1
00:00:09,664 --> 00:00:13,104
Speaker 1: Mission Implausible is now something you can watch. Just go

2
00:00:13,144 --> 00:00:16,823
Speaker 1: to YouTube and search Mission Implausible podcasts or click on

3
00:00:16,864 --> 00:00:20,864
Speaker 1: the link to our channel. In our show notes, I'm

4
00:00:20,904 --> 00:00:22,784
Speaker 1: John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea.

5
00:00:23,264 --> 00:00:26,544
Speaker 2: We have over sixty years of experience as clandestine officers

6
00:00:26,624 --> 00:00:29,544
Speaker 2: in the CIA, serving in high risk areas all around

7
00:00:29,544 --> 00:00:30,784
Speaker 2: the world, and part.

8
00:00:30,584 --> 00:00:34,504
Speaker 3: Of our job was creating conspiracies to deceive our adversaries.

9
00:00:34,784 --> 00:00:37,504
Speaker 2: Now we're going to use that experience to investigate the

10
00:00:37,504 --> 00:00:40,504
Speaker 2: conspiracy theories everyone's talking about, as well as some you

11
00:00:40,584 --> 00:00:41,224
Speaker 2: may not have heard.

12
00:00:41,304 --> 00:00:43,584
Speaker 3: Could they be true or are we being manipulated?

13
00:00:43,703 --> 00:00:49,943
Speaker 2: We'll find out now on Mission Implausible. So today's guest

14
00:00:49,983 --> 00:00:52,864
Speaker 2: is doctor Vince how He's the former historian at the

15
00:00:52,903 --> 00:00:56,264
Speaker 2: International Spy Museum here in Washington. He was the museum's

16
00:00:56,264 --> 00:00:58,584
Speaker 2: subject matter expert. He created a lot of the content

17
00:00:58,703 --> 00:01:01,344
Speaker 2: and said bits and design of the new museum. He's

18
00:01:01,344 --> 00:01:04,224
Speaker 2: a PhD in intelligence history. He's the author of several books.

19
00:01:04,664 --> 00:01:06,384
Speaker 2: One we're going to be certainly talking about today called

20
00:01:06,464 --> 00:01:09,544
Speaker 2: Nuking the Moon, about intelligence schemes and plots that about

21
00:01:09,624 --> 00:01:12,024
Speaker 2: on the drawing board. He did one on the Cold

22
00:01:12,064 --> 00:01:15,104
Speaker 2: War in Miami called Covert City, and one about nuclear spies.

23
00:01:15,384 --> 00:01:18,464
Speaker 2: He's currently the director of the National Cryptologic Museum in

24
00:01:18,544 --> 00:01:22,184
Speaker 2: Fort Mead, which is adjacent to the NSA and likely

25
00:01:22,264 --> 00:01:25,264
Speaker 2: unfurlough now during the closure of the governments. Vin is

26
00:01:25,304 --> 00:01:26,063
Speaker 2: great to have you here.

27
00:01:26,143 --> 00:01:28,304
Speaker 4: Yeah, I got plenty of time, John, I appreciate being here.

28
00:01:28,783 --> 00:01:30,064
Speaker 4: Not doing much right now.

29
00:01:30,063 --> 00:01:31,864
Speaker 2: So just quick on your newest job. Jerry and I

30
00:01:31,944 --> 00:01:34,344
Speaker 2: remember we visited the NSA Museum. It's in an old

31
00:01:34,664 --> 00:01:36,904
Speaker 2: motel right there by the NSA, and.

32
00:01:36,984 --> 00:01:39,384
Speaker 4: We're the only museum in the entire intelligence community that's

33
00:01:39,384 --> 00:01:41,904
Speaker 4: completely open to the public, so we're fully public facing.

34
00:01:42,264 --> 00:01:45,184
Speaker 4: But we got a good number of artifacts. He classified,

35
00:01:45,224 --> 00:01:48,144
Speaker 4: some stories declassified. There's things like nuclear command and control,

36
00:01:48,344 --> 00:01:51,064
Speaker 4: but that's on display that had never been before. Caused

37
00:01:51,064 --> 00:01:53,144
Speaker 4: a little bit of a fuss one that went on

38
00:01:53,144 --> 00:01:55,544
Speaker 4: display because everyone's like, you're doing what you're showing the

39
00:01:55,584 --> 00:01:58,624
Speaker 4: nuclear codes, like, yeah, they're obsolete now barely. They had

40
00:01:58,664 --> 00:02:01,504
Speaker 4: literally just been declassified a year before we reopen. Everything

41
00:02:01,544 --> 00:02:03,904
Speaker 4: on display is real. We made a rule in the

42
00:02:03,984 --> 00:02:06,104
Speaker 4: very beginning that we would not do reproductions. We would

43
00:02:06,104 --> 00:02:08,584
Speaker 4: not do replicas. If you're looking at it, it's a

44
00:02:08,624 --> 00:02:12,344
Speaker 4: real artifact and almost ninety percent are one of a kind,

45
00:02:12,464 --> 00:02:14,864
Speaker 4: meaning they are the only one left on Earth. We

46
00:02:14,904 --> 00:02:17,544
Speaker 4: have the rarest enigma in the world. It was Hitler's enigma.

47
00:02:17,664 --> 00:02:19,624
Speaker 4: It doesn't get any rareer than that. We know you

48
00:02:19,624 --> 00:02:21,544
Speaker 4: can go to FBI, and you can go to other places.

49
00:02:21,584 --> 00:02:23,144
Speaker 4: You got to get special permission. You got to get

50
00:02:23,144 --> 00:02:25,144
Speaker 4: a VIP pass to get on a CIA. I know

51
00:02:25,184 --> 00:02:27,944
Speaker 4: that civilians have been there. Here you just drive up

52
00:02:27,984 --> 00:02:30,064
Speaker 4: and park and walk in. Right, what's cool?

53
00:02:30,264 --> 00:02:33,984
Speaker 3: Well, your job and Nuke in the Moon is espionage,

54
00:02:34,024 --> 00:02:37,984
Speaker 3: as we know, is a lot about conspiracies, and then

55
00:02:37,984 --> 00:02:41,824
Speaker 3: there's conspiracy theories and then the Venn diagrams the match

56
00:02:41,904 --> 00:02:44,824
Speaker 3: between those two, and in nuking the Moon you catch

57
00:02:44,904 --> 00:02:50,424
Speaker 3: the seitgeist of the crazy banshit crazy stuff that intelligence

58
00:02:50,464 --> 00:02:53,584
Speaker 3: has been into that crosses into conspiracy theory categories. So

59
00:02:53,784 --> 00:02:56,144
Speaker 3: I think for the listeners, you got to tell the

60
00:02:56,224 --> 00:02:59,824
Speaker 3: cat story. I think keep it brief, but let's talk

61
00:02:59,904 --> 00:03:02,424
Speaker 3: about the acoustic kitty just for a second.

62
00:03:02,784 --> 00:03:03,504
Speaker 4: Is that real?

63
00:03:04,064 --> 00:03:05,384
Speaker 3: And what did it ever work?

64
00:03:05,584 --> 00:03:07,544
Speaker 4: And what is it? Everything in the book is real,

65
00:03:07,624 --> 00:03:10,104
Speaker 4: and I think that's where these are story worries that

66
00:03:10,584 --> 00:03:14,104
Speaker 4: are absolutely verifiable but these are stories that aren't as

67
00:03:14,144 --> 00:03:16,384
Speaker 4: well known because they don't happen. That's the premise of

68
00:03:16,424 --> 00:03:19,824
Speaker 4: the book is I tried to hunt down interesting stories

69
00:03:19,864 --> 00:03:24,064
Speaker 4: from intelligence and military history that were planned, funded, tested,

70
00:03:24,464 --> 00:03:26,984
Speaker 4: and got right to the point of going fully operational,

71
00:03:26,984 --> 00:03:29,224
Speaker 4: and then were canceled for one reason or another. In

72
00:03:29,224 --> 00:03:31,504
Speaker 4: some cases that were superseded by events the war ended

73
00:03:31,784 --> 00:03:35,504
Speaker 4: or something else happened. In other cases, someone up high

74
00:03:35,584 --> 00:03:37,544
Speaker 4: decided this was an idea that we didn't want to

75
00:03:37,584 --> 00:03:40,824
Speaker 4: go after, and so Acoustic Kitty was a CIA operation

76
00:03:41,584 --> 00:03:43,944
Speaker 4: under the Office Technical Services. So this is the Director

77
00:03:43,984 --> 00:03:44,944
Speaker 4: of Science and Technology.

78
00:03:45,824 --> 00:03:48,184
Speaker 3: In essence, this is like the nineteen fifties, right, this.

79
00:03:48,064 --> 00:03:50,144
Speaker 4: Is in sixties, so you're looking at a time.

80
00:03:49,984 --> 00:03:51,504
Speaker 3: Period before John and I were there.

81
00:03:51,544 --> 00:03:54,504
Speaker 4: We would write yes, wait, when the CIA is finding itself.

82
00:03:54,744 --> 00:03:57,784
Speaker 4: This is when Alan Dalles is director. The CI is

83
00:03:57,824 --> 00:04:00,024
Speaker 4: figuring out it's got a charter, but the charter is

84
00:04:00,104 --> 00:04:02,304
Speaker 4: so vague that the CIA is making it up as

85
00:04:02,304 --> 00:04:04,824
Speaker 4: it goes along, and they're bringing in people like doctor

86
00:04:04,864 --> 00:04:07,864
Speaker 4: Sidney Gottlieb, who is the guy who runs MK Ultra.

87
00:04:08,264 --> 00:04:11,264
Speaker 4: They're bringing in people who, given the same kind of

88
00:04:11,464 --> 00:04:13,904
Speaker 4: mandate I did, is go do fun stuff and see

89
00:04:13,944 --> 00:04:17,064
Speaker 4: what happens. And so one of these ideas was spurred

90
00:04:17,064 --> 00:04:22,424
Speaker 4: on by a case officer's observation that Istanbul was just

91
00:04:22,464 --> 00:04:24,263
Speaker 4: full of stray cats. Have you ever been there? It

92
00:04:24,344 --> 00:04:28,063
Speaker 4: is cat heaven, cats everywhere. And he was watching the

93
00:04:28,144 --> 00:04:30,623
Speaker 4: Soviet embassy and he noticed that cats were just going

94
00:04:30,664 --> 00:04:32,544
Speaker 4: in and out of the Soviet embassy with impunity, like

95
00:04:32,584 --> 00:04:34,544
Speaker 4: no one even paid attention. They'd open the door, cats

96
00:04:34,544 --> 00:04:36,984
Speaker 4: would walk in, or the courtyard cats were going out.

97
00:04:37,224 --> 00:04:39,984
Speaker 4: They would jump up on the lapse of Soviet personnel

98
00:04:40,063 --> 00:04:43,024
Speaker 4: and they'd get scratches and cuddles. Man, if we could

99
00:04:43,063 --> 00:04:45,664
Speaker 4: just get something in there on one of these cats,

100
00:04:46,264 --> 00:04:48,703
Speaker 4: then we could listen to everything going on. And it

101
00:04:48,784 --> 00:04:52,424
Speaker 4: turns out that instead of putting something on one of

102
00:04:52,424 --> 00:04:54,664
Speaker 4: those cats, they decided, what if we can't put something

103
00:04:54,743 --> 00:04:58,144
Speaker 4: inside one of these cats? And the solution was a

104
00:04:58,303 --> 00:05:01,264
Speaker 4: surgical operation. And I don't mean that like they dropped

105
00:05:01,303 --> 00:05:03,623
Speaker 4: the very specific bomb in a specific place. They opened

106
00:05:03,664 --> 00:05:06,863
Speaker 4: up a cat through surgery and implanted a listening device

107
00:05:06,904 --> 00:05:09,784
Speaker 4: inside of it and ran the antenna down to its tail,

108
00:05:09,863 --> 00:05:12,824
Speaker 4: put a battery pack in its abdomen, and then tested it.

109
00:05:12,904 --> 00:05:15,344
Speaker 4: And they tested it again and again, and it turned

110
00:05:15,344 --> 00:05:18,623
Speaker 4: out it worked. Now what does that mean worked? That

111
00:05:18,704 --> 00:05:21,384
Speaker 4: means that they were able to get it to go

112
00:05:21,424 --> 00:05:24,503
Speaker 4: from point A to point B. The listening device actually

113
00:05:24,743 --> 00:05:27,504
Speaker 4: was able to pick up conversations and testing. They had

114
00:05:27,503 --> 00:05:29,823
Speaker 4: to tweak the wiring a little bit to get the

115
00:05:29,863 --> 00:05:31,664
Speaker 4: cat to do what they wanted, because it's a cat,

116
00:05:31,743 --> 00:05:35,264
Speaker 4: of course. And then the legend ends, and it ends

117
00:05:35,464 --> 00:05:40,023
Speaker 4: very unsatisfactorily because there is the official version of what happens,

118
00:05:40,024 --> 00:05:42,664
Speaker 4: and that comes courtesy of people like Bob Wallace, who

119
00:05:43,104 --> 00:05:44,904
Speaker 4: wasn't there at the time. He was head of technical

120
00:05:44,943 --> 00:05:47,383
Speaker 4: service at CIA. He comes in afterwards, but he hears

121
00:05:47,943 --> 00:05:50,144
Speaker 4: what they had done before him, and Bob's like, no, no, no,

122
00:05:50,183 --> 00:05:52,024
Speaker 4: we just canceled the plan. No one ever really did

123
00:05:52,063 --> 00:05:54,703
Speaker 4: field test of it. I'm like, Bob, that's terribly boring,

124
00:05:54,823 --> 00:05:57,984
Speaker 4: Like what The better story comes from Victor Marchetti, who

125
00:05:58,104 --> 00:06:02,263
Speaker 4: wrote a pretty scathing book of CIA where he tells

126
00:06:02,383 --> 00:06:05,904
Speaker 4: the story of the field test of Acoustic Kitty, where

127
00:06:05,943 --> 00:06:08,664
Speaker 4: they bring it out to Northwest DC to where the

128
00:06:08,664 --> 00:06:11,104
Speaker 4: embassies are and they're gonna they're gonna test it in

129
00:06:11,144 --> 00:06:13,583
Speaker 4: a park and essentially they're gonna send the kiddy into

130
00:06:13,623 --> 00:06:15,584
Speaker 4: the park, sit down and listen to the conversations that

131
00:06:15,664 --> 00:06:19,383
Speaker 4: are taking place on a park bench. And they the

132
00:06:19,464 --> 00:06:21,743
Speaker 4: tech guys are in the van and they put the

133
00:06:21,823 --> 00:06:23,904
Speaker 4: cat down on the street and they punch in the commands,

134
00:06:23,904 --> 00:06:25,904
Speaker 4: and the cat takes off straight across the street from

135
00:06:25,904 --> 00:06:28,623
Speaker 4: the park, and then as it's getting halfway across the street,

136
00:06:28,623 --> 00:06:31,664
Speaker 4: against run over by a DC Taxi cab. And that's

137
00:06:31,704 --> 00:06:35,544
Speaker 4: the end of the story as far as the Marcheti's

138
00:06:35,584 --> 00:06:38,104
Speaker 4: version is concerned. If you're a cat lover, you like

139
00:06:38,104 --> 00:06:39,943
Speaker 4: Bob Wallace's version better that they just you know what,

140
00:06:39,984 --> 00:06:42,584
Speaker 4: this isn't gonna work out great. But I love to

141
00:06:42,623 --> 00:06:45,863
Speaker 4: think that's the story about the look on the faces

142
00:06:45,863 --> 00:06:49,104
Speaker 4: of the tech guys who can't just drive away. Right

143
00:06:49,183 --> 00:06:53,583
Speaker 4: there's a smoking, sparking cat roadkill in the middle of

144
00:06:53,623 --> 00:06:56,503
Speaker 4: Connecticut Avenue and they've got to go grab it before

145
00:06:56,704 --> 00:06:59,623
Speaker 4: the Soviets. So the God forbid, the Washington Post comes

146
00:06:59,664 --> 00:07:01,503
Speaker 4: and finds out what they're up to. And it had

147
00:07:01,544 --> 00:07:03,263
Speaker 4: it been a bad like we don't get paid enough for.

