1
00:00:00,760 --> 00:00:04,160
Speaker 1: This episode was recorded before the election on November fifth.

2
00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:08,200
Speaker 2: She was out of Czechoslovakia and she had committed an

3
00:00:08,200 --> 00:00:12,640
Speaker 2: illegal act, and she had illegally emigrated with this illegally

4
00:00:12,680 --> 00:00:16,680
Speaker 2: gotten passport to Canada, and then she filled in forms

5
00:00:16,680 --> 00:00:20,360
Speaker 2: to come to the United States that she filled in illegally,

6
00:00:20,520 --> 00:00:23,200
Speaker 2: and she met and married Donald Trump.

7
00:00:25,079 --> 00:00:28,080
Speaker 3: I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry o'she. I served in

8
00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:31,680
Speaker 3: the CIA's Clandestine Service for twenty eight years, living undercover

9
00:00:31,920 --> 00:00:33,240
Speaker 3: all around the world.

10
00:00:32,960 --> 00:00:35,360
Speaker 2: And in my thirty three years with the CIA, I

11
00:00:35,400 --> 00:00:38,240
Speaker 2: served in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

12
00:00:38,400 --> 00:00:40,639
Speaker 3: Although we don't usually look at it this way, we

13
00:00:40,760 --> 00:00:42,840
Speaker 3: created conspiracies.

14
00:00:42,280 --> 00:00:45,279
Speaker 2: In our operations. We got people to believe things that

15
00:00:45,360 --> 00:00:46,040
Speaker 2: weren't true.

16
00:00:46,159 --> 00:00:49,080
Speaker 3: Now we're investigating the conspiracy theories we see in the

17
00:00:49,120 --> 00:00:50,320
Speaker 3: news almost every day.

18
00:00:50,520 --> 00:00:52,800
Speaker 2: We'll break them down for you to determine whether they

19
00:00:52,840 --> 00:00:55,200
Speaker 2: could be real or whether we're being manipulated.

20
00:00:55,480 --> 00:00:57,760
Speaker 3: Welcome to Mission Implausible.

21
00:01:00,640 --> 00:01:02,720
Speaker 1: This is a two parter on whether Trump is a

22
00:01:02,800 --> 00:01:06,319
Speaker 1: Russian asset, Beginning with a business trip to Moscow thirty

23
00:01:06,319 --> 00:01:11,080
Speaker 1: seven years ago. Immediately after he returned, he began doing interviews,

24
00:01:11,240 --> 00:01:13,880
Speaker 1: obsessed with many of the same things he still speaks

25
00:01:13,920 --> 00:01:17,560
Speaker 1: about today. We continue with the conversation with Peter Struck.

26
00:01:17,720 --> 00:01:22,200
Speaker 1: He's a former deputy Assistant director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division,

27
00:01:22,400 --> 00:01:25,600
Speaker 1: and he led the investigation into the Russian interference in

28
00:01:25,640 --> 00:01:29,520
Speaker 1: the twenty sixteen United States elections. He's an author and

29
00:01:29,560 --> 00:01:32,800
Speaker 1: hosts the popular podcast Clean Up in Aisle forty five.

30
00:01:34,560 --> 00:01:37,000
Speaker 4: Would it surprise me at all if Donald Trump is

31
00:01:37,000 --> 00:01:40,440
Speaker 4: a businessman in the seventies and the eighties traveled to

32
00:01:40,800 --> 00:01:45,360
Speaker 4: Moscow or had Soviet then Russian businessman or private citizens

33
00:01:45,360 --> 00:01:47,520
Speaker 4: coming in and wanting to invest in his real estate

34
00:01:48,080 --> 00:01:51,760
Speaker 4: or casinos anywhere else. Wouldn't surprise me at all. Would

35
00:01:51,840 --> 00:01:55,040
Speaker 4: the Russians try and look at that information that they

36
00:01:55,440 --> 00:01:58,120
Speaker 4: obtained to say, Hey, who is this person? How can

37
00:01:58,160 --> 00:02:02,040
Speaker 4: we leverage him now or even ten, twenty thirty years

38
00:02:02,040 --> 00:02:04,520
Speaker 4: in the future. Because maybe in ten years that person

39
00:02:04,600 --> 00:02:07,559
Speaker 4: is suddenly a prominent real estate mugel. Maybe in twenty

40
00:02:07,600 --> 00:02:09,680
Speaker 4: years that person's president of the United States. But just

41
00:02:09,680 --> 00:02:12,760
Speaker 4: because somebody is there in Moscow, somebody is there dealing

42
00:02:12,760 --> 00:02:15,320
Speaker 4: with people who have either director in direct contacts with

43
00:02:15,320 --> 00:02:18,400
Speaker 4: the Russian intelligence, doesn't make them, oh they're a source,

44
00:02:18,560 --> 00:02:21,000
Speaker 4: right they're in bed with the Russians. It doesn't work

45
00:02:21,040 --> 00:02:21,359
Speaker 4: that way.

46
00:02:21,680 --> 00:02:24,120
Speaker 2: It's often not a binary thing. I think it's important

47
00:02:24,160 --> 00:02:26,320
Speaker 2: for people to realize that they think that you're either

48
00:02:26,360 --> 00:02:29,160
Speaker 2: a spy or you're not right, there's a big spectrum

49
00:02:29,160 --> 00:02:32,200
Speaker 2: in between and on the long game, this is something

50
00:02:32,200 --> 00:02:34,000
Speaker 2: that the Russians have been doing for a long time.

51
00:02:34,080 --> 00:02:39,320
Speaker 2: There's this famous story from nineteen sixty eight that Hubert

52
00:02:39,400 --> 00:02:43,079
Speaker 2: Humphrey was running for president and he and Johnson were

53
00:02:43,120 --> 00:02:46,600
Speaker 2: not getting along. Humphrey had a much softer line on Vietnam,

54
00:02:47,320 --> 00:02:50,840
Speaker 2: and the Humphrey campaign was really low on money because

55
00:02:50,919 --> 00:02:54,640
Speaker 2: Johnson wasn't getting the big donors to contribute to his campaign,

56
00:02:55,520 --> 00:03:01,160
Speaker 2: and the KGB then asked Soviet Ambassador to the US Dobreenen,

57
00:03:01,600 --> 00:03:06,840
Speaker 2: to have breakfast with Humphrey, and he offered Humphrey money

58
00:03:07,080 --> 00:03:09,799
Speaker 2: for his campaign and a way to get the money

59
00:03:09,919 --> 00:03:13,360
Speaker 2: to Humphrey without it being obviously from the Soviet Union.

60
00:03:13,560 --> 00:03:17,080
Speaker 2: Humphrey turned him down flat and one of the reasons

61
00:03:17,080 --> 00:03:19,600
Speaker 2: for that, Humphrey said later was that he knew that

62
00:03:19,680 --> 00:03:22,280
Speaker 2: once he took the money, it's not as though he

63
00:03:22,440 --> 00:03:25,600
Speaker 2: was their spy, but they would have leverage on him.

64
00:03:25,639 --> 00:03:26,920
Speaker 2: For the rest of his life.

65
00:03:27,040 --> 00:03:29,200
Speaker 4: Yeah. I think that's a great example, and a couple

66
00:03:29,240 --> 00:03:32,399
Speaker 4: of takeaways from that. One is that you're absolutely right.

67
00:03:32,760 --> 00:03:37,200
Speaker 4: The recruited agent, the recruited source on whichever side. The

68
00:03:37,240 --> 00:03:39,400
Speaker 4: person who is sitting there, they know they were working

69
00:03:39,400 --> 00:03:43,160
Speaker 4: for a foreign intelligence service. There engaged in clandestine intelligence collection.

70
00:03:43,200 --> 00:03:47,280
Speaker 4: They're using covert communications to respond to the tasking and

71
00:03:47,400 --> 00:03:50,560
Speaker 4: receive that tasking. They're getting paid clandestinely. That is, in

72
00:03:50,600 --> 00:03:55,720
Speaker 4: my experience, the tiny, small number of percentage of people

73
00:03:55,800 --> 00:03:59,120
Speaker 4: that you get information from, either foreign collectors, Russians, Chinese

74
00:03:59,120 --> 00:04:01,320
Speaker 4: here in the United States, the number of people they

75
00:04:01,400 --> 00:04:05,760
Speaker 4: have actually working in that context are tiny compared to

76
00:04:05,800 --> 00:04:08,280
Speaker 4: the number of people who are agentsy influence, who have

77
00:04:08,400 --> 00:04:11,040
Speaker 4: mental red lines or fig leafs that they want to

78
00:04:11,080 --> 00:04:13,080
Speaker 4: maintain or Jerry to your point, they don't want to

79
00:04:13,080 --> 00:04:15,560
Speaker 4: take money because they feel if they do that they'd

80
00:04:15,560 --> 00:04:17,400
Speaker 4: be exposed to coercion, and they want to be able

81
00:04:17,440 --> 00:04:19,680
Speaker 4: to say they never took it. Even though they're doing favors.

82
00:04:19,800 --> 00:04:22,640
Speaker 4: They're willing to do things short of Hey, I want

83
00:04:22,640 --> 00:04:25,000
Speaker 4: you to be in on the book's asset, and we're

84
00:04:25,000 --> 00:04:27,480
Speaker 4: going to give you a code name, and again wants

85
00:04:27,480 --> 00:04:29,760
Speaker 4: you to behave in all these very specific ways that

86
00:04:29,800 --> 00:04:32,120
Speaker 4: you have to do if you're going to operate at

87
00:04:32,120 --> 00:04:34,960
Speaker 4: that level. And the second point to your example, Jerry

88
00:04:35,000 --> 00:04:36,960
Speaker 4: is you know, our political system in so many ways

89
00:04:37,040 --> 00:04:39,520
Speaker 4: relies on people having the good sense and also a

90
00:04:39,560 --> 00:04:42,080
Speaker 4: sense of morality to say I'm not going to take

91
00:04:42,120 --> 00:04:44,960
Speaker 4: this money because it would expose me to coercion and

92
00:04:45,000 --> 00:04:47,400
Speaker 4: it would look bad. When you look at Donald Trump,

93
00:04:47,440 --> 00:04:50,280
Speaker 4: that's one of the concerning things is there's no apparent

94
00:04:50,760 --> 00:04:54,560
Speaker 4: compunction to not take that money. Has statements about, you know,

95
00:04:54,680 --> 00:04:56,880
Speaker 4: towards the end of his administration, well, if she offered

96
00:04:56,920 --> 00:04:59,760
Speaker 4: me apoh on Biden, I'd probably take it, or at

97
00:04:59,800 --> 00:05:02,400
Speaker 4: least said look at it before I'd consider telling the FBI.

