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Speaker 1: Fellow conspiracy realist, we return to you, mere humble Farmers

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Speaker 1: with another classic episode. This one is a doozy. We're

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Speaker 1: entering the world of tradecraft, morally gray political thrillers situations.

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Speaker 2: M I five.

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Speaker 1: The question are they a criminal organization? I'm shrinking, y'all.

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Speaker 3: I have been knee deep in this Apple TV series

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Speaker 3: called Slow Horses with Gary Oldman and some other fantastic

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Speaker 3: cast members, and it is about m I five and

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Speaker 3: it really speaks to this exact thing, like some of

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Speaker 3: the political maneuvers that these folks in charge of five

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Speaker 3: perpetrate in this series, which I believe is based on

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Speaker 3: a book series that was written by somebody with inside information.

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Speaker 4: About the inner workings of five.

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Speaker 5: Absolutely staggering, reckless, psychotic, megalomaniacal behavior, no no account for

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Speaker 5: human life outside of just one's own political motivations and

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Speaker 5: or covering one's own RS as they say.

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Speaker 2: For Crown and country guys. Uh what am I five?

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Speaker 2: This is the one that's similar to the NSA, right,

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Speaker 2: not the FBI, but like National Security Agency in the Uecurity.

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Speaker 4: Services I believe is what they're called over there.

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Speaker 2: Yes, okay, but like Internal hundred resent Okay.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, not to be confused with six, which is

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Speaker 1: a different thing. M I five investigates national security internally

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Speaker 1: though I counterinsurgency.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, like CIA would be our equivalent to I six

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Speaker 2: takes field trips. Got it well with that?

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Speaker 1: With that, folks, and I love the shout out to

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Speaker 1: slow horses there too.

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Speaker 4: With that, we are going to dive in.

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Speaker 6: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 6: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 6: learn this stuff they don't want you to know.

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Speaker 2: Welcome back to the show. My name is Matt, Mine

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Speaker 2: name is Nolan.

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Speaker 4: They called me Ben.

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Speaker 1: We were joined with our super producer Paul Michigan control

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Speaker 1: dec At most importantly, you are you. You are here,

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Speaker 1: and that makes this stuff they don't want you to know. No,

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Speaker 1: we several of us have been to the UK, right, correct?

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Speaker 4: Right? Have we all been?

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Speaker 7: I have when I was very very little, but I

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Speaker 7: don't really recall it intimillion.

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Speaker 1: Okay and Paul thumbs up, thumbs down.

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Speaker 4: Have you been to London? He is not. Okay, Paul.

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Speaker 1: We will go on an adventure soon, assuming we can

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Speaker 1: get into the country.

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Speaker 4: After today's episode, which is kind of a.

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Speaker 1: Question that we have to confront often.

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Speaker 2: Had a I think we'll be fine as what we

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Speaker 2: will find out a little bit later. Yes, about the

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Speaker 2: differences in MS.

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Speaker 4: Hopefully, yes, hopefully we will be fine.

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Speaker 1: You know, if the Epstein episode didn't didn't finish us,

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Speaker 1: hopefully this one will be fine. So we have a

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Speaker 1: lot of listeners in the United Kingdom. A lot of

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Speaker 1: your fellow listeners as you are checking out the show

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Speaker 1: today are located often in the Anglo sphere where people

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Speaker 1: speak English, right, but there are listeners around the world.

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Speaker 1: We just got an email from a guy in Uganda actually,

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Speaker 1: which is very interesting. He was left our risk was

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Speaker 1: not a fan of the above majestic interview. By the way,

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Speaker 1: you can check out our Facebook page. Here's where it

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Speaker 1: gets crazy to see our response to this sort of stuff.

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Speaker 1: But this this is a episode that will center on

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Speaker 1: the United Kingdom. If you are thinking to yourself, Matt

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Speaker 1: nol Ben Michigan control, why should I care about this?

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Speaker 1: Why does it Matt to me? I don't want to

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Speaker 1: go to foggy London town. This is irrelevant.

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Speaker 2: Well, let's just say before you get into your point,

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Speaker 2: remember all the connections we've made between intelligence agencies across

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Speaker 2: the world, especially those that speak English.

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Speaker 4: Right, right, So this matters to you.

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Speaker 1: If you can understand the language in which we are

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Speaker 1: conducting this podcast, then this matters very much more so

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Speaker 1: than you might assume. Like most countries, the United Kingdom

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Speaker 1: has its own variety of intelligence services, and most people

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Speaker 1: outside of the UK, we're familiar with their intelligence operations

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Speaker 1: through one very important portrayal in fiction, James Bond. Yes, right, yes,

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Speaker 1: perfect Agent double seven himself. I mean, I can't even

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Speaker 1: I should have looked this up before we hopped in

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Speaker 1: the booth here, but I don't even remember how many

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Speaker 1: James Bond films exist.

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Speaker 7: I'm gonna have a shot in the dark and say twelve.

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Speaker 2: That sounds like the title for James Bond film Shot

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Speaker 2: in the Dark. But that's not right.

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Speaker 4: It's more than fifteen.

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Speaker 2: Paul says, thirty five, Paul says nineteen, Paul says twenty five.

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Speaker 2: He's a twenty five.

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Speaker 1: That's amazing, and it also shows like, of course, we

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Speaker 1: would be most familiar with intelligence agencies through this James

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Speaker 1: Bond thing. There's also an interesting study you can find

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Speaker 1: if you just google it about James Bond's drinking habit.

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Speaker 1: Somebody went through all the books and they counted every

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Speaker 1: time he had a drink, and we're like, well, this

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Speaker 1: guy is clearly wasted the entire time, and he probably

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Speaker 1: has a serotic liver.

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Speaker 7: Have you ever had a vesper martini? That's James Bond's

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Speaker 7: martini of choice.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, there's a there's there are a couple of great

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Speaker 1: vesper places here in town now.

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Speaker 4: Really really good.

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Speaker 7: It's like got a lemon twist and it uses lil

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Speaker 7: a instead of remooth, I believe, which is like a

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Speaker 7: kind of dry white wine, A pair of teeth kind

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Speaker 7: of thing, very citrusy.

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Speaker 4: Very refreshed.

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Speaker 2: I have no idea most of the words that you

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Speaker 2: just said, A pair of teeth.

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Speaker 4: It's good, it's good.

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Speaker 1: We we also have a huge advocate for vespers in

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Speaker 1: the form of our pal Josh Clark.

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Speaker 4: He's a he's a vesper guy.

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Speaker 2: Now nice.

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Speaker 1: I don't know why I said it, like that changes

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Speaker 1: his that shakes his moral character to the core.

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Speaker 2: I see a lot of people riding around on the vespers.

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Speaker 4: Uh in.

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Speaker 1: That's cute man, all right, big oof, but uh today

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Speaker 1: we are taking a look behind the curtain past the

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Speaker 1: the sexy James Bond portrayals. Right, today, we're looking at

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Speaker 1: the real life inspiration for countless spy thrillers. Aiming to

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Speaker 1: answer a disturbing question. Let's just get it.

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Speaker 4: Out of the way now.

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Speaker 1: Is m I five a criminal organization?

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Speaker 6: Oh?

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Speaker 2: That's that's heavy.

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Speaker 7: It's a good way to frame this discussion. Get some clicks, right, Yeah,

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Speaker 7: it's a big question. Sure, we're going to drill down

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Speaker 7: into it. As they say in corporate speak.

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Speaker 2: Let's start drilling.

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Speaker 1: Let's get granular. So what is m I five?

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Speaker 2: Well, am I is the most important thing you need

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Speaker 2: to know here, and that's military intelligence.

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Speaker 4: I thought it was Mission impossible.

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Speaker 2: I wish that it was.

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Speaker 4: I thought it was martian intuition.

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Speaker 2: In this case, it is military intelligence. Specifically, that number

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Speaker 2: afterwards is the section number, so Section five. And it's

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Speaker 2: founded in nineteen o nine, and it wasn't called this

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Speaker 2: at all times. It started out as just something that

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Speaker 2: was called the Secret Service Bureau.

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Speaker 1: Because what better way to keep a secret than have

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Speaker 1: the word secret in the title.

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Speaker 2: That's right, I mean, in that Secret Service in nineteen

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Speaker 2: oh nine. You can see it harken back then to

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Speaker 2: the United States in our own secret service, and it

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Speaker 2: we we'll find is that they do very different things.

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Speaker 2: And that's why you kind of have sections for all

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Speaker 2: these different secret services that you have. In this case,

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Speaker 2: five is directed by the Joint Intelligence Committee or JIIC,

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Speaker 2: and this service itself is bound by this thing that

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Speaker 2: was created in nineteen eighty nine called the Security Service

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Speaker 2: Act of nineteen eighty nine.

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Speaker 4: Yes, yes, yeah, that's name right.

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Speaker 1: What we mean when we say bound is that the

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Speaker 1: Security Service Act, essentially, i should say, ostensibly, lays the

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Speaker 1: groundwork for what MI five is supposed to do, how

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Speaker 1: it does it, what it can do basically right right,

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Speaker 1: right right, and what does it do. The service is

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Speaker 1: supposed to, well, it's directed to, we should say, protect

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Speaker 1: British parliamentary democracy and Britain's economic interest and a counter

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Speaker 1: terrorism and espionage within the UK so counterintelligence.

