1 00:00:02,480 --> 00:00:07,160 Speaker 1: Also media, I get on their ass. Somebody's got to 2 00:00:07,160 --> 00:00:21,479 Speaker 1: do it. This is better offly and I'm d Zetron. 3 00:00:21,720 --> 00:00:24,640 Speaker 1: Today I'm joined by the wonderful Jason Kint, who has 4 00:00:24,680 --> 00:00:29,120 Speaker 1: been at the Google ads trial and multiple other FDC 5 00:00:29,240 --> 00:00:32,080 Speaker 1: and DOJ related trials as well. Now, last week we 6 00:00:32,159 --> 00:00:34,360 Speaker 1: have wonderful news the Department of Justice won their ant 7 00:00:34,440 --> 00:00:36,720 Speaker 1: trust trial against Google saying they have a monopoly of 8 00:00:36,760 --> 00:00:39,440 Speaker 1: our ad tech. This is a wonderful time. And Jason, 9 00:00:39,479 --> 00:00:41,960 Speaker 1: of course last year was here for multiple episodes with 10 00:00:42,040 --> 00:00:43,760 Speaker 1: us to walk us through the trial. He was there 11 00:00:43,760 --> 00:00:45,440 Speaker 1: in person. Jason, how are you doing. 12 00:00:46,360 --> 00:00:49,080 Speaker 2: I'm good, thank you. It's good to see decisions starting 13 00:00:49,120 --> 00:00:50,839 Speaker 2: to come in from the courts on what we've been 14 00:00:50,880 --> 00:00:51,400 Speaker 2: talking about. 15 00:00:52,200 --> 00:00:54,000 Speaker 1: And just to be clear, Jason as the CEO of 16 00:00:54,000 --> 00:00:56,240 Speaker 1: Digital Content Next, I did not say that The Top 17 00:00:56,400 --> 00:01:00,279 Speaker 1: the professional podcast run by a professional, but soll us 18 00:01:00,280 --> 00:01:01,240 Speaker 1: through what the verdict was. 19 00:01:02,480 --> 00:01:05,880 Speaker 2: This is the ad tech case against Google that was 20 00:01:05,920 --> 00:01:10,880 Speaker 2: in Virginia, to remind the listeners, and it was around 21 00:01:11,000 --> 00:01:14,800 Speaker 2: Google having market power and monopoly power on the buy side, 22 00:01:14,840 --> 00:01:18,120 Speaker 2: the cell side and in the exchange and then illegally 23 00:01:18,240 --> 00:01:22,600 Speaker 2: using that monopoly power. The decision from the judge was 24 00:01:22,760 --> 00:01:25,920 Speaker 2: that mostly in agreement with the plaintiffs, and it was 25 00:01:25,959 --> 00:01:27,959 Speaker 2: a big win for the Justice Department, who worked really 26 00:01:28,000 --> 00:01:31,360 Speaker 2: hard on this case. That they have monopoly power in 27 00:01:31,440 --> 00:01:34,480 Speaker 2: the exchange, so where the auctions actually happen, and then 28 00:01:34,520 --> 00:01:38,680 Speaker 2: on the publisher side with the ads server marketplace that 29 00:01:38,800 --> 00:01:41,880 Speaker 2: determines what ads land on the page, and that they 30 00:01:41,920 --> 00:01:46,440 Speaker 2: illegally tied those two products together. So the only part 31 00:01:46,440 --> 00:01:49,040 Speaker 2: of the decision, which I think Google's trying to make 32 00:01:49,120 --> 00:01:51,640 Speaker 2: to be a bigger deal than it probably is, is 33 00:01:52,040 --> 00:01:54,200 Speaker 2: that they the judge did not agree that there was 34 00:01:54,240 --> 00:01:57,480 Speaker 2: this market on the buy side the way it was defined. 35 00:01:57,960 --> 00:02:00,880 Speaker 1: And so what does that mean in simple in. 36 00:02:00,840 --> 00:02:05,960 Speaker 2: Simpler terms, it could affect where remedies go because there 37 00:02:06,040 --> 00:02:10,440 Speaker 2: is not a finding that they illegally use monopoly power 38 00:02:10,480 --> 00:02:14,639 Speaker 2: on the buy side with advertisers buying ads, and so. 39 00:02:14,919 --> 00:02:17,640 Speaker 1: Just they owned the technology to sell the ads and 40 00:02:17,840 --> 00:02:20,400 Speaker 1: the ways in which it was like, I guess. 41 00:02:22,000 --> 00:02:27,160 Speaker 2: Yeah, they still it's true that they have significant influence 42 00:02:27,280 --> 00:02:30,320 Speaker 2: because they have they're the largest player on the buy 43 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:33,400 Speaker 2: side of ads, so where advertisers are actually buying the ads, 44 00:02:34,160 --> 00:02:36,560 Speaker 2: but not that they She didn't find that they that 45 00:02:36,600 --> 00:02:39,840 Speaker 2: there was a form legal market there that they abused, 46 00:02:40,280 --> 00:02:44,320 Speaker 2: and so as we go through remedies discussions, I think 47 00:02:44,360 --> 00:02:46,799 Speaker 2: it's probably it might be less likely that there's some 48 00:02:46,840 --> 00:02:49,160 Speaker 2: sort of structural separation where they need to divest the 49 00:02:49,200 --> 00:02:51,960 Speaker 2: buy side too, although all this stuff's frankly going to 50 00:02:51,960 --> 00:02:54,080 Speaker 2: get tangled together and it will be a whole new 51 00:02:54,080 --> 00:02:57,480 Speaker 2: ball game with remedies, especially with search meedies going on 52 00:02:57,520 --> 00:02:58,000 Speaker 2: this week too. 53 00:02:58,120 --> 00:02:58,639 Speaker 3: So go ahead. 54 00:02:58,880 --> 00:03:01,320 Speaker 1: I was going to say, so, what are the remedies 55 00:03:01,320 --> 00:03:03,359 Speaker 1: that the Department of Justice is actually seeking. 56 00:03:03,080 --> 00:03:06,560 Speaker 2: Here on the ad tech case? On this case, it's 57 00:03:06,639 --> 00:03:12,040 Speaker 2: a structural separation of their roles in the ad tech marketplace, 58 00:03:12,760 --> 00:03:15,320 Speaker 2: and so that was very clear coming into the into 59 00:03:15,360 --> 00:03:15,880 Speaker 2: the trial. 60 00:03:16,639 --> 00:03:18,760 Speaker 1: So just break it down for me, though, what they 61 00:03:19,000 --> 00:03:21,280 Speaker 1: How would they break up Google in its current form? 62 00:03:21,440 --> 00:03:22,480 Speaker 1: Is that even possible? 63 00:03:23,320 --> 00:03:27,320 Speaker 2: I mean yes, absolutely in the in the simplest way 64 00:03:27,360 --> 00:03:33,160 Speaker 2: would be forcing Google to divest, which probably would mean 65 00:03:33,840 --> 00:03:37,160 Speaker 2: spinning off to its shareholders rather than selling because it's 66 00:03:37,160 --> 00:03:39,160 Speaker 2: going to be such a valuable asset. 67 00:03:40,040 --> 00:03:42,560 Speaker 3: But actually a separate company. 68 00:03:42,280 --> 00:03:45,840 Speaker 2: A separate company that is the ad server marketplace. Yeah, 69 00:03:45,920 --> 00:03:48,200 Speaker 2: and in the exchange itself too. 70 00:03:48,240 --> 00:03:51,000 Speaker 1: So so dumb guy question for you, what is an 71 00:03:51,040 --> 00:03:53,360 Speaker 1: AD server in this case? Like, how how does this 72 00:03:53,440 --> 00:03:54,320 Speaker 1: actually break down? 73 00:03:54,760 --> 00:03:57,520 Speaker 2: It's the you know, it's the technology that sits on 74 00:03:57,640 --> 00:04:01,480 Speaker 2: the web pages or on the public sure side, that 75 00:04:01,640 --> 00:04:05,240 Speaker 2: actually makes the decision on what ad to serve on 76 00:04:05,280 --> 00:04:08,000 Speaker 2: the page. So when you're browsing a web page or 77 00:04:08,040 --> 00:04:11,119 Speaker 2: on an app, it's what's deciding to serve the ad. 78 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:16,400 Speaker 1: And so Google ran that themselves. They like, they ran 79 00:04:16,440 --> 00:04:18,760 Speaker 1: that themselves, So they ended up prioritizing their own ads. 80 00:04:18,760 --> 00:04:22,320 Speaker 2: I'm guessing yes, that's that's the case. And so and 81 00:04:22,480 --> 00:04:25,880 Speaker 2: you know, in the findings, what's really interesting is that 82 00:04:25,920 --> 00:04:30,280 Speaker 2: the judge very much agreed with and understood that Google's 83 00:04:30,400 --> 00:04:33,960 Speaker 2: illegal conduct in terms of how they were able to 84 00:04:34,000 --> 00:04:39,799 Speaker 2: manipulate auctions in ways that probably favored them and certainly 85 00:04:39,839 --> 00:04:42,640 Speaker 2: harmed the publishers was a part of the finding. 