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Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff You Should Know, a production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh, and there's

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Speaker 2: Chuck and it's just us again, Jerry who And this

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Speaker 2: is stuff you should Know. That's right.

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Speaker 3: Another Econ edition. Typically not my favorite, but you know,

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Speaker 3: this one I could wrap my head around for the

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Speaker 3: most part.

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Speaker 2: I think that's one of the reasons why it's had

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Speaker 2: such an enormous impact on the world. Yes, because it

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Speaker 2: is so easy to wrap your head around. We should

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Speaker 2: probably say, we're talking about the tragedy of the Commons.

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Speaker 2: And for those of you who aren't familiar, it's this idea,

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Speaker 2: this concept that if you have a shared resource a commons, say,

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Speaker 2: and people are able to use it at their own

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Speaker 2: leisure for their own purposes. Event as they seek to

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Speaker 2: maximize their profits, they're going to overuse this commons and

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Speaker 2: inevitably it'll be ruined because people can't have anything nice. Essentially,

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Speaker 2: you know.

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Speaker 3: It's funny, you're gonna laugh at me here, they're all

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Speaker 3: gonna laugh at you. Central the central area of my

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Speaker 3: high school was called the Commons. Yeah, and it just

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Speaker 3: occurred to me thirty five years or so after I

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Speaker 3: graduated that that's what that meant.

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Speaker 2: Oh, I see, I thought you were going to say,

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Speaker 2: like my teenage years were the tragedy of the comments.

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Speaker 3: No, I just I don't know. I never thought about

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Speaker 3: the word because it was when you're in high school,

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Speaker 3: it's just sending the comments will meet the commons. But

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Speaker 3: it never occurred to me that that's what that meant,

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Speaker 3: just like a common area sure by everybody.

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Speaker 2: It didn't either to me. I know exactly what you're

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Speaker 2: talking about. There was, if not high school, then maybe

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Speaker 2: middle school. There was some school where that was called

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Speaker 2: that too. Yeah, and I wonder if it was like

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Speaker 2: a surreptitious shot at kids, like they're all sheep, because

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Speaker 2: I don't think that's true. But one of the major

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Speaker 2: uses for commons traditionally has been for grazing. That's a

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Speaker 2: really good example. If you've let a bunch of people

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Speaker 2: graze on a shared resource, but they're taking what they

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Speaker 2: can from that resource to make money for themselves to

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Speaker 2: support themselves, then just because humans are rational, selfish, horrible beings,

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Speaker 2: that metal or that high school cafeteria will be ruined.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, that's right. And the idea of the tragedy of

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Speaker 3: the commons started out in nineteen sixty eight an article

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Speaker 3: from Science, the journal Science. It was called the Tragedy

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Speaker 3: of the Commons, and it was by a biologist named

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Speaker 3: Garrett Hardin, and he was sort of piggybacking on a

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Speaker 3: nineteenth century English mathematician and economist named William forsteror not Foster.

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Speaker 2: I would say, piggybacking or hijacking.

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Speaker 3: Hijacking William Forster Lloyd. And you mentioned grazing, and this

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Speaker 3: is sort of the thought experiment Harden went with, which

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Speaker 3: is like, you have a you know, a grazing field,

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Speaker 3: and let's say three farmers have use of it, and

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Speaker 3: they're letting their cows and cheap and you know grays

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Speaker 3: out there. But at some point one of them is

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Speaker 3: going to get an extra fat cow that they sell

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Speaker 3: for pretty good money. And they're like, hey, well, if

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Speaker 3: that worked out, maybe I can add like an additional cow,

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Speaker 3: and maybe it'll make you know, the value of all

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Speaker 3: of these cows go down a little bit, including my own,

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Speaker 3: because they're not getting as fat because I've added another

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Speaker 3: cow here, right, But if I can sell it for

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Speaker 3: this much money and it's only costing me a fraction

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Speaker 3: of that, for you know the.

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Speaker 2: Won't you extra cow?

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Speaker 3: Well, I mean it would only cost a fraction of

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Speaker 3: loss of resources for the other cows. Like I'm still

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Speaker 3: coming out ahead and so bad to being bada boom,

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Speaker 3: that's what I'm going.

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Speaker 2: To do, right Yeah. So if everybody was making one

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Speaker 2: dollar off of their caw when everything was being raised unsustainably,

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Speaker 2: then if you add one more cow, now everybody's making

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Speaker 2: eighty five cents off of their cows because you're starting

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Speaker 2: to overtax the commons. But that person who added that cow,

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Speaker 2: that's an extra eighty five cents they wouldn't have had before,

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Speaker 2: right yeah.

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Speaker 3: And if you're able to sell that cow for like

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Speaker 3: five bucks, that eighty five cents is a pittance compared

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Speaker 3: to what you're making on the other side.

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Speaker 2: Right, So there's always, under the logic of the tragedy

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Speaker 2: of the comments, there's always a reason to add another cow,

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Speaker 2: and add another cow, and add another cow, because your

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Speaker 2: returns are always going to be more than the cost

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Speaker 2: that you can offset with the returns. Right.

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Speaker 3: Well, that and you're also on the assumption that like

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Speaker 3: everyone else is going to be adding cow. So I'm

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Speaker 3: not going to be the only sucker not adding cows.

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Speaker 2: Right, So you're either a sucker or you're just somebody

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Speaker 2: who wants to survive. Because if people start ad cows

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Speaker 2: and you're the one farmer who's like, I'm not going

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Speaker 2: to do that. I find that morally repugnant. I really

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Speaker 2: like sustainably grazing here, and I'll just take one for

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Speaker 2: the team. In very short order, that farmer would find

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Speaker 2: that they were no longer making money because exactly because

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Speaker 2: each additional cow was taking an additional fraction. So let's

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Speaker 2: say that every time you added a cow, it reduced

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Speaker 2: the price that all the other cows got by fifteen percent.

