WEBVTT - Scientific Reductionism

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Stuff to Blow your Mind from how Stuff

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<v Speaker 1>Works dot com. Hey, you're welcome to Stuff to Blow

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<v Speaker 1>your mind. My name is Robert Lamb and I'm Joe McCormick.

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<v Speaker 1>In Today, we're gonna be looking at the philosophical underpinnings

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<v Speaker 1>of science. Don't run away, stick here, because we're gonna

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<v Speaker 1>be talking about scientific reductionism. Now, we've done episodes before

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<v Speaker 1>where we've talked about not just you know, the fruits

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<v Speaker 1>of scientific investigation, but the ideas that lie underneath what

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<v Speaker 1>we do when we do science. Uh, we've talked before

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<v Speaker 1>about that Daniel Dennett quote from Darwin's Dangerous Idea where

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<v Speaker 1>he says that you know, scientists a lot of times

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<v Speaker 1>think that philosophies what those other, you know, naval gazers

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<v Speaker 1>do over there, and that that science is really free

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<v Speaker 1>from all the constraints of that naval gazing, that they're

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<v Speaker 1>immune to, quote the confusions that philosophers devote their lives

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<v Speaker 1>to dissolving. But what Dennett says is there's no such

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<v Speaker 1>thing as philosophy free science. There's only science whose philosophical

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<v Speaker 1>baggage is taken on board without examination. And I think

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<v Speaker 1>that makes a lot of sense. I think that's a

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<v Speaker 1>maximum we should adhere to to to look at what's

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<v Speaker 1>lying underneath science intellectually and and always ask ourselves the question, like,

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<v Speaker 1>is what is what we're doing philosophically grounded? Does it

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<v Speaker 1>make sense? Yeah? I mean it gets it down to

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<v Speaker 1>the idea of to what extent can we truly just

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<v Speaker 1>sort of mathematically, passionlessly, uh, breakdown things into their fundamental

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<v Speaker 1>parts in order to make sense of them. Yeah, And

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<v Speaker 1>that is the idea we're gonna be talking about today.

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<v Speaker 1>It's the concept of scientific reductionism. Now, I want to

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<v Speaker 1>start by clarifying the meaning of that term, because if

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<v Speaker 1>you've heard that term used in conversation, there's a very

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<v Speaker 1>good chance that you've heard it used in a way

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<v Speaker 1>that's different than what we mean today. So people did

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<v Speaker 1>bonding on Facebook to say a new story about a

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<v Speaker 1>scientific study or a theory and say, well, that sounds reductionist.

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<v Speaker 1>You're just being a reductionist here. Uh. Yeah. So there's

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<v Speaker 1>one version of the word reductive that means something sort

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<v Speaker 1>of like oversimplified. Like if I say that you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the only reason French cooking tastes good is because they

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<v Speaker 1>use like a full stick of butter and every dish. People.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, some French chef might say, no, wait, there's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of technique. You're taking a very reductionist attitude.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not that simple um or another one you might hear.

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<v Speaker 1>I think often these days, if you hear people talking

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<v Speaker 1>about scientific reductionism, you're hearing it used, uh, not in

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<v Speaker 1>a philosophical argument about the underpinnings of science, but more

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<v Speaker 1>in an argument about the validity of world views. And

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<v Speaker 1>it works as this kind of snarl word that means

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<v Speaker 1>something like nihilism, or the belief that there is nothing

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<v Speaker 1>of value, beauty, or goodness in the world. That is

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<v Speaker 1>not what we mean. That's not what the term means

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<v Speaker 1>in philosophy of science, and that's not the way we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to be using it today. Yeah. I think a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of this gets back to the concepts that we

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<v Speaker 1>tackled in the Wicked Problems episode and as well as

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<v Speaker 1>the illusion of explanatory depth. And that's the idea that simple,

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<v Speaker 1>broad solutions to complex societal problems, complicts problems in general

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<v Speaker 1>tend to be ineffective and spawn new problems. And you

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<v Speaker 1>could say that's that's because they take a reductionist approach

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<v Speaker 1>to it. Robots are dangerous, so we ban all robots.

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<v Speaker 1>Humans are the cause of war, so exterminate all all humans.

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<v Speaker 1>Right now, I wonder if that way of using reductionism

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<v Speaker 1>fits more into the hater's definition or the definition we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to look at today. Well, the interesting thing, isn't

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<v Speaker 1>it that the hater's definition is itself reductionist, right, and

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<v Speaker 1>then maybe my that definition is also reductionist because to

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<v Speaker 1>a certain extent, Yes, when you there are some things

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<v Speaker 1>that they're complicated enough and if you boil them, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you can boil them down to sort of concrete solutions

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<v Speaker 1>and concrete um causes. And it depends on what you're studying.

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<v Speaker 1>Like sometimes, especially with societal issues, it's not always that

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<v Speaker 1>cut and dry. There's just too many factors and it's

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<v Speaker 1>difficult to test out the solution, certainly in real time. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>because by the time you've deployed the answer, you've created

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<v Speaker 1>all these additional problems. So that's that it's only butter explanation.

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<v Speaker 1>Somebody is trying to explain deliciousness in terms of butter

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<v Speaker 1>only when we in reality it's much more complicated. Yes, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>so what what what I mean by scientific reductionism, and

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<v Speaker 1>what's usually discussed in uh philosophy of science, is that

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<v Speaker 1>as a method, it means that any system or entity

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<v Speaker 1>existing in reality will ultimately be best understood if broken

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<v Speaker 1>down into its simpler constituent parts, and the workings of

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<v Speaker 1>those parts are understood. Uh. And we see this all

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<v Speaker 1>the time in science, right, the science is constantly trying

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<v Speaker 1>to reduce a complex phenomenon into its part and find

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<v Speaker 1>out how it's parts work. Yeah, what's it's kind of like,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's basically what how stuff works is all about, right,

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<v Speaker 1>It's about how is this actually working? What are the properties?

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<v Speaker 1>What are the physical laws involved? Even if it's something

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<v Speaker 1>as simple. Well, for instance, I wrote an article on

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<v Speaker 1>how hula hoops work a while back, and so part

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<v Speaker 1>of that is like the culture of the history, who

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<v Speaker 1>in the in the history of the hula hoop, where

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<v Speaker 1>it came from, how it gained popularity, how it's utilize

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<v Speaker 1>different ways. But you also get down to just the

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<v Speaker 1>basic physics of what's going on when a hula hoop

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<v Speaker 1>is swinging around a body and motion, and you can

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<v Speaker 1>reduce it to physicals. So in that sense, I think

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<v Speaker 1>that is a perfectly valid way of using a reductionist

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<v Speaker 1>approach is saying, like, what are the most basic laws

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<v Speaker 1>and elements and explanatory UH systems that are in play

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<v Speaker 1>when you see somebody hula hooping and there man and

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<v Speaker 1>I can see where there would be people who would say,

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<v Speaker 1>who are like such hula hoop enthusiasts? And it would

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<v Speaker 1>say stop explaining trying to explain the magic of hula hoops.

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<v Speaker 1>When you explain the physics of hula hoops, you take

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<v Speaker 1>all the fun out of it. That would be a

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<v Speaker 1>crazy statement because the fun still there. We're just explaining

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<v Speaker 1>how the fun works, right. And the controversy we're talking

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<v Speaker 1>about today, and this example we can probably use a

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<v Speaker 1>better example in the minic would not be uh whether

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<v Speaker 1>it takes the fun out of it, but whether it

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<v Speaker 1>misses something crucial. If you just describe a hula hoop

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<v Speaker 1>in terms of the basic physics of of how it

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<v Speaker 1>goes around the body, are you missing something factually crucial

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<v Speaker 1>and autonomously true about the phenomenon of hula hooping? Who

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<v Speaker 1>is something vital to its functionality? Yeah, that's probably not

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<v Speaker 1>a good example. But one other way we can look

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<v Speaker 1>at what scientific reductionism is is that it's a it's

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<v Speaker 1>a hypothesis on the final nature of the relationship between

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<v Speaker 1>science and reality, and so it can be interpreted to

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<v Speaker 1>mean that in effect, every correct explanation of the world

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<v Speaker 1>can be reduced to the most fundamental, lowest theory of reality,

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<v Speaker 1>and essentially everything is physics if you go deep enough. Uh. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>there're gonna be a lot of reductionists who will say, now,

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<v Speaker 1>I understand that we need sciences like psychology and chemistry

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<v Speaker 1>and political science and sociology to explain things that it

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<v Speaker 1>would be ridiculous to think we can explain by looking

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<v Speaker 1>at all the elementary particles. Um, but that in principle

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<v Speaker 1>we should be able to explain all those things given

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<v Speaker 1>just our understanding of elementary particles and forces. They're just

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<v Speaker 1>too complex for us to understand right now. Okay, So

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<v Speaker 1>let's try to put this into a specific concrete example. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>If if you accept that everything in the universe is

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<v Speaker 1>subject to the laws of physics, and I think Robert,

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<v Speaker 1>you and I can agree that as far as we

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<v Speaker 1>know it is, uh, then everything in the universe ultimately

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<v Speaker 1>could be best explained by fundamental physics or whatever we

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<v Speaker 1>find lying underneath fundamental physics, whatever is the ultimate theory

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<v Speaker 1>of everything, the ultimate underlying law of the universe. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>And so let's look at a higher order phenomenon and

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<v Speaker 1>and try to say what it would mean to reduce it.

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<v Speaker 1>So I came up with this horrible example and an

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<v Speaker 1>apparent case of psychogenic blindness. So you are with your

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<v Speaker 1>family on Thanksgiving, and so they get to pick what

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<v Speaker 1>movie you go out and see, and you are overruled,

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<v Speaker 1>and you go to see the new Adam Sandler movie,

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<v Speaker 1>in which I imagine the next one is going to be.

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<v Speaker 1>Adam Sandler plays the fifteenth Dalai Lama and also plays

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<v Speaker 1>the Dalai Lama is really loud, flatulent twin sister. Twenty

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<v Speaker 1>five minutes into the onset of this film, you go

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<v Speaker 1>blind in both eyes. Now you go to the doctor,

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<v Speaker 1>and the doctors can find no evidence of injury or

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<v Speaker 1>neurological dysfunctions, So they classify this as a rare case

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<v Speaker 1>of psychogenic blindness, blindness that's induced by psychological distress rooted

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<v Speaker 1>in a state of mind. And we've discussed this on

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<v Speaker 1>the show before, especially in terms of certain almost for

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<v Speaker 1>natural occurrences right right, where like there's a mystical experience

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<v Speaker 1>and it leads to a bodily manifestation. Yeah, and so

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<v Speaker 1>in psychology there might be some framework for explaining what

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<v Speaker 1>happened to you uh, and that framework would be a

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<v Speaker 1>theory like knowledge. It would be explanatory talking about causes

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<v Speaker 1>in the mind and uh, and perhaps solutions that take

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<v Speaker 1>place in the mind. But of course, assuming that we

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<v Speaker 1>had a complete understanding of the whole state of your

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<v Speaker 1>body at the level of neuroscience, fully explaining all of

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<v Speaker 1>your brain tissues and functions and how they were interacting

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<v Speaker 1>on the reductionist hypothesis, we actually shouldn't need the psychological explanation, right,

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<v Speaker 1>that's just a convenience. If we understood everything there was

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<v Speaker 1>to understand about the physical nature of your brain, we

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't need psychology. We wouldn't need the psychologist to say,

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<v Speaker 1>what's happening with your blindness. We could just look at

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<v Speaker 1>the cells in your brain. Now. Of course, if we

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<v Speaker 1>had a perfect understanding of your brain from perspective of

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<v Speaker 1>cell biology, explaining what all the cells in your body

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<v Speaker 1>are doing and how, we technically wouldn't need the neuroscience explanation.

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<v Speaker 1>We just say, okay, here's the cell theory that you know.

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<v Speaker 1>This is what explains everything that's going on. And then

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<v Speaker 1>you could reduce it further. You could say, well, of

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<v Speaker 1>course we had a perfect understanding of every molecule in

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<v Speaker 1>your body from the standpoint of fundamental chemistry, understanding what

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<v Speaker 1>all the atoms and molecules are doing and how, we

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't need the biochemistry you know, the biology or biochemistry explanation.

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<v Speaker 1>And of course, if we had a perfect understanding of

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<v Speaker 1>the whole state of your body from the standpoint of

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<v Speaker 1>fundamental physics, you know, elementary particle physics, the quantum mechanical

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<v Speaker 1>wave functions of all the particles and energy states in

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<v Speaker 1>your body, we wouldn't need the chemistry explanation. So ultimately,

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<v Speaker 1>the hypothesis goes like this, if we're able to explain

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<v Speaker 1>everything in the universe in terms of fundamental physics, we

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<v Speaker 1>would and that would be the best explanation. It's only

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<v Speaker 1>our lack of understanding and our lack of knowledge and

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<v Speaker 1>computational power that forces us to conceive of explanations of

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<v Speaker 1>things that are more complex than fundamental physics, like chemistry,

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<v Speaker 1>like biology, like psychology like you know, sociology, or or

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<v Speaker 1>political science. Um, but that at bottom, the best explanation

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<v Speaker 1>for everything is here are the particles and their energy

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<v Speaker 1>states and vectors. Now it's almost impossible to think about

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<v Speaker 1>something of this without like this, without thinking about comparisons

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<v Speaker 1>to like our modern computing experience, right, you know, like

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<v Speaker 1>thinking of hardware, and then a type of hardware, the code,

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm simplifying here, but then on top of the

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<v Speaker 1>code the sort of uh user interface, and then our

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<v Speaker 1>interaction with that user interface. So it seems like you

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<v Speaker 1>would have I mean, realistically, you would have problems that

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<v Speaker 1>occur with the root of that problem at different levels

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<v Speaker 1>in that in that depth, right, something, you might have

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<v Speaker 1>a problem at the hardware level, you might have a

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<v Speaker 1>problem uh at the the the user interface level. But

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<v Speaker 1>if we had a complete enough understanding, we could address

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<v Speaker 1>any problem from the bottom exactly. So the physical reductionists

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<v Speaker 1>would say, okay, but if you had a perfect understanding, yeah, everything,

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<v Speaker 1>there would be energy states and elementary particles. If you

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<v Speaker 1>understood what all of them were doing, you could fix

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<v Speaker 1>any problem at any level. Yes, So, so so not even

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<v Speaker 1>going down to the hardware level, but going down to

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<v Speaker 1>the the the even more primal levels, going into the

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<v Speaker 1>very basement of reality. Yeah, and so the question today

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<v Speaker 1>is looking at that perspective of the world, is that true?

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<v Speaker 1>Is that a correct understanding of what science is? Um

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<v Speaker 1>or our higher level science is more complex sciences like chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology,

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<v Speaker 1>and so forth. Do these sciences have unique insights that

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<v Speaker 1>are not present at the lower levels of more simplicity

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<v Speaker 1>of you know, simpler realities. Are they just the best

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<v Speaker 1>we can do to understand complex phenomena like society, minds,

0:13:01.040 --> 0:13:05.360
<v Speaker 1>and organisms? Or do they Are they intellectually autonomous? Do

0:13:05.440 --> 0:13:08.960
<v Speaker 1>they have something original to offer? So, like, the counter

0:13:09.080 --> 0:13:13.240
<v Speaker 1>argument here would be that that physics and carpentry engineering

0:13:13.280 --> 0:13:16.680
<v Speaker 1>can explain the way that a stage is built, but

0:13:16.760 --> 0:13:19.040
<v Speaker 1>they're not going to have any impact on say, the

0:13:19.080 --> 0:13:22.360
<v Speaker 1>play that the actors on the stage you're reciting. Sure, yeah,

0:13:22.400 --> 0:13:25.800
<v Speaker 1>that that you might uh, well, yeah, I mean that

0:13:25.800 --> 0:13:28.960
<v Speaker 1>that that's sort of an analogy that works, I guess. Um.

