1 00:00:01,680 --> 00:00:08,799 Speaker 1: Colz Media. Hey, everybody, Robert Evans here and this is 2 00:00:09,000 --> 00:00:13,440 Speaker 1: it could happen here a podcast about well what's happening. 3 00:00:13,880 --> 00:00:16,400 Speaker 1: And on March thirtieth, twenty twenty six, which is the 4 00:00:16,520 --> 00:00:19,400 Speaker 1: day that I started sitting down to write the episode 5 00:00:19,400 --> 00:00:22,360 Speaker 1: that you're listening to right now, Reuter's published an article 6 00:00:22,360 --> 00:00:25,840 Speaker 1: announcing the arrival of another twenty five hundred United States 7 00:00:25,880 --> 00:00:28,920 Speaker 1: marines in the Middle East as the Trump administration quote 8 00:00:29,120 --> 00:00:34,080 Speaker 1: considers options for Iran operations. As you all know, Operation 9 00:00:34,240 --> 00:00:37,159 Speaker 1: Epic Fury. It's not going to call it, but its 10 00:00:37,240 --> 00:00:39,479 Speaker 1: name was launched a little over a month ago with 11 00:00:39,600 --> 00:00:44,000 Speaker 1: the administration insists and expected duration of four to six weeks, 12 00:00:44,600 --> 00:00:47,360 Speaker 1: and we're coming up to the end of that timeline. 13 00:00:47,400 --> 00:00:50,159 Speaker 1: Trump announced the day I record this March thirty first, 14 00:00:50,680 --> 00:00:54,160 Speaker 1: that he's expecting combat operations to end in two weeks 15 00:00:54,240 --> 00:00:58,440 Speaker 1: or less. So we'll see what happens tomorrow. There's supposed 16 00:00:58,440 --> 00:01:01,760 Speaker 1: to be a speech by President on Iran, so we'll 17 00:01:01,800 --> 00:01:06,240 Speaker 1: know more then, But relevant reporting indicates the Trump administration 18 00:01:06,400 --> 00:01:09,440 Speaker 1: is at least seriously weighing the feasibility of sending marines 19 00:01:09,480 --> 00:01:13,160 Speaker 1: in to take and hold Iranian territory, namely Karg Island 20 00:01:13,200 --> 00:01:16,360 Speaker 1: and potentially other islands in the Strait of Hormos, most 21 00:01:16,400 --> 00:01:19,880 Speaker 1: of which are inhabited and all of which are heavily defended. 22 00:01:20,440 --> 00:01:22,640 Speaker 1: If they go through with this, we might be about 23 00:01:22,640 --> 00:01:25,080 Speaker 1: to watch in real time one of the most consequential 24 00:01:25,120 --> 00:01:28,880 Speaker 1: disasters in military history, a modern day Gallipoli, in which 25 00:01:29,000 --> 00:01:33,280 Speaker 1: hundreds or thousands of American soldiers and billions in materiel 26 00:01:33,600 --> 00:01:37,640 Speaker 1: get chewed up in an unsustainable and unwinnable war of attrition. 27 00:01:38,400 --> 00:01:40,920 Speaker 1: There's no real way for the average American to know 28 00:01:40,959 --> 00:01:43,680 Speaker 1: what kind of stockpile our military maintains of the most 29 00:01:43,680 --> 00:01:47,480 Speaker 1: advanced munitions. We're talking precision guided missiles like the Tomahawk 30 00:01:47,480 --> 00:01:50,480 Speaker 1: cruise missile, but also the interceptor missiles used by our 31 00:01:50,520 --> 00:01:54,960 Speaker 1: various missile batteries. Estimates suggests the US has already expended 32 00:01:55,000 --> 00:01:58,360 Speaker 1: about one thousand Tomahawks in a month of combat operations, 33 00:01:58,360 --> 00:02:00,880 Speaker 1: which would be around a third, maybe a little less, 34 00:02:00,960 --> 00:02:04,560 Speaker 1: of the total stockpile. That doesn't sound so bad until 35 00:02:04,560 --> 00:02:08,000 Speaker 1: you realize that our present stockpile of Tomahawks was built 36 00:02:08,080 --> 00:02:10,920 Speaker 1: up over more than a decade. We're only capable of 37 00:02:11,000 --> 00:02:14,200 Speaker 1: making about one hundred and fifty a year at present levels, 38 00:02:14,400 --> 00:02:17,520 Speaker 1: which means our military already burned through around seven years 39 00:02:17,560 --> 00:02:20,640 Speaker 1: worth of these things, maybe more, because in twenty twenty five, 40 00:02:20,720 --> 00:02:24,680 Speaker 1: the US to finish budget included something like fifty six Tomahawks, 41 00:02:24,720 --> 00:02:27,960 Speaker 1: even though our largely ineffectual war against the Huthies had 42 00:02:27,960 --> 00:02:31,239 Speaker 1: already depleted the stockpile. This is a story that you'll 43 00:02:31,240 --> 00:02:33,880 Speaker 1: hear over and over again in this episode. The US 44 00:02:33,960 --> 00:02:37,640 Speaker 1: military is actually quite bad at knowing and asking for 45 00:02:37,840 --> 00:02:40,960 Speaker 1: what it will need, and even worse at predicting accurately 46 00:02:41,040 --> 00:02:43,920 Speaker 1: what it's going to need in the immediate future. Each 47 00:02:44,000 --> 00:02:47,480 Speaker 1: Tomahawk cost him around three point six million dollars to produce, 48 00:02:47,600 --> 00:02:50,840 Speaker 1: and these are the only long range offensive weapons mounted 49 00:02:50,840 --> 00:02:54,760 Speaker 1: by our naval destroyers, per source interviewed by Military Watch 50 00:02:54,800 --> 00:02:58,600 Speaker 1: magazine quote without intervention, the Pentagon may be left out 51 00:02:58,600 --> 00:03:02,519 Speaker 1: of ammunition. Now, Tomahawks aren't the only things the US 52 00:03:02,560 --> 00:03:06,239 Speaker 1: military is low on. For that same article, inventories of 53 00:03:06,280 --> 00:03:09,720 Speaker 1: anti ballistic missiles and GBU fifty seven bunker buster bombs 54 00:03:09,720 --> 00:03:12,799 Speaker 1: are estimated to have been almost totally spent, while being 55 00:03:12,840 --> 00:03:17,000 Speaker 1: significantly more costly to replace. We just don't have granular 56 00:03:17,080 --> 00:03:20,280 Speaker 1: data on the size of US interceptor missile stockpiles or 57 00:03:20,360 --> 00:03:23,240 Speaker 1: supply of stuff like Patriot missiles. But we do have 58 00:03:23,280 --> 00:03:26,440 Speaker 1: a pretty good understanding of how badly our regional allies 59 00:03:26,480 --> 00:03:29,959 Speaker 1: have depleted their stockpiles of these defensive tools. Bahrain is 60 00:03:30,080 --> 00:03:33,160 Speaker 1: estimated to have expended eighty seven percent of their Patriot missiles, 61 00:03:33,320 --> 00:03:36,320 Speaker 1: the UAE and Kuwait are up to seventy five percent, 62 00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:40,600 Speaker 1: and Qatar is at like forty percent. Experts estimate that 63 00:03:40,640 --> 00:03:43,880 Speaker 1: Iran has gone through or lost via airstrike roughly a 64 00:03:43,920 --> 00:03:48,080 Speaker 1: third of their ballistic missile stockpile. This may or may 65 00:03:48,120 --> 00:03:50,600 Speaker 1: not be accurate, and if it's inaccurate, it may or 66 00:03:50,640 --> 00:03:54,280 Speaker 1: may not be inaccurate in either direction. Our intel and 67 00:03:54,560 --> 00:03:57,640 Speaker 1: Israel's intel is often very spotty when it comes to 68 00:03:57,640 --> 00:04:00,320 Speaker 1: stuff like this. A good illustration of this would be 69 00:04:00,360 --> 00:04:04,080 Speaker 1: the fact that on March twentieth, Iran fired two ICBMs 70 00:04:04,120 --> 00:04:07,320 Speaker 1: at Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean that 71 00:04:07,440 --> 00:04:11,240 Speaker 1: hosts a joint US UK air and naval base. Neither 72 00:04:11,320 --> 00:04:14,320 Speaker 1: missile did any damage, but that wasn't really the point. 