98
00:05:02,560 --> 00:05:05,640
Speaker 4: There's this recent reporting, again without saying whether it's true

99
00:05:05,720 --> 00:05:08,560
Speaker 4: or not, from Carolina at the at the Washington Post,

100
00:05:08,680 --> 00:05:10,880
Speaker 4: that there was this alleged payment of ten million dollars

101
00:05:10,920 --> 00:05:14,080
Speaker 4: from the government of Egypt to Trump. But those sort

102
00:05:14,160 --> 00:05:18,960
Speaker 4: of traditional ways in which intelligence services seek to exploit

103
00:05:19,000 --> 00:05:23,200
Speaker 4: people to gain leverage short of formal recruitment, that's the

104
00:05:23,279 --> 00:05:26,640
Speaker 4: area where he's a counterintelligence guy. When you look at Trump,

105
00:05:26,720 --> 00:05:30,400
Speaker 4: he's extraordinarily susceptible to that, but also doesn't mean the

106
00:05:30,400 --> 00:05:32,800
Speaker 4: guy's like a formal everybody's like, oh, he met Putin

107
00:05:32,839 --> 00:05:34,760
Speaker 4: and he got his tasking for the next court and

108
00:05:34,839 --> 00:05:37,719
Speaker 4: he didn't get his fucking next tasking for the next quarter.

109
00:05:37,760 --> 00:05:39,880
Speaker 4: They were just talking and Putin was playing him like

110
00:05:39,920 --> 00:05:42,360
Speaker 4: he's played him the entire time through. And it wasn't

111
00:05:42,400 --> 00:05:45,600
Speaker 4: like a little card or a one time pad where

112
00:05:45,640 --> 00:05:48,800
Speaker 4: he could use that to decrypt what the seventeen documents

113
00:05:48,880 --> 00:05:49,560
Speaker 4: where they wanted.

114
00:05:49,400 --> 00:05:51,160
Speaker 3: To imagine Trump try to decrypt one time?

115
00:05:51,160 --> 00:05:53,159
Speaker 4: Oh my god, no, fuck no. Can you imagine like

116
00:05:53,240 --> 00:05:55,160
Speaker 4: sitting there and like doing the math, and.

117
00:05:57,040 --> 00:06:00,960
Speaker 2: Well, there was a corrupt politician was taking money for

118
00:06:01,080 --> 00:06:04,880
Speaker 2: the Egyptians for political favors. But it wasn't Donald Trump.

119
00:06:04,920 --> 00:06:08,360
Speaker 2: It was Senator Menendez, right, And his sin was that

120
00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:10,559
Speaker 2: he got the money in gold bars and one hundred

121
00:06:10,600 --> 00:06:12,720
Speaker 2: dollars bills that he stuck in his freezer. If he'd

122
00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:15,600
Speaker 2: been a little smarter on how he did it, he

123
00:06:15,680 --> 00:06:16,839
Speaker 2: might not have gone to jail.

124
00:06:17,080 --> 00:06:18,320
Speaker 5: So, Peter, let me ask you a question.

125
00:06:18,640 --> 00:06:22,160
Speaker 3: Was the Mueller investigation a counter intelligence investigation? And how

126
00:06:22,160 --> 00:06:23,839
Speaker 3: would it have been different if it were?

127
00:06:24,040 --> 00:06:26,280
Speaker 4: So the answer is No. And one of the frustrating

128
00:06:26,279 --> 00:06:31,400
Speaker 4: and confounding things is that we the FBI, after Director

129
00:06:31,480 --> 00:06:36,120
Speaker 4: Comy was fired, a case was opened on Trump. So

130
00:06:36,200 --> 00:06:38,440
Speaker 4: one of the takeaway is there was not some case

131
00:06:38,440 --> 00:06:40,720
Speaker 4: on Trump going back to the summer twenty sixteen. That

132
00:06:40,760 --> 00:06:43,400
Speaker 4: case on Trump was not opened until whenever that was

133
00:06:43,600 --> 00:06:47,240
Speaker 4: spring is twenty seventeen, and it was a twofold opening. Right.

134
00:06:47,320 --> 00:06:50,080
Speaker 4: One was did he engage in the crime of obstruction

135
00:06:50,279 --> 00:06:53,840
Speaker 4: by firing Comy? And there's a criminal statute that lays

136
00:06:53,839 --> 00:06:55,680
Speaker 4: out the elements of the crime to obstruction, it would

137
00:06:55,680 --> 00:06:58,880
Speaker 4: be just a traditional criminal investigation. But there was a

138
00:06:58,960 --> 00:07:02,360
Speaker 4: second component of that case, which was a counterintelligence case

139
00:07:02,360 --> 00:07:05,480
Speaker 4: about Trump, which was designed to sit there and ask

140
00:07:05,520 --> 00:07:08,840
Speaker 4: those questions that I talked about earlier about what is

141
00:07:08,920 --> 00:07:11,640
Speaker 4: Russia trying to do? What has Russia done with Trump

142
00:07:11,720 --> 00:07:12,240
Speaker 4: in the past.

143
00:07:12,360 --> 00:07:14,960
Speaker 3: Was that an investigation of Trump or of the campaign.

144
00:07:14,840 --> 00:07:17,480
Speaker 4: That was Trump? There was never an investigation in the campaign.

145
00:07:17,560 --> 00:07:20,160
Speaker 4: Now another lot that you'll hear out of the far right.

146
00:07:20,240 --> 00:07:22,360
Speaker 4: There was never an investigation of the campaign. We don't

147
00:07:22,400 --> 00:07:25,920
Speaker 4: investigate campaigns. And what is frustrating to me is I

148
00:07:26,080 --> 00:07:28,720
Speaker 4: talked with Amie McCabe, who was the acting director of

149
00:07:28,720 --> 00:07:30,920
Speaker 4: the FBI at the time and said, okay, in addition

150
00:07:31,000 --> 00:07:34,600
Speaker 4: to going and working with Muller with agents and investigators

151
00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:38,280
Speaker 4: to investigate those crimes, at the same time, the FBI

152
00:07:38,360 --> 00:07:43,040
Speaker 4: contingent was going to do this counterintelligence investigation and recognizing

153
00:07:43,080 --> 00:07:45,280
Speaker 4: that Muller couldn't and didn't want to and didn't have

154
00:07:45,320 --> 00:07:47,080
Speaker 4: the authority to do it. But the only place where

155
00:07:47,080 --> 00:07:50,360
Speaker 4: all that sort of information came together was sitting there

156
00:07:50,360 --> 00:07:53,840
Speaker 4: in the Special Counsel's office. And then when I was removed,

157
00:07:54,520 --> 00:07:58,360
Speaker 4: to my surprise and Amie McCabe saying his surprise, that

158
00:07:58,480 --> 00:08:01,480
Speaker 4: never continued. It essentially stopped. And I think that is

159
00:08:01,680 --> 00:08:05,120
Speaker 4: to the FBI's discredit, to the harm of the nation.

160
00:08:05,320 --> 00:08:08,080
Speaker 4: That again, when you look at whose job is it

161
00:08:08,320 --> 00:08:11,680
Speaker 4: to take the lead on counter intelligence within the United States,

162
00:08:11,680 --> 00:08:14,920
Speaker 4: what's the fbis, and that nobody has ever looked at

163
00:08:15,240 --> 00:08:19,720
Speaker 4: the very I think reasonable question of counterintelligence concerns surrounding

164
00:08:19,720 --> 00:08:22,400
Speaker 4: Trump is a problem, is a gap, is a failure,

165
00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:25,480
Speaker 4: and we haven't done it, and frankly, I don't think

166
00:08:25,480 --> 00:08:27,240
Speaker 4: at this point in our history we're ever going to

167
00:08:27,400 --> 00:08:31,840
Speaker 4: do it. Because my suspicion is if he's elected never

168
00:08:31,880 --> 00:08:34,440
Speaker 4: going to happen. If he's not elected, people are going

169
00:08:34,520 --> 00:08:36,680
Speaker 4: to he's an old man, he's at least four years

170
00:08:36,760 --> 00:08:38,680
Speaker 4: later down the line. Just let it go because it

171
00:08:38,760 --> 00:08:41,000
Speaker 4: is also hard to do right with somebody like Trump.

172
00:08:41,000 --> 00:08:45,040
Speaker 4: That's an extraordinarily daunting prospect. So the short takeaway from

173
00:08:45,120 --> 00:08:49,360
Speaker 4: that is, this person, where it's been demonstrated, has extraordinary

174
00:08:49,360 --> 00:08:53,760
Speaker 4: counter intelligence concerns around him, will never ever be subjected

175
00:08:54,559 --> 00:08:58,679
Speaker 4: to a professional counterintelligence investigation to try and understand it.

176
00:08:59,080 --> 00:09:01,640
Speaker 2: In two and eight, and this is something that Trump

177
00:09:01,679 --> 00:09:04,559
Speaker 2: talks about. It's effect. In two thousand and eight, he

178
00:09:04,600 --> 00:09:08,400
Speaker 2: sold a six acre Palm beach piece of real estate

179
00:09:08,800 --> 00:09:15,199
Speaker 2: to Russian billionaire Dmitri Rabolov got the name bolovv Ribolovov.

180
00:09:15,920 --> 00:09:20,880
Speaker 2: Trump initially bought the real estate for forty million dollars. Now,

181
00:09:21,040 --> 00:09:25,080
Speaker 2: Ribolovov is very close to Putin, he's a Russian oligarch,

182
00:09:25,559 --> 00:09:30,200
Speaker 2: and he bought it several years later in two thousand

183
00:09:30,240 --> 00:09:32,800
Speaker 2: and eight, when the market was bad for real estate,

184
00:09:33,200 --> 00:09:35,480
Speaker 2: he bought it for one hundred million. So it's a

185
00:09:35,600 --> 00:09:40,080
Speaker 2: sixty million dollar increase in the price of the real estate,

186
00:09:40,200 --> 00:09:46,120
Speaker 2: which my understanding was only frimerally fixed. Up and renovated. So,

187
00:09:46,760 --> 00:09:50,319
Speaker 2: from a counterintelligence point of view, was this a way

188
00:09:50,360 --> 00:09:53,160
Speaker 2: to funnel money into Donald Trump? And from a law

189
00:09:53,240 --> 00:09:55,440
Speaker 2: enforcement point of you, is that anything illegal?

190
00:09:55,640 --> 00:09:58,400
Speaker 4: Again, Jim, that's a great question because the sort of

191
00:09:58,480 --> 00:10:02,920
Speaker 4: evil glory of Trump is that his overlay of vulnerabilities

192
00:10:02,920 --> 00:10:06,600
Speaker 4: from account intelligence perspective, overlay with the shadiness of a

193
00:10:06,600 --> 00:10:10,160
Speaker 4: lot of is. In my opinion, business empire real estate

194
00:10:10,240 --> 00:10:13,000
Speaker 4: is well suited for corrupt actors to take advantage of

195
00:10:13,040 --> 00:10:16,120
Speaker 4: for very specific reasons and ways that you pointed out right.

196
00:10:16,200 --> 00:10:18,000
Speaker 4: On the one hand, you can have false valuations to

197
00:10:18,040 --> 00:10:22,600
Speaker 4: evade taxes, which Trump has been convicted of in New York.

198
00:10:22,880 --> 00:10:25,000
Speaker 4: The other thing that's been done is that you can

199
00:10:25,440 --> 00:10:30,719
Speaker 4: either inflate or deflate costs to engage in the transaction.

200
00:10:30,840 --> 00:10:34,520
Speaker 4: And you're the example you gave. Both parties knew that

201
00:10:34,559 --> 00:10:37,040
Speaker 4: the property was not worth what it eventually sold far,

202
00:10:37,120 --> 00:10:39,559
Speaker 4: but they ultimately agreed to sell it at that price

203
00:10:39,600 --> 00:10:43,000
Speaker 4: because it's hard to show that it wasn't in fact worth,

204
00:10:43,040 --> 00:10:45,080
Speaker 4: that there was a buyer's premium, that they found it

205
00:10:45,120 --> 00:10:46,679
Speaker 4: was worth that, and how do you prove that in

206
00:10:46,760 --> 00:10:48,880
Speaker 4: a court. To show it's illegal is very difficult.