0:13:29.640 --> 0:13:31.520
<v Speaker 1>One of the things that I do want to make

0:13:31.559 --> 0:13:34.920
<v Speaker 1>sure we're clarifying is that I don't plan on Robert

0:13:34.960 --> 0:13:37.800
<v Speaker 1>you can, you can violate this if you want, but

0:13:37.880 --> 0:13:41.400
<v Speaker 1>I don't plan on exploring arguments against scientific reductionism that

0:13:41.440 --> 0:13:46.920
<v Speaker 1>are based in a belief in supernatural causation, because, as

0:13:46.920 --> 0:13:49.600
<v Speaker 1>we mentioned in another recent podcast, I'm not even sure

0:13:49.640 --> 0:13:52.960
<v Speaker 1>the concept of supernatural causation is coherent. I'm not I'm

0:13:52.960 --> 0:13:55.960
<v Speaker 1>not sure that it's incoherent. But then again, try to

0:13:56.000 --> 0:14:00.440
<v Speaker 1>picture it. What are you picturing? Usually you're just picturing

0:14:00.559 --> 0:14:05.079
<v Speaker 1>natural causation with with some kind of blurry nous or

0:14:05.160 --> 0:14:07.680
<v Speaker 1>some kind of detail obscured. Right, It's like the hand

0:14:07.679 --> 0:14:11.000
<v Speaker 1>of God. Analogy. If if the hand if God is

0:14:11.040 --> 0:14:13.840
<v Speaker 1>something outside of our universe, then for that hand to

0:14:13.880 --> 0:14:16.640
<v Speaker 1>reach into our universe to do something, it has to

0:14:17.160 --> 0:14:19.520
<v Speaker 1>adhere to the laws of physics. It has to wear

0:14:19.560 --> 0:14:21.880
<v Speaker 1>the glove of our reality at least, and then it

0:14:21.960 --> 0:14:25.240
<v Speaker 1>has to therefore be observable as a physical phenomenon. Yet

0:14:25.280 --> 0:14:29.280
<v Speaker 1>to do something, it has to do something right. Um.

0:14:29.320 --> 0:14:32.760
<v Speaker 1>But but we will instead look at a different concept,

0:14:32.920 --> 0:14:36.760
<v Speaker 1>that is the concept of emergentis um, a philosophical distinction

0:14:37.320 --> 0:14:41.200
<v Speaker 1>that says that there are large complex systems that show

0:14:41.360 --> 0:14:45.680
<v Speaker 1>genuinely novel properties due to their complexity, that are not

0:14:45.880 --> 0:14:50.680
<v Speaker 1>inherently predictable from or reducible to the combined effects of

0:14:50.720 --> 0:14:54.920
<v Speaker 1>their simpler, more constituent parts and ultimately not predictable from

0:14:55.040 --> 0:14:59.080
<v Speaker 1>or reducible to fundamental physics. So let's this is where

0:14:59.080 --> 0:15:03.040
<v Speaker 1>I come back to my perhaps imperfect analogy of the

0:15:03.080 --> 0:15:05.720
<v Speaker 1>stage and the actors on the stage. You can't have

0:15:05.760 --> 0:15:09.240
<v Speaker 1>one without the other, but one seems to be operating

0:15:09.280 --> 0:15:12.200
<v Speaker 1>in a way that the lower level cannot fully predict

0:15:12.480 --> 0:15:15.800
<v Speaker 1>or control beyond the very basic levels. Okay, that, yeah,

0:15:15.800 --> 0:15:17.640
<v Speaker 1>I can see that. I think that's a good analogy.

0:15:17.680 --> 0:15:20.320
<v Speaker 1>Then I'm sorry if I was skeptical it to be. No, no, no,

0:15:20.760 --> 0:15:25.120
<v Speaker 1>A healthy dose of skepticism is uh is important here. Okay.

0:15:25.200 --> 0:15:28.120
<v Speaker 1>So given our given our idea that we're gonna look

0:15:28.160 --> 0:15:31.760
<v Speaker 1>at emergentis um as a form of material understanding of

0:15:31.800 --> 0:15:34.520
<v Speaker 1>the world. You know, it's an extension of science, not

0:15:34.520 --> 0:15:38.760
<v Speaker 1>not an expression of like vitalism or supernaturalism. What are

0:15:38.800 --> 0:15:42.960
<v Speaker 1>some examples of things in nature that we might assume

0:15:43.240 --> 0:15:47.840
<v Speaker 1>are not able to be explained by fundamental physics. Well,

0:15:47.920 --> 0:15:51.640
<v Speaker 1>big one is intelligence. So yeah, even playing like Dungeons

0:15:51.640 --> 0:15:55.000
<v Speaker 1>and Dragons, where you have a definite intelligent score versus

0:15:55.040 --> 0:15:59.120
<v Speaker 1>like wisdom or charisma, I often find myself in conversations

0:15:59.440 --> 0:16:01.800
<v Speaker 1>with the poem i'm playing with, like, was this would

0:16:01.800 --> 0:16:03.960
<v Speaker 1>this be an intelligence check or wisdom check? Like, we

0:16:04.000 --> 0:16:08.960
<v Speaker 1>really have a very ambiguous idea of what constitutes intelligence. Yeah,

0:16:08.960 --> 0:16:12.600
<v Speaker 1>But at the same time, intelligence is I think by

0:16:12.600 --> 0:16:15.120
<v Speaker 1>the fact that you consider it this separate property, that

0:16:15.200 --> 0:16:18.080
<v Speaker 1>you have this separate score, and it's natural to think

0:16:18.080 --> 0:16:22.080
<v Speaker 1>of it as something that discreetly emerges at higher levels

0:16:22.160 --> 0:16:26.760
<v Speaker 1>of complexity and isn't reducible to simpler objects. So, uh yeah,

0:16:26.880 --> 0:16:29.720
<v Speaker 1>like you said, it's sometimes kind of difficult to define intelligence.

0:16:29.760 --> 0:16:32.320
<v Speaker 1>What is it? My favorite definition that I've come across

0:16:32.400 --> 0:16:35.880
<v Speaker 1>is that intelligence is the tendency of a system to

0:16:36.000 --> 0:16:42.160
<v Speaker 1>accelerate the solution of problems. It leads to faster solving. So,

0:16:42.600 --> 0:16:45.280
<v Speaker 1>however we define it, we know when we see it right.

0:16:45.320 --> 0:16:49.560
<v Speaker 1>Intelligence is highly useful, ubiquitous, undeniable. It's part of our

0:16:49.600 --> 0:16:53.600
<v Speaker 1>experience of the everyday world. But can intelligence be explained

0:16:53.600 --> 0:16:58.040
<v Speaker 1>in terms of simpler fundamental units. I don't know. After all,

0:16:58.120 --> 0:17:01.640
<v Speaker 1>there is no indication that a single goal neuron possesses

0:17:01.720 --> 0:17:06.840
<v Speaker 1>anything like intelligence. There's no analogy for intelligence below what

0:17:06.920 --> 0:17:09.760
<v Speaker 1>things like brains or computers do, at least as far

0:17:09.760 --> 0:17:13.040
<v Speaker 1>as I can tell. Well, even then, it's far more complicated.

0:17:13.040 --> 0:17:15.240
<v Speaker 1>We've all I felt we've probably even covered on the

0:17:15.240 --> 0:17:18.120
<v Speaker 1>show before the whole topic of what makes a genius?

0:17:18.160 --> 0:17:20.679
<v Speaker 1>What does a genius's brain look like? And yes, you

0:17:20.680 --> 0:17:23.560
<v Speaker 1>can you can draw certain Uh, you can look to

0:17:23.600 --> 0:17:27.280
<v Speaker 1>the gray matter and line up various factors, but a

0:17:27.320 --> 0:17:29.199
<v Speaker 1>lot of it is going to be beyond that. It's

0:17:29.200 --> 0:17:31.720
<v Speaker 1>going to have to do with with with it, with

0:17:31.720 --> 0:17:34.879
<v Speaker 1>the experience and personality of the individual. Yeah, it's the

0:17:34.880 --> 0:17:39.000
<v Speaker 1>whole Boys from Brazil scenario we're trying to colonial. Yeah. So,

0:17:39.040 --> 0:17:42.720
<v Speaker 1>I mean assuming that animal intelligence or computer intelligence is

0:17:42.760 --> 0:17:46.520
<v Speaker 1>not magic. We're not believing it's magic, but that it's

0:17:46.560 --> 0:17:50.680
<v Speaker 1>still possible that it can't be explained reductively by recourse

0:17:50.720 --> 0:17:55.440
<v Speaker 1>to more fundamental sciences. That chemistry alone can't explain intelligence.

0:17:55.440 --> 0:17:58.359
<v Speaker 1>It's something that only happens to matter at a certain

0:17:58.440 --> 0:18:02.480
<v Speaker 1>level of complexity and configure curation, and is not predictable

0:18:02.560 --> 0:18:06.560
<v Speaker 1>from lower levels of understanding. Uh so, what what would

0:18:06.560 --> 0:18:09.880
<v Speaker 1>it mean to understand intelligence of the level of single cells.

0:18:10.000 --> 0:18:12.240
<v Speaker 1>I don't know. Maybe it's possible to do that, but

0:18:12.359 --> 0:18:15.520
<v Speaker 1>at least sounds like a very difficult project. Yeah, I mean,

0:18:15.560 --> 0:18:18.720
<v Speaker 1>so the basic idea here is that interactions among smaller

0:18:18.840 --> 0:18:21.960
<v Speaker 1>entities lead to larger entities, and there's a self organizing

0:18:22.000 --> 0:18:26.040
<v Speaker 1>aspect to reality. So what economist Jeffrey Goldstein called quote

0:18:26.040 --> 0:18:29.720
<v Speaker 1>the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns, and properties

0:18:30.000 --> 0:18:33.760
<v Speaker 1>during the process of self organization in complex systems. So

0:18:33.920 --> 0:18:37.879
<v Speaker 1>I think, like a classic sort of science example I

0:18:37.880 --> 0:18:40.120
<v Speaker 1>always go back to, is just the accretion of cosmic

0:18:40.240 --> 0:18:45.000
<v Speaker 1>dust into smaller bodies and clouds, building mass, exerting gravity

0:18:45.040 --> 0:18:49.680
<v Speaker 1>forming stars, planet, everything everything else gravitating around each other,

0:18:49.760 --> 0:18:54.760
<v Speaker 1>held in uh in gravitational um enslavement to each other,

0:18:55.119 --> 0:18:59.840
<v Speaker 1>and becoming the system. A system that emerges initially from

0:19:00.200 --> 0:19:03.639
<v Speaker 1>particles floating around and bumping into each other, and thus

0:19:03.920 --> 0:19:06.640
<v Speaker 1>and thus it does obey the laws of physics at

0:19:06.640 --> 0:19:09.760
<v Speaker 1>every level, But is it reducible too and predictable from

0:19:09.800 --> 0:19:14.879
<v Speaker 1>those laws When the case of just like basic the

0:19:14.920 --> 0:19:18.960
<v Speaker 1>basic assembly of solar system, of of a galaxy, I

0:19:19.040 --> 0:19:21.400
<v Speaker 1>would think, yes, I think this is this is definitely

0:19:21.480 --> 0:19:25.880
<v Speaker 1>a physics based bringing together of properties. But it's such

0:19:25.960 --> 0:19:28.320
<v Speaker 1>a Maybe it's because it's just such a grandiose thing

0:19:28.359 --> 0:19:33.880
<v Speaker 1>to imagine assembling from such minute pieces. It feels an

0:19:33.880 --> 0:19:38.040
<v Speaker 1>appropriate metaphor for the emergence of say consciousness, the vergence

0:19:38.080 --> 0:19:43.159
<v Speaker 1>of intelligence, because if dust can turn into the Milky

0:19:43.160 --> 0:19:46.960
<v Speaker 1>Way galaxy, and and I'm simplifying, uh, but but if

0:19:47.000 --> 0:19:51.440
<v Speaker 1>if something so vast and complex and energetic can can

0:19:51.680 --> 0:19:54.159
<v Speaker 1>can can come together from such small pieces, then it

0:19:54.200 --> 0:19:58.000
<v Speaker 1>makes sense that's something as at least on the individual level,

0:19:58.240 --> 0:20:02.080
<v Speaker 1>as complex and amazing and brew as intelligence and consciousness,

0:20:02.200 --> 0:20:05.359
<v Speaker 1>that that too could emerge from just things bumping into

0:20:05.400 --> 0:20:07.760
<v Speaker 1>each other. Well, yeah, and there you do say something

0:20:07.800 --> 0:20:10.159
<v Speaker 1>that I think should put us on guard against the

0:20:10.200 --> 0:20:13.520
<v Speaker 1>concept of emergentism, which is that it feels good for us,

0:20:13.920 --> 0:20:16.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, the idea that no, no, no, you know,

0:20:16.200 --> 0:20:20.400
<v Speaker 1>things like intelligence and and higher order concepts really are

0:20:20.760 --> 0:20:23.680
<v Speaker 1>somehow unique at their level of organization, and they're not

0:20:23.800 --> 0:20:28.000
<v Speaker 1>just reducible to elementary particles and and energy states. Well,

0:20:28.280 --> 0:20:31.800
<v Speaker 1>that's that's something we like to feel, and so thus

0:20:31.840 --> 0:20:34.080
<v Speaker 1>I think we should be a little on guard about

0:20:34.480 --> 0:20:37.320
<v Speaker 1>about that idea. Yeah, but I would to counter I

0:20:37.320 --> 0:20:40.879
<v Speaker 1>would say that basically, the the idea of consciousness, of

0:20:41.000 --> 0:20:44.400
<v Speaker 1>being conscious, of being a live feels majestic. I think

0:20:44.400 --> 0:20:48.080
<v Speaker 1>we can look to just the universe itself and say, well,

0:20:48.680 --> 0:20:52.359
<v Speaker 1>the universe and all its majesty is based on things

0:20:52.400 --> 0:20:55.240
<v Speaker 1>bumping into each other, you know, randomly and in order

0:20:55.520 --> 0:20:58.040
<v Speaker 1>arising out of all of that. Then it's no great

0:20:58.040 --> 0:21:01.359
<v Speaker 1>stretch to say that the mind is the same the

0:21:01.440 --> 0:21:05.240
<v Speaker 1>cosmos is a humiliating analogy. Yeah, well yeah, because you

0:21:05.280 --> 0:21:06.760
<v Speaker 1>can go either way. You can say my mind is

0:21:06.760 --> 0:21:08.919
<v Speaker 1>like the universe, man, but you can also say, hey,

0:21:08.960 --> 0:21:10.840
<v Speaker 1>your mind is just like the universe. It's just stuff

0:21:10.880 --> 0:21:14.920
<v Speaker 1>bumping into each other until a system emerges. Okay, well,

0:21:14.960 --> 0:21:16.720
<v Speaker 1>maybe we should look at a few more examples of

0:21:16.720 --> 0:21:20.240
<v Speaker 1>supposed emergent behavior that you can see in nature systems,

0:21:20.320 --> 0:21:23.560
<v Speaker 1>where you know, at a complex enough level, things seem

0:21:23.600 --> 0:21:26.720
<v Speaker 1>to happen that are not obviously predictable from the simpler

0:21:26.760 --> 0:21:30.399
<v Speaker 1>components acting alone. Well, evolution is a big one, of course,

0:21:30.800 --> 0:21:34.680
<v Speaker 1>just the I mean, that's the basic underlying principle right

0:21:34.960 --> 0:21:37.920
<v Speaker 1>in the in this uh, this constant race, the survival

0:21:37.960 --> 0:21:42.480
<v Speaker 1>of the fittest, uh, natural selection that you have all

0:21:42.480 --> 0:21:45.879
<v Speaker 1>these different forms, these various mutations that are kind of

0:21:45.920 --> 0:21:50.000
<v Speaker 1>throwing out different different versions of the same product into

0:21:50.000 --> 0:21:55.040
<v Speaker 1>the open market of brutal survivalism, and then whatever sticks sticks, yeah,

0:21:55.440 --> 0:21:58.560
<v Speaker 1>uh yeah, And so that's the thing, like if you

0:21:58.600 --> 0:22:00.960
<v Speaker 1>were just in the universe where there was no life,

0:22:01.000 --> 0:22:04.240
<v Speaker 1>but there was just say, organic chemistry. Would you would

0:22:04.280 --> 0:22:07.080
<v Speaker 1>you be able to really predict the devolution was going

0:22:07.119 --> 0:22:11.440
<v Speaker 1>to occur? Maybe, I don't know. Um what about here.