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Speaker 2: That's not a steady price because if you reduce a

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Speaker 2: dollar by fifteen percent, now you're getting eighty five cents

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Speaker 2: for a cow. But now when you're adding another cow,

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Speaker 2: that reduces that eighty five cents by fifteen percent. So

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Speaker 2: all of a sudden, you're making seventy two cents, and

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Speaker 2: then sixty one cents and then fifty two cents. Right.

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Speaker 2: But again, if you're adding cows, that's always extra almost

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Speaker 2: found money. If you're not adding cows, then the cows

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Speaker 2: that you had originally are now getting less and less

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Speaker 2: and less, until you're making zero money, so you are

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Speaker 2: forced into adding cows. And that's why it's considered the tragedy.

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Speaker 2: You're why Garrett Harden called it the tragedy of the

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Speaker 2: comments because inevitably, under these circumstances, which are have long

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Speaker 2: been considered to be universal circumstances, basically the commons will

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Speaker 2: always get ruined and depleted and everybody will be totally

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Speaker 2: up the creek.

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Speaker 3: That's right. And if Harden was basically like, there's a

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Speaker 3: couple of solutions here. You can either divide this area

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Speaker 3: up and now each person has their own little private

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Speaker 3: part of the past year that they're only in control

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Speaker 3: of and no one else can get on it and

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Speaker 3: graze there, or a government a body is going to

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Speaker 3: have to step in and regulate this stuff and manage it.

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Speaker 3: And you know, if you listen to Harden, and we'll

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Speaker 3: talk a little bit about the problems with this guy

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Speaker 3: in a second, Yeah, but if you listen to Harden,

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Speaker 3: he'll say, when you divide the things, this thing up

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Speaker 3: and make it just private it and everyone you know

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Speaker 3: is incentivized to basically preserve their plots and do it

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Speaker 3: sustainably so their profits are maximized. With, you know, making

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Speaker 3: sure the land isn't ruined so they can keep those

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Speaker 3: profits maximized.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, because now it's their land and they suddenly realize, oh,

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Speaker 2: this is a finite resource. If I start to degrade

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Speaker 2: this land, it's only coming out of my profits because

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Speaker 2: the other farmer's land is not degraded. So I'm the

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Speaker 2: only one in competition with myself here, really, and I

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Speaker 2: need to make sure that this land is preserved because

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Speaker 2: now it's the gold of the goose that laid the

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Speaker 2: golden egg, and I need to keep it nice and

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Speaker 2: healthy and happy. That's the direct result of privatization, as

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Speaker 2: far as Garrett Harden was explaining, as far as the

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Speaker 2: tragedy of the Commons goes right, simple solution, just give

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Speaker 2: people an incentive to take care of it by making

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Speaker 2: it their own. And the other way, like you said,

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Speaker 2: is government inter And this seems to be what hardens

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Speaker 2: big Like this is his favorite. I think solution was

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Speaker 2: bring the government in and just say you can't over

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Speaker 2: you can't graze more than these number of sheep, and

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Speaker 2: if you do, we'll wipe out your entire family line

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Speaker 2: something along those those lines.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. But here's the thing, like It wasn't like he

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Speaker 3: was some big champion of the government, because if you

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Speaker 3: read the whole article, Harden is like, and another thing,

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Speaker 3: the reason why the world is headed toward a bad

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Speaker 3: place or a bad place already is because freedom to

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Speaker 3: breed is intolerable. So there's just too many people. We're

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Speaker 3: making too many babies, and the welfare state that the

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Speaker 3: government is encouraging is taking away the natural consequence of

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Speaker 3: what happens if you have too many kids, like they're

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Speaker 3: going to not be able to sustain that, and the

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Speaker 3: kids are going to starve to death. So we're overbreeding.

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Speaker 3: And all of a sudden, everyone's going whoa, whoaa, whoa.

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Speaker 3: And he said and another thing, he said, this overbreeding,

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Speaker 3: it could actually be a strategy where a cohesive group

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Speaker 3: could come along to increase their power. And they're like,

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Speaker 3: wait a minute, are you talking about the great replacement?

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Speaker 3: And he said, I don't know what that is, right,

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Speaker 3: and they said, well, it'll be a thing at some point.

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Speaker 2: He's like, I like the ring of it though, Yeah,

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Speaker 2: it's catchy, so yeah. Yeah. His whole thing was we

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Speaker 2: using scare quotes are overbreeding, meant poor non white countries

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Speaker 2: are overbreeding. Right, that was basically his whole thing, and

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Speaker 2: that yes, because there was such thing as international aid

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Speaker 2: in the way of food, in the way of money,

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Speaker 2: that that people could just keep having kids and knowing

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Speaker 2: that the western wealthier governments were going to take care

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Speaker 2: of him. And he was like, that's that's not what

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Speaker 2: we should be doing. And here's why the tragedy of

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Speaker 2: the commons. And to say that, by the way, the

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Speaker 2: I read another paper of his two called Lifeboat Ethics,

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Speaker 2: the Argument against Helping the poor. Yeah, hell is the subtitle,

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Speaker 2: so we really just put it out there. But he

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Speaker 2: basically said, Okay, let's imagine that all of the countries

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Speaker 2: in the world are lifeboats. Some are ridiculously overloaded with people,

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Speaker 2: others the wealthier, more advanced ones. Let's say that they're

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Speaker 2: in a lifeboat that seats one hundred and they only

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Speaker 2: have ninety people, but there's tons of people swimming around

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Speaker 2: them trying to get into the lifeboat. Do you pick

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Speaker 2: ten people out of these, you know, thousands of people

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Speaker 2: out there to let come into your lifeboat? If so,

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Speaker 2: how do you pick those people? What do you tell

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Speaker 2: the people you don't pick? And he ultimately concludes that

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Speaker 2: just don't help anybody, then you don't have to worry

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Speaker 2: about playing favorites or anything like that. Plus you keep

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Speaker 2: your ten person safety buffer in case things change for

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Speaker 2: you in your lifeboat, and you're fine. He actually argues

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Speaker 2: against guilt. You shouldn't feel any guilt, and as a

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Speaker 2: matter of fact, we shouldn't put guilt on people for

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Speaker 2: making decisions like these because they're just smart. And then secondly,

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Speaker 2: he also says that if you are one of those

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Speaker 2: people like that one farmer who is like overgrazing is

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Speaker 2: morally repugnant, and now I'm not going to do it.