73 00:04:14,600 --> 00:04:16,960 Speaker 1: The launch of these missiles was a message from the 74 00:04:16,960 --> 00:04:20,920 Speaker 1: Iranian regime to the US one. Previously, Iran had limited 75 00:04:20,960 --> 00:04:23,880 Speaker 1: itself to only striking targets within twelve hundred and forty 76 00:04:23,920 --> 00:04:27,440 Speaker 1: miles of its own borders with ballistic missiles, Diego Garcia 77 00:04:27,480 --> 00:04:31,560 Speaker 1: is roughly twenty three hundred miles away. Many US analysts 78 00:04:31,600 --> 00:04:34,120 Speaker 1: had treated for years twelve hundred and forty miles as 79 00:04:34,120 --> 00:04:37,839 Speaker 1: if it represented an actual hard limit on Iran's striking 80 00:04:37,880 --> 00:04:41,120 Speaker 1: capability based on what their missiles could reach, as opposed 81 00:04:41,160 --> 00:04:43,760 Speaker 1: to what it really was, which is a political decision 82 00:04:43,839 --> 00:04:46,800 Speaker 1: made by Iranian leaders to limit the scope of conflicts. 83 00:04:47,400 --> 00:04:50,640 Speaker 1: When the Trump administration launched an unprovoked series of joint 84 00:04:50,680 --> 00:04:54,200 Speaker 1: strikes on Iran, killing a supreme leader in many senior officials, 85 00:04:54,560 --> 00:04:57,479 Speaker 1: we violated one of the unstated agreements that had held 86 00:04:57,520 --> 00:05:01,800 Speaker 1: for over decades of conflict. President's supporters and major hawks 87 00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:04,920 Speaker 1: in Iran argued that these self imposed limits were allowing 88 00:05:04,920 --> 00:05:09,480 Speaker 1: Iran's leadership to support terrorism abroad with impunity. The strike 89 00:05:09,520 --> 00:05:12,839 Speaker 1: on Diego Garcia proved that military analysts had been wrong 90 00:05:12,880 --> 00:05:15,400 Speaker 1: about the top range of Iran's best ballistic missiles, but 91 00:05:15,440 --> 00:05:18,560 Speaker 1: it also served as a statement from Iran's new leaders, 92 00:05:18,880 --> 00:05:21,160 Speaker 1: You've taken the gloves off and thrown out the rule book. 93 00:05:21,520 --> 00:05:26,080 Speaker 1: Now we have two. Hudson Institute's senior fellow, Khan Kosopoglu, 94 00:05:26,200 --> 00:05:29,920 Speaker 1: published an analysis that made this same basic argument. Quote 95 00:05:30,040 --> 00:05:33,240 Speaker 1: A strike profile extending into the Indian Ocean demonstrates not 96 00:05:33,360 --> 00:05:37,800 Speaker 1: merely extended range, but Iran's delivered abandonment of strategic ambiguity. 97 00:05:37,960 --> 00:05:40,920 Speaker 1: Iran is no longer signaling restraint. It is signaling reach, 98 00:05:41,040 --> 00:05:44,719 Speaker 1: and doing so under live war fighting conditions. It also 99 00:05:44,880 --> 00:05:49,120 Speaker 1: more subtly signaled something else. US planners didn't know as 100 00:05:49,200 --> 00:05:52,359 Speaker 1: much as they thought they did about Iran's capabilities. This 101 00:05:52,440 --> 00:05:55,480 Speaker 1: has been evident since the war began, despite Trump's claims 102 00:05:55,520 --> 00:05:59,400 Speaker 1: to have totally annihilated Iran's offensive capability. On March twenty seventh, 103 00:05:59,440 --> 00:06:02,279 Speaker 1: that combined missile and drone attack hit Prince Sultan Air 104 00:06:02,320 --> 00:06:05,839 Speaker 1: Base in Saudi Arabia, injuring more than ten US soldiers, 105 00:06:06,000 --> 00:06:10,440 Speaker 1: too seriously in damaging several aircraft. One of these, which 106 00:06:10,480 --> 00:06:13,200 Speaker 1: we have pictures of, was an E three a wax 107 00:06:13,360 --> 00:06:16,400 Speaker 1: aka the planes with those huge radar dishes on top, 108 00:06:16,839 --> 00:06:19,640 Speaker 1: and at least one a Wax was destroyed. The Air 109 00:06:19,680 --> 00:06:22,559 Speaker 1: Force only has sixteen of these, and only about half 110 00:06:22,600 --> 00:06:25,800 Speaker 1: our mission capable at any given time. The Army also 111 00:06:25,839 --> 00:06:28,320 Speaker 1: maintains a fleet of E three's. I found an article 112 00:06:28,320 --> 00:06:30,880 Speaker 1: in Air and Space Forces magazine by Chris Gordon and 113 00:06:30,920 --> 00:06:34,040 Speaker 1: Stephen Lassi, who interviewed Heather Penny. She's a former F 114 00:06:34,120 --> 00:06:36,839 Speaker 1: sixteen pilot and current director of the Air Force Academy's 115 00:06:36,880 --> 00:06:41,120 Speaker 1: Institute for Aerospace Studies. Penny said, quote, the loss of 116 00:06:41,160 --> 00:06:44,200 Speaker 1: this E three is incredibly problematic, given how crucial these 117 00:06:44,240 --> 00:06:49,280 Speaker 1: battle managers are to everything from airspace deconfliction, aircraft deconfliction, targeting, 118 00:06:49,279 --> 00:06:52,000 Speaker 1: and providing other lethal effects that the entire force needs 119 00:06:52,000 --> 00:06:56,640 Speaker 1: for the battlespace. E three's provide an irreplaceable service on 120 00:06:56,720 --> 00:06:59,680 Speaker 1: the battlefield. They act as both airborne radar stations and 121 00:06:59,720 --> 00:07:02,920 Speaker 1: air traffic control towers, spotting threats up to two hundred 122 00:07:02,960 --> 00:07:06,000 Speaker 1: and fifty miles away, and providing crucial early warning to 123 00:07:06,080 --> 00:07:11,440 Speaker 1: forces in combat about incoming threats, particularly missiles and drones, drones, 124 00:07:11,440 --> 00:07:14,840 Speaker 1: really about anything else. In other words, the E three 125 00:07:14,920 --> 00:07:18,040 Speaker 1: is really really useful if you're, say, planning to have 126 00:07:18,160 --> 00:07:21,040 Speaker 1: troops land on islands in a narrow strait surrounded by 127 00:07:21,080 --> 00:07:24,600 Speaker 1: hostile forces who can shoot at you from the mainland. Now, 128 00:07:24,680 --> 00:07:28,720 Speaker 1: the a wax themselves aren't technically irreplaceable, but they aren't 129 00:07:28,760 --> 00:07:32,520 Speaker 1: easy to replace, especially on short notice. Each one costs 130 00:07:32,520 --> 00:07:35,000 Speaker 1: between seven hundred million and a billion dollars, and we 131 00:07:35,040 --> 00:07:38,160 Speaker 1: don't like, we don't like make them anymore. A wax 132 00:07:38,200 --> 00:07:41,200 Speaker 1: are old. The average age of our remaining fleet is 133 00:07:41,280 --> 00:07:45,120 Speaker 1: forty five per Irrelevant Article and Task and Purpose magazine. 