0:22:11.440 --> 0:22:14.280
<v Speaker 1>Here's a product of evolution that's often been cited as

0:22:14.280 --> 0:22:18.120
<v Speaker 1>a really interesting version of emergent behavior, hive insect behavior.

0:22:18.240 --> 0:22:20.520
<v Speaker 1>Oh yes, yeah, this is this is always a cool

0:22:20.520 --> 0:22:26.760
<v Speaker 1>concept the view of you social insects, bees, wasps, ants, uh, termites, etcetera.

0:22:27.359 --> 0:22:31.800
<v Speaker 1>But especially especially bees and ants being like the prime

0:22:31.840 --> 0:22:36.160
<v Speaker 1>examples of this. Uh, they're they're essentially an emergent system

0:22:37.200 --> 0:22:39.399
<v Speaker 1>after all. You know, how else is all of this

0:22:39.440 --> 0:22:43.520
<v Speaker 1>behavior going to get there? Nobody's programming the ants, nobody's

0:22:43.880 --> 0:22:46.919
<v Speaker 1>telling them, Oh, you're the queen and you do this. Uh. No,

0:22:47.320 --> 0:22:51.840
<v Speaker 1>one ant or one b is able to display anything

0:22:51.960 --> 0:22:55.200
<v Speaker 1>like the hive behavior we see, And not even any

0:22:55.240 --> 0:22:58.040
<v Speaker 1>small group of them show these rudimentary signs of it.

0:22:58.040 --> 0:22:59.879
<v Speaker 1>It's only when you get enough of them in our

0:23:00.040 --> 0:23:04.280
<v Speaker 1>acting that hive behavior emerges. Yeah, and out of all

0:23:04.320 --> 0:23:07.320
<v Speaker 1>of these little interactions, these roles, it all adds up

0:23:07.359 --> 0:23:10.959
<v Speaker 1>to a kind of and it's important to say, you know,

0:23:11.080 --> 0:23:14.240
<v Speaker 1>non sci fi and the non science fictional sense, a

0:23:14.359 --> 0:23:17.679
<v Speaker 1>hive mind. You know, they don't like share a conscious experience, right,

0:23:17.720 --> 0:23:20.040
<v Speaker 1>they're not, you know, they don't have their brains all

0:23:20.080 --> 0:23:22.760
<v Speaker 1>hooked up with tubes into a you know, floating mega

0:23:22.800 --> 0:23:25.240
<v Speaker 1>brain or something. But in a very real, non scie

0:23:25.240 --> 0:23:27.840
<v Speaker 1>by sense, there is this hive mind, this high think

0:23:28.280 --> 0:23:31.720
<v Speaker 1>that emerges and they're able to do something many things

0:23:31.760 --> 0:23:34.679
<v Speaker 1>as a group, solve problems as a group that the

0:23:34.720 --> 0:23:38.520
<v Speaker 1>individual is just not. I mean it's almost cheating to

0:23:38.520 --> 0:23:41.399
<v Speaker 1>say they're incapable of it, because they are capable of

0:23:41.440 --> 0:23:43.959
<v Speaker 1>it as this sort of metal organism that they've become,

0:23:44.600 --> 0:23:48.760
<v Speaker 1>just not on the individual level. And this approach has

0:23:48.800 --> 0:23:52.000
<v Speaker 1>proven very useful and artificial intelligence and robotics. I'm sure

0:23:52.000 --> 0:23:54.480
<v Speaker 1>you've covered this in the past and the Forward Thinking

0:23:54.840 --> 0:23:59.200
<v Speaker 1>podcast the the study of of you social insects and

0:23:59.320 --> 0:24:02.760
<v Speaker 1>figuring out how to ads robotics and engineers faces challenges

0:24:02.760 --> 0:24:06.719
<v Speaker 1>and the interactions of simple machines machine learning. So you

0:24:06.920 --> 0:24:10.239
<v Speaker 1>essentially have the creation of like little robots that are

0:24:10.280 --> 0:24:14.760
<v Speaker 1>behaving like ants. Yeah. Uh, here here's another big one. Consciousness.

0:24:14.800 --> 0:24:17.440
<v Speaker 1>This is probably the thing that is most often discussed

0:24:17.520 --> 0:24:22.560
<v Speaker 1>as as a potentially irreducible phenomenon in nature. Uh, so

0:24:22.720 --> 0:24:25.000
<v Speaker 1>you have a mind. You don't just have a brain,

0:24:25.560 --> 0:24:27.840
<v Speaker 1>but you have a mind. Assuming you do have a mind,

0:24:27.880 --> 0:24:29.520
<v Speaker 1>I don't you know, it's impossible for me to know

0:24:29.600 --> 0:24:31.840
<v Speaker 1>anybody else in the world has a mind. I assume

0:24:31.920 --> 0:24:35.120
<v Speaker 1>you do. You seem like you do, you claim to usually,

0:24:35.920 --> 0:24:38.480
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, you've got a mind, a conscious experience. And

0:24:38.560 --> 0:24:41.480
<v Speaker 1>there's no analogy that we can find or that we

0:24:41.560 --> 0:24:45.000
<v Speaker 1>have good evidence of at lower levels. Right, there's no

0:24:45.119 --> 0:24:48.439
<v Speaker 1>evidence that single neurons are conscious. There's no evidence that

0:24:48.880 --> 0:24:51.720
<v Speaker 1>atoms or molecules or anything like that have any kind

0:24:51.720 --> 0:24:54.879
<v Speaker 1>of rudimentary consciousness. Some people assume this. There's like a

0:24:55.280 --> 0:24:59.199
<v Speaker 1>philosophical position known as pan psychism, which is the idea

0:24:59.320 --> 0:25:02.920
<v Speaker 1>that at um it's in some kind of way consciousness

0:25:02.960 --> 0:25:05.520
<v Speaker 1>exists all over the universe and all that matter. This

0:25:05.640 --> 0:25:10.080
<v Speaker 1>is the idea that any sufficiently complex system may manifest

0:25:10.240 --> 0:25:12.840
<v Speaker 1>as consciousness. No. No, this is the idea that that

0:25:13.000 --> 0:25:15.280
<v Speaker 1>all matter is in some sense, that a rock is

0:25:15.320 --> 0:25:18.520
<v Speaker 1>in some sense conscious, but by virtue of being like

0:25:18.640 --> 0:25:23.320
<v Speaker 1>a complex system. Okay, yeah, because even a rock is

0:25:22.920 --> 0:25:25.720
<v Speaker 1>is complex. When you start breaking it down and you

0:25:25.760 --> 0:25:29.160
<v Speaker 1>start really diving the powers of ten style. And now

0:25:29.520 --> 0:25:32.280
<v Speaker 1>I think that's an interesting speculation, but I don't see

0:25:32.320 --> 0:25:34.920
<v Speaker 1>any evidence for that. It would be hard to know

0:25:35.000 --> 0:25:38.199
<v Speaker 1>what evidence for that would be. Yeah, yeah, I like

0:25:38.280 --> 0:25:41.040
<v Speaker 1>I like it too. I think it it lines up

0:25:41.160 --> 0:25:46.520
<v Speaker 1>nicely with some with various supernatural interpretations of reality. But

0:25:46.560 --> 0:25:48.399
<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure how much I'm willing to invest in

0:25:48.440 --> 0:25:51.280
<v Speaker 1>it at this point. So yeah, so we we have

0:25:51.359 --> 0:25:55.040
<v Speaker 1>the rock speaks, When will it speak? And what would

0:25:55.080 --> 0:25:58.359
<v Speaker 1>it say? That's the thing I mean, the rocks. The

0:25:58.480 --> 0:26:00.760
<v Speaker 1>rock it's I mean, it's seen a lot stuff, but

0:26:00.960 --> 0:26:04.640
<v Speaker 1>it hasn't really been up to much. You got mud

0:26:04.680 --> 0:26:09.480
<v Speaker 1>on your face, big disgrace. Oh never mind, Oh yes,

0:26:09.560 --> 0:26:13.359
<v Speaker 1>we'll we'll rock you good, good reference. You can shame

0:26:13.400 --> 0:26:16.080
<v Speaker 1>me later. Okay. One more thing I would think of

0:26:16.240 --> 0:26:20.280
<v Speaker 1>is uh the human equivalent of hive insect behavior? But

0:26:20.440 --> 0:26:26.600
<v Speaker 1>what about social sciences, sociology, political science, anthropology, the study

0:26:26.640 --> 0:26:28.720
<v Speaker 1>of what humans do in large groups. There seem to

0:26:28.760 --> 0:26:33.280
<v Speaker 1>be phenomenon there that are not uh, strictly predictable from

0:26:33.359 --> 0:26:36.639
<v Speaker 1>just understanding of say psychology. Could you look at a

0:26:36.760 --> 0:26:39.919
<v Speaker 1>really really good understanding of psychology and say this is

0:26:39.920 --> 0:26:44.160
<v Speaker 1>how societies will work? I don't know, I mean there

0:26:44.160 --> 0:26:48.720
<v Speaker 1>are those who extrapolate meaning from psychological concepts, who those

0:26:48.760 --> 0:26:52.280
<v Speaker 1>who attempt to. But yeah, it becomes increasingly complicated. Uh.

0:26:52.520 --> 0:26:57.360
<v Speaker 1>One of talking about this difference between, you know, reducible

0:26:57.359 --> 0:27:01.160
<v Speaker 1>phenomena and emergent phenomena. One of my favorite often misattributed

0:27:01.240 --> 0:27:06.720
<v Speaker 1>quotes Joseph Stalin is alleged to have said, falsely alleged

0:27:06.760 --> 0:27:09.920
<v Speaker 1>to have said quantity has a quality all its own.

0:27:10.960 --> 0:27:13.440
<v Speaker 1>I've always liked that quote. I can't find any evidence

0:27:13.480 --> 0:27:15.159
<v Speaker 1>he ever said this, but it does sort of echo

0:27:15.200 --> 0:27:18.000
<v Speaker 1>a sentiment explored by Marx and Engels in their writings

0:27:18.040 --> 0:27:22.800
<v Speaker 1>about economics and their adaptation of Hegelian dialectical philosophy. Uh,

0:27:22.840 --> 0:27:25.840
<v Speaker 1>the quantitative differences over a time, which is what we'd

0:27:25.840 --> 0:27:30.200
<v Speaker 1>sort of be looking at for for reductive philosophy of science.

0:27:30.440 --> 0:27:36.399
<v Speaker 1>Just quantitative changes actually do become qualitative differences. More is

0:27:36.440 --> 0:27:40.640
<v Speaker 1>not just more. In many cases more is different. Yes,

0:27:40.680 --> 0:27:42.320
<v Speaker 1>And I think this is this plasn't nicely with a

0:27:42.320 --> 0:27:45.240
<v Speaker 1>couple of papers, will look at later in the episode. Um,

0:27:45.280 --> 0:27:47.320
<v Speaker 1>as long as we're throwing out quotes, one I always

0:27:47.480 --> 0:27:50.199
<v Speaker 1>uh have have enjoyed on this sort of topic of

0:27:50.240 --> 0:27:53.760
<v Speaker 1>emergence is one from the poet Wawa Stevens his poem

0:27:54.000 --> 0:27:57.240
<v Speaker 1>Connoisseur of Chaos. A violent order is a disorder, and

0:27:57.280 --> 0:28:00.040
<v Speaker 1>be a great disorder as an order. These two of

0:28:00.160 --> 0:28:03.240
<v Speaker 1>things are one pages of illustrations. Oh man, that's a

0:28:03.280 --> 0:28:05.560
<v Speaker 1>good one. Stevens has a lot of great quotes that

0:28:05.600 --> 0:28:08.159
<v Speaker 1>I think somehow apply to science. You know, when I

0:28:08.200 --> 0:28:11.520
<v Speaker 1>often I get I get these feelings about what must

0:28:11.560 --> 0:28:14.040
<v Speaker 1>be true in science, But then I often hear in

0:28:14.080 --> 0:28:16.160
<v Speaker 1>the back of my mind that line from the Emperor

0:28:16.160 --> 0:28:22.160
<v Speaker 1>of ice Cream. Let be b finale of seam. He's

0:28:22.160 --> 0:28:23.760
<v Speaker 1>a good one. If if anyone out there is looking

0:28:23.760 --> 0:28:26.080
<v Speaker 1>to pick up some thought provoking poetry, get yourself a

0:28:26.080 --> 0:28:30.879
<v Speaker 1>book of Wallace Stevens and and to flip around in there. Okay, well,

0:28:30.880 --> 0:28:32.520
<v Speaker 1>I think we should take a quick break, and then

0:28:32.920 --> 0:28:35.119
<v Speaker 1>when we come back we will look at one of

0:28:35.160 --> 0:28:38.600
<v Speaker 1>our main resources in this episode, classic paper from the

0:28:38.640 --> 0:28:48.720
<v Speaker 1>history of science from the nineteen seventies called More is Different. Alright,

0:28:48.720 --> 0:28:52.480
<v Speaker 1>we're back, so tell me Joe is more different. That's

0:28:52.480 --> 0:28:56.200
<v Speaker 1>a good question, Robert. That's sort of the central question

0:28:56.240 --> 0:28:58.800
<v Speaker 1>of this episode. As you reach higher levels of complexity,

0:28:58.840 --> 0:29:02.600
<v Speaker 1>you get more things to other interacting to do different,

0:29:02.800 --> 0:29:07.400
<v Speaker 1>uniquely new properties emerge or is it just more and more? Well.

0:29:07.480 --> 0:29:11.200
<v Speaker 1>In nineteen seventy two, the Nobel Prize winning American physicist

0:29:11.200 --> 0:29:16.120
<v Speaker 1>Philip W. Anderson published this massively influential, highly cited paper

0:29:16.160 --> 0:29:19.560
<v Speaker 1>in the journal Science, and the title of the the

0:29:19.680 --> 0:29:22.959
<v Speaker 1>essay was more is Different and you, as you can

0:29:23.000 --> 0:29:26.200
<v Speaker 1>probably guess based on the title what position he took

0:29:26.240 --> 0:29:30.360
<v Speaker 1>on the emergentists debate. So Anderson writes that while at

0:29:30.360 --> 0:29:32.640
<v Speaker 1>the time he was writing, which was nint seventy two,

0:29:32.720 --> 0:29:38.240
<v Speaker 1>philosophers might still debate scientific reductionism, but he said scientists don't.