148
00:07:03,264 --> 00:07:04,583
Speaker 2: This, wasn't there a bad story?

149
00:07:04,584 --> 00:07:06,743
Speaker 4: You got cats? You got back. So the first section

150
00:07:06,784 --> 00:07:08,544
Speaker 4: of the book is all the different fun animals that

151
00:07:08,544 --> 00:07:12,703
Speaker 4: were involved. Story actually was World War Two, and the

152
00:07:12,824 --> 00:07:16,784
Speaker 4: US military had a brand idea of attaching small explosives

153
00:07:17,224 --> 00:07:21,984
Speaker 4: to bats and then dropping them quasi hibernated over Japan,

154
00:07:22,384 --> 00:07:24,944
Speaker 4: with the idea that they would wake up halfway down

155
00:07:25,024 --> 00:07:27,744
Speaker 4: as are falling from a bomber, and as bats do,

156
00:07:27,824 --> 00:07:31,944
Speaker 4: they try to find dark, cold, dank places, and that

157
00:07:31,944 --> 00:07:34,104
Speaker 4: would mean if it's falling over a city or a town,

158
00:07:34,544 --> 00:07:38,264
Speaker 4: addicts and easements and places inside buildings and houses. And

159
00:07:38,304 --> 00:07:40,504
Speaker 4: at this point, about ninety five percent of Japan as

160
00:07:40,504 --> 00:07:42,824
Speaker 4: a bit of wood, even the major cities are made

161
00:07:42,864 --> 00:07:44,864
Speaker 4: of wood. So if you've got a bat with an

162
00:07:44,864 --> 00:07:47,504
Speaker 4: explosive device and incendiary device who goes up into attic,

163
00:07:47,544 --> 00:07:49,264
Speaker 4: where you've got one hundred bats that go up into

164
00:07:49,264 --> 00:07:51,984
Speaker 4: a building's attic and they all explode at the same time,

165
00:07:52,064 --> 00:07:54,664
Speaker 4: you can basically burn Japan to the ground using your bats.

166
00:07:54,984 --> 00:07:59,344
Speaker 4: And this was an idea that was not only pursued

167
00:07:59,384 --> 00:08:02,424
Speaker 4: but funded by the millions and millions of dollars and

168
00:08:02,464 --> 00:08:06,344
Speaker 4: fully tested multiple times throughout parts of the United States,

169
00:08:06,344 --> 00:08:08,584
Speaker 4: And in fact, one of the tests went so well

170
00:08:08,904 --> 00:08:11,184
Speaker 4: that they burned out a US airfield. They didn't meet him,

171
00:08:11,184 --> 00:08:13,824
Speaker 4: burned out a US airfield. But the bats got loose

172
00:08:13,944 --> 00:08:15,704
Speaker 4: and did exactly what they thought they were going to

173
00:08:15,784 --> 00:08:18,104
Speaker 4: do as they went, and they found all these nooks

174
00:08:18,104 --> 00:08:20,944
Speaker 4: and crannies inside these buildings and then exploded and burned

175
00:08:20,984 --> 00:08:22,864
Speaker 4: all these buildings at the ground. Unfortunately, it was an

176
00:08:22,864 --> 00:08:26,463
Speaker 4: active operational US Army airfoot field. So there were some

177
00:08:26,584 --> 00:08:28,984
Speaker 4: very pissed off people who didn't know what happened because

178
00:08:29,024 --> 00:08:31,544
Speaker 4: this was a top secret program that they couldn't tell

179
00:08:31,584 --> 00:08:33,463
Speaker 4: them that they had to swear them in secrecy that

180
00:08:33,504 --> 00:08:36,104
Speaker 4: they saw bats flying in there earlier, and the Chief

181
00:08:36,144 --> 00:08:39,544
Speaker 4: of Naval Operations was asked for full funding for this

182
00:08:39,744 --> 00:08:42,223
Speaker 4: to round up millions of bats with millions of small

183
00:08:42,223 --> 00:08:46,463
Speaker 4: bombs and use them against Japan. And timing was really

184
00:08:46,463 --> 00:08:49,384
Speaker 4: interesting because it's only a couple of weeks after the

185
00:08:49,504 --> 00:08:53,144
Speaker 4: CNO has been informed about a very special secret project

186
00:08:53,184 --> 00:08:55,703
Speaker 4: taking place in Ala Monngorda in New Mexico and Los

187
00:08:55,703 --> 00:08:58,143
Speaker 4: Alamos in Mexico. If they had asked them about a

188
00:08:58,184 --> 00:09:00,744
Speaker 4: month earlier, he probably would have fully funded this. But

189
00:09:00,824 --> 00:09:03,744
Speaker 4: he had just learned about a very special program that

190
00:09:03,784 --> 00:09:07,424
Speaker 4: had been successful. On July sixteenth, nineteen forty five, that's

191
00:09:07,463 --> 00:09:09,703
Speaker 4: the atomic bomb. And he said, no, I can can't

192
00:09:09,744 --> 00:09:11,344
Speaker 4: give you money for this, we don't need it. But

193
00:09:11,384 --> 00:09:13,583
Speaker 4: it's a really good idea. So when I talk about

194
00:09:13,784 --> 00:09:16,024
Speaker 4: some of these programs that were not canceled because they

195
00:09:16,064 --> 00:09:19,104
Speaker 4: were ridiculous, this is a program that was only canceled

196
00:09:19,664 --> 00:09:23,264
Speaker 4: because the atomic bomb was an easier solution potentially. But

197
00:09:23,664 --> 00:09:26,664
Speaker 4: there's sort of interesting names here. Lewis Sfiser, who actually

198
00:09:26,744 --> 00:09:30,984
Speaker 4: invented napalm, which you know is still used today. Harvard

199
00:09:31,064 --> 00:09:34,264
Speaker 4: chemist and napalm was he worked on this program because

200
00:09:34,264 --> 00:09:36,983
Speaker 4: they wanted to create these small, little incendiary devices. They

201
00:09:36,984 --> 00:09:38,904
Speaker 4: got the idea about what back to you use by

202
00:09:38,944 --> 00:09:41,024
Speaker 4: talking to the guy who invented what we all learned

203
00:09:41,024 --> 00:09:44,264
Speaker 4: in third grade about echolocation. Right, he's the bat expert

204
00:09:44,664 --> 00:09:47,743
Speaker 4: who discovered how bats actually can see and operate. We're

205
00:09:47,744 --> 00:09:49,504
Speaker 4: talking We're going to talk about looney Tunes here, right,

206
00:09:49,544 --> 00:09:52,824
Speaker 4: We're talking about people who were the hot Nobel Prize

207
00:09:52,864 --> 00:09:55,784
Speaker 4: winning type scientists who were working on these programs. And

208
00:09:55,864 --> 00:09:57,944
Speaker 4: that's true for just about every one of these.

209
00:09:57,824 --> 00:10:00,104
Speaker 2: But go to Looney Like of the different things that

210
00:10:00,144 --> 00:10:02,784
Speaker 2: you looked at most of these there's a spark of

211
00:10:02,984 --> 00:10:06,424
Speaker 2: common sense even if it didn't pan out that you

212
00:10:06,664 --> 00:10:09,343
Speaker 2: read and went holy shit, like mk ultra kind of stuff.

213
00:10:09,544 --> 00:10:11,703
Speaker 4: Well, one of that it almost didn't include, and actually

214
00:10:11,703 --> 00:10:15,224
Speaker 4: it really coincides well with the podcast, is Operation Northwoods.

215
00:10:15,463 --> 00:10:17,384
Speaker 4: That's one that it almost didn't put in the book

216
00:10:17,424 --> 00:10:21,584
Speaker 4: because that program has inspired so many conspiracy theories since then.

217
00:10:21,904 --> 00:10:24,584
Speaker 4: And for those probably people listening to podcasts know exactly

218
00:10:24,624 --> 00:10:27,343
Speaker 4: what I'm talking about. For those that don't, Operation Northwoods

219
00:10:27,384 --> 00:10:30,703
Speaker 4: was a proposed plan to essentially create a false flag

220
00:10:30,744 --> 00:10:33,304
Speaker 4: operation to pick a fight with Cuba. We after Bay

221
00:10:33,343 --> 00:10:35,383
Speaker 4: of Pigs and after the Cuban Missile crisis, we were

222
00:10:35,424 --> 00:10:38,184
Speaker 4: desperate to figure out a way to get Castro out

223
00:10:38,184 --> 00:10:40,583
Speaker 4: of power, and so we came up with a lot

224
00:10:40,583 --> 00:10:43,944
Speaker 4: of different options to try to get Castro to do

225
00:10:43,984 --> 00:10:47,144
Speaker 4: something stupid. Right, We'd love Castro to do something stupid

226
00:10:47,184 --> 00:10:48,864
Speaker 4: and try to pick a fight that we could justify

227
00:10:48,864 --> 00:10:52,224
Speaker 4: an invasion. Castro, unfortunately, was not an idiot, and he said,

228
00:10:52,304 --> 00:10:54,104
Speaker 4: I'm not going to I'm doing great, man. I got

229
00:10:54,103 --> 00:10:56,264
Speaker 4: a great new benefactor of the Soviet Union who's giving

230
00:10:56,264 --> 00:10:58,184
Speaker 4: me all that I need, and I'm certainly not going

231
00:10:58,304 --> 00:11:01,464
Speaker 4: to risk the ire of the United States, especially since

232
00:11:01,504 --> 00:11:05,264
Speaker 4: they really can't do anything about me right now because

233
00:11:05,384 --> 00:11:09,024
Speaker 4: of they're now twice failure. I mean, the Cuban missile

234
00:11:09,024 --> 00:11:13,064
Speaker 4: crisis was success when it comes to not all dying,

235
00:11:13,424 --> 00:11:16,264
Speaker 4: but it was a we luckily stumbled into discovering that

236
00:11:16,264 --> 00:11:19,223
Speaker 4: the Soviets had put nuclear weapons onto Cuba, and that's

237
00:11:19,223 --> 00:11:22,704
Speaker 4: so it's an intelligence failure. Ultimately repaired it as being

238
00:11:22,744 --> 00:11:25,463
Speaker 4: this wonderful. The U two finds the missiles and were

239
00:11:25,504 --> 00:11:27,424
Speaker 4: able to kind of bully them to leave, but they're

240
00:11:27,463 --> 00:11:29,984
Speaker 4: almost stuck in under our noses. Back to back failures

241
00:11:29,984 --> 00:11:33,064
Speaker 4: with Baya Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and so we're chastised,

242
00:11:33,384 --> 00:11:36,504
Speaker 4: we can't really do much about it. So in Operation Northwoods,

243
00:11:36,544 --> 00:11:40,224
Speaker 4: it is a series of potential policy options, military options

244
00:11:40,583 --> 00:11:44,544
Speaker 4: that would make it look like the Cubans had done

245
00:11:44,583 --> 00:11:49,664
Speaker 4: something to deserve a retaliatory strike. And by definition, this

246
00:11:49,744 --> 00:11:52,103
Speaker 4: is a false flag operation. And again this goes to

247
00:11:52,103 --> 00:11:55,144
Speaker 4: the highest level, the Joint chiefs of Staff. We're behind

248
00:11:55,504 --> 00:11:59,304
Speaker 4: this plan. Edward Lansdale, who is famous or infamous depending

249
00:11:59,343 --> 00:12:02,184
Speaker 4: on who you ask, was the policy maker behind this plan.

250
00:12:02,223 --> 00:12:04,944
Speaker 4: And it included everything from kind of simple things like

251
00:12:05,064 --> 00:12:07,904
Speaker 4: dressing up Cuban exiles as Cuban military and had them

252
00:12:07,904 --> 00:12:12,824
Speaker 4: attack Guantanamo, dressing up Cuban exiles and having them attack

253
00:12:12,984 --> 00:12:17,024
Speaker 4: American shipping to having an American ship like outside of

254
00:12:17,024 --> 00:12:20,144
Speaker 4: guantanamoud explode, I e. Kind of the USS main which

255
00:12:20,223 --> 00:12:22,904
Speaker 4: led us into the Spanish American War. And then some

256
00:12:23,583 --> 00:12:28,064
Speaker 4: not so benign ones blowing up planes traveling from Miami

257
00:12:28,144 --> 00:12:32,103
Speaker 4: to Washington or actually putting mail bombs or our IEDs

258
00:12:32,184 --> 00:12:34,504
Speaker 4: as we call them now throughout Miami. And these were

259
00:12:34,544 --> 00:12:38,503
Speaker 4: actual policy proposals. And as somebody whose parents met at

260
00:12:38,504 --> 00:12:41,104
Speaker 4: the University of Miami in the nineteen sixties exactly at

261
00:12:41,103 --> 00:12:43,463
Speaker 4: the time, these plans kissed me off a little bit.

262
00:12:43,463 --> 00:12:45,304
Speaker 4: It's given a little bit back to the future thing.

263
00:12:45,343 --> 00:12:49,184
Speaker 2: Where did you look at it as a bureaucratic game

264
00:12:49,264 --> 00:12:52,424
Speaker 2: by the DoD to screw CIA, because if I remember correctly,

265
00:12:52,504 --> 00:12:55,464
Speaker 2: there was a Defense department was involved in coming up

266
00:12:55,504 --> 00:12:57,824
Speaker 2: with this, but they wanted the CIA to actually do it. Well, sure,

267
00:12:57,904 --> 00:12:59,544
Speaker 2: maybe they were just trying to set up the CIA

268
00:12:59,664 --> 00:13:00,144
Speaker 2: to fail.

269
00:13:00,583 --> 00:13:02,544
Speaker 4: No, you're right in how you laid it out. The

270
00:13:02,544 --> 00:13:04,944
Speaker 4: conclusion is iffy, right, Are they trying to set up CIA?

271
00:13:05,223 --> 00:13:08,344
Speaker 4: Maybe not, because this is after Bay of Pigs. The

272
00:13:08,424 --> 00:13:11,784
Speaker 4: DoD kind of got a lot more power than they had.

273
00:13:11,864 --> 00:13:14,744
Speaker 4: CIA was right, and high Hippigs slapped the CIA down

274
00:13:14,864 --> 00:13:19,304
Speaker 4: like Dallas has fired every Wizzerd's gone everyone. Basically Kennedy

275
00:13:19,304 --> 00:13:21,784
Speaker 4: clean's house and brings in John McCone, who is very

276
00:13:21,824 --> 00:13:24,664
Speaker 4: studious and buy the book, and the DoD gets a

277
00:13:24,703 --> 00:13:27,504
Speaker 4: lot of the power that CIA had beforehand, especially to

278
00:13:27,504 --> 00:13:29,944
Speaker 4: do covert operations. And that's where Lansdale comes in and

279
00:13:30,024 --> 00:13:32,064
Speaker 4: many respects. I think this is like they had power

280
00:13:32,103 --> 00:13:33,784
Speaker 4: they weren't expecting to have and they kind of ran

281
00:13:33,864 --> 00:13:35,664
Speaker 4: with it. So, yes, this would have been a joint

282
00:13:35,703 --> 00:13:38,223
Speaker 4: operation with CIA. I think that the people who were

283
00:13:38,264 --> 00:13:43,144
Speaker 4: behind this legitimately wanted to free Cuba or to aus Castro,

284
00:13:43,864 --> 00:13:46,464
Speaker 4: and so a lot of people have taken this idea

285
00:13:47,103 --> 00:13:50,264
Speaker 4: and used it as a justification for later on conspiracy theories.

286
00:13:50,384 --> 00:13:53,144
Speaker 4: If the Americans would plan something like north Woods, then

287
00:13:53,184 --> 00:13:55,464
Speaker 4: what wouldn't they do. There's all this fault.

288
00:13:55,264 --> 00:13:57,703
Speaker 2: False flag like yeah, now you see the silliest like.