134 00:07:45,320 --> 00:07:48,080 Speaker 1: Nobody makes spare parts for the E three's TF thirty 135 00:07:48,120 --> 00:07:50,960 Speaker 1: three engines anymore, which takes a toll on maintenance. In 136 00:07:51,000 --> 00:07:53,400 Speaker 1: twenty twenty two, General Mark Kelly, then the head of 137 00:07:53,400 --> 00:07:56,720 Speaker 1: Air Combat Command, told reporters we basically have thirty one 138 00:07:56,720 --> 00:07:59,720 Speaker 1: airplanes in hospice care, the most expensive care there is, 139 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:02,160 Speaker 1: and we need to get into the maternity business and 140 00:08:02,200 --> 00:08:05,840 Speaker 1: out of hospices. That's a weird metaphor for a plane 141 00:08:05,880 --> 00:08:08,560 Speaker 1: designed to help you fight wars. But we'll move past 142 00:08:08,600 --> 00:08:23,360 Speaker 1: that and into some ads and we're back. So when 143 00:08:23,400 --> 00:08:25,760 Speaker 1: we left off, i'd mentioned how in twenty twenty two, 144 00:08:25,800 --> 00:08:28,320 Speaker 1: Mark Kelly, then the head of Air Combat Command, was like, 145 00:08:28,960 --> 00:08:31,240 Speaker 1: we've only got about thirty one of these a wax 146 00:08:31,320 --> 00:08:33,240 Speaker 1: and they're at hospice care, and we need to like 147 00:08:33,480 --> 00:08:37,160 Speaker 1: make some new aax that are modern and aren't falling 148 00:08:37,160 --> 00:08:41,239 Speaker 1: apart and have engines being produced. Unfortunately for our military, 149 00:08:41,320 --> 00:08:45,760 Speaker 1: but fortunately for not our military. The Pentagon voted against 150 00:08:45,760 --> 00:08:49,720 Speaker 1: getting into the maternity business last year. The E seven Wedgetail, 151 00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:53,079 Speaker 1: which is in service currently in the Royal Australian Air Force, 152 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:55,400 Speaker 1: was meant to replace the E three's for the US 153 00:08:55,520 --> 00:08:58,079 Speaker 1: Air Force, and the first of twenty six new craft 154 00:08:58,080 --> 00:09:00,600 Speaker 1: were supposed to arrive from Boeing in twenty two seven, 155 00:09:00,880 --> 00:09:04,280 Speaker 1: but the project was killed last summer. Defense Secretary Pete 156 00:09:04,320 --> 00:09:07,760 Speaker 1: Hegseth argued it was quote sort of late, more expensive 157 00:09:07,800 --> 00:09:11,560 Speaker 1: and gold plated. Plus Pete warned it might not survive 158 00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:14,920 Speaker 1: a war with China. Hegg Seth's plan was to just 159 00:09:15,040 --> 00:09:18,440 Speaker 1: have the military use satellites for all their airborne tracking needs, 160 00:09:18,679 --> 00:09:20,680 Speaker 1: and if we had to have, you know, a plane 161 00:09:20,720 --> 00:09:22,959 Speaker 1: doing some of that, we could just have Navy E 162 00:09:23,040 --> 00:09:26,840 Speaker 1: two D Hawkeyes as a temporary replacement. Now, most of 163 00:09:26,840 --> 00:09:29,079 Speaker 1: my listeners are not Air Force generals, and either of 164 00:09:29,080 --> 00:09:32,280 Speaker 1: them I but I've read stuff guys who know that 165 00:09:32,400 --> 00:09:34,760 Speaker 1: kind of thing have written, and I'll tell you this, 166 00:09:35,160 --> 00:09:38,079 Speaker 1: it's a bad fucking idea, or it's widely agreed by 167 00:09:38,120 --> 00:09:41,040 Speaker 1: the experts to be a bad fucking idea. For one thing, 168 00:09:41,440 --> 00:09:43,480 Speaker 1: the East seven, which is what we would have been 169 00:09:43,520 --> 00:09:46,679 Speaker 1: replacing our E threes with, has already proven itself in combat. 170 00:09:47,040 --> 00:09:49,120 Speaker 1: The AUSSI sent Theirs over to a rock during the 171 00:09:49,120 --> 00:09:51,840 Speaker 1: fighting against ISIS, and per task and purpose, it quote 172 00:09:52,080 --> 00:09:54,720 Speaker 1: was so reliable that whenever American F twenty two fighters 173 00:09:54,720 --> 00:09:57,439 Speaker 1: were in theater, the US Air Force asked the OSSIS 174 00:09:57,480 --> 00:10:01,760 Speaker 1: to support the US jets. Sixteen retired US Air Force 175 00:10:01,800 --> 00:10:04,480 Speaker 1: four star generals took the unprecedented step of writing a 176 00:10:04,559 --> 00:10:07,760 Speaker 1: letter to Congress and begging them to reverse Exseth's decision. 177 00:10:08,200 --> 00:10:11,840 Speaker 1: They're reasoning why boils down to this, satellites aren't ready 178 00:10:11,880 --> 00:10:15,120 Speaker 1: to track airborne targets, and the Hawkeye is too small 179 00:10:15,160 --> 00:10:19,120 Speaker 1: for the job. Congress ultimately reversed course, but it's uncertain when, 180 00:10:19,240 --> 00:10:22,880 Speaker 1: if ever new E seven's will arrive, certainly not in 181 00:10:22,920 --> 00:10:25,680 Speaker 1: time for whatever the Trump administration is going to do next. 182 00:10:26,040 --> 00:10:29,120 Speaker 1: In the meantime, the Air Force is down roughly ten 183 00:10:29,200 --> 00:10:32,720 Speaker 1: percent or more of its functional fleet of a wax, 184 00:10:33,000 --> 00:10:36,160 Speaker 1: and we don't even have boots on the ground anywhere. Now, 185 00:10:36,200 --> 00:10:38,520 Speaker 1: what I think happened here? What I think is behind 186 00:10:38,720 --> 00:10:41,120 Speaker 1: all of these bad decisions and this is not something 187 00:10:41,160 --> 00:10:44,079 Speaker 1: I can verify. This is opinion is that a wax 188 00:10:44,120 --> 00:10:46,800 Speaker 1: aren't sexy. They're not like a cool weapons system. They 189 00:10:46,800 --> 00:10:51,640 Speaker 1: don't kill people directly. They facilitate other soldiers and sailors 190 00:10:51,679 --> 00:10:55,640 Speaker 1: and airmen from killing people using other weapons systems. But 191 00:10:55,679 --> 00:10:58,480 Speaker 1: you can't threaten somebody with just an a whack. They're 192 00:10:58,520 --> 00:11:01,520 Speaker 1: not like scary. And I can't show one blowing something 193 00:11:01,600 --> 00:11:04,040 Speaker 1: up on the news because they don't do that. So 194 00:11:04,080 --> 00:11:06,079 Speaker 1: I don't think it was a priority for Hegseth or 195 00:11:06,080 --> 00:11:09,000 Speaker 1: anyone else in his administration, because they're all fucking twelve 196 00:11:09,080 --> 00:11:12,840 Speaker 1: year olds. Previous administrations and let me be fair here, 197 00:11:12,960 --> 00:11:15,679 Speaker 1: it's not like they were any more forward thinking. Had 198 00:11:15,760 --> 00:11:18,080 Speaker 1: kind of looked at our aging fleet and said, eh, 199 00:11:18,240 --> 00:11:20,360 Speaker 1: good enough. It's not like anyone we're fighting as a 200 00:11:20,400 --> 00:11:23,920 Speaker 1: better alternative. Right, who cares. It's the same kind of 201 00:11:23,960 --> 00:11:26,600 Speaker 1: story we just heard with the Tomawks. Right, what the 202 00:11:26,600 --> 00:11:29,400 Speaker 1: military was already doing was good enough to scrape by 203 00:11:29,480 --> 00:11:32,199 Speaker 1: in the conflicts it was already fighting, and nobody involved 204 00:11:32,200 --> 00:11:35,360 Speaker 1: in starting the next conflict was interested in making sure 205 00:11:35,440 --> 00:11:39,000 Speaker 1: that the military was prepared ahead of time. Now I 206 00:11:39,120 --> 00:11:42,440 Speaker 1: recognize all this talk about failures to produce war material 207 00:11:42,520 --> 00:11:45,359 Speaker 1: and sufficient quantities. May make it sound like I'm complaining 208 00:11:45,440 --> 00:11:48,360 Speaker 1: that our air force isn't buying enough weaponry and that 209 00:11:48,440 --> 00:11:51,280 Speaker 1: I'm urging us to spend more money producing arms and ammunitions, 210 00:11:51,280 --> 00:11:54,120 Speaker 1: and that is not my intent. I want exactly the opposite. 