0:29:38.760 --> 0:29:44.120
<v Speaker 1>Scientists just take scientific reductionism for granted. Uh. And his

0:29:44.240 --> 0:29:48.680
<v Speaker 1>formulation of the reductionist hypothesis went like this quote. The

0:29:48.720 --> 0:29:51.440
<v Speaker 1>workings of our minds and bodies, and of all the

0:29:51.480 --> 0:29:55.480
<v Speaker 1>animate or inanimate matter of which they have any detailed knowledge,

0:29:55.800 --> 0:29:58.920
<v Speaker 1>are assumed to be controlled by the same set of

0:29:58.960 --> 0:30:03.360
<v Speaker 1>fundamental laws, which accept under certain extreme conditions, we feel

0:30:03.400 --> 0:30:06.640
<v Speaker 1>we know pretty well. In other words, he's saying, when

0:30:06.640 --> 0:30:09.920
<v Speaker 1>you chase causal explanations deep enough, it all boils down

0:30:09.920 --> 0:30:12.800
<v Speaker 1>to the bottom. It all goes straight down to fundamental physics,

0:30:13.040 --> 0:30:15.920
<v Speaker 1>and that is as it should be right. I mean,

0:30:15.960 --> 0:30:19.680
<v Speaker 1>that's why we established all of these basic fundamental physical

0:30:19.760 --> 0:30:24.600
<v Speaker 1>laws and interactions, because we wanted an idea of how

0:30:25.160 --> 0:30:29.000
<v Speaker 1>the the universe works, and so everything should boil down

0:30:29.000 --> 0:30:31.840
<v Speaker 1>to those laws. If it doesn't, that would indicate there's

0:30:31.880 --> 0:30:34.720
<v Speaker 1>some sort of problem with our laws, then our physics exactly. Yeah,

0:30:34.920 --> 0:30:39.040
<v Speaker 1>what what good does physics if it's not actually fundamental? Uh? So,

0:30:39.520 --> 0:30:42.120
<v Speaker 1>Anderson says, you know, if this is true, many many

0:30:42.120 --> 0:30:46.080
<v Speaker 1>people assume that it entails the idea that very few

0:30:46.120 --> 0:30:49.360
<v Speaker 1>people in the sciences are actually working on anything fundamental,

0:30:49.480 --> 0:30:54.200
<v Speaker 1>anything autonomous, anything original. Uh And to illustrate this example

0:30:54.440 --> 0:30:57.040
<v Speaker 1>or this frame of mind, Anderson quotes this passage from

0:30:57.040 --> 0:31:02.120
<v Speaker 1>the theoretical physicist Victor F. Weisskopf, which which sorts all

0:31:02.240 --> 0:31:07.920
<v Speaker 1>science into these two categories, which Weiskoff calls intensive and extensive.

0:31:08.600 --> 0:31:14.600
<v Speaker 1>So intensive research tries to discover fundamental laws. Extensive research

0:31:14.720 --> 0:31:19.680
<v Speaker 1>tries to explain phenomena with the use of known fundamental laws.

0:31:20.440 --> 0:31:23.920
<v Speaker 1>So at any given time, a minority, vast, a very

0:31:23.960 --> 0:31:27.200
<v Speaker 1>small minority of scientists, generally in fields like particle physics,

0:31:27.520 --> 0:31:31.760
<v Speaker 1>are working on describing fundamental laws that govern reality. Um,

0:31:31.800 --> 0:31:36.080
<v Speaker 1>they're doing the intensive science, and meanwhile, the vast majority

0:31:36.120 --> 0:31:40.120
<v Speaker 1>of scientists are just taking the models of fundamental laws

0:31:40.160 --> 0:31:44.400
<v Speaker 1>and applying them as an explanation for anything. For why

0:31:44.480 --> 0:31:47.920
<v Speaker 1>the rain in Nashville smells like hot dog water, or

0:31:48.240 --> 0:31:53.000
<v Speaker 1>sometimes sometimes I'm just kidding, you know, sometimes rain anywhere

0:31:53.000 --> 0:31:56.520
<v Speaker 1>smells like I haven't spent enough time in Nashville, you know, anything,

0:31:56.560 --> 0:32:00.479
<v Speaker 1>why your eyes won't stop bleeding. Uh So, the the

0:32:00.560 --> 0:32:04.760
<v Speaker 1>extension of this distinction, some presume, is that once we

0:32:04.840 --> 0:32:07.520
<v Speaker 1>have a fundamental theory of physics at the base of

0:32:07.520 --> 0:32:11.600
<v Speaker 1>all science, there's no intensive science left to do. Does

0:32:11.600 --> 0:32:14.200
<v Speaker 1>that make sense? Like you could still apply theories up

0:32:14.240 --> 0:32:18.040
<v Speaker 1>the chain, but there's nothing original left to discover. It's

0:32:18.160 --> 0:32:23.200
<v Speaker 1>just continually the application of what we know to different phenomena.

0:32:24.400 --> 0:32:27.760
<v Speaker 1>But Anderson throws down a flag here. He says, hold on,

0:32:28.400 --> 0:32:32.160
<v Speaker 1>let's say we accept the reductionist hypothesis that we can

0:32:32.200 --> 0:32:38.600
<v Speaker 1>reduce complex phenomenon explanations uh to simpler, more fundamental physical laws.

0:32:38.600 --> 0:32:42.040
<v Speaker 1>That doesn't necessarily imply the converse, which he calls the

0:32:42.120 --> 0:32:46.440
<v Speaker 1>quote constructionist hypothesis. It does not, in his words, it

0:32:46.520 --> 0:32:50.280
<v Speaker 1>does not imply the ability to start from those laws

0:32:50.320 --> 0:32:55.040
<v Speaker 1>and reconstruct the universe. So what is science supposed to do.

0:32:55.120 --> 0:32:57.480
<v Speaker 1>It's supposed to be able to predict. Right, if you

0:32:57.520 --> 0:33:00.080
<v Speaker 1>have a correct scientific theory, you should be able to

0:33:00.120 --> 0:33:05.480
<v Speaker 1>make accurate predictions about the future. But if you can't

0:33:06.240 --> 0:33:10.240
<v Speaker 1>make accurate predictions about the future from the fundamental laws

0:33:10.280 --> 0:33:13.760
<v Speaker 1>of physics, then do the fundamental laws of physics really

0:33:13.840 --> 0:33:18.840
<v Speaker 1>describe everything? So, in in Anderson's view, uh, why does

0:33:18.880 --> 0:33:21.440
<v Speaker 1>it not imply that we can start from the fundamental

0:33:21.520 --> 0:33:24.200
<v Speaker 1>laws and predict everything? Um, you know, shouldn't we be

0:33:24.280 --> 0:33:26.880
<v Speaker 1>able to do that in in in principle? Well, according

0:33:26.880 --> 0:33:30.280
<v Speaker 1>to Anderson, the answer is no. And Anderson says there

0:33:30.320 --> 0:33:34.440
<v Speaker 1>are two main problems with the constructionist hypothesis. One is

0:33:34.520 --> 0:33:38.680
<v Speaker 1>scale and the other is complexity. And I just want

0:33:38.680 --> 0:33:41.160
<v Speaker 1>to read a quote from him. Anderson writes, quote the

0:33:41.240 --> 0:33:45.560
<v Speaker 1>behavior of large and complex aggregations of elementary particles, So

0:33:45.640 --> 0:33:49.400
<v Speaker 1>that would be anything a football, Uh, to return to

0:33:49.560 --> 0:33:54.240
<v Speaker 1>a hot dog, a jar of pickles. Yes, I guess

0:33:54.280 --> 0:33:58.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm all thinking of cylindrical foods. I'm not sure why.

0:33:58.720 --> 0:34:03.000
<v Speaker 1>Um Uh. The behavior of large and complex aggregations of

0:34:03.000 --> 0:34:06.760
<v Speaker 1>elementary particles, it turns out, is not to be understood

0:34:06.800 --> 0:34:09.360
<v Speaker 1>in terms of a simple explanation of the properties of

0:34:09.400 --> 0:34:14.680
<v Speaker 1>a few particles. Instead, at each level of complexity, entirely

0:34:14.719 --> 0:34:18.400
<v Speaker 1>new properties appear, and the understanding of the new behaviors

0:34:18.400 --> 0:34:21.839
<v Speaker 1>requires research, which I think is as fundamental in its

0:34:21.920 --> 0:34:25.480
<v Speaker 1>nature as any other. So he's throwing in with with

0:34:25.560 --> 0:34:29.520
<v Speaker 1>a certain version of the emergentist hypothesis. Studying what happens

0:34:29.560 --> 0:34:32.480
<v Speaker 1>to more complex bodies, like studying what happens to a

0:34:32.560 --> 0:34:37.280
<v Speaker 1>jar of pickles, is doing original research that is actually

0:34:37.440 --> 0:34:42.399
<v Speaker 1>yielding hypotheses and theories that are not predictable from just

0:34:42.680 --> 0:34:47.160
<v Speaker 1>understanding the particles that make up that jar of pickles. Well,

0:34:47.160 --> 0:34:50.839
<v Speaker 1>this just reminds me again of societal examples and then

0:34:50.880 --> 0:34:53.200
<v Speaker 1>the idea of wicked problems. They like rolling out a

0:34:53.239 --> 0:34:58.239
<v Speaker 1>solution into a complex system that is society and not

0:34:58.320 --> 0:35:02.240
<v Speaker 1>realizing that the solution is going to spin off additional problems.

0:35:02.239 --> 0:35:04.719
<v Speaker 1>It's going to create additional complexity. They're going to be

0:35:04.920 --> 0:35:09.239
<v Speaker 1>emergent uh problems out of your solution, right that, Yeah,

0:35:09.280 --> 0:35:12.399
<v Speaker 1>there are things we can't predict from simpler principles, even

0:35:12.480 --> 0:35:17.000
<v Speaker 1>if those simpler principles are correct. Uh so, uh So,

0:35:17.080 --> 0:35:19.879
<v Speaker 1>Just to clarify, Anderson accepts that the sciences of more

0:35:19.920 --> 0:35:25.920
<v Speaker 1>complex phenomena are explanatorily dependent on the sciences of simpler phenomena. Right,

0:35:26.080 --> 0:35:29.760
<v Speaker 1>psychology is in a sense dependent on biology. We couldn't

0:35:29.760 --> 0:35:33.160
<v Speaker 1>have it without a you know, which is dependent on chemistry,

0:35:33.200 --> 0:35:36.480
<v Speaker 1>which is dependent on physics. But explicitly he rejects the

0:35:36.520 --> 0:35:41.239
<v Speaker 1>idea that this means psychology is just applied biology, or

0:35:41.280 --> 0:35:44.719
<v Speaker 1>that biology is just applied chemistry. At each of these

0:35:44.719 --> 0:35:49.399
<v Speaker 1>new levels of complexity, genuinely novel properties emerge which are

0:35:49.440 --> 0:35:53.279
<v Speaker 1>not necessarily predictable from a complete understanding of the more

0:35:53.360 --> 0:35:57.000
<v Speaker 1>fundamental science. Uh and he grounds this in an example

0:35:57.040 --> 0:36:00.000
<v Speaker 1>from his own field, because he works in many body physics.

0:36:01.400 --> 0:36:04.160
<v Speaker 1>And uh he he grounds it in this concept that

0:36:04.280 --> 0:36:08.040
<v Speaker 1>is known as symmetry breaking. So what does that mean? Well,

0:36:08.480 --> 0:36:12.319
<v Speaker 1>for Anderson, the study of fundamental physics is almost synonymous

0:36:12.360 --> 0:36:15.600
<v Speaker 1>with the study of symmetry. In other words, fundamental physics

0:36:15.680 --> 0:36:18.319
<v Speaker 1>is the search for the laws of reality that are

0:36:18.880 --> 0:36:22.600
<v Speaker 1>homogeneous and isotropic. What does that mean. It means they're

0:36:22.640 --> 0:36:26.360
<v Speaker 1>the same everywhere and they apply to everything no matter

0:36:26.480 --> 0:36:29.520
<v Speaker 1>from what vantage point you look. That sounds like a

0:36:29.560 --> 0:36:32.040
<v Speaker 1>good description to me of what the fundamental laws should be.

0:36:32.080 --> 0:36:36.520
<v Speaker 1>In other words, they're fundamentally symmetrical. They're they're the same everywhere. Right.

0:36:36.560 --> 0:36:38.479
<v Speaker 1>It works in the city, works in the country, works

0:36:38.480 --> 0:36:41.439
<v Speaker 1>on earth, works in alpha centaire. Right, and that that's

0:36:41.440 --> 0:36:45.360
<v Speaker 1>what physics should be. But while all matter obeys basic

0:36:45.400 --> 0:36:49.080
<v Speaker 1>electrodynamics and quantum theory, many objects in the universe, and

0:36:49.160 --> 0:36:53.040
<v Speaker 1>not just minds and societies, but Anderson uses examples of

0:36:53.080 --> 0:36:57.720
<v Speaker 1>tiny basic physical structures. Many of these objects display novel

0:36:58.000 --> 0:37:01.799
<v Speaker 1>or asymmetrical properties, which he says, they're not strictly predictable

0:37:02.280 --> 0:37:05.520
<v Speaker 1>from the symmetrical laws that govern them govern them. So

0:37:05.719 --> 0:37:09.400
<v Speaker 1>these asymmetries include He gives examples like the inversion of

0:37:09.440 --> 0:37:14.320
<v Speaker 1>the ammonia molecule, the shapes of atomic nuclei like sometimes

0:37:14.320 --> 0:37:17.880
<v Speaker 1>an atomic nucleus you can work out mathematically is in

0:37:17.920 --> 0:37:21.759
<v Speaker 1>a sense shaped like a football or shaped like a plate. Uh,

0:37:21.800 --> 0:37:24.520
<v Speaker 1>and he talks about the structures of crystals. These are

0:37:24.680 --> 0:37:28.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, they should be. They're based on symmetrical laws,

0:37:28.800 --> 0:37:34.000
<v Speaker 1>but the symmetrical laws end up generating asymmetries in reality.

