Speaker 1: we've raised already, the idea that if it requires plugging 734 00:44:43,719 --> 00:44:47,759 Speaker 1: a modified cable into an electronic box that typically is 735 00:44:47,880 --> 00:44:55,880 Speaker 1: not accessible by a passenger, why didn't anyone else notice 736 00:44:56,280 --> 00:45:00,120 Speaker 1: or comment on it? Or you know, because again, and 737 00:45:00,560 --> 00:45:03,320 Speaker 1: it requires some manipulation of the box to get access 738 00:45:03,360 --> 00:45:06,319 Speaker 1: to it, even According to the affidavit story of what 739 00:45:06,440 --> 00:45:09,799 Speaker 1: Roberts was saying, um, and a lot of these do 740 00:45:09,920 --> 00:45:11,960 Speaker 1: have screws that are set in, so you would have 741 00:45:12,000 --> 00:45:17,000 Speaker 1: to unscrew a a a panel in order to get 742 00:45:17,040 --> 00:45:20,479 Speaker 1: access to the ports that are inside of it. Why 743 00:45:20,520 --> 00:45:24,680 Speaker 1: would no other pastor or flight attendant have noticed this 744 00:45:24,719 --> 00:45:28,399 Speaker 1: because it's it's you know, it's fairly disruptive. On one hand, 745 00:45:28,440 --> 00:45:30,480 Speaker 1: I agree with that, but then there's a little part 746 00:45:30,520 --> 00:45:32,920 Speaker 1: of my brain that says, yeah, but what's the easiest 747 00:45:32,960 --> 00:45:35,799 Speaker 1: way to rob a bank? Show up and look like 748 00:45:35,840 --> 00:45:38,000 Speaker 1: you know what you're doing. Just walk into the vault 749 00:45:38,040 --> 00:45:40,960 Speaker 1: like you're somebody who's supposed to be going in. Yeah. 750 00:45:41,600 --> 00:45:44,200 Speaker 1: I mean, there's a certain thing to be said for 751 00:45:44,320 --> 00:45:47,400 Speaker 1: if you just don't act like you're doing anything shady, 752 00:45:47,480 --> 00:45:49,759 Speaker 1: but you've got this sort of like aura of yeah, 753 00:45:49,800 --> 00:45:52,359 Speaker 1: this is what I normally do. People just don't really 754 00:45:52,440 --> 00:45:54,640 Speaker 1: question it. They're like, Okay, I assume me knows what 755 00:45:54,680 --> 00:45:57,880 Speaker 1: he's doing. Well, and I suppose if if someone saying 756 00:45:57,920 --> 00:46:00,799 Speaker 1: next to that person just assumes that what they're doing 757 00:46:00,880 --> 00:46:03,400 Speaker 1: is plugging in a device to charge. Because some a 758 00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:06,239 Speaker 1: lot of aircraft now have you know, outlets for that 759 00:46:06,320 --> 00:46:09,279 Speaker 1: sort of thing. Maybe that's the assumption. I still think 760 00:46:09,280 --> 00:46:14,279 Speaker 1: that flight attendants would find it interesting, but maybe. But 761 00:46:14,360 --> 00:46:16,359 Speaker 1: let's let's all right, let's go ahead and say that 762 00:46:16,360 --> 00:46:18,759 Speaker 1: that's one of the objections. But the other one is 763 00:46:18,800 --> 00:46:22,440 Speaker 1: that you have to you know this. This also assumes 764 00:46:22,480 --> 00:46:26,640 Speaker 1: that the i FE is in fact an interconnected network 765 00:46:27,440 --> 00:46:31,920 Speaker 1: with the same computers that control the flight controls, and 766 00:46:32,280 --> 00:46:37,919 Speaker 1: not two separate networks that have limited or no connectivity. Right. 767 00:46:37,960 --> 00:46:41,600 Speaker 1: So this is the objection that I really hope is correct. 