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Speaker 2: If you were like that farmer in this lifeboat and

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Speaker 2: you said, I just I can't do this. I can't

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Speaker 2: sit there and watch people drown while I'm sitting here.

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Speaker 2: I'm going to give up my seat for somebody else.

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Speaker 2: Harden argued that just by virtue of a person accepting

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Speaker 2: your seat, they are less moral than you, and that

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Speaker 2: over time is more people in the lifeboat give up

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Speaker 2: their seat for moral reasons. Morality will be replaced in

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Speaker 2: this lifeboat with self interest, and then what do you

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Speaker 2: have then, So he makes all these like like if

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Speaker 2: you're a rational person and you take emotion out of it,

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Speaker 2: You're like, you know, I guess that kind of makes

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Speaker 2: sense in a little bit, but the moment you add

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Speaker 2: in any a drop of humanity to it, you're like,

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Speaker 2: this is horrible that this guy wrote a series of

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Speaker 2: papers arguing this.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and he, you know, as far as the tragedy

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Speaker 3: of the Commons goes, he very explicitly says like, you know,

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Speaker 3: you got to prioritize yourself here, and you're you know

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Speaker 3: what you're doing and maximize your profits, and if you don't,

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Speaker 3: if you have ethics or something, then you're you're not

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Speaker 3: a very smart person.

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Speaker 2: Right exactly. So this is his whole thing that you know,

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Speaker 2: like all of it was over of population. The thing

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Speaker 2: is it got diluted or take him very literally, very quickly,

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Speaker 2: and it was applied to actual commons as we'll see,

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Speaker 2: and just it was stripped of its overpopulation, xenophobia, racism,

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Speaker 2: all of that stuff and just got applied to real

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Speaker 2: world old commons management. And to say like it changed

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Speaker 2: things is the understatement of the century.

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Speaker 3: Chok, that's right. Should we take a break.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, let's all right, We'll be right back, everybody.

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Speaker 2: Okay, So, uh, the tragedy of commons became like the

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Speaker 2: dominant way of looking at the world among Western nations

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Speaker 2: because it did two things. It said that you can

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Speaker 2: solve this problem everyone is going to have. Any time

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Speaker 2: you have a shared resource, people are going to deplete it.

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Speaker 2: That's what it said, no matter where you are in

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Speaker 2: the world, no matter who you are, but we want

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Speaker 2: to save these shared resources. Because this paper came out

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Speaker 2: at about the same time the environmental consciousness came up,

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Speaker 2: so it was like perfect timing for that. But it

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Speaker 2: also said, just privatize, buddy. And at that time, neoliberalism

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Speaker 2: was on the rise, and they're like, yes, privatize, take

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Speaker 2: all these government run things and put them in the

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Speaker 2: hands of corporations and we'll all be better off.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. And you know, one of the ways that happened

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Speaker 3: was and we're going to talk about sort of different

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Speaker 3: versions of this here and there in this episode, but

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Speaker 3: environmental trading markets emerged and that came from Canada actually

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Speaker 3: an economist named J. H. Dales in nineteen sixty eight.

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Speaker 3: But the eighties and nineties or when they really kind

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Speaker 3: of started flying off the shelf. But that's like when

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Speaker 3: the government comes in with a regulation. Let's say to

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Speaker 3: cap whatever in this case, like let's say they're capping

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Speaker 3: emissions on.

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Speaker 2: On baseball caps.

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Speaker 3: Baseball cap, I need to get rid of some baseball caps.

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Speaker 3: So that's great.

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Speaker 2: You have too many? Do you have any good Hawks ones?

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Speaker 2: I'm on the I'm on the lookout for those.

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Speaker 3: I have one Hawks cap that I wear.

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Speaker 2: I gotcha.

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Speaker 3: I just gave away a second one because it was

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Speaker 3: too big. But your your head is too small for

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Speaker 3: this thing.

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Speaker 2: It's a really tiny head. I'm like that that one

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Speaker 2: Safari hunter and beetle juice.

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Speaker 3: Do you know what your hat size is?

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Speaker 2: Uh? Like point six point six?

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Speaker 3: Okay, that's good. So let's say it's fisheries, because we're

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Speaker 3: going to talk about the fisheries a lot. So yeah,

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Speaker 3: you know, the government will come in and say, hey,

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Speaker 3: you're overfishing, so we're going to cap how many fish

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Speaker 3: you can harvest or make it a certain size and

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Speaker 3: a certain area or something like that. And then here's

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Speaker 3: your permit Fishery A, and here's your permit fishery B

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Speaker 3: and fishery C. And they grant these permits. But and

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Speaker 3: this is the key to the etm's environmental trading markets.

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Speaker 3: The word trade you can trade as i e. Buy

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Speaker 3: and sell these permits, which and this is something that

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Speaker 3: I don't fully understand, or maybe I do understand, And

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Speaker 3: that's the whole point. But if company A is let's

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Speaker 3: say it's an environmental like, hey, you're a factory and

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Speaker 3: we're incentivizing you to clean up your pollution and here's

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Speaker 3: your permit or whatever. If Company A does a really

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Speaker 3: good job and does the right thing and comes in

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Speaker 3: like way under the amount of emissions that they're supposed

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Speaker 3: to hit, by simply selling that to Company B, who's like, man,

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Speaker 3: we're not too good at that. I mean, is it creating?