289
00:13:57,664 --> 00:13:58,463
Speaker 3: That's just false.

290
00:13:58,824 --> 00:14:01,784
Speaker 4: This was right, This is one. This was one that

291
00:14:01,904 --> 00:14:05,223
Speaker 4: like you can there's a paper trail, right, there's actually

292
00:14:06,103 --> 00:14:08,784
Speaker 4: US government documents that were declassified that says this was

293
00:14:08,824 --> 00:14:10,624
Speaker 4: going to happen. Now, well, you can look at this

294
00:14:10,664 --> 00:14:12,504
Speaker 4: as a cess or a failure. I look at this

295
00:14:12,544 --> 00:14:15,744
Speaker 4: as a success because this doesn't happen, right. This gets

296
00:14:15,824 --> 00:14:18,144
Speaker 4: to a level where the higher up say, not a

297
00:14:18,223 --> 00:14:20,304
Speaker 4: chance in hell we're doing this. This is where the

298
00:14:20,304 --> 00:14:22,824
Speaker 4: government worked the way it was supposed to work, where

299
00:14:22,864 --> 00:14:26,064
Speaker 4: these policy proposals were put forward, and yes, they cleared

300
00:14:26,064 --> 00:14:27,944
Speaker 4: through the chiefs of staff and everything else, but they

301
00:14:27,944 --> 00:14:31,424
Speaker 4: got to the civilian control like Robert mcnamaron John Kennedy

302
00:14:31,464 --> 00:14:33,584
Speaker 4: are like, are you guys out of your minds? We're

303
00:14:33,624 --> 00:14:36,984
Speaker 4: not doing this. This is absolutely ridiculous. And that's exactly

304
00:14:37,024 --> 00:14:39,384
Speaker 4: how the government's supposed to work, right, And so I

305
00:14:39,424 --> 00:14:42,184
Speaker 4: look at this. This is a glass half empty, class

306
00:14:42,184 --> 00:14:44,744
Speaker 4: full where you're like, wow, God, the DD came up

307
00:14:44,784 --> 00:14:48,304
Speaker 4: with these wacky doodle plans, but the civilian control of

308
00:14:48,624 --> 00:14:50,984
Speaker 4: the military, which is exactly what was designed to do

309
00:14:51,024 --> 00:14:52,784
Speaker 4: in the first place, said no, we're not doing that.

310
00:14:53,024 --> 00:14:56,784
Speaker 4: And this is just part of me goes, man, I

311
00:14:56,824 --> 00:14:58,984
Speaker 4: can't imagine why they'd come up with this idea. The

312
00:14:59,024 --> 00:15:01,464
Speaker 4: other part of me goes, that's their job. Their job

313
00:15:01,544 --> 00:15:04,344
Speaker 4: is to come up with every single potential option you

314
00:15:04,344 --> 00:15:07,224
Speaker 4: can come there. The bad scientists at US Army trade

315
00:15:07,264 --> 00:15:09,464
Speaker 4: off if you had never heard of them. Their job

316
00:15:09,704 --> 00:15:12,064
Speaker 4: is literally to come up with some of the craziest shit,

317
00:15:12,184 --> 00:15:14,384
Speaker 4: and ninety percent of the stuff they come up with

318
00:15:14,504 --> 00:15:17,504
Speaker 4: doesn't work, but ten percent does. It's kind of like

319
00:15:17,584 --> 00:15:19,944
Speaker 4: what DARPA's mandate was back in the beginning and spent

320
00:15:20,024 --> 00:15:22,344
Speaker 4: a ton of money. Most of the stuff you're gonna

321
00:15:22,584 --> 00:15:25,304
Speaker 4: research is gonna not pan out, But every so often,

322
00:15:25,344 --> 00:15:28,664
Speaker 4: you're gonna get the Internet. You're gonna get kevlar, you're

323
00:15:28,664 --> 00:15:29,664
Speaker 4: gonna get them.

324
00:15:29,584 --> 00:15:31,864
Speaker 2: Might have rebonded against us to this internet.

325
00:15:31,544 --> 00:15:33,504
Speaker 4: Right, Sure, we're great when it was ARPA net. Not

326
00:15:33,584 --> 00:15:36,264
Speaker 4: so much now. But that's what the DoD is supposed

327
00:15:36,264 --> 00:15:38,104
Speaker 4: to do. People joke about, is there some kind of

328
00:15:38,104 --> 00:15:41,264
Speaker 4: an plan for Canada? There is no one looks at

329
00:15:41,304 --> 00:15:42,904
Speaker 4: it and no one really refines it all that much.

330
00:15:42,944 --> 00:15:46,024
Speaker 4: But they're someone in the poor bastard in the DoD's

331
00:15:46,104 --> 00:15:48,584
Speaker 4: job is a plan and an invasion of Canada. And

332
00:15:48,984 --> 00:15:52,024
Speaker 4: because they're supposed to write this is just one that

333
00:15:52,064 --> 00:15:54,824
Speaker 4: got out of hand. Right, Northwoods should have died on

334
00:15:54,864 --> 00:15:56,784
Speaker 4: the vine, right, it should there should have been some

335
00:15:56,904 --> 00:15:59,424
Speaker 4: major at the Pentagon somewhere that said I'm going to

336
00:15:59,464 --> 00:16:01,424
Speaker 4: put this in a file and lock it up. But

337
00:16:01,504 --> 00:16:03,784
Speaker 4: it just kept working its way up, and it kept

338
00:16:03,824 --> 00:16:06,584
Speaker 4: going higher and higher at the Pentagon and eventually got

339
00:16:06,584 --> 00:16:08,264
Speaker 4: to generals and admirals who are like, you know, this

340
00:16:08,344 --> 00:16:10,904
Speaker 4: isn't a bad idea. Never should have gotten that high.

341
00:16:10,984 --> 00:16:14,024
Speaker 4: And eventually yeah, that was the ultimate. Kennedy was like,

342
00:16:14,264 --> 00:16:16,024
Speaker 4: how did this get to me? This should have died

343
00:16:16,064 --> 00:16:17,664
Speaker 4: a long time before it got to me.

344
00:16:17,784 --> 00:16:19,984
Speaker 3: So Vince, in your work with the Spawn Museum, what

345
00:16:20,064 --> 00:16:22,784
Speaker 3: do you hear from the general public people coming in

346
00:16:22,824 --> 00:16:25,664
Speaker 3: about conspiracy theories that do they come in and say,

347
00:16:25,704 --> 00:16:28,464
Speaker 3: where's the spaceship? What's resonating with the public As far

348
00:16:28,504 --> 00:16:31,784
Speaker 3: as conspiracy theories in the agency or the US intelligence community.

349
00:16:31,784 --> 00:16:35,104
Speaker 4: I mean, NSA is full of really interesting conspiracies, and

350
00:16:35,144 --> 00:16:36,824
Speaker 4: I can certainly talk about some of them. I mean,

351
00:16:37,224 --> 00:16:42,144
Speaker 4: for popular culture, the most famous movie about NSA's Enemy

352
00:16:42,144 --> 00:16:44,624
Speaker 4: of the State, the will Smith Gene Hackman movie from

353
00:16:44,664 --> 00:16:45,184
Speaker 4: the nineties.

354
00:16:45,384 --> 00:16:47,864
Speaker 3: Right over there in your phone was a GPS SAT tracker.

355
00:16:47,944 --> 00:16:49,824
Speaker 4: Pulse is a twenty four gigger. I don't know what

356
00:16:49,864 --> 00:16:51,264
Speaker 4: that means. It's like a love.

357
00:16:51,224 --> 00:16:53,424
Speaker 3: Jack, only two generations better than what the police have.

358
00:16:53,584 --> 00:16:55,544
Speaker 4: And what does that mean? It means the NSA can

359
00:16:55,584 --> 00:16:57,944
Speaker 4: read the time off your fucking wristwatch. Right enough. It

360
00:16:57,984 --> 00:16:58,984
Speaker 4: is bullshit right now.

361
00:16:58,984 --> 00:17:00,944
Speaker 3: You either shoot me or tell me what the fuck

362
00:17:01,024 --> 00:17:01,584
Speaker 3: is going on?

363
00:17:03,584 --> 00:17:08,024
Speaker 4: And that's some people's only impression of NSA is people

364
00:17:08,104 --> 00:17:09,904
Speaker 4: running around washingt DC is shooting people.

365
00:17:10,144 --> 00:17:11,984
Speaker 3: There don't mean federal agents you had following you on

366
00:17:11,984 --> 00:17:13,424
Speaker 3: that ferry.

367
00:17:13,744 --> 00:17:14,944
Speaker 4: I don't mean working for me.

368
00:17:15,904 --> 00:17:18,464
Speaker 3: I'm not worried about me my target here?

369
00:17:18,504 --> 00:17:19,144
Speaker 4: Do they know me?

370
00:17:19,544 --> 00:17:21,104
Speaker 3: Who is the Do they know me?

371
00:17:21,384 --> 00:17:23,144
Speaker 4: I don't know what you're talking about.

372
00:17:25,744 --> 00:17:27,744
Speaker 2: Either very smart or incredibly stupid.

373
00:17:28,144 --> 00:17:30,824
Speaker 4: Number one the NSA. There may not be two people

374
00:17:30,824 --> 00:17:33,504
Speaker 4: at NSA who are that fit at the entire agency.

375
00:17:33,944 --> 00:17:36,504
Speaker 4: Right we were behind the running. There's not a lot

376
00:17:36,504 --> 00:17:39,384
Speaker 4: of running around, even the military side where we do

377
00:17:39,504 --> 00:17:42,584
Speaker 4: cyber we do singles intelligence, but no one's shooting anybody,

378
00:17:42,784 --> 00:17:44,784
Speaker 4: you know. One of the first interviews I ever did

379
00:17:45,144 --> 00:17:48,144
Speaker 4: the Spy Museum was one of the mission possible movies

380
00:17:48,144 --> 00:17:49,304
Speaker 4: that just came out, and they asked me. It was

381
00:17:49,304 --> 00:17:51,024
Speaker 4: the one where unkers hang off the side of the

382
00:17:51,024 --> 00:17:53,104
Speaker 4: plane and it was like vanity fair, Like, how real

383
00:17:53,184 --> 00:17:53,624
Speaker 4: is Adam?

384
00:17:53,864 --> 00:17:54,704
Speaker 3: I'm on the plane.

385
00:17:54,864 --> 00:17:56,864
Speaker 4: Open the door. How'd you get in the plane? Not

386
00:17:57,024 --> 00:17:59,224
Speaker 4: dang the plane. I'm behind the plane.

387
00:17:59,624 --> 00:18:01,264
Speaker 3: Open the door, Benj.

388
00:18:01,264 --> 00:18:06,064
Speaker 4: You open that door right now? Yeah, I'm trying. Come on,

389
00:18:06,104 --> 00:18:10,864
Speaker 4: Benj you ben Do you open that door? I'm god, Benji,

390
00:18:10,944 --> 00:18:13,264
Speaker 4: not that door. The door. I'm like, you would have

391
00:18:13,304 --> 00:18:15,264
Speaker 4: been fired the next day. And what I mean fired,

392
00:18:15,304 --> 00:18:17,024
Speaker 4: I'm like, look, you're shooting at somebody. You failed. If

393
00:18:17,064 --> 00:18:18,944
Speaker 4: you're in a car chase, you failed. If you're running

394
00:18:18,944 --> 00:18:20,424
Speaker 4: for your life, you've failed. If you're hanging off the

395
00:18:20,464 --> 00:18:22,704
Speaker 4: side of a plane, you've failed. You know, NSA. If

396
00:18:22,704 --> 00:18:25,024
Speaker 4: you're not sitting behind your computer, you're probably not doing

397
00:18:25,024 --> 00:18:27,704
Speaker 4: your job right. And so the problem we run into

398
00:18:27,984 --> 00:18:30,864
Speaker 4: is if no one knows anything about the agency, and

399
00:18:30,944 --> 00:18:34,424
Speaker 4: so pop culture fills in those gaps, and CI and

400
00:18:34,544 --> 00:18:36,664
Speaker 4: FBI have done a really good job right. So in

401
00:18:36,704 --> 00:18:41,504
Speaker 4: the last almost fifty years in guiding pop culture and

402
00:18:41,544 --> 00:18:44,584
Speaker 4: the direction they wanted to go. Right, there's fifteen TV

403
00:18:44,624 --> 00:18:46,664
Speaker 4: shows where the FBI are the heroes, and a bunch

404
00:18:46,704 --> 00:18:50,544
Speaker 4: of CIA, whether it's Jack Ryan or anybody else. CIA

405
00:18:50,584 --> 00:18:53,624
Speaker 4: basically co wrote Zero Dark thirty. So you're looking at

406
00:18:54,024 --> 00:18:57,144
Speaker 4: very good public relations people and NSA just says, don't

407
00:18:57,184 --> 00:18:59,704
Speaker 4: talk to us, no comment, that's the policy. And so

408
00:18:59,784 --> 00:19:02,304
Speaker 4: we let people fill in the gaps and enemy the

409
00:19:02,304 --> 00:19:03,944
Speaker 4: state's one thing where they filled in the gaps. And

410
00:19:03,984 --> 00:19:05,904
Speaker 4: so we get all the time, like how many people

411
00:19:05,944 --> 00:19:13,744
Speaker 4: have been killed today? I say no, one's early though, Right.

412
00:19:19,904 --> 00:19:22,744
Speaker 3: When Snowden came out, there was a lot of misperceptions

413
00:19:22,744 --> 00:19:25,664
Speaker 3: going on that everybody's worried that when they pick up

414
00:19:25,704 --> 00:19:28,104
Speaker 3: the phone and lie to their wife, right, and they're

415
00:19:28,144 --> 00:19:31,824
Speaker 3: like people were genuinely worried, like whoa, And they're listening

416
00:19:31,944 --> 00:19:35,824
Speaker 3: in and if people from the audience understand when you're

417
00:19:35,824 --> 00:19:40,104
Speaker 3: on the inside, what it takes to actually exploit something

418
00:19:40,224 --> 00:19:43,064
Speaker 3: like that, to listen to it, to put it into context,

419
00:19:43,144 --> 00:19:47,104
Speaker 3: to write it up. Nobody is looking anybody in this concast. No,

420
00:19:47,264 --> 00:19:51,664
Speaker 3: unless there's some kgb kgbs Russian intelligence officer here, nobody

421
00:19:51,784 --> 00:19:53,384
Speaker 3: is freaking listening to your phone call.

422
00:19:53,504 --> 00:19:56,224
Speaker 4: And ever will I'm going to gently walk around this

423
00:19:56,344 --> 00:19:58,704
Speaker 4: question while still answering it. The key is something that

424
00:19:58,904 --> 00:20:02,024
Speaker 4: is fundamental to intelligence is we can collect all you want, right,

425
00:20:02,064 --> 00:20:04,104
Speaker 4: you can coluct the hell out you can have billions

426
00:20:04,144 --> 00:20:06,464
Speaker 4: and billions of really interesting pieces of data and information.

427
00:20:06,744 --> 00:20:08,464
Speaker 4: But if you don't have the ability to analyze it,

428
00:20:08,664 --> 00:20:10,304
Speaker 4: and you have the ability to turn it into something

429
00:20:10,344 --> 00:20:12,464
Speaker 4: that you can hand over to a policymaker and actually

430
00:20:12,504 --> 00:20:15,384
Speaker 4: make sense to that policymaker, then you might as well

431
00:20:15,384 --> 00:20:17,544
Speaker 4: not collect it in the first place. Billions of phone

432
00:20:17,584 --> 00:20:20,304
Speaker 4: calls do no one any good if you can't actually

433
00:20:20,544 --> 00:20:22,624
Speaker 4: pull out the signals from the noise. And that it's

434
00:20:22,624 --> 00:20:25,784
Speaker 4: something that Roberto Wolfsteater talked about in her book about

435
00:20:25,784 --> 00:20:28,664
Speaker 4: Pearl Harbor decades ago. Data comes in at floods that

436
00:20:28,704 --> 00:20:30,384
Speaker 4: you just get overwhelmed by the data. But if you

437
00:20:30,384 --> 00:20:33,184
Speaker 4: can't pull out the stuff that matters, then there's no

438
00:20:33,264 --> 00:20:34,944
Speaker 4: point in it. And then that's not just NSA, that's

439
00:20:34,944 --> 00:20:37,184
Speaker 4: true for every agency. And then turn it into a

440
00:20:37,224 --> 00:20:40,864
Speaker 4: final product that members of Congress who are not necessarily

441
00:20:40,984 --> 00:20:44,984
Speaker 4: experts that anything can understand and do something about. Then

442
00:20:45,384 --> 00:20:46,464
Speaker 4: you know what's the point.