211 00:11:54,280 --> 00:11:56,559 Speaker 1: What I'm trying to do is to highlight how utterly 212 00:11:56,640 --> 00:12:00,560 Speaker 1: unprepared our administration is for the conflict they start, and 213 00:12:00,640 --> 00:12:03,800 Speaker 1: how that failure to prepare has made a major military 214 00:12:03,800 --> 00:12:08,200 Speaker 1: disaster for US forces, not just foreseeable, but likely if 215 00:12:08,320 --> 00:12:11,720 Speaker 1: the administration makes the decision to send in ground forces 216 00:12:11,880 --> 00:12:15,480 Speaker 1: or in some other way significantly escalate the pace of 217 00:12:15,480 --> 00:12:19,160 Speaker 1: our operations against Iran. Now, the mainstream media has done 218 00:12:19,200 --> 00:12:22,040 Speaker 1: an okay job of reporting on the ammunition shortages that 219 00:12:22,080 --> 00:12:23,839 Speaker 1: I've discussed, But what I don't think has been a 220 00:12:23,840 --> 00:12:26,839 Speaker 1: hammere at home enough is that both are expenditure of 221 00:12:26,840 --> 00:12:30,120 Speaker 1: advanced ammunitions and the loss of multiple aircraft due to 222 00:12:30,160 --> 00:12:33,600 Speaker 1: Iranian strikes are a kind of attrition, and they are 223 00:12:33,600 --> 00:12:36,440 Speaker 1: a really serious kind of attrition. Now, you may be 224 00:12:36,440 --> 00:12:38,560 Speaker 1: more familiar with a term attrition as it applies to 225 00:12:38,640 --> 00:12:41,920 Speaker 1: human casualties in a war or battle, but to an extent. 226 00:12:42,120 --> 00:12:45,559 Speaker 1: The attrition of interceptor missiles and hard to replace special 227 00:12:45,559 --> 00:12:48,000 Speaker 1: purpose vehicles like a wax does a lot more to 228 00:12:48,080 --> 00:12:51,920 Speaker 1: damage US war fighting capability than human losses. A good 229 00:12:51,920 --> 00:12:54,280 Speaker 1: example of this came in March sixth of this year, 230 00:12:54,440 --> 00:12:58,640 Speaker 1: after Ironstruck and PERCNN apparently destroyed the radar system for 231 00:12:58,679 --> 00:13:02,640 Speaker 1: a THAD missile battery in Jordan. BAD stands for Terminal 232 00:13:02,720 --> 00:13:07,079 Speaker 1: high Altitude Area Defense. These are our absolute best, most 233 00:13:07,080 --> 00:13:10,920 Speaker 1: effective anti missile defense systems. Each battery costs more than 234 00:13:10,960 --> 00:13:13,599 Speaker 1: a billion dollars, and each missile a fire costs like 235 00:13:13,720 --> 00:13:17,400 Speaker 1: twelve point six million dollars. These are part of why 236 00:13:17,440 --> 00:13:20,920 Speaker 1: you don't have healthcare. Now we know another series of 237 00:13:20,920 --> 00:13:24,720 Speaker 1: strikes in the UAE quote hit buildings housing similar radar 238 00:13:24,760 --> 00:13:27,800 Speaker 1: systems to the THAD battery in Jordan. It's unclear if 239 00:13:27,880 --> 00:13:30,960 Speaker 1: these were damaged or how badly they might have been damaged, 240 00:13:31,200 --> 00:13:33,280 Speaker 1: and it's going to remain unclear because the workings of 241 00:13:33,320 --> 00:13:37,080 Speaker 1: these systems are extremely classified. As of twenty twenty five, 242 00:13:37,160 --> 00:13:39,560 Speaker 1: the United States zones and operates a grand total of 243 00:13:39,679 --> 00:13:43,600 Speaker 1: eight THAD batteries, so at least one of eight is 244 00:13:43,679 --> 00:13:46,600 Speaker 1: now out of commission and two more may have suffered 245 00:13:46,640 --> 00:13:50,360 Speaker 1: some degree of damage a month into this conflict. That 246 00:13:50,480 --> 00:13:52,800 Speaker 1: is not the kind of attrition you want to see 247 00:13:52,840 --> 00:13:56,480 Speaker 1: prior to actually putting boots on the ground. Now, US 248 00:13:56,520 --> 00:13:59,520 Speaker 1: military spokespeople will point out, whenever asked, that the vast 249 00:13:59,520 --> 00:14:02,680 Speaker 1: majority of Iranian missiles and drones are being intercepted, and 250 00:14:02,720 --> 00:14:05,200 Speaker 1: that Iran is currently firing few of these munitions than 251 00:14:05,200 --> 00:14:07,679 Speaker 1: they did at the outbreak of hostilities. And what you're 252 00:14:07,679 --> 00:14:10,000 Speaker 1: supposed to conclude from that is that they're running out 253 00:14:10,120 --> 00:14:12,760 Speaker 1: because we are doing a better job of attritting them 254 00:14:13,120 --> 00:14:15,600 Speaker 1: than they are doing of a treating us. And I 255 00:14:15,640 --> 00:14:19,240 Speaker 1: can't tell you who's actually coming off worse in this fight. 256 00:14:19,360 --> 00:14:22,680 Speaker 1: I certainly don't have good insight into the levels of 257 00:14:22,680 --> 00:14:26,840 Speaker 1: Iran stockpiles of the weapons systems that they're using. However, 258 00:14:26,880 --> 00:14:29,440 Speaker 1: there is reason to doubt that the United States is 259 00:14:29,440 --> 00:14:32,680 Speaker 1: coming off the better in this conflict. Ari Cicirel is 260 00:14:32,680 --> 00:14:35,280 Speaker 1: an analyst for the Jewish Institute for National Security of 261 00:14:35,320 --> 00:14:39,080 Speaker 1: America or JINSA, and he told Fox News quote, overall, 262 00:14:39,200 --> 00:14:41,520 Speaker 1: high missile and drone interception rates have been important, but 263 00:14:41,600 --> 00:14:44,000 Speaker 1: only tell part of the story. Iran came into this 264 00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:46,760 Speaker 1: war with a deliberate plan to dismantle the architecture that 265 00:14:46,840 --> 00:14:50,320 Speaker 1: makes those strikes possible. It has struck energy infrastructure to 266 00:14:50,400 --> 00:14:53,640 Speaker 1: upset markets and use cluster munitions to achieve higher hit rates. 