0:37:34.600 --> 0:37:37.840
<v Speaker 1>So in Anderson's view, the question is why are large

0:37:37.920 --> 0:37:42.280
<v Speaker 1>systems not just bigger than elementary particles, but fundamentally different

0:37:42.400 --> 0:37:45.800
<v Speaker 1>from them, with unique properties to study. And here I

0:37:45.800 --> 0:37:47.760
<v Speaker 1>want to read a quote from Anderson. He says, quote,

0:37:48.040 --> 0:37:51.839
<v Speaker 1>the essential idea is that in the so called into infinity,

0:37:51.960 --> 0:37:55.759
<v Speaker 1>in approaching infinity limit of large systems between stuff on

0:37:55.800 --> 0:37:59.120
<v Speaker 1>our own macroscopic scale, it is not only convenient but

0:37:59.440 --> 0:38:04.360
<v Speaker 1>essentially to realize that matter will undergo mathematically sharp singular

0:38:04.760 --> 0:38:09.560
<v Speaker 1>phase transitions to state at which the macros microscopic symmetries,

0:38:10.400 --> 0:38:13.400
<v Speaker 1>and even the microscopic equations of motion are in a

0:38:13.560 --> 0:38:17.960
<v Speaker 1>sense violated. The symmetry leaves behind ass as its expression,

0:38:18.080 --> 0:38:23.600
<v Speaker 1>only certain characteristic behaviors, for example, long wavelength vibrations of

0:38:23.640 --> 0:38:27.120
<v Speaker 1>which the familiar example is sound waves, or the unusual

0:38:27.200 --> 0:38:31.759
<v Speaker 1>macroscopic conduction phenomena of the superconductor, or in a very

0:38:31.800 --> 0:38:36.560
<v Speaker 1>deep analogy, the very rigidity of crystal lattices and thus

0:38:36.600 --> 0:38:40.120
<v Speaker 1>of most solid matter. There is, of course no question

0:38:40.239 --> 0:38:44.040
<v Speaker 1>of the systems really violating, as opposed to breaking the

0:38:44.120 --> 0:38:47.919
<v Speaker 1>symmetry of space and time. But because its parts find

0:38:47.960 --> 0:38:52.440
<v Speaker 1>it energetically more favorable to maintain certain fixed relationships with

0:38:52.520 --> 0:38:55.719
<v Speaker 1>each other, the symmetry allows only the body as a

0:38:55.800 --> 0:39:00.120
<v Speaker 1>whole to respond to external forces. Uh so again he

0:39:00.120 --> 0:39:03.000
<v Speaker 1>he's not saying that a big system macroscopic system like

0:39:03.040 --> 0:39:06.440
<v Speaker 1>a jar of pickles, violates the laws of physics, but

0:39:06.480 --> 0:39:09.759
<v Speaker 1>he's saying, at certain levels of complexity, large objects make

0:39:09.880 --> 0:39:12.959
<v Speaker 1>more sense understood as a whole than at the level

0:39:13.000 --> 0:39:16.759
<v Speaker 1>of their constituent parts. Uh. And the whole has a

0:39:16.840 --> 0:39:20.799
<v Speaker 1>novel scheme of behavior that's not easily predictable from the

0:39:20.880 --> 0:39:24.640
<v Speaker 1>nature of its elementary particles. And then of course there

0:39:24.680 --> 0:39:26.600
<v Speaker 1>he's like, well, now we've just talked about you know,

0:39:26.640 --> 0:39:28.719
<v Speaker 1>crystals and stuff like that, but he of course says,

0:39:28.760 --> 0:39:30.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, this applies to d N A and stuff

0:39:30.760 --> 0:39:33.440
<v Speaker 1>like that too. Of Course, once you get much more complex,

0:39:33.480 --> 0:39:37.040
<v Speaker 1>the problem is is magnified all the more things just

0:39:37.440 --> 0:39:42.359
<v Speaker 1>become really seemingly impossible to reduce to or predict from

0:39:42.680 --> 0:39:46.080
<v Speaker 1>the underlying laws of elementary particles. There are these quantum

0:39:46.160 --> 0:39:50.359
<v Speaker 1>leaps where it appears that quantity has a quality all

0:39:50.360 --> 0:39:53.000
<v Speaker 1>its own suddenly, And of course, in the end of

0:39:53.040 --> 0:39:55.960
<v Speaker 1>his paper he paraphrases marks in in that saying quantity

0:39:55.960 --> 0:39:58.600
<v Speaker 1>as a quality all its own, and then I love this.

0:39:58.680 --> 0:40:02.719
<v Speaker 1>He also quotes a supposed conversation between f. Scott Fitzgerald

0:40:02.760 --> 0:40:06.719
<v Speaker 1>and Earnest Hemingway, where of course Fitzgerald says the rich

0:40:06.719 --> 0:40:10.719
<v Speaker 1>are different from us and Hemingway replies, yes, they have

0:40:10.840 --> 0:40:14.560
<v Speaker 1>more money. Now this is interesting because it immediately brings

0:40:14.560 --> 0:40:18.960
<v Speaker 1>to mind some like reductionist criticisms that are thrown out.

0:40:19.239 --> 0:40:23.480
<v Speaker 1>I've seen before about say that human beings to say, oh,

0:40:23.520 --> 0:40:26.360
<v Speaker 1>well you can you can dissect a human being. You can,

0:40:26.600 --> 0:40:29.120
<v Speaker 1>you can hold a human heart in your hand, but

0:40:29.200 --> 0:40:31.080
<v Speaker 1>you're not going to get a sense of who that

0:40:31.120 --> 0:40:34.479
<v Speaker 1>person was based on that experience. Yeah, and I would say,

0:40:34.480 --> 0:40:39.239
<v Speaker 1>actually that um that Anderson is not the final word

0:40:39.239 --> 0:40:43.080
<v Speaker 1>on this, obviously, like people disagree with him, but this

0:40:43.120 --> 0:40:45.600
<v Speaker 1>has been a really interesting and influential paper. And it's

0:40:45.600 --> 0:40:48.480
<v Speaker 1>also not to rule out the idea that redundant sciences

0:40:48.480 --> 0:40:52.239
<v Speaker 1>do exist somewhere. For example, there might be fields of

0:40:52.280 --> 0:40:55.279
<v Speaker 1>science that really do reduce to nothing more the app

0:40:55.360 --> 0:40:58.520
<v Speaker 1>than the application of principles of a more fundamental field

0:40:58.560 --> 0:41:01.279
<v Speaker 1>of science. But it just looks like this is not

0:41:01.360 --> 0:41:04.920
<v Speaker 1>the case for most, if not all, mature scientific fields.

0:41:05.640 --> 0:41:08.799
<v Speaker 1>But somebody out there in a lab right now, it

0:41:08.880 --> 0:41:11.640
<v Speaker 1>could happen to you. You could be reduced to a

0:41:11.680 --> 0:41:15.359
<v Speaker 1>simpler study field is okay, But maybe we should look

0:41:15.360 --> 0:41:19.280
<v Speaker 1>at a counterpoint, because, as as I mentioned, not everybody

0:41:19.320 --> 0:41:23.520
<v Speaker 1>agrees with Anderson. Uh well, and so what if maybe

0:41:23.560 --> 0:41:26.560
<v Speaker 1>it's not as different as you think. More might seem

0:41:26.640 --> 0:41:30.560
<v Speaker 1>different or field different, and more might be useful to

0:41:30.719 --> 0:41:34.640
<v Speaker 1>treat as different given our limitations. But maybe it's not

0:41:34.960 --> 0:41:38.799
<v Speaker 1>really different. There's nothing actually unique going on at higher

0:41:38.880 --> 0:41:42.520
<v Speaker 1>levels of complexity. It's just convenient for us to treat

0:41:42.560 --> 0:41:45.439
<v Speaker 1>it that way. And here I want to come to

0:41:45.520 --> 0:41:49.920
<v Speaker 1>another Nobel Prize winning American physicist, Stephen Weinberg, who offers

0:41:49.960 --> 0:41:54.880
<v Speaker 1>a really interesting complementary counter analysis in his book Dreams

0:41:54.880 --> 0:41:57.320
<v Speaker 1>of a Final Theory. Have you ever read anything by Weinberg?

0:41:59.120 --> 0:42:02.239
<v Speaker 1>I am not sure that I have. He's a really

0:42:02.239 --> 0:42:05.960
<v Speaker 1>good writer. The first chapter of this book is just

0:42:06.000 --> 0:42:11.000
<v Speaker 1>this brilliant, rollicking fun adventure through science, through chemistry and

0:42:11.040 --> 0:42:14.319
<v Speaker 1>particle physics, if you can believe that, where he he

0:42:14.360 --> 0:42:17.439
<v Speaker 1>talks about a piece of chalk, and he's like, let's

0:42:17.440 --> 0:42:20.279
<v Speaker 1>apply the reductionist hypothesis to a piece of chalk, and

0:42:20.480 --> 0:42:23.799
<v Speaker 1>and and in every way possible, look at its properties

0:42:24.120 --> 0:42:27.560
<v Speaker 1>and ask why. And every time you ask why, why

0:42:27.680 --> 0:42:30.440
<v Speaker 1>is the chalk white? Why is the chalk shaped? Like

0:42:30.480 --> 0:42:33.439
<v Speaker 1>it is. Why you know any question like that, you

0:42:33.520 --> 0:42:36.960
<v Speaker 1>can What you're doing, essentially is playing the reductionist game, right,

0:42:37.040 --> 0:42:39.239
<v Speaker 1>You're you're going one level down. I have to do

0:42:39.280 --> 0:42:41.959
<v Speaker 1>that all the time as a as a father. Yeah,

0:42:42.160 --> 0:42:45.759
<v Speaker 1>I'm constantly asked questions. I mean, he hasn't asked me

0:42:45.760 --> 0:42:47.799
<v Speaker 1>about chalk, but I can easily imagine and ask me

0:42:47.840 --> 0:42:50.400
<v Speaker 1>those very questions. Why is it white? Why does it

0:42:50.440 --> 0:42:53.080
<v Speaker 1>do this? One? Is it? That will get very reductionist

0:42:53.200 --> 0:42:57.000
<v Speaker 1>questions about virtually everything. And when you do that, you're

0:42:57.040 --> 0:43:01.120
<v Speaker 1>putting reductionism into practice. You're saying, Okay, well, I can

0:43:01.160 --> 0:43:05.240
<v Speaker 1>explain these these higher properties in terms of lower properties,

0:43:05.640 --> 0:43:08.840
<v Speaker 1>simpler properties that cause an effect we see at a

0:43:08.880 --> 0:43:11.680
<v Speaker 1>large scale. Yeah, I often don't see see it quite

0:43:11.760 --> 0:43:14.120
<v Speaker 1>that beautifully. Generally, it's like, oh jeez, I'm just trying

0:43:14.160 --> 0:43:16.160
<v Speaker 1>to to drive you to school, and now I've I've

0:43:16.200 --> 0:43:20.280
<v Speaker 1>got to explain gravity. You know, because you were asking

0:43:20.320 --> 0:43:22.800
<v Speaker 1>about a you know, a bird or a football or something,

0:43:23.480 --> 0:43:26.520
<v Speaker 1>what like why did that bird fly into the car window?

0:43:26.840 --> 0:43:29.680
<v Speaker 1>Is it? That's uh no, no, no, no, unfortunately not.

0:43:29.920 --> 0:43:32.400
<v Speaker 1>But you know, it will just be you know, random

0:43:32.440 --> 0:43:35.279
<v Speaker 1>wonderful questions about just how the universe works, and it

0:43:35.280 --> 0:43:38.120
<v Speaker 1>will generally start start with a particular detail, but it

0:43:38.200 --> 0:43:42.840
<v Speaker 1>quickly spirals out into these very complex uh you know,

0:43:42.960 --> 0:43:47.799
<v Speaker 1>notions of of reality. Yeah. Uh so, So Weinberg is

0:43:47.840 --> 0:43:51.200
<v Speaker 1>a fan of reductionism. Weinberg he's looking for a final theory.

0:43:51.280 --> 0:43:54.040
<v Speaker 1>He wants to find a final theory of physics. And

0:43:54.200 --> 0:43:57.080
<v Speaker 1>ultimately he says, yeah, maybe not in practice, can we

0:43:57.120 --> 0:43:59.680
<v Speaker 1>actually reduce everything to physics, like it might just be

0:43:59.680 --> 0:44:02.840
<v Speaker 1>beyond into our capabilities. But in theory, everything should be

0:44:02.880 --> 0:44:06.000
<v Speaker 1>reducible to fundamental physics, that there should be no higher

0:44:06.120 --> 0:44:10.120
<v Speaker 1>order insights. Really, uh, it's all there in the physics.

0:44:10.160 --> 0:44:13.879
<v Speaker 1>So in this opening chapter he's discussing problems with with

0:44:14.000 --> 0:44:17.480
<v Speaker 1>putting the reductionist hypothesis into practice, and he acknowledges there

0:44:17.480 --> 0:44:20.640
<v Speaker 1>are plenty of problems. He's not cavalier about that. Uh.

0:44:20.640 --> 0:44:23.239
<v Speaker 1>And one of the problems with reducing things like biology

0:44:23.360 --> 0:44:26.360
<v Speaker 1>to fundamental physics is that he points out biology is

0:44:26.400 --> 0:44:30.120
<v Speaker 1>not just a product of fundamental laws, but also biology

0:44:30.160 --> 0:44:35.120
<v Speaker 1>incorporates stuff that happened in the past, like it is

0:44:35.160 --> 0:44:38.719
<v Speaker 1>the product of both the fundamental laws of physics and

0:44:39.040 --> 0:44:43.640
<v Speaker 1>some accidents of history. In Weinberg's view, biology wouldn't be

0:44:43.760 --> 0:44:47.240
<v Speaker 1>the way it was if some different things had happened

0:44:47.239 --> 0:44:51.080
<v Speaker 1>in the past. Um. So I think that's kind of interesting.

0:44:51.120 --> 0:44:53.920
<v Speaker 1>And in this sense, you see in sciences like biology,

0:44:54.080 --> 0:44:58.480
<v Speaker 1>the past becomes calcified into structures that all life on

0:44:58.520 --> 0:45:04.360
<v Speaker 1>Earth uses, and so physics appears to be timeless and universal.

0:45:04.640 --> 0:45:08.120
<v Speaker 1>But biology is a contingent science. It's a result of

0:45:08.239 --> 0:45:12.000
<v Speaker 1>something that happened at one point. Uh. Now, you could

0:45:12.000 --> 0:45:13.960
<v Speaker 1>maybe go to a higher level and say that even

0:45:13.960 --> 0:45:17.120
<v Speaker 1>physics could be that way. Maybe there, you know, maybe

0:45:17.120 --> 0:45:20.120
<v Speaker 1>there's a multiverse. Maybe the laws of physics in this

0:45:20.200 --> 0:45:23.000
<v Speaker 1>local universe are in fact contingent. They didn't have to

0:45:23.040 --> 0:45:26.319
<v Speaker 1>be that way. Different universes could have different laws of physics,

0:45:26.360 --> 0:45:29.000
<v Speaker 1>that's possible, but they at least appear to be universal

0:45:29.080 --> 0:45:31.640
<v Speaker 1>in this universe. Okay, So yeah, when we look at

0:45:31.640 --> 0:45:35.840
<v Speaker 1>a complex system, we're also looking at a process. Yeah. Um,

0:45:35.880 --> 0:45:39.360
<v Speaker 1>but then uh. Weinberg also deals with the concept of

0:45:39.400 --> 0:45:42.600
<v Speaker 1>emergence and and he tries to he's respectful toward it,

0:45:42.680 --> 0:45:44.880
<v Speaker 1>but he tries to show that he thinks it doesn't

0:45:45.080 --> 0:45:49.719
<v Speaker 1>undercut the reductionist hypothesis. So he cites Anderson's essay more

0:45:49.840 --> 0:45:53.640
<v Speaker 1>is different, and Weinberg stresses, like Anderson, that while most

0:45:53.680 --> 0:45:56.960
<v Speaker 1>obvious examples of potential emergence are in the biological and

0:45:57.000 --> 0:46:00.480
<v Speaker 1>social sciences, if emergence exists, it appears to be in

0:46:00.920 --> 0:46:05.680
<v Speaker 1>physics as well, and he gives this prime example thermodynamics,

0:46:06.400 --> 0:46:09.799
<v Speaker 1>the study of heat. Now you might be thinking like, well,

0:46:09.840 --> 0:46:13.520
<v Speaker 1>how could heat be all that complex? Heat is mega complex.