207
00:10:48,880 --> 00:10:51,240
Speaker 2: So well, as you leverage buy you influence.

208
00:10:51,200 --> 00:10:53,320
Speaker 4: And that comes up in two contexts, right. One could

209
00:10:53,400 --> 00:10:56,240
Speaker 4: be this is absolutely a payment for influence. It's a

210
00:10:56,280 --> 00:10:59,080
Speaker 4: payment for an action to be taken that's already been taken.

211
00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:01,439
Speaker 4: The other thing, where it comes up in real estate

212
00:11:01,480 --> 00:11:04,360
Speaker 4: all the time, is to launder money. If you have

213
00:11:04,480 --> 00:11:07,319
Speaker 4: illicit money, whether you're an oligarch, whether you're a drug dealer,

214
00:11:07,400 --> 00:11:10,240
Speaker 4: one of the ways that you take these illicit moneies

215
00:11:10,320 --> 00:11:12,960
Speaker 4: that you've gotten and make them turn them into legitimate,

216
00:11:13,040 --> 00:11:15,600
Speaker 4: tangible things of value is to buy real estate. And

217
00:11:15,640 --> 00:11:18,000
Speaker 4: that's why it's concerning when I think it was Eric Trump,

218
00:11:18,280 --> 00:11:19,920
Speaker 4: not Donald. I think it was Eric who said at

219
00:11:19,960 --> 00:11:23,680
Speaker 4: some point in the twenty sixteen campaign a disproportionate amount

220
00:11:23,800 --> 00:11:26,960
Speaker 4: of the Trump's real estate holdings were from Russian entities.

221
00:11:26,960 --> 00:11:30,040
Speaker 4: So that's an alarm belt, right, because one, Russians may

222
00:11:30,040 --> 00:11:31,800
Speaker 4: be trying to buy real estate because they want to

223
00:11:31,840 --> 00:11:34,480
Speaker 4: park value in the West, but two, they could be

224
00:11:34,520 --> 00:11:37,560
Speaker 4: laundering moneys through there. And if you look at Trump,

225
00:11:37,600 --> 00:11:40,280
Speaker 4: it's like his entire career, in my opinion, has been

226
00:11:40,280 --> 00:11:42,040
Speaker 4: doing that. It's real estate, but it's also look at

227
00:11:42,080 --> 00:11:46,280
Speaker 4: his casinos. Another amazing way for laundering moneies that are

228
00:11:46,600 --> 00:11:49,040
Speaker 4: ill gotten gains that you go and you buy chips

229
00:11:49,040 --> 00:11:52,000
Speaker 4: and then maybe lose ten percent, But when you cash out,

230
00:11:52,120 --> 00:11:56,360
Speaker 4: you can take illegal moneies and make them more legal.

231
00:11:56,480 --> 00:12:01,400
Speaker 4: So Trump has spent his entire business career in and

232
00:12:01,480 --> 00:12:07,320
Speaker 4: around business that is well suited to illicit movements of money.

233
00:12:07,440 --> 00:12:09,719
Speaker 4: And one of his casinos, if I remember correctly, got

234
00:12:09,760 --> 00:12:12,839
Speaker 4: in trouble, I think because they failed to do sufficient

235
00:12:12,920 --> 00:12:15,280
Speaker 4: to know your customer type checks when somebody rolled in

236
00:12:15,320 --> 00:12:18,280
Speaker 4: with a bunch of money. Their state and other licensing

237
00:12:18,480 --> 00:12:21,520
Speaker 4: entities require you as a casino to go out and

238
00:12:21,559 --> 00:12:23,880
Speaker 4: do a certain amount of due diligence to make sure

239
00:12:23,880 --> 00:12:27,560
Speaker 4: that these are legal moneies. And if I recall correctly,

240
00:12:27,880 --> 00:12:29,680
Speaker 4: his casino, at least one of them was written up

241
00:12:29,720 --> 00:12:33,240
Speaker 4: for not doing that sufficiently. So he's got a history

242
00:12:33,280 --> 00:12:35,040
Speaker 4: of this. On the one hand, it serves him in

243
00:12:35,040 --> 00:12:37,640
Speaker 4: my opinion on shady business dealings, but it also serves

244
00:12:37,679 --> 00:12:41,720
Speaker 4: him in a making himself vulnerable in an intelligence context.

245
00:12:42,280 --> 00:12:44,360
Speaker 3: So, Peter, do you have a theory of the case

246
00:12:44,440 --> 00:12:48,040
Speaker 3: on Trump vis a VI compromised with the Russians? And

247
00:12:48,120 --> 00:12:50,120
Speaker 3: let me just put out my case around just around

248
00:12:50,120 --> 00:12:54,520
Speaker 3: the twenty sixteen election, is that Donald Trump's lifestyle business

249
00:12:54,559 --> 00:12:57,520
Speaker 3: practice has made him uniquely vulnerable to blackmail and extortion

250
00:12:57,840 --> 00:13:00,440
Speaker 3: by the country that is un arguably the best in

251
00:13:00,440 --> 00:13:03,920
Speaker 3: the world at those dark arts. His campaign team, with

252
00:13:04,000 --> 00:13:06,400
Speaker 3: its own unusual shady ties of Russia, was willing to

253
00:13:06,440 --> 00:13:09,520
Speaker 3: work with a hostile form power and eager to accept

254
00:13:09,600 --> 00:13:12,600
Speaker 3: material stolen from Americans. None of them went to the

255
00:13:12,600 --> 00:13:15,560
Speaker 3: authorities to report the illicit contexts, and many of them

256
00:13:15,600 --> 00:13:19,360
Speaker 3: were subsequently arrested. When the issue of Russian involvement surfaced publicly,

257
00:13:19,400 --> 00:13:21,960
Speaker 3: every single one of them lied and covered up their actions.

258
00:13:22,400 --> 00:13:26,199
Speaker 3: Trump then attacked the very institutions and people you one

259
00:13:26,200 --> 00:13:28,480
Speaker 3: of them that could hold him on account, and sought

260
00:13:28,520 --> 00:13:32,360
Speaker 3: to obstruct the investigations, eventually then pardoning anyone who could

261
00:13:32,360 --> 00:13:36,160
Speaker 3: provide evidence of wrongdoing. And then, even after all of that,

262
00:13:36,600 --> 00:13:39,600
Speaker 3: even his most fervent supporters have been unable to provide

263
00:13:39,640 --> 00:13:43,839
Speaker 3: any innocent explanation why a domestic political campaign would need

264
00:13:43,920 --> 00:13:46,240
Speaker 3: such deep engagement with a hostile form power. To me,

265
00:13:46,880 --> 00:13:49,800
Speaker 3: that is very damning and suggests that there should be

266
00:13:50,400 --> 00:13:53,720
Speaker 3: a counterintelligence investigation around the twenty sixteen election and Trump,

267
00:13:53,800 --> 00:13:54,800
Speaker 3: if nothing else.

268
00:13:54,679 --> 00:13:58,760
Speaker 2: His campaign manager. Man Form admits publicly in his book

269
00:13:58,840 --> 00:14:01,160
Speaker 2: that he was meeting with a Russian an intelligence officer

270
00:14:01,679 --> 00:14:04,920
Speaker 2: and passing him information from the campaign that the Russians

271
00:14:04,920 --> 00:14:08,240
Speaker 2: could then use to manipulate our election.

272
00:14:08,520 --> 00:14:11,960
Speaker 4: Intelligence agencies. Typically, certainly when you look at the Russians

273
00:14:12,040 --> 00:14:16,040
Speaker 4: are competent right broadly, they're going to play somebody with

274
00:14:16,160 --> 00:14:18,360
Speaker 4: a view towards the long game. They're not going to

275
00:14:18,400 --> 00:14:20,760
Speaker 4: push an issue to cause that person to turn away

276
00:14:20,840 --> 00:14:22,640
Speaker 4: or put them in a position where it's going to

277
00:14:22,720 --> 00:14:24,600
Speaker 4: make them not want to do something. So what I

278
00:14:24,640 --> 00:14:27,480
Speaker 4: mean by that is if you're Russia and you are

279
00:14:27,840 --> 00:14:32,120
Speaker 4: well versed in the ways to identify vulnerabilities and people,

280
00:14:32,200 --> 00:14:33,800
Speaker 4: and again it isn't just you and the three of

281
00:14:33,880 --> 00:14:35,520
Speaker 4: us sitting around having a beer and shooting the shit

282
00:14:35,560 --> 00:14:37,880
Speaker 4: about how somebody might be vulnerable. I mean, it's like

283
00:14:37,920 --> 00:14:40,160
Speaker 4: the agentcy like any intel service, you have teams of

284
00:14:40,200 --> 00:14:43,200
Speaker 4: people who are sitting there through a formal process looking

285
00:14:43,280 --> 00:14:47,080
Speaker 4: at somebody to identify their vulnerabilities, to evaluate their psychology

286
00:14:47,160 --> 00:14:49,560
Speaker 4: and what makes them tick, and to go out there

287
00:14:49,640 --> 00:14:52,160
Speaker 4: and leverage that. Some of that has got sense as

288
00:14:52,200 --> 00:14:54,040
Speaker 4: a case officer, but a lot of is backed up

289
00:14:54,080 --> 00:14:57,360
Speaker 4: by a huge organization, well resourced. It's looking into it.

290
00:14:57,400 --> 00:14:59,720
Speaker 4: And when you look at Trump, the things that motivate

291
00:14:59,720 --> 00:15:05,480
Speaker 4: Trump are his ego, his insecurity, his affection and love

292
00:15:05,600 --> 00:15:08,680
Speaker 4: of authoritarian figures. And the psychologists can figure out if

293
00:15:08,680 --> 00:15:11,120
Speaker 4: that's like a daddy issue when he was little, and

294
00:15:11,240 --> 00:15:14,240
Speaker 4: money and all of those are things that the Russian

295
00:15:14,280 --> 00:15:18,440
Speaker 4: intelligence services are extraordinarily competent and exploiting. And again this

296
00:15:18,800 --> 00:15:21,160
Speaker 4: isn't and would never be the SVR is showing up

297
00:15:21,160 --> 00:15:24,560
Speaker 4: at some sidebar between Putin and Trump and handing him

298
00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:26,800
Speaker 4: over a bag of money or a wallet full of bitcoin.