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Speaker 3: Like doesn't that kind of defeat the whole purpose?

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Speaker 2: No, it doesn't. And we talked about this in the

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Speaker 2: acid rain episode. Do you remember whatever happened to acid rain?

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Speaker 2: That thing?

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Speaker 1: Oh?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it can work, and it does work. We actually

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Speaker 2: reduced sulfur dioxide emissions that we were associated with acid

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Speaker 2: rain so much. The acid rain went away and it

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Speaker 2: was like the ozone layer of like the early eighties,

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Speaker 2: I think in seventies, like it was a big scary

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Speaker 2: thing and we took care of it because of cap

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Speaker 2: and trade schemes. So it can work.

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Speaker 3: But how That's what I don't get. If one company

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Speaker 3: is lowering their output but another one is increasing theirs

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Speaker 3: because they just bought the other companies, then how is

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Speaker 3: that a net loss.

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Speaker 2: Because of the cap? Because you put the cap at

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Speaker 2: something close to a target that you want to reduce

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Speaker 2: things to, so you don't make like some sky high

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Speaker 2: cap that's more than what you're at now. You make

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Speaker 2: it less and then maybe a couple of years later,

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Speaker 2: you make it less than that. So those caps, those

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Speaker 2: those little shares or whatever, those allowances that they can trade,

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Speaker 2: they get more and more valuable the less and less

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Speaker 2: they represent because the law is kind of bringing these

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Speaker 2: emissions down further and further. So ultimately you're rewarding a

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Speaker 2: company by reducing their emissions because they can make money

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Speaker 2: selling that to another company, and that other company is

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Speaker 2: actually technically be punished because they're having to shell out

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Speaker 2: more money than they budgeted for because they're omitting more

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Speaker 2: than they are supposed to. So ultimately you're penalizing and

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Speaker 2: rewarding through this cap and trade scheme, but you're also

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Speaker 2: creating an artificial cap. All these companies could just pollute

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Speaker 2: as much as they want, but this government is saying no,

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Speaker 2: you actually can't. Here's your level. Here it is divided

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Speaker 2: among the ten companies go to town. But does that

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Speaker 2: make sense?

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Speaker 3: Well? Yeah. The thing I still don't get though, is

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Speaker 3: the company that's, you know, buying extra emissions whatever output

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Speaker 3: from the company that's like really good at it, are

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Speaker 3: they allowed to go over the cap?

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Speaker 2: They know they But let's say they have a cap

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Speaker 2: to put out ten pounds of CO two, right, yeah,

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Speaker 2: and they're going to they know they're putting out fifteen

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Speaker 2: that year. Well, this other company that's putting out five

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Speaker 2: pounds of CO two that year, they can sell their

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Speaker 2: other five pounds, So no one goes over the cap

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Speaker 2: total cap, but different companies can contribute different amounts based

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Speaker 2: on how much of those allowance shares they can purchase

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Speaker 2: or sell. Does that make sense?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I guess so.

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Speaker 2: I promise it works. It worked for sulfur dioxide. It

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Speaker 2: does work. The problem is is it's also like it

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Speaker 2: requires a lot of buy in from industry or really

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Speaker 2: heavy handed government regulation.

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Speaker 3: Well, either way. It became a big deal in the eighties,

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Speaker 3: and by the end of the eighties, the World Bank

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Speaker 3: referred to tragedy of the commons as quote the dominant

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Speaker 3: paradigm within which social scientists assess natural resource issues. So

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Speaker 3: I mean you can't like there's a bunch of different

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Speaker 3: policies in a bunch of different areas, so you can't

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Speaker 3: just look at the entire thing as a whole and

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Speaker 3: say like, well it's been a huge success, Like you

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Speaker 3: can pick out something like acid rain or say it

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Speaker 3: was success in this case, but there's humans involved, so

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Speaker 3: you never can tell. Well, it's not like you never

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Speaker 3: can't tell like I say, can forecast, but there's not

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Speaker 3: just one big blanket like nope, this is the exact solution.

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Speaker 2: Right for sure, And it depends on the on the industry,

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Speaker 2: right like you said, acid rain, that was a great

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Speaker 2: success story. Fisheries are another example. If you take a

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Speaker 2: fishery like you were saying, and you divide up the

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Speaker 2: total catch between companies, those companies can actually go around

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Speaker 2: and buy you know, huge portions of the other company shares, right,

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Speaker 2: and so all of a sudden, they're basically one company

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Speaker 2: with all of the rights to catch all of the

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Speaker 2: fish in that fishery because they managed to consolidate the

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Speaker 2: shares over time. And that's a huge problem that's not

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Speaker 2: at all what you want. Like, yeah, that that fishing

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Speaker 2: company is still staying within the total number of fish

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Speaker 2: that can be caught annually, but they ran all the

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Speaker 2: other people out of business. That's so that's not at

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Speaker 2: all what you want with it. So there's there's pluses

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Speaker 2: and minuses. There's a situation. The thing is is the

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Speaker 2: tragedy of the commons has largely been overblown and the

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Speaker 2: idea that you can come out on top just by

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Speaker 2: privatizing things like natural resources has been a lesson learned

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Speaker 2: the hard way. That's just overall, that's not necessarily the

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Speaker 2: best way to do it, and it can really really

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Speaker 2: harm some groups while enriching others tremendously.