768 00:46:42,080 --> 00:46:45,759 Speaker 1: And the objection is the airplanes do not actually have 769 00:46:45,880 --> 00:46:49,320 Speaker 1: this vulnerability, right, Like, he couldn't have done what he 770 00:46:49,400 --> 00:46:53,359 Speaker 1: said because it's not possible. Yeah, Now, there are some 771 00:46:53,400 --> 00:46:56,840 Speaker 1: connections that have to be there for most of these 772 00:46:56,840 --> 00:47:00,520 Speaker 1: i FE systems, because if you've ever been on one 773 00:47:00,560 --> 00:47:04,239 Speaker 1: where you have the track my flight, then obviously the 774 00:47:04,360 --> 00:47:07,920 Speaker 1: track my flight uh app or whatever you want to 775 00:47:07,960 --> 00:47:11,520 Speaker 1: call it in the entertainment system, that feature is gaining 776 00:47:11,640 --> 00:47:16,279 Speaker 1: some information from various systems aboard the aircraft, uh you know, 777 00:47:16,320 --> 00:47:19,800 Speaker 1: things like altitude and air speed and the temperature outside 778 00:47:19,840 --> 00:47:22,759 Speaker 1: all this kind of stuff. Um, how how far are 779 00:47:22,800 --> 00:47:25,080 Speaker 1: you from your point of origin? How far are you 780 00:47:25,160 --> 00:47:28,919 Speaker 1: from your destination? But all that being said, that could 781 00:47:28,960 --> 00:47:31,680 Speaker 1: totally be connected to computer systems that have no other 782 00:47:32,320 --> 00:47:35,399 Speaker 1: connection to anything else. Right, Like, there are a lot 783 00:47:35,400 --> 00:47:38,359 Speaker 1: of redundant systems aboard aircraft for very good reason. You 784 00:47:38,360 --> 00:47:42,719 Speaker 1: want there to be redundantcy for safety. So and it 785 00:47:42,719 --> 00:47:45,440 Speaker 1: could also be that the information that's coming across is 786 00:47:45,480 --> 00:47:48,600 Speaker 1: again traveling in a very specific one way path that 787 00:47:48,640 --> 00:47:53,239 Speaker 1: there's no way to go upstream of that information. Um, 788 00:47:53,360 --> 00:47:55,960 Speaker 1: and that would make the most sense. In fact, Boeing 789 00:47:56,000 --> 00:47:59,279 Speaker 1: says the connections are limited and offer no access to 790 00:47:59,280 --> 00:48:03,439 Speaker 1: flight controls through the i f E. UH, and that 791 00:48:03,480 --> 00:48:06,279 Speaker 1: means that you wouldn't be able to get access to 792 00:48:06,320 --> 00:48:09,359 Speaker 1: this thrust management control using the i f It would 793 00:48:09,360 --> 00:48:12,320 Speaker 1: be impossible. So you know, you might be able to 794 00:48:12,400 --> 00:48:14,400 Speaker 1: hack the i FE and get access to it and 795 00:48:14,440 --> 00:48:18,880 Speaker 1: maybe require everyone to watch biodome, but you wouldn't necessarily 796 00:48:18,880 --> 00:48:23,600 Speaker 1: be able to terrible. It would be awful, yeah, but 797 00:48:23,680 --> 00:48:28,080 Speaker 1: not as awful as having someone altered the flight path plan. Um. Now, 798 00:48:29,400 --> 00:48:31,560 Speaker 1: there have been some folks who said it's it might 799 00:48:31,560 --> 00:48:34,160 Speaker 1: be possible that the i f E has a direct 800 00:48:34,160 --> 00:48:39,439 Speaker 1: connection to climate control, which matters, Yeah, because if it's 801 00:48:39,440 --> 00:48:41,319 Speaker 1: on the same system as climate control, and you shut 802 00:48:41,320 --> 00:48:43,880 Speaker 1: down climate control, then you're going to force that aircraft 803 00:48:43,880 --> 00:48:47,840 Speaker 1: to land. Uh. I don't know how much access to 804 00:48:47,880 --> 00:48:50,839 Speaker 1: climate control the typical i F has. It may only 805 00:48:50,880 --> 00:48:55,080 Speaker 1: have access to vent control, even your vent is on 806 00:48:55,200 --> 00:48:57,120 Speaker 1: or off and that's it. It may not have any 807 00:48:57,160 --> 00:49:00,719 Speaker 1: access to the actual climate control part. I don't know. 808 00:49:00,840 --> 00:49:02,920 Speaker 1: But if it does have access to climate control, that 809 00:49:02,960 --> 00:49:05,040 Speaker 1: could potentially be a point of vulnerability that could be 810 00:49:05,040 --> 00:49:10,000 Speaker 1: exploited to force an aircraft to land prematurely, um most 811 00:49:10,040 --> 00:49:13,320 Speaker 1: likely flying to the closest airport that has availability and landing. 