86 00:04:42,760 --> 00:04:46,279 Speaker 1: So, yeah, when they when you say they harmed the publishers, 87 00:04:46,320 --> 00:04:48,560 Speaker 1: is it just the it wasn't possible to compete with 88 00:04:48,600 --> 00:04:51,880 Speaker 1: Google on ads because Google both made ads and then 89 00:04:52,200 --> 00:04:54,160 Speaker 1: had the platform that showed the ads to people. 90 00:04:54,800 --> 00:04:56,400 Speaker 2: You know, she she hit on a number of things 91 00:04:56,440 --> 00:04:58,120 Speaker 2: that I think are gonna be super interesting in the remedies. 92 00:04:58,160 --> 00:05:01,080 Speaker 2: She hit on that Google was able to keep charging 93 00:05:01,120 --> 00:05:06,040 Speaker 2: twenty percent of the exchange market, so they could take 94 00:05:06,080 --> 00:05:08,920 Speaker 2: twenty percent of every single transaction, and that that price 95 00:05:09,480 --> 00:05:11,560 Speaker 2: never moved from twenty percent for the most part because 96 00:05:11,600 --> 00:05:14,640 Speaker 2: of their monopoly power. But she also hit on all 97 00:05:14,760 --> 00:05:17,520 Speaker 2: the ways that they could manipulate the auctions, which could 98 00:05:17,560 --> 00:05:19,800 Speaker 2: end up being that's a bigger issue when you start 99 00:05:19,800 --> 00:05:22,840 Speaker 2: thinking about the private lawsuits they're out there too. You 100 00:05:22,880 --> 00:05:25,880 Speaker 2: get into, you know, literally tens of tens of billions 101 00:05:25,880 --> 00:05:32,840 Speaker 2: of dollars of potential harm to publishers from auction manipulations. 102 00:05:32,200 --> 00:05:34,440 Speaker 1: And how were they manipulating your auctions? 103 00:05:34,480 --> 00:05:39,440 Speaker 2: Just so we understand, well, the allegations were that and 104 00:05:40,440 --> 00:05:44,240 Speaker 2: this in what she addressed in the opinion were things 105 00:05:44,440 --> 00:05:48,320 Speaker 2: like first look and last look where they actually were 106 00:05:48,440 --> 00:05:55,920 Speaker 2: able to see the prices ahead of time or at 107 00:05:55,960 --> 00:05:58,560 Speaker 2: the end of the auction and make decisions based on 108 00:05:59,040 --> 00:06:02,080 Speaker 2: the bids that they uniquely were able to. 109 00:06:01,960 --> 00:06:02,480 Speaker 3: Do, which is. 110 00:06:04,160 --> 00:06:06,279 Speaker 1: Which is so insane that they were able to like 111 00:06:06,360 --> 00:06:10,039 Speaker 1: they basically set prices like get to everyone to bid 112 00:06:10,080 --> 00:06:13,640 Speaker 1: and then just immediately beat them. Like it's it's shocking, 113 00:06:14,000 --> 00:06:14,600 Speaker 1: that's the thing. 114 00:06:14,920 --> 00:06:16,040 Speaker 3: It's kind of flagrant. 115 00:06:16,600 --> 00:06:19,160 Speaker 2: So with last Look, I think, you know, I think 116 00:06:19,200 --> 00:06:21,400 Speaker 2: I've hit on two things here. One of the last look, 117 00:06:21,720 --> 00:06:23,680 Speaker 2: which I think the judge very much understood because I 118 00:06:23,680 --> 00:06:26,640 Speaker 2: can remember her, you know, who was completely new to 119 00:06:26,680 --> 00:06:31,480 Speaker 2: this marketplace. She totally got why that was an issue 120 00:06:31,560 --> 00:06:34,279 Speaker 2: when she you know, last look. If you take to 121 00:06:34,400 --> 00:06:37,040 Speaker 2: like a silent auction where you put your little bids 122 00:06:37,040 --> 00:06:39,160 Speaker 2: down in an envelope and everybody has kind of their 123 00:06:39,200 --> 00:06:42,160 Speaker 2: secret bid, this would be like Google. Then at the 124 00:06:42,240 --> 00:06:44,200 Speaker 2: end was able to look at everybody's bid, see what 125 00:06:44,240 --> 00:06:47,120 Speaker 2: the highest bid was, and then bid higher if they wanted. 126 00:06:47,200 --> 00:06:49,800 Speaker 2: That was last Look, And there were a bunch of 127 00:06:49,839 --> 00:06:52,279 Speaker 2: other things that stemmed from that, and she really seemed 128 00:06:52,279 --> 00:06:54,520 Speaker 2: to understand it, which is what is it's you know, 129 00:06:54,560 --> 00:06:55,479 Speaker 2: it's nice to. 130 00:06:55,480 --> 00:06:58,000 Speaker 1: See so kind of impressive to see a judge just 131 00:06:58,040 --> 00:06:59,280 Speaker 1: pick up an entire subject. 132 00:06:59,360 --> 00:06:59,960 Speaker 3: Matt to like that. 133 00:07:00,040 --> 00:07:02,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, I totally agree. You know what, who I'd be 134 00:07:03,279 --> 00:07:06,800 Speaker 2: should be most scared, frankly by this opinion, is if 135 00:07:06,839 --> 00:07:09,920 Speaker 2: I'm Facebook or Meta, who is like counting on this 136 00:07:10,040 --> 00:07:12,960 Speaker 2: idea that the judge in their case doesn't know or 137 00:07:13,080 --> 00:07:16,080 Speaker 2: use social media and TikTok and Instagram, et cetera. It 138 00:07:16,120 --> 00:07:19,680 Speaker 2: tells you once again that a judge that understands the 139 00:07:19,800 --> 00:07:23,240 Speaker 2: law and sits there for four weeks plus all the 140 00:07:23,280 --> 00:07:28,320 Speaker 2: pre trial stuff and listens to the evidence can understand 141 00:07:28,320 --> 00:07:30,760 Speaker 2: these issues. And the most important greening I think was 142 00:07:30,760 --> 00:07:34,960 Speaker 2: the Justice Department who really understood the case in a 143 00:07:34,960 --> 00:07:37,320 Speaker 2: way that they could dive deep and then explain it 144 00:07:37,360 --> 00:07:39,640 Speaker 2: to the judge. And they succeeded to do that. 145 00:07:41,160 --> 00:07:43,640 Speaker 1: So it kind of reminds me so during some of 146 00:07:43,680 --> 00:07:47,000 Speaker 1: the Google ads trial things you talked about the spaghetti thing, 147 00:07:47,360 --> 00:07:48,960 Speaker 1: when they are trying to do this kind of slight 148 00:07:49,000 --> 00:07:51,640 Speaker 1: of hand thing and like, ah, it's too impossible to understand, 149 00:07:53,040 --> 00:07:55,880 Speaker 1: it's too complex, and they turned it into that ridiculous thing. 150 00:07:57,000 --> 00:07:59,400 Speaker 2: That's right, they did, And yeah, and that tells you 151 00:07:59,480 --> 00:08:02,320 Speaker 2: that that is not going to be a successful defense. 152 00:08:02,680 --> 00:08:07,280 Speaker 2: Is trying to confuse a judge who has never used it, 153 00:08:07,360 --> 00:08:09,880 Speaker 2: we would understand add tech, that's not going to work. 154 00:08:10,040 --> 00:08:13,320 Speaker 2: The just departments succeeded and explaining it. They kept it simple. 