Speaker 1: You've no doubt heard President Joe Biden is pumping billions
Speaker 1: of dollars into bringing micro chip manufacturing back to the US.
Speaker 1: It's called the Chips Act, and Biden talks about it
Speaker 1: every chance he gets. Now, no that we met this moment.
Speaker 2: Today, I'm signing the law, the Chips and Science Act,
Speaker 2: once in a generation investment in America itself, a law
Speaker 2: that the American people can be proud of.
Speaker 1: In large part that's all about jobs, of course, but
Speaker 1: also national security. COVID lockdowns exposed just how vulnerable the
Speaker 1: US is because of its dependence on chip makers overseas.
Speaker 3: The demand shock of these chips really created kind of
Speaker 3: this logjam, and this says that, well, we can't access
Speaker 3: these chips that are the centerpiece of everything from our
Speaker 3: cell phones to our cars to our fighter airplace.
Speaker 1: Later in the show, doctor Sarah Kreps of Cornell University
Speaker 1: weighs the upsides and the potential downsides of the US
Speaker 1: and its allies all racing to make their own semiconductors. First,
Speaker 1: let's bring in Bloomberg reporter Eric Martin. He's tracking where
Speaker 1: all that chip money is going. I'm West Ksova. That's
Speaker 1: today on the big Take, Eric, We're hearing about chips
Speaker 1: just all the time. In one of the things we're
Speaker 1: hearing is the US needs to very quickly gain a
Speaker 1: new footing in what's widely called this chip war to
Speaker 1: try to dominate this industry.
Speaker 2: Why is that?
Speaker 4: Was this something that people in Congress were starting to
Speaker 4: look at towards the end of the Trump administration, even
Speaker 4: before COVID nineteen hit. But when the pandemic hit and
Speaker 4: it interrupted supply chains and suddenly people couldn't buy cars,
Speaker 4: there weren't enough electronics, sun stores, everybody was working from home.
Speaker 4: It really revealed how dependent we are on chips. They
Speaker 4: go into everything from your dishwasher to laptop to vehicles,
Speaker 4: absolutely everything has chips in them. And the fact that
Speaker 4: the US for so many decades had been outsourcing chip
Speaker 4: production to East Asia, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea. It was something
Speaker 4: that kind of just happened because companies were looking for
Speaker 4: the best profit center and the cheapest place to produce.
Speaker 4: But in the process, I think a lot of people
Speaker 4: didn't realize what was happening in terms of moving US
Speaker 4: capacity offshore. So that's why last summer Congress, with both
Speaker 4: Democrats and Republicans passed this massive fifty two billion dollar
Speaker 4: Chips bending and Production and Research Bill is to address
Speaker 4: that shortage and to try to make sure that something
Speaker 4: like that never happens again.
Speaker 1: Eric, you point to this important distinction between designing and
Speaker 1: inventing these chips and then actually manufacturing them. And the
Speaker 1: US is still one of the leading places where especially
Speaker 1: really advanced chips are still being designed. Is that right?
Speaker 4: Absolutely. We have Silicon Valley because it was Silicon because
Speaker 4: it's the chip industry that gave birth to this massive
Speaker 4: and powerful economy in that part of the country. And
Speaker 4: so firms like Intel, Apple, you know, they still design
Speaker 4: their chips in house, but they farm out the actual
Speaker 4: production to companies located in East Asia where the production
Speaker 4: is a lot cheaper, including in China. The China still
Speaker 4: makes a lot of the advanced chips that get shipped
Speaker 4: to the US. But also you look at the company
Speaker 4: like TSMC, whose entire model has been around building the
Speaker 4: chips that other companies design.
Speaker 1: And they're the big chip maker in Taiwan. We hear
Speaker 1: a lot about.
Speaker 4: Yes, absolutely, and they're just breaking ground on a new, huge,
Speaker 4: multi billion dollar factory near Phoenix, Arizona and are looking
Speaker 4: at expanding their production in the US. Had a big
Speaker 4: groundbreaking with President Biden President last year. But looking at
Speaker 4: the fact that the US only produces about twelve percent
Speaker 4: of chips, down from around forty percent of chips as
Speaker 4: recently as nineteen ninety, but that almost none of the
Speaker 4: chips the US produces are the most advanced chips. And
Speaker 4: that's what the Chips and Science Act really is trying
Speaker 4: to bring back, to make sure that that kind of
Speaker 4: technology is never inaccessible for the US, whether it be
Speaker 4: due to a pandemic or some of the geopolitical things
Speaker 4: that we're looking at, like the possibility of China invading
Speaker 4: Taiwan and threatening some of those TSMC production facilities that
Speaker 4: are indispensable to the US economy and really to the
Speaker 4: global economy.