812 00:49:14,040 --> 00:49:16,640 Speaker 1: So it's not like it's not like, you know, a 813 00:49:17,920 --> 00:49:21,640 Speaker 1: drastic emergency, but it would require premature landing, which obviously 814 00:49:21,680 --> 00:49:25,000 Speaker 1: would be problematic at best. Yeah. I also remember seeing 815 00:49:25,040 --> 00:49:27,799 Speaker 1: one criticism of the story that that essentially said that 816 00:49:28,080 --> 00:49:31,600 Speaker 1: pilots would have to review any kind of like review 817 00:49:31,600 --> 00:49:34,920 Speaker 1: and approved any incoming change to the flight path or 818 00:49:34,960 --> 00:49:39,800 Speaker 1: flight control. Yeah, that's the aircraft systems are designed for safety. 819 00:49:40,160 --> 00:49:43,960 Speaker 1: And again that redundancy is meant for not just the systems, 820 00:49:44,000 --> 00:49:47,880 Speaker 1: but for commands given to the system so that you know, 821 00:49:48,440 --> 00:49:51,160 Speaker 1: think of any computer program where you've had, you know, 822 00:49:51,320 --> 00:49:53,880 Speaker 1: something where you you choose a command and it pops 823 00:49:53,960 --> 00:49:56,960 Speaker 1: up and says are you sure, and you hit okay. 824 00:49:57,160 --> 00:49:59,640 Speaker 1: Multiply that by a hundred, and that's what we're talking 825 00:49:59,680 --> 00:50:02,640 Speaker 1: about aircraft systems for good reason that that you know, 826 00:50:02,760 --> 00:50:05,960 Speaker 1: you are meant to review and approve these things, so 827 00:50:06,040 --> 00:50:09,480 Speaker 1: that anything that would affect a key element of the 828 00:50:09,520 --> 00:50:13,880 Speaker 1: aircraft's operation would require approval, review, and approval, and not 829 00:50:14,080 --> 00:50:20,360 Speaker 1: just a command issued by a computer. So that's another objection. Uh. 830 00:50:20,400 --> 00:50:24,759 Speaker 1: There's also a Mashable has an article on this. They 831 00:50:24,760 --> 00:50:27,680 Speaker 1: interviewed a pilot. The pilot requested to remain anonymous in 832 00:50:27,719 --> 00:50:30,040 Speaker 1: the interview, so we don't I trust that it's really 833 00:50:30,120 --> 00:50:34,040 Speaker 1: a pilot. I do too. So the pilot said that 834 00:50:34,200 --> 00:50:37,520 Speaker 1: Robert's claims, according to what the FBI said, at any rate, 835 00:50:38,360 --> 00:50:41,560 Speaker 1: we're false because the systems he had claimed to access 836 00:50:41,680 --> 00:50:45,560 Speaker 1: didn't exist aboard the type of aircraft he was on. Now, granted, 837 00:50:45,600 --> 00:50:49,400 Speaker 1: this might have just been been uh limited to the 838 00:50:49,400 --> 00:50:53,560 Speaker 1: seven story, and it could be that it was a 839 00:50:53,560 --> 00:50:56,480 Speaker 1: different aircraft that he claimed he had gained access to, 840 00:50:56,560 --> 00:50:59,680 Speaker 1: but he said, the pilot says, if Roberts is saying 841 00:50:59,680 --> 00:51:04,040 Speaker 1: he was hundred when he did this, it's impossible because 842 00:51:04,160 --> 00:51:06,840 Speaker 1: the system he claims to have taken advantage of, can't 843 00:51:06,840 --> 00:51:09,680 Speaker 1: do that. He also points out the eye cast system 844 00:51:09,680 --> 00:51:13,320 Speaker 1: you were talking about earlier, that that just displays messages. 