155 00:08:25,880 --> 00:08:28,400 Speaker 1: So what happens next? What are the next moves with 156 00:08:28,480 --> 00:08:29,720 Speaker 1: this pub Well. 157 00:08:29,640 --> 00:08:33,520 Speaker 2: A reminder, this is what's called the rocket docket. The 158 00:08:33,640 --> 00:08:37,520 Speaker 2: Virginia District Eastern District of Virginia. And so the judge 159 00:08:37,559 --> 00:08:39,840 Speaker 2: moved really really fast. That's why they have that name. 160 00:08:40,200 --> 00:08:43,760 Speaker 2: This case was filed in January of twenty twenty three, 161 00:08:43,880 --> 00:08:46,400 Speaker 2: and so we got to a trial, you know, eighteen 162 00:08:46,400 --> 00:08:49,200 Speaker 2: months later, in a decision that took you know, frankly, 163 00:08:49,240 --> 00:08:51,200 Speaker 2: the decision took a lot longer than anyone thought it 164 00:08:51,240 --> 00:08:53,680 Speaker 2: was going to take to come out. People are starting 165 00:08:53,679 --> 00:08:55,160 Speaker 2: to get nervous, but you know, it just took time. 166 00:08:55,200 --> 00:08:59,040 Speaker 2: And she clearly wrote a really clear opinion and it's 167 00:08:59,440 --> 00:09:04,600 Speaker 2: very it's very easy to read through. So that keeping 168 00:09:04,600 --> 00:09:07,800 Speaker 2: in mind, I think she'll probably move fast. They have 169 00:09:07,840 --> 00:09:12,480 Speaker 2: a meeting. I think it'll be tomorrow in terms of 170 00:09:12,520 --> 00:09:15,960 Speaker 2: what's the schedule going forward for remedies, and so I 171 00:09:15,960 --> 00:09:18,079 Speaker 2: would expect the dates to all be in the next 172 00:09:18,120 --> 00:09:18,640 Speaker 2: few months. 173 00:09:19,040 --> 00:09:20,240 Speaker 3: But what would the remedies be? 174 00:09:20,360 --> 00:09:23,000 Speaker 1: So they would have to break off the three parts, 175 00:09:23,080 --> 00:09:25,400 Speaker 1: like the AD side, they would have to break off 176 00:09:25,440 --> 00:09:26,679 Speaker 1: the cell side, Like. 177 00:09:26,640 --> 00:09:28,640 Speaker 3: What are they going to have to do in theory? 178 00:09:28,640 --> 00:09:29,800 Speaker 3: I realize you're just guessing. 179 00:09:30,840 --> 00:09:34,400 Speaker 2: I'm just guessing. You know that the findings are clear 180 00:09:34,520 --> 00:09:37,360 Speaker 2: enough that there's going to be structural separation that they're 181 00:09:37,400 --> 00:09:41,920 Speaker 2: going to be pushing for you know, how the buyside 182 00:09:41,960 --> 00:09:46,000 Speaker 2: gets handled, it's going to be really important because a reminder, 183 00:09:46,679 --> 00:09:49,240 Speaker 2: and this doesn't come out really in the proceedings as much, 184 00:09:50,080 --> 00:09:53,600 Speaker 2: but the ad tech case is downstream from the Search case, 185 00:09:54,440 --> 00:09:57,839 Speaker 2: and the arguments were that the reason Google was able 186 00:09:57,880 --> 00:10:01,080 Speaker 2: to dominate the buy side, the cell side, and ad 187 00:10:01,120 --> 00:10:04,600 Speaker 2: tech was because of the monopoly power in search, which 188 00:10:04,640 --> 00:10:08,000 Speaker 2: we also have remedies now that started on Monday, and 189 00:10:08,040 --> 00:10:11,480 Speaker 2: so these things are going to start to swirl together. 190 00:10:11,760 --> 00:10:14,240 Speaker 2: And when you think about Google having to divest Chrome 191 00:10:14,360 --> 00:10:16,640 Speaker 2: and some of the other remedies within the search case, 192 00:10:17,440 --> 00:10:19,200 Speaker 2: it's you know, it's quite possible that there will be 193 00:10:19,240 --> 00:10:24,800 Speaker 2: some larger settlement that will be proposed, or a larger 194 00:10:24,840 --> 00:10:28,599 Speaker 2: structural separation that needs to play out between the two decisions. 195 00:10:30,000 --> 00:10:33,079 Speaker 1: So as as you've been hinting at, there was the 196 00:10:33,080 --> 00:10:35,760 Speaker 1: there was the verdict last year that Google did have 197 00:10:35,760 --> 00:10:38,560 Speaker 1: a monopoly over search. How do you think that these 198 00:10:38,600 --> 00:10:40,400 Speaker 1: two things are going to play together? You kind of 199 00:10:40,400 --> 00:10:42,600 Speaker 1: got it there, But what are the ways in which 200 00:10:42,640 --> 00:10:43,120 Speaker 1: this could go? 201 00:10:43,800 --> 00:10:47,040 Speaker 2: Well, the search decision was not There were two monopolies 202 00:10:47,080 --> 00:10:50,480 Speaker 2: that they were found of abused. One was searched. The 203 00:10:50,520 --> 00:10:53,840 Speaker 2: other was search text ads. So it's the ads that 204 00:10:53,880 --> 00:10:58,160 Speaker 2: we see in search, which is Google's largest business, right 205 00:10:58,200 --> 00:11:00,920 Speaker 2: And so. 206 00:10:59,840 --> 00:11:02,640 Speaker 1: Just so I'm clear, you're saying that there's the monopoly 207 00:11:02,679 --> 00:11:06,119 Speaker 1: over a search engine and then the advertising onset search. 208 00:11:05,880 --> 00:11:10,719 Speaker 2: Engine exactly, and so and that advertising on said sir, 209 00:11:11,320 --> 00:11:15,959 Speaker 2: that advertising on said search engine is is what allowed them, 210 00:11:16,000 --> 00:11:18,440 Speaker 2: according to the JUST Department, to then dominate in the 211 00:11:18,480 --> 00:11:21,840 Speaker 2: ad tech stack. And so I think that's the connection 212 00:11:21,960 --> 00:11:25,520 Speaker 2: point between the cases and will also start to be 213 00:11:25,559 --> 00:11:28,400 Speaker 2: a part of the discussion in the remedies. Both cases 214 00:11:28,440 --> 00:11:34,480 Speaker 2: involve network effects. Both cases involve using data to to 215 00:11:34,679 --> 00:11:37,680 Speaker 2: maintain market power and to abuse it. 216 00:11:38,679 --> 00:11:41,960 Speaker 1: Right, So the potential remedies, it sounds like, could be 217 00:11:42,520 --> 00:11:45,760 Speaker 1: almost breaking up Google into multiple different companies. 218 00:11:47,160 --> 00:11:51,640 Speaker 2: With this case, the the baby bells, you know, idea 219 00:11:51,679 --> 00:11:55,120 Speaker 2: of what happened to AT and T should be much. 220 00:11:55,040 --> 00:11:56,760 Speaker 3: More happily than to several listeners. 221 00:11:57,440 --> 00:12:01,560 Speaker 2: They divided AT and T up into into pieces and 222 00:12:01,600 --> 00:12:04,840 Speaker 2: so so you know, not just forcing them to vest 223 00:12:04,920 --> 00:12:07,600 Speaker 2: one piece of their business. And so you know, with 224 00:12:07,640 --> 00:12:10,960 Speaker 2: the ad tech case, again there's you know, there's settlements 225 00:12:10,960 --> 00:12:13,520 Speaker 2: that can happen, there's appeals that will happen. But the 226 00:12:13,760 --> 00:12:18,440 Speaker 2: argument for you know, should Google have to divest not 227 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:23,480 Speaker 2: just its advertising ad tech business, but also you know, 228 00:12:23,760 --> 00:12:27,200 Speaker 2: other areas of its business, I think becomes much stronger. 229 00:12:27,640 --> 00:12:29,360 Speaker 2: You can imagine Chrome, you can imagine Android, you can 230 00:12:29,360 --> 00:12:30,480 Speaker 2: imagine YouTube. 231 00:12:31,000 --> 00:12:33,120 Speaker 3: Yeah. Actually, here's a good question for you. 232 00:12:33,679 --> 00:12:37,160 Speaker 1: I I know Chrome, and I'm sure many listeners know 233 00:12:37,280 --> 00:12:40,760 Speaker 1: Chrome as a free browser, not really a business entity. 