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Speaker 7: M I five was founded by Captain Vernon Kel. It's

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Speaker 7: a very distinguished sounding name. The organization played a central

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Speaker 7: role in the capture of most of Imperial Germany's intelligence

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Speaker 7: agents in the UK at the beginning of World War One.

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Speaker 7: It's a big deal. M I five is not the

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Speaker 7: same thing. It's important to note as am I six,

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Speaker 7: M I five is the British security Service. Well, I

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Speaker 7: six is the British foreign intelligence Service. So Ben, how

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Speaker 7: how should we think about this?

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Speaker 4: Yeah?

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Speaker 1: I think of it as been similar in a way

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Speaker 1: for our American listeners to the relationship between the FBI

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Speaker 1: and the CIA just always kind of flummes me a

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Speaker 1: little bit. If I'm being honest, I think it always

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Speaker 1: flumkes the FBI and CIA themselves because they certainly overstep

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Speaker 1: into one another's encroach. Yeah, well, and often, I mean

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Speaker 1: when the CIA is dealing drugs and the FBI has

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Speaker 1: to deal with it, things get messy. Uh oh whatever,

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Speaker 1: It's true.

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Speaker 2: Ultimately, it's dealing with inward facing and outward facing counterintelligence

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Speaker 2: and intelligence.

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Speaker 1: Right, perfect, Yeah, that's the perfect way to say it. Essentially,

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Speaker 1: I six is tasked to send British spies abroad, and

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Speaker 1: m I five is there to catch spies from other countries.

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Speaker 2: So there you go.

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Speaker 4: That makes sense, right, and.

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Speaker 1: There are multiple military intelligence services. I really like the

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Speaker 1: hit on this, Noel, because we a lot of people

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Speaker 1: have kind of this Heinz fifty seven problem when we

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Speaker 1: talk about I five and m I six. You know,

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Speaker 1: were you ever a kid looking at heines fifty seven

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Speaker 1: and wondering where the hell or the other fifty six.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I want to try some of those, at least ketchups.

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Speaker 4: It doesn't have to do with how many spices are

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Speaker 4: in it or something. I don't know.

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Speaker 7: I assumed it was like Baskin Robbins or they've got

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Speaker 7: the flavors and they always exceeded that flavor.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, we should.

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Speaker 1: We should probably ask Lauren Vogel Bomb or Annie Reese.

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Speaker 1: There's a plug for savor. It's a boot size showing lifestyle.

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Speaker 1: But yeah, So it turns.

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Speaker 2: Out it was an historical advertising slogan about the fifty

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Speaker 2: seven different varieties of sickulls.

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Speaker 4: Oh pickles?

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Speaker 1: Okay, how do you have fifty seven different I guess

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Speaker 1: you can pickle anything, right.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So, in the case of these multiple military intelligence services

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Speaker 1: in the UK, we find that they go all the

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Speaker 1: way up to m I nineteen and many have come

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Speaker 1: and gone since the creation of the first military intelligence

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Speaker 1: service m I one, which was created sometime during World

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Speaker 1: War One, and they mainly focused on cryptography, code breaking,

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Speaker 1: counterintelligence stuff, you know what I mean. So they were

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Speaker 1: figuring out what Imperial Germany was up to and as

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Speaker 1: we mentioned, they were quite successful with some of this stuff,

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Speaker 1: and over time various sections folded or they merged, or

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Speaker 1: they changed their area of focus. In these sections I

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Speaker 1: one through nineteen ran all sorts of different I don't

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Speaker 1: want to say hustles, but different processes. Their activities included

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Speaker 1: stuff like specialized geographical analysis. You know, we have a

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Speaker 1: desk that just looks at Russia, for instance, when that

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Speaker 1: just looks at South America. And then they would have

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Speaker 1: things like map making, aerial photography.

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Speaker 4: They would also have.

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Speaker 1: Things that we would normally find objectionable in Western governments today,

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Speaker 1: such as three different active propaganda and censorship bureaus. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and they were blatant about it. That's what it's said

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Speaker 1: on their label.

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Speaker 2: But you know, a lot of that stuff spawned out

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Speaker 2: of World War Two, when the propaganda had to be

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Speaker 2: strong on all fronts, right, And including with that was

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Speaker 2: I nineteen that you already mentioned, and that was the

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Speaker 2: bureau specifically, or the I guess section specifically designed to

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Speaker 2: interrogate prisoners of war during World War Two, which is

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Speaker 2: kind of scary. It's like the Black Site section.

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Speaker 1: And it's also it's interesting because the organization feels a

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Speaker 1: little bit different in comparison to intelligence agencies in the US,

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Speaker 1: Like the CIA handles a ton of this stuff with

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Speaker 1: its own different subsection, you know what I mean. So

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Speaker 1: what does m I five do. We've we've looked at

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Speaker 1: just the broad I don't know the broad strokes of this,

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Speaker 1: but when we ask what it actually does on the ground,

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Speaker 1: we run this is one of those million dollars or

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Speaker 1: million pound questions. Officially, I five does what it says

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Speaker 1: on the website, right.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it catches spies, that's what it does. It intercepts communications,

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Speaker 2: it finds people, it conducts classified counterintelligence. I mean, come on,

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Speaker 2: that's m I five for you. And what it does

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Speaker 2: is it keeps the bear from the.

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Speaker 4: Door whatever scary animal.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, the coyotes can't get in because of US.

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Speaker 1: Yeah yeah, that's I like that Cold War reference, right,

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Speaker 1: because the UK had to reorganize a lot of their

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Speaker 1: stuff in and evolve their sophistication when the KGB came

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Speaker 1: out guns blazing in the Cold War.

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Speaker 7: Oh yeah, interesting though, because to this day many of

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Speaker 7: these operations and my five operations remain classified.

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Speaker 4: Yeah it's kind of a big deal. Yeah yeah, yeah, yes,

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Speaker 4: I mean a lot.

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Speaker 7: It seems like in our country some of that stuff

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Speaker 7: kind of eventually over time, when it ceases to be

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Speaker 7: important for security, we get to get a little glimpse

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Speaker 7: into some of the past covert operations, right, a little, yeah,

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Speaker 7: some of them.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean, yeah, you're absolutely correct. One thing that's

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Speaker 1: one thing that's tough for the British public is that

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Speaker 1: without information about a lot of these operations, many of

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Speaker 1: which were fairly recent in the nineteen eighties and stuff.

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Speaker 1: Without that information, it's tough to gauge how successful or

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Speaker 1: unsuccessful this organization is. Because if they're doing everything right,

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Speaker 1: you never hear about them, you know, you only hear

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Speaker 1: about them when something goes pair shaped, which I believe

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Speaker 1: is British slang.

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Speaker 2: Or something goes really right and another person leaks information.

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Speaker 1: Right, And that's how we do know some intelligence failures.

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Speaker 1: For instance, in nineteen eighty three, one of MI five's officers,

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Speaker 1: a guy named Michael Bettany, was caught trying to sell

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Speaker 1: information to the KGB. He got caught, he got convicted

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Speaker 1: of vespionage. The big question is what did he did

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Speaker 1: He successfully sell some stuff beforehand?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, did he get away with it? Before he got

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Speaker 2: caught and was he the only guy selling information? I

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Speaker 2: certainly doubt it.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, probably not.

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Speaker 2: And you know, with these organizations, you have to continually

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Speaker 2: justify the reason that you're getting so much money from

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Speaker 2: the public, I guess tax dollars and all of that

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Speaker 2: with any intelligence community or organization. And as a Cold

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Speaker 2: War came to an end, they switched gears again because

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Speaker 2: there were terrorist threats coming from Northern Ireland states such

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Speaker 2: as Libya where Colonel Gaddafi was operating, and that was

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Speaker 2: a threat, at least at the time it perceived threat.

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Speaker 2: These were some of the major threats at least according

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Speaker 2: to the MI five for a little while there. And

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Speaker 2: then you know, like we said, the Cold War is

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Speaker 2: coming to an end. Now we're in the nineties, and

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Speaker 2: there were some major reforms put into place, and the

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Speaker 2: service actually around this time gained its first female director general.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, Dame Stella Remington, who held the position from nineteen

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Speaker 1: ninety two to nineteen ninety six.

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Speaker 7: And then the rise of Islamis terrorism at the end

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Speaker 7: of the nineties, culminating in the nine to eleven attacks

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Speaker 7: in two thousand and one, led to massive changes in the.

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Speaker 4: Way MI five operated.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, absolutely, and look, folks, it's no secret. The counter

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Speaker 1: intelligence is a murky murky business. Operations often edge into

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Speaker 1: moorally and legally gray areas. Over the course of its existence,

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Speaker 1: like many other intelligence agencies, five has conducted numerous secret operations,

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Speaker 1: often without any public oversight, and often even without governmental oversight.

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Speaker 1: The left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing.

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Speaker 2: And many people would say that is the way it

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Speaker 2: should be.