443
00:20:46,584 --> 00:20:48,584
Speaker 3: I was in West Berlin just as the Cold War

444
00:20:48,664 --> 00:20:52,264
Speaker 3: was ending, and estimates are that up to twenty percent

445
00:20:52,544 --> 00:20:56,024
Speaker 3: one in five of the East German population was either

446
00:20:56,184 --> 00:20:59,984
Speaker 3: spying or being spied on inside of East Germany. And

447
00:21:00,024 --> 00:21:02,824
Speaker 3: what we found afterwards was that the Stazi, the East

448
00:21:02,824 --> 00:21:07,664
Speaker 3: German secret police, very effective. They were basically frigging, drowning

449
00:21:07,704 --> 00:21:11,664
Speaker 3: in information. They had no way, except for a few cases,

450
00:21:11,664 --> 00:21:17,664
Speaker 3: they had no way of prioritizing, collating, and analyzing the

451
00:21:17,824 --> 00:21:21,104
Speaker 3: vast majority of the information and it was just for nothing. Basically,

452
00:21:21,184 --> 00:21:24,784
Speaker 3: they just sucked it up, stored it away to include

453
00:21:25,144 --> 00:21:26,864
Speaker 3: and these I'm just sitting in your book. They had

454
00:21:26,864 --> 00:21:29,544
Speaker 3: the special pads where they would try to get like

455
00:21:29,584 --> 00:21:32,384
Speaker 3: a CIA guy or somebody there following, to sit on

456
00:21:32,424 --> 00:21:36,384
Speaker 3: a certain chair so they could capture their ass smell

457
00:21:36,864 --> 00:21:38,944
Speaker 3: and then they would take this pad and put it

458
00:21:38,984 --> 00:21:41,504
Speaker 3: in a glass jar and label it so that later

459
00:21:41,624 --> 00:21:44,184
Speaker 3: dogs could smell it and they could follow you. And like,

460
00:21:44,424 --> 00:21:47,224
Speaker 3: apparently this is this huge program and they almost never

461
00:21:47,504 --> 00:21:47,984
Speaker 3: used it.

462
00:21:48,304 --> 00:21:49,904
Speaker 4: I got the opportunity to go when I was at

463
00:21:49,904 --> 00:21:53,264
Speaker 4: the Spy Museum to Havana and several places around Cuba,

464
00:21:53,424 --> 00:21:56,464
Speaker 4: but in Havana, the Cubans and this is ten years ago, right,

465
00:21:56,544 --> 00:21:58,384
Speaker 4: so this is not during the Cold War. This is

466
00:21:58,384 --> 00:22:02,664
Speaker 4: when there's modern computing available. They had spies everywhere. There's

467
00:22:02,664 --> 00:22:04,664
Speaker 4: something called it the CDR, the Committee for the Defense

468
00:22:04,704 --> 00:22:07,184
Speaker 4: of the Revolution which are essentially much in the same way.

469
00:22:07,304 --> 00:22:11,304
Speaker 4: The informants worked back for this one per block essentially,

470
00:22:11,384 --> 00:22:13,304
Speaker 4: and US usually some old woman who had sit on

471
00:22:13,424 --> 00:22:16,224
Speaker 4: her porch all day and report on everybody and kind

472
00:22:16,264 --> 00:22:17,504
Speaker 4: of write down who was going in and out of

473
00:22:17,504 --> 00:22:19,064
Speaker 4: what buildings, and who was walking by and who was

474
00:22:19,104 --> 00:22:21,304
Speaker 4: going to work, and that stuff got passed up. But

475
00:22:21,344 --> 00:22:24,704
Speaker 4: it just died them. It just went nowhere because unless

476
00:22:24,744 --> 00:22:28,024
Speaker 4: you've got one hundred thousand analysts going through all this information,

477
00:22:28,104 --> 00:22:30,024
Speaker 4: there's very little you can do with it. That was

478
00:22:30,064 --> 00:22:33,424
Speaker 4: before AI, though, you know what, good luck AI. Look,

479
00:22:33,784 --> 00:22:36,544
Speaker 4: the technology is interesting in the way that it's being

480
00:22:36,624 --> 00:22:38,944
Speaker 4: used to try to filter and work its way through this.

481
00:22:39,064 --> 00:22:41,784
Speaker 4: NSA has been at the forefront of supercomputer technology, and

482
00:22:41,824 --> 00:22:44,624
Speaker 4: that was the reason why right it's can we sift

483
00:22:44,624 --> 00:22:46,584
Speaker 4: through all this information to figure out what it means?

484
00:22:46,904 --> 00:22:49,584
Speaker 4: Seymour Cray, who might not be a name people recognized

485
00:22:49,584 --> 00:22:52,904
Speaker 4: but maybe builized. The last name is Cray Computers, Cray one,

486
00:22:53,144 --> 00:22:56,144
Speaker 4: which was the first supercomputer that he built, Serial number

487
00:22:56,184 --> 00:23:00,064
Speaker 4: one and serial number two. What US US government's customers

488
00:23:00,144 --> 00:23:02,184
Speaker 4: one went to Los Alamos was the job of it

489
00:23:02,224 --> 00:23:04,704
Speaker 4: basically was the crunch numbers for nuclear weapons testing, and

490
00:23:04,744 --> 00:23:07,064
Speaker 4: two went to NSA with the idea of not only

491
00:23:07,184 --> 00:23:10,263
Speaker 4: breaking codes and ciphers, but also to mash data that

492
00:23:10,344 --> 00:23:12,784
Speaker 4: came in through signals intelligence. And so if you don't

493
00:23:12,824 --> 00:23:17,064
Speaker 4: have a football field sized building like NSA does, filled

494
00:23:17,104 --> 00:23:19,944
Speaker 4: with supercomputers that are crunching data twenty four hours a

495
00:23:19,984 --> 00:23:22,584
Speaker 4: day using the most advanced technology in the world, you

496
00:23:22,624 --> 00:23:25,304
Speaker 4: don't even have anything because you're not in a position

497
00:23:25,344 --> 00:23:27,384
Speaker 4: where you can take this information and then do anything

498
00:23:27,384 --> 00:23:30,064
Speaker 4: with it. And even in this case, NSA had supercomputing

499
00:23:30,104 --> 00:23:33,544
Speaker 4: technology before nine to eleven, and we're foiled by you know,

500
00:23:33,624 --> 00:23:36,464
Speaker 4: guys with box cutters. And yeah, there hasn't been a

501
00:23:36,464 --> 00:23:38,904
Speaker 4: major attack since knock on Wood, but there's been a

502
00:23:38,944 --> 00:23:40,584
Speaker 4: bunch of little ones, and there's been a bunch of

503
00:23:40,744 --> 00:23:43,624
Speaker 4: turmoil throughout the world that NSA hasn't been able to stop,

504
00:23:43,624 --> 00:23:46,664
Speaker 4: and or as CIA or anybody else. And it's because

505
00:23:46,824 --> 00:23:51,584
Speaker 4: usually that's big. Well, the world's languages. Languages are something

506
00:23:51,624 --> 00:23:53,944
Speaker 4: we're good at. But yeah, lots of languages, but lots

507
00:23:53,984 --> 00:23:56,144
Speaker 4: of information coming in. And this is what really the

508
00:23:56,144 --> 00:23:58,624
Speaker 4: book is about. The reason I like these stories is

509
00:23:58,864 --> 00:24:01,504
Speaker 4: they don't have endings. There's no outcome, and we it's

510
00:24:01,544 --> 00:24:05,464
Speaker 4: so good at Monday morning quarterbacking intelligence operations and military

511
00:24:05,504 --> 00:24:09,304
Speaker 4: operations and judging them in hindsight, and I think unfairly

512
00:24:09,424 --> 00:24:11,264
Speaker 4: right we're judging the people who plan this stuff is

513
00:24:11,304 --> 00:24:13,344
Speaker 4: we know how it turned out, and we're so good

514
00:24:13,344 --> 00:24:15,984
Speaker 4: at after action reports and so good at going back

515
00:24:16,024 --> 00:24:19,104
Speaker 4: and saying, boys, should we should have done this differently, X, Y,

516
00:24:19,184 --> 00:24:22,824
Speaker 4: and Z. And that's doesn't help us very much because

517
00:24:23,224 --> 00:24:25,264
Speaker 4: right off the bat, people read this book and they go,

518
00:24:25,304 --> 00:24:26,984
Speaker 4: oh my god, what were they thinking? And I'm like,

519
00:24:27,104 --> 00:24:28,944
Speaker 4: I want you to say that, but without the judgment.

520
00:24:29,144 --> 00:24:31,344
Speaker 4: I want you to say what were they thinking? What

521
00:24:31,424 --> 00:24:34,144
Speaker 4: was the analysis going on here? What were these people

522
00:24:34,224 --> 00:24:36,664
Speaker 4: trying to do? And that's how we can actually learn

523
00:24:36,704 --> 00:24:39,504
Speaker 4: from this stuff. And I think that's the big hurdle

524
00:24:39,624 --> 00:24:43,104
Speaker 4: that we have modern day in intelligence communities is that

525
00:24:43,144 --> 00:24:46,184
Speaker 4: we're thinking about outcome instead of process, and it's trying

526
00:24:46,224 --> 00:24:49,184
Speaker 4: to understand how do we work our way through this

527
00:24:49,224 --> 00:24:51,744
Speaker 4: and pull out the tidbit of information to make it

528
00:24:51,784 --> 00:24:52,664
Speaker 4: actionable and.

529
00:24:52,504 --> 00:24:55,783
Speaker 2: Not if you blow up the capital, then maybe they

530
00:24:55,824 --> 00:24:57,744
Speaker 2: can go back in time and pull up old shit

531
00:24:57,824 --> 00:24:59,344
Speaker 2: and figure out who the hell you are? I mean

532
00:24:59,704 --> 00:25:02,224
Speaker 2: this is not Americans. I don't want people thinking I

533
00:25:02,224 --> 00:25:03,864
Speaker 2: say and see I collect on Americans.

534
00:25:03,864 --> 00:25:06,584
Speaker 4: But yeah, no, I know. There's a lot of back

535
00:25:06,624 --> 00:25:10,064
Speaker 4: and forth about that, and with the ca of someone

536
00:25:10,064 --> 00:25:13,624
Speaker 4: like Michael Flynn who didn't quite understand or release he

537
00:25:13,944 --> 00:25:15,904
Speaker 4: throughout the fact that like, why do they listening to

538
00:25:15,904 --> 00:25:17,944
Speaker 4: my phone calls as you call the Russian ambassador. We're

539
00:25:17,984 --> 00:25:19,984
Speaker 4: not listening to your phone calls. We're listening to rusianbassador's

540
00:25:19,984 --> 00:25:21,783
Speaker 4: phone calls. You happen to be on the other end

541
00:25:21,824 --> 00:25:24,024
Speaker 4: of that. So that's not our problem.

542
00:25:24,824 --> 00:25:26,784
Speaker 2: Quickly, go back to your book. Do you have a

543
00:25:26,824 --> 00:25:29,624
Speaker 2: favorite story from that or even since then? Because obviously

544
00:25:29,664 --> 00:25:31,344
Speaker 2: your history and you're continuing to look at things.

545
00:25:31,544 --> 00:25:33,744
Speaker 4: There are stories that keep popping up again and again

546
00:25:33,784 --> 00:25:35,584
Speaker 4: where I thought I was writing history, and it turns

547
00:25:35,584 --> 00:25:38,984
Speaker 4: out that things weren't left behind. One of them is

548
00:25:39,024 --> 00:25:40,824
Speaker 4: the title of the book, Nuke in the Moon, Because

549
00:25:40,864 --> 00:25:43,144
Speaker 4: every so often somebody brings up this idea of show

550
00:25:43,144 --> 00:25:46,224
Speaker 4: a force. Let's set off a multi megaton nuclear weapon

551
00:25:46,264 --> 00:25:48,984
Speaker 4: on the moon to show everybody's business. Thankfully, that doesn't

552
00:25:48,984 --> 00:25:51,624
Speaker 4: get very far. But an idea that came up as

553
00:25:51,664 --> 00:25:53,984
Speaker 4: this book was coming out was the potential of using

554
00:25:54,064 --> 00:25:57,984
Speaker 4: nuclear weapons against weather patterns, specifically against hurricanes. There was

555
00:25:58,024 --> 00:26:01,224
Speaker 4: some discussion amongst the highest levels in Washington about why

556
00:26:01,224 --> 00:26:04,384
Speaker 4: can't we do this. If we use a nuclear weapon,

557
00:26:04,384 --> 00:26:06,464
Speaker 4: maybe we can turn a hurricane in a different direction.

558
00:26:06,784 --> 00:26:09,504
Speaker 4: I know won't hit the public, and I want to

559
00:26:09,744 --> 00:26:12,504
Speaker 4: like This was discussed back in the nineteen sixties and

560
00:26:12,504 --> 00:26:16,264
Speaker 4: the nineteen fifties there was an attempt to talk about

561
00:26:16,264 --> 00:26:20,304
Speaker 4: peaceful uses of nuclear weapons. Project Plowshare goes from the

562
00:26:20,304 --> 00:26:23,624
Speaker 4: biblical kind of phrase to turn swords into plowshares, the

563
00:26:23,664 --> 00:26:26,584
Speaker 4: idea of take these weapons of war and make them

564
00:26:26,864 --> 00:26:30,264
Speaker 4: useful for kind of civilian life, you know, create artificial reefs,

565
00:26:30,384 --> 00:26:33,984
Speaker 4: artificial harbors, or tunnels through mountains or other things like that.

566
00:26:34,024 --> 00:26:37,144
Speaker 4: And one of the ideas by a very good otherwise

567
00:26:37,424 --> 00:26:41,664
Speaker 4: a very rational otherwise meteorologist, was if we launch several

568
00:26:41,784 --> 00:26:43,984
Speaker 4: multi megaton nuclear weapons into the eye of a hurricane,

569
00:26:44,024 --> 00:26:46,104
Speaker 4: we could potentially break it up. Now this is before

570
00:26:46,144 --> 00:26:48,864
Speaker 4: we have the computer modeling to understand that this is

571
00:26:48,904 --> 00:26:50,984
Speaker 4: not something that's going to happen and not something that's

572
00:26:50,984 --> 00:26:53,224
Speaker 4: going to work. But at the time it was taken seriously,

573
00:26:53,304 --> 00:26:56,184
Speaker 4: it was investigated it was research, and it turned out

574
00:26:56,504 --> 00:26:58,504
Speaker 4: that you could take every nuclear weapon ever made on

575
00:26:58,544 --> 00:27:01,144
Speaker 4: Earth and multiply it times a thousand and launch them

576
00:27:01,184 --> 00:27:04,144
Speaker 4: all at a hurricane and it would do anything. You

577
00:27:04,184 --> 00:27:07,184
Speaker 4: would basically create a radioactive hurricane, which is a little

578
00:27:07,184 --> 00:27:09,144
Speaker 4: bit worse than even just a normal one. But some

579
00:27:09,184 --> 00:27:12,064
Speaker 4: of these eyes ideas came back up, like these were discussed,

580
00:27:12,504 --> 00:27:14,904
Speaker 4: you know, twenty seventeen to twenty twenty one ish time

581
00:27:14,944 --> 00:27:20,024
Speaker 4: period about potential ways of taking care of hurricanes. That's nuts, right.