234 00:12:41,120 --> 00:12:44,720 Speaker 1: How does selling off Chrome meaningfully help with the monopoly 235 00:12:45,440 --> 00:12:46,600 Speaker 1: situation Chrome? 236 00:12:46,920 --> 00:12:52,040 Speaker 2: You know, Google's entire advertising business is based on targeting 237 00:12:52,160 --> 00:12:56,120 Speaker 2: ads based on signals that it in, data that it 238 00:12:56,200 --> 00:13:00,600 Speaker 2: gathers from the various ways that it can touch the user. 239 00:13:01,120 --> 00:13:05,800 Speaker 2: And so Chrome as a web browser is an incredible 240 00:13:05,880 --> 00:13:09,960 Speaker 2: way to harvest data about how you're browsing the web 241 00:13:10,800 --> 00:13:14,240 Speaker 2: and where you are location, search, et cetera. And so 242 00:13:15,040 --> 00:13:17,240 Speaker 2: you know where Google believes it has permission to use 243 00:13:17,280 --> 00:13:20,280 Speaker 2: that data to target ads and train its into its 244 00:13:20,280 --> 00:13:23,560 Speaker 2: machine learning and AI training. That is very valuable. 245 00:13:24,640 --> 00:13:28,160 Speaker 1: I did so, wait, so this is perhaps I'm very stupid. 246 00:13:28,280 --> 00:13:31,880 Speaker 1: So Chrome collects data on your browsing habits for every user. 247 00:13:32,400 --> 00:13:35,480 Speaker 2: Now, for every user, there's there's privacy, you know, settings 248 00:13:35,520 --> 00:13:37,120 Speaker 2: and all sorts of things you can do. You can 249 00:13:37,160 --> 00:13:43,120 Speaker 2: go into incognito mode. But if Google is acting as 250 00:13:43,160 --> 00:13:48,040 Speaker 2: your browser, it has access to your browsing history and 251 00:13:48,240 --> 00:13:51,240 Speaker 2: what you're doing on the web, and they can, where 252 00:13:51,280 --> 00:13:54,360 Speaker 2: they believe they have the rights, they can use that data. 253 00:13:55,000 --> 00:14:01,200 Speaker 2: Two help you know, provide further information on both both 254 00:14:01,240 --> 00:14:04,440 Speaker 2: for search but also for you know, what content to 255 00:14:04,480 --> 00:14:07,040 Speaker 2: serve up and what adds to serve up. What they're 256 00:14:07,080 --> 00:14:09,400 Speaker 2: actually doing becomes a bigger question. 257 00:14:10,040 --> 00:14:14,640 Speaker 1: Right, So was that established a whole trial not. 258 00:14:15,120 --> 00:14:17,600 Speaker 2: It was in the search in the search case that 259 00:14:18,760 --> 00:14:24,040 Speaker 2: but it was more specifically focused on the default settings 260 00:14:23,640 --> 00:14:28,560 Speaker 2: for search from the browser, right. And so within Chrome, 261 00:14:28,640 --> 00:14:30,480 Speaker 2: if you type in your location bar, you're always going 262 00:14:30,520 --> 00:14:33,640 Speaker 2: to be doing a Google search. That's it's pretty clear 263 00:14:33,680 --> 00:14:35,800 Speaker 2: that how that le then gets passed from the browser 264 00:14:35,840 --> 00:14:36,760 Speaker 2: to the search engine. 265 00:14:37,360 --> 00:14:39,880 Speaker 1: Yeah, and if they have billions of users, then they 266 00:14:39,920 --> 00:14:43,120 Speaker 1: can think everyone is searching using Google because they have 267 00:14:43,240 --> 00:14:46,280 Speaker 1: because it's the default. That's so crazy. But the thing 268 00:14:46,320 --> 00:14:48,640 Speaker 1: with Chrome as well, isn't a revenue driver? Is that 269 00:14:49,720 --> 00:14:52,320 Speaker 1: like a direct source of revenue for Google? 270 00:14:52,720 --> 00:14:55,440 Speaker 2: You know, it's if you if you think about the 271 00:14:55,440 --> 00:14:58,520 Speaker 2: search case again, I mean Google is paying Apple, you know, 272 00:14:58,560 --> 00:15:03,280 Speaker 2: twenty five billion dollars. Let's say I'm estimating twenty It 273 00:15:03,320 --> 00:15:05,400 Speaker 2: was twenty billion a few years ago, but let's say 274 00:15:05,400 --> 00:15:07,640 Speaker 2: twenty five billion dollars. They were paying to Apple to 275 00:15:07,680 --> 00:15:10,680 Speaker 2: be the default search on Safari and all of the 276 00:15:10,720 --> 00:15:16,560 Speaker 2: access points on iOS. So Chrome technically is making revenue 277 00:15:16,680 --> 00:15:21,480 Speaker 2: off of those search queries. It's just Google's pain itself, right, 278 00:15:21,520 --> 00:15:24,720 Speaker 2: And so that's the that's the issue. 279 00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:27,040 Speaker 1: Well, the reason I bring that up is one of 280 00:15:27,040 --> 00:15:30,120 Speaker 1: the remedies the idea of selling Chrome off. Why would 281 00:15:30,120 --> 00:15:32,720 Speaker 1: you like, what value would that be in Chrome? If 282 00:15:32,720 --> 00:15:34,480 Speaker 1: the whole value of it is to just be kind 283 00:15:34,520 --> 00:15:38,640 Speaker 1: of a flume towards Google, like a like a kind 284 00:15:38,880 --> 00:15:41,360 Speaker 1: like a way to like almost like a marketing arm 285 00:15:41,400 --> 00:15:44,040 Speaker 1: of Google. If you sold off Chrome, surely it wouldn't 286 00:15:44,080 --> 00:15:45,600 Speaker 1: have as much business value. 287 00:15:46,040 --> 00:15:47,840 Speaker 2: It wouldn't have as much business value to Google. The 288 00:15:47,840 --> 00:15:49,600 Speaker 2: whole point would be it be an independent business that 289 00:15:49,640 --> 00:15:53,400 Speaker 2: would be making decisions. I mean, technically a browser is 290 00:15:53,400 --> 00:15:55,520 Speaker 2: supposed to be a user agent. It's supposed to be 291 00:15:56,240 --> 00:15:58,800 Speaker 2: making decisions for the user. And what would they. 292 00:15:58,880 --> 00:15:59,720 Speaker 3: Value right. 293 00:16:02,480 --> 00:16:06,040 Speaker 1: As an autonomous business? Like yeah, because right now is 294 00:16:06,440 --> 00:16:08,280 Speaker 1: it's not like people pay for creat It just doesn't 295 00:16:08,320 --> 00:16:10,800 Speaker 1: feel like that is a practical thing to do, because 296 00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:13,000 Speaker 1: if the whole value proposition of it is that it's 297 00:16:13,000 --> 00:16:15,840 Speaker 1: a free product that makes Google money and it doesn't 298 00:16:15,880 --> 00:16:18,560 Speaker 1: make any money for anyone else, or like it isn't 299 00:16:18,680 --> 00:16:19,400 Speaker 1: you know what I mean? 300 00:16:20,200 --> 00:16:22,360 Speaker 2: Yeah, so it could make a decision to point to 301 00:16:23,120 --> 00:16:28,360 Speaker 2: you know, a new Amazon search site or sure that 302 00:16:28,480 --> 00:16:30,840 Speaker 2: gets into search, right and so and get paid. 303 00:16:30,720 --> 00:16:33,280 Speaker 3: For it, right Yeah. 304 00:16:33,400 --> 00:16:35,880 Speaker 1: I mean it almost feels like this could lead to 305 00:16:36,200 --> 00:16:37,680 Speaker 1: I don't want I'm not going to say the death 306 00:16:37,680 --> 00:16:39,840 Speaker 1: of Google in the sense that Google will cease to be, 307 00:16:40,000 --> 00:16:43,480 Speaker 1: but the death of modern Google as we know it. 308 00:16:43,480 --> 00:16:48,160 Speaker 2: It definitely, you know, all leads towards a very different Google, 309 00:16:48,800 --> 00:16:52,320 Speaker 2: whether it be structurally different or just being hamstrung by 310 00:16:52,880 --> 00:16:55,000 Speaker 2: the appeals of all these cases. 