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Speaker 1: Sure, Sure, sometimes even people who don't work for five,

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Speaker 1: mostly people who work for m I five probably say that. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: but yeah, I see the point about compartmentalized information, right,

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Speaker 1: There's a need to have that sort of operational security.

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Speaker 1: But critics don't buy this. Critics allege that I five

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Speaker 1: is much more than a counter intelligence agency. In fact,

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Speaker 1: they argue, while I five functions as a spy service,

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Speaker 1: it also effectively functions as a criminal empire. WHOA yeah,

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Speaker 1: like hydro level, What the hell are we talking about?

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Speaker 1: We'll tell you after a word from our sponsor. Here's

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Speaker 1: where it gets crazy.

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Speaker 2: While the MI five might not be a criminal organization

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Speaker 2: at least to its parent government, yield just call it

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Speaker 2: what do we call it? The Parliamentary United Kingdom In

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Speaker 2: their government and you know, perhaps the Queen and all

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Speaker 2: of her subjects. But it certainly functions as a criminal

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Speaker 2: organization at least at times, you know. And we're not again,

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Speaker 2: we're not just throwing throwing ninja stars. Is that okay

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Speaker 2: to say, we're not just throwing ninja stars at Britain.

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Speaker 2: We've seen this occur, as we said earlier, with many

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Speaker 2: other intelligence services within many other countries. But it does

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Speaker 2: function as a criminal organization sometimes.

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Speaker 4: And we know this.

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Speaker 1: This isn't a theory. No, this isn't some to foil

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Speaker 1: Internet bloggery. Here it turns out that in twenty eighteen,

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Speaker 1: declassified documents showed that the government of the United Kingdom

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Speaker 1: allows MI five's agents and informants to carry out crime

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Speaker 1: within the UK without consequence. They've been allowed to do

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Speaker 1: this for at least thirty years. WHOA, Seriously, it's a

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Speaker 1: it's a license to kill, it's a license to torture, pillage.

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Speaker 4: Did you just say a license to kill? Yes?

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Speaker 1: Oh wait, yeah I did.

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Speaker 4: I mean, come on, man, that's great.

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Speaker 1: I can't believe I did think of that.

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Speaker 4: That's awesome. Yeah, yeah, I mean that.

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Speaker 1: But really the bit we did was awesome.

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Speaker 4: But the fact that they can just go murder people

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Speaker 4: is not cool.

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Speaker 7: And and as it turns out, which was a bummer

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Speaker 7: to me or to my kid's self, they don't actually

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Speaker 7: have a license they can flash before they kill someone,

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Speaker 7: letting them know that it's legit.

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Speaker 4: It's more of an expression.

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Speaker 1: Maybe we should just manufacture our own, not to use,

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Speaker 1: but just to have just.

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Speaker 2: On a T shirt.

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Speaker 4: Maybe we like, how would you.

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Speaker 1: Feel if you stole someone's wallet and you were going

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Speaker 1: through the wallet and you found like three different fake

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Speaker 1: forms of identification right all the same face, three different names,

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Speaker 1: three different profiles, and then you saw like this mysterious

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Speaker 1: license to kill. What would you do with that wallet?

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Speaker 2: I would put it right back down, wipe first. I'd

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Speaker 2: wipe my prints from it. There you go, say it

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Speaker 2: right back down on the ground.

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Speaker 4: Clever, clever?

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Speaker 1: All right, well, I know what you guys are getting

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Speaker 1: for the holidays.

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Speaker 2: You'd also have to check local security cameras and any

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Speaker 2: CCTV that's around. Make sure to destroy those tapes, all right.

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Speaker 1: And you probably want to drop your phone too, because

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Speaker 1: that GPS record would be there. Oh god, you know what,

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Speaker 1: we might be taking this thought experiment a little too far.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Right, Now, if you do have a license to kill,

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Speaker 1: and you can tell us about it without killing us,

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Speaker 1: we would love to hear your experiences. We will do

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Speaker 1: our best to keep you anonymous, just putting it out there.

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Speaker 4: Well, I guess you're right, Noel, it's as we'll see.

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Speaker 1: They kind of did have not a badge they could

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Speaker 1: wave around, but they did have documented proof that the

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Speaker 1: government at all levels that were aware of it, approved

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Speaker 1: of this. It was called a secret and concealed policy.

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Speaker 1: This would allow the security service to authorize participation in murder, torture,

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Speaker 1: sexual assault, or other grave criminality if.

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Speaker 4: Just a few folks believed it was.

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Speaker 1: In the service of the greater good in the public interest.

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Speaker 2: That is so creepy and disgusting, and I wonder how

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Speaker 2: many other intelligence organizations have an active policy like that,

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Speaker 2: a secret and concealed policy. Okay, so this was basically

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Speaker 2: a criminal authorization, just literally that you can do crime

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Speaker 2: and it's okay.

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Speaker 7: But it's like a further greater good clause, right right,

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Speaker 7: that's the implication here.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, but yes, but this is something that has been

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Speaker 2: around for thirty years and it was only first acknowledged

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Speaker 2: in British court when an alliance of human rights groups

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Speaker 2: argued that it was unlawful to have this kind of policy,

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Speaker 2: like maybe not, let's not do this.

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Speaker 1: And it was completely secret like they were practicing omerta

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Speaker 1: until twenty twelve. Prime Minister David Cameron wrote to Sir

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Speaker 1: Mark Waller, the Intelligence Service Commissioner at the time, asking

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Speaker 1: him to keep the policy under review, which we've got

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Speaker 1: a quote. It's very British in the way it's written,

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Speaker 1: but we'll give it a shot.

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Speaker 7: I'm gonna do a British accent, let's say, in the

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Speaker 7: discharge of their function to protect national security. The Security

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Speaker 7: Service has long standing policy for their agent handlers to

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Speaker 7: agree to agents participating in crime in circumstances where it

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Speaker 7: is considered such involvement is necessary and proportionate in providing

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Speaker 7: or maintaining access to intelligence that will allow the disruption

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Speaker 7: of more serious crimes or threats to national security.

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Speaker 2: Oh wow, that was great.

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Speaker 4: That it sounds nice.

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Speaker 1: But it sounds like he's describing marzipan.

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Speaker 4: It sounds like he's reading like a Winnie the Pooh

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Speaker 4: story or something.

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Speaker 2: You know, it's totally it's a clause for undercover agents, right,

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Speaker 2: that's all that's what that is.

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Speaker 1: Well, no, but I meant is but yeah, it's saying like,

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Speaker 1: if you have an informant who is operating maybe in

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Speaker 1: something like gun running or human trafficking circle, yeah, and

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Speaker 1: you need to keep them embedded.

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Speaker 7: Question in the States, Yeah, you see it in movies.

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Speaker 7: I just want to see what you guys think about this.

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Speaker 7: Whenever an undercover agent is offered drugs, they they go

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Speaker 7: to whatever lengths they can to not actually do the drugs.

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Speaker 7: If they're like, you know, you know, like prove you're

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Speaker 7: not a cop, do the drugs.

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Speaker 4: Or whatever, it's like oops, oops, I drop the drugs.

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Speaker 7: You know, isn't that a thing? No, I'm wondering, like,

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Speaker 7: do you think we have a It does seem like

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Speaker 7: it's not. It's frowned upon for undercover cops to like

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Speaker 7: get deep and start like doing drugs. It sounds like

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Speaker 7: there's a border, there's a there's a boundary that we

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Speaker 7: would prefer not to cross.

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Speaker 1: They probably want to avoid it, but it comes into

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Speaker 1: that idea the greater good right accomplishing the sting or

444
00:24:06,560 --> 00:24:10,239
Speaker 1: the operation. So I am sure there are people who have,

445
00:24:10,400 --> 00:24:13,879
Speaker 1: maybe in the DEA or something, been forced to do

446
00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:18,840
Speaker 1: cocaine or something like that. But I don't know if

447
00:24:18,880 --> 00:24:24,400
Speaker 1: there's a strict, a strict bright line policy wise, I.

448
00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:26,840
Speaker 2: Don't think there can be. Yeah, I think because all

449
00:24:26,880 --> 00:24:29,240
Speaker 2: of it's circumstantial, right, especially when you're dealing with this,

450
00:24:29,359 --> 00:24:32,840
Speaker 2: if this is full on national security for the past

451
00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:36,560
Speaker 2: thirty years, I can't even imagine some of the terrible

452
00:24:36,640 --> 00:24:39,000
Speaker 2: things that some of these agents have had to do,

453
00:24:39,800 --> 00:24:42,439
Speaker 2: like you're saying, in the human trafficking fields and drug

454
00:24:42,520 --> 00:24:46,480
Speaker 2: fields and murder, like in murder in order to then

455
00:24:46,600 --> 00:24:49,240
Speaker 2: get a bigger fish essentially down the line.