Speaker 1: You said that over the years, one of the reasons
Speaker 1: why these chip companies in the US sent production overseas
Speaker 1: is because it's so much cheaper. So what does this
Speaker 1: Chips Bill do about controlling the costs of making chips?
Speaker 1: Where does that money go that suddenly makes it economically
Speaker 1: advantageous to make chips in the US when it isn't
Speaker 1: right now?
Speaker 4: So thirty nine billion dollars out of the fifty two
Speaker 4: billion is in incentives, grants, and other kinds of loans
Speaker 4: to help companies private companies that would like to produce
Speaker 4: in the US to help give them a greater reason
Speaker 4: financially to do so. That goes to building out factories,
Speaker 4: it goes to helping with workforce development. One of the
Speaker 4: key things that the Commerce Department and Secretary Engineer Amundo,
Speaker 4: who are in the lead for this project, have underlined
Speaker 4: is that the US needs to build a whole ecosystem
Speaker 4: to make it attractive for chip companies to produce in
Speaker 4: the US. And right now there's a shortage of hundreds
Speaker 4: of thousands of workers that these companies are going to
Speaker 4: need in the coming years that just aren't there. One
Speaker 4: of the things that they struggle with is a shortage
Speaker 4: of engineers. For instance, it's been really sexy in recent
Speaker 4: years to go into, for instance, software engineering, and there
Speaker 4: is a recognition that you need to make semiconductor engineering
Speaker 4: and engineering jobs on fab floors just as attractive for
Speaker 4: young people to go into and find people students in
Speaker 4: high school, how do you make them excited about going
Speaker 4: into the chip industry.
Speaker 1: Let's say they are able to do that using some
Speaker 1: of this money. Once those fabs, those factories are up
Speaker 1: and running, the workers get paid a lot. These are
Speaker 1: very high paying jobs, and if cost is a big
Speaker 1: reason of moving things overseas, this money could be an
Speaker 1: initial influx of capital to help them build it. But
Speaker 1: then what about the cost of just paying all of
Speaker 1: these people a lot of money to make chips? Why
Speaker 1: is it economically feasible under this program when it wasn't
Speaker 1: just before.
Speaker 4: That's a really important point, Wes. The fifty two billion
Speaker 4: on its own from the Chips program is never going
Speaker 4: to be enough, and that's something that people in the
Speaker 4: Biden administration acknowledge. This is going to need to be
Speaker 4: amplified four or five times by private companies choosing to
Speaker 4: invest in the US because of the advantages that the
Speaker 4: US provides. That also leads to another aspect of this,
Speaker 4: which is the eleven billion dollars in research and development
Speaker 4: funding that the Chips Act provides and looking at building
Speaker 4: a national Semiconductor Technology Center and trying to bring in
Speaker 4: different stakeholders from academia, universities, bringing them together with private companies,
Speaker 4: and trying to provide a place that is going to
Speaker 4: have a government impulse and with government as the catalyst
Speaker 4: for tackling some of the biggest global challenges in terms
Speaker 4: of technology, inventing the technologies of tomorrow. It's a role
Speaker 4: that the government played, particularly the defense industry in the
Speaker 4: nineteen forties and fifties, in getting the chip industry founded
Speaker 4: and up and running. But it's a role that government
Speaker 4: has gotten away from in recent decades and does this
Speaker 4: kind of return in some ways to the roots of
Speaker 4: the chip industry where there was some level of government
Speaker 4: involvement in leadership and industrial planning in a way that
Speaker 4: then was copied by Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore was copied
Speaker 4: by economies in Asia with great success in more recent decades.
Speaker 1: So let's talk a little bit more about this National
Speaker 1: Semiconductor Technology Center, because it's kind of like the centerpiece.