311 00:16:55,760 --> 00:16:59,400 Speaker 1: So, I mean, it's they. I cannot think of anyone 312 00:16:59,440 --> 00:17:02,400 Speaker 1: who got more lucky than it being good Friday than 313 00:17:02,480 --> 00:17:05,040 Speaker 1: Google right now, because it's good, we're recording this a 314 00:17:05,080 --> 00:17:08,840 Speaker 1: good Friday. And it's like they didn't like the markets 315 00:17:08,880 --> 00:17:11,399 Speaker 1: are closed, so they didn't immediately get the markets just 316 00:17:11,480 --> 00:17:14,600 Speaker 1: pummeling them as they should because they've lost both now 317 00:17:15,040 --> 00:17:17,919 Speaker 1: they don't like whatever appeals they may do, are not 318 00:17:18,040 --> 00:17:21,480 Speaker 1: going to really, I don't think they're going to stop everything. 319 00:17:22,840 --> 00:17:26,359 Speaker 2: Markets are complex, I would I would hesitate to wonder 320 00:17:26,400 --> 00:17:29,359 Speaker 2: and you know, to predict why the stock did what 321 00:17:29,359 --> 00:17:31,919 Speaker 2: it did yesterday, even when the announcement came out. You know, 322 00:17:32,000 --> 00:17:34,480 Speaker 2: there are some arguments that having to divest, you know, 323 00:17:34,560 --> 00:17:37,320 Speaker 2: divest parts of the business could actually create more value 324 00:17:37,359 --> 00:17:38,280 Speaker 2: back to shareholders. 325 00:17:39,680 --> 00:17:40,639 Speaker 3: What value would that be? 326 00:17:42,160 --> 00:17:46,160 Speaker 2: Well, typically when you spin things off, you often see 327 00:17:46,160 --> 00:17:48,760 Speaker 2: it or you sell things, often the stock you know, 328 00:17:48,840 --> 00:17:52,199 Speaker 2: can go up because of that. And so you know, 329 00:17:52,440 --> 00:17:54,280 Speaker 2: are the is the some of the parts worth more 330 00:17:54,400 --> 00:17:56,360 Speaker 2: than than the whole? You know, those questions all come 331 00:17:56,359 --> 00:18:00,639 Speaker 2: into play, But that's all. Yeah, that's all to the markets. 332 00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:02,800 Speaker 2: And sometimes the markets aren't as smart as we think 333 00:18:02,840 --> 00:18:05,119 Speaker 2: they are, and they take time to understand and impact things. 334 00:18:19,880 --> 00:18:22,560 Speaker 1: Yeah, I agree, and I've seen the same thing with 335 00:18:22,640 --> 00:18:24,840 Speaker 1: Core Weeve recently, which is a company that has driven 336 00:18:24,880 --> 00:18:29,199 Speaker 1: me insane onto more sane things. Though, So when we're 337 00:18:29,400 --> 00:18:31,320 Speaker 1: recording this, it's going to be next week, but the 338 00:18:31,640 --> 00:18:34,399 Speaker 1: beginning of the remedies for the search trial is on 339 00:18:34,720 --> 00:18:37,040 Speaker 1: the twenty first, So what can people expect there? 340 00:18:37,800 --> 00:18:39,560 Speaker 2: I don't think there's gonna be as much excitement and 341 00:18:39,640 --> 00:18:43,280 Speaker 2: drama as we saw with the actual liabilities trial. I think, 342 00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:47,159 Speaker 2: you know, for the folks that follow the industry closely, 343 00:18:47,680 --> 00:18:51,040 Speaker 2: what you should expect is all the AI companies are 344 00:18:52,000 --> 00:18:58,160 Speaker 2: involved and so either through depositions, discovery, and some testifying. 345 00:18:58,280 --> 00:19:02,520 Speaker 2: So you've got anthropic open AI Microsoft. So when you 346 00:19:02,520 --> 00:19:06,040 Speaker 2: think about the shaping of the AI world going forward, 347 00:19:06,320 --> 00:19:09,679 Speaker 2: you're going to have all the major players. Apple is 348 00:19:10,760 --> 00:19:16,320 Speaker 2: Apple tried to actually intervene, and but the judge didn't 349 00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:19,720 Speaker 2: allow them. So they've they've got a strong interest because 350 00:19:19,720 --> 00:19:22,679 Speaker 2: they've got estimated to be I think ten to fifteen 351 00:19:22,720 --> 00:19:26,120 Speaker 2: percent of their profits are tied to their Google deal. 352 00:19:26,040 --> 00:19:29,160 Speaker 1: Right, and so well, because Google pays them to use 353 00:19:29,680 --> 00:19:33,679 Speaker 1: just just for the listeners, so Google pays Apple billions 354 00:19:34,080 --> 00:19:37,000 Speaker 1: have to be the default such, right, That's right, and. 355 00:19:37,040 --> 00:19:39,679 Speaker 2: The you know, the remedies are that they can't do 356 00:19:39,760 --> 00:19:43,440 Speaker 2: that anymore. And so the reason they weren't allowed to intervene, 357 00:19:43,520 --> 00:19:46,399 Speaker 2: according to Judge Meta, was because he didn't see a 358 00:19:46,440 --> 00:19:50,200 Speaker 2: difference in Apple's interests from Google's interests. He basically said, yeah, 359 00:19:50,240 --> 00:19:51,359 Speaker 2: you have the same interest. 360 00:19:51,640 --> 00:19:55,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, well, I mean the interest being the Apple needs 361 00:19:55,320 --> 00:19:56,720 Speaker 1: Google to keep them and not police so that the 362 00:19:56,720 --> 00:19:58,960 Speaker 1: Apple can keep getting a chunk of their revenue. 363 00:19:59,080 --> 00:20:02,960 Speaker 2: That's exactly right. Yeah, so yeah, so Apple cares a lot, 364 00:20:03,040 --> 00:20:06,320 Speaker 2: Microsoft cares a lot, All the big players care. The 365 00:20:06,480 --> 00:20:09,840 Speaker 2: testimonies is going to be X, a lot of experts 366 00:20:10,160 --> 00:20:13,040 Speaker 2: and you know, unless CEO. 367 00:20:12,320 --> 00:20:14,200 Speaker 1: Who will be doing the testimonies. 368 00:20:14,840 --> 00:20:18,760 Speaker 2: It'll be experts from both sides, like so academics that 369 00:20:18,920 --> 00:20:23,320 Speaker 2: study these issues. It will be executives from the AI companies. 370 00:20:24,359 --> 00:20:28,960 Speaker 2: I think we'll probably hear from Eddie Q again at Apple, 371 00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:32,480 Speaker 2: who's one of their top executives. We'll probably hear from 372 00:20:32,520 --> 00:20:36,280 Speaker 2: Suon Dharbashi again from Google as CEO. They're on the list. 373 00:20:36,560 --> 00:20:39,400 Speaker 1: So and so in those two weeks, what's going to happen. 374 00:20:39,440 --> 00:20:42,120 Speaker 1: So it's basically another trial to say how they will 375 00:20:42,119 --> 00:20:43,639 Speaker 1: deal with their monopoly in search. 376 00:20:44,359 --> 00:20:46,159 Speaker 2: That's right, And well, I mean, I guess one thing 377 00:20:46,200 --> 00:20:49,800 Speaker 2: that's interesting is they're still pretty far apart. So Google's 378 00:20:49,840 --> 00:20:53,439 Speaker 2: proposed remedies for itself are basically a slap on the wrist, 379 00:20:54,080 --> 00:20:57,880 Speaker 2: and you know, kind of kind of embarrassing for anybody, 380 00:20:57,960 --> 00:20:59,520 Speaker 2: and you know that studies they think. 381 00:20:59,400 --> 00:21:00,600 Speaker 3: So when you said up on the wrist. 382 00:21:00,760 --> 00:21:04,840 Speaker 1: Is it like a fine that offering. 383 00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:09,800 Speaker 2: They're offering some restrictions on the way they do things, 384 00:21:09,840 --> 00:21:14,680 Speaker 2: but nothing that touches on structural separation in any way, 385 00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:18,040 Speaker 2: shape or form. Nothing that prevents them from doing an 386 00:21:18,080 --> 00:21:24,000 Speaker 2: Apple like deal. And so it's, you know, the bare minimum. 