845 00:51:13,440 --> 00:51:16,040 Speaker 1: It doesn't have any control over the aircraft at all. 846 00:51:16,080 --> 00:51:20,080 Speaker 1: All it does is tell you stuff. It's a redoubt essentially. 847 00:51:20,920 --> 00:51:23,960 Speaker 1: Ah and be like trying to compromise a computer by 848 00:51:24,040 --> 00:51:27,480 Speaker 1: issuing print commands. Yeah, yeah, you might be able to 849 00:51:27,520 --> 00:51:31,359 Speaker 1: print some naughty words out, but it's not It's not 850 00:51:31,480 --> 00:51:34,439 Speaker 1: affecting any other part of the computer. Uh. And then 851 00:51:34,440 --> 00:51:36,319 Speaker 1: he also pointed out that the I f E and 852 00:51:36,360 --> 00:51:39,880 Speaker 1: cockpit systems had no point of commonality except for the 853 00:51:39,920 --> 00:51:42,320 Speaker 1: fact that they both drew power from the same power source. 854 00:51:43,239 --> 00:51:45,400 Speaker 1: But that's it. They didn't have any crossover. There was 855 00:51:45,440 --> 00:51:50,279 Speaker 1: no connectivity between the two. So it is entirely possible 856 00:51:50,840 --> 00:51:57,080 Speaker 1: that the this is a big fuss over over largely nothing. Um, 857 00:51:57,120 --> 00:52:00,320 Speaker 1: but I mean I certainly hope so yeah, but also 858 00:52:00,400 --> 00:52:04,000 Speaker 1: hope no matter what the true facts of this case, 859 00:52:04,000 --> 00:52:08,000 Speaker 1: where I hope this is at least encouraging airline manufacturers 860 00:52:08,000 --> 00:52:10,840 Speaker 1: and the people who design their their hardware and software 861 00:52:10,880 --> 00:52:14,719 Speaker 1: to re examine the security of their aircraft. Right. Yeah, 862 00:52:14,719 --> 00:52:17,759 Speaker 1: and really put it through vigorous testing. And I don't 863 00:52:17,800 --> 00:52:20,160 Speaker 1: mean to suggest that they don't already do that. I 864 00:52:20,360 --> 00:52:25,680 Speaker 1: imagine that these companies, I mean, obviously they have a 865 00:52:25,760 --> 00:52:30,480 Speaker 1: vested interest in making sure those those systems are tested 866 00:52:30,560 --> 00:52:35,160 Speaker 1: vigorously with lots of different attempts at intrusion. The various 867 00:52:35,160 --> 00:52:37,800 Speaker 1: scenarios have to be run about how likely or possible 868 00:52:37,880 --> 00:52:41,680 Speaker 1: is this? Because I mean, it's it's it's life and death, 869 00:52:42,000 --> 00:52:45,720 Speaker 1: and a company has to be able to rely upon 870 00:52:46,840 --> 00:52:51,400 Speaker 1: having the reputation of being responsible for something as important 871 00:52:51,960 --> 00:52:56,120 Speaker 1: and potentially as dangerous as air travel. Um So I 872 00:52:56,280 --> 00:53:02,440 Speaker 1: I'm fairly confident that that the security vulnerabilities are very 873 00:53:02,480 --> 00:53:06,760 Speaker 1: seriously looked at in these cases. Whether the Roberts case 874 00:53:07,040 --> 00:53:10,759 Speaker 1: is as extreme as has been indicated in that affidavit, 875 00:53:10,920 --> 00:53:13,799 Speaker 1: I don't know. I mean, if that is a possibility, 876 00:53:13,840 --> 00:53:16,879 Speaker 1: then that's certainly warrants a re examination of how these 877 00:53:16,920 --> 00:53:20,440 Speaker 1: network systems are laid out within an aircraft. Now let 878 00:53:20,440 --> 00:53:22,280 Speaker 1: me do let me tell you something. This is background 879 00:53:22,280 --> 00:53:24,800 Speaker 1: on Jonathan Way. Before I worked for How Stuff Works, 880 00:53:24,960 --> 00:53:27,600 Speaker 1: years before I had worked for uh, you know, I 881 00:53:27,640 --> 00:53:29,560 Speaker 1: worked for a couple of consulting firms. Is before that, 882 00:53:29,600 --> 00:53:31,040 Speaker 1: this is way back when I was looking for my 883 00:53:31,080 --> 00:53:33,560 Speaker 1: first job. I landed some contract work with an airline 884 00:53:34,160 --> 00:53:39,680 Speaker 1: and my job was to transcribe audio files that were 885 00:53:39,719 --> 00:53:43,400 Speaker 1: detailing the various systems aboard aircraft into text files so 886 00:53:43,440 --> 00:53:47,319 Speaker 1: that there'll be a text copy of these audios. As 887 00:53:47,320 --> 00:53:49,480 Speaker 1: far as I know, they didn't have the manuals or 888 00:53:49,520 --> 00:53:54,040 Speaker 1: the hard copy anywhere. So it's my job to transcribe 889 00:53:54,760 --> 00:53:59,920 Speaker 1: hours of technical documentation about these aircraft, which included things 890 00:54:00,040 --> 00:54:02,040 Speaker 1: like how the cables were laid out in the systems, 891 00:54:02,080 --> 00:54:04,920 Speaker 1: and it was fascinating to learn at the time. It 892 00:54:05,040 --> 00:54:09,000 Speaker 1: was nothing you know, that was exploitable or anything like that. 893 00:54:09,080 --> 00:54:12,319 Speaker 1: It was just interesting. But it really displayed to me 894 00:54:12,400 --> 00:54:16,200 Speaker 1: the care that goes into designing these systems to make 895 00:54:16,280 --> 00:54:19,520 Speaker 1: certain that this redundancy is there, and it actually it 896 00:54:19,640 --> 00:54:23,000 Speaker 1: really reassured me quite a bit while I was doing this, 897 00:54:23,080 --> 00:54:27,759 Speaker 1: like it removes some of the the mystery behind aircraft, 898 00:54:28,160 --> 00:54:35,000 Speaker 1: and also displayed exactly how incredibly um detail oriented these 899 00:54:35,040 --> 00:54:37,560 Speaker 1: designers had to be, which you know, makes sense if 900 00:54:37,560 --> 00:54:40,359 Speaker 1: you think about it for more than a second you realize, oh, 901 00:54:40,400 --> 00:54:42,600 Speaker 1: of course they have to be. But it really drove 902 00:54:42,640 --> 00:54:44,719 Speaker 1: that home. So I was very thankful to actually have 903 00:54:44,760 --> 00:54:47,160 Speaker 1: that experience. It's one that not a lot of people 904 00:54:47,280 --> 00:54:49,840 Speaker 1: have necessarily had. Now. I will also say that it 905 00:54:49,920 --> 00:54:52,920 Speaker 1: was for a lot of old aircraft that aren't around anymore, 906 00:54:52,920 --> 00:54:55,799 Speaker 1: because this was many years ago, and those aircraft have 907 00:54:55,880 --> 00:54:59,919 Speaker 1: since been retired from various fleets. But I think there's 908 00:55:00,120 --> 00:55:03,279 Speaker 1: old aircraft still in circulation. Yeah, but you don't see 909 00:55:03,280 --> 00:55:07,879 Speaker 1: a whole lot of these gigantic old war horses. They've 910 00:55:07,880 --> 00:55:13,400 Speaker 1: been they've been replaced by newer more. Um. Yeah, you know, 911 00:55:14,160 --> 00:55:17,279 Speaker 1: you know, back back when uh an aircraft consisted of 912 00:55:17,320 --> 00:55:20,600 Speaker 1: a giant rubber band and a lot of hope. No, 913 00:55:20,719 --> 00:55:23,000 Speaker 1: it wasn't like that. But one other thing I wanted 914 00:55:23,000 --> 00:55:24,600 Speaker 1: to point out, kind of going back to the car 915 00:55:25,040 --> 00:55:29,640 Speaker 1: discussion just briefly, is that whether or not these concerns 916 00:55:29,880 --> 00:55:33,080 Speaker 1: are critical, like whether or not these are things that 917 00:55:33,120 --> 00:55:36,640 Speaker 1: we really need to worry about. Most most security experts 918 00:55:36,640 --> 00:55:39,880 Speaker 1: say right now, the trouble you'd have to go through 919 00:55:39,960 --> 00:55:42,960 Speaker 1: in order to exploit any of these so called vulnerabilities 