0:46:13.680 --> 0:46:15.880
<v Speaker 1>If you ask somebody who's been trying to do, you know,

0:46:15.960 --> 0:46:21.239
<v Speaker 1>calculations and thermodynamics, it's really complicated. And Weinberg points out

0:46:21.280 --> 0:46:25.840
<v Speaker 1>that in the nineteenth century, thermodynamics was a fundamentally different

0:46:25.960 --> 0:46:31.400
<v Speaker 1>and distinct science. It was considered logically autonomous and kept

0:46:31.480 --> 0:46:35.439
<v Speaker 1>separate from general mechanics. So you might have your Newtonians

0:46:35.480 --> 0:46:39.480
<v Speaker 1>over here, you know, doing their mechanics work, and then

0:46:39.600 --> 0:46:44.080
<v Speaker 1>you've got your thermodynamicists. And so while physics relied on

0:46:44.200 --> 0:46:48.000
<v Speaker 1>concepts like particles and forces, he says, thermodynamics relied on

0:46:48.080 --> 0:46:51.759
<v Speaker 1>concepts like temperature and entropy, which just did not have

0:46:51.880 --> 0:46:56.080
<v Speaker 1>counterparts in general mechanics. Uh and uh. He says that

0:46:56.160 --> 0:46:59.360
<v Speaker 1>the only real bridge was the first law of thermodynamics,

0:46:59.400 --> 0:47:02.759
<v Speaker 1>which was the conservation of energy that linked thermodynamics with

0:47:02.800 --> 0:47:05.359
<v Speaker 1>the rest of physics, but he writes that the main

0:47:05.440 --> 0:47:08.680
<v Speaker 1>idea and thermodynamics was the second law, which says that

0:47:08.760 --> 0:47:13.360
<v Speaker 1>in any closed system, there's this magical quantity called entropy,

0:47:13.400 --> 0:47:16.920
<v Speaker 1>which tends to increase over time until the system reaches

0:47:17.000 --> 0:47:20.480
<v Speaker 1>a state of equilibrium, until everything just sort of equals

0:47:20.520 --> 0:47:25.080
<v Speaker 1>out and becomes very mellow um. But then he writes,

0:47:25.120 --> 0:47:27.840
<v Speaker 1>in the nineteenth century, physicists took the second law of

0:47:27.880 --> 0:47:31.360
<v Speaker 1>thermodynamics as an axiom. They believed it, believed in it

0:47:31.400 --> 0:47:34.920
<v Speaker 1>basically on the basis of induction. Uh. And you could

0:47:35.080 --> 0:47:38.800
<v Speaker 1>and still can see examples of thermodynamics all over nature.

0:47:39.080 --> 0:47:41.520
<v Speaker 1>You can look at the behavior of steam billowing up

0:47:41.560 --> 0:47:45.080
<v Speaker 1>from a pot and see thermody dynamics. You can see

0:47:45.120 --> 0:47:48.200
<v Speaker 1>freezing and boiling liquids, and then you can even see

0:47:48.640 --> 0:47:52.840
<v Speaker 1>versions of what looked like thermodynamics in globular clusters in space.

0:47:53.480 --> 0:47:57.879
<v Speaker 1>But if you see thermodynamics principles play out all over

0:47:57.960 --> 0:48:00.520
<v Speaker 1>all scales of the universe, from like mall lecules of

0:48:00.640 --> 0:48:03.759
<v Speaker 1>H two in your kitchen to clouds and clouds of

0:48:03.800 --> 0:48:08.960
<v Speaker 1>stars and galaxies, then surely thermodynamics is logically independent from

0:48:08.960 --> 0:48:14.320
<v Speaker 1>fundamental physics. Right, But Weinberg says no. He writes that eventually,

0:48:14.560 --> 0:48:18.320
<v Speaker 1>the work of theoretical physicists like Maxwell, Boltzmann and Gibbs

0:48:19.680 --> 0:48:23.600
<v Speaker 1>showed that quote, the principles of thermodynamics could in fact

0:48:23.680 --> 0:48:28.200
<v Speaker 1>be deduced mathematically by an analysis of the pro probabilities

0:48:28.239 --> 0:48:32.720
<v Speaker 1>of different configurations of certain kinds of system those systems

0:48:32.760 --> 0:48:36.520
<v Speaker 1>whose energy is shared among a very large number of subsystems,

0:48:36.920 --> 0:48:39.880
<v Speaker 1>as for instance, a gas whose energy is shared among

0:48:39.920 --> 0:48:43.520
<v Speaker 1>the molecules of which it is composed. So, in other words,

0:48:43.719 --> 0:48:46.440
<v Speaker 1>they came up with the interpretive bridge to show how

0:48:46.480 --> 0:48:53.200
<v Speaker 1>thermodynamics reduces to underlying mechanics, statistical mechanics. And this amazing

0:48:53.360 --> 0:48:57.280
<v Speaker 1>weird property known as heat really just is the combined

0:48:57.440 --> 0:48:59.880
<v Speaker 1>kinetic energy of all the particles in the system. And

0:49:00.000 --> 0:49:02.239
<v Speaker 1>that's what we're taught in school. Now you learn heat

0:49:02.320 --> 0:49:06.040
<v Speaker 1>is the kinetic energy of vibrating particles. Uh An entropy,

0:49:06.160 --> 0:49:10.560
<v Speaker 1>it's just actually a measure of how disordered the system is. Entropy, Uh,

0:49:10.640 --> 0:49:12.560
<v Speaker 1>it just means the amount of order in a closed

0:49:12.560 --> 0:49:16.520
<v Speaker 1>system decreases over time. So thermodynamics, he says, has been

0:49:16.560 --> 0:49:21.520
<v Speaker 1>reduced to underlying theories of particles and forces. And yet

0:49:22.000 --> 0:49:25.680
<v Speaker 1>Weinberg writes, you know, these higher order, complex and seemingly

0:49:25.719 --> 0:49:30.080
<v Speaker 1>emergent properties like temperature and entropy, which have no counterpart

0:49:30.239 --> 0:49:32.799
<v Speaker 1>at the scale of individual particles, they're just not they're

0:49:32.880 --> 0:49:36.120
<v Speaker 1>down low, are still useful for lots of kinds of explanations.

0:49:36.160 --> 0:49:39.839
<v Speaker 1>So he's not saying higher order sciences aren't useful, they're

0:49:39.880 --> 0:49:44.520
<v Speaker 1>just not actually fundamental. They're not describing anything novel necessarily.

0:49:45.320 --> 0:49:49.200
<v Speaker 1>Uh So he he concludes this discussion that, um, yeah,

0:49:49.600 --> 0:49:53.160
<v Speaker 1>by saying, quote, thermodynamics is more like a mode of

0:49:53.320 --> 0:49:58.200
<v Speaker 1>reasoning than a body of universal physical law. Wherever it applies,

0:49:58.480 --> 0:50:01.160
<v Speaker 1>it always allows us to jud stify the use of

0:50:01.200 --> 0:50:05.520
<v Speaker 1>the same principles. But the explanation of why thermodynamics it

0:50:05.600 --> 0:50:09.040
<v Speaker 1>does apply to any particular system takes the form of

0:50:09.080 --> 0:50:13.600
<v Speaker 1>a deduction using the methods of statistical mechanics from the

0:50:13.640 --> 0:50:17.719
<v Speaker 1>details of what the system contains, and this inevitably leads

0:50:17.800 --> 0:50:20.879
<v Speaker 1>us down to the level of elementary particles. So he's

0:50:20.880 --> 0:50:24.759
<v Speaker 1>saying it's useful, but it's it's elementary physics. They're what's

0:50:24.880 --> 0:50:28.920
<v Speaker 1>driving it is really fundamental physics. So my interpretation of

0:50:28.960 --> 0:50:33.040
<v Speaker 1>Weinberg here is that he's using the example of thermodynamics

0:50:33.080 --> 0:50:36.440
<v Speaker 1>to show that while these higher order sciences dealing with

0:50:36.480 --> 0:50:40.719
<v Speaker 1>complex phenomenon might always remain explanatory, useful, they're just never

0:50:40.880 --> 0:50:45.239
<v Speaker 1>logically autonomous, never fundamental, never independent, and they might be

0:50:45.320 --> 0:50:49.200
<v Speaker 1>good to retain for purposes of communication and understanding, but

0:50:49.280 --> 0:50:53.239
<v Speaker 1>they don't describe fundamental truths. For that, you need reduction

0:50:53.280 --> 0:50:57.680
<v Speaker 1>to fundamental physics, paired with an acknowledgement of accidents of history,

0:50:57.960 --> 0:51:02.439
<v Speaker 1>and ultimately a theory of every thing. So basically, any

0:51:02.480 --> 0:51:04.279
<v Speaker 1>of these different fields is ultimately going to be a

0:51:04.320 --> 0:51:07.680
<v Speaker 1>subset of another field. All Right, we're gonna take a

0:51:07.760 --> 0:51:09.880
<v Speaker 1>quick break, and when we come back, we're going to

0:51:09.960 --> 0:51:13.359
<v Speaker 1>discuss this in terms of some more human elements. Um,

0:51:13.600 --> 0:51:17.319
<v Speaker 1>So if your if your mind is exploding with all

0:51:17.320 --> 0:51:20.440
<v Speaker 1>of the thermodynamics, bear with us, because things are going

0:51:20.480 --> 0:51:28.520
<v Speaker 1>to get a little more human. Okay, So we just

0:51:28.600 --> 0:51:34.040
<v Speaker 1>looked at some difficult examples of where emergent properties may

0:51:34.280 --> 0:51:38.960
<v Speaker 1>appear to exist in things like crystals or thermodynamics. They

0:51:39.040 --> 0:51:41.920
<v Speaker 1>might really exist and be fundamental. They might just be

0:51:41.960 --> 0:51:45.239
<v Speaker 1>an illusion that they're not actually fundamental. But one of

0:51:45.280 --> 0:51:48.000
<v Speaker 1>the places where people have a really hard time not

0:51:48.160 --> 0:51:52.640
<v Speaker 1>seeing something unique and original at higher levels of complexities

0:51:52.680 --> 0:51:56.320
<v Speaker 1>and the human sciences in things like psychology and anthropology.

0:51:56.360 --> 0:51:58.600
<v Speaker 1>So maybe we should look at a couple of examples

0:51:59.040 --> 0:52:03.000
<v Speaker 1>of papers taking the idea of emergentis um and applying

0:52:03.040 --> 0:52:06.920
<v Speaker 1>it to these higher complexity sciences. Yeah, and you know

0:52:06.960 --> 0:52:09.360
<v Speaker 1>a lot of this boils down to like what's the

0:52:09.400 --> 0:52:14.440
<v Speaker 1>saying three's company fours the crowd? Like there, I mean,

0:52:14.480 --> 0:52:17.200
<v Speaker 1>in our own experience, we know that as is more

0:52:17.239 --> 0:52:24.960
<v Speaker 1>people gather together, certain certain realities come online, certain certain

0:52:25.040 --> 0:52:30.560
<v Speaker 1>social responsibilities come online, like, for instance, yoga classes. If

0:52:30.560 --> 0:52:32.279
<v Speaker 1>anyone out there has ever been a yoga class, rom

0:52:32.280 --> 0:52:34.560
<v Speaker 1>exercise class, if there are just two people in it,

0:52:34.600 --> 0:52:36.840
<v Speaker 1>if there's just a teacher and a student, one of

0:52:36.920 --> 0:52:39.919
<v Speaker 1>the realities not to be crude is there there There

0:52:40.080 --> 0:52:45.680
<v Speaker 1>is no plausible deniability of flatulence. If one person um

0:52:45.800 --> 0:52:49.600
<v Speaker 1>passes gas and it's audible or you know, or not audible.

0:52:49.600 --> 0:52:53.319
<v Speaker 1>If it's noticeable, then there's no questioning who did it.

0:52:54.160 --> 0:52:57.080
<v Speaker 1>But if there are three, then there's plausible deniability. Then

0:52:57.080 --> 0:53:00.239
<v Speaker 1>you've got a society, you've got a suspicion and got

0:53:00.280 --> 0:53:03.200
<v Speaker 1>bluffing exactly. And I mean that's just a very simple example.

0:53:03.239 --> 0:53:08.480
<v Speaker 1>But this takes place, the more you expand the social dynamic.

0:53:09.160 --> 0:53:11.200
<v Speaker 1>And uh, and there have been studies that have that

0:53:11.280 --> 0:53:13.920
<v Speaker 1>have looked into this, uh in you know, broad or

0:53:14.000 --> 0:53:17.920
<v Speaker 1>less crude terms of course. UH. One paper in particular,

0:53:18.040 --> 0:53:20.600
<v Speaker 1>and this is one that that that you found for

0:53:20.680 --> 0:53:25.520
<v Speaker 1>us here is from Robert L. Carnario, the Transition from

0:53:25.640 --> 0:53:29.160
<v Speaker 1>Quantity to Quality and neglected causal mechanism in Accounting for

0:53:29.239 --> 0:53:31.840
<v Speaker 1>social evolution. I was interested in this one because it

0:53:31.840 --> 0:53:35.000
<v Speaker 1>plays on the idea of quantity becoming quality. So yeah,

0:53:35.000 --> 0:53:38.000
<v Speaker 1>the basic nugget here is that when the quantitative increase

0:53:38.040 --> 0:53:41.400
<v Speaker 1>in some entity reaches a certain threshold, the situation gives

0:53:41.480 --> 0:53:45.840
<v Speaker 1>rise to a qualitative change. So more is different, right Exactly,

0:53:45.840 --> 0:53:48.719
<v Speaker 1>it's the same process, but the idea is that it

0:53:48.760 --> 0:53:52.560
<v Speaker 1>would break down, uh, you know, beyond mere biological and

0:53:52.600 --> 0:53:54.759
<v Speaker 1>chemical examples. We've touched on some of them already, but

0:53:54.880 --> 0:53:57.560
<v Speaker 1>like a couple more that the the author brings up here,

0:53:57.600 --> 0:54:00.400
<v Speaker 1>like the critical mass of uranium or the quanty aitative

0:54:00.440 --> 0:54:03.399
<v Speaker 1>difference in the wavelength of the light received by our

0:54:03.400 --> 0:54:07.279
<v Speaker 1>retina and the effect that has on color perception. So

0:54:07.280 --> 0:54:08.400
<v Speaker 1>I guess you can think of in terms you know,

0:54:08.400 --> 0:54:12.600
<v Speaker 1>there's a there's a tipping point um where where quantity

0:54:13.520 --> 0:54:16.799
<v Speaker 1>because it becomes quality. Oh yeah, I never thought about that.

0:54:16.880 --> 0:54:21.320
<v Speaker 1>Wavelengths of light, So increasing wavelengths suddenly we just perceive

0:54:21.400 --> 0:54:24.480
<v Speaker 1>a different color, right, that's that's that's the basic idea.

0:54:24.680 --> 0:54:27.560
<v Speaker 1>But the author here focuses on the notion that quantitative

0:54:27.560 --> 0:54:30.520
<v Speaker 1>increases in the form of population give rise to a

0:54:30.600 --> 0:54:32.600
<v Speaker 1>change in the structure of a society. So it's that

0:54:32.680 --> 0:54:37.880
<v Speaker 1>yoga example, it's the threes company fours a crowd, except

0:54:38.520 --> 0:54:41.319
<v Speaker 1>he explores it through some some various other examples here.

0:54:41.920 --> 0:54:45.960
<v Speaker 1>So on a basic level, let's say we have a

0:54:46.040 --> 0:54:49.200
<v Speaker 1>village of humans and it reaches a large enough size

0:54:49.719 --> 0:54:52.520
<v Speaker 1>that you know what, you end up having factions emerge,

0:54:52.640 --> 0:54:55.200
<v Speaker 1>clans emerged, like this is a This is a classic

0:54:55.239 --> 0:54:59.600
<v Speaker 1>trope of various fictional scenarios in which you have outsiders

0:54:59.719 --> 0:55:04.000
<v Speaker 1>and a survivalist. You know, Stephen King's the Mist, Lord

0:55:04.000 --> 0:55:07.600
<v Speaker 1>of the Flies Lost. You're gonna have factions emerged, right,

0:55:07.640 --> 0:55:10.120
<v Speaker 1>and this is reality television. What did you mean the

0:55:10.160 --> 0:55:13.280
<v Speaker 1>Mist or the stand Well, both, right, I guess, because

0:55:13.320 --> 0:55:15.400
<v Speaker 1>the Mist is like simplified version of that. They're all

0:55:15.440 --> 0:55:18.919
<v Speaker 1>trapped in the supermarket and then immediately there's like they're

0:55:18.960 --> 0:55:21.920
<v Speaker 1>like two different factions. There's like the the It's been

0:55:21.920 --> 0:55:23.399
<v Speaker 1>a while since I've read it, but I remember there's

0:55:23.440 --> 0:55:27.560
<v Speaker 1>one one one faction is a little more uh apocalypt

0:55:27.640 --> 0:55:30.960
<v Speaker 1>apocalyptic than the other. Who's to say which one is

0:55:31.000 --> 0:55:36.040
<v Speaker 1>correct given that apocalyptic scenario, but we so so we

0:55:36.080 --> 0:55:39.600
<v Speaker 1>see splintering in groups, We see splintering in countries and organizations,

0:55:39.640 --> 0:55:42.360
<v Speaker 1>both real and fictional. I mean, who can forget the

0:55:42.400 --> 0:55:45.080
<v Speaker 1>People's Front of Judea and the Judea and People's Front

0:55:45.200 --> 0:55:47.000
<v Speaker 1>right from the Life of Brian. Yeah, well you have

0:55:47.040 --> 0:55:50.839
<v Speaker 1>the two different resistance organization that it's splintered from the one,

0:55:50.880 --> 0:55:54.359
<v Speaker 1>and an additional satellite organizations have splintered off as well.