299
00:15:26,880 --> 00:15:29,320
Speaker 4: It's going to be ways that are explainable, that are

300
00:15:29,320 --> 00:15:32,160
Speaker 4: hard to trace. And to your point, during the twenty

301
00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:36,040
Speaker 4: sixteen election, Michael Cohen was convicted and went to jail,

302
00:15:36,600 --> 00:15:41,280
Speaker 4: was literally in and around Moscow dealing with Russian folks

303
00:15:41,440 --> 00:15:44,360
Speaker 4: about the prospect of a Trump Tower of Moscow. Literally

304
00:15:44,440 --> 00:15:46,760
Speaker 4: at the moment Trump was on the campaign trail saying

305
00:15:46,800 --> 00:15:49,560
Speaker 4: I have no financial ties to Russia, none, which is

306
00:15:49,600 --> 00:15:52,800
Speaker 4: obvious bullshit. And Trump knew that Cohen was dealing with

307
00:15:52,880 --> 00:15:55,320
Speaker 4: Moscow at the moment he said that, and of course

308
00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:58,680
Speaker 4: the Russians knew that Michael Cohen was dealing them. So

309
00:15:59,120 --> 00:16:02,120
Speaker 4: the minute that happen happens, the Russians are like, wait

310
00:16:02,200 --> 00:16:04,560
Speaker 4: a minute, Trump denied it and we're doing it. So

311
00:16:04,600 --> 00:16:07,600
Speaker 4: therefore we've got this ongoing back and forth that gives

312
00:16:07,680 --> 00:16:10,240
Speaker 4: us leverage because Trump just denied it, and if we

313
00:16:10,280 --> 00:16:12,480
Speaker 4: go there and publicize it's going to hurt him politically.

314
00:16:12,880 --> 00:16:15,760
Speaker 4: Trump knows they know that, and so it's this unspoken

315
00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:19,840
Speaker 4: agreement between those two parties. Then you know, wink and

316
00:16:19,920 --> 00:16:23,320
Speaker 4: a nod, this is fine. And again, look at Trump's

317
00:16:23,320 --> 00:16:26,800
Speaker 4: sexual history, look at what's been proven with Egene Carroll,

318
00:16:26,880 --> 00:16:29,600
Speaker 4: look at what's been alleged by the scores of women

319
00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:33,360
Speaker 4: in the US. You can't tell me knowing what you know.

320
00:16:33,400 --> 00:16:36,040
Speaker 4: And the way Russians are willing to use compromise in

321
00:16:36,160 --> 00:16:39,720
Speaker 4: women to target Westerners in your experience, what you saw

322
00:16:39,800 --> 00:16:42,800
Speaker 4: happening in Russia, that they don't have the ability to

323
00:16:42,880 --> 00:16:45,440
Speaker 4: one understand that appetite and Trump and to apply that

324
00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:47,440
Speaker 4: it's ridiculous.

325
00:16:48,240 --> 00:16:53,200
Speaker 2: We'll be right back in a moment, welcome back.

326
00:16:54,280 --> 00:16:57,800
Speaker 3: When Donald Trump pushes back against the stuff he always says, Russia, Russia, Russia.

327
00:16:57,960 --> 00:17:00,000
Speaker 3: And you said something which I thought was really interest

328
00:17:00,920 --> 00:17:03,960
Speaker 3: you said that these kind of things, this gangster mentality,

329
00:17:03,960 --> 00:17:06,960
Speaker 3: doesn't just work with Russia and Russian intelligence, it could

330
00:17:07,000 --> 00:17:09,760
Speaker 3: work with others. If you look into Trump's experience and

331
00:17:09,800 --> 00:17:12,960
Speaker 3: his family and money coming from China, that there's as

332
00:17:13,040 --> 00:17:15,680
Speaker 3: much a concern with China and perhaps the Egypt or

333
00:17:15,720 --> 00:17:17,119
Speaker 3: others as it would be with Russia.

334
00:17:17,240 --> 00:17:19,320
Speaker 4: I mean, you look at Jared Kushner. After the administration,

335
00:17:19,400 --> 00:17:21,520
Speaker 4: you got wet like some of more than one one

336
00:17:21,520 --> 00:17:24,240
Speaker 4: to two billion dollars of investment money from the Saudi

337
00:17:24,600 --> 00:17:27,760
Speaker 4: having Wealth Fund and others within weeks and hasn't turned

338
00:17:27,760 --> 00:17:30,520
Speaker 4: a profit and has made one two hundred million. I

339
00:17:30,560 --> 00:17:33,160
Speaker 4: forget the exact amount in fees for managing that money

340
00:17:33,160 --> 00:17:36,480
Speaker 4: for zero return for their investors, and that fund has

341
00:17:36,920 --> 00:17:40,200
Speaker 4: little to nothing to show for it has no competence

342
00:17:40,280 --> 00:17:43,440
Speaker 4: in it. The Saudi Sovereign Wealth Fund advisors were saying,

343
00:17:43,480 --> 00:17:45,680
Speaker 4: don't put your money here because it doesn't make sense

344
00:17:45,720 --> 00:17:48,960
Speaker 4: financially from a risk perspective. But nonetheless that money is

345
00:17:49,000 --> 00:17:51,400
Speaker 4: flowing in there. There are other countries. We talked about

346
00:17:51,480 --> 00:17:53,760
Speaker 4: Egypt earlier. There's some I think the Katari's there's some

347
00:17:53,800 --> 00:17:57,680
Speaker 4: indication that they're making licensing deals with Trump for a

348
00:17:57,760 --> 00:17:59,720
Speaker 4: high rise, not that he's building just to put his

349
00:17:59,800 --> 00:18:03,120
Speaker 4: name on it. But any time you get countries who

350
00:18:03,160 --> 00:18:08,520
Speaker 4: are willing to pay tribute through some legally coverable way,

351
00:18:08,880 --> 00:18:11,120
Speaker 4: Trump is going to take it. And then the other thing,

352
00:18:11,119 --> 00:18:14,119
Speaker 4: of course, is this odd like he does have a

353
00:18:14,160 --> 00:18:16,840
Speaker 4: fascination with strongman. He talks about Kim Jong un and

354
00:18:16,880 --> 00:18:19,040
Speaker 4: not just this stupid no he wrote me love letters,

355
00:18:19,040 --> 00:18:21,560
Speaker 4: but comments he made to White House staff about when

356
00:18:21,600 --> 00:18:24,679
Speaker 4: he Kim Jong un talks, his people will snap to attention.

357
00:18:25,080 --> 00:18:28,200
Speaker 4: And Trump sees that as something he wants emulated. Right.

358
00:18:28,280 --> 00:18:32,040
Speaker 4: He wants his people, he wants, whether that's his government

359
00:18:32,160 --> 00:18:35,159
Speaker 4: or the US population, to snap to attention. And they

360
00:18:35,200 --> 00:18:38,919
Speaker 4: have big parades and cry hysterically singing his praises on

361
00:18:38,960 --> 00:18:42,240
Speaker 4: the evening news. And Trump is the mark in the bizarre.

362
00:18:42,720 --> 00:18:45,000
Speaker 4: He is the guy that walks in and everybody's like,

363
00:18:45,119 --> 00:18:48,080
Speaker 4: there's the sucker that we are going to get ten

364
00:18:48,119 --> 00:18:51,440
Speaker 4: thousand dollars to this two hundred dollars carpet, and everybody

365
00:18:51,480 --> 00:18:51,960
Speaker 4: knows it.

366
00:18:52,400 --> 00:18:54,080
Speaker 3: For you or for the audience. I would like to

367
00:18:54,440 --> 00:18:56,960
Speaker 3: aim people towards An article I wrote in twenty nineteen

368
00:18:57,040 --> 00:19:00,320
Speaker 3: for Just Security called is Trump a Russian agent, which

369
00:19:00,359 --> 00:19:02,680
Speaker 3: tries to lay out the terms and the explanations, which

370
00:19:02,720 --> 00:19:05,440
Speaker 3: comes to that same conclusion, it's more of this gangster

371
00:19:05,480 --> 00:19:08,439
Speaker 3: culture than it is. He's likely a controlled asset of

372
00:19:08,440 --> 00:19:09,840
Speaker 3: any foreign intelligence zone.

373
00:19:09,880 --> 00:19:12,120
Speaker 2: When I was on the inside, I know of an

374
00:19:12,119 --> 00:19:17,280
Speaker 2: instance where there was a young agency officer and he

375
00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:21,440
Speaker 2: was posted to an authoritarian government, met a young woman,

376
00:19:21,680 --> 00:19:25,560
Speaker 2: fell in love. And the way the agency works that

377
00:19:26,160 --> 00:19:28,080
Speaker 2: is that when an agency office is going to marry

378
00:19:28,080 --> 00:19:30,680
Speaker 2: a foreign or, she has to be polygraphed, and on

379
00:19:30,760 --> 00:19:35,119
Speaker 2: her polygraph she said yeah. At one point in the

380
00:19:35,200 --> 00:19:38,520
Speaker 2: dating processes it was getting serious. The local service, the

381
00:19:38,560 --> 00:19:42,000
Speaker 2: local intelligence service from this authoritarian government which has close

382
00:19:42,040 --> 00:19:46,320
Speaker 2: ties to Russia, came to her and didn't say, don't

383
00:19:46,320 --> 00:19:48,520
Speaker 2: fuck with us, you need to work with us, but said,

384
00:19:49,119 --> 00:19:51,840
Speaker 2: we would like to persuade you to talk to us

385
00:19:51,880 --> 00:19:54,399
Speaker 2: from time to time through a family member. You know,

386
00:19:54,440 --> 00:19:56,520
Speaker 2: we'll talk to your dad or he or she is

387
00:19:56,560 --> 00:19:58,679
Speaker 2: willing to do it, and from time to time we

388
00:19:58,800 --> 00:20:03,000
Speaker 2: can chat. And she said no. So she admitted this

389
00:20:03,080 --> 00:20:06,360
Speaker 2: on the polygraph, and the agency said, you know what,

390
00:20:07,480 --> 00:20:09,720
Speaker 2: we think this match is for real. They really love

391
00:20:09,760 --> 00:20:12,879
Speaker 2: each other. But to the CIA officer We said, you

392
00:20:13,000 --> 00:20:15,679
Speaker 2: need to choose either to remain in the agency and

393
00:20:15,720 --> 00:20:17,960
Speaker 2: not get married to this woman, or you need to

394
00:20:18,080 --> 00:20:22,880
Speaker 2: leave because she will always be vulnerable her family members.

395
00:20:23,200 --> 00:20:25,439
Speaker 2: Two or three years from now, something will happen. So

396
00:20:25,520 --> 00:20:29,359
Speaker 2: it's just set the stage. So in nineteen seventy seven,

397
00:20:30,000 --> 00:20:33,240
Speaker 2: way back then, Donald Trump, the real estate bogul, married

398
00:20:33,640 --> 00:20:37,159
Speaker 2: a Czech citizen. Czechoslovakia at the time. You're smiling, You

399
00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:40,760
Speaker 2: know the story. Czechoslovakia at the time was a really

400
00:20:41,119 --> 00:20:46,200
Speaker 2: hardcore like the East German Stalinist government with a really

401
00:20:46,240 --> 00:20:52,199
Speaker 2: hardcore intelligence service. Now she was out of Czechoslovakia and

402
00:20:52,240 --> 00:20:55,040
Speaker 2: she had committed an illegal act. She had entered into

403
00:20:55,080 --> 00:20:59,320
Speaker 2: a sham marriage with an Austrian Evanna did, and she

404
00:20:59,400 --> 00:21:04,880
Speaker 2: had eagerly emigrated with this illegally gotten passport to Canada,

405
00:21:05,320 --> 00:21:07,359
Speaker 2: and then she filled in forms to come to the

406
00:21:07,480 --> 00:21:12,000
Speaker 2: United States that she filled in illegally. She made claims

407
00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:14,399
Speaker 2: that she had a veil at Austrian passport and she

408
00:21:14,600 --> 00:21:20,800
Speaker 2: did not. And she met and married Donald Trump. This

409
00:21:20,880 --> 00:21:24,439
Speaker 2: is a tremendous honor for me. I guess in a

410
00:21:24,480 --> 00:21:26,840
Speaker 2: lot of ways, my wife is sitting right over here.