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Speaker 3: Well. Yeah, and like in the case of a fishery,

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Speaker 3: like if you're a small fishing crew or something, good

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Speaker 3: luck kind of working your way up and maybe establishing

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Speaker 3: yourself as one of the larger companies, especially if the

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Speaker 3: people that are buying these things up are people that

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Speaker 3: don't live around. There are these corporations that right that

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Speaker 3: don't have necessarily a local interest. And again, while they

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Speaker 3: might be like hitting you know, staying under the threshold environmentally,

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Speaker 3: it might be working out, but you're consolidating the wealth.

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Speaker 3: Sometimes there's regulations on that where they say you have

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Speaker 3: to be you know, like on the fishing boat, and like,

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Speaker 3: you know, like Chick fil A. If you're going to

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Speaker 3: buy Chick fil A franchise, you gotta manage that.

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Speaker 2: Thing exactly right. You want that Chick fil A Cadillac.

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Speaker 3: Exactly But sometimes there aren't regulations like that. And what's

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Speaker 3: been proven over and over, especially with etms, if there's

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Speaker 3: a way for a system to be exploited for profit,

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Speaker 3: then a company will come along and do it no

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Speaker 3: matter what.

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Speaker 2: That's basically the neoliberalism tea shirt what you just said

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Speaker 2: to you know exactly.

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Speaker 3: Here's the thing, if you look at the actual try

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Speaker 3: tragedy of the commons, Harden sort of just leaves conveniently

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Speaker 3: leaves a lot of stuff out. Like he's assuming in

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Speaker 3: this argument that like the people that the farmers that

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Speaker 3: are sharing this grazing spot aren't talking to each other

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Speaker 3: at all about what's going on and saying like, hey,

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Speaker 3: we're ruining this land. By the way, maybe we should

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Speaker 3: dial it back, like everybody get rid of two cows.

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Speaker 3: And it also assumes that their only interest is to

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Speaker 3: maximize profit and do not care for the land, and

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Speaker 3: that's just not always the case.

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Speaker 2: No. I mean that's really a tough sell to a

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Speaker 2: neoliberal policy maker, Like they're just like, you're crazy, you're

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Speaker 2: so naive for even thinking that. Of course their goal

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Speaker 2: is to maximize profits. But what's really cool is we'll

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Speaker 2: see a little later on real world examples prove that

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Speaker 2: that's not true. They disprove the tragedy of the commons

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Speaker 2: by themselves. It wasn't like, oh, let's set up this crazy,

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Speaker 2: really kind of rickety experiment and see if we can

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Speaker 2: disprove the tragedy of the commons. Now, people went out

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Speaker 2: and looked at real world, for example, indigenous treatment of

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Speaker 2: common resources, and they're like, these people have been managing

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Speaker 2: and not depleting these things for thousands of years now

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Speaker 2: because they came up with their own sensible rules that

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Speaker 2: aren't neoliberal in nature.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, for sure, if you look at the original sort

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Speaker 3: of like it's not just a theoretical thing. If you

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Speaker 3: look at the paper by William Forrester. I think he

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Speaker 3: said Forster earlier, not Forrester Lloyd, that this is the

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Speaker 3: one hardened would you say, hijacked to begin with, he did.

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Speaker 3: He was talking about actual English commons, which was how

433
00:24:09,920 --> 00:24:13,800
Speaker 3: it used to work in medieval England. Was the lord

434
00:24:13,840 --> 00:24:16,119
Speaker 3: would own all this land, but there were people that

435
00:24:16,200 --> 00:24:18,240
Speaker 3: lived on it. It wasn't like, hey, this is my

436
00:24:18,280 --> 00:24:21,199
Speaker 3: private land, no one can be here at first. So

437
00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:22,760
Speaker 3: the people that lived there, they you know, they had

438
00:24:22,760 --> 00:24:24,760
Speaker 3: to graze their animals and fish out of the streams

439
00:24:24,800 --> 00:24:27,919
Speaker 3: and ponds and things like that, and they were allowed

440
00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:32,800
Speaker 3: to with you know, through certain age old customs. Sometimes

441
00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:34,600
Speaker 3: the local government would step in and kind of help

442
00:24:34,680 --> 00:24:38,120
Speaker 3: manage this stuff and limit grazing and things like that.

443
00:24:38,160 --> 00:24:42,320
Speaker 3: But it wasn't like this set codified system in place

444
00:24:42,520 --> 00:24:44,960
Speaker 3: all over England. It was just they had been working

445
00:24:45,040 --> 00:24:48,240
Speaker 3: it out for centuries like this. It wasn't perfect, but

446
00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:51,760
Speaker 3: it was sustainable and they didn't like just destroy their

447
00:24:51,840 --> 00:24:55,399
Speaker 3: land because they all had self interest to keep it sustainable.

448
00:24:55,440 --> 00:24:58,919
Speaker 2: Right, And then they were enclosed. And enclosure was this

449
00:24:59,160 --> 00:25:06,080
Speaker 2: huge mass as have overlooked world changing event, and we

450
00:25:06,200 --> 00:25:08,600
Speaker 2: need to do an episode on the fencing of the

451
00:25:08,640 --> 00:25:12,680
Speaker 2: Commons someday because it's just it changed the entire mentality.