456
00:24:49,720 --> 00:24:52,159
Speaker 1: And you also have to wonder, Okay, let's put ourselves

457
00:24:52,200 --> 00:24:56,000
Speaker 1: in that hypothetical position. Let's say Paul Mission Control DECA

458
00:24:56,720 --> 00:25:02,200
Speaker 1: is a big time like Narco's level Columbia drug cartel leader, right,

459
00:25:02,320 --> 00:25:04,399
Speaker 1: I can see it, and we're we're up and comers,

460
00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:08,359
Speaker 1: we're gonna be lieutenants. And he's like this, do this

461
00:25:08,400 --> 00:25:12,040
Speaker 1: cocaine in front of me? It's cocaine, and we would

462
00:25:13,240 --> 00:25:16,960
Speaker 1: we would look very suspicious if we just fumbled, just

463
00:25:17,119 --> 00:25:20,159
Speaker 1: dropped it. Because I don't know. I don't know a

464
00:25:20,240 --> 00:25:24,240
Speaker 1: ton about about that drug, but I do know about

465
00:25:24,280 --> 00:25:26,720
Speaker 1: the general trends of addiction and people who are into

466
00:25:26,760 --> 00:25:28,439
Speaker 1: that kind of stuff don't just drop it.

467
00:25:28,920 --> 00:25:31,520
Speaker 2: Yeah. In that case, I think the fumble move would

468
00:25:31,520 --> 00:25:34,640
Speaker 2: be to accidentally drop it on one of the guys

469
00:25:34,680 --> 00:25:37,760
Speaker 2: that you know is not an undercover agent, so that it's, oh, well,

470
00:25:37,800 --> 00:25:40,440
Speaker 2: we didn't waste it. It just is all over that guy.

471
00:25:40,520 --> 00:25:43,119
Speaker 1: Now, I don't know, man, I think you have to

472
00:25:43,160 --> 00:25:44,320
Speaker 1: do it if you're at that point.

473
00:25:44,440 --> 00:25:46,399
Speaker 7: It's like that you can't be like that scene in

474
00:25:46,400 --> 00:25:49,240
Speaker 7: that Woody Allen movie where he sneezes the cocaine off

475
00:25:48,800 --> 00:25:51,760
Speaker 7: the dish or whatever, and it's just basically like a

476
00:25:51,760 --> 00:25:54,960
Speaker 7: party foul. It's more like a you're gonna get shot

477
00:25:55,000 --> 00:25:55,919
Speaker 7: in the face foul.

478
00:25:56,400 --> 00:25:59,480
Speaker 2: Yeah. But then if you're talking about the bigger operations,

479
00:25:59,520 --> 00:26:01,720
Speaker 2: where you're at out in the field doing things other

480
00:26:01,760 --> 00:26:04,760
Speaker 2: than drugs, the actual criminal acts, that's where it gets

481
00:26:05,160 --> 00:26:08,600
Speaker 2: a little I don't know, it gets murky.

482
00:26:08,320 --> 00:26:12,440
Speaker 1: For me, right right right, Like if you are embedded

483
00:26:12,440 --> 00:26:14,680
Speaker 1: as an enforcer and you're sent to beat the crap

484
00:26:14,720 --> 00:26:16,720
Speaker 1: out of someone, you know what I mean. And I'm

485
00:26:16,760 --> 00:26:19,040
Speaker 1: sure there have been in the past undercover agents who

486
00:26:19,040 --> 00:26:22,359
Speaker 1: have to performatively beat the snot out of one another

487
00:26:23,600 --> 00:26:27,600
Speaker 1: just to make sure they look like they're legit. So yes,

488
00:26:27,720 --> 00:26:31,399
Speaker 1: the informant stuff, that's part of it, and that doesn't

489
00:26:31,440 --> 00:26:34,679
Speaker 1: seem that far out. But when Cameron is writing this

490
00:26:34,840 --> 00:26:40,320
Speaker 1: letter to Sir Mark Waller, he essentially says, look, we're

491
00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:44,239
Speaker 1: not going to ask you to tell us whether like,

492
00:26:44,280 --> 00:26:46,280
Speaker 1: we don't want you to feel as if you have

493
00:26:46,359 --> 00:26:49,240
Speaker 1: to report it to anybody. If you get what I'm

494
00:26:49,280 --> 00:26:54,080
Speaker 1: saying anyone, and you don't have to worry about whether

495
00:26:54,160 --> 00:26:57,320
Speaker 1: or not it's legal at all.

496
00:26:58,640 --> 00:26:59,840
Speaker 2: That's just crazy, man.

497
00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:01,199
Speaker 7: Is that one of those things where it sort of

498
00:27:01,240 --> 00:27:04,320
Speaker 7: exists in like an extra legal area.

499
00:27:04,600 --> 00:27:07,000
Speaker 1: Yes, right, Yeah, And most people in the government had

500
00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:09,080
Speaker 1: no idea what was happening, you know what I mean.

501
00:27:09,119 --> 00:27:11,480
Speaker 1: I think most people in Parliament at that time would

502
00:27:11,480 --> 00:27:15,120
Speaker 1: have said, you know, we should we should not give

503
00:27:15,160 --> 00:27:18,040
Speaker 1: people these licensees for wanton destruction.

504
00:27:19,320 --> 00:27:20,280
Speaker 4: Cameron, to be.

505
00:27:20,359 --> 00:27:23,120
Speaker 1: Fair, he am were gonna try to be fair here

506
00:27:23,400 --> 00:27:27,199
Speaker 1: said he considered making the letter public in the interest

507
00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:30,840
Speaker 1: of transparency, but decided against it because he thought it

508
00:27:30,880 --> 00:27:34,520
Speaker 1: might be damaging to the national interest also known as

509
00:27:34,640 --> 00:27:39,600
Speaker 1: his political career. Wow, that's what I think. I think

510
00:27:39,640 --> 00:27:42,840
Speaker 1: he was sane, damaging to the national interest, But he

511
00:27:43,040 --> 00:27:45,080
Speaker 1: meant damaging to his political career.

512
00:27:45,400 --> 00:27:46,439
Speaker 4: Yeah, kind of a typo.

513
00:27:46,640 --> 00:27:50,360
Speaker 2: Maybe A Well, I can see that. I can see that, Ben,

514
00:27:50,480 --> 00:27:52,879
Speaker 2: I mean I can see where you become prime minister,

515
00:27:53,000 --> 00:27:56,639
Speaker 2: you get with of something like this, and as a citizen,

516
00:27:56,760 --> 00:27:59,320
Speaker 2: it gives you pause just knowing that it's happening right,

517
00:27:59,520 --> 00:28:02,760
Speaker 2: no matter where what your beliefs are in while you're

518
00:28:02,800 --> 00:28:05,399
Speaker 2: holding that office. And it does seem like he kind

519
00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:07,800
Speaker 2: of rode the fence there a little bit of should

520
00:28:07,840 --> 00:28:10,080
Speaker 2: I shouldn't I tell anybody about this? This is really

521
00:28:10,119 --> 00:28:14,879
Speaker 2: effed up? But in the in the in the uh,

522
00:28:15,400 --> 00:28:18,280
Speaker 2: let's keep national security in public interest in order, and

523
00:28:18,359 --> 00:28:20,520
Speaker 2: let's just balance it out and say, let's just keep

524
00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:23,119
Speaker 2: it quiet. Like, wasn't it the whole idea that he

525
00:28:23,200 --> 00:28:26,919
Speaker 2: basically just he said he told this guy not to

526
00:28:27,000 --> 00:28:29,040
Speaker 2: comment on the legality. That was the whole idea.

527
00:28:29,200 --> 00:28:29,640
Speaker 4: Yeah.

528
00:28:29,680 --> 00:28:34,000
Speaker 1: So it's the policy is under review. Doing air quotes here,

529
00:28:34,160 --> 00:28:37,480
Speaker 1: I hope you could hear them. The policies under review. However,

530
00:28:38,360 --> 00:28:43,080
Speaker 1: what that essentially means is provide cover for us and

531
00:28:43,200 --> 00:28:46,680
Speaker 1: don't like, Okay, look, sometimes you gotta you gotta break

532
00:28:46,720 --> 00:28:49,160
Speaker 1: a few innocent eggs if you really want to cook

533
00:28:49,200 --> 00:28:50,320
Speaker 1: a terrorism Omelet you.

534
00:28:50,320 --> 00:28:51,680
Speaker 4: Know what I mean? Geez.

535
00:28:52,080 --> 00:28:55,160
Speaker 1: So that's yeah, that's exactly what happens. Said, don't comment

536
00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:58,440
Speaker 1: on the legality, don't refer it to any prosecuting body,

537
00:28:58,480 --> 00:29:02,920
Speaker 1: don't refer it to law enforcement. Let's keep this between us.

538
00:29:03,000 --> 00:29:06,240
Speaker 1: Let's let's have a greater good. So the argument was

539
00:29:06,320 --> 00:29:11,760
Speaker 1: essentially that for most of history, most of modern British history,

540
00:29:12,000 --> 00:29:16,480
Speaker 1: they have been following one of two paths as just

541
00:29:16,560 --> 00:29:20,080
Speaker 1: a nation. There was the rule of law and then

542
00:29:20,120 --> 00:29:24,680
Speaker 1: there were criminal acts. Right, But they called this strategy

543
00:29:25,320 --> 00:29:31,000
Speaker 1: the third direction, right right? Do you guys remember Glee?