411
00:21:26,880 --> 00:21:29,760
Speaker 2: She just became an American citizen, and that's a honor.

412
00:21:36,480 --> 00:21:40,439
Speaker 2: We do know from the Czech files left over from

413
00:21:40,760 --> 00:21:43,359
Speaker 2: when the turn of the Fall of the Wall and

414
00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:46,600
Speaker 2: so forth, that the Czech Service, the STB opened an

415
00:21:46,680 --> 00:21:51,320
Speaker 2: investigation into her, that we know her father, who I

416
00:21:51,400 --> 00:21:56,080
Speaker 2: understand informally was a hardcore communist, her father was talking

417
00:21:56,119 --> 00:21:59,960
Speaker 2: to the Chech Service, and that they opened an operational file.

418
00:22:00,240 --> 00:22:04,720
Speaker 2: I they had a specific operation in mind for this

419
00:22:04,880 --> 00:22:11,680
Speaker 2: young influential entrepreneur. That file has disappeared, that's never been found,

420
00:22:12,160 --> 00:22:16,280
Speaker 2: so there is no smoking gun. And this is conspiracy

421
00:22:16,320 --> 00:22:21,480
Speaker 2: theory light. But in the counterintelligence world, if I was

422
00:22:21,520 --> 00:22:24,560
Speaker 2: the Czech Service working closely with the Russians, I would

423
00:22:24,600 --> 00:22:29,240
Speaker 2: probably use that to bump into Donald Trump, to have

424
00:22:29,480 --> 00:22:32,160
Speaker 2: Evanna or her father who was working with a Czech

425
00:22:32,160 --> 00:22:36,919
Speaker 2: Service engineer or relationship, or bump somebody into him to

426
00:22:37,160 --> 00:22:39,960
Speaker 2: just talk to you know, we could talk from time

427
00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:42,600
Speaker 2: to time, perhaps to begin this operation.

428
00:22:42,880 --> 00:22:45,119
Speaker 3: But you're mentioning, Jerry, is a failure of the FBI

429
00:22:45,240 --> 00:22:53,720
Speaker 3: to investigate properly this young woman or there.

430
00:22:54,359 --> 00:22:56,800
Speaker 2: This is almost a conspiracy theory, but it's not right,

431
00:22:56,960 --> 00:22:59,200
Speaker 2: as the sets of facts that lead to suspicion is

432
00:22:59,240 --> 00:23:01,000
Speaker 2: all it is. But what's your sense of that?

433
00:23:01,600 --> 00:23:04,040
Speaker 4: Yes, so look one my sense is like, at least

434
00:23:04,080 --> 00:23:06,880
Speaker 4: on the counterintelligence side, this is absolutely what the Soviets

435
00:23:06,880 --> 00:23:08,960
Speaker 4: and Soviet client states would do, whether it is the

436
00:23:09,000 --> 00:23:11,760
Speaker 4: Soviet In many cases like I, as good as the

437
00:23:11,840 --> 00:23:14,560
Speaker 4: KGB was, the size of these Germans were better. In

438
00:23:14,600 --> 00:23:17,040
Speaker 4: my opinion. The checks were amazing, the polls were very,

439
00:23:17,119 --> 00:23:20,160
Speaker 4: very good. And when it came to the immigrant communities,

440
00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:23,520
Speaker 4: in particular, levaging those personnel who moved into the West,

441
00:23:23,560 --> 00:23:25,840
Speaker 4: and whether it was immediately or just you know, you've

442
00:23:25,840 --> 00:23:28,040
Speaker 4: got a huge field and you put out a thousand

443
00:23:28,080 --> 00:23:30,960
Speaker 4: seeds and you just watch which ones grow up. No

444
00:23:31,080 --> 00:23:33,879
Speaker 4: good intelligence service. They're not going to wield their power

445
00:23:33,880 --> 00:23:36,840
Speaker 4: and influence like a blunt instrument. It is what. You're

446
00:23:36,880 --> 00:23:39,240
Speaker 4: not going to say something that is going to force

447
00:23:39,280 --> 00:23:42,320
Speaker 4: somebody to an uncomfortable choice of either I'm in with

448
00:23:42,320 --> 00:23:43,960
Speaker 4: you one hundred percent or I'm going to walk away.

449
00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:47,400
Speaker 4: You give people latitude and leeway so that whether consciously

450
00:23:47,480 --> 00:23:51,560
Speaker 4: or subconsciously, they think they're okay, and you maintain that relationship.

451
00:23:51,640 --> 00:23:54,240
Speaker 4: And so again, going back to the earlier question about

452
00:23:54,280 --> 00:23:57,360
Speaker 4: the counter intelligence investigation of Trump, without saying one way

453
00:23:57,400 --> 00:24:00,200
Speaker 4: or the other. It is a reasonable question to ask.

454
00:24:00,520 --> 00:24:04,120
Speaker 4: Because the Bureau had a vibrant counter intelligence program during

455
00:24:04,160 --> 00:24:06,840
Speaker 4: the Cold War, they looked at emigrats like this. Did

456
00:24:06,880 --> 00:24:09,920
Speaker 4: anybody ever look at Evanna Trump? Did anybody look if

457
00:24:09,960 --> 00:24:12,880
Speaker 4: not her, the people that she was connected to, who

458
00:24:12,920 --> 00:24:17,040
Speaker 4: were in contact with the Czech services, did anybody look

459
00:24:17,080 --> 00:24:18,800
Speaker 4: at them? That's one of the things you do. If

460
00:24:18,840 --> 00:24:21,879
Speaker 4: you had a counterintelligence case on Trump, you would go

461
00:24:22,000 --> 00:24:24,600
Speaker 4: back and say, let's look at all these factors and

462
00:24:24,680 --> 00:24:29,879
Speaker 4: see potential intersections between Soviet or Soviet client state intelligence

463
00:24:29,920 --> 00:24:32,840
Speaker 4: services and not only Trump but anybody around them. And

464
00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:35,560
Speaker 4: Avana screams, I mean, it was a weird Like if

465
00:24:35,600 --> 00:24:38,000
Speaker 4: you go back and look at the timeline that's known

466
00:24:38,080 --> 00:24:40,119
Speaker 4: about her movement to the West and the time she

467
00:24:40,160 --> 00:24:42,199
Speaker 4: spent in Canada and what she did or didn't do,

468
00:24:42,640 --> 00:24:44,800
Speaker 4: and where this lie that I think Don Trump Junior

469
00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:46,520
Speaker 4: is saying my mom was an Olympian. No, she was

470
00:24:46,520 --> 00:24:49,440
Speaker 4: never an Olympian. Never, And so where, you know, where

471
00:24:49,480 --> 00:24:52,119
Speaker 4: did that story come from? What was the timing of

472
00:24:52,160 --> 00:24:55,000
Speaker 4: her application for permanent residency in the United States, the

473
00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:57,680
Speaker 4: data that was put down to support that permanent residency,

474
00:24:57,680 --> 00:25:00,480
Speaker 4: Whether there's sham marriages or not. All those a reasonable

475
00:25:00,560 --> 00:25:05,679
Speaker 4: questions because those are techniques that were used by the checks,

476
00:25:05,720 --> 00:25:08,000
Speaker 4: by the polls, by the East Germans, by the Soviets

477
00:25:08,040 --> 00:25:10,640
Speaker 4: to get immigrats into the United States.

478
00:25:10,800 --> 00:25:12,879
Speaker 3: I have a question for you, Peter, what was it

479
00:25:12,960 --> 00:25:14,120
Speaker 3: like to work with the CIA.

480
00:25:14,320 --> 00:25:17,080
Speaker 2: I'll be honest, Yeah, were you in Awe? How did

481
00:25:17,080 --> 00:25:19,919
Speaker 2: you the name was?

482
00:25:19,960 --> 00:25:21,480
Speaker 4: It was good. I mean a lot of it was

483
00:25:21,560 --> 00:25:25,840
Speaker 4: just learning, you know, and my I grew up around

484
00:25:25,880 --> 00:25:28,199
Speaker 4: the world and overseas, so I think and then just

485
00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:30,080
Speaker 4: through education, I think at a little bit of a

486
00:25:30,119 --> 00:25:32,560
Speaker 4: different appreciation of what the CIA did and how they

487
00:25:32,600 --> 00:25:34,639
Speaker 4: work than the average bureau agent.

488
00:25:34,800 --> 00:25:34,919
Speaker 3: Right.

489
00:25:34,960 --> 00:25:38,439
Speaker 4: I remember my agents getting frustrated because they would have

490
00:25:38,480 --> 00:25:41,639
Speaker 4: some back and forth to somebody at headquarters and then

491
00:25:41,760 --> 00:25:43,439
Speaker 4: give them different names. But I don't know if your

492
00:25:43,440 --> 00:25:45,920
Speaker 4: listeners know you've got your true name, and then you've

493
00:25:45,920 --> 00:25:47,960
Speaker 4: got potentially a cover name which you might use if

494
00:25:48,000 --> 00:25:50,800
Speaker 4: you're overseas, but then also internally you have a pseudo

495
00:25:50,880 --> 00:25:53,359
Speaker 4: or a different name, so you all walk around with

496
00:25:53,440 --> 00:25:55,800
Speaker 4: multiple different names, which all makes sense if you're on

497
00:25:55,840 --> 00:25:58,320
Speaker 4: the inside, because you know, every email's got your funny

498
00:25:58,359 --> 00:26:01,119
Speaker 4: name or whatever. But for an agents sitting there saying, well,

499
00:26:01,160 --> 00:26:03,960
Speaker 4: I talked to John, but really he called himself storm Hammer.

500
00:26:04,119 --> 00:26:05,720
Speaker 4: I don't know what the fuck that's all about. And

501
00:26:05,760 --> 00:26:09,960
Speaker 4: so they're not trustable and storm Hammer, storm Hammer.

502
00:26:11,640 --> 00:26:13,560
Speaker 2: John and I are pseudos. Were pretty lame.

503
00:26:13,920 --> 00:26:16,520
Speaker 4: Yeah, that most of them are, Like I can count

504
00:26:16,560 --> 00:26:18,679
Speaker 4: on one hand. I'm like, oh, that's badass. The other one.

505
00:26:18,760 --> 00:26:20,840
Speaker 2: The funny thing is that it's you get a first name,

506
00:26:20,920 --> 00:26:22,959
Speaker 2: a middle initial that doesn't have a name, and then

507
00:26:23,000 --> 00:26:25,199
Speaker 2: you get a weird name. And I remember there was

508
00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:27,439
Speaker 2: the this is a Nicaragua a long time ago, but

509
00:26:27,480 --> 00:26:30,240
Speaker 2: they shot down an airplane that the Sandin Easts did it.

510
00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:34,919
Speaker 2: It was Eugene J. Hassen Fuss And I'm like, that

511
00:26:35,240 --> 00:26:42,560
Speaker 2: is a pseudo, but it was it sound like yeah.