452
00:25:12,680 --> 00:25:16,520
Speaker 2: Remember our episode on the Luddites and how they emerged

453
00:25:16,520 --> 00:25:18,840
Speaker 2: from a world that was just it just completely turned

454
00:25:18,880 --> 00:25:22,400
Speaker 2: everything on its head. That's what happened with enclosure. When

455
00:25:22,440 --> 00:25:25,920
Speaker 2: they fenced the commons, it changed everything, and the concept

456
00:25:25,960 --> 00:25:28,520
Speaker 2: of private property like really kind of developed out of that,

457
00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:31,280
Speaker 2: at least in the West, right. So we'll do a

458
00:25:31,280 --> 00:25:34,000
Speaker 2: whole separate episode on that, but suffice to say that

459
00:25:34,080 --> 00:25:37,840
Speaker 2: it seems to be once the commons were fenced and

460
00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:41,800
Speaker 2: we're no longer a shared resource, that's when the issue

461
00:25:41,840 --> 00:25:46,080
Speaker 2: started to come up. If you ask Karl Marx, he

462
00:25:46,119 --> 00:25:48,000
Speaker 2: would have said that this is where we came up

463
00:25:48,040 --> 00:25:51,679
Speaker 2: with the landless proletariat, the working class who had to

464
00:25:51,760 --> 00:25:55,680
Speaker 2: work for wages because they no longer owned anything. It

465
00:25:55,720 --> 00:25:59,040
Speaker 2: created the very, very wealthy class that didn't actually have

466
00:25:59,080 --> 00:26:00,959
Speaker 2: to do anything because because all they had to do

467
00:26:01,040 --> 00:26:04,399
Speaker 2: was start renting this private property of theirs to the

468
00:26:04,400 --> 00:26:09,720
Speaker 2: people who needed to work. It created a whole system

469
00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:13,840
Speaker 2: of problems. And in fact, some people are like, whether,

470
00:26:13,960 --> 00:26:16,320
Speaker 2: however you feel about capitalism, you can kind of trace

471
00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:19,280
Speaker 2: us back to the beginning of capitalism, the fencing of

472
00:26:19,280 --> 00:26:22,600
Speaker 2: the commons. The irony of all this is that William

473
00:26:22,640 --> 00:26:28,840
Speaker 2: Forrester or Lloyd was arguing against Adam Smith's capitalist idea

474
00:26:29,440 --> 00:26:32,679
Speaker 2: that the invisible hand of the market will always guide

475
00:26:32,720 --> 00:26:37,720
Speaker 2: things to a good outcome. He created, ultimately the Tragedy

476
00:26:37,760 --> 00:26:40,640
Speaker 2: of the Commons as a thought experiment to show like, no, actually,

477
00:26:41,040 --> 00:26:46,840
Speaker 2: people don't. People aren't guided to this bottom good. Instead,

478
00:26:47,240 --> 00:26:49,639
Speaker 2: they are going to act in their own self interest

479
00:26:49,680 --> 00:26:53,560
Speaker 2: and destroy this stuff. So Harden actually took it and

480
00:26:53,800 --> 00:26:58,560
Speaker 2: turned it around as an argument for capitalism, for private

481
00:26:58,640 --> 00:27:03,520
Speaker 2: enterprise advertising stuff. This argument that was originally used to

482
00:27:03,560 --> 00:27:04,159
Speaker 2: disprove that.

483
00:27:04,800 --> 00:27:07,639
Speaker 3: Yeah, and if you were enclosing your own comments or

484
00:27:07,760 --> 00:27:12,040
Speaker 3: arguing in that favor at the time, you were saying, hey,

485
00:27:12,119 --> 00:27:15,440
Speaker 3: everything has been chaos up into this point. It's very

486
00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:19,320
Speaker 3: inefficient and there's got to be a more organized way

487
00:27:19,320 --> 00:27:23,200
Speaker 3: to do this. And that was you know, it wasn't

488
00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:25,800
Speaker 3: a guys, I guess, but what they were really saying

489
00:27:25,920 --> 00:27:31,080
Speaker 3: was is we want this area, right, it's ours. Yeah,

490
00:27:31,119 --> 00:27:33,919
Speaker 3: I mean, let's just oversell the chaos, maybe because it

491
00:27:33,920 --> 00:27:37,680
Speaker 3: was actually working out okay for many centuries, but we're

492
00:27:37,720 --> 00:27:40,160
Speaker 3: going to just sell it as this this chaotic mess

493
00:27:40,160 --> 00:27:42,399
Speaker 3: that needs to be cleaned up and organized.

494
00:27:42,800 --> 00:27:45,480
Speaker 2: Right, That's how it's done. It seems like, isn't it.

495
00:27:45,600 --> 00:27:49,000
Speaker 2: Charles Like people people come along and create a problem

496
00:27:49,040 --> 00:27:52,600
Speaker 2: that's not actually there for their own benefit. Ultimately.

497
00:27:53,160 --> 00:27:57,560
Speaker 3: Yeah, I have a friend who ever since college, he

498
00:27:57,640 --> 00:27:59,120
Speaker 3: was just one of those guys that while we were

499
00:27:59,160 --> 00:28:03,760
Speaker 3: just like what over, he was about what about everything

500
00:28:03,800 --> 00:28:06,000
Speaker 3: about the world, about politics, about you know that that

501
00:28:06,040 --> 00:28:07,640
Speaker 3: period of college would you just kind of check out

502
00:28:07,640 --> 00:28:09,160
Speaker 3: and all you care about is like where you're going

503
00:28:09,200 --> 00:28:11,200
Speaker 3: that night? All that to say, he was a very

504
00:28:11,200 --> 00:28:12,920
Speaker 3: smart guy back then, and he used to just say

505
00:28:12,960 --> 00:28:15,080
Speaker 3: stuff that used to shake all of us to our

506
00:28:15,119 --> 00:28:18,440
Speaker 3: core about what's coming about this, that or the other

507
00:28:18,480 --> 00:28:20,600
Speaker 3: with a government. And he would always say, but here's

508
00:28:20,640 --> 00:28:22,840
Speaker 3: how they're going to sell it to you, And I, oh, yeah.

509
00:28:22,880 --> 00:28:25,560
Speaker 3: That always stuck with me, and he's totally right, like

510
00:28:25,880 --> 00:28:27,679
Speaker 3: they'll sell it to you as this, but then it

511
00:28:27,720 --> 00:28:28,359
Speaker 3: becomes this.