267 00:14:54,720 --> 00:14:57,440 Speaker 1: Because we simply lack good data on this stuff, I 268 00:14:57,480 --> 00:15:00,400 Speaker 1: can't tell you perfectly how a rate of interception has 269 00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:02,800 Speaker 1: changed from day one to day thirty, but there is 270 00:15:02,840 --> 00:15:05,520 Speaker 1: evidence in a few different places that in late March, 271 00:15:05,720 --> 00:15:08,720 Speaker 1: the rate of successful drone attacks on our regional allies 272 00:15:08,760 --> 00:15:11,600 Speaker 1: like the UAE increased. In other words, more drones were 273 00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:14,760 Speaker 1: getting through or being launched. But I think getting through 274 00:15:14,960 --> 00:15:18,320 Speaker 1: is the more supported conclusion, and they're getting through because 275 00:15:18,360 --> 00:15:21,120 Speaker 1: our defenses have gotten or the defenses of our allies 276 00:15:21,480 --> 00:15:24,800 Speaker 1: have gotten less effective. The Genser report also notes that 277 00:15:24,880 --> 00:15:28,720 Speaker 1: Israeli officials have stopped intercepting some cluster munition attacks in 278 00:15:28,800 --> 00:15:33,000 Speaker 1: order to preserve ammunition, basically not shooting down the cluster 279 00:15:33,120 --> 00:15:35,640 Speaker 1: munitions that don't look like they're going to hit anything 280 00:15:35,800 --> 00:15:40,160 Speaker 1: or anyone, because they don't have the ammunition to stop everything. Now, 281 00:15:40,200 --> 00:15:42,720 Speaker 1: I don't doubt that Iron is also feeling somewhat pinched, 282 00:15:42,760 --> 00:15:44,760 Speaker 1: and the Munitions Department, it would be kind of weird 283 00:15:44,800 --> 00:15:47,360 Speaker 1: if they weren't both due to how many they fired 284 00:15:47,400 --> 00:15:49,440 Speaker 1: and how many have been destroyed via air strikes. But 285 00:15:49,480 --> 00:15:53,120 Speaker 1: the question isn't are they suffering attrition too? It's are 286 00:15:53,160 --> 00:15:55,360 Speaker 1: they better able to maintain the rate of attrition they're 287 00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:57,720 Speaker 1: suffering than we are? And while I can't answer that 288 00:15:57,760 --> 00:16:01,560 Speaker 1: question in absolute terms, think think the answer is probably yes. 289 00:16:02,280 --> 00:16:06,080 Speaker 1: Iran's ballistic missiles generally cost a few hundred thousand dollars 290 00:16:06,120 --> 00:16:10,000 Speaker 1: each that interceptor missiles cost, as I said, around thirteen 291 00:16:10,040 --> 00:16:13,800 Speaker 1: million dollars. Shaheed drones cost like thirty thousand dollars to 292 00:16:13,880 --> 00:16:17,080 Speaker 1: make and are often stopped by munitions that cost millions 293 00:16:17,120 --> 00:16:20,000 Speaker 1: to make and are hard to replace. It's also worth 294 00:16:20,080 --> 00:16:22,360 Speaker 1: noting that the reduction in the total number of missiles 295 00:16:22,400 --> 00:16:25,480 Speaker 1: fired by Iran is not just due to the fact 296 00:16:25,520 --> 00:16:27,960 Speaker 1: that they run through some of their stockpilets at least 297 00:16:27,960 --> 00:16:31,880 Speaker 1: partly a strategic decision. As even Fox News admits quote, 298 00:16:32,080 --> 00:16:35,479 Speaker 1: Iran has adapted its tactics accordingly, shifting from large barrages 299 00:16:35,480 --> 00:16:38,840 Speaker 1: to smaller, more frequent attacks designed to maintain constant pressure 300 00:16:39,040 --> 00:16:42,800 Speaker 1: while gradually draining defensive resources. These persistent salvos, even if 301 00:16:42,840 --> 00:16:45,400 Speaker 1: limited in size, force defenders to remain on high alert 302 00:16:45,480 --> 00:16:51,440 Speaker 1: and continue expending interceptors, accelerating the depletion of already finite stockpiles. Now, 303 00:16:51,480 --> 00:16:54,320 Speaker 1: there's an important point made towards the end of that paragraph. 304 00:16:54,680 --> 00:16:58,760 Speaker 1: Persistent attacks forced defenders to remain on high alert. This 305 00:16:58,920 --> 00:17:02,440 Speaker 1: is true, and it also brings us to another underdiscussed 306 00:17:02,520 --> 00:17:06,720 Speaker 1: aspect of attrition, the energy and time of the soldiers. 307 00:17:06,760 --> 00:17:09,960 Speaker 1: Our administration expects to fight this war for them, and 308 00:17:10,000 --> 00:17:23,840 Speaker 1: we'll talk about that after another brace of ads and 309 00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:27,640 Speaker 1: we're back. Too often, people who want to wargame out 310 00:17:27,640 --> 00:17:30,280 Speaker 1: how the US will perform in a given conflict just 311 00:17:30,320 --> 00:17:33,639 Speaker 1: focus on the theoretical capabilities of the vehicles and weapons 312 00:17:33,680 --> 00:17:36,760 Speaker 1: systems we own. And in its class aircraft carrier has 313 00:17:36,800 --> 00:17:39,000 Speaker 1: this many planes and so it can unleash this amount 314 00:17:39,040 --> 00:17:41,200 Speaker 1: of firepower on a target and this amount of time. 315 00:17:41,560 --> 00:17:44,760 Speaker 1: And that's a bad way to predict combat performance because 316 00:17:44,800 --> 00:17:48,520 Speaker 1: it ignores the human element. The USS Gerald R Ford 317 00:17:48,760 --> 00:17:52,360 Speaker 1: a Gerald R Ford class aircraft carrier is what's commonly 318 00:17:52,400 --> 00:17:55,600 Speaker 1: known as a supercarrier. It can travel for twenty five 319 00:17:55,680 --> 00:17:58,199 Speaker 1: years before its nuclear reactors need refueling, and it has 320 00:17:58,240 --> 00:18:00,560 Speaker 1: a complement of more than forty five hundred men and women. 321 00:18:00,840 --> 00:18:03,639 Speaker 1: It is a small city at sea, and I've talked 322 00:18:03,640 --> 00:18:05,560 Speaker 1: in the past about how hard these things are to 323 00:18:05,680 --> 00:18:08,920 Speaker 1: actually sink. During the Fordes deployment to fight the Hoothies, 324 00:18:08,960 --> 00:18:12,760 Speaker 1: there were viral rumors stoked by AIMS information that it 325 00:18:12,800 --> 00:18:16,040 Speaker 1: had been seriously damaged or even destroyed by a Hoothy 326 00:18:16,080 --> 00:18:18,920 Speaker 1: ballistic missile strike. Now, I pointed out at the time 327 00:18:18,960 --> 00:18:21,680 Speaker 1: that this was fanciful. The defense systems on a boat 328 00:18:21,720 --> 00:18:25,480 Speaker 1: like this cost billions and provide excellent, proven protection against 329 00:18:25,520 --> 00:18:28,959 Speaker 1: most missiles, drones, and aircraft. It's likely to encounter. The 330 00:18:29,119 --> 00:18:32,320 Speaker 1: entire naval battlegroup it travels with exists to protect and 331 00:18:32,440 --> 00:18:35,760 Speaker 1: enhance the carrier's capabilities, and even if it were stripped 332 00:18:35,760 --> 00:18:38,119 Speaker 1: of all those things, these boats are just so damned 333 00:18:38,160 --> 00:18:41,000 Speaker 1: tough to fucking sink. In two thousand and five, the 334 00:18:41,080 --> 00:18:43,399 Speaker 1: US Navy conducted a live fire test to sink a 335 00:18:43,480 --> 00:18:47,040 Speaker 1: retired Kittie Hawk class supercarrier. Per an article in Forbes, 336 00:18:47,359 --> 00:18:50,159 Speaker 1: the carrier endured nearly a month of intense weaponized testing 337 00:18:50,160 --> 00:18:53,600 Speaker 1: and was finally scuttled via internal explosive charges. It should 338 00:18:53,640 --> 00:18:55,879 Speaker 1: be added that the warship had been decommissioned nearly a 339 00:18:55,920 --> 00:18:58,600 Speaker 1: decade earlier and was in poor material condition. There were 340 00:18:58,640 --> 00:19:01,159 Speaker 1: also no damage control left for it's to save the ship. 341 00:19:02,119 --> 00:19:05,280 Speaker 1: In February of this year, just days before his own death, 342 00:19:05,359 --> 00:19:09,400 Speaker 1: Iran's former Supreme Leader Ayatola ali Jmeni threatened the US 343 00:19:09,480 --> 00:19:12,119 Speaker 1: carriers operating in the Persian Gulf in a post on 344 