544
00:29:31,080 --> 00:29:32,040
Speaker 1: Do you remember their band?

545
00:29:32,920 --> 00:29:33,200
Speaker 7: Uh?

546
00:29:33,640 --> 00:29:36,960
Speaker 1: One direction was a real band?

547
00:29:37,480 --> 00:29:40,320
Speaker 4: What am I thinking of? Well, there was that U

548
00:29:40,360 --> 00:29:42,040
Speaker 4: plus me equals us thing?

549
00:29:42,920 --> 00:29:46,800
Speaker 1: New direction, a new direction, new direction.

550
00:29:47,000 --> 00:29:52,320
Speaker 4: It's a pun new direction. I see a very body.

551
00:29:52,160 --> 00:29:56,720
Speaker 1: Like Boy's Soul from Always Sunday in Philadelphia. But they

552
00:29:56,760 --> 00:30:02,280
Speaker 1: called this thing, seriously, the third direction. Nobody acknowledged it

553
00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:06,560
Speaker 1: until this year in a British court when that Alliance

554
00:30:06,560 --> 00:30:11,000
Speaker 1: of Human Rights group said Matt mentioned earlier, Privacy International.

555
00:30:11,000 --> 00:30:11,840
Speaker 4: Who are the other ones?

556
00:30:12,080 --> 00:30:15,280
Speaker 2: Yeah, those guys over at PI. Then we've got reprieve

557
00:30:15,600 --> 00:30:18,880
Speaker 2: the Committee on the Administration of Justice and the Pat

558
00:30:18,960 --> 00:30:19,760
Speaker 2: Finnickan Center.

559
00:30:20,200 --> 00:30:23,720
Speaker 1: According to the legal team representing this alliance, the third

560
00:30:23,800 --> 00:30:27,760
Speaker 1: direction policy is likely to have enabled the Security Service

561
00:30:27,840 --> 00:30:32,760
Speaker 1: to conceal wide ranging illegal activity, and they brought this

562
00:30:32,920 --> 00:30:38,600
Speaker 1: case before an investigatory powers tribunal. The trial included as

563
00:30:38,640 --> 00:30:44,160
Speaker 1: a bonus the publication of a heavily redacted document, a

564
00:30:44,320 --> 00:30:47,400
Speaker 1: guideline essentially for how to break the law and get

565
00:30:47,440 --> 00:30:48,040
Speaker 1: away with it.

566
00:30:48,400 --> 00:30:49,320
Speaker 4: This is how you do it.

567
00:30:49,680 --> 00:30:52,120
Speaker 1: And like a lot of government documents, you can find

568
00:30:52,200 --> 00:30:56,520
Speaker 1: copies of this published in a couple of different places

569
00:30:56,520 --> 00:31:02,920
Speaker 1: in British media, but tons like the entire paragraphs are

570
00:31:02,960 --> 00:31:05,960
Speaker 1: blacked out. They're not gonna admit this stuff, right because

571
00:31:05,960 --> 00:31:09,400
Speaker 1: it's still the great boogeyman of national security exactly.

572
00:31:09,920 --> 00:31:11,720
Speaker 2: And you know, the timing of the letter was also

573
00:31:11,840 --> 00:31:15,320
Speaker 2: really strange here because just two weeks after this highly

574
00:31:15,360 --> 00:31:19,680
Speaker 2: redacted document gets released, it's made public. Mister Cameron, our buddy,

575
00:31:19,880 --> 00:31:24,440
Speaker 2: admitted that there was this thing called state collusion in

576
00:31:24,480 --> 00:31:28,840
Speaker 2: the nineteen eighty nine murder of Belfast solicitor Patrick Finnickin

577
00:31:29,280 --> 00:31:34,640
Speaker 2: and state state collusion what does that mean?

578
00:31:35,240 --> 00:31:41,320
Speaker 1: That means essentially the Cameron is arguing some faction of

579
00:31:41,360 --> 00:31:45,200
Speaker 1: the intelligence apparatus or the state apparatus.

580
00:31:44,720 --> 00:31:46,120
Speaker 4: Of the United Kingdom.

581
00:31:47,480 --> 00:31:51,960
Speaker 1: May have aided aided in this guy's death, or may

582
00:31:52,000 --> 00:31:55,920
Speaker 1: have at the very least been criminally negligent and protecting him. Right,

583
00:31:56,200 --> 00:31:59,480
Speaker 1: it's the most fair way to say it. They get

584
00:31:59,480 --> 00:32:04,120
Speaker 1: into some very very very dirty things when they were

585
00:32:04,200 --> 00:32:08,800
Speaker 1: attempting to retain Northern Ireland, you know. Oh yeah, and

586
00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:11,360
Speaker 1: we'll tell you more about the trial after a word

587
00:32:11,360 --> 00:32:21,680
Speaker 1: from our sponsor. So, according to Sir James ed QC,

588
00:32:21,920 --> 00:32:24,400
Speaker 1: that stands for Queen's Counsel, those are the guys who

589
00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:28,920
Speaker 1: have the wigs. The name for those wigs is Peruke, So.

590
00:32:29,320 --> 00:32:33,440
Speaker 4: Peruk assault, What was the what was the one you did?

591
00:32:33,440 --> 00:32:33,800
Speaker 4: Off air?

592
00:32:33,880 --> 00:32:35,720
Speaker 2: Peruca's on fire Peruke.

593
00:32:36,560 --> 00:32:38,240
Speaker 7: To learn more about the history of the Peruke, you

594
00:32:38,240 --> 00:32:40,480
Speaker 7: can check out me and Ben's other podcast, Ridiculous History,

595
00:32:40,520 --> 00:32:42,920
Speaker 7: where we do an episode about what the heck's up

596
00:32:42,960 --> 00:32:47,000
Speaker 7: with those crazy British lawyer wigs, which is yeah, which

597
00:32:47,040 --> 00:32:48,400
Speaker 7: is one of our first episodes.

598
00:32:48,560 --> 00:32:52,560
Speaker 4: Be kind or be brutal, it's up to you. We

599
00:32:52,680 --> 00:32:54,920
Speaker 4: just want you to know. That's a great word. Internet's

600
00:32:54,920 --> 00:32:56,040
Speaker 4: going to do it then, and that's going to do.

601
00:32:56,080 --> 00:32:57,960
Speaker 4: Then that's true. That's true.

602
00:32:58,360 --> 00:33:03,600
Speaker 1: So this guy, Sir James Edy, QC, is representing the

603
00:33:03,640 --> 00:33:07,320
Speaker 1: intelligence agencies, the Home Office in the Foreign Office, and

604
00:33:07,360 --> 00:33:12,240
Speaker 1: he told this Investigatory Powers Tribunal that details of MI

605
00:33:12,440 --> 00:33:15,240
Speaker 1: five's conduct had to be kept secret even in the

606
00:33:15,280 --> 00:33:18,120
Speaker 1: modern day and could not be aired in open court.

607
00:33:18,320 --> 00:33:21,200
Speaker 1: He argued that the claim should be restricted to investigating

608
00:33:21,320 --> 00:33:24,520
Speaker 1: over a sensible time period, at most six years.

609
00:33:24,960 --> 00:33:28,320
Speaker 2: Wow, six years to keep all your secrets?

610
00:33:28,880 --> 00:33:29,120
Speaker 3: Right?

611
00:33:29,800 --> 00:33:30,360
Speaker 2: Interesting?

612
00:33:30,480 --> 00:33:33,240
Speaker 1: So what did the Alliance of Human rights organizations say

613
00:33:33,280 --> 00:33:33,600
Speaker 1: to that?

614
00:33:34,040 --> 00:33:38,200
Speaker 7: So in their argument, the claimants cite Finnican's murder as

615
00:33:38,240 --> 00:33:43,880
Speaker 7: an illustration of the considerable public importance of the issues raised.

616
00:33:44,240 --> 00:33:49,280
Speaker 7: It also refers to allegations that Freddie Scapatici great name,

617
00:33:49,480 --> 00:33:52,760
Speaker 7: Yeah it's pretty good, was a former senior member of

618
00:33:52,840 --> 00:33:56,719
Speaker 7: the IRA and a security Service agent working under the

619
00:33:56,760 --> 00:34:02,400
Speaker 7: code name Oh my god, I love this Steak Knife

620
00:34:01,720 --> 00:34:06,560
Speaker 7: s T A k E. That's a good DJ name

621
00:34:06,680 --> 00:34:08,160
Speaker 7: right there, Steak Knife.

622
00:34:08,920 --> 00:34:09,440
Speaker 4: How about that?

623
00:34:09,520 --> 00:34:11,280
Speaker 2: Huh oh wow, that's great.

624
00:34:11,680 --> 00:34:18,880
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's so Skeptichi aka steak Knife was we have

625
00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:22,680
Speaker 1: to say, allegedly still but was involved in kidnap, torture,

626
00:34:22,719 --> 00:34:27,000
Speaker 1: and murder. A while working as an agent employed by

627
00:34:27,200 --> 00:34:31,400
Speaker 1: m I five. So the roundabout way, then the government

628
00:34:31,440 --> 00:34:35,520
Speaker 1: of the United Kingdom was paying this guy to kidnap,

629
00:34:35,600 --> 00:34:37,560
Speaker 1: torture and murder people.