Speaker 4: So it's definitely something that the Commerce Department is excited
Speaker 4: about that they talk about a lot. That one of
Speaker 4: the most important aspects of this is that it be independent,
Speaker 4: that it be seen as science driven, and that it
Speaker 4: be a place that can bring together and unify all
Speaker 4: kinds of different stakeholders because you have all these different
Speaker 4: private companies that are competing with each other, so the
Speaker 4: question is how do you pull them together to pursue
Speaker 4: share goals. It's going to be structured as a nonprofit
Speaker 4: and there are still a lot of open questions about
Speaker 4: exactly how all of this will work. They have not
Speaker 4: yet announced the headquarters for the NSTC as it's being
Speaker 4: called for the Technology Center. It's going to be a
Speaker 4: national network of different technical centers as well, and part
Speaker 4: of the aim of the Chips and Science Act is
Speaker 4: to diversify production as well as research and development across
Speaker 4: the country. It's an industry that's very focused on the
Speaker 4: coast right now and so looking at ways to bring
Speaker 4: that more into the heartland of the country. So it's
Speaker 4: geographically diverse, also more diversity in terms of the workers
Speaker 4: in the industry. But there are a lot of open
Speaker 4: questions about exactly how all of this will work, and
Speaker 4: Secretary Ramondo I think is very frank about them. When
Speaker 4: we spoke with the Secretary, she talked about how this
Speaker 4: is the biggest US industrial policy foray of the past
Speaker 4: seventy years and if it doesn't work, it'll be the
Speaker 4: last attempt for seventy years.
Speaker 1: After the break. Why billions of dollars alone won't be
Speaker 1: enough to jump start chip making in the US. Eric
Speaker 1: before the break, you were talking about how US chip
Speaker 1: makers ideally will come together in these technology centers and
Speaker 1: share what they know for the good of the country,
Speaker 1: but they're also competing with each other for business. Will
Speaker 1: they want to share with the competition?
Speaker 4: Well, that's the fifty two billion dollar question in some way.
Speaker 4: The eleven billion that's being spent on research and development.
Speaker 4: In a net sense, it's a large amount of money,
Speaker 4: eleven billion dollars, but it's a small amount when you
Speaker 4: look at the global spend on research and development. Intel,
Speaker 4: the biggest maker of computer processors, spend more than seventeen
Speaker 4: billion in twenty twenty two alone on R and D.
Speaker 4: And so it's something that is going to be a
Speaker 4: big challenge of how do you amplify the amount of
Speaker 4: government spending, you know, which can never equal the amount
Speaker 4: that's spent by the private sector. You know. When we
Speaker 4: look at the goals of this broadly, some of the
Speaker 4: goals are to make it easier for particularly smaller companies
Speaker 4: and startups and companies that are not the intels of
Speaker 4: the world, but may have a great idea for the
Speaker 4: next generation of chips or next generation technology, and to
Speaker 4: give them a place to try new things, to try
Speaker 4: out prototypes, to have a less expensive way to test
Speaker 4: some of their ideas, precisely because this is an industry
Speaker 4: that requires so much money in order to do trial
Speaker 4: runs of new technologies. So one of the things that
Speaker 4: the Center aims to do is to level the playing
Speaker 4: field a little bit. Secretary of Ramondo comes from a
Speaker 4: venture capital background. That's what she was doing before she
Speaker 4: ran for treasurer of Rhode Island, later became governor, now
Speaker 4: obviously Commerce Secretary, so she has experience with venture capital,
Speaker 4: with new ideas, with innovation, and one of the things
Speaker 4: the Center is trying to do is to boost those opportunities,
Speaker 4: to cut I think in half. They're looking for the
Speaker 4: cost of entry over the next decade, but to really
Speaker 4: say that innovation needs to come from the ground up,
Speaker 4: and if you're going to have that kind of competition
Speaker 4: and the profit motivations that are going to spur new
Speaker 4: entries to the industry, you really need to make it
Speaker 4: easier and lower the cost for people to try new
Speaker 4: things and for people to test their ideas. And that's
Speaker 4: one of the things that the Technology Center aims for,
Speaker 4: as well as giving workers the opportunity to gain hands
Speaker 4: on experience to develop those skills. And so it's aiming
Speaker 4: for this kind of virtuous cycle where both you'll have
Speaker 4: new ideas being tried, but also workers and the workforce
Speaker 4: being trained in this whole ecosystem emanating from this national
Speaker 4: network of technical facilities and the partnerships with universities, with companies,
Speaker 4: all of this kind of being created as a new
Speaker 4: initiative and as a bold new idea.