512
00:28:28,920 --> 00:28:32,720
Speaker 2: Right, Yeah, that's really interesting. I love stuff like that

513
00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:37,639
Speaker 2: about how just massive sweeping changes come from just a

514
00:28:37,760 --> 00:28:41,000
Speaker 2: change in an idea, change in yeah, in perspective, And

515
00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:44,240
Speaker 2: that's a really great That's what the tragedy of the

516
00:28:44,280 --> 00:28:47,000
Speaker 2: Commons was. It was an idea, it was a perspective.

517
00:28:47,520 --> 00:28:51,520
Speaker 2: He'd like Garrett Harden, didn't undertake a bunch of different

518
00:28:51,560 --> 00:28:55,520
Speaker 2: experiments or field studies or anything like that. In his paper,

519
00:28:55,640 --> 00:28:57,960
Speaker 2: which was published in Science by the way, it was

520
00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:02,000
Speaker 2: an essay at his own thoughts on something that he

521
00:29:02,080 --> 00:29:07,840
Speaker 2: presented so reasonably that people who were again neoliberals, who

522
00:29:07,880 --> 00:29:12,800
Speaker 2: were in favor of privatizing everything, including common resources, could

523
00:29:12,880 --> 00:29:16,080
Speaker 2: go to government policymakers and be like, here's how it works.

524
00:29:16,400 --> 00:29:19,880
Speaker 2: Doesn't that make sense? And the government said, yes, that

525
00:29:20,280 --> 00:29:23,600
Speaker 2: makes sense, let's start privatizing everything. And it was just

526
00:29:23,640 --> 00:29:27,600
Speaker 2: because this guy took this idea and made it approachable,

527
00:29:27,920 --> 00:29:31,640
Speaker 2: that's it. Yeah, it's not. It became fact even though

528
00:29:31,680 --> 00:29:35,360
Speaker 2: it was never faced. I just find that fascinating how

529
00:29:35,520 --> 00:29:37,560
Speaker 2: something like that can just change the world.

530
00:29:37,960 --> 00:29:39,840
Speaker 3: Well, you know, I think there were so many people

531
00:29:39,960 --> 00:29:42,560
Speaker 3: licking their chops. They were like, oh, here's a great

532
00:29:42,560 --> 00:29:45,480
Speaker 3: opportunity for us to jump on this bandwagon to take

533
00:29:45,520 --> 00:29:46,959
Speaker 3: more for ourselves.

534
00:29:47,240 --> 00:29:49,680
Speaker 2: Right, But what if the bandwagon had never been there?

535
00:29:49,720 --> 00:29:53,760
Speaker 2: Would anyone have figured out how to manipulate things so thoroughly,

536
00:29:53,920 --> 00:29:58,720
Speaker 2: especially so quickly too? Without this one paper, this one biologist.

537
00:29:58,200 --> 00:29:59,920
Speaker 3: Wrote, Yeah, someone would have.

538
00:30:00,800 --> 00:30:03,640
Speaker 2: Yeah, but it would have happened piecemeal. I think, I

539
00:30:03,720 --> 00:30:06,680
Speaker 2: don't know, it's questionable that it would have happened like

540
00:30:06,840 --> 00:30:07,320
Speaker 2: it had.

541
00:30:07,760 --> 00:30:09,480
Speaker 3: Yeah, maybe let's.

542
00:30:09,280 --> 00:30:09,959
Speaker 2: Take a break.

543
00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:12,080
Speaker 3: All right, we'll be right back. We're going to contemplate

544
00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:14,280
Speaker 3: that and come back with the definitive answer. Right for this,

545
00:30:48,640 --> 00:30:49,920
Speaker 3: we don't have a definitive answer.

546
00:30:49,920 --> 00:30:52,800
Speaker 2: I was just kidding, You got me.

547
00:30:52,960 --> 00:30:57,440
Speaker 3: We should talk about Eleanor Ostrom though. This is a

548
00:30:57,480 --> 00:31:00,200
Speaker 3: woman who wrote a book in nineteen ninety called Governing

549
00:31:00,280 --> 00:31:04,640
Speaker 3: the Commons colon the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,

550
00:31:05,400 --> 00:31:07,800
Speaker 3: and she's probably like at the top of the list

551
00:31:08,080 --> 00:31:13,040
Speaker 3: for really bringing this to the upper echelons of the

552
00:31:13,040 --> 00:31:18,680
Speaker 3: political world worldwide. I guess she took a bunch of

553
00:31:18,720 --> 00:31:25,200
Speaker 3: examples all over the world of controlled cprs, like grazing

554
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:28,520
Speaker 3: areas it's always a good one in Switzerland in this case,

555
00:31:29,600 --> 00:31:33,400
Speaker 3: forests in Japan, meadows in Japan, and of course fisheries

556
00:31:33,440 --> 00:31:35,520
Speaker 3: and things like that in this case in the Philippines.

557
00:31:36,360 --> 00:31:38,680
Speaker 3: So kind of really kind of picking different spots all

558
00:31:38,720 --> 00:31:42,040
Speaker 3: over the world and examining these and how they've worked out,

559
00:31:42,840 --> 00:31:47,880
Speaker 3: and basically argued that like, hey, these things are had

560
00:31:47,920 --> 00:31:51,560
Speaker 3: been working out for centuries and it worked out pretty

561
00:31:51,600 --> 00:31:55,960
Speaker 3: good because everybody lived there who was involved. And when

562
00:31:55,960 --> 00:31:59,160
Speaker 3: you have local people that have long term interest in

563
00:31:59,800 --> 00:32:02,400
Speaker 3: the well being of their land and their area and

564
00:32:02,480 --> 00:32:07,680
Speaker 3: keeping that up. Then the economic side of things, it

565
00:32:07,760 --> 00:32:09,480
Speaker 3: is not going to go away, but it's going to

566
00:32:09,520 --> 00:32:11,720
Speaker 3: take a back seat to ensuring that this land that

567
00:32:11,760 --> 00:32:15,240
Speaker 3: they live in stays as close to as it is

568
00:32:15,280 --> 00:32:15,880
Speaker 3: as possible.