512
00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:44,800
Speaker 4: But and so setting aside that and and some of

513
00:26:44,800 --> 00:26:47,000
Speaker 4: this dependent on the officer. Like the biggest thing that

514
00:26:47,000 --> 00:26:49,600
Speaker 4: aggravated me is like occasionally come across people that, in

515
00:26:49,680 --> 00:26:51,760
Speaker 4: addition to working with you, would try to case office

516
00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:53,120
Speaker 4: you you know what I mean by that. I don't

517
00:26:53,119 --> 00:26:55,639
Speaker 4: know if your listeners do, but like we are colleagues,

518
00:26:55,720 --> 00:26:57,520
Speaker 4: I am not a recruitment target. So don't sit there

519
00:26:57,520 --> 00:26:59,480
Speaker 4: and all of a sudden started launching into pro questions.

520
00:26:59,560 --> 00:27:01,240
Speaker 4: But when you go to school own no kidding, what

521
00:27:01,320 --> 00:27:03,440
Speaker 4: did you major? And don't don't I know what you're

522
00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:04,800
Speaker 4: fucking doing. Stop asking me question.

523
00:27:04,800 --> 00:27:06,359
Speaker 3: I'm a poor case officer because every.

524
00:27:06,359 --> 00:27:08,240
Speaker 4: That is a poor case officer, because like, yeah, John,

525
00:27:08,240 --> 00:27:10,160
Speaker 4: you've been doing it to me for like five years now,

526
00:27:10,160 --> 00:27:11,919
Speaker 4: and I have no fucking clue right way to get

527
00:27:11,920 --> 00:27:12,200
Speaker 4: an f.

528
00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:14,080
Speaker 3: THEI officers just pay for his food.

529
00:27:14,160 --> 00:27:17,280
Speaker 4: That's or travel or travel. Hey, we need to take it,

530
00:27:17,400 --> 00:27:18,960
Speaker 4: and we need to take it into the UK and

531
00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:21,360
Speaker 4: we'll pay for business class whatever you want.

532
00:27:21,359 --> 00:27:25,160
Speaker 3: All right, I'm in Thank you very much for coming

533
00:27:25,200 --> 00:27:27,000
Speaker 3: on with us. You're not only you're a good profession,

534
00:27:27,080 --> 00:27:28,399
Speaker 3: but you're a good friend and that we hope we

535
00:27:28,440 --> 00:27:29,960
Speaker 3: can have you on again sometime soon.

536
00:27:30,040 --> 00:27:31,120
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, it would be great.

537
00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:34,119
Speaker 3: Hold on just a second, well we take a quick break.

538
00:27:37,520 --> 00:27:39,520
Speaker 6: All right, back to Mission implausible.

539
00:27:40,600 --> 00:27:46,880
Speaker 5: Now, let's bring back Adam Davidson, so.

540
00:27:46,920 --> 00:27:50,000
Speaker 6: Can I Here's what I think the single best defense

541
00:27:50,480 --> 00:27:54,399
Speaker 6: Trump has, which is he's so obviously an agent of

542
00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:56,320
Speaker 6: the Russians that he can't possibiz.

543
00:27:56,359 --> 00:27:59,119
Speaker 3: We'll use the term asset because asset has two terms.

544
00:27:59,119 --> 00:28:03,440
Speaker 3: I'm resourcing benefit, he's a benefit to Russian talking points Russia.

545
00:28:03,480 --> 00:28:06,080
Speaker 6: But I mean on the idea that he's an actual agent.

546
00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:09,360
Speaker 6: He's not acting like an agent, right. An agent would

547
00:28:09,400 --> 00:28:11,680
Speaker 6: be the leading voice against Russia.

548
00:28:11,880 --> 00:28:14,840
Speaker 7: Right, if you use the dictionary term, he's an agent, right,

549
00:28:14,920 --> 00:28:17,160
Speaker 7: someone who does something on behalf of someone else.

550
00:28:17,359 --> 00:28:19,640
Speaker 6: But I mean when you guys have an agent at

551
00:28:19,680 --> 00:28:22,679
Speaker 6: an agent back, you know, many years ago before you

552
00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:26,879
Speaker 6: became old and retired and had wouldn't you tell them, like,

553
00:28:26,960 --> 00:28:30,840
Speaker 6: don't go defending America and don't feed the loudest voice

554
00:28:31,440 --> 00:28:33,360
Speaker 6: in favor agent.

555
00:28:33,520 --> 00:28:36,919
Speaker 3: I'd like to think, Adam, you read my definitive article

556
00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:39,560
Speaker 3: called is Trump a Russian Agent? In Just Security in

557
00:28:39,680 --> 00:28:42,400
Speaker 3: twenty nineteen. But I go through it all of how

558
00:28:43,360 --> 00:28:47,120
Speaker 3: the CIA looks at recruiting sources and what it means,

559
00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:48,920
Speaker 3: and how you handle them, how you communicate with them,

560
00:28:49,040 --> 00:28:50,920
Speaker 3: and then also look at the history of how Russians

561
00:28:50,960 --> 00:28:52,600
Speaker 3: do it. Russians have a different way. They look at

562
00:28:52,640 --> 00:28:55,200
Speaker 3: a much wider variety of things. They don't have to

563
00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:58,560
Speaker 3: have that same sense of control and things that we do.

564
00:28:59,320 --> 00:29:02,120
Speaker 3: But I come to the same conclusion is he may

565
00:29:02,160 --> 00:29:04,400
Speaker 3: be of value to them in the fact that they

566
00:29:04,440 --> 00:29:06,000
Speaker 3: can put stuff in front of him and hope that

567
00:29:06,040 --> 00:29:09,120
Speaker 3: he doesn't know any better and regurgitates it. But the

568
00:29:09,160 --> 00:29:12,320
Speaker 3: notion that he would actually follow their direction or could

569
00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:15,000
Speaker 3: report to them on what's going on, or that he

570
00:29:15,040 --> 00:29:17,760
Speaker 3: could follow any direction and do communications with them or

571
00:29:17,800 --> 00:29:21,200
Speaker 3: something is crazy. He just doesn't have the discipline to

572
00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:22,760
Speaker 3: do those kind of things. So the notion that he

573
00:29:22,800 --> 00:29:24,880
Speaker 3: would be a spy in the sense that we and

574
00:29:25,000 --> 00:29:29,240
Speaker 3: CIA run spies just doesn't make any sense. But whether

575
00:29:29,280 --> 00:29:32,880
Speaker 3: he's of value to the Russians and that he's somehow

576
00:29:33,000 --> 00:29:36,280
Speaker 3: compromised or treated by them in a way that helps them,

577
00:29:36,640 --> 00:29:37,760
Speaker 3: it certainly is possible.

578
00:29:37,920 --> 00:29:42,440
Speaker 2: The former Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schruder, I think he

579
00:29:42,760 --> 00:29:46,920
Speaker 2: is depending on your definition, he is certainly an agent

580
00:29:47,040 --> 00:29:48,720
Speaker 2: of the Russian government now right.

581
00:29:48,960 --> 00:29:51,640
Speaker 7: They hit even the Trump Yeah, yeah, And I think

582
00:29:51,720 --> 00:29:55,120
Speaker 7: they have appealed to his ego, They've appealed to his

583
00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:58,440
Speaker 7: sense of wanting to remain important, and they have said

584
00:29:58,480 --> 00:30:02,080
Speaker 7: to him, you can build a bridge intellectually. And of

585
00:30:02,120 --> 00:30:05,080
Speaker 7: course they're paying him a shitload of money through nord

586
00:30:05,120 --> 00:30:08,520
Speaker 7: Stream almost and yeah, two shiploads of money.

587
00:30:08,560 --> 00:30:14,320
Speaker 2: And he has consistently defended Putin and defended the invasion

588
00:30:14,680 --> 00:30:18,000
Speaker 2: of Crimea by not criticizing, by saying, you need to

589
00:30:18,040 --> 00:30:21,040
Speaker 2: understand the Russian point of view. Ukraine's aren't perfect either.

590
00:30:21,200 --> 00:30:23,920
Speaker 7: They get it common and I don't think they said,

591
00:30:24,000 --> 00:30:25,640
Speaker 7: hey man, we got dirty pictures of it.

592
00:30:25,640 --> 00:30:27,160
Speaker 2: He's been married five times, so it's not going to

593
00:30:27,200 --> 00:30:28,800
Speaker 2: work anyway. We've got we've got.

594
00:30:28,640 --> 00:30:31,240
Speaker 7: Dirty pictures, or you've done this, we are going to

595
00:30:31,280 --> 00:30:34,920
Speaker 7: blackmail you into this. You blahahaha a spine now, but

596
00:30:35,080 --> 00:30:37,200
Speaker 7: he is an agent of the Russian government.

597
00:30:37,240 --> 00:30:39,000
Speaker 2: Now. I don't get to use the word indubably all

598
00:30:39,040 --> 00:30:40,720
Speaker 2: that often, but it was a it fits there.

599
00:30:40,920 --> 00:30:42,720
Speaker 3: Got to be a professional journalist. Would you use the

600
00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:43,560
Speaker 3: word indubitably?

601
00:30:43,760 --> 00:30:45,840
Speaker 6: First of all, I know how to pronounce it, which

602
00:30:45,880 --> 00:30:47,000
Speaker 6: is an important part.

603
00:30:46,800 --> 00:30:47,400
Speaker 2: Of using it.

604
00:30:47,480 --> 00:30:51,680
Speaker 6: But indubitably, yeah, but I was you know, I was

605
00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:54,080
Speaker 6: trained don't use a ten dollars word when a nickel

606
00:30:54,080 --> 00:30:56,880
Speaker 6: word'll do. Although you know the New Yorker has been

607
00:30:56,920 --> 00:30:58,920
Speaker 6: known to use a ten dollar word every now and again.

608
00:30:59,400 --> 00:31:01,080
Speaker 5: So do we do that?

609
00:31:01,320 --> 00:31:04,800
Speaker 6: Are there, maybe in Russia, or in China or in

610
00:31:04,840 --> 00:31:07,960
Speaker 6: other countries, people who are working on our behalf without

611
00:31:08,040 --> 00:31:11,720
Speaker 6: being agents or is that not something we do as much.

612
00:31:11,880 --> 00:31:14,640
Speaker 3: I mean, we're a bigger, richer country, so there might

613
00:31:14,640 --> 00:31:17,920
Speaker 3: be people who believe in our system better. But as

614
00:31:17,960 --> 00:31:22,280
Speaker 3: a bureaucracy, the CIA, the clandestine Service, we get promoted

615
00:31:22,520 --> 00:31:25,560
Speaker 3: by recruiting someone who is in a position that can

616
00:31:25,560 --> 00:31:29,400
Speaker 3: give us secrets, follows our direction, is under our control,

617
00:31:29,760 --> 00:31:32,960
Speaker 3: so that they can say John or Jerry recruited this source.

618
00:31:33,040 --> 00:31:35,440
Speaker 3: This source is providing us information we can't get any

619
00:31:35,440 --> 00:31:37,280
Speaker 3: other way. And this person is going to take a

620
00:31:37,280 --> 00:31:40,480
Speaker 3: turnover to another officer and will continue to work for us,

621
00:31:40,520 --> 00:31:43,160
Speaker 3: and is motivated to do so. But as a Russian system,

622
00:31:43,280 --> 00:31:45,800
Speaker 3: when we've seen it over the decades, they have what

623
00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:48,720
Speaker 3: they call useful idiots, and they have agents of influence,

624
00:31:48,760 --> 00:31:51,640
Speaker 3: and they have fellow travelers, and they have a journalist

625
00:31:51,720 --> 00:31:54,200
Speaker 3: who they talk to, and the journalist says mildly pro

626
00:31:54,280 --> 00:31:57,200
Speaker 3: Russian things. They're comfortable with that that's good, that's a

627
00:31:57,200 --> 00:31:59,680
Speaker 3: benefit to their system. So they have a much wider

628
00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:02,600
Speaker 3: view of how they run sources than we see how

629
00:32:02,640 --> 00:32:02,880
Speaker 3: you do.