Speaker 1: Eric like everything that's still in an idea phase. It
Speaker 1: sounds really great, but there's already been a lot of
Speaker 1: criticism about the way some of this money is being spent.
Speaker 4: Absolutely, that workforce is a top concern when you talk
Speaker 4: to companies, and the Biden administration is pretty candid that
Speaker 4: this is one piece of what's needed to build the industry.
Speaker 4: That they would love to have immigration reform, an ability
Speaker 4: to keep more of these foreign students who come to
Speaker 4: the US get PhDs in computer science and then need
Speaker 4: to leave because they don't have the visas to stay,
Speaker 4: and also permitting reform, the ability to build these facilities faster.
Speaker 4: But a lot of those things require Congress, and I
Speaker 4: think everyone is clear eyed and honest about the fact
Speaker 4: that Congress is stalemated in terms of any kind of
Speaker 4: imtegration reform, and it has been for years now, and
Speaker 4: so trying to address what can be done things that
Speaker 4: do have bipartisan support, like the Chips and Science Act,
Speaker 4: and understanding that workforce is going to be a big challenge.
Speaker 4: Lack of immigration reform shouldn't prevent this kind of project,
Speaker 4: this kind of effort from going forward.
Speaker 1: Another component to this effort to make chips in the
Speaker 1: US is national security, making sure the US has the
Speaker 1: chips it needs and isn't dependent on other countries.
Speaker 4: That's something that Secretary of Ramundo always mentions is that
Speaker 4: the focus here is not about helping particular companies or
Speaker 4: picking companies as winners and losers. It's through the north
Speaker 4: star of national security. And that what the pandemic and
Speaker 4: supply chain disruptions revealed was that a lack of chips
Speaker 4: is a threat to US economic and national security.
Speaker 1: And when they talk about national security, what they're really
Speaker 1: talking about is China. How does the geopolitical tensions between
Speaker 1: the US and China play out here?
Speaker 4: Absolutely, you know, the philosophy of the Biden administration has
Speaker 4: been to trade with China in goods that are not
Speaker 4: national security sensitive or do not threaten US interests, but
Speaker 4: also to protect leading edge chip technology using export controls
Speaker 4: another area that the Commerce Department has the responsibility, and
Speaker 4: to make sure that the US stays ahead of China
Speaker 4: in terms of its technology that maintains that advantage because
Speaker 4: one of the key areas that chips go into, of
Speaker 4: course is military equipment, the next generation submarines and fire jets.
Speaker 4: And so you're absolutely right that the national security here
Speaker 4: is both about logistics and being able to get from
Speaker 4: all of Asia the chips that the US needs, but
Speaker 4: also maintaining that advantage over China at the time when
Speaker 4: the tensions between these two geopolitical rivals are only growing.
Speaker 1: So, Eric, we've talked about a lot of high concept
Speaker 1: stuff and big plans the US government has for all
Speaker 1: this money, What can we actually expect in real life?
Speaker 1: How long before this chip center is open? How long
Speaker 1: before some of this money starts yielding tangible results?
Speaker 4: Well, Wes, it's not going to be overnight, for sure.
Speaker 4: These fabs, the chip production factories take years to build.
Speaker 4: The funding that Congress has appropriated is for the next
Speaker 4: five years, So there are some questions about will future
Speaker 4: administrations continue the funding that would be necessary to implement
Speaker 4: this strategy over a longer period of time. But you
Speaker 4: can sense that there's a great urgency within the Commerce
Speaker 4: Department and within the broader administration to get this into place,
Speaker 4: and so things like the National Semiconductor Technology Center. We're
Speaker 4: expecting more announcements and for that to be up and
Speaker 4: running by the end of this year and moving as
Speaker 4: fast as possible because the timing is so urgent.
Speaker 1: Eric, thanks so much for coming on the show.
Speaker 4: Wes, thank you for having me when we come back.
Speaker 1: How chips figure into the rivalry between the US and China,
Speaker 1: As we've heard, geopolitics is also at the center of
Speaker 1: the push to bring chip making back to the US.