0:55:54.480 --> 0:55:58.640
<v Speaker 1>I think also there, I guess uh satirizing the narcissism

0:55:58.640 --> 0:56:02.040
<v Speaker 1>of small differences. Now, when it breaks down to their

0:56:02.080 --> 0:56:06.120
<v Speaker 1>actual villages, the Kaiapo villages typically hit six hundred or

0:56:06.160 --> 0:56:09.960
<v Speaker 1>eight hundred persons. Okay, that's like the their their upper limit.

0:56:10.440 --> 0:56:12.839
<v Speaker 1>The Yana Mamo, however, they tend to max out at

0:56:12.880 --> 0:56:15.759
<v Speaker 1>two hundred or or even a little below, and then

0:56:15.800 --> 0:56:18.200
<v Speaker 1>they splinter. So the difference here is that the Kappo

0:56:18.280 --> 0:56:24.000
<v Speaker 1>boast a complex social segmentation consisting of clans, while the

0:56:24.120 --> 0:56:26.719
<v Speaker 1>Yana Mamo have only a few different lineages. So the

0:56:26.800 --> 0:56:31.239
<v Speaker 1>takeaway here is that larger popular population aggregates UH can

0:56:31.360 --> 0:56:36.919
<v Speaker 1>bring about an abrupt elaboration in social structure. So it's

0:56:36.960 --> 0:56:40.560
<v Speaker 1>it's it's interesting because the the larger group, the group

0:56:40.600 --> 0:56:43.960
<v Speaker 1>that is able to maintain the larger village, does so

0:56:44.719 --> 0:56:49.560
<v Speaker 1>by through this complex complexity. Like it's the it's almost

0:56:49.680 --> 0:56:52.120
<v Speaker 1>like if you were to apply to an engineering standpoint,

0:56:52.200 --> 0:56:55.920
<v Speaker 1>like to create a large domed building, UH is going

0:56:55.960 --> 0:56:57.719
<v Speaker 1>to be more of an engineering feat and require a

0:56:57.719 --> 0:57:02.160
<v Speaker 1>little more finesse than like a small like an egg

0:57:02.239 --> 0:57:04.520
<v Speaker 1>glue type hut Oh. It's kind of like how we've

0:57:04.520 --> 0:57:08.000
<v Speaker 1>talked about, like the difference between building a house and

0:57:08.040 --> 0:57:11.839
<v Speaker 1>building a skyscraper. Skyscraper is not just bigger, it's a

0:57:11.840 --> 0:57:14.640
<v Speaker 1>different thing. It's a different project. You can't just have

0:57:14.680 --> 0:57:17.360
<v Speaker 1>an approchase with a different mentality, exactly. You can't just

0:57:17.400 --> 0:57:20.240
<v Speaker 1>have a larger elephant. You have to have a different

0:57:20.400 --> 0:57:24.400
<v Speaker 1>organism that may resemble in some way the elephant um

0:57:24.600 --> 0:57:26.560
<v Speaker 1>And so we see we see that reflected here. He

0:57:26.640 --> 0:57:30.600
<v Speaker 1>also points out North American Plains, Indians, they did they

0:57:31.080 --> 0:57:34.280
<v Speaker 1>displayed a tendency to rely on simple social organizations for

0:57:34.320 --> 0:57:38.760
<v Speaker 1>small bands. Okay, so the existing in in small groups,

0:57:39.240 --> 0:57:41.440
<v Speaker 1>and they'll have a leader of those groups, but the

0:57:41.560 --> 0:57:44.440
<v Speaker 1>leader doesn't exert a tremendous amount of power. But then

0:57:44.480 --> 0:57:47.560
<v Speaker 1>when they they will periodically come together for say some

0:57:47.600 --> 0:57:50.720
<v Speaker 1>sort of a large hunt or tribal exercise, and then

0:57:50.760 --> 0:57:54.080
<v Speaker 1>they'll they'll organize under a tribal chief who exerts far

0:57:54.200 --> 0:57:57.520
<v Speaker 1>greater power than a regional So it's not it it's

0:57:57.840 --> 0:58:01.200
<v Speaker 1>it's not like even a necessarily a proportional uh change

0:58:01.200 --> 0:58:03.600
<v Speaker 1>in power. It's a significant change in power, Like the

0:58:03.640 --> 0:58:06.880
<v Speaker 1>complexity really takes off, and then when they have to

0:58:06.920 --> 0:58:10.080
<v Speaker 1>splinter again, it all just kind of goes away. Um,

0:58:10.120 --> 0:58:13.800
<v Speaker 1>But it's it's it's it seems very emergent in its form,

0:58:14.280 --> 0:58:16.240
<v Speaker 1>and that it's not like, oh, they're more of us, now,

0:58:16.280 --> 0:58:17.840
<v Speaker 1>this is the way we do things. It's more like,

0:58:17.880 --> 0:58:19.560
<v Speaker 1>this is the way we do things when we come

0:58:19.600 --> 0:58:25.400
<v Speaker 1>together high necessity. We're making the bigger elephant here interesting

0:58:26.840 --> 0:58:29.680
<v Speaker 1>and uh he he points to uh, some other sources

0:58:29.680 --> 0:58:32.960
<v Speaker 1>on this point. There's a quote here included from anthropologist

0:58:33.000 --> 0:58:36.880
<v Speaker 1>Michael J. Harner, who observed that quote population pressure is

0:58:36.920 --> 0:58:40.400
<v Speaker 1>a major uh determinant of social evolution, and that we

0:58:40.440 --> 0:58:45.360
<v Speaker 1>see this in all of humanity's greatest transformation, so agriculture, industry, science,

0:58:45.360 --> 0:58:50.280
<v Speaker 1>ETCETERA greater land subsistence, resource scarcity with consequently intensified competition

0:58:50.320 --> 0:58:52.760
<v Speaker 1>for its control. This leads to the spread of war,

0:58:52.880 --> 0:58:57.560
<v Speaker 1>the development of states, and all the the human complexity

0:58:57.560 --> 0:58:59.880
<v Speaker 1>that spreads out from that. Yeah, it's interesting to think

0:58:59.880 --> 0:59:04.400
<v Speaker 1>of about how uh in a sense large society is

0:59:04.760 --> 0:59:07.800
<v Speaker 1>I guess they're emphasizing here just not predictable from small

0:59:07.880 --> 0:59:11.840
<v Speaker 1>groups of humans, uh, that that it transforms into this

0:59:11.920 --> 0:59:18.560
<v Speaker 1>fundamentally different thing with with different functions and yeah, um,

0:59:18.600 --> 0:59:20.800
<v Speaker 1>I mean I I can definitely see this even at

0:59:20.800 --> 0:59:22.640
<v Speaker 1>a small scale, like like you were talking about with

0:59:22.640 --> 0:59:27.080
<v Speaker 1>the yoga class. You know, a uh, this is getting

0:59:27.200 --> 0:59:29.840
<v Speaker 1>very colloquial with the idea of emergentism, but you know,

0:59:29.880 --> 0:59:34.000
<v Speaker 1>a gathering of a gathering of five friends is not

0:59:34.160 --> 0:59:37.480
<v Speaker 1>just larger than a gathering of two friends. It's very,

0:59:37.640 --> 0:59:42.040
<v Speaker 1>very different. And to come back to the the apocalyptic

0:59:42.040 --> 0:59:43.720
<v Speaker 1>examples from fiction when we're drawing, I think that's one

0:59:43.760 --> 0:59:46.200
<v Speaker 1>of the appeals of stuff like the Walking Dead or

0:59:46.240 --> 0:59:49.520
<v Speaker 1>the stand or the mist in that these examples reduced

0:59:49.520 --> 0:59:52.520
<v Speaker 1>the human population to a much smaller and at least

0:59:52.800 --> 0:59:55.920
<v Speaker 1>seemingly manageable number. And then we try to and in

0:59:56.000 --> 0:59:59.240
<v Speaker 1>a sense, we're trying to reduce societal problems to fundamental

0:59:59.640 --> 1:00:03.040
<v Speaker 1>proper these like everything goes screwed because of this character,

1:00:03.520 --> 1:00:06.200
<v Speaker 1>how he or she is behaving. You can be familiar

1:00:06.360 --> 1:00:09.560
<v Speaker 1>with all of the agents that matter, right, and this

1:00:09.680 --> 1:00:13.480
<v Speaker 1>is not true of society today. There are tons of

1:00:13.520 --> 1:00:16.080
<v Speaker 1>agents acting upon your life who you don't even know

1:00:16.120 --> 1:00:18.760
<v Speaker 1>who they are, what their names are. Yeah, or it's

1:00:18.760 --> 1:00:21.400
<v Speaker 1>not necessarily oh, the villainous character. It's more like, oh,

1:00:21.480 --> 1:00:27.800
<v Speaker 1>it's the the villainous are that that emerges when this

1:00:27.880 --> 1:00:31.160
<v Speaker 1>group of people get together with these ideals in mind,

1:00:31.440 --> 1:00:34.120
<v Speaker 1>and these ideals are actually really positive, but then there's

1:00:34.120 --> 1:00:38.240
<v Speaker 1>this negative manifestation of it. Yeah, it gets, uh, it gets,

1:00:38.720 --> 1:00:43.520
<v Speaker 1>it gets complexity emerges fairly quickly. And then there's another

1:00:43.560 --> 1:00:46.040
<v Speaker 1>study looked at here, and this is a our Keith

1:00:46.080 --> 1:00:48.640
<v Speaker 1>saw your emergence and psychology lessons from the history of

1:00:48.680 --> 1:00:51.400
<v Speaker 1>non reductionist science, and the basic nugget in this one

1:00:51.480 --> 1:00:54.400
<v Speaker 1>was that while we often look to psychology for a

1:00:54.400 --> 1:00:57.760
<v Speaker 1>reductionist view, there's a lot of potential in an emergent

1:00:57.800 --> 1:01:00.360
<v Speaker 1>view of psychology. The mind is not mere really a

1:01:00.440 --> 1:01:03.560
<v Speaker 1>shadow cast by a functioning brain, which is kind of

1:01:03.560 --> 1:01:05.840
<v Speaker 1>an analogy off and fall back on, but but a

1:01:06.320 --> 1:01:09.400
<v Speaker 1>higher level emergence system forming the shadow puppet on the

1:01:09.440 --> 1:01:12.840
<v Speaker 1>wall and continually revising its form. So like, even if

1:01:12.880 --> 1:01:16.040
<v Speaker 1>you don't take a substance duelist point of view, even

1:01:16.120 --> 1:01:18.440
<v Speaker 1>if you don't think that the mind is supernatural in

1:01:18.520 --> 1:01:22.160
<v Speaker 1>some sense, you could still uh find some merit in

1:01:22.200 --> 1:01:25.160
<v Speaker 1>the idea that the mind is not fully explicable from

1:01:25.240 --> 1:01:28.760
<v Speaker 1>the standpoint of neuroscience. Yes, that's that's my take take

1:01:28.800 --> 1:01:31.400
<v Speaker 1>away from the paper anyway. Yeah, you can't just look

1:01:31.440 --> 1:01:33.440
<v Speaker 1>at all the tissue in the brain and say this

1:01:33.520 --> 1:01:36.680
<v Speaker 1>is the kind of mind it would generate. Okay, Well,

1:01:36.720 --> 1:01:38.640
<v Speaker 1>one more thing I wanted to look at before we

1:01:38.680 --> 1:01:41.520
<v Speaker 1>wrap things up is we've heard from the reductionist view

1:01:41.520 --> 1:01:44.960
<v Speaker 1>of Weinberg, and then we've heard from emergentis like Anderson.

1:01:45.160 --> 1:01:49.240
<v Speaker 1>But Anderson accepts one interpretation of reductionism, he just rejects

1:01:49.280 --> 1:01:52.560
<v Speaker 1>another interpretation of it. What about people who are away

1:01:52.640 --> 1:01:57.240
<v Speaker 1>far out there in fully rejecting explanatory reductionism in all

1:01:57.280 --> 1:02:02.360
<v Speaker 1>its forms. Obviously, the debate still going on among some thinkers,

1:02:02.360 --> 1:02:05.240
<v Speaker 1>and I found a good short essay from by the

1:02:05.360 --> 1:02:10.680
<v Speaker 1>biologist and philosopher of science Massimo Pelaucci about this ongoing debate,

1:02:10.720 --> 1:02:13.040
<v Speaker 1>and he discusses the work of a few philosophers like

1:02:13.120 --> 1:02:17.320
<v Speaker 1>John Duprey, Jerry Photo, and Nancy Cartwright who have argued

1:02:17.360 --> 1:02:21.920
<v Speaker 1>against the fundamental unity of sciences and against the reductionist hypothesis.

1:02:22.320 --> 1:02:24.960
<v Speaker 1>And I think he makes a few interesting points. One

1:02:25.040 --> 1:02:30.320
<v Speaker 1>he talks about Jerry phoed or making a distinction about

1:02:30.320 --> 1:02:33.720
<v Speaker 1>what it means for one science to reduce to another. Anyway,

1:02:33.760 --> 1:02:36.960
<v Speaker 1>So you could be talking about ontological reduction, which just

1:02:37.040 --> 1:02:41.280
<v Speaker 1>means that the more complex phenomena the mind is literally

1:02:41.320 --> 1:02:43.720
<v Speaker 1>made out of the simpler phenomena. You know, the mind

1:02:43.880 --> 1:02:46.480
<v Speaker 1>literally is dependent upon the brain. You can agree with that,

1:02:47.560 --> 1:02:50.960
<v Speaker 1>but uh, this part might be pretty obviously true to you.

1:02:51.120 --> 1:02:53.600
<v Speaker 1>Molecules are made out of atoms, organisms are made out

1:02:53.640 --> 1:02:56.640
<v Speaker 1>of cells, populations are made out of individual organisms. But

1:02:57.400 --> 1:03:00.600
<v Speaker 1>when it comes to theoretical reduction, which you might also

1:03:00.640 --> 1:03:05.480
<v Speaker 1>call explanatory or explanatory reduction, the same does not necessarily

1:03:05.560 --> 1:03:10.120
<v Speaker 1>hold true. While complex phenomena are made out of simpler phenomena.

1:03:10.200 --> 1:03:15.080
<v Speaker 1>Are theories explaining complex phenomena are different than the things themselves.