630
00:32:03,520 --> 00:32:06,360
Speaker 6: So I really look at this. It's my background through

631
00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:10,440
Speaker 6: economic eyes and capital flight from the former Soviet Union.

632
00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:14,240
Speaker 6: So like oligarchs sending their money to the US and

633
00:32:14,280 --> 00:32:18,400
Speaker 6: the UK and some other offshore havens. It's like half

634
00:32:18,520 --> 00:32:23,080
Speaker 6: the wealth. It is trillions of dollars. Like one of

635
00:32:23,120 --> 00:32:26,720
Speaker 6: the largest industries in the world is capital flight from

636
00:32:26,800 --> 00:32:30,840
Speaker 6: former Soviet states and oil rich states, and that money

637
00:32:31,280 --> 00:32:35,920
Speaker 6: that has flowed disproportionately to a handful of cities London,

638
00:32:35,920 --> 00:32:41,400
Speaker 6: New York, Miami, LA, disproportionately into real estate. When your

639
00:32:41,760 --> 00:32:46,479
Speaker 6: capital flight is not investment, you're not like picking small

640
00:32:46,520 --> 00:32:50,760
Speaker 6: startups based on your sophisticated analysis of which ones might

641
00:32:50,800 --> 00:32:54,000
Speaker 6: be successful. You know you're going to lose it around

642
00:32:54,080 --> 00:32:56,520
Speaker 6: twenty percent on average of your money. So you have

643
00:32:56,880 --> 00:33:00,920
Speaker 6: a billion dollars in Moscow or bak Who or tush

644
00:33:01,000 --> 00:33:04,000
Speaker 6: Kent or whatever. If you have a billion, you're willing

645
00:33:04,080 --> 00:33:06,560
Speaker 6: to have eight hundred million in London because that's eight

646
00:33:06,600 --> 00:33:09,080
Speaker 6: hundred million in London or eight hundred million in New

647
00:33:09,120 --> 00:33:11,360
Speaker 6: York is worth a lot more than a billion in

648
00:33:11,440 --> 00:33:15,560
Speaker 6: toush Kent. So as a result, you have this very

649
00:33:15,600 --> 00:33:22,480
Speaker 6: corrosive lubrication of American business activity. Where the way I

650
00:33:22,520 --> 00:33:25,440
Speaker 6: think about it is, if you're in New York real estate,

651
00:33:25,920 --> 00:33:30,200
Speaker 6: say I'm just randomly picking one industry just in geographic

652
00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:32,280
Speaker 6: area out of the blue. You know, New York real

653
00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:34,440
Speaker 6: estate was basically a bunch of oligarchs. It was a

654
00:33:34,480 --> 00:33:38,000
Speaker 6: handful of families that owned everything, and it was very

655
00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:40,400
Speaker 6: close to the mob and every like. I think Trump's

656
00:33:40,440 --> 00:33:42,920
Speaker 6: dad was a sketchy dude, but there were a bunch

657
00:33:42,920 --> 00:33:46,720
Speaker 6: of Trump's dads. But in the nineties into the two thousands,

658
00:33:46,720 --> 00:33:50,320
Speaker 6: what you saw is a professionalization. The families that endured,

659
00:33:50,360 --> 00:33:54,000
Speaker 6: they got real accountants, they built real systems, and they

660
00:33:54,200 --> 00:33:58,920
Speaker 6: became much more established businesses in a modern sense. So

661
00:33:59,000 --> 00:34:01,719
Speaker 6: you have that option, But then you have this other option,

662
00:34:02,320 --> 00:34:07,920
Speaker 6: which is you just facilitate this capital flight, this money laundering.

663
00:34:08,160 --> 00:34:11,760
Speaker 6: It's an easier option. I don't think you really become

664
00:34:11,800 --> 00:34:13,359
Speaker 6: a billionaires easily that way.

665
00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:16,799
Speaker 2: But if you pick your facilitator, they owe you, right.

666
00:34:16,880 --> 00:34:19,360
Speaker 2: It's like I'm going to wash my money through you,

667
00:34:20,120 --> 00:34:22,160
Speaker 2: but you need to do me a favor too, so

668
00:34:22,239 --> 00:34:26,120
Speaker 2: it's not a one way transaction. So both get dirty

669
00:34:26,400 --> 00:34:28,000
Speaker 2: and both become vulnerable.

670
00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:30,920
Speaker 6: Now what's interesting about Trump though, So there's the people

671
00:34:30,960 --> 00:34:33,680
Speaker 6: who are coming to New York or Miami or la

672
00:34:33,800 --> 00:34:37,600
Speaker 6: or London, and that is billions and billions of dollars

673
00:34:37,840 --> 00:34:41,000
Speaker 6: of people buying over priced houses, buying condos that they'll

674
00:34:41,080 --> 00:34:43,759
Speaker 6: visit once for eighty million dollars. So that's a thing,

675
00:34:44,000 --> 00:34:46,080
Speaker 6: and there's lots of people who touch on that. And

676
00:34:46,120 --> 00:34:50,480
Speaker 6: then there's international you know, Exon Mobile or Bechtel or whatever,

677
00:34:50,560 --> 00:34:53,640
Speaker 6: like massive conglomerates that have to do work in kind

678
00:34:53,640 --> 00:34:56,920
Speaker 6: of sketchy countries and they somehow find a way to

679
00:34:57,000 --> 00:35:00,239
Speaker 6: do business. But what Trump has done is really interesting

680
00:35:00,360 --> 00:35:03,680
Speaker 6: is he's essentially become a partner of local developers. There's

681
00:35:03,680 --> 00:35:08,280
Speaker 6: not a Trump Tower Paris, There's not a Trump Tower London, Baku, Azerbaijan.

682
00:35:09,080 --> 00:35:12,680
Speaker 6: He tried and failed a project in Batumi, Georgia. He

683
00:35:12,760 --> 00:35:17,319
Speaker 6: tried and failed projects in Kazakhstan. Has five big projects

684
00:35:17,320 --> 00:35:20,800
Speaker 6: in sort of second tier cities in India, a couple

685
00:35:20,880 --> 00:35:25,680
Speaker 6: projects and second tier cities in Indonesia, and really working

686
00:35:25,840 --> 00:35:30,840
Speaker 6: in the local economy, facilitating in every one of those cases,

687
00:35:31,560 --> 00:35:34,640
Speaker 6: the people sketchy in the context of that kind of

688
00:35:34,800 --> 00:35:38,880
Speaker 6: those highly corrupt nations, like people who are not if

689
00:35:38,920 --> 00:35:41,799
Speaker 6: you compare it to four Seasons or Ritz Carlton, who

690
00:35:41,840 --> 00:35:45,719
Speaker 6: are also doing business. Very often they will have a

691
00:35:45,760 --> 00:35:49,600
Speaker 6: local oligarch, but they'll have the international oligarch. The person

692
00:35:49,719 --> 00:35:53,520
Speaker 6: whose kids go to Harvard, who is hiring like American

693
00:35:53,600 --> 00:35:57,520
Speaker 6: law firms, American accounting firms, to really make sure this project.

694
00:35:57,600 --> 00:35:59,799
Speaker 6: So the Ritz Carlton whatever. I don't want to make

695
00:35:59,800 --> 00:36:03,440
Speaker 6: any specific accusations that this project is clean, even if

696
00:36:03,440 --> 00:36:06,560
Speaker 6: the partner is not clean. But Trump's stuff. The reporting

697
00:36:06,560 --> 00:36:10,440
Speaker 6: I did on Azerbaijan, this was the bottom tier oligarch,

698
00:36:10,600 --> 00:36:14,000
Speaker 6: like a mini gark who's paying people in duffel bags

699
00:36:14,040 --> 00:36:17,080
Speaker 6: full of cash, like in Azerbaijan, one of the most

700
00:36:17,120 --> 00:36:19,279
Speaker 6: highly corrupt nations in the world. It was the guy

701
00:36:19,320 --> 00:36:22,080
Speaker 6: who everyone laughed at how crudely corrupt he was that

702
00:36:22,120 --> 00:36:26,480
Speaker 6: Trump did business with, And that to me is so risky,

703
00:36:27,160 --> 00:36:31,320
Speaker 6: it's so stupid. It's not that other business people aren't

704
00:36:31,320 --> 00:36:35,000
Speaker 6: doing it because they're more moral. It's that it's way

705
00:36:35,120 --> 00:36:38,080
Speaker 6: too little money. You know, Trump's making a million bucks here,

706
00:36:38,239 --> 00:36:41,480
Speaker 6: five million bucks there. So I think when I think

707
00:36:41,520 --> 00:36:46,200
Speaker 6: about Trump, it's he's a salesman who's trying to just

708
00:36:46,480 --> 00:36:50,280
Speaker 6: get these piece of crap little deals, and he thinks

709
00:36:50,880 --> 00:36:54,359
Speaker 6: that by saying these things, he's helping. But that got

710
00:36:54,440 --> 00:36:57,560
Speaker 6: him into a situation where they do have things on him.

711
00:36:57,600 --> 00:37:01,000
Speaker 6: These deals are inherently corrupt. He is no legal way,

712
00:37:01,520 --> 00:37:03,240
Speaker 6: non corrupt way to do what he did.

713
00:37:03,560 --> 00:37:05,799
Speaker 2: I just want to underline this with so the two

714
00:37:05,840 --> 00:37:08,160
Speaker 2: times he tried that we know of for a Moscow tower,

715
00:37:08,360 --> 00:37:11,040
Speaker 2: Moscow Trump Tower, he used Felix Sayer, who is this

716
00:37:11,520 --> 00:37:14,120
Speaker 2: Russian low level mafiosa guy, And that was one of

717
00:37:14,120 --> 00:37:16,360
Speaker 2: the guys he was trying to use to build Trump Tower.

718
00:37:16,600 --> 00:37:19,200
Speaker 6: So I anyway, I think there's a very clear and

719
00:37:19,280 --> 00:37:23,080
Speaker 6: clean story that doesn't require he's an official agent. It's

720
00:37:23,120 --> 00:37:27,160
Speaker 6: a very simple story. He doesn't dispute it. There's no dispute.

721
00:37:27,239 --> 00:37:30,040
Speaker 6: There's all this money pouring in to the US. It's

722
00:37:30,120 --> 00:37:33,440
Speaker 6: relatively easy money. He took advantage of it. No question

723
00:37:33,520 --> 00:37:38,239
Speaker 6: Trump Tower, Trump Soho filled with dirty Russian money. But

724
00:37:38,400 --> 00:37:43,279
Speaker 6: so are all these new apartment towers in Manhattan, Florida too.

725
00:37:43,640 --> 00:37:47,640
Speaker 6: So in that sense, Trump's not an outlier, but nobody's

726
00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:51,160
Speaker 6: going there. And forget about Moscow going to these like

727
00:37:51,400 --> 00:37:55,480
Speaker 6: third tier cities to work with the fifth tier oligarch.