630
00:34:37,760 --> 00:34:40,640
Speaker 4: For the greater good, for the greater good. Right.

631
00:34:41,800 --> 00:34:45,400
Speaker 1: M I five has refused to answer the claimant's questions

632
00:34:45,440 --> 00:34:49,320
Speaker 1: about the scope of this third direction policy, including whether

633
00:34:49,360 --> 00:34:53,120
Speaker 1: it could in principle authorize murder, torture, in humane and

634
00:34:53,200 --> 00:34:58,400
Speaker 1: degrading treatment, sexual assault, kidnapping, or false imprisonment. The security

635
00:34:58,440 --> 00:35:02,640
Speaker 1: services lawyers all so said to answer such questions would

636
00:35:02,719 --> 00:35:06,360
Speaker 1: reveal the facts of conduct that they wish to keep secret.

637
00:35:06,600 --> 00:35:09,759
Speaker 1: So it's kind of like a trust us we're doing

638
00:35:09,800 --> 00:35:11,839
Speaker 1: the right thing. We can't tell you what we're doing.

639
00:35:11,960 --> 00:35:15,799
Speaker 1: We can't tell you why. Other than that, not a

640
00:35:15,880 --> 00:35:17,319
Speaker 1: very convincing argument.

641
00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:20,480
Speaker 2: No, not at all. And we also have other examples

642
00:35:20,680 --> 00:35:23,200
Speaker 2: of some strange things that ended up coming to light,

643
00:35:24,000 --> 00:35:26,719
Speaker 2: or at least things that maybe never wanted to see

644
00:35:26,719 --> 00:35:29,560
Speaker 2: the light of day. There were some papers released by

645
00:35:29,760 --> 00:35:33,200
Speaker 2: the Irish state that showed that there was this loyalist

646
00:35:33,480 --> 00:35:36,480
Speaker 2: paramilitary group, or at least members of one of these groups,

647
00:35:36,520 --> 00:35:40,759
Speaker 2: specifically the Ultier Volunteer Force. They're a paramilitary group out

648
00:35:40,760 --> 00:35:44,800
Speaker 2: of Northern Ireland. They claimed that am I five asked

649
00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:49,800
Speaker 2: them to assassinate the then Prime Minister of Ireland, Charles

650
00:35:49,920 --> 00:35:55,080
Speaker 2: Hahi in nineteen eighty five. And we went to this

651
00:35:55,160 --> 00:35:57,399
Speaker 2: BBC source to learn a little bit more about this.

652
00:35:57,920 --> 00:36:02,400
Speaker 2: But it's very I don't know, it's very strange because

653
00:36:02,440 --> 00:36:05,520
Speaker 2: it was it was a letter, just kind of your

654
00:36:05,600 --> 00:36:09,400
Speaker 2: standard letter sent to somebody, like a correspondence, and it

655
00:36:09,520 --> 00:36:13,600
Speaker 2: just happened to include a couple documents and a couple

656
00:36:14,400 --> 00:36:17,480
Speaker 2: literally guys who just said, hey, by the way, m

657
00:36:17,560 --> 00:36:19,399
Speaker 2: I five asked us to kill you one time.

658
00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:23,000
Speaker 4: We didn't do it, yeah, but but you know, you

659
00:36:23,040 --> 00:36:24,680
Speaker 4: should know it's crazy.

660
00:36:24,719 --> 00:36:27,840
Speaker 2: It was sent two years after the alleged I guess

661
00:36:27,880 --> 00:36:31,240
Speaker 2: assassination or the hit was put on him, I guess.

662
00:36:32,080 --> 00:36:36,000
Speaker 2: It contained a long long list of collusion allegations against

663
00:36:36,600 --> 00:36:39,759
Speaker 2: the British Intelligence Service so or various services that the

664
00:36:39,800 --> 00:36:44,280
Speaker 2: British intelligence has this guy. It was addressed to mister Hahien.

665
00:36:44,280 --> 00:36:47,000
Speaker 2: It read in nineteen eighty five, we were approached by

666
00:36:47,040 --> 00:36:50,520
Speaker 2: an MI five officer. He asked us to execute you.

667
00:36:51,160 --> 00:36:54,279
Speaker 2: And it said that these this paramilitary group had been

668
00:36:54,320 --> 00:36:59,080
Speaker 2: supplied with quote details that would have compromised this guy's

669
00:36:59,160 --> 00:37:03,520
Speaker 2: personal security, including aerial photographs of his family home, his cars,

670
00:37:03,600 --> 00:37:04,760
Speaker 2: and his private yacht.

671
00:37:05,440 --> 00:37:11,759
Speaker 1: So for an imperfect comparison, it's similar to say, the

672
00:37:11,960 --> 00:37:18,920
Speaker 1: CIA taking over Newfoundland and the people of Newfoundland wanting

673
00:37:18,960 --> 00:37:23,160
Speaker 1: to make a United Canada, and so the CIA contacts

674
00:37:23,160 --> 00:37:27,160
Speaker 1: someone in Canada and says, kill whomever is in charge

675
00:37:27,600 --> 00:37:32,200
Speaker 1: of this unity group in Newfoundland, or kill the prime

676
00:37:32,239 --> 00:37:34,759
Speaker 1: minister of Canada so we can keep our part.

677
00:37:35,200 --> 00:37:38,480
Speaker 2: Yeah, And I guess they didn't imagine that the people

678
00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:43,840
Speaker 2: who were not necessarily the friends of the British Intelligence Service,

679
00:37:44,480 --> 00:37:46,719
Speaker 2: they wouldn't just say, oh, yeah, okay, show up boss.

680
00:37:47,239 --> 00:37:49,840
Speaker 1: Well maybe they just said, you know, killing prime ministers

681
00:37:50,200 --> 00:37:51,000
Speaker 1: step too far.

682
00:37:51,239 --> 00:37:53,000
Speaker 2: I guess that's what I'm saying. Yeah, like they didn't

683
00:37:53,040 --> 00:37:55,920
Speaker 2: expect that to occur. That seems very strange to me.

684
00:37:56,560 --> 00:38:00,920
Speaker 1: In twenty ten, Benyam Mohammed al Habashi went to court

685
00:38:00,960 --> 00:38:05,080
Speaker 1: to hold five accountable for collusion in his torture at

686
00:38:05,120 --> 00:38:07,600
Speaker 1: the hands of Uncle Sam. And then there's the example

687
00:38:07,640 --> 00:38:12,399
Speaker 1: of Shakira Mir who said I five watched him being

688
00:38:12,400 --> 00:38:13,919
Speaker 1: tortured in two thousand and one.

689
00:38:14,360 --> 00:38:17,719
Speaker 2: That was really brutal too. Yeah, the guy he was

690
00:38:18,160 --> 00:38:22,240
Speaker 2: in Guantanamo Bay, right, and he said like several times

691
00:38:22,440 --> 00:38:25,000
Speaker 2: British officers would be in the room while he's being beaten,

692
00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:29,160
Speaker 2: just brutally beaten, his head slammed against the wall. Yeah,

693
00:38:29,160 --> 00:38:30,480
Speaker 2: pretty pretty crazy stuff.

694
00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:34,319
Speaker 1: It's truly disturbing because now with all this new information,

695
00:38:35,280 --> 00:38:40,880
Speaker 1: this admission on the part of the British government that

696
00:38:41,480 --> 00:38:44,839
Speaker 1: these sorts of things occur, many of those previous allegations

697
00:38:44,840 --> 00:38:47,280
Speaker 1: of criminal activity on the part of mi I five

698
00:38:47,360 --> 00:38:50,200
Speaker 1: that were once dismissed as out and out conspiracy theories

699
00:38:50,239 --> 00:38:56,440
Speaker 1: seem increasingly maybe not plausible, well maybe not probable, but

700
00:38:56,520 --> 00:38:59,920
Speaker 1: certainly less impossible. They've been implicated in the murder of

701
00:39:00,160 --> 00:39:04,200
Speaker 1: anti nuclear activists Tilda Murle. They've been accused of creating

702
00:39:04,320 --> 00:39:08,320
Speaker 1: a far right neo Nazi group, Combat eighteen. Their profile

703
00:39:08,480 --> 00:39:12,239
Speaker 1: peaked in February fifteenth, nineteen ninety five, when they orchestrated

704
00:39:12,280 --> 00:39:15,120
Speaker 1: a riot in Dublin that led to a cancellation of

705
00:39:15,120 --> 00:39:19,200
Speaker 1: a football match between England and Ireland. One theory suggests

706
00:39:19,200 --> 00:39:22,080
Speaker 1: that British intelligence wanted to create a magnet for the

707
00:39:22,080 --> 00:39:26,279
Speaker 1: most extreme parts of these political parties. One member who

708
00:39:26,320 --> 00:39:28,480
Speaker 1: is convicted of murder. In nineteen ninety eight, a guy

709
00:39:28,560 --> 00:39:32,040
Speaker 1: named Charlie Sargent has been accused of being an MI

710
00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:36,279
Speaker 1: five informant with some pretty solid evidence. And then we

711
00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:40,120
Speaker 1: did the death of Commander Buster Crab in a previous episode.