Speaker 1: So let's hear from someone who studies how technology and
Speaker 1: national security are increasingly intertwined. Doctor Sarah Krepps is a
Speaker 1: professor of government at Cornell University and director of the
Speaker 1: Cornell Tech Policy Institute.
Speaker 3: There were many kind of long term factors that we're building,
Speaker 3: you know, the rise of China in the case of semiconductors,
Speaker 3: the share of American production of semiconductor chips had been
Speaker 3: declining for thirty or forty years, but nothing really was
Speaker 3: happening on policy side until COVID, and so COVID with
Speaker 3: the lockdowns around the world in China, in Taiwan, in
Speaker 3: South Korea, in the United States, that plus the demand
Speaker 3: shock of these chips, really created kind of this log jam.
Speaker 3: And this says that, wow, we can't access these chips
Speaker 3: that are the centerpiece of everything from our cell phones
Speaker 3: to our cars to our fighter airplanes. And so what
Speaker 3: we need to do is reshore that industry so we
Speaker 3: can build and resilience in our supply chain, but also
Speaker 3: guard against national security risk.
Speaker 2: And you know what has happened more recently is.
Speaker 3: Build in some social safety net by building in some
Speaker 3: expectations of if you take these incentives, here are these other.
Speaker 2: Things that we expect you to do.
Speaker 3: So it's sort of ticking off a number of boxes
Speaker 3: at once. I think that policy window would have been
Speaker 3: unopened had COVID not been this real shock to the system.
Speaker 1: Are there potential downsides to this US focus on making
Speaker 1: chips at home instead of partnering abroad.
Speaker 2: Definitely.
Speaker 3: One of the critiques of this is that this policy
Speaker 3: may or really kind of privileges the resilience national security criterion,
Speaker 3: which is to say that what the US is basically
Speaker 3: saying is that.
Speaker 2: Our most important priority is to have.
Speaker 3: Resilience in the face of what I think some people
Speaker 3: would consider a tail risk, which is a Chinese invasion
Speaker 3: of Taiwan, where Taiwan TSMC produces on the island ninety
Speaker 3: five percent of the most advanced semiconductor chips. And the
Speaker 3: view is, well, what if that happens, we need to
Speaker 3: be able to continue manufacturing those so we can run
Speaker 3: our fighter planes and our iPhones. But the downside risk
Speaker 3: of that is that US companies do a lot of
Speaker 3: business with China. China is a huge customer of US
Speaker 3: chip makers.
Speaker 2: That is an unintended consequence.
Speaker 3: And I think it is seen as well, that's just
Speaker 3: what happens when you're prioritizing national security.
Speaker 1: And do you think that when you do that kind
Speaker 1: of risk benefit analysis, it's worth it to have that
Speaker 1: short term loss of market, loss of I suppose innovation
Speaker 1: and manufacturing capability for the long term gain of not
Speaker 1: being dependent on China if the relationship should turn even worse.
Speaker 3: Clearly in the Cold War with the US and the
Speaker 3: Soviet Union, there were all kinds of these export restrictions,
Speaker 3: and so in a lot of ways, this is nothing new.
Speaker 3: But what's different here is that the US and China
Speaker 3: had such a robust trade relationship and it really did
Speaker 3: benefit overall, it benefited both countries.
Speaker 2: So I think with policy, though.
Speaker 3: It's always a question of trade offs, is that we're
Speaker 3: trying to accomplish let's say five different things, and this
Speaker 3: policy will really accomplish one or two of them, and
Speaker 3: then these other three are going to be unfortunate casualties
Speaker 3: of that policy. And I think that's not certainly not
Speaker 3: how it would be pitched. But I think to the
Speaker 3: extent that these policies are really aiming at decoupling this
Speaker 3: trade relationship between the US and China, then it really
Speaker 3: does undermine all of the insight and motivation that underlied globalization,
Speaker 3: which is that we shouldn't all be producing everything in
Speaker 3: our own country because it's not economically efficient. And so
Speaker 3: you know, by saying that the US wants to reshore
Speaker 3: these industries, essentially the US is saying we're not as
Speaker 3: concerned about price. What we're concerned about is the supply
Speaker 3: chain resilience.
Speaker 1: That robust trade relationship with China, which is kind of
Speaker 1: broken down now looks like it's pretty broken and doesn't
Speaker 1: seem like it could easily be repaired. So is it
Speaker 1: realistic to think that chips could be manufactured in the
Speaker 1: way that you're saying, or is it that the US
Speaker 1: and China really are going to need to manufacture them themselves.