00:19:12,160 --> 00:19:17,400 Speaker 1: Twitter because it's fucking twenty twenty six quote the Americans 345 00:19:17,440 --> 00:19:20,200 Speaker 1: constantly say that they've sent a warship towards Iran. Of course, 346 00:19:20,240 --> 00:19:23,080 Speaker 1: a warship is a dangerous piece of military hardware. However, 347 00:19:23,200 --> 00:19:25,400 Speaker 1: more dangerous than that warship is the weapon that can 348 00:19:25,440 --> 00:19:28,840 Speaker 1: send that warship to the bottom of the sea. Now 349 00:19:29,119 --> 00:19:31,400 Speaker 1: kind of unclear exactly what he was talking about. Maybe 350 00:19:31,400 --> 00:19:33,600 Speaker 1: it's some sort of secret weapon that the Iranians have 351 00:19:33,680 --> 00:19:35,679 Speaker 1: that we don't know about, but we do know that 352 00:19:35,720 --> 00:19:38,680 Speaker 1: Iranian negotiators are currently talking with the People's Republic of 353 00:19:38,760 --> 00:19:42,880 Speaker 1: China about purchasing CM three H two supersonic missiles. These 354 00:19:42,920 --> 00:19:46,040 Speaker 1: were developed by Chinese military planners to fly low and fast, 355 00:19:46,160 --> 00:19:48,639 Speaker 1: avoiding most of the layered defenses a boat like the 356 00:19:48,720 --> 00:19:52,399 Speaker 1: Ford joys their carrier killer missiles, or at least that's 357 00:19:52,440 --> 00:19:55,800 Speaker 1: the idea Beijing also has a line of land based 358 00:19:55,840 --> 00:19:58,960 Speaker 1: carrier killer missiles, because if you think you might wind 359 00:19:59,040 --> 00:20:01,480 Speaker 1: up in a war with the Uni States, it probably 360 00:20:01,840 --> 00:20:03,919 Speaker 1: booves you to think about how you would kill an 361 00:20:04,000 --> 00:20:08,000 Speaker 1: aircraft carrier. Now again, Iran doesn't have any of these 362 00:20:08,000 --> 00:20:11,840 Speaker 1: weapons systems yet, at least not to our knowledge. But 363 00:20:12,160 --> 00:20:14,639 Speaker 1: this war of choice by the United States didn't come 364 00:20:14,680 --> 00:20:18,240 Speaker 1: as a complete surprise. The Iranian military and the Iranian 365 00:20:18,280 --> 00:20:21,480 Speaker 1: Revolutionary Guard Corps had been preparing to fight this war 366 00:20:21,560 --> 00:20:25,120 Speaker 1: for quite some time. Those preparations have included the construction 367 00:20:25,200 --> 00:20:28,720 Speaker 1: of multiple fake aircraft carriers, which their forces have sunk 368 00:20:28,720 --> 00:20:32,159 Speaker 1: in a variety of wargames exercises. The most recent of 369 00:20:32,200 --> 00:20:36,760 Speaker 1: these occurred in twenty twenty. The Prophet Muhammed fourteen exercise 370 00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:38,880 Speaker 1: was meant to prepare for an attack on a Nimitz 371 00:20:38,880 --> 00:20:42,160 Speaker 1: class carrier, and ironically, Iran made it too easy to sink, 372 00:20:42,320 --> 00:20:44,080 Speaker 1: which caused it to go down while it was being 373 00:20:44,119 --> 00:20:47,439 Speaker 1: towed in an inconvenient location that temporarily blocked a canal. 374 00:20:47,960 --> 00:20:49,959 Speaker 1: And that should act as a warning that just as 375 00:20:50,000 --> 00:20:53,880 Speaker 1: American military planners and analysts fuck up constantly, so two 376 00:20:53,960 --> 00:20:57,320 Speaker 1: to their Iranian counterparts. And we shouldn't assume our guys 377 00:20:57,359 --> 00:20:59,960 Speaker 1: are a bunch of hegseth looking chuckle fucks. While Iran 378 00:21:00,080 --> 00:21:04,159 Speaker 1: Pentagon equivalent is staffed entirely by hard eyed professionals. Every 379 00:21:04,200 --> 00:21:07,680 Speaker 1: military has dipshit officers and has to deal with bad 380 00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:10,639 Speaker 1: calls made by people with political power that function up 381 00:21:10,680 --> 00:21:13,560 Speaker 1: for everyone. What you should take from this, though, is 382 00:21:13,600 --> 00:21:16,600 Speaker 1: that Iran as a country with a large, comparatively well 383 00:21:16,680 --> 00:21:21,120 Speaker 1: funded and prepared military. They regularly invent and sell weapons 384 00:21:21,119 --> 00:21:23,879 Speaker 1: systems that are utilized around the world. And they've been 385 00:21:23,880 --> 00:21:27,919 Speaker 1: obsessively planning to kill an aircraft carrier for years and 386 00:21:27,960 --> 00:21:29,880 Speaker 1: now that doesn't mean they're going to sink one. In fact, 387 00:21:29,920 --> 00:21:32,480 Speaker 1: I still think that's pretty close to impossible, at least 388 00:21:32,480 --> 00:21:35,240 Speaker 1: with the technology we know they have. But they don't 389 00:21:35,320 --> 00:21:39,000 Speaker 1: need to sink one to render it inoperable. Just hitting 390 00:21:39,080 --> 00:21:41,240 Speaker 1: the top of it could be enough to do serious 391 00:21:41,320 --> 00:21:43,760 Speaker 1: damage that would render it combat and capable for an 392 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:45,960 Speaker 1: extended period of time. And to back me up on 393 00:21:46,000 --> 00:21:49,400 Speaker 1: that point, a few weeks ago, while it was actively 394 00:21:49,440 --> 00:21:53,400 Speaker 1: engaged in combat operations against Iranian forces, a fire started 395 00:21:53,480 --> 00:21:56,600 Speaker 1: on board the jerry Ford. It began in the laundry 396 00:21:56,680 --> 00:21:59,399 Speaker 1: room or at least in an area related to the 397 00:21:59,520 --> 00:22:03,200 Speaker 1: vast laundry system that a vehicle like this has. It's 398 00:22:03,280 --> 00:22:06,840 Speaker 1: kind of a little unclear exactly what happened. According to 399 00:22:06,880 --> 00:22:09,479 Speaker 1: the New York Times, though the fire alone took thirty 400 00:22:09,600 --> 00:22:13,879 Speaker 1: hours to put out. Now, the Navy disputes this, that 401 00:22:13,920 --> 00:22:16,520 Speaker 1: the ship was burning for more than a day, but 402 00:22:16,560 --> 00:22:19,600 Speaker 1: they provided no reason anyone should actually trust them. Here 403 00:22:19,960 --> 00:22:22,640 Speaker 1: I found an article published in the National Interest by 404 00:22:22,680 --> 00:22:26,240 Speaker 1: Peter Soussio. He writes that quote, the fire caused far 405 00:22:26,320 --> 00:22:29,359 Speaker 1: greater damage than was initially reported, with one sailor medically 406 00:22:29,400 --> 00:22:32,080 Speaker 1: evacuated from the ship and two hundred more treated for 407 00:22:32,119 --> 00:22:35,399 Speaker 1: smoke inhalation. I'm not surprised that the Navy wanted to 408 00:22:35,480 --> 00:22:38,119 Speaker 1: hide the extent of the damage its biggest warships suffered 409 00:22:38,160 --> 00:22:41,840 Speaker 1: due to a laundry fire, but this reinforces how unreliable 410 00:22:41,920 --> 00:22:44,320 Speaker 1: the Navy is as an ongoing source in these matters. 