387 00:21:24,320 --> 00:21:26,760 Speaker 2: That the only way I can read it, and I'm 388 00:21:26,800 --> 00:21:31,239 Speaker 2: just you know, spitballing here, but is that they're not 389 00:21:31,240 --> 00:21:33,600 Speaker 2: giving it an inch right now because they think either 390 00:21:34,320 --> 00:21:37,720 Speaker 2: they can do some sort of transactional deal settlement with 391 00:21:37,840 --> 00:21:40,960 Speaker 2: the current administration or that they can win on appeal, 392 00:21:41,160 --> 00:21:44,160 Speaker 2: and they don't want to show their cards by moving 393 00:21:44,200 --> 00:21:47,159 Speaker 2: the line in any way because it's so far removed 394 00:21:47,160 --> 00:21:48,720 Speaker 2: from the decision itself. 395 00:21:49,160 --> 00:21:52,280 Speaker 1: Right, because if they go defensive, then they would cut 396 00:21:52,480 --> 00:21:54,639 Speaker 1: they would kind of reveal their hand for when they 397 00:21:54,680 --> 00:21:55,320 Speaker 1: go to appeal. 398 00:21:55,400 --> 00:21:57,720 Speaker 3: You're saying that's right, that's right. 399 00:21:57,560 --> 00:21:59,560 Speaker 1: And so is the Department of Justice. The Department of 400 00:21:59,680 --> 00:22:01,800 Speaker 1: Justice is saying they should sell off Chrome or is 401 00:22:01,840 --> 00:22:03,440 Speaker 1: that anything else they're asking for? 402 00:22:04,080 --> 00:22:06,320 Speaker 2: They should sell off Chrome, and they're struck, you know, 403 00:22:06,359 --> 00:22:09,960 Speaker 2: divest Chrome. They may need to divest Android, but it 404 00:22:09,960 --> 00:22:13,040 Speaker 2: basically says, let's see how that goes, but we can 405 00:22:13,080 --> 00:22:18,600 Speaker 2: still do that, and then very importantly, they're requiring them 406 00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:23,680 Speaker 2: to share some data with other search engines that would 407 00:22:23,720 --> 00:22:26,920 Speaker 2: help other search engines have a more level playing field. 408 00:22:27,440 --> 00:22:31,840 Speaker 2: And as it relates to publishers, who again I do 409 00:22:31,920 --> 00:22:33,679 Speaker 2: a lot of work for the work for the publishers, 410 00:22:34,520 --> 00:22:42,840 Speaker 2: it requires Google to allow publishers to narrowly define what 411 00:22:43,280 --> 00:22:47,520 Speaker 2: Google can crawl and use data for. And so the 412 00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:50,399 Speaker 2: publisher can say, hey, you can crawl my website for 413 00:22:50,440 --> 00:22:52,919 Speaker 2: the purpose of search, but you cannot then use it 414 00:22:53,000 --> 00:22:56,120 Speaker 2: to train your your AI engines. 415 00:22:57,200 --> 00:23:00,720 Speaker 1: So yeah, and so that the DO is pushing to 416 00:23:00,720 --> 00:23:01,720 Speaker 1: make sure that's the case. 417 00:23:02,040 --> 00:23:05,880 Speaker 2: The DJ is very smartly understanding that if they don't 418 00:23:06,200 --> 00:23:11,760 Speaker 2: put real constraints on Google round AI, then they're only 419 00:23:11,800 --> 00:23:15,639 Speaker 2: addressing past behavior, but they're not actually making sure that 420 00:23:15,680 --> 00:23:18,359 Speaker 2: there's a level playing you field going forward in which 421 00:23:18,440 --> 00:23:20,640 Speaker 2: people won't be able to just abuse and run over 422 00:23:20,640 --> 00:23:21,760 Speaker 2: the AI marketplace too. 423 00:23:23,080 --> 00:23:25,320 Speaker 1: It really feels like we're kind of on the precipice 424 00:23:25,359 --> 00:23:27,560 Speaker 1: of something changing in the next few years with the web, 425 00:23:27,880 --> 00:23:32,359 Speaker 1: because if Google has to even share data from search, 426 00:23:32,880 --> 00:23:35,840 Speaker 1: that will change, like we will get competition in search 427 00:23:35,880 --> 00:23:39,920 Speaker 1: for the first time really meaningfully in decade, like decades. 428 00:23:39,960 --> 00:23:42,440 Speaker 1: I guess it's like since the lycost and old Tavista 429 00:23:42,520 --> 00:23:46,960 Speaker 1: days because these two cases are so inherently intertwined. 430 00:23:47,960 --> 00:23:53,080 Speaker 2: Absolutely, yeah, and don't and don't shot change Gopher or 431 00:23:53,200 --> 00:23:57,480 Speaker 2: web crawler in that Yeah, but yeah, there hasn't been 432 00:23:58,160 --> 00:23:59,880 Speaker 2: other search engine since the late nineties. 433 00:24:00,400 --> 00:24:04,800 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, Oh no, I said, I think I said excite, like, yeah, okay, 434 00:24:04,960 --> 00:24:07,719 Speaker 1: changing changing gis before we wrap up. You've been at 435 00:24:07,760 --> 00:24:11,240 Speaker 1: the FTC case with Meta. How's that going? And also 436 00:24:11,280 --> 00:24:12,119 Speaker 1: what is that about? 437 00:24:12,920 --> 00:24:17,520 Speaker 2: So that is about whether or not when Meta and 438 00:24:17,720 --> 00:24:22,720 Speaker 2: Facebook at the time acquired Instagram and WhatsApp, that they 439 00:24:22,760 --> 00:24:26,840 Speaker 2: were doing that to maintain their monopoly power in a 440 00:24:26,960 --> 00:24:32,199 Speaker 2: market for personal social networking services. And so that's that 441 00:24:32,320 --> 00:24:35,840 Speaker 2: is actually explicitly to break up Meta, so force them 442 00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:41,480 Speaker 2: to divest WhatsApp and Instagram. And the testimony I saw 443 00:24:41,600 --> 00:24:45,080 Speaker 2: was Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO, who was on the stand 444 00:24:45,119 --> 00:24:47,960 Speaker 2: for roughly seven or eight hours, which is a lot 445 00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:51,080 Speaker 2: for any CEO. He's he's the key witness, and so 446 00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:53,640 Speaker 2: now they're rolling into the other witnesses. I think it's 447 00:24:53,680 --> 00:24:56,600 Speaker 2: going well to answer your question, Yeah. 448 00:24:55,960 --> 00:24:57,840 Speaker 1: So what are some of the highlights of things that 449 00:24:57,920 --> 00:24:58,800 Speaker 1: Marcky Mack said. 450 00:25:01,040 --> 00:25:04,200 Speaker 2: He you know, he confirmed there's a lot of emails 451 00:25:04,280 --> 00:25:07,240 Speaker 2: in that case, and unlike the Google case, where there 452 00:25:07,320 --> 00:25:10,719 Speaker 2: was real problems with preservation of evidence and there were 453 00:25:10,760 --> 00:25:13,360 Speaker 2: emails that were in messaging that were deleted and all 454 00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:15,960 Speaker 2: sorts of things that by the way, Google's Kent Walker 455 00:25:16,080 --> 00:25:19,960 Speaker 2: got slammed by the judge for for not preserving evidence 456 00:25:20,359 --> 00:25:21,680 Speaker 2: for like the third or fourth time. 457 00:25:21,720 --> 00:25:25,359 Speaker 1: Now, and you mentioned that Jurigar interviews as well, that 458 00:25:25,400 --> 00:25:26,800 Speaker 1: the judge pissed about this. 459 00:25:27,200 --> 00:25:30,360 Speaker 2: The judge was pissed and it came out in her opinion. Yeah, 460 00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:34,320 Speaker 2: that's abuse of attorney client privilege. She basically said. The 461 00:25:34,359 --> 00:25:36,119 Speaker 2: only the way I read it was the only reason 462 00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:38,919 Speaker 2: I'm not sanctioning you is because I found you liable 463 00:25:38,920 --> 00:25:41,440 Speaker 2: of breaking the Sherman Act. So and that's kind of 464 00:25:41,480 --> 00:25:43,880 Speaker 2: what happened in the Search case too, and it's kind 465 00:25:43,880 --> 00:25:45,880 Speaker 2: of in the app Store case they did get sanctioned. 