582
00:27:20,104 --> 00:27:22,744
Speaker 4: We actually put an exhibit in the Spy Museum about

583
00:27:22,784 --> 00:27:26,424
Speaker 4: a cloud seating where during the Vietnam YEP Operation Popeye

584
00:27:26,464 --> 00:27:29,304
Speaker 4: during Vietnam, where we cloud seated in an attempt to

585
00:27:29,344 --> 00:27:31,944
Speaker 4: create to extend the monsoon season, try to wash out

586
00:27:31,944 --> 00:27:35,144
Speaker 4: the Hochiman trail. I've seen multiple things about cloud seating

587
00:27:35,224 --> 00:27:37,544
Speaker 4: and whether it's droughts or floods or other things like that,

588
00:27:37,624 --> 00:27:41,624
Speaker 4: about government weather modulation. I mean, every time a big

589
00:27:41,664 --> 00:27:43,744
Speaker 4: storm comes and it just go happens to go around

590
00:27:43,904 --> 00:27:46,944
Speaker 4: DC in a perfect it's like the DC Weather Dome

591
00:27:47,464 --> 00:27:49,304
Speaker 4: and no one says, hey, it's a title base and

592
00:27:49,344 --> 00:27:51,384
Speaker 4: it's got really weird weather patterns. That's why it's so

593
00:27:51,504 --> 00:27:53,664
Speaker 4: damn hot, and that's the reason the storms are not

594
00:27:53,704 --> 00:27:55,864
Speaker 4: going directly over it. No, it's because we have some

595
00:27:55,984 --> 00:27:58,984
Speaker 4: kind of shield against the weather. That's something you want

596
00:27:59,024 --> 00:28:01,263
Speaker 4: to have on from like Da or Nro who can

597
00:28:01,304 --> 00:28:03,144
Speaker 4: talk more about that than I can, And I say,

598
00:28:03,144 --> 00:28:04,064
Speaker 4: has nothing to do with the weather.

599
00:28:04,384 --> 00:28:04,544
Speaker 2: Good.

600
00:28:04,744 --> 00:28:06,944
Speaker 3: The operation Popeye was make mud, not war.

601
00:28:07,304 --> 00:28:10,424
Speaker 4: Right. It was great that one. It might have worked, right.

602
00:28:10,424 --> 00:28:12,264
Speaker 4: That's one of those wonderful things is we have no

603
00:28:12,384 --> 00:28:14,904
Speaker 4: idea because it rains a lot in Vietnam, right, and

604
00:28:14,944 --> 00:28:15,984
Speaker 4: so how do you know if you're going to make

605
00:28:16,024 --> 00:28:18,144
Speaker 4: it rain more? And it's one of these things where

606
00:28:18,624 --> 00:28:21,464
Speaker 4: do you extend the monsoon season which was the whole idea,

607
00:28:21,544 --> 00:28:23,544
Speaker 4: and how do you gauge that? And that's one of

608
00:28:23,584 --> 00:28:26,904
Speaker 4: the things where if you had brought aboard a scientist

609
00:28:26,944 --> 00:28:28,744
Speaker 4: at the very beginning of this instead of a bunch

610
00:28:28,744 --> 00:28:32,184
Speaker 4: of engineers, the scientists would like, look, the scientific method

611
00:28:32,224 --> 00:28:35,464
Speaker 4: was invented by Bacon centuries ago, and the concept is

612
00:28:35,464 --> 00:28:38,264
Speaker 4: is this testable? How do we know if we actually

613
00:28:38,344 --> 00:28:41,104
Speaker 4: do this successfully? And the answer to that is we don't.

614
00:28:41,344 --> 00:28:43,264
Speaker 4: It's one of these things where you can go, hey,

615
00:28:43,264 --> 00:28:48,584
Speaker 4: look it worked. It rains, it's the jungle, it's monsoon season, but.

616
00:28:48,544 --> 00:28:50,544
Speaker 2: You can even go. So there's a scientific method. Then

617
00:28:50,544 --> 00:28:53,824
Speaker 2: there's also the bureaucratic problem, and we saw this in Cia.

618
00:28:53,464 --> 00:28:55,704
Speaker 2: Is if you're to do a program like okay, might

619
00:28:55,784 --> 00:28:57,984
Speaker 2: do a program. We're going to try to influence whatever

620
00:28:58,104 --> 00:29:01,584
Speaker 2: voters in Serbia and Melosovich's running or something. I don't

621
00:29:01,624 --> 00:29:04,624
Speaker 2: make up your story, and so Congress wants to pay

622
00:29:04,624 --> 00:29:06,424
Speaker 2: money to whatever it is take over Chili. Well, you

623
00:29:06,464 --> 00:29:08,424
Speaker 2: know years ago, how do you measure that? How do

624
00:29:08,464 --> 00:29:10,704
Speaker 2: you measure this? Except there's a lot of programs, a

625
00:29:10,704 --> 00:29:12,904
Speaker 2: lot of money, a lot of inputs that you can

626
00:29:12,944 --> 00:29:14,984
Speaker 2: measure the inputs, and a lot of times you can't

627
00:29:14,984 --> 00:29:17,584
Speaker 2: measure the outputs. And so that they'll come back and

628
00:29:17,624 --> 00:29:19,464
Speaker 2: they're like, okay, was that successful, And you're like, I

629
00:29:19,464 --> 00:29:21,224
Speaker 2: don't know, it rained or it didn't rain.

630
00:29:21,504 --> 00:29:25,424
Speaker 4: My favorite kind of intelligence theory concept is the paradox

631
00:29:25,504 --> 00:29:28,064
Speaker 4: are strategic warning, which is talked a lot about Richard

632
00:29:28,064 --> 00:29:30,384
Speaker 4: Betts and others, where they've written about the idea of

633
00:29:30,704 --> 00:29:32,944
Speaker 4: if you have the greatest intelligence agency in the world

634
00:29:33,344 --> 00:29:35,264
Speaker 4: and they come up with the perfect information and the

635
00:29:35,384 --> 00:29:38,064
Speaker 4: perfect analysis and they hand that off to a policy maker,

636
00:29:38,064 --> 00:29:40,544
Speaker 4: and they do great dissemination. They convince the policy maker

637
00:29:40,784 --> 00:29:43,344
Speaker 4: you have to act. If you act on this, you're

638
00:29:43,344 --> 00:29:45,864
Speaker 4: going to stop a horrible event from happening. And then

639
00:29:45,864 --> 00:29:49,024
Speaker 4: they do something and the horrible event doesn't happen. Well,

640
00:29:49,064 --> 00:29:52,784
Speaker 4: one of two things occurred. One is you stopped it, congratulations,

641
00:29:52,864 --> 00:29:54,384
Speaker 4: great job. Two is it never was going to happen.

642
00:29:54,424 --> 00:29:57,024
Speaker 4: And I had a lot of conversations with people like

643
00:29:57,104 --> 00:30:01,344
Speaker 4: Barbara Sude, who wrote the famous August sixth beIN Launden

644
00:30:01,424 --> 00:30:04,264
Speaker 4: determined to attack the United States memo for CIA, and

645
00:30:04,304 --> 00:30:05,904
Speaker 4: then people like Koph Black, who is the head of

646
00:30:05,904 --> 00:30:08,384
Speaker 4: the CATE Terrorism Center on nine to eleven, like, all right,

647
00:30:08,424 --> 00:30:11,464
Speaker 4: looking back, what we've done differently? And the answer is

648
00:30:11,464 --> 00:30:14,064
Speaker 4: always nothing. We think we did it right the first time,

649
00:30:14,344 --> 00:30:16,424
Speaker 4: Like what else could we have done? And that, to

650
00:30:16,464 --> 00:30:19,464
Speaker 4: me is one of the really interesting paradoxes of let's say,

651
00:30:19,584 --> 00:30:22,184
Speaker 4: on literally on nine eleven, two thousand and one, or

652
00:30:22,184 --> 00:30:24,864
Speaker 4: you get great evident information that there's going to be hijackings,

653
00:30:25,104 --> 00:30:27,224
Speaker 4: they're going to run the planes into buildings in New

654
00:30:27,304 --> 00:30:31,424
Speaker 4: York and Washington or northern Virginia, and what do you do?

655
00:30:31,464 --> 00:30:34,304
Speaker 4: You ground all the aircraft. Right, No, George Bush wakes

656
00:30:34,344 --> 00:30:36,064
Speaker 4: up at six am on nine to eleven and says,

657
00:30:36,184 --> 00:30:38,584
Speaker 4: all aircraft they are grounded. At the end of the day.

658
00:30:38,984 --> 00:30:41,864
Speaker 4: What doesn't happen nine eleven doesn't happen? Great, No, nine

659
00:30:41,904 --> 00:30:42,304
Speaker 4: to eleven.

660
00:30:42,464 --> 00:30:45,544
Speaker 2: But the president is a failure and horrible and stopped commerce.

661
00:30:45,544 --> 00:30:47,704
Speaker 2: And so it becomes a negative.

662
00:30:47,304 --> 00:30:49,584
Speaker 4: For well, it not only becomes a negative, but you

663
00:30:49,624 --> 00:30:51,184
Speaker 4: at that point, how do you prove there was going

664
00:30:51,264 --> 00:30:53,504
Speaker 4: to be a nine to eleven in the first place? Right,

665
00:30:53,544 --> 00:30:55,024
Speaker 4: And or they do it on nine to twelve, or

666
00:30:55,064 --> 00:30:56,704
Speaker 4: they do it on nine thirteen. So this is one

667
00:30:56,744 --> 00:30:59,384
Speaker 4: of these things that we're constantly in the intelligence business

668
00:30:59,424 --> 00:31:01,944
Speaker 4: having to deal with. How do you measure success? It's

669
00:31:01,984 --> 00:31:04,224
Speaker 4: easy to measure failure. Failure is really obvious if you

670
00:31:04,304 --> 00:31:06,264
Speaker 4: don't know what If you're failing, you'll see it on

671
00:31:06,304 --> 00:31:07,704
Speaker 4: the front page of New York Times. They'll let you

672
00:31:07,744 --> 00:31:10,304
Speaker 4: know you're failing. But success is the tough one, right

673
00:31:10,344 --> 00:31:16,024
Speaker 4: because sometimes your success doesn't appear for twenty years. Sometimes

674
00:31:16,024 --> 00:31:19,304
Speaker 4: your success starts out as great and then falls apart

675
00:31:19,344 --> 00:31:21,624
Speaker 4: if there's blowback down the line. I mean, look, we

676
00:31:21,744 --> 00:31:25,024
Speaker 4: successfully ousted Moza dec in Iran looked great for a

677
00:31:25,064 --> 00:31:27,784
Speaker 4: little while until nineteen seventy nine, right. I mean, we

678
00:31:27,784 --> 00:31:30,784
Speaker 4: were happy that Saddam Hussein was dead for about an

679
00:31:30,784 --> 00:31:34,344
Speaker 4: hour until all of a sudden, Iraq falls apart.

680
00:31:34,544 --> 00:31:37,264
Speaker 3: There's also the nature of intelligence for people that people

681
00:31:37,304 --> 00:31:39,344
Speaker 3: tend to think that it's black or white. Right If

682
00:31:39,384 --> 00:31:41,904
Speaker 3: on nine to eleven we'd figured out these guys on

683
00:31:41,944 --> 00:31:46,504
Speaker 3: these days had box hiders, and that's very specific, actionable information.

684
00:31:47,024 --> 00:31:49,104
Speaker 3: But in the weeks running up to nine to eleven,

685
00:31:49,384 --> 00:31:53,144
Speaker 3: we knew something was in the air. So I know

686
00:31:53,224 --> 00:31:57,064
Speaker 3: it's in media that the CIA director was calling around

687
00:31:57,104 --> 00:32:01,224
Speaker 3: to other European counterparts and others saying, we know from

688
00:32:01,224 --> 00:32:05,624
Speaker 3: the chatter from hearing them talk the seniors that something

689
00:32:05,904 --> 00:32:08,624
Speaker 3: is going on. But then he said, we don't know where,

690
00:32:08,904 --> 00:32:11,984
Speaker 3: we don't know who, we don't know how, but we

691
00:32:12,184 --> 00:32:15,224
Speaker 3: know their plan and something and we know it's getting close.

692
00:32:15,504 --> 00:32:18,144
Speaker 3: We knew or didn't know, knows the wrong word. We

693
00:32:18,224 --> 00:32:24,024
Speaker 3: had strong indications that people hid whatever, but you go

694
00:32:24,104 --> 00:32:26,864
Speaker 3: with what you got, and so it's people tend to think,

695
00:32:27,064 --> 00:32:30,184
Speaker 3: especially with so the difference between CIA and NSA is

696
00:32:30,584 --> 00:32:34,064
Speaker 3: we look through humans to find plans and intentions and

697
00:32:34,064 --> 00:32:37,104
Speaker 3: intentions are things that haven't happened yet that you're still

698
00:32:37,104 --> 00:32:39,024
Speaker 3: trying to figure out whether you're going to do it

699
00:32:39,144 --> 00:32:41,624
Speaker 3: or not. Right, Putin could put all his troops, and

700
00:32:42,144 --> 00:32:44,304
Speaker 3: he could put him on the border. But to give

701
00:32:44,344 --> 00:32:47,184
Speaker 3: that final order easier, isn't he Like even the Russians

702
00:32:47,184 --> 00:32:49,624
Speaker 3: didn't know what's his intention, and you can come in

703
00:32:49,664 --> 00:32:51,744
Speaker 3: and say, yeah, they're massing their troops, but we don't

704
00:32:51,784 --> 00:32:53,464
Speaker 3: know what's between his ears.

705
00:32:53,504 --> 00:32:55,864
Speaker 4: And that's where the community, part of the intelligence community

706
00:32:55,904 --> 00:32:58,984
Speaker 4: becomes so important. Right, So you've got the signals intelligence

707
00:32:59,024 --> 00:33:02,384
Speaker 4: coming from NSA, but you also have leadership analysis coming

708
00:33:02,384 --> 00:33:05,104
Speaker 4: from places like CIA and other like understanding who Putin

709
00:33:05,144 --> 00:33:07,664
Speaker 4: is as an individual and understanding his background. Then you've

710
00:33:07,704 --> 00:33:10,864
Speaker 4: got NNG and NRO doing their overhead stuff trying to

711
00:33:10,904 --> 00:33:12,184
Speaker 4: understand what's going on.

712
00:33:12,264 --> 00:33:16,584
Speaker 3: Conspiracy theorists, they assume that we have a perfect insight

713
00:33:16,704 --> 00:33:19,504
Speaker 3: into our into our adversary, and I wish we could

714
00:33:19,544 --> 00:33:21,584
Speaker 3: take some of these conspiracy theories and show them like

715
00:33:21,824 --> 00:33:25,704
Speaker 3: the cool stuff we can do, but also our limitations

716
00:33:25,744 --> 00:33:26,504
Speaker 3: are also huge.

717
00:33:26,984 --> 00:33:30,344
Speaker 2: Staying look at twenty twenty two, the community got it

718
00:33:30,544 --> 00:33:32,024
Speaker 2: right in the sense that we tried to tell our

719
00:33:32,024 --> 00:33:33,864
Speaker 2: allies and others that Britain was going to go in

720
00:33:33,904 --> 00:33:37,464
Speaker 2: and that was good, but those say some of the

721
00:33:37,464 --> 00:33:41,104
Speaker 2: same analysts really messed up. What would Ukraine do? So like,

722
00:33:41,144 --> 00:33:42,744
Speaker 2: at a time when we probably could have supported or

723
00:33:42,744 --> 00:33:45,464
Speaker 2: give more things to Ukraine, the view of the analytic

724
00:33:45,504 --> 00:33:47,944
Speaker 2: community was all they're going to get overrun quickly in Ukraine,

725
00:33:47,944 --> 00:33:50,824
Speaker 2: won't fight like whoa, whoa. And sadly many of those

726
00:33:51,024 --> 00:33:54,024
Speaker 2: same analysts who are the ones that media is still talking.