411 00:22:44,640 --> 00:22:48,639 Speaker 1: Sousio notes, quote, there remained conflicting accounts of the fire 412 00:22:48,680 --> 00:22:51,560 Speaker 1: in the media, and the Pentagon seemingly attempted to downplay 413 00:22:51,600 --> 00:22:54,200 Speaker 1: the severity of the fire in the immediate aftermath, leading 414 00:22:54,200 --> 00:22:57,879 Speaker 1: to later confusion. What we do know is that the Ford, 415 00:22:58,040 --> 00:23:00,760 Speaker 1: a small city on the sea, lost all ability to 416 00:23:00,840 --> 00:23:04,560 Speaker 1: launder clothing, betting, and anything else. This caused an immediate 417 00:23:04,640 --> 00:23:07,919 Speaker 1: hygiene issue aboard and a logistic nightmare for the Navy, 418 00:23:08,119 --> 00:23:11,320 Speaker 1: which had to fly in clean clothing at terrific expense. 419 00:23:11,920 --> 00:23:14,480 Speaker 1: Saying a supercarrier was taken out of commission by a 420 00:23:14,560 --> 00:23:17,840 Speaker 1: laundry fire sounds silly, but you can't keep a town 421 00:23:17,880 --> 00:23:21,000 Speaker 1: of forty five hundred people going if no one can 422 00:23:21,040 --> 00:23:24,560 Speaker 1: do the laundry. The fire seems to have also done 423 00:23:24,600 --> 00:23:27,840 Speaker 1: extensive damage to Crewe living quarters, which forced a thousand 424 00:23:27,880 --> 00:23:30,640 Speaker 1: mattresses to be flown in while the crew slept. Well, 425 00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:34,000 Speaker 1: wherever they were sleeping, it wasn't in their bunks. Now 426 00:23:34,000 --> 00:23:36,879 Speaker 1: we don't know how the fire started again, but unconfirmed 427 00:23:36,880 --> 00:23:41,280 Speaker 1: reports have blamed sabotage by members of the gerald Ford's crew. 428 00:23:42,119 --> 00:23:43,760 Speaker 1: I can't tell you if this is true or not, 429 00:23:44,040 --> 00:23:46,080 Speaker 1: but if it is, it would not be the first 430 00:23:46,080 --> 00:23:49,879 Speaker 1: time something like this happened. In twenty twelve, a civilian 431 00:23:49,920 --> 00:23:53,159 Speaker 1: contractor started a fire aboard the USS Miami and Attack 432 00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:56,600 Speaker 1: submarine because he wanted to leave work early. The fire 433 00:23:56,680 --> 00:23:59,000 Speaker 1: cost four hundred million dollars in damage and led to 434 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:02,320 Speaker 1: the vessel being decons mission. Two years later, the contractor 435 00:24:02,400 --> 00:24:06,600 Speaker 1: was sentenced to seventeen years in prison. Nabal sabotage was 436 00:24:06,640 --> 00:24:09,040 Speaker 1: an even bigger business during the latter stages of the 437 00:24:09,080 --> 00:24:12,920 Speaker 1: war in Vietnam. In December of nineteen seventy two, Jeffrey Allison, 438 00:24:13,000 --> 00:24:15,520 Speaker 1: a nineteen year old sailor from Oakland, was sentenced to 439 00:24:15,560 --> 00:24:17,840 Speaker 1: five years in prison for lighting a fire aboard an 440 00:24:17,880 --> 00:24:22,240 Speaker 1: aircraft carrier, the USS Forestall that same year, a sailor 441 00:24:22,240 --> 00:24:25,879 Speaker 1: aboard the USS Ranger, another supercarrier, delayed its deployment to 442 00:24:25,920 --> 00:24:28,760 Speaker 1: the Pacific by three months by allegedly sticking a paint 443 00:24:28,760 --> 00:24:32,480 Speaker 1: scraper in the main reduction gear, which disabled an engine. 444 00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:36,000 Speaker 1: Perent article in the Alameda Post, the Navy's official history 445 00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:39,000 Speaker 1: of the Ranger, confirmed that sabotage was becoming more popular 446 00:24:39,000 --> 00:24:43,080 Speaker 1: as the war in Vietnam became more unpopular. Sabotage happens 447 00:24:43,160 --> 00:24:46,399 Speaker 1: every day, all day. A crewman serving aboard another carrier 448 00:24:46,440 --> 00:24:50,520 Speaker 1: based in Alameda, the Oriskany, was quoted as saying, now 449 00:24:50,560 --> 00:24:53,720 Speaker 1: these sailors, the folks sabotaging their own warships in the 450 00:24:53,800 --> 00:24:56,240 Speaker 1: later stages of the Vietnam War were part of the 451 00:24:56,280 --> 00:24:59,960 Speaker 1: so called SOS movement, a protest campaign launched in sises 452 00:25:00,040 --> 00:25:03,280 Speaker 1: stained entirely by sailors angry at being forced to participate 453 00:25:03,320 --> 00:25:06,320 Speaker 1: in the war against Vietnam. The movement gained its name 454 00:25:06,320 --> 00:25:09,080 Speaker 1: from an active protest in nineteen seventy one, when forty 455 00:25:09,119 --> 00:25:11,520 Speaker 1: sailors stood on the flight deck of their returning aircraft 456 00:25:11,520 --> 00:25:16,000 Speaker 1: carrier and spelled out SOS with their bodies again. I 457 00:25:16,040 --> 00:25:19,520 Speaker 1: don't know if sabotage caused the fire on the Gerald Ford, 458 00:25:19,520 --> 00:25:21,640 Speaker 1: and neither it is anyone else, but there are good 459 00:25:21,720 --> 00:25:25,040 Speaker 1: reasons to believe it did. As Senator Mark Warner, vice 460 00:25:25,119 --> 00:25:27,680 Speaker 1: chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in late March, 461 00:25:27,880 --> 00:25:29,679 Speaker 1: the Ford and its crew have been pushed to the 462 00:25:29,720 --> 00:25:33,439 Speaker 1: brink after nearly a year at sea. Normal deployment for 463 00:25:33,480 --> 00:25:36,640 Speaker 1: sailors on before it is like six months. Come April, 464 00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:39,440 Speaker 1: it will break the record for the longest post Vietnam 465 00:25:39,520 --> 00:25:43,119 Speaker 1: carrier deployment two hundred and ninety four days. Crew members 466 00:25:43,160 --> 00:25:45,840 Speaker 1: have been told their deployment will likely be extended to May, 467 00:25:46,000 --> 00:25:47,760 Speaker 1: at which point they'll have been at sea for an 468 00:25:47,920 --> 00:25:48,639 Speaker 1: entire year. 469 00:25:49,320 --> 00:25:49,480 Speaker 2: Now. 470 00:25:49,480 --> 00:25:52,040 Speaker 1: I don't want to really expect anyone to pour out 471 00:25:52,040 --> 00:25:54,400 Speaker 1: their sympathy for sailors on a warship that has helped 472 00:25:54,400 --> 00:25:56,800 Speaker 1: to kill a minimum of fifteen hundred Iranians so far, 473 00:25:56,920 --> 00:25:59,640 Speaker 1: including two hundred children. But you don't need to feel 474 00:25:59,680 --> 00:26:01,840 Speaker 1: bad for all the lost birthdays and weddings and missed 475 00:26:01,880 --> 00:26:05,439 Speaker 1: funerals to understand the deleterious effect that this has on morale. 