920 00:55:42,960 --> 00:55:47,080 Speaker 1: would be so great as to render the meaningless. That 921 00:55:47,440 --> 00:55:51,320 Speaker 1: doesn't really matter, because there's been so much public interest 922 00:55:51,600 --> 00:55:55,200 Speaker 1: shown on the story for obvious reasons. That is it 923 00:55:55,280 --> 00:55:59,200 Speaker 1: has prompted politicians to get involved, and Congressman Ed Markey 924 00:56:00,080 --> 00:56:03,319 Speaker 1: sent out a letter to twenty automakers after the two 925 00:56:03,320 --> 00:56:06,759 Speaker 1: thousand thirteen black Hat conference that that are earlier one 926 00:56:06,840 --> 00:56:11,960 Speaker 1: where uh they were demonstrating the ability to hack vehicles 927 00:56:12,000 --> 00:56:17,720 Speaker 1: by directly hooking up computers to the diagnostic system UM 928 00:56:17,840 --> 00:56:21,520 Speaker 1: and he sent these letter to twenty automakers to ask 929 00:56:21,560 --> 00:56:24,960 Speaker 1: about their security measures for wireless attacks. Now, all of 930 00:56:25,000 --> 00:56:28,520 Speaker 1: the automakers that responded, and I think sixteen of twenty 931 00:56:28,600 --> 00:56:32,400 Speaker 1: cent responses something like that, but all of the response 932 00:56:32,440 --> 00:56:35,320 Speaker 1: the ones that responded said their vehicles had wireless points 933 00:56:35,320 --> 00:56:38,240 Speaker 1: of access, so at least one wireless point of access 934 00:56:38,320 --> 00:56:42,399 Speaker 1: that could potentially be used to connect to the car, 935 00:56:42,520 --> 00:56:46,680 Speaker 1: not necessarily exploit a vulnerability, but to connect. Seven of 936 00:56:46,719 --> 00:56:49,279 Speaker 1: the respondents said that they used a third party to 937 00:56:49,360 --> 00:56:53,320 Speaker 1: test their systems for security vulnerabilities, So essentially white hat hackers. 938 00:56:53,320 --> 00:56:57,240 Speaker 1: They went outside their own company to hire contractors and say, 939 00:56:57,800 --> 00:57:00,640 Speaker 1: see if you can gain wireless access were mode access 940 00:57:00,640 --> 00:57:03,600 Speaker 1: to these security systems, and if you can or these 941 00:57:03,719 --> 00:57:06,520 Speaker 1: these what are supposed to be secured systems, and if 942 00:57:06,520 --> 00:57:07,960 Speaker 1: you can, let us know how you did it. So 943 00:57:08,000 --> 00:57:11,000 Speaker 1: we can address that before we release the vehicle as 944 00:57:11,040 --> 00:57:16,400 Speaker 1: a production model. Very responsible, But only two said that 945 00:57:16,440 --> 00:57:19,880 Speaker 1: their vehicles had countermeasures for hacking attacks on stuff like 946 00:57:19,960 --> 00:57:23,320 Speaker 1: breaking and steering systems. So the story that gets out 947 00:57:23,360 --> 00:57:26,600 Speaker 1: from this is that you know, only a couple of 948 00:57:26,760 --> 00:57:31,520 Speaker 1: car manufacturers when they weren't named, actually have the security 949 00:57:31,520 --> 00:57:36,120 Speaker 1: measures in place, and only seven are using third parties 950 00:57:36,160 --> 00:57:39,240 Speaker 1: to test their systems. The flip side of that argument 951 00:57:39,280 --> 00:57:45,479 Speaker 1: could be there's no demonstrable security issue yet that that 952 00:57:45,560 --> 00:57:49,880 Speaker 1: would be enough to create a concern. However, it is 953 00:57:50,000 --> 00:57:52,760 Speaker 1: good to be aware of it and to perhaps start 954 00:57:52,800 --> 00:57:57,440 Speaker 1: building in these kind of safety features moving forward, knowing 955 00:57:57,520 --> 00:58:00,960 Speaker 1: that it's not like the world's going to get less connected, right, 956 00:58:01,040 --> 00:58:03,280 Speaker 1: We're gonna continue to see that trend go, so we 957 00:58:03,320 --> 00:58:05,520 Speaker 1: need to be certain that we're doing so in a 958 00:58:05,560 --> 00:58:11,240 Speaker 1: responsible way, in a safe way. Totally excellent. I'm glad 959 00:58:11,240 --> 00:58:14,520 Speaker 1: you agree. So, yeah, this was This was a fun 960 00:58:14,680 --> 00:58:17,560 Speaker 1: kind of thing to look at, and I mean, ultimately, 961 00:58:17,800 --> 00:58:22,160 Speaker 1: I would always argue, apply critical thinking to the situation. 962 00:58:22,360 --> 00:58:27,320 Speaker 1: Don't react with your initial emotional reaction. I mean, anyone 963 00:58:27,360 --> 00:58:29,840 Speaker 1: who sees anything like this, I'm sure the first emotional 964 00:58:29,880 --> 00:58:33,600 Speaker 1: reaction is a fear, a feeling of unease, if not 965 00:58:33,760 --> 00:58:37,000 Speaker 1: fear right, because I mean, when you are behind the 966 00:58:37,000 --> 00:58:39,840 Speaker 1: wheel of your car, you know you want to be 967 00:58:39,880 --> 00:58:42,919 Speaker 1: in control. You don't get the thought of someone else 968 00:58:43,120 --> 00:58:45,720 Speaker 1: potentially gaining control of the situation that you felt you 969 00:58:45,760 --> 00:58:49,480 Speaker 1: were in control of is that's scary. So, I mean, 970 00:58:49,520 --> 00:58:53,200 Speaker 1: it's understandable, but apply critical thinking. Know that it is 971 00:58:53,240 --> 00:58:55,880 Speaker 1: not likely to happen. There are other things that are 972 00:58:55,920 --> 00:58:58,440 Speaker 1: far more likely to happen, and as long as you 973 00:58:58,480 --> 00:59:02,160 Speaker 1: take those precautions against those, you're probably okay about these 974 00:59:02,160 --> 00:59:07,520 Speaker 1: other more remote possibilities. Um And again, if you are 975 00:59:07,520 --> 00:59:10,480 Speaker 1: in a position to make decisions about these kind of systems, 976 00:59:10,480 --> 00:59:14,240 Speaker 1: whether it's you know, from a car manufacturer or maybe 977 00:59:14,280 --> 00:59:19,880 Speaker 1: you do aftermarket stuff, then keeping that in mind and 978 00:59:20,240 --> 00:59:23,560 Speaker 1: keeping that as as part of your best practices of 979 00:59:23,560 --> 00:59:27,160 Speaker 1: of testing the security of your systems, it's definitely something 980 00:59:27,200 --> 00:59:31,360 Speaker 1: you should look into. I hope you enjoyed that episode 981 00:59:31,560 --> 00:59:36,760 Speaker 1: called Hack that Auto two point oh. Clearly, as cars 982 00:59:36,840 --> 00:59:41,200 Speaker 1: get more and more computerized h there are even more 983 00:59:41,240 --> 00:59:44,880 Speaker 1: literal hacking things we could talk about with vehicles. In fact, 984 00:59:44,920 --> 00:59:46,920 Speaker 1: I have covered some of those in the past, So 985 00:59:46,960 --> 00:59:48,920 Speaker 1: maybe I'll do a follow up to this episode in 986 00:59:48,960 --> 00:59:51,600 Speaker 1: the future. If you have suggestions for topics I should 987 00:59:51,600 --> 00:59:54,200 Speaker 1: cover in episodes of tech Stuff, please reach out to me. 988 00:59:54,280 --> 00:59:56,720 Speaker 1: The best way to do that is on Twitter. The 989 00:59:56,760 --> 01:00:00,200 Speaker 1: handle for the show is tech Stuff hs W and 990 01:00:00,240 --> 01:00:09,000 Speaker 1: I'll talk to you again really soon. Y. Tech Stuff 991 01:00:09,040 --> 01:00:12,360 Speaker 1: is an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from 992 01:00:12,400 --> 01:00:16,160 Speaker 1: I Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, 993 01:00:16,280 --> 01:00:18,280 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.