466 00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:50,000 Speaker 2: So there's the third anti trust uh loss that Google 467 00:25:50,080 --> 00:25:52,760 Speaker 2: has in which they've been you know, nailed by the 468 00:25:52,880 --> 00:25:55,360 Speaker 2: judge and they've got more trials coming, so it's it's 469 00:25:55,400 --> 00:25:59,040 Speaker 2: a problem for them. And so the difference the flip 470 00:25:59,040 --> 00:26:02,439 Speaker 2: side of that is that Facebook and Meta. You know, 471 00:26:02,520 --> 00:26:06,359 Speaker 2: there's a wealth of emails, and you know, Mark clearly 472 00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:09,680 Speaker 2: ran the company very tightly and drove the product decisions 473 00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:12,879 Speaker 2: very tightly, and he documented a lot of that in emails, 474 00:26:13,200 --> 00:26:15,080 Speaker 2: and some of them are pretty damning, you know. I 475 00:26:15,119 --> 00:26:17,440 Speaker 2: think the one that has always gotten the most attention 476 00:26:18,520 --> 00:26:22,040 Speaker 2: is emails where he discussed why would we buy Instagram 477 00:26:22,880 --> 00:26:27,119 Speaker 2: and focused in on the reasons of neutralizing a competitor 478 00:26:27,280 --> 00:26:33,120 Speaker 2: and buying time. So neutralizing Instagram and buying time, and 479 00:26:33,440 --> 00:26:37,640 Speaker 2: a lot of the contemporary contemporaneous evidence shows that they 480 00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:42,560 Speaker 2: were very, very concerned over one year to eighteen month 481 00:26:42,640 --> 00:26:47,320 Speaker 2: period where Facebook was behind and moving to mobile, Instagram 482 00:26:47,359 --> 00:26:50,159 Speaker 2: was growing very very quickly, and they had screwed up 483 00:26:50,200 --> 00:26:53,840 Speaker 2: by building the Facebook app for HTML five that's a 484 00:26:53,840 --> 00:26:56,320 Speaker 2: technical thing, instead of their own native app, and they 485 00:26:56,320 --> 00:27:00,440 Speaker 2: were freaking out. And there's a lot of emails about that. 486 00:27:00,440 --> 00:27:01,200 Speaker 3: That's fascinating. 487 00:27:01,280 --> 00:27:05,760 Speaker 1: So really kind of returning to what I was saying 488 00:27:05,800 --> 00:27:08,280 Speaker 1: previously as well, it feels like the results of these 489 00:27:08,320 --> 00:27:11,560 Speaker 1: trials could just fundamentally rebuild the web because if Instagram 490 00:27:11,720 --> 00:27:15,200 Speaker 1: was competitive with Facebook, by which I mean they had 491 00:27:15,240 --> 00:27:17,359 Speaker 1: to spin it off and make it its own company, 492 00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:20,080 Speaker 1: and Google could no longer monopolize all the parts of 493 00:27:20,119 --> 00:27:22,960 Speaker 1: the ads. It's going to change the economics of everything 494 00:27:23,080 --> 00:27:26,280 Speaker 1: underlying the Internet because the Internet is mostly paidful by ads. 495 00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:29,920 Speaker 2: That's right. That last parts really really important that you're 496 00:27:29,920 --> 00:27:31,800 Speaker 2: making is Yeah, we're talking about a lot of the 497 00:27:31,920 --> 00:27:34,959 Speaker 2: user behaviors and stuff. But there's one hundred and whatever 498 00:27:35,000 --> 00:27:39,800 Speaker 2: forty billion dollars of US digital advertising that goes to 499 00:27:39,840 --> 00:27:43,879 Speaker 2: those two companies I would get estimating. And so most 500 00:27:43,880 --> 00:27:46,520 Speaker 2: of the growth in digital advertising over the last decade 501 00:27:46,560 --> 00:27:49,120 Speaker 2: has gone to Google and Facebook in some way, shape 502 00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:52,479 Speaker 2: or form. And so, how does it affect the advertising business? 503 00:27:52,520 --> 00:27:53,960 Speaker 2: Becomes really really important to all. 504 00:27:53,920 --> 00:27:57,159 Speaker 1: Us, and the way it would affect it is it 505 00:27:57,200 --> 00:27:59,640 Speaker 1: could be cheaper for advertising, but it could also be 506 00:28:01,000 --> 00:28:06,080 Speaker 1: more chaotic because especially with metas advertising products. From what 507 00:28:06,119 --> 00:28:09,639 Speaker 1: I understand, it's like almost the equivalent of Google MACS 508 00:28:10,040 --> 00:28:12,840 Speaker 1: in that you put you give meta money and it 509 00:28:12,880 --> 00:28:15,280 Speaker 1: goes into the greater metaverse. I don't mean I mean 510 00:28:15,280 --> 00:28:17,359 Speaker 1: that with a cap Yeah, damn, I can't say that shit, 511 00:28:17,680 --> 00:28:21,159 Speaker 1: but goes into the data meta series of products in 512 00:28:21,200 --> 00:28:23,200 Speaker 1: the same way that Google MACS. You put money in 513 00:28:23,240 --> 00:28:25,920 Speaker 1: and it goes across all of Google's stuff. That being 514 00:28:25,960 --> 00:28:29,080 Speaker 1: broken up would be like Google like ninety something percent 515 00:28:29,160 --> 00:28:31,920 Speaker 1: of metas revenue is ads as well, Like this was 516 00:28:32,000 --> 00:28:33,800 Speaker 1: right destroy the company potentially. 517 00:28:34,480 --> 00:28:37,000 Speaker 2: Yeah, they you know, they're ninety six ninety seven percent 518 00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:40,480 Speaker 2: of their business is advertising, and so you imagine a 519 00:28:40,520 --> 00:28:45,720 Speaker 2: world where advertisers are buying through a different buy platform 520 00:28:45,880 --> 00:28:48,960 Speaker 2: or a neutral one. Let's call it a neutral one 521 00:28:48,960 --> 00:28:52,840 Speaker 2: that actually can buy ads on Instagram versus the Facebook 522 00:28:52,880 --> 00:28:56,280 Speaker 2: app and actually make decisions on that in real time 523 00:28:56,320 --> 00:28:57,880 Speaker 2: of what's best for the advertiser. 524 00:28:58,920 --> 00:29:01,280 Speaker 1: I feel like they're also have to compete for business 525 00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:03,160 Speaker 1: in the way they've never had to, like justify their 526 00:29:03,160 --> 00:29:05,800 Speaker 1: business and provide analytics that they don't already. 527 00:29:06,080 --> 00:29:08,520 Speaker 2: I've always asked a question of like when Facebook started 528 00:29:08,520 --> 00:29:13,000 Speaker 2: to you know, really getscribed as a toxic waste jump 529 00:29:13,040 --> 00:29:15,920 Speaker 2: in like put like twenty eighteen, twenty nineteen, where they 530 00:29:15,920 --> 00:29:19,760 Speaker 2: started to just run into some real difficulties like Instagram. 