712
00:39:40,239 --> 00:39:40,920
Speaker 7: Yeah, just a.

713
00:39:41,040 --> 00:39:44,720
Speaker 2: Crab where he never surfaced, and it seems that maybe

714
00:39:44,760 --> 00:39:46,719
Speaker 2: someone on the inside was responsible.

715
00:39:46,760 --> 00:39:49,759
Speaker 4: Weren't there frogmen involved in that story? Yes? Yeah, what

716
00:39:49,760 --> 00:39:50,520
Speaker 4: about crab men?

717
00:39:51,239 --> 00:39:54,960
Speaker 1: They never made it to Crab mainly because the difficulty

718
00:39:55,000 --> 00:39:56,439
Speaker 1: of making forward backward motion.

719
00:39:56,719 --> 00:39:58,800
Speaker 4: That's hard. Yeah, scuttling, scuttling.

720
00:39:59,320 --> 00:40:04,480
Speaker 1: So you mentioned Colonel Muammar Gaddaffi earlier as well, right.

721
00:40:04,640 --> 00:40:06,680
Speaker 2: Oh, yeah, And in ninety six, there was a bomb

722
00:40:06,680 --> 00:40:09,080
Speaker 2: that was placed under a car that was I guess

723
00:40:09,120 --> 00:40:11,759
Speaker 2: thought to be the vehicle that Gaddafi was going to

724
00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:16,399
Speaker 2: be traveling in in his motorcade, but well he wasn't

725
00:40:16,440 --> 00:40:19,600
Speaker 2: in that vehicle. The car did explode, the bomb did explode,

726
00:40:19,640 --> 00:40:22,960
Speaker 2: and several bodyguards were killed. There was an ensuing gun

727
00:40:23,000 --> 00:40:28,919
Speaker 2: battle that killed several people, and there were even there

728
00:40:28,960 --> 00:40:31,000
Speaker 2: would be assassins, you know, the people that planted the

729
00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:33,520
Speaker 2: bomb and everything. They had links to al Qaeda, and

730
00:40:33,560 --> 00:40:37,400
Speaker 2: it's thought that maybe maybe I five had a little

731
00:40:37,400 --> 00:40:38,160
Speaker 2: bit of a hand in.

732
00:40:38,160 --> 00:40:39,319
Speaker 4: This, right.

733
00:40:39,480 --> 00:40:41,919
Speaker 1: The head of the Libyan desk for mi I five

734
00:40:41,960 --> 00:40:44,839
Speaker 1: at the time was a guy named David Shaler, and

735
00:40:44,880 --> 00:40:48,799
Speaker 1: in nineteen ninety seven he left the service leaked this

736
00:40:48,920 --> 00:40:52,319
Speaker 1: information at these accusations, these allegations to the press. He

737
00:40:52,480 --> 00:40:55,240
Speaker 1: was forced to flee to France, and in nineteen ninety

738
00:40:55,320 --> 00:40:58,160
Speaker 1: eight he claimed that the plot to kill Gadaffi had

739
00:40:58,200 --> 00:40:59,200
Speaker 1: been funded by.

740
00:40:59,320 --> 00:41:02,520
Speaker 4: M I six. Wow, cooperation with m I five.

741
00:41:03,160 --> 00:41:05,239
Speaker 2: There's you know, taking out a head, a leader like

742
00:41:05,280 --> 00:41:07,360
Speaker 2: that of a country is no small deal.

743
00:41:07,600 --> 00:41:11,560
Speaker 1: Well, and there's compelling it's not compelling evidence, there's proof

744
00:41:12,120 --> 00:41:17,000
Speaker 1: that ultimately the French government was behind the assassination of

745
00:41:17,160 --> 00:41:22,120
Speaker 1: Goadaffi to preserve financial hegemony because they wanted you know,

746
00:41:22,200 --> 00:41:26,800
Speaker 1: Godaffy did many, many terrible things, but the thing France

747
00:41:26,920 --> 00:41:29,480
Speaker 1: was most frightened of him doing was to create a

748
00:41:30,680 --> 00:41:36,279
Speaker 1: continental African currency, a denollur. Yeah, so mess with the money, right,

749
00:41:36,400 --> 00:41:37,120
Speaker 1: that's what happens.

750
00:41:37,200 --> 00:41:38,840
Speaker 2: Money in the oil.

751
00:41:40,160 --> 00:41:42,800
Speaker 1: The new series starting Matt Frederick.

752
00:41:42,400 --> 00:41:44,000
Speaker 7: Here's always money in the banana stand.

753
00:41:45,560 --> 00:41:47,120
Speaker 4: So what does this all mean?

754
00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:50,840
Speaker 1: This is this is pretty strange because it's rare for

755
00:41:51,200 --> 00:41:54,000
Speaker 1: this kind of information to come out in such a

756
00:41:54,040 --> 00:41:57,319
Speaker 1: blatant way. Yeah, break the law for the greater good,

757
00:41:57,640 --> 00:42:01,439
Speaker 1: most intelligence agencies, I would say, pra just that right.

758
00:42:01,520 --> 00:42:04,920
Speaker 1: The problem is the goalpost of that defines greater good

759
00:42:05,040 --> 00:42:05,840
Speaker 1: is always moving.

760
00:42:06,040 --> 00:42:08,040
Speaker 4: Who's good, right, greater for whom?

761
00:42:08,360 --> 00:42:12,120
Speaker 1: Exactly exactly, And at this point many of us listening

762
00:42:12,120 --> 00:42:14,840
Speaker 1: to the show today will have a hard time being surprised.

763
00:42:15,160 --> 00:42:17,759
Speaker 1: Some of us might even support this policy, you know

764
00:42:17,760 --> 00:42:19,560
Speaker 1: what I mean. There are people who say that torture

765
00:42:19,600 --> 00:42:22,919
Speaker 1: is a terrible thing, but ultimately it saves lives. We

766
00:42:23,000 --> 00:42:26,520
Speaker 1: have an episode on why that is not true as well.

767
00:42:26,719 --> 00:42:26,959
Speaker 4: Yeah.

768
00:42:27,800 --> 00:42:32,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, but but there are points to be made that

769
00:42:32,160 --> 00:42:34,800
Speaker 2: if you it's not an easy task to stop the

770
00:42:35,120 --> 00:42:38,920
Speaker 2: you know that, in your worldview, the worst people in

771
00:42:38,960 --> 00:42:40,880
Speaker 2: the world from doing the worst things. That's not an

772
00:42:40,920 --> 00:42:43,759
Speaker 2: easy task to prevent that from happening, and you do

773
00:42:43,880 --> 00:42:47,960
Speaker 2: have to perhaps do some bad things. It's just I

774
00:42:48,000 --> 00:42:50,839
Speaker 2: think in this case, it's that gray area of how

775
00:42:50,920 --> 00:42:53,880
Speaker 2: bad is too bad for the a thing for the

776
00:42:53,920 --> 00:42:55,719
Speaker 2: good guys to do to prevent the bad guys.

777
00:42:55,719 --> 00:42:57,759
Speaker 7: Well, it's that idea that to like counter to the

778
00:42:57,760 --> 00:43:00,480
Speaker 7: bad guys, you got to stoop to their level. We

779
00:43:00,560 --> 00:43:04,040
Speaker 7: got to play by their rules otherwise you're gonna get

780
00:43:04,080 --> 00:43:06,400
Speaker 7: stepped all over right in theory?

781
00:43:06,520 --> 00:43:08,080
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, I mean it's a good point. Did they

782
00:43:08,080 --> 00:43:11,440
Speaker 1: tell you guys rewatched True Detective recently?

783
00:43:11,480 --> 00:43:12,600
Speaker 4: Season two? Season one?

784
00:43:13,160 --> 00:43:13,640
Speaker 2: Thank god?

785
00:43:13,840 --> 00:43:14,120
Speaker 4: Yeah.

786
00:43:14,600 --> 00:43:17,120
Speaker 7: I have a friend that really says, revisit season two,

787
00:43:17,160 --> 00:43:17,960
Speaker 7: give another chance.

788
00:43:18,080 --> 00:43:19,000
Speaker 4: I yeah, I've heard that.

789
00:43:19,239 --> 00:43:20,879
Speaker 1: I've heard that before, but I didn't take a break

790
00:43:20,880 --> 00:43:22,919
Speaker 1: beause season one was just so great. There's a quote

791
00:43:22,960 --> 00:43:26,719
Speaker 1: that's not a spoiler, but this, this conversation reminds me

792
00:43:26,760 --> 00:43:31,200
Speaker 1: of it. The two main characters, Marty and Rust, are

793
00:43:31,239 --> 00:43:37,120
Speaker 1: having a philosophical discussion about the nature of good and evil,

794
00:43:37,280 --> 00:43:40,240
Speaker 1: and at some point in the conversation, Marty says Marty

795
00:43:40,280 --> 00:43:45,440
Speaker 1: asked if they're good people, and Rust says, no, we're bad,

796
00:43:45,760 --> 00:43:47,759
Speaker 1: but they need bad men like us to keep the

797
00:43:47,800 --> 00:43:48,719
Speaker 1: others from the door.