Speaker 3: I think they're probably short answers to that question.
Speaker 2: But one of the maybe slightly longer answers.
Speaker 3: Is that when China acceded to the World Trade Organization
Speaker 3: in two thousand and one, I think there was a
Speaker 3: lot of hope that playing field would be leveled, and
Speaker 3: that's just not what happened. And I think what emerged
Speaker 3: as China started to become more dominant in the two
Speaker 3: thousands and the reality that tech would be at the
Speaker 3: center of this is the restrictions on five G. But then,
Speaker 3: what I think is surprising in some senses is that
Speaker 3: President Trump had campaigned on this very aggressive d couple
Speaker 3: US from China kind of trade policy that I think
Speaker 3: was easily chalked up to just, well, he's sort of
Speaker 3: unusual in SUI generous and a lot of his policies.
Speaker 3: And what's interesting, though, is the Biden administration took up
Speaker 3: really all of these policies and expanded these trade restrictions.
Speaker 3: So it doesn't seem like there is any near term
Speaker 3: converged of these kinds of alignment of these trade relationships,
Speaker 3: and if anything, it just continues to seem to diverge.
Speaker 1: And do you think there's any desire on China's side
Speaker 1: to maintain or renew that kind of relationship because they
Speaker 1: seem to be diverging as well.
Speaker 3: It does seem like China has taken a kind of
Speaker 3: turn inward where they're also pretty happy to be kind
Speaker 3: of less integrated globally as well. And so that's the
Speaker 3: way in which maybe we could say the incentives are aligned,
Speaker 3: is that all of these countries now are turning inward.
Speaker 3: You know, the European Union, for example, has initiated its
Speaker 3: own kind of version of the CHIPAC to try to
Speaker 3: create these incentives to reshore some of the chip industry
Speaker 3: in Europe as well, because they've also gone from forty
Speaker 3: percent market shared to ten percent in the last three
Speaker 3: or four decades.
Speaker 2: And so the problem with it is that you have.
Speaker 3: A pie of one hundred and all of these countries,
Speaker 3: the US and European Union are trying to get from
Speaker 3: ten percent back up till let's say twenty percent.
Speaker 2: But someone's going to lose here, and so.
Speaker 3: They're all trying these same policies. And I think it
Speaker 3: really is kind of a collision course because it does
Speaker 3: look like protectionism, because you know, South Korea is trying
Speaker 3: to do this. All of them now are trying to
Speaker 3: kind of shore up no pun intended, but their domestic
Speaker 3: industry is to try to get a piece of this pie.
Speaker 1: And I guess that raises this kind of question looking forward,
Speaker 1: which is the US wants to bring home manufacturing in
Speaker 1: part for domestic policy reasons, put Americans back to work,
Speaker 1: partly to protect against supply chain disruptions. And as you say,
Speaker 1: this potential risk that China would invade Taiwan and then
Speaker 1: have all of Taiwan's chip manufacturing capability. But what about
Speaker 1: creating other partnerships with European nations instead of every country
Speaker 1: doing it themselves.
Speaker 3: So that's something I've written about in publications with the
Speaker 3: Brookings Institution, which is this idea of near shoring and
Speaker 3: friendshoring that has gotten some traction I think in policy circles,
Speaker 3: not because of what I've written, but I think that
Speaker 3: that has become.
Speaker 2: A new watch word, which is, well, there must be
Speaker 2: a third way.
Speaker 3: There must be something in between everyone trying to reshore
Speaker 3: everything and globalization kind of status quo ante. And I
Speaker 3: think that idea makes a ton of sense, which is
Speaker 3: there are some countries that do these things really well.
Speaker 3: We're very close partners with those countries or they're close by,
Speaker 3: so that is becoming I think an attractive third way
Speaker 3: that friends showing or near showing to kind of try
Speaker 3: to optimize on that idea of the resilience and national
Speaker 3: security that we discussed earlier, without the adverse consequences of
Speaker 3: you know, the cost consequences, let's say.
Speaker 1: Doctor Sarah Craps, thanks so much for coming on the show.
Speaker 1: Thanks Liz, thanks for listening to us here at The
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