531 00:29:19,880 --> 00:29:21,680 Speaker 2: If I were Instagram, I would act differently if I 532 00:29:21,720 --> 00:29:25,400 Speaker 2: wasn't part of the of the larger corporation, right, and 533 00:29:26,640 --> 00:29:28,880 Speaker 2: they probably Instagram would have put the screws to Facebook 534 00:29:28,920 --> 00:29:31,520 Speaker 2: at that time and vice versa, you know, and so 535 00:29:32,280 --> 00:29:35,000 Speaker 2: it really changes the dynamic of those two platforms where 536 00:29:35,000 --> 00:29:37,680 Speaker 2: they're actually having to compete with each other, both for 537 00:29:37,920 --> 00:29:42,760 Speaker 2: users and for ads. The parent company, the brand is 538 00:29:42,800 --> 00:29:45,080 Speaker 2: you know, one of the least you know, according to 539 00:29:45,120 --> 00:29:49,480 Speaker 2: like the Axios Reputation survey, it's like number ninety nine 540 00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:51,479 Speaker 2: or something like that in the hundred brands. So like, 541 00:29:51,560 --> 00:29:56,560 Speaker 2: the brand is significantly challenged despite the success of the company. 542 00:29:56,680 --> 00:30:00,680 Speaker 1: So so as we wrap up it almost I know 543 00:30:00,760 --> 00:30:03,719 Speaker 1: that we like this show is not necessarily the most optimistic, 544 00:30:03,800 --> 00:30:06,640 Speaker 1: but I kind of feel a little optimistic seeing all 545 00:30:06,680 --> 00:30:08,800 Speaker 1: of this stuff. It feels like there could be a 546 00:30:08,800 --> 00:30:10,560 Speaker 1: better Internet that comes out of it. 547 00:30:12,400 --> 00:30:15,000 Speaker 2: I agree with that, and I also, you know, make 548 00:30:15,040 --> 00:30:18,719 Speaker 2: a broader point that it does make me optimistic to 549 00:30:18,720 --> 00:30:22,440 Speaker 2: see courts doing what they're supposed to be doing, judges 550 00:30:22,520 --> 00:30:28,040 Speaker 2: actually understanding the complexity of technology, having you know, attorneys 551 00:30:28,080 --> 00:30:30,440 Speaker 2: that can describe it to the courts in a way 552 00:30:30,480 --> 00:30:33,200 Speaker 2: that that you know, can be applied to anti trust 553 00:30:33,240 --> 00:30:36,040 Speaker 2: law that's been around for more than a century. And 554 00:30:36,320 --> 00:30:38,320 Speaker 2: by the way, it should be said too that these 555 00:30:38,320 --> 00:30:41,240 Speaker 2: cases were brought by the Trump administration through a Biden 556 00:30:41,280 --> 00:30:45,080 Speaker 2: administration administration. Now they're being enforced and we're getting decisions 557 00:30:45,120 --> 00:30:49,480 Speaker 2: under a Trump administration again. So they're incredibly bipartisan. And 558 00:30:49,520 --> 00:30:51,360 Speaker 2: I had a chance to testify a few weeks ago 559 00:30:51,400 --> 00:30:53,360 Speaker 2: in front of the Anti Trust Committee and that was 560 00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:57,160 Speaker 2: incredibly bipartisan too. And so these are these are issues 561 00:30:57,160 --> 00:30:59,840 Speaker 2: that stretch across the parties, that are pretty unique in 562 00:30:59,840 --> 00:31:03,560 Speaker 2: this in this current moment, and it. 563 00:31:03,560 --> 00:31:07,240 Speaker 1: Kind of feels like that the Dumerists out there are saying, oh, 564 00:31:07,480 --> 00:31:10,120 Speaker 1: he'll they'll just pay off Trump. But and it doesn't 565 00:31:10,120 --> 00:31:13,280 Speaker 1: even feel it feels like the administrations, both of them 566 00:31:13,360 --> 00:31:15,240 Speaker 1: kind of have the same willingness to. 567 00:31:15,200 --> 00:31:17,760 Speaker 3: Do this, that's right. I mean the Wall Street Journal 568 00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:18,959 Speaker 3: report basically we don't know. 569 00:31:19,360 --> 00:31:21,440 Speaker 2: Well, yeah, but the Wall Street General reported that that 570 00:31:22,080 --> 00:31:26,160 Speaker 2: Mark Zuckerberg met with the Trump with Trump administration or 571 00:31:26,160 --> 00:31:28,600 Speaker 2: Trump himself I think three times in the last few 572 00:31:28,600 --> 00:31:32,720 Speaker 2: months and offered to settle for four hundred and fifty 573 00:31:32,720 --> 00:31:37,400 Speaker 2: million dollars and the FCC wanted thirty billion dollars. And 574 00:31:37,440 --> 00:31:39,840 Speaker 2: so you can see that there's a pretty pretty big 575 00:31:39,880 --> 00:31:43,600 Speaker 2: delta between the two. And I think the Trump administration 576 00:31:43,720 --> 00:31:48,400 Speaker 2: understands why these issues are issues regardless of party in 577 00:31:48,440 --> 00:31:52,360 Speaker 2: politics and too much power in the hands of you know, 578 00:31:52,400 --> 00:31:53,920 Speaker 2: too little people is always. 579 00:31:53,640 --> 00:31:56,720 Speaker 1: A problem, so can the greenlaw. All right, Jason, where 580 00:31:56,720 --> 00:31:57,440 Speaker 1: can people find you? 581 00:31:58,320 --> 00:32:01,360 Speaker 2: They could buy me on Twitter, Jason Underscore kids on 582 00:32:01,480 --> 00:32:05,320 Speaker 2: Blue Sky. They can always email me at dcn's website. 583 00:32:05,560 --> 00:32:07,600 Speaker 2: I'm around, I'm always looking to engage, so. 584 00:32:07,640 --> 00:32:08,360 Speaker 3: Thank you very much. 585 00:32:08,760 --> 00:32:10,400 Speaker 1: Such a pleasure to have you, sir. And you can 586 00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:12,320 Speaker 1: of course find me on the internet at Google the 587 00:32:12,360 --> 00:32:15,320 Speaker 1: man who killed Google Search. That's how you find me. 588 00:32:15,480 --> 00:32:17,400 Speaker 1: This has been Better Offline. I'm at Zitron. 589 00:32:17,520 --> 00:32:17,880 Speaker 3: Thank you. 590 00:32:17,880 --> 00:32:20,080 Speaker 1: You're going to hear a very similar message to follow. 591 00:32:28,040 --> 00:32:29,720 Speaker 1: Thank you for listening to Better Offline. 592 00:32:29,840 --> 00:32:32,280 Speaker 4: The editor and composer of the Better Offline theme song 593 00:32:32,360 --> 00:32:35,000 Speaker 4: is Matasowski. You can check out more of his music 594 00:32:35,040 --> 00:32:38,680 Speaker 4: and audio projects at Matasowski dot com, M A T 595 00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:43,120 Speaker 4: T O S O W s ki dot com. You 596 00:32:43,160 --> 00:32:45,680 Speaker 4: can email me at easy at Better offline dot com, 597 00:32:45,760 --> 00:32:48,080 Speaker 4: or visit Better Offline dot com to find more podcast 598 00:32:48,120 --> 00:32:51,440 Speaker 4: links and of course my newsletter. I also really recommend 599 00:32:51,480 --> 00:32:53,400 Speaker 4: you go to chat dot Where's youreed dot at to 600 00:32:53,520 --> 00:32:56,320 Speaker 4: visit the discord, and go to our slash Better Offline 601 00:32:56,320 --> 00:32:59,560 Speaker 4: to check out our Reddit, Thank you so much for listening. 602 00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:02,880 Speaker 2: Better Offline is a production of cool Zone Media. 603 00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:06,400 Speaker 4: For more from cool Zone Media, visit our website coolzonmedia 604 00:33:06,440 --> 00:33:09,240 Speaker 4: dot com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, 605 00:33:09,320 --> 00:33:11,720 Speaker 4: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.