798
00:43:48,960 --> 00:43:51,400
Speaker 4: Yeah, and that made that a bear from the beginning

799
00:43:51,440 --> 00:43:52,840
Speaker 4: of the show. Yeah, exactly.

800
00:43:53,160 --> 00:43:56,440
Speaker 1: Or Jack Nicholson, right, not not as a not as

801
00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:58,480
Speaker 1: a character, just him.

802
00:43:58,960 --> 00:44:01,880
Speaker 4: He's keep don't know, he's a creepy looking guy. I

803
00:44:01,920 --> 00:44:03,680
Speaker 4: don't know. I wouldn't want him to knock him.

804
00:44:03,920 --> 00:44:06,880
Speaker 1: Yeah, I don't know him well enough to remark on

805
00:44:06,960 --> 00:44:07,880
Speaker 1: his door policy.

806
00:44:08,120 --> 00:44:11,600
Speaker 2: I guess, I guess the big question is do we

807
00:44:11,760 --> 00:44:14,799
Speaker 2: have to have the bad guys inside the door keeping

808
00:44:14,880 --> 00:44:16,920
Speaker 2: the other bad guys from the door. Why can't we

809
00:44:17,000 --> 00:44:19,200
Speaker 2: just build a giant wall and.

810
00:44:21,680 --> 00:44:26,319
Speaker 4: Topical topical question? So I take that.

811
00:44:26,520 --> 00:44:27,640
Speaker 2: Totally, getting them totally.

812
00:44:27,800 --> 00:44:31,600
Speaker 1: Well. It's a good question though, because should m I

813
00:44:31,640 --> 00:44:34,279
Speaker 1: five allow its agents and informants to break the law?

814
00:44:34,400 --> 00:44:39,800
Speaker 1: Does it really does it really become a necessary evil

815
00:44:39,880 --> 00:44:42,240
Speaker 1: on the way to achieving a greater good?

816
00:44:42,600 --> 00:44:42,799
Speaker 4: Right?

817
00:44:43,000 --> 00:44:46,279
Speaker 1: And if so, for who what laws they break? How

818
00:44:46,320 --> 00:44:50,200
Speaker 1: do we measure the success or the efficiency of something

819
00:44:50,239 --> 00:44:53,000
Speaker 1: like this if it's conducted entirely in secret? What sort

820
00:44:53,040 --> 00:44:56,480
Speaker 1: of oversight should the public and or government agencies have

821
00:44:56,719 --> 00:44:59,360
Speaker 1: on this process? Because right now the answer is not.

822
00:45:00,000 --> 00:45:03,160
Speaker 1: But yeah, they have a letter from twenty twelve that's like,

823
00:45:04,200 --> 00:45:07,920
Speaker 1: don't send this to anybody. David Cameron sent a no

824
00:45:08,040 --> 00:45:08,800
Speaker 1: snitching letter.

825
00:45:09,200 --> 00:45:13,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's exactly what happened, and that's where we are today,

826
00:45:14,320 --> 00:45:15,560
Speaker 2: no snitching, boys.

827
00:45:15,280 --> 00:45:20,560
Speaker 4: And girls, Snitches end up in stitches. Yeah, Well, tell

828
00:45:20,640 --> 00:45:21,319
Speaker 4: us what you think.

829
00:45:21,400 --> 00:45:24,160
Speaker 1: Find us on Instagram, Facebook and Twitter and let us know.

830
00:45:24,760 --> 00:45:30,520
Speaker 1: Are these things necessary evils, is allowing the collapse of

831
00:45:30,560 --> 00:45:35,120
Speaker 1: the rule of law in one scenario really necessary to

832
00:45:35,800 --> 00:45:39,399
Speaker 1: allow the enforcement of rule of law in another situation? Right,

833
00:45:39,480 --> 00:45:41,200
Speaker 1: That's ultimately the question really is.

834
00:45:42,120 --> 00:45:43,319
Speaker 2: And by the way, I was just going to bring

835
00:45:43,360 --> 00:45:47,000
Speaker 2: this up before we ended at the Tenderfoot holiday party

836
00:45:47,000 --> 00:45:49,680
Speaker 2: thing that we were at the three of US. I

837
00:45:49,760 --> 00:45:53,080
Speaker 2: ran into a gentleman. Paul Dicken was there too, but

838
00:45:53,080 --> 00:45:55,960
Speaker 2: I ran into a gentleman who truly truly believes and

839
00:45:56,000 --> 00:45:57,960
Speaker 2: had a long discussion on me about it that the

840
00:45:57,960 --> 00:46:00,000
Speaker 2: British government still controls the United States.

841
00:46:00,000 --> 00:46:02,320
Speaker 4: I overheard that, and I didn't want to jump in.

842
00:46:02,520 --> 00:46:04,879
Speaker 2: He truly believed it. Oh, I should talk to him,

843
00:46:04,920 --> 00:46:07,719
Speaker 2: I know, well, I kind of. I didn't want to

844
00:46:07,719 --> 00:46:10,040
Speaker 2: go any deeper than we already had in the conversation

845
00:46:10,160 --> 00:46:12,720
Speaker 2: because it's one of those that doesn't really go anywhere.

846
00:46:12,800 --> 00:46:14,560
Speaker 2: After you hit a certain wall. It's like, yeah, well,

847
00:46:14,600 --> 00:46:17,760
Speaker 2: you can't prove anything, but that's an interesting idea.

848
00:46:17,800 --> 00:46:19,400
Speaker 4: Did you tell me did an episode on it?

849
00:46:19,480 --> 00:46:19,839
Speaker 2: I did?

850
00:46:20,400 --> 00:46:22,719
Speaker 1: Did you tell him that he can contact us via

851
00:46:23,200 --> 00:46:25,880
Speaker 1: a telephone call? We're just a phone call away.

852
00:46:25,760 --> 00:46:29,440
Speaker 2: I did, I said, call one eight three three std

853
00:46:29,920 --> 00:46:34,160
Speaker 2: WYTK brought the STD back for this one because it's

854
00:46:34,200 --> 00:46:36,359
Speaker 2: not about awful things like the last one.

855
00:46:36,520 --> 00:46:39,799
Speaker 1: Oh and I also also want to just in the

856
00:46:39,800 --> 00:46:43,400
Speaker 1: interest of full transparency, I'm not at death's door, but

857
00:46:43,520 --> 00:46:46,719
Speaker 1: I am in. I am darn sure on like the

858
00:46:46,840 --> 00:46:49,759
Speaker 1: sub basement of sickness right now. So that's why my

859
00:46:49,880 --> 00:46:50,839
Speaker 1: voice sounds.

860
00:46:50,800 --> 00:46:51,359
Speaker 4: A little bad.

861
00:46:51,400 --> 00:46:54,880
Speaker 1: If you heard any any mucusy noises, sorry, folks, that

862
00:46:55,000 --> 00:46:55,239
Speaker 1: was me.

863
00:46:55,520 --> 00:47:00,000
Speaker 4: Should be hailing hardy later. Are you down with the sickness? Ben? Oh?

864
00:46:59,239 --> 00:47:02,840
Speaker 4: Oh ah, I'm always I'm always up to something.

865
00:47:03,040 --> 00:47:04,920
Speaker 2: It's just extra deep. I like it.

866
00:47:05,200 --> 00:47:09,120
Speaker 4: It's nice and gravelly. Thanks guys, Paul, Will Shirley snip

867
00:47:09,120 --> 00:47:11,399
Speaker 4: out all the snot sounds, thanks Paul.

868
00:47:12,040 --> 00:47:14,120
Speaker 1: So yeah, let us let us know what you think

869
00:47:14,200 --> 00:47:16,480
Speaker 1: and check in with your fellow and listeners. We'd like

870
00:47:16,560 --> 00:47:19,279
Speaker 1: to take this debate to the internet, and we mentioned

871
00:47:19,320 --> 00:47:20,920
Speaker 1: it earlier in the show, but you can find us

872
00:47:21,000 --> 00:47:22,240
Speaker 1: at our Facebook site.

873
00:47:22,800 --> 00:47:25,440
Speaker 4: Here's where it gets crazy if you love all that.

874
00:47:25,680 --> 00:47:28,640
Speaker 2: And that's the end of this classic episode. If you

875
00:47:28,719 --> 00:47:32,799
Speaker 2: have any thoughts or questions about this episode, you can

876
00:47:32,840 --> 00:47:35,440
Speaker 2: get into contact with us in a number of different ways.

877
00:47:35,640 --> 00:47:37,200
Speaker 2: One of the best is to give us a call.

878
00:47:37,239 --> 00:47:42,080
Speaker 2: Our number is one eight three three STDWYTK. If you

879
00:47:42,080 --> 00:47:43,920
Speaker 2: don't want to do that, you can send us a

880
00:47:43,960 --> 00:47:45,120
Speaker 2: good old fashioned email.

881
00:47:45,360 --> 00:47:49,560
Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

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Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know. Is a production

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Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

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Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.