1:03:15.120 --> 1:03:18.280
<v Speaker 1>They exist in our minds, not in physical space. And

1:03:18.320 --> 1:03:21.680
<v Speaker 1>just because the thing reduces does not necessarily mean that

1:03:21.760 --> 1:03:24.800
<v Speaker 1>the proper explanation for it reduces. I know that's kind

1:03:24.800 --> 1:03:28.160
<v Speaker 1>of a strange philosophical point, but I think there's there

1:03:28.200 --> 1:03:32.040
<v Speaker 1>might be a grain of truth there um. Another thing, though,

1:03:32.120 --> 1:03:36.760
<v Speaker 1>is that uh, reductionism is not supported by an inductive

1:03:36.800 --> 1:03:39.600
<v Speaker 1>survey of the progress of science. This is kind of interesting,

1:03:39.600 --> 1:03:41.800
<v Speaker 1>and I think I mostly agree with him on this one.

1:03:42.240 --> 1:03:46.480
<v Speaker 1>Instead of more complex theories collapsing into simpler ones, what

1:03:46.560 --> 1:03:48.880
<v Speaker 1>have we seen in the history of science. We've seen

1:03:48.920 --> 1:03:53.080
<v Speaker 1>exactly the opposite. Instead, we see the proliferation of more

1:03:53.160 --> 1:03:58.000
<v Speaker 1>and more specialized theories. We don't see the specific science

1:03:58.040 --> 1:04:01.800
<v Speaker 1>collapsing into the general. We see the general branching off

1:04:01.840 --> 1:04:04.920
<v Speaker 1>into the specific. Now, maybe this just means our our

1:04:04.960 --> 1:04:07.600
<v Speaker 1>study of science isn't mature enough yet, you know, like

1:04:07.640 --> 1:04:11.160
<v Speaker 1>that we haven't done enough work reducing complex sciences into

1:04:11.200 --> 1:04:14.919
<v Speaker 1>simpler ones. That's possible, but if you're just to look

1:04:14.960 --> 1:04:19.560
<v Speaker 1>at it inductively, science is not reducing. That's not happening.

1:04:19.560 --> 1:04:23.360
<v Speaker 1>At all. Uh. One more thing is that voter says,

1:04:23.400 --> 1:04:26.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, the reductionist assumption is not, as far as

1:04:26.040 --> 1:04:30.200
<v Speaker 1>we know, actually guided by a principle. It might be intuitive,

1:04:30.360 --> 1:04:33.560
<v Speaker 1>especially to scientists who have, you know, some other phenomena,

1:04:34.520 --> 1:04:38.680
<v Speaker 1>who have seen some other phenomena successfully reduced to simpler principles.

1:04:38.680 --> 1:04:42.640
<v Speaker 1>Think of Weinberg talking about thermodynamics. But what reason do

1:04:42.760 --> 1:04:46.160
<v Speaker 1>we actually have to assume that biology can be fully

1:04:46.240 --> 1:04:49.960
<v Speaker 1>explained by physics? Uh? I don't know. My intuition certainly

1:04:49.960 --> 1:04:52.560
<v Speaker 1>tells me it can be. But my intuition, of course,

1:04:52.920 --> 1:04:56.360
<v Speaker 1>is not worth a sack of split piece in science. Uh.

1:04:56.440 --> 1:04:58.760
<v Speaker 1>And then one last idea I wanted to end on

1:04:58.800 --> 1:05:01.000
<v Speaker 1>because I thought this was really yeard, but also very

1:05:01.040 --> 1:05:07.040
<v Speaker 1>interesting is the anti realism of Nancy Cartwright, the philosopher

1:05:07.080 --> 1:05:10.000
<v Speaker 1>of science. Nancy Cartwright not the voice actress who plays

1:05:10.040 --> 1:05:15.680
<v Speaker 1>Bart Simpson. So she offers a positive rationale for believing

1:05:15.720 --> 1:05:19.320
<v Speaker 1>that theories for complex phenomenon might not be expected to

1:05:19.360 --> 1:05:23.160
<v Speaker 1>reduce to theories for simpler ones, and she advocates what's

1:05:23.240 --> 1:05:26.680
<v Speaker 1>known as an anti realist position. And in her case,

1:05:26.720 --> 1:05:29.960
<v Speaker 1>what this means is she rejects the idea that there

1:05:30.160 --> 1:05:33.479
<v Speaker 1>is such a thing as fundamental laws of nature. Now

1:05:33.640 --> 1:05:36.160
<v Speaker 1>you might be thinking, how on earth could you do that? Well,

1:05:36.760 --> 1:05:38.840
<v Speaker 1>this it sounds kind of weird, but think would go

1:05:38.880 --> 1:05:41.240
<v Speaker 1>with her for a second. I think it's actually kind

1:05:41.240 --> 1:05:44.680
<v Speaker 1>of interesting. One thing, we can't denize that science works,

1:05:44.840 --> 1:05:48.960
<v Speaker 1>right we we know it works practically, pragmatically, it just works.

1:05:49.000 --> 1:05:52.080
<v Speaker 1>It generates theories that make predictions which are accurate enough

1:05:52.640 --> 1:05:56.360
<v Speaker 1>for us to make technology and make civilization out of them.

1:05:56.480 --> 1:06:00.520
<v Speaker 1>But what if they're not, in fact truly universal and fundamental,

1:06:00.600 --> 1:06:03.920
<v Speaker 1>but rather, as I said a minute ago, accurate enough.

1:06:05.040 --> 1:06:07.640
<v Speaker 1>And there's really a present precedent for this in the

1:06:07.760 --> 1:06:10.960
<v Speaker 1>history of the pursuit of physics already, because for a

1:06:11.000 --> 1:06:12.880
<v Speaker 1>long time, what did we have in physics? We had

1:06:12.920 --> 1:06:16.840
<v Speaker 1>the mechanics of Isaac Newton, and they were accurate enough

1:06:17.160 --> 1:06:20.000
<v Speaker 1>that we could use them to predict the motions of baseballs,

1:06:20.080 --> 1:06:22.000
<v Speaker 1>or if I throw a jar of pickles at your face,

1:06:22.920 --> 1:06:25.280
<v Speaker 1>even tried to study the motions of planets. This could

1:06:25.280 --> 1:06:30.160
<v Speaker 1>pretty much all be explained accurately by Newtonian mechanics, um

1:06:30.200 --> 1:06:32.360
<v Speaker 1>and we we could we could make a technology out

1:06:32.360 --> 1:06:34.840
<v Speaker 1>of them. We can fire cannonballs, all that stuff. But

1:06:34.920 --> 1:06:38.520
<v Speaker 1>we now know that strictly speaking, Newton was wrong. His

1:06:38.680 --> 1:06:42.600
<v Speaker 1>laws were not able to generate very accurate predictions at

1:06:42.680 --> 1:06:46.560
<v Speaker 1>things beyond the medium scales of matter and energy, and

1:06:46.640 --> 1:06:49.360
<v Speaker 1>for those things they've now been replaced with things like

1:06:49.680 --> 1:06:53.160
<v Speaker 1>general relativity and quantum mechanics, which can give us even

1:06:53.200 --> 1:06:56.480
<v Speaker 1>more accurate predictions to explain those weird few cases where

1:06:56.720 --> 1:07:01.840
<v Speaker 1>Newtonian mechanics break down in our experience. So where does

1:07:01.920 --> 1:07:04.440
<v Speaker 1>Nancy Cartwright go with this? She says, well, what if

1:07:04.480 --> 1:07:09.360
<v Speaker 1>in fact, all possible fundamental theories are like that, accurate

1:07:09.520 --> 1:07:13.280
<v Speaker 1>enough to make predictions, but not actually district descriptive of

1:07:13.400 --> 1:07:18.760
<v Speaker 1>inviolable universal laws. So this could maybe explain why, or

1:07:18.760 --> 1:07:22.800
<v Speaker 1>at least the ultimate reason why it proves so hard

1:07:22.880 --> 1:07:26.840
<v Speaker 1>to reduce all science to physics, because we haven't essentially

1:07:26.960 --> 1:07:31.280
<v Speaker 1>an imperfect system that merely lines up with most things. Yeah,

1:07:31.280 --> 1:07:33.400
<v Speaker 1>I mean, the the idea would be, yeah, that the

1:07:33.840 --> 1:07:37.160
<v Speaker 1>physics will always be imperfect, that there is no universal

1:07:37.240 --> 1:07:42.440
<v Speaker 1>physics at bottom, there's only predictive enough. And in Cartwright's terminology,

1:07:42.520 --> 1:07:45.720
<v Speaker 1>this would mean that all scientific laws are quote phenomenal logical,

1:07:46.200 --> 1:07:48.880
<v Speaker 1>good enough to reckon our experience of the world at

1:07:48.880 --> 1:07:53.080
<v Speaker 1>the level of their appropriate application, but not necessarily truly

1:07:53.240 --> 1:07:57.720
<v Speaker 1>universal and fundamental. Uh. And if that's the case, that

1:07:57.720 --> 1:08:00.560
<v Speaker 1>that could essentially apply all down the line. You know,

1:08:00.680 --> 1:08:05.840
<v Speaker 1>because there is this inherent indeterminacy or you know, this

1:08:06.040 --> 1:08:10.640
<v Speaker 1>inherent imprecision at the basis of all matter and energy,

1:08:10.920 --> 1:08:14.520
<v Speaker 1>you can understand why higher, more complex levels of science

1:08:14.560 --> 1:08:17.559
<v Speaker 1>would not be reducible to lower ones. So it's like

1:08:17.600 --> 1:08:20.280
<v Speaker 1>saying there's no United States. There's actually just all these

1:08:20.320 --> 1:08:23.519
<v Speaker 1>different states. There's no there's no European Union. There's just

1:08:23.560 --> 1:08:26.360
<v Speaker 1>all these different countries. Are they or to go back

1:08:26.400 --> 1:08:28.600
<v Speaker 1>to the state's aeology, there are just these counties that

1:08:28.640 --> 1:08:32.800
<v Speaker 1>are assembled into this this order. On an individual level,

1:08:33.080 --> 1:08:37.280
<v Speaker 1>there can be a truth, but not an overall arching system. Well,

1:08:37.320 --> 1:08:39.200
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I think she would be saying that at

1:08:39.200 --> 1:08:42.479
<v Speaker 1>the bottom there is no universal truth, so that that

1:08:42.640 --> 1:08:45.880
<v Speaker 1>maybe you might have like that there's no there's no

1:08:46.040 --> 1:08:50.200
<v Speaker 1>fundamental basis of political organization from what you're saying, Like,

1:08:50.439 --> 1:08:56.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, you can use political organization to reckon countries, states, counties,

1:08:56.160 --> 1:08:59.040
<v Speaker 1>and stuff, and it all works well enough at those levels,

1:08:59.040 --> 1:09:03.120
<v Speaker 1>but there is no bottom of political organization. There's no

1:09:03.200 --> 1:09:08.040
<v Speaker 1>fundamental unit of it that is perfectly real. Yeah, all right,

1:09:08.120 --> 1:09:11.680
<v Speaker 1>I can I'm not saying i'd buy her take on it,

1:09:11.680 --> 1:09:13.880
<v Speaker 1>but I can see how it would. I see how

1:09:13.920 --> 1:09:16.599
<v Speaker 1>it lines up. Yeah, and I do think it's interesting.

1:09:16.760 --> 1:09:18.880
<v Speaker 1>I'm not saying I'm convinced by her point of view.

1:09:18.960 --> 1:09:20.880
<v Speaker 1>I just think it's an interesting idea. Yeah. And to

1:09:21.000 --> 1:09:22.880
<v Speaker 1>your like point that we laid out at the beginning,

1:09:22.920 --> 1:09:26.240
<v Speaker 1>it's a it's a non magical version of this. Like

1:09:26.280 --> 1:09:29.559
<v Speaker 1>certainly we can look to any two various examples where

1:09:29.560 --> 1:09:33.360
<v Speaker 1>someone uh isn't buying into it for supernatural reasons, but

1:09:33.400 --> 1:09:38.280
<v Speaker 1>she has a a scientific theory here. Yeah, and so uh, well,

1:09:38.320 --> 1:09:41.519
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, but let's say it's at least a

1:09:41.600 --> 1:09:45.160
<v Speaker 1>non supernatural thing and it participates inductively, and so because

1:09:45.160 --> 1:09:47.479
<v Speaker 1>it looks at like, well, this has been the case

1:09:47.720 --> 1:09:49.760
<v Speaker 1>in in some of our study of science, we keep

1:09:49.800 --> 1:09:52.960
<v Speaker 1>finding out that stuff that we think accurately describes the

1:09:52.960 --> 1:09:58.559
<v Speaker 1>world is not really perfectly accurate. Is just accurate enough anyway,

1:09:59.360 --> 1:10:01.800
<v Speaker 1>That's what I got. So, Robert, are you convinced? What

1:10:01.800 --> 1:10:04.640
<v Speaker 1>what do you think? Are you reductionist emergentists somewhere in

1:10:04.640 --> 1:10:08.080
<v Speaker 1>between one of those qualified middle grounds. Oh, I guess

1:10:08.120 --> 1:10:10.000
<v Speaker 1>I've I've got to fall back on the sort of

1:10:10.520 --> 1:10:12.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, lens based view of it. You know, I

1:10:12.720 --> 1:10:17.520
<v Speaker 1>can put the lens of reductionism and the lens of

1:10:17.520 --> 1:10:20.639
<v Speaker 1>of emergence on as needed and certainly see how they

1:10:20.800 --> 1:10:25.000
<v Speaker 1>line up with reality. But but yeah, I mean, I

1:10:24.720 --> 1:10:29.920
<v Speaker 1>I certainly think, uh, emergence carries a lot of weight. Yeah,

1:10:29.960 --> 1:10:33.320
<v Speaker 1>I certainly intuitively feel that sense of emergence. But then again,

1:10:33.360 --> 1:10:36.599
<v Speaker 1>I also when I get thinking in the reductionist of mindset,

1:10:36.680 --> 1:10:38.360
<v Speaker 1>that can make sense to me too. I guess I'm

1:10:38.400 --> 1:10:41.880
<v Speaker 1>just very impressionable. I don't know what to think about this.

1:10:41.960 --> 1:10:44.200
<v Speaker 1>I do think it's a really interesting subject though, and

1:10:44.240 --> 1:10:47.040
<v Speaker 1>I do think it's important always to to come back

1:10:47.080 --> 1:10:48.760
<v Speaker 1>to the kind of stuff we're doing here, where we

1:10:49.240 --> 1:10:51.439
<v Speaker 1>pay attention not just to how science is done, but

1:10:51.520 --> 1:10:57.120
<v Speaker 1>to the assumptions underpinning it. Yeah. Indeed, all right, Well, hey,

1:10:57.200 --> 1:10:58.920
<v Speaker 1>if you want, if you want to find out more

1:10:58.920 --> 1:11:01.400
<v Speaker 1>about this topic other related topics to do with sort

1:11:01.400 --> 1:11:04.919
<v Speaker 1>of the the nature of science and the nature scientific inquiry,

1:11:05.040 --> 1:11:06.760
<v Speaker 1>heading over to stuff to Blow your Mind dot com.

1:11:06.760 --> 1:11:09.439
<v Speaker 1>That's what we'll find all the podcast episodes, videos, blog

1:11:09.479 --> 1:11:13.439
<v Speaker 1>post links out to various social media accounts of his Facebook, Twitter, Tumbler, etcetera.

1:11:13.840 --> 1:11:15.920
<v Speaker 1>And hey, there's even an old fashioned way to get

1:11:15.880 --> 1:11:18.160
<v Speaker 1>in Dutch with us as well. Right, you can email

1:11:18.280 --> 1:11:20.519
<v Speaker 1>us as always that blow the mind at how stuff

1:11:20.560 --> 1:11:32.960
<v Speaker 1>works dot com for more on this than thousands of

1:11:32.960 --> 1:11:58.080
<v Speaker 1>other topics. Is that how stuff works dot com