727
00:33:53,704 --> 00:33:56,824
Speaker 4: To, I don't think you're completely right unless you can

728
00:33:56,824 --> 00:33:59,944
Speaker 4: convince people. They convinced American leadership, but they weren't able

729
00:33:59,984 --> 00:34:03,384
Speaker 4: to convince the leadership that mattered overseas, and that means

730
00:34:03,424 --> 00:34:06,744
Speaker 4: that there's systematic issues with liaison and with all sorts

731
00:34:06,744 --> 00:34:10,184
Speaker 4: of other things that That's the thing about conspira theory

732
00:34:10,504 --> 00:34:14,223
Speaker 4: is that we're right one percent of the time and

733
00:34:14,264 --> 00:34:16,223
Speaker 4: we barely can tie our shoes the other ninety nine

734
00:34:16,224 --> 00:34:18,904
Speaker 4: percent of the time. And it's intelligence right. It's not

735
00:34:18,984 --> 00:34:22,104
Speaker 4: dropping a smart bomb through an airshaft. It's very gray,

736
00:34:22,183 --> 00:34:23,183
Speaker 4: it's very dirty.

737
00:34:23,263 --> 00:34:25,064
Speaker 3: I'm going to try to play stump the chump just

738
00:34:25,064 --> 00:34:27,104
Speaker 3: for a bit and inflict a quick story on you

739
00:34:27,143 --> 00:34:28,823
Speaker 3: and see if you know it. But this hits to

740
00:34:28,904 --> 00:34:32,183
Speaker 3: do with toothpaste and the atomic bomb? Do you know

741
00:34:32,183 --> 00:34:33,064
Speaker 3: what I'm talking about.

742
00:34:32,984 --> 00:34:35,663
Speaker 4: A little bit? Yeah, I'll tell it. Yeah, I'll let that.

743
00:34:36,504 --> 00:34:40,223
Speaker 3: In Germany before World War Two, the leading brand of

744
00:34:40,304 --> 00:34:44,743
Speaker 3: toothpaste was called Doramd and it used God forbid, it

745
00:34:44,864 --> 00:34:48,904
Speaker 3: used radioactive thorium a little bit in the toothpaste and

746
00:34:48,984 --> 00:34:51,584
Speaker 3: it was said that it would make your teeth brighter,

747
00:34:52,143 --> 00:34:54,623
Speaker 3: and it probably did, but it's also going to rot

748
00:34:54,703 --> 00:34:57,623
Speaker 3: your jaw, but they didn't realize this at the time.

749
00:34:57,783 --> 00:35:02,664
Speaker 3: So thorium can also be used to make a nuclear weapon.

750
00:35:02,984 --> 00:35:05,184
Speaker 3: And so there was this team in the United States

751
00:35:05,183 --> 00:35:07,704
Speaker 3: called the Aesops Team, and they were trying to figure

752
00:35:07,743 --> 00:35:11,024
Speaker 3: out how close German he was to the bomb, right

753
00:35:11,064 --> 00:35:13,223
Speaker 3: because we didn't know we knew they were working on it.

754
00:35:13,584 --> 00:35:16,343
Speaker 3: We know we had the Manhattan Project, and we're trying

755
00:35:16,384 --> 00:35:19,424
Speaker 3: to figure out, like what avenues are they taking and

756
00:35:19,464 --> 00:35:23,904
Speaker 3: how close are they? And in Paris, as the Allies

757
00:35:23,944 --> 00:35:28,903
Speaker 3: were landing on D Day, group of German officers went

758
00:35:28,944 --> 00:35:32,343
Speaker 3: into an office in Paris, a scientific office, and they

759
00:35:32,544 --> 00:35:37,623
Speaker 3: commandeered they stole all the thorum out of this research facility,

760
00:35:37,984 --> 00:35:41,104
Speaker 3: and the Allies learned this, and of course thorum you

761
00:35:41,104 --> 00:35:44,104
Speaker 3: can make a nuclear weapon with it. The Germans just

762
00:35:44,424 --> 00:35:50,264
Speaker 3: hijacked all this thorium. Holy shit. So they're directing bomber

763
00:35:50,304 --> 00:35:53,704
Speaker 3: missions over Germany to go after what they think maybe

764
00:35:54,304 --> 00:35:57,864
Speaker 3: German efforts to create a nuclear weapon VI authorium. After

765
00:35:57,904 --> 00:36:03,024
Speaker 3: the war, it turned out that the German officers realized, oh,

766
00:36:03,064 --> 00:36:05,344
Speaker 3: we're going to lose the war and we're going to

767
00:36:05,424 --> 00:36:07,623
Speaker 3: need to do something afterwards. What are we going to

768
00:36:08,104 --> 00:36:11,623
Speaker 3: Let's make toothpaste. So they went in and they stole

769
00:36:11,663 --> 00:36:14,463
Speaker 3: the thorium and they hid it and they figure, after

770
00:36:14,504 --> 00:36:18,263
Speaker 3: the war, we're gonna make door it again. And unfortunately

771
00:36:18,344 --> 00:36:20,504
Speaker 3: what happened is we traked all them down. Is tell

772
00:36:20,584 --> 00:36:22,623
Speaker 3: us about the nuclear weapon, dude, I just wanted to

773
00:36:22,623 --> 00:36:25,623
Speaker 3: make toothpaste, and then we found out that the last

774
00:36:25,663 --> 00:36:29,104
Speaker 3: thing you want to put in toothpaste is radioactive thorium.

775
00:36:29,743 --> 00:36:32,824
Speaker 4: Al sauce was chosen by the Pentagon, and it sounds

776
00:36:32,824 --> 00:36:35,344
Speaker 4: like it's just a random word, but it actually tends.

777
00:36:35,464 --> 00:36:38,384
Speaker 4: It's a word in Greek for a grove, like a

778
00:36:38,384 --> 00:36:41,064
Speaker 4: grove of trees, and whoever picked up the Pentagon was

779
00:36:41,183 --> 00:36:43,343
Speaker 4: picking it as like an homage to Leslie Gross. So

780
00:36:43,464 --> 00:36:47,264
Speaker 4: basically when Gross found out about this, he went berserk.

781
00:36:47,344 --> 00:36:50,584
Speaker 4: He said, you named the secret mission to go and

782
00:36:50,623 --> 00:36:51,864
Speaker 4: find out what the Germans were up to with the

783
00:36:51,904 --> 00:36:54,624
Speaker 4: atomic bomb? After me, what the hell are you doing?

784
00:36:55,104 --> 00:36:57,623
Speaker 4: But by that point actually would have been more obvious

785
00:36:57,623 --> 00:36:59,383
Speaker 4: if they had changed it. So they had to suck

786
00:36:59,424 --> 00:37:01,343
Speaker 4: it up and it was the al Sauce mission going through.

787
00:37:01,384 --> 00:37:03,624
Speaker 4: But there's another great story from that same mission. Where

788
00:37:04,024 --> 00:37:06,703
Speaker 4: as they were working their way through France, they did

789
00:37:06,864 --> 00:37:09,743
Speaker 4: water samples and they sent them back to Britain to

790
00:37:09,703 --> 00:37:12,343
Speaker 4: be analyzed by the sciences there, because the idea was

791
00:37:12,384 --> 00:37:14,824
Speaker 4: that fission by products may end up in the water

792
00:37:15,143 --> 00:37:16,944
Speaker 4: and they can determine whether or not it's coming from

793
00:37:16,984 --> 00:37:19,424
Speaker 4: a factory up river. And so they sent back a

794
00:37:19,504 --> 00:37:22,904
Speaker 4: crate of these water, like these basin jars full of water.

795
00:37:23,304 --> 00:37:26,984
Speaker 4: And then they're in wine country and Champagne region, and

796
00:37:27,024 --> 00:37:28,783
Speaker 4: so they sent back a case of champagne to the

797
00:37:28,824 --> 00:37:32,903
Speaker 4: guys back doing this hard work inside the UK kind

798
00:37:32,944 --> 00:37:35,944
Speaker 4: of say hey, here's spoils of war. Have some champagne

799
00:37:35,944 --> 00:37:38,183
Speaker 4: while you're doing this. But they don't send a note, right,

800
00:37:38,183 --> 00:37:40,064
Speaker 4: They just send these two crates back. So about a

801
00:37:40,064 --> 00:37:42,944
Speaker 4: week later, they get a like a frantic message, like

802
00:37:42,984 --> 00:37:46,824
Speaker 4: a flash traffic saying the creative water is completely negative

803
00:37:46,824 --> 00:37:49,144
Speaker 4: for any of radio activity, but the wine is just full.

804
00:37:49,544 --> 00:37:52,064
Speaker 4: The wine is absolutely and and so they're freaking out,

805
00:37:52,064 --> 00:37:53,584
Speaker 4: like where did you get this wine? Is it done?

806
00:37:53,584 --> 00:37:56,183
Speaker 4: You know, it's like it's champagne. And it turned out

807
00:37:56,183 --> 00:37:59,223
Speaker 4: that they finally asked science as a front. Scientists like

808
00:37:59,584 --> 00:38:03,944
Speaker 4: it's naturally radioactive, like it has small little radioactivity in

809
00:38:03,984 --> 00:38:05,903
Speaker 4: it naturally, and so you're not picking up a German

810
00:38:05,984 --> 00:38:08,783
Speaker 4: nuclear weapon, you're picking up the soil that this stuff

811
00:38:08,824 --> 00:38:11,223
Speaker 4: has actually grown in.

812
00:38:26,904 --> 00:38:30,064
Speaker 3: Searching for like a dirty bomb. They were trying to

813
00:38:30,104 --> 00:38:33,423
Speaker 3: like you know, all cargo entering the US, and one

814
00:38:33,424 --> 00:38:35,384
Speaker 3: of the big problems they had initially. It's in the

815
00:38:35,384 --> 00:38:38,703
Speaker 3: media now, but there's certainly is that bananas. They have

816
00:38:38,824 --> 00:38:40,904
Speaker 3: a they you know, with a potassium in the banana

817
00:38:40,984 --> 00:38:43,823
Speaker 3: that that there was certain the machine couldn't tell whether

818
00:38:43,864 --> 00:38:47,304
Speaker 3: it was bananas or a possible dirty nuclear dirty bomb.

819
00:38:47,623 --> 00:38:50,343
Speaker 4: You need to have a like a conics trailer full

820
00:38:50,344 --> 00:38:53,904
Speaker 4: of bananas, but you sometimes you'd have a Conics trailer

821
00:38:53,904 --> 00:38:54,544
Speaker 4: full of the.

822
00:38:54,464 --> 00:38:57,104
Speaker 3: Intelligence is like the bananas are a nuclear weapon and.

823
00:38:57,024 --> 00:38:59,263
Speaker 4: There are several good books about this that actually talk

824
00:38:59,344 --> 00:39:03,424
Speaker 4: about nuclear detection and that technology and how it advanced,

825
00:39:03,464 --> 00:39:05,823
Speaker 4: going all the way from figuring it out during World

826
00:39:05,824 --> 00:39:08,544
Speaker 4: War Two to how we discovered that the Russian table bomb,

827
00:39:08,623 --> 00:39:10,904
Speaker 4: to how we did didn't do a great job in

828
00:39:10,944 --> 00:39:14,264
Speaker 4: figuring out as each of these nuclear powers sequentially became

829
00:39:14,384 --> 00:39:17,303
Speaker 4: nuclear powers in the Chinese and the Israelis and the

830
00:39:17,344 --> 00:39:20,783
Speaker 4: Indians and Pakistani's and everybody else. The technology is extraordinary.

831
00:39:20,824 --> 00:39:22,623
Speaker 4: It is really thinking outside the box if you want

832
00:39:22,663 --> 00:39:26,504
Speaker 4: to think about using seismographs and spectroscopy and some of

833
00:39:26,504 --> 00:39:29,703
Speaker 4: these really we call it massins measurements and signatures intelligence

834
00:39:29,783 --> 00:39:32,743
Speaker 4: kind of you know, the really nerdy science stuff that

835
00:39:32,783 --> 00:39:34,903
Speaker 4: I love. It's not something you can get from human

836
00:39:34,944 --> 00:39:36,864
Speaker 4: intelligence sources. It's not something you can get for signals

837
00:39:36,904 --> 00:39:39,143
Speaker 4: intelligence because people aren't on the phone talking about it

838
00:39:39,263 --> 00:39:42,223
Speaker 4: or writing about it. They're doing underground nuclear tests. And

839
00:39:42,263 --> 00:39:43,984
Speaker 4: how do you pick that up. You sniff the air,

840
00:39:44,143 --> 00:39:47,584
Speaker 4: you feel the actual vibrations of the earth you're doing.

841
00:39:47,783 --> 00:39:49,223
Speaker 2: I've done a lot of it in my career, going

842
00:39:49,263 --> 00:39:51,863
Speaker 2: around with a thing to collect air or water or

843
00:39:51,864 --> 00:39:52,343
Speaker 2: whatever in.

844
00:39:52,263 --> 00:39:54,504
Speaker 4: Places, and that was learning as we went. Right, This

845
00:39:54,584 --> 00:39:57,183
Speaker 4: is not something that anyone had done beforehand, because there

846
00:39:57,223 --> 00:39:59,263
Speaker 4: was no reason to do it. I talked to a

847
00:39:59,304 --> 00:40:03,903
Speaker 4: person who worked for Sotheby's, the auction house, and they

848
00:40:03,944 --> 00:40:09,544
Speaker 4: were saying that they're able to determine forgeries of wine.

849
00:40:09,663 --> 00:40:11,424
Speaker 4: So it's like someone will bring like a case of

850
00:40:11,504 --> 00:40:14,264
Speaker 4: wine to auction and they'll say, this is an eighteen

851
00:40:14,384 --> 00:40:17,664
Speaker 4: sixty five, blah blah blah, and they'll take one little

852
00:40:17,703 --> 00:40:19,783
Speaker 4: test of it and determine, no, it's not, And like, well,

853
00:40:19,783 --> 00:40:21,343
Speaker 4: how can you know it's because there's no season one

854
00:40:21,424 --> 00:40:24,504
Speaker 4: thirty five minutes, right, there's no strontium ninety trace, and

855
00:40:24,584 --> 00:40:26,464
Speaker 4: if it was from that time period, there wouldn't be.

856
00:40:26,984 --> 00:40:29,423
Speaker 4: So we know this was made after nineteen forty five

857
00:40:29,464 --> 00:40:32,903
Speaker 4: because atmospheric nuclear fission by products would be in every

858
00:40:32,984 --> 00:40:35,423
Speaker 4: single drop of wine on earth. And that is here,

859
00:40:35,504 --> 00:40:37,663
Speaker 4: which means this is not in eighteen whatever. This is

860
00:40:37,703 --> 00:40:41,024
Speaker 4: a nineteen sixty poured into a bottle as a forgery.

861
00:40:41,464 --> 00:40:44,464
Speaker 4: And that was that's a civilian use of a technology

862
00:40:44,464 --> 00:40:47,223
Speaker 4: that was designed for intelligence purposes, that was designed to

863
00:40:47,263 --> 00:40:50,024
Speaker 4: try to figure out are the Soviets building a bomb?

864
00:40:50,504 --> 00:40:53,104
Speaker 4: And later on for are the Chinese building a bomb?

865
00:40:53,143 --> 00:40:55,504
Speaker 4: And then are the Pakastaniess building a bomb, and our

866
00:40:55,623 --> 00:40:56,864
Speaker 4: Koreans and everybody after that.

867
00:40:57,024 --> 00:40:58,663
Speaker 2: Yeah, they should just figure out the answers. Yes all

868
00:40:58,703 --> 00:40:59,343
Speaker 2: the time, it's not.