476 00:26:05,920 --> 00:26:09,359 Speaker 1: Fighting spirit has adjust a buzzword. When soldiers are exhausted 477 00:26:09,400 --> 00:26:11,919 Speaker 1: and pissed off, they're likely to fuck things up. And 478 00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:15,280 Speaker 1: I'm not just talking about grand acts of sabotage. When 479 00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:17,679 Speaker 1: it was still off the coast of Venezuela earlier. In 480 00:26:17,720 --> 00:26:21,040 Speaker 1: this deployment, the Ford suffered massive recurrent issues with its 481 00:26:21,080 --> 00:26:23,639 Speaker 1: plumbing system, which was ripped off a design used in 482 00:26:23,680 --> 00:26:27,200 Speaker 1: cruise ships and works very badly. I can't exaggerate how 483 00:26:27,280 --> 00:26:29,800 Speaker 1: bad the sewage systems on the Ford work. They are 484 00:26:29,840 --> 00:26:34,080 Speaker 1: broken fucking constantly, and per the Alameda Post, some crew 485 00:26:34,119 --> 00:26:37,720 Speaker 1: members may be intentionally exacerbating problems with defective toilets aboard 486 00:26:37,760 --> 00:26:40,280 Speaker 1: the ship by flushing t shirts and other objects, as 487 00:26:40,280 --> 00:26:43,240 Speaker 1: documented in an email from the ship's engineering department obtained 488 00:26:43,240 --> 00:26:46,720 Speaker 1: by NBR. Our sewage system is being mistreated and destroyed 489 00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:49,560 Speaker 1: by sailors on a daily basis. That March twenty twenty 490 00:26:49,640 --> 00:26:52,680 Speaker 1: five email stated, my whole maintenance technicians are currently working 491 00:26:52,760 --> 00:26:54,720 Speaker 1: nineteen hours a day right now to keep up with 492 00:26:54,760 --> 00:26:58,560 Speaker 1: the demand. It's a lot of flushed shirts. Now, what 493 00:26:58,600 --> 00:27:01,119 Speaker 1: I'm building to is that there's a perfectly good chance 494 00:27:01,160 --> 00:27:03,480 Speaker 1: this fire didn't even start as an act of sabotage, 495 00:27:03,720 --> 00:27:07,359 Speaker 1: but because somebody fucked up, maybe because they were exhausted, 496 00:27:07,640 --> 00:27:10,160 Speaker 1: maybe because they've just been running the machines too long. 497 00:27:10,200 --> 00:27:13,320 Speaker 1: The laundry is always going all this thing's underway, and 498 00:27:13,359 --> 00:27:15,760 Speaker 1: if it's going for months longer, the normal shit like 499 00:27:15,840 --> 00:27:18,040 Speaker 1: lint is going to build up. In fact, I want 500 00:27:18,040 --> 00:27:20,240 Speaker 1: to read a quote from that article in the National Interest. 501 00:27:20,720 --> 00:27:23,080 Speaker 1: If the ducts haven't been cleaned out properly, it is 502 00:27:23,119 --> 00:27:26,480 Speaker 1: easy for small lint particles to catch fire, potentially leading 503 00:27:26,520 --> 00:27:29,359 Speaker 1: to a larger blaze, not unlike a house fire caused 504 00:27:29,359 --> 00:27:33,560 Speaker 1: by lint build up. So again, this fire was certainly 505 00:27:33,560 --> 00:27:36,399 Speaker 1: not enough to sink the gerald Ford. It didn't destroy it, 506 00:27:36,720 --> 00:27:40,240 Speaker 1: but it did enough damage that it became combat and effective, 507 00:27:40,359 --> 00:27:44,480 Speaker 1: or at least you could argue that's the case. You know, 508 00:27:44,680 --> 00:27:47,800 Speaker 1: obviously we replaced it with a different carrier group. There's 509 00:27:47,840 --> 00:27:51,040 Speaker 1: not just not a carrier now, but the ford was 510 00:27:51,080 --> 00:27:54,840 Speaker 1: not originally scheduled to leave and left as a result 511 00:27:54,840 --> 00:27:58,480 Speaker 1: of the fire in order to undergo repairs. That gets 512 00:27:58,520 --> 00:28:01,600 Speaker 1: it something very important, very relevant, the question of how 513 00:28:01,640 --> 00:28:05,119 Speaker 1: a higher intensity war, one involving ground troops against Iran 514 00:28:05,160 --> 00:28:07,520 Speaker 1: would go, because while Iran may or may not be 515 00:28:07,560 --> 00:28:09,840 Speaker 1: able to sink a carrier, they certainly have the tools 516 00:28:09,840 --> 00:28:12,800 Speaker 1: to potentially hit one, starting a fire or just damaging 517 00:28:12,880 --> 00:28:16,680 Speaker 1: the deck badly enough to render it combat ineffective. And 518 00:28:16,800 --> 00:28:19,879 Speaker 1: if these deployment cycles keep getting extended, if sailors are 519 00:28:19,960 --> 00:28:22,600 Speaker 1: kept at a high operational tempo for days or weeks 520 00:28:22,680 --> 00:28:25,480 Speaker 1: or months at a time, people will start fucking up. 521 00:28:25,560 --> 00:28:27,679 Speaker 1: And some of those fuck ups have a chance, as 522 00:28:27,760 --> 00:28:31,840 Speaker 1: we've already seen, to remove the ship from being combat capable, 523 00:28:31,920 --> 00:28:35,239 Speaker 1: or to remove other ships from being combat capable. If 524 00:28:35,280 --> 00:28:37,680 Speaker 1: you're talking from the perspective of US marines trying to 525 00:28:37,720 --> 00:28:41,239 Speaker 1: hold onto an island surrounded by enemies, this is a 526 00:28:41,400 --> 00:28:44,080 Speaker 1: really scary thing, the fact that your main source of 527 00:28:44,120 --> 00:28:47,520 Speaker 1: air support might not be able to function because somebody 528 00:28:47,560 --> 00:28:51,080 Speaker 1: fucks up or sabotages it. There's a fire, it gets hit. 529 00:28:51,800 --> 00:28:54,480 Speaker 1: You know, these boats are not sinkable, but in certain 530 00:28:54,520 --> 00:28:57,520 Speaker 1: ways they're a lot more fragile than people are used 531 00:28:57,520 --> 00:29:00,560 Speaker 1: to thinking of them as being. Aircraft care have been 532 00:29:00,640 --> 00:29:03,360 Speaker 1: gods of the sea for so long. I think it 533 00:29:03,440 --> 00:29:06,760 Speaker 1: really is something people ought to pay attention to. The 534 00:29:06,840 --> 00:29:10,080 Speaker 1: fact that this simple laundry fire took the Jerry Ford 535 00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:14,080 Speaker 1: out of the theater matters. The longer the US keeps 536 00:29:14,080 --> 00:29:16,280 Speaker 1: fighting and the longer we keep our ships deployed chasing 537 00:29:16,280 --> 00:29:19,560 Speaker 1: Donald Trump's dreams, the higher the odds that something else 538 00:29:19,600 --> 00:29:22,959 Speaker 1: goes wrong. Get whether it's just exhausted soldiers screwing up, 539 00:29:23,000 --> 00:29:26,760 Speaker 1: angry sailors sabotaging things to protest an unpopular war, or 540 00:29:26,800 --> 00:29:30,280 Speaker 1: a damned lucky shot. The Pentagon is continuing to roll 541 00:29:30,280 --> 00:29:33,800 Speaker 1: those dice every day, and I guess we'll see what 542 00:29:33,960 --> 00:29:36,600 Speaker 1: happens next. That's all I've got for you right now, everybody. 543 00:29:36,800 --> 00:29:40,200 Speaker 1: Hopefully we're not invading the islands with ground troops by 544 00:29:40,200 --> 00:29:42,040 Speaker 1: the time this episode comes out, but we might be. 545 00:29:46,000 --> 00:29:48,480 Speaker 2: It could happen. Here is a production of cool Zone Media. 546 00:29:48,680 --> 00:29:51,720 Speaker 2: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 547 00:29:51,800 --> 00:29:54,360 Speaker 2: cool zonemedia dot com, or check us out on the 548 00:29:54,400 --> 00:29:58,360 Speaker 2: iHeartRadio app, Apple podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts 549 00:29:58,840 --> 00:30:01,000 Speaker 2: can now find sources for it could happen here, listed 550 00:30:01,040 --> 00:30:03,680 Speaker 2: directly in episode descriptions. Thanks for listening.