728
00:37:55,560 --> 00:37:59,120
Speaker 6: It is such an outlier from how American business people behave,

729
00:38:00,080 --> 00:38:06,040
Speaker 6: and it's guarantees that you're going to have profound dirt.

730
00:38:06,080 --> 00:38:08,520
Speaker 6: There's a feign corrupt practices act that you can't. You

731
00:38:08,520 --> 00:38:10,840
Speaker 6: can go to jail for bribing a foreign official. He

732
00:38:10,960 --> 00:38:13,879
Speaker 6: was part of a ton of deals where they were

733
00:38:13,920 --> 00:38:19,720
Speaker 6: fundamentally bribing foreign officials. There's taking money from Iran's Revolutionary Guard.

734
00:38:19,760 --> 00:38:24,840
Speaker 6: Trump took money, it was cleaned through this guy, Ziamamadov,

735
00:38:24,920 --> 00:38:27,840
Speaker 6: but from the Runnian Revolutionary Guard. You could go to

736
00:38:27,960 --> 00:38:32,680
Speaker 6: jail for that. These are crazy, stupid risks that he

737
00:38:32,800 --> 00:38:38,120
Speaker 6: took that exposed him to a level of compromise that's unimaginable.

738
00:38:38,320 --> 00:38:41,560
Speaker 6: He did lots and lots of things that if all

739
00:38:41,600 --> 00:38:44,040
Speaker 6: the evidence came out, it would reveal how little money

740
00:38:44,080 --> 00:38:46,520
Speaker 6: he has and how little money he got from these deals.

741
00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:50,960
Speaker 6: And the evidence of those are in file cabinets in Baku,

742
00:38:51,040 --> 00:38:56,400
Speaker 6: in Batumi and Tubilisi. And there's just a whole world

743
00:38:56,719 --> 00:39:00,000
Speaker 6: of people who have dirt on him. As Felix Sayer actual,

744
00:39:00,040 --> 00:39:03,320
Speaker 6: they said to me once, Trump is what a Russian

745
00:39:03,360 --> 00:39:04,440
Speaker 6: man thinks a man.

746
00:39:04,280 --> 00:39:04,960
Speaker 1: Should be like.

747
00:39:05,239 --> 00:39:09,240
Speaker 6: That's and they liked him for all of those reasons.

748
00:39:09,719 --> 00:39:11,880
Speaker 6: But I don't think they were like, oh, let's collect

749
00:39:11,960 --> 00:39:14,960
Speaker 6: information on this guy because this guy might wan day

750
00:39:14,960 --> 00:39:17,160
Speaker 6: be president. We can use it. It's and John, you know,

751
00:39:17,200 --> 00:39:20,080
Speaker 6: this better than I do. Going way back to Soviet

752
00:39:20,080 --> 00:39:24,920
Speaker 6: and even pre Soviet days, Russia collects intelligence on people

753
00:39:25,120 --> 00:39:27,400
Speaker 6: that they can then use if those people happen to

754
00:39:27,400 --> 00:39:30,200
Speaker 6: get out of line or become powerful. So I think

755
00:39:30,200 --> 00:39:35,279
Speaker 6: there's a very simple story to tell that's pretty much undisputed,

756
00:39:35,600 --> 00:39:40,279
Speaker 6: that he is an asset of not just Russia, but

757
00:39:40,560 --> 00:39:43,480
Speaker 6: a whole bunch of important people in the former Soviet Union,

758
00:39:43,480 --> 00:39:45,160
Speaker 6: a whole bunch of people in the Gulf, a whole

759
00:39:45,200 --> 00:39:51,080
Speaker 6: bunch of people in Indonesia, in Malaysia, in in China.

760
00:39:51,480 --> 00:39:53,759
Speaker 6: And I think if we asked him that, and he'd

761
00:39:53,800 --> 00:39:56,480
Speaker 6: be like, yeah, man, you know, like, I don't like this.

762
00:39:56,560 --> 00:39:59,239
Speaker 6: To me, isn't even like a content like the is

763
00:39:59,280 --> 00:40:03,120
Speaker 6: he an actual and relisted agent of the FSB or something?

764
00:40:03,320 --> 00:40:05,120
Speaker 6: Is like a distraction? We don't need that.

765
00:40:05,239 --> 00:40:05,840
Speaker 1: Who cares?

766
00:40:05,880 --> 00:40:06,480
Speaker 6: Maybe he is.

767
00:40:06,560 --> 00:40:07,000
Speaker 4: I don't think.

768
00:40:07,239 --> 00:40:09,680
Speaker 3: What's interesting about that is, in a sense, he would

769
00:40:09,680 --> 00:40:11,280
Speaker 3: have been fine if he didn't run for president.

770
00:40:11,640 --> 00:40:13,680
Speaker 6: Yeah, he would have been totally fine.

771
00:40:13,880 --> 00:40:16,520
Speaker 3: But he's so angry now that he's getting accountability or

772
00:40:16,560 --> 00:40:19,440
Speaker 3: attention for this. But he hasn't hasn't occurred to him

773
00:40:19,440 --> 00:40:22,160
Speaker 3: that it's a different level. If you're the president of

774
00:40:22,160 --> 00:40:24,680
Speaker 3: the United States, You're expected to have a certain sense

775
00:40:24,680 --> 00:40:25,840
Speaker 3: of security values.

776
00:40:26,040 --> 00:40:27,520
Speaker 6: So this is depressing.

777
00:40:27,560 --> 00:40:30,799
Speaker 2: Guys, welcome to the world of counter rescionage.

778
00:40:30,880 --> 00:40:34,319
Speaker 6: But from your standpoint, like John, when you you were

779
00:40:34,320 --> 00:40:37,320
Speaker 6: in Moscow when there were lots of American business people

780
00:40:37,360 --> 00:40:40,560
Speaker 6: going over leaving aside the presidency, does he seem like

781
00:40:40,680 --> 00:40:41,520
Speaker 6: a dime a dozen?

782
00:40:41,640 --> 00:40:44,400
Speaker 3: Or does he seem he fits exactly the kind of

783
00:40:44,440 --> 00:40:47,719
Speaker 3: people who do business in places that are wild West

784
00:40:47,840 --> 00:40:50,040
Speaker 3: and crazy like that, where they can make a quick

785
00:40:50,080 --> 00:40:53,800
Speaker 3: buck and they don't mind dealing with corruption. What's odd

786
00:40:53,800 --> 00:40:56,400
Speaker 3: about this is that those people don't usually then apply

787
00:40:56,920 --> 00:41:01,280
Speaker 3: for serious national security positions that require a security class.

788
00:41:01,760 --> 00:41:06,080
Speaker 2: Do we have people rainmakers assets that mainly often generally

789
00:41:06,080 --> 00:41:09,080
Speaker 2: don't pay. Rich influential guys who like to sit down.

790
00:41:09,120 --> 00:41:12,320
Speaker 2: And I could think of one individual in a country

791
00:41:12,360 --> 00:41:15,600
Speaker 2: I was in where he could meet with the prime

792
00:41:15,640 --> 00:41:18,360
Speaker 2: minister of this country, he could meet with a defense minister,

793
00:41:18,800 --> 00:41:22,120
Speaker 2: he could meet with a Russian ambassador, and he'd like

794
00:41:22,200 --> 00:41:24,759
Speaker 2: the agency, he liked the US, he wanted his kids

795
00:41:24,760 --> 00:41:26,600
Speaker 2: to go to school in the US. Basically, you would

796
00:41:26,600 --> 00:41:28,600
Speaker 2: sit with him, he'd say, could you go talk to

797
00:41:28,640 --> 00:41:30,799
Speaker 2: the president for me, He's like, yeah, sure, I'll go

798
00:41:30,840 --> 00:41:33,279
Speaker 2: talk to him. And then when you would debris from

799
00:41:33,680 --> 00:41:35,680
Speaker 2: he would say, oh, the President said this and the

800
00:41:35,680 --> 00:41:38,120
Speaker 2: other thing, and you'd write it down. And then he'd say,

801
00:41:38,320 --> 00:41:40,680
Speaker 2: and what I think about that is And one time

802
00:41:40,920 --> 00:41:44,360
Speaker 2: is he was going on what his interpretation what the

803
00:41:44,360 --> 00:41:46,520
Speaker 2: President said is. I put my pen down and he's Jenny,

804
00:41:46,640 --> 00:41:49,200
Speaker 2: you're not writing this down. I'm like, oh, because we

805
00:41:49,280 --> 00:41:52,200
Speaker 2: only care what the president said. I don't actually care what.

806
00:41:52,160 --> 00:41:53,919
Speaker 1: You're about that.

807
00:41:54,360 --> 00:41:56,160
Speaker 5: There's no way that's not intelligence.

808
00:41:56,200 --> 00:41:59,080
Speaker 7: It is intelligence, your relationship, what he said to you

809
00:41:59,200 --> 00:41:59,719
Speaker 7: or what you're saying.

810
00:41:59,719 --> 00:42:02,240
Speaker 2: He said, Trump could be just one of these guys

811
00:42:02,280 --> 00:42:05,520
Speaker 2: that struck the lottery and ended up running for president.

812
00:42:05,960 --> 00:42:06,359
Speaker 1: I think.

813
00:42:06,440 --> 00:42:07,400
Speaker 8: So yeah.

814
00:42:07,520 --> 00:42:09,799
Speaker 5: To wrap this up, let's hear a little more of

815
00:42:09,880 --> 00:42:14,800
Speaker 5: Rob Quadr's recitation of Trump's nineteen ninety interview with Playboy.

816
00:42:15,960 --> 00:42:19,120
Speaker 8: I think of the future, but I refuse to paint it.

817
00:42:19,719 --> 00:42:23,359
Speaker 8: Anything can happen. But I often think of nuclear war.

818
00:42:23,520 --> 00:42:27,600
Speaker 8: It's a very important element in my thought process. It's

819
00:42:27,640 --> 00:42:33,439
Speaker 8: the ultimate, the ultimate catastrophe, the biggest problem this world has,

820
00:42:33,480 --> 00:42:36,840
Speaker 8: and nobody's focusing on the nuts and bolts of it.

821
00:42:36,840 --> 00:42:40,719
Speaker 8: It's a little like sickness. People don't believe they're going

822
00:42:40,800 --> 00:42:44,280
Speaker 8: to get sick until they do. I believe the greatest

823
00:42:44,280 --> 00:42:47,680
Speaker 8: of all stupidities is people believing it will never happen

824
00:42:48,040 --> 00:42:52,480
Speaker 8: because everybody knows how destructive it will be, so nobody

825
00:42:52,520 --> 00:42:53,320
Speaker 8: uses weapons.

826
00:42:53,880 --> 00:42:54,719
Speaker 1: What bullshit.

827
00:42:56,840 --> 00:43:02,920
Speaker 9: The Mission Implause is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'shay,

828
00:43:03,320 --> 00:43:08,280
Speaker 9: John Seipher, and Jonathan Stern. The associate producer is Rachel Harner.

829
00:43:08,520 --> 00:43:12,319
Speaker 9: Mission Implausible is a production of honorable mention and abominable

830
00:43:12,360 --> 00:43:14,359
Speaker 9: pictures for iHeart Podcasts.