869
00:40:59,904 --> 00:41:03,303
Speaker 4: Yeah. There's a historian named jeff Richelson who he's really

870
00:41:03,344 --> 00:41:05,424
Speaker 4: well known because he did The Wizards of Langley and

871
00:41:05,424 --> 00:41:08,104
Speaker 4: he got a ton of stuff at CID classified. But

872
00:41:08,183 --> 00:41:10,504
Speaker 4: he also did Spying on the Bomb, which is kind

873
00:41:10,544 --> 00:41:13,584
Speaker 4: of every chapter is another country, and essentially the theme

874
00:41:13,663 --> 00:41:16,383
Speaker 4: is how we failed against just to figure out what

875
00:41:16,464 --> 00:41:19,344
Speaker 4: was going on against every single country. And my book

876
00:41:19,544 --> 00:41:21,863
Speaker 4: The Nuclear Spies actually does is a great thing, but

877
00:41:21,864 --> 00:41:24,064
Speaker 4: he doesn't connect anyone. And what The Nuclear Spies does

878
00:41:24,143 --> 00:41:26,864
Speaker 4: is actually looks at our intelligence against the Germans and

879
00:41:26,864 --> 00:41:29,504
Speaker 4: World War II, and then our intelligence against the Soviets

880
00:41:29,504 --> 00:41:31,903
Speaker 4: in the early Cold War and figures out why one

881
00:41:31,944 --> 00:41:34,584
Speaker 4: succeeds and one fails, and juxtaposed, they're only a couple

882
00:41:34,584 --> 00:41:37,223
Speaker 4: of years apart, they had the same people involved, a

883
00:41:37,223 --> 00:41:39,183
Speaker 4: lot of the same technology. Why were we good at

884
00:41:39,223 --> 00:41:40,984
Speaker 4: one and bad at the other? I thought I was

885
00:41:41,024 --> 00:41:45,983
Speaker 4: writing a book about why were we so unsuccessful in

886
00:41:46,024 --> 00:41:48,783
Speaker 4: determining what the Soviets were up to? When we were

887
00:41:48,783 --> 00:41:51,304
Speaker 4: successful in determining what the Germans were up to, all saws,

888
00:41:51,304 --> 00:41:53,303
Speaker 4: and we had a lot of really great singles intelligence

889
00:41:53,304 --> 00:41:55,303
Speaker 4: and great human intelligence, all these other things. And it

890
00:41:55,344 --> 00:41:57,343
Speaker 4: turned out I was asking the wrong question. The question

891
00:41:57,384 --> 00:41:59,303
Speaker 4: I was, how did we get it right? Ever? Right?

892
00:41:59,544 --> 00:42:02,024
Speaker 4: That the mission against the Soviets, the operation of the

893
00:42:02,024 --> 00:42:04,743
Speaker 4: Soviets was the norm, not the exception. The operation is

894
00:42:04,824 --> 00:42:07,503
Speaker 4: the Germans was the exception because we got it wrong

895
00:42:07,663 --> 00:42:11,104
Speaker 4: every time after that right, it was different degrees of wrong.

896
00:42:11,584 --> 00:42:15,304
Speaker 4: But every time a new nuclear power joined the nuclear family,

897
00:42:15,663 --> 00:42:18,544
Speaker 4: we were surprised. Now maybe it was surprised by days

898
00:42:18,623 --> 00:42:21,344
Speaker 4: or weeks or months, in some cases surprised by years,

899
00:42:21,783 --> 00:42:24,383
Speaker 4: but no one saw any of them coming. That goes

900
00:42:24,384 --> 00:42:26,303
Speaker 4: back to what we're talking about the very beginning is

901
00:42:26,663 --> 00:42:29,143
Speaker 4: we were collecting all the right stuff. We had an

902
00:42:29,183 --> 00:42:31,863
Speaker 4: analyst who understood it from a scientific perspective, But could

903
00:42:31,904 --> 00:42:34,384
Speaker 4: we put dots together? Could we actually put the puzzles

904
00:42:34,384 --> 00:42:38,104
Speaker 4: together to say, hey, that pakistanis are about to test

905
00:42:38,143 --> 00:42:40,743
Speaker 4: a nuclear weapon? Or the North Koreans you don't know

906
00:42:40,783 --> 00:42:43,663
Speaker 4: about a QCN, right, you know that come? Oh? Of

907
00:42:43,703 --> 00:42:45,824
Speaker 4: course if they got a guy from Pakistan telling exactly

908
00:42:45,864 --> 00:42:47,024
Speaker 4: how to do it, of course, they're going to do it.

909
00:42:47,064 --> 00:42:48,863
Speaker 4: That's the missing piece of the puzzle that you're not

910
00:42:48,904 --> 00:42:50,904
Speaker 4: going to get, so you're going to get surprised. And

911
00:42:50,984 --> 00:42:54,064
Speaker 4: the answer is it's really hard to do exactly, and

912
00:42:54,223 --> 00:42:56,584
Speaker 4: you can't just be like, let's solve this questions. You

913
00:42:56,623 --> 00:42:59,303
Speaker 4: don't even what the question is sometimes and that doesn't help.

914
00:42:59,344 --> 00:43:00,744
Speaker 4: If you just add a thousand people.

915
00:43:00,904 --> 00:43:03,143
Speaker 3: I will tell you somebody who worked on the inside,

916
00:43:03,344 --> 00:43:07,024
Speaker 3: we get a friggin lot, not always huge, but we've

917
00:43:07,064 --> 00:43:10,303
Speaker 3: saved I worked in Encounter Terrorism Center. We saved a

918
00:43:10,544 --> 00:43:11,504
Speaker 3: lot of lives.

919
00:43:11,663 --> 00:43:14,784
Speaker 2: When they can't prove how many, you can't, No, you can't.

920
00:43:14,984 --> 00:43:18,024
Speaker 3: So we do have a lot of successes. I feel

921
00:43:18,104 --> 00:43:21,584
Speaker 3: good and sleep well knowing that. But yeah, it's freaking hard.

922
00:43:21,783 --> 00:43:24,143
Speaker 4: Not only can you not prove when you're successful, but

923
00:43:24,183 --> 00:43:27,864
Speaker 4: you can't publicize when you're successful. You don't want to anyway.

924
00:43:27,944 --> 00:43:30,343
Speaker 4: It's much better if our adversaries think we're idiots and

925
00:43:30,384 --> 00:43:32,264
Speaker 4: we don't want people to know our sources and methods,

926
00:43:32,424 --> 00:43:34,143
Speaker 4: and so a lot of times we do things well

927
00:43:34,183 --> 00:43:36,303
Speaker 4: and we do things effectively and people don't know about it,

928
00:43:36,424 --> 00:43:39,183
Speaker 4: and it's frustrating as hell. Claricia stuff from my experience.

929
00:43:39,183 --> 00:43:42,223
Speaker 2: One thing I can say is NSA does an amazing job,

930
00:43:42,304 --> 00:43:45,864
Speaker 2: a tremendous job. A massive amount of the important things

931
00:43:45,904 --> 00:43:50,064
Speaker 2: that are protected this country have come through nssay collection, analysis,

932
00:43:50,064 --> 00:43:51,783
Speaker 2: and work, and so I think the NSA is a

933
00:43:51,904 --> 00:43:53,624
Speaker 2: gem for the American people.

934
00:43:53,783 --> 00:43:55,703
Speaker 4: I think the thing that kind of saves the agency

935
00:43:55,703 --> 00:43:58,064
Speaker 4: every time that's some kind of hubbub happens, some kind

936
00:43:58,064 --> 00:44:02,584
Speaker 4: of scandal is the directorship. The leadership will go down

937
00:44:02,663 --> 00:44:04,743
Speaker 4: and do a closed session of Congress and then the

938
00:44:04,783 --> 00:44:07,104
Speaker 4: congressman will come out and be like, yeah, we can't

939
00:44:07,143 --> 00:44:09,703
Speaker 4: cut that. So I'm constantly pushing for stuff to be

940
00:44:09,743 --> 00:44:12,343
Speaker 4: declassified when I think it should be. But ninety nine

941
00:44:12,623 --> 00:44:14,624
Speaker 4: nine percent of stuff, I'm like, yeah, there's a reason.

942
00:44:14,783 --> 00:44:16,663
Speaker 4: And when I get request because people know my back

943
00:44:16,703 --> 00:44:19,463
Speaker 4: people know my personality, and they're like, Vince, i'd really

944
00:44:19,504 --> 00:44:20,944
Speaker 4: love to see X, Y and Z, and I'm like,

945
00:44:21,024 --> 00:44:22,743
Speaker 4: let me look into it. And I'm like and they

946
00:44:22,743 --> 00:44:24,544
Speaker 4: trust me. When I come back to and be like nope,

947
00:44:24,703 --> 00:44:26,464
Speaker 4: and they're like really why, I'm like, you're going to

948
00:44:26,504 --> 00:44:28,303
Speaker 4: have to trust me on this one. This is just

949
00:44:28,344 --> 00:44:31,423
Speaker 4: not going to happen. And I'm constantly that's the kind

950
00:44:31,464 --> 00:44:33,743
Speaker 4: of part of the house I work in is I'm

951
00:44:33,743 --> 00:44:38,263
Speaker 4: constantly like, what can we possibly like proactively declassify, Like

952
00:44:38,344 --> 00:44:40,263
Speaker 4: where are we in a position where something can be

953
00:44:40,344 --> 00:44:42,943
Speaker 4: put out that will make us look good number one,

954
00:44:43,024 --> 00:44:44,944
Speaker 4: but also that will give a good history lesson to

955
00:44:44,984 --> 00:44:47,504
Speaker 4: the public. And we've done it over the years that

956
00:44:47,544 --> 00:44:50,464
Speaker 4: I've been there, We've proactively declassified a bunch of stuff

957
00:44:50,703 --> 00:44:53,383
Speaker 4: and said, look, what took so long? It took long

958
00:44:53,424 --> 00:44:57,264
Speaker 4: because until very recently, there's a source that we were protecting,

959
00:44:57,304 --> 00:45:00,263
Speaker 4: or there's a methodology that we're protecting, or until very recently,

960
00:45:00,743 --> 00:45:05,663
Speaker 4: there were potential blowback from this being released to an

961
00:45:05,663 --> 00:45:09,384
Speaker 4: ally or to the grandkid of someone who worked for

962
00:45:09,984 --> 00:45:11,504
Speaker 4: See how he deals with this all the time? Right,

963
00:45:11,504 --> 00:45:14,263
Speaker 4: Like why isn't this stuff from nineteen sixty five to classified?

964
00:45:14,584 --> 00:45:17,183
Speaker 4: Because the government in nineteen sixty five that is still

965
00:45:17,183 --> 00:45:18,783
Speaker 4: the government today and they're going to take it out

966
00:45:18,824 --> 00:45:22,143
Speaker 4: on their great grandkid that their great grandpa were for CIA.

967
00:45:22,743 --> 00:45:25,744
Speaker 3: One of the great examples of this we mentioned it before,

968
00:45:25,864 --> 00:45:28,663
Speaker 3: is in the Kennedy papers and things that were still classified.

969
00:45:28,984 --> 00:45:32,784
Speaker 3: And one of the things that was classified isn't now

970
00:45:33,344 --> 00:45:37,384
Speaker 3: is that the president of Mexico personally gave us permission

971
00:45:37,504 --> 00:45:42,383
Speaker 3: against Mexican law to bug the Soviet embassy, and the

972
00:45:42,384 --> 00:45:45,584
Speaker 3: Soviet embassy was telephoning with Lee Harvey Oswald. It is

973
00:45:45,623 --> 00:45:47,383
Speaker 3: how we knew he was there, and then we knew

974
00:45:47,384 --> 00:45:50,824
Speaker 3: that they were talking. But the President, we the CIA

975
00:45:51,183 --> 00:45:55,344
Speaker 3: gave the President of Mexico our word that we would

976
00:45:55,464 --> 00:45:59,024
Speaker 3: never to classify this because this guy, this man's legacy

977
00:45:59,064 --> 00:46:02,183
Speaker 3: is the President of Mexico is breaking president Mexican law

978
00:46:02,263 --> 00:46:03,143
Speaker 3: to help us.

979
00:46:03,663 --> 00:46:06,223
Speaker 2: Vince has also written about Cold War Miami, which of

980
00:46:06,223 --> 00:46:09,544
Speaker 2: course ties into Kennedy Cuba, all this type of things.

981
00:46:10,024 --> 00:46:11,943
Speaker 2: Can you give us a little bit of background on.

982
00:46:11,864 --> 00:46:13,663
Speaker 4: That one, Well, it's my hometown is one of the

983
00:46:13,703 --> 00:46:16,664
Speaker 4: reasons I researched it. Growing up, a buddy of mine

984
00:46:17,024 --> 00:46:21,183
Speaker 4: had a fascinating background. His grandfather was the head of

985
00:46:21,263 --> 00:46:25,024
Speaker 4: the Cuban Naval Academy under Bautista. So he's a commandant

986
00:46:25,064 --> 00:46:28,703
Speaker 4: in the naval Academy and actually left Cuba twice. He

987
00:46:28,783 --> 00:46:32,303
Speaker 4: left Cuba because Bautista was essentially hounding him to the

988
00:46:32,304 --> 00:46:34,823
Speaker 4: point of going to prison, and then when Castro took power,

989
00:46:34,864 --> 00:46:37,544
Speaker 4: he went back because he thought Castro coming to power

990
00:46:37,544 --> 00:46:40,144
Speaker 4: would actually be a great thing and then said, WHOA

991
00:46:40,183 --> 00:46:42,784
Speaker 4: never mind, and then left again and settled in Miami

992
00:46:42,944 --> 00:46:46,304
Speaker 4: with his kids, and one of his kids married actually

993
00:46:46,304 --> 00:46:49,904
Speaker 4: someone from Operation Patro Penn, which was an operation to

994
00:46:49,944 --> 00:46:52,784
Speaker 4: get unaccompanied minors over to the United States out of Cuba,

995
00:46:53,263 --> 00:46:56,064
Speaker 4: and their offspring was my friend. And so we grew

996
00:46:56,143 --> 00:46:58,944
Speaker 4: up three blocks from each other, and when all the

997
00:46:58,944 --> 00:47:01,743
Speaker 4: same schools, liked all the same sports, updated some of

998
00:47:01,783 --> 00:47:03,903
Speaker 4: the same people, and so our upbringing all the way

999
00:47:03,944 --> 00:47:06,903
Speaker 4: up through college was identical, but we viewed it from

1000
00:47:07,064 --> 00:47:11,024
Speaker 4: very different perspectives. He was a first generation of America and

1001
00:47:11,064 --> 00:47:14,623
Speaker 4: first born in America, and I'm like sixteenth generation, like

1002
00:47:14,663 --> 00:47:16,864
Speaker 4: the first of my family came over in sixteen thirty.

1003
00:47:17,024 --> 00:47:19,223
Speaker 4: But we had all the same experiences growing up in

1004
00:47:19,223 --> 00:47:22,424
Speaker 4: this town, but we really understood them and experienced them

1005
00:47:22,464 --> 00:47:24,823
Speaker 4: in very different ways because of our background. And so

1006
00:47:24,904 --> 00:47:27,423
Speaker 4: we're just talking about this, probably at a bar two

1007
00:47:27,424 --> 00:47:29,544
Speaker 4: in the morning when we were in college. Are like, a,

1008
00:47:29,663 --> 00:47:32,663
Speaker 4: we should there's so much interesting history in Miami. We

1009
00:47:32,663 --> 00:47:34,903
Speaker 4: should write a book about it one day, and we're like, ah,

1010
00:47:34,944 --> 00:47:36,743
Speaker 4: that's funny. We were both college students. We were going

1011
00:47:36,783 --> 00:47:38,823
Speaker 4: to think about that, And so I went on to

1012
00:47:38,904 --> 00:47:40,423
Speaker 4: do what I did, and eventually got to the point

1013
00:47:40,424 --> 00:47:42,223
Speaker 4: where I was in the Washington, DC area with a

1014
00:47:42,263 --> 00:47:44,944
Speaker 4: PhD and an intelligence historian, and he ended up in

1015
00:47:45,024 --> 00:47:48,303
Speaker 4: DC also working for the Pentagon as a liaison for

1016
00:47:48,344 --> 00:47:50,143
Speaker 4: the Coast Guard, and we're like, hey, we're both in

1017
00:47:50,143 --> 00:47:52,703
Speaker 4: the city. We've got time to kill this COVID y

1018
00:47:52,703 --> 00:47:55,623
Speaker 4: at the time. Let's revisit this book because I think

1019
00:47:55,663 --> 00:47:57,824
Speaker 4: we can actually write this now, And so the idea

1020
00:47:57,944 --> 00:48:00,704
Speaker 4: was to attack it from both angles, from the bottom

1021
00:48:00,824 --> 00:48:04,904
Speaker 4: up angle of kind of understanding the transformation of this city, Miami,

1022
00:48:05,464 --> 00:48:08,743
Speaker 4: from a perspective of the Cuban exiles themselves and how

1023
00:48:08,783 --> 00:48:12,263
Speaker 4: they're transforming the city, and how they're embracing the intelligence

1024
00:48:12,304 --> 00:48:15,504
Speaker 4: world because they're really coming over and being just sucked

1025
00:48:15,504 --> 00:48:17,663
Speaker 4: in by CIA. And then me tacking it from the

1026
00:48:17,703 --> 00:48:20,823
Speaker 4: top down and looking at the US government usage of

1027
00:48:20,864 --> 00:48:23,863
Speaker 4: this new army down in Miami and how they were

1028
00:48:23,904 --> 00:48:26,024
Speaker 4: going to fund it and some of the answers. Miami

1029
00:48:26,104 --> 00:48:28,343
Speaker 4: is the only city in America that can claim to

1030
00:48:28,464 --> 00:48:32,343
Speaker 4: be built because of money from CIA, and I'm not exaggerating.

1031
00:48:32,663 --> 00:48:35,783
Speaker 4: In the nineteen sixties, one third of Miami's economy came

1032
00:48:35,783 --> 00:48:38,944
Speaker 4: from the agency from CIA one third. The CIA was

1033
00:48:38,984 --> 00:48:42,104
Speaker 4: the third largest employer in the state of Florida during

1034
00:48:42,143 --> 00:48:44,864
Speaker 4: this time period. Any kind of how is that possible? Well,

1035
00:48:45,024 --> 00:48:47,743
Speaker 4: it's possible because there were hundreds of people working within

1036
00:48:47,743 --> 00:48:51,783
Speaker 4: the Miami station working for CIA on actual salary, right

1037
00:48:51,783 --> 00:48:54,823
Speaker 4: one hundred gs. Whatever's working at the Miami station, and

1038
00:48:54,904 --> 00:48:58,744
Speaker 4: they were controlling another fifteen thousand or so Cuban exiles

1039
00:48:58,743 --> 00:49:01,104
Speaker 4: who were on contract, and every single one of them

1040
00:49:01,143 --> 00:49:04,864
Speaker 4: needed houses and cars and furniture and groceries and kids

1041
00:49:04,904 --> 00:49:07,263
Speaker 4: going to school and school supplies and everything else. So

1042
00:49:07,464 --> 00:49:11,223
Speaker 4: millions upon millions upon hunters and millions of dollars were

1043
00:49:11,223 --> 00:49:14,504
Speaker 4: being funneled into Miami by CIA. And what this did

1044
00:49:14,623 --> 00:49:17,464
Speaker 4: was built a city that during World War Two in

1045
00:49:17,504 --> 00:49:20,664
Speaker 4: the nineteen fifties is a dinky, little tourist trap into

1046
00:49:20,743 --> 00:49:24,104
Speaker 4: one of the premier cities in America. And it's because

1047
00:49:24,143 --> 00:49:27,664
Speaker 4: of national security and because of intelligence, and now Miami

1048
00:49:27,703 --> 00:49:30,424
Speaker 4: is considered jokingly the capital of Latin America is all

1049
00:49:30,504 --> 00:49:33,263
Speaker 4: the trade that goes through there. Washington, DC has more

1050
00:49:33,304 --> 00:49:36,064
Speaker 4: spies per capita than inner city in the world. Miami

1051
00:49:36,064 --> 00:49:38,303
Speaker 4: at one point was a close second, just because the

1052
00:49:38,663 --> 00:49:41,223
Speaker 4: CIA was doing and because of what human intelligence was doing,

1053
00:49:41,223 --> 00:49:43,544
Speaker 4: and then later when the Soviets got involved, and then

1054
00:49:43,544 --> 00:49:47,183
Speaker 4: now the Russians. Today it might actually be more because

1055
00:49:47,263 --> 00:49:49,503
Speaker 4: today Miami is so much more of an international city

1056
00:49:49,504 --> 00:49:51,544
Speaker 4: than ever was before. You've got the Russians that are

1057
00:49:51,544 --> 00:49:54,544
Speaker 4: there in Sunny Isles, which is called Little Moscow. You've

1058
00:49:54,544 --> 00:49:55,984
Speaker 4: got the Chinese that are there.

1059
00:49:55,904 --> 00:49:56,463
Speaker 2: In mar A Lago.

1060
00:49:56,504 --> 00:49:58,143
Speaker 4: There's a lot of in Marla, so mar A Lago

1061
00:49:58,223 --> 00:50:01,064
Speaker 4: is a little north, but Sunny Isles is actually an

1062
00:50:01,143 --> 00:50:03,823
Speaker 4: area where there are tons and tons of Russians who

1063
00:50:03,824 --> 00:50:06,744
Speaker 4: live in properties owned not only by the current president

1064
00:50:06,824 --> 00:50:10,223
Speaker 4: but also by others. And that's where Iran the real

1065
00:50:10,223 --> 00:50:13,343
Speaker 4: anchor baby situation is taking place, because these oligarchs will

1066
00:50:13,344 --> 00:50:16,464
Speaker 4: bring their wives or girlfriends over six months pregnant, and

1067
00:50:16,464 --> 00:50:18,223
Speaker 4: they'll sit there for a couple of weeks and months

1068
00:50:18,304 --> 00:50:20,623
Speaker 4: until they have kids, and then they'll bring the kids

1069
00:50:20,663 --> 00:50:23,343
Speaker 4: back to Russia with the US passport because they were

1070
00:50:23,344 --> 00:50:26,143
Speaker 4: born in the United States. And you don't have to

1071
00:50:26,143 --> 00:50:28,703
Speaker 4: think about twenty years from now how problematic that might

1072
00:50:28,743 --> 00:50:32,143
Speaker 4: be if they've been sitting inside Russia, sons of a

1073
00:50:32,304 --> 00:50:35,303
Speaker 4: Russian millionaire with a US passport. You don't have to

1074
00:50:35,584 --> 00:50:38,504
Speaker 4: know a lot about intelligence work to understand that getting

1075
00:50:38,544 --> 00:50:41,863
Speaker 4: a passport is magic when it comes to being in

1076
00:50:41,904 --> 00:50:46,383
Speaker 4: illegal or being undercover, because that gives you so much legitimacy,

1077
00:50:46,623 --> 00:50:48,584
Speaker 4: you know, if you're an American citizen in this case.

1078
00:50:48,984 --> 00:50:51,263
Speaker 4: So that's a real issue. And so one of the

1079
00:50:51,263 --> 00:50:54,104
Speaker 4: things that we trace was essentially the history of CIA

1080
00:50:54,263 --> 00:50:57,783
Speaker 4: and it goes from one person literally there was one

1081
00:50:57,824 --> 00:51:01,263
Speaker 4: person who ran the CIA quote unquote office in Miami

1082
00:51:01,584 --> 00:51:04,944
Speaker 4: at the time of the Cuban Revolution, to being the

1083
00:51:05,104 --> 00:51:08,544
Speaker 4: largest in the nineteen sixties CIA station in the world

1084
00:51:08,944 --> 00:51:11,584
Speaker 4: other than Yangley, Virginia. And you can kind of call

1085
00:51:11,584 --> 00:51:13,663
Speaker 4: it a station in business. It was in Miami, but

1086
00:51:13,824 --> 00:51:17,344
Speaker 4: largest CI facility in the world other than in Langley, Virginia,

1087
00:51:17,384 --> 00:51:20,824
Speaker 4: Bigger than Moscow station, bigger than Beijing station, bigger than Berlin,

1088
00:51:21,223 --> 00:51:23,943
Speaker 4: and that's extraordinary. It's in a US city. And we'd

1089
00:51:24,024 --> 00:51:26,304
Speaker 4: run all the way up to modern day, because today

1090
00:51:26,344 --> 00:51:29,183
Speaker 4: there's still people being arrested. We got to the point

1091
00:51:29,183 --> 00:51:30,944
Speaker 4: where we had to cut it off at one point

1092
00:51:31,263 --> 00:51:33,584
Speaker 4: because as we're going through the editing process, which is

1093
00:51:33,703 --> 00:51:36,984
Speaker 4: a pain in the ass. As we're editing and copy editing,

1094
00:51:37,344 --> 00:51:39,823
Speaker 4: there would be stories like once every couple of weeks

1095
00:51:39,864 --> 00:51:42,664
Speaker 4: about some other spook who was arrested in Miami working

1096
00:51:42,663 --> 00:51:44,743
Speaker 4: for the Cubans or for the Venezuelans or something, and

1097
00:51:44,864 --> 00:51:48,984
Speaker 4: like or one story about former Blackwater guy who tried

1098
00:51:49,024 --> 00:51:51,464
Speaker 4: to foment to coup in Venezuela with a bunch of

1099
00:51:51,464 --> 00:51:54,904
Speaker 4: ex Special Forces, or there was an attempted suspect.

1100
00:51:54,944 --> 00:51:55,743
Speaker 2: There'll be more of those.

1101
00:51:56,064 --> 00:51:58,104
Speaker 4: Yeah, it just keeps happening. There was a coup attempt

1102
00:51:58,143 --> 00:52:00,223
Speaker 4: in Haiti where the president was killed, and I'm like

1103
00:52:00,504 --> 00:52:03,183
Speaker 4: and I texted my co author and I'm like, one

1104
00:52:03,263 --> 00:52:06,383
Speaker 4: hundred bucks says this was planned in Miami, and he said,

1105
00:52:06,384 --> 00:52:08,104
Speaker 4: I'm not taking that bet. It's a loser bet. And

1106
00:52:08,104 --> 00:52:10,104
Speaker 4: then within two days it was like planning done in

1107
00:52:10,143 --> 00:52:12,703
Speaker 4: Brickle Avenue and Miami and yep, there it is. And

1108
00:52:12,703 --> 00:52:14,143
Speaker 4: so we're like, look, we have to cut this off.

1109
00:52:14,183 --> 00:52:16,704
Speaker 4: And it ended up being Bolsonaro was our cutoff where

1110
00:52:17,223 --> 00:52:20,223
Speaker 4: if you remember when he escaped to Florida, and so

1111
00:52:20,623 --> 00:52:23,464
Speaker 4: we perused social media and every single one from the

1112
00:52:23,544 --> 00:52:26,024
Speaker 4: Cuban government to left these all over the place, and

1113
00:52:26,024 --> 00:52:29,104
Speaker 4: even others were like, of course, Bolsonara runs off to Miami.

1114
00:52:29,304 --> 00:52:31,264
Speaker 4: He had gone to Orlando and actually was at disney

1115
00:52:31,344 --> 00:52:33,863
Speaker 4: World and at Epcot. But Miami got blamed for it

1116
00:52:33,904 --> 00:52:36,984
Speaker 4: because that was that was the reputation that Miami deserved

1117
00:52:37,024 --> 00:52:39,024
Speaker 4: at that point of being the place where you go.

1118
00:52:39,104 --> 00:52:41,384
Speaker 4: We equate it to most size Ley Cantina. It is

1119
00:52:41,424 --> 00:52:44,744
Speaker 4: the American version of the Cantina from Star Wars, where

1120
00:52:45,584 --> 00:52:48,223
Speaker 4: it's a hive of scum and villainy. And if you

1121
00:52:48,263 --> 00:52:50,384
Speaker 4: need to hire somebody that off somebody that you can

1122
00:52:50,424 --> 00:52:51,623
Speaker 4: go to Miami to do it. If you need to

1123
00:52:51,623 --> 00:52:53,743
Speaker 4: overthrow a country, you've got the right people. You could

1124
00:52:53,783 --> 00:52:55,943
Speaker 4: offer amount of money to get anything done.

1125
00:52:56,024 --> 00:52:58,824
Speaker 3: There is there a museum in Miami, Spy Museum.

1126
00:52:59,584 --> 00:53:03,304
Speaker 4: So there is a Miami Military Museum. Actually that's really interesting.

1127
00:53:03,304 --> 00:53:06,584
Speaker 4: So it actually is in the old jam Wave headquarters.

1128
00:53:06,783 --> 00:53:09,183
Speaker 4: So they've taken over the old CIA station headquarters and

1129
00:53:09,183 --> 00:53:12,143
Speaker 4: they built the Miami Military Museum down there. There's one

1130
00:53:12,223 --> 00:53:14,584
Speaker 4: artifact that's by itself worth millions of dollars, which is

1131
00:53:14,623 --> 00:53:17,743
Speaker 4: the Trotsky Ias, the Iceacks that killed Trotsky. It's the

1132
00:53:17,824 --> 00:53:20,223
Speaker 4: real one. There's a letter from George Washington that the

1133
00:53:20,263 --> 00:53:23,663
Speaker 4: Spy Museum has that creates the first American intelligence organization.

1134
00:53:24,183 --> 00:53:26,584
Speaker 3: You can go to Mexico City to coate. You can

1135
00:53:26,623 --> 00:53:29,944
Speaker 3: go into the very room where Trotsky there's still blood

1136
00:53:29,944 --> 00:53:32,663
Speaker 3: on their rug. Yes, yeah, it was the old Joe

1137
00:53:32,703 --> 00:53:34,823
Speaker 3: because it was the last words Trotsky ever heard you.

1138
00:53:35,064 --> 00:53:36,183
Speaker 3: If I pick your brain.

1139
00:53:36,183 --> 00:53:39,183
Speaker 4: Oh that's a good one. I have to if I

1140
00:53:39,223 --> 00:53:40,904
Speaker 4: was still giving tours of this five m exam I

1141
00:53:40,944 --> 00:53:42,263
Speaker 4: would have to steal that one again.

1142
00:53:42,344 --> 00:53:45,263
Speaker 2: Vince. Thank you know we love reading what you're putting out.

1143
00:53:45,504 --> 00:53:47,303
Speaker 2: We'd like to be able to check in with you

1144
00:53:47,344 --> 00:53:48,984
Speaker 2: from time to time on some of these things.

1145
00:53:49,223 --> 00:53:51,503
Speaker 4: Yeah. Absolutely, And I have a book in the works

1146
00:53:51,544 --> 00:53:53,904
Speaker 4: right now that comes out in the spring. John, you

1147
00:53:53,984 --> 00:53:55,904
Speaker 4: are so graciously talk to me about it, But I

1148
00:53:55,904 --> 00:53:59,263
Speaker 4: can't really get into the topics specifically, but I can

1149
00:53:59,304 --> 00:54:01,464
Speaker 4: say it's the Soviet Union in the eighties is the

1150
00:54:01,544 --> 00:54:04,143
Speaker 4: setting for all this. So John was a perfect person

1151
00:54:04,143 --> 00:54:06,424
Speaker 4: to have a conversation with about this. But in the

1152
00:54:06,504 --> 00:54:09,944
Speaker 4: springtime there'll be yet another book. Because this fight, what

1153
00:54:10,024 --> 00:54:12,223
Speaker 4: I tell myself, I just can't stop doing it.

1154
00:54:12,464 --> 00:54:12,983
Speaker 2: Thanks again.

1155
00:54:17,064 --> 00:54:22,104
Speaker 1: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'Shea, John Ceipher,

1156
00:54:22,424 --> 00:54:26,784
Speaker 1: and Jonathan Stern. The associate producer is Rachel Harner Mission

1157
00:54:26,824 --> 00:54:30,824
Speaker 1: Implausible is a production of honorable mention and abominable pictures

1158
00:54:30,904 --> 00:54:32,263
Speaker 1: for iHeart Podcasts.