569
00:32:17,160 --> 00:32:21,200
Speaker 2: Yes, And so she was the one who went out

570
00:32:21,240 --> 00:32:24,720
Speaker 2: and actually did those field studies that Garrett Harden didn't like.

571
00:32:24,760 --> 00:32:27,200
Speaker 2: She had the receipts to back up what she was saying,

572
00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:31,960
Speaker 2: which was the tragedy of the Commons isn't actually true.

573
00:32:32,200 --> 00:32:35,680
Speaker 2: It's certainly not in every case. And what's the ironic

574
00:32:35,720 --> 00:32:41,440
Speaker 2: thing is this Chuck the tragedy of the Commons played out.

575
00:32:42,360 --> 00:32:47,000
Speaker 2: I feel like for the most part, when things were

576
00:32:47,040 --> 00:32:51,360
Speaker 2: privatized and outside industry were allowed to come in and

577
00:32:51,480 --> 00:32:55,120
Speaker 2: have a share of the Commons, that's when it was

578
00:32:55,680 --> 00:32:58,000
Speaker 2: that's when the problems really began.

579
00:32:58,320 --> 00:33:00,000
Speaker 3: Yeah.

580
00:33:00,680 --> 00:33:02,560
Speaker 2: So I want to say one other thing too, because

581
00:33:02,560 --> 00:33:05,160
Speaker 2: I know I'm kind of known for having a very

582
00:33:05,200 --> 00:33:09,520
Speaker 2: hard nos certain opinion about things and its lants, you know,

583
00:33:10,000 --> 00:33:13,400
Speaker 2: in this particular direction. Typically, I don't know, in the

584
00:33:13,440 --> 00:33:19,760
Speaker 2: last like years, so I've kind of lost my taste

585
00:33:18,320 --> 00:33:22,560
Speaker 2: for brigidity like that, or black and white thinking. So

586
00:33:22,920 --> 00:33:24,880
Speaker 2: I don't want anybody to think that I'm just like

587
00:33:25,120 --> 00:33:31,240
Speaker 2: neoliberalism equals bad alternatives to neoliberalism all good. Like, I

588
00:33:31,400 --> 00:33:34,840
Speaker 2: just don't see the world like that anymore. So I

589
00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:38,040
Speaker 2: don't want anybody to think that I'm just like I'm

590
00:33:38,080 --> 00:33:42,480
Speaker 2: bashing neoliberalism as if there's no redeemable quality to it whatsoever.

591
00:33:42,560 --> 00:33:45,040
Speaker 2: I just don't believe that. But in the case of

592
00:33:45,160 --> 00:33:48,000
Speaker 2: the tragedy of the commons, I feel like more often

593
00:33:48,040 --> 00:33:54,000
Speaker 2: than not, neoliberal policies again, privatizing shared resources or taking

594
00:33:54,120 --> 00:33:56,120
Speaker 2: oversight away from the government and just putting it in

595
00:33:56,200 --> 00:33:58,920
Speaker 2: the hands of the market has been disastrous for the

596
00:33:58,960 --> 00:34:02,480
Speaker 2: world over the last it's like forty fifty years. It's

597
00:34:02,520 --> 00:34:06,880
Speaker 2: been really good for wealthy people and helping other people

598
00:34:07,280 --> 00:34:11,640
Speaker 2: get wealthier, but that ignores the expense on the backs

599
00:34:11,680 --> 00:34:14,480
Speaker 2: of other people that it's created too. I just wanted

600
00:34:14,520 --> 00:34:17,400
Speaker 2: to put that out there, yeah, that I don't want

601
00:34:17,400 --> 00:34:21,080
Speaker 2: anybody think I'm just bashing neoliberalism because it does help

602
00:34:21,120 --> 00:34:22,120
Speaker 2: in a lot of ways.

603
00:34:22,520 --> 00:34:24,680
Speaker 3: No, And I know you well, and I can tell

604
00:34:24,719 --> 00:34:28,200
Speaker 3: everybody that you are a very varied person who looks

605
00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:31,560
Speaker 3: at things from all angles and is very considerate of

606
00:34:33,080 --> 00:34:35,120
Speaker 3: you don't just shut anything down outright. You like to

607
00:34:35,200 --> 00:34:42,319
Speaker 3: consider things now. Okay, So back to Austrom though, she

608
00:34:42,560 --> 00:34:46,319
Speaker 3: argues that, hey, this we've shown time and time again.

609
00:34:46,360 --> 00:34:48,800
Speaker 3: I show in these real world examples in my books

610
00:34:49,640 --> 00:34:53,000
Speaker 3: in Japan and in Switzerland and the Philippines with the

611
00:34:53,000 --> 00:34:57,480
Speaker 3: fisheries that this can work. But there's some parameters that

612
00:34:57,560 --> 00:35:00,800
Speaker 3: have been shown to ensure that it works, and you

613
00:35:00,880 --> 00:35:02,959
Speaker 3: got to follow these or it's not going to work.

614
00:35:03,360 --> 00:35:06,400
Speaker 3: And she had narrowed it down to eight principles of

615
00:35:06,680 --> 00:35:10,839
Speaker 3: like a successful you know, regulation of a commons, which

616
00:35:10,920 --> 00:35:15,400
Speaker 3: is clearly defined boundaries. So who can use this area,

617
00:35:15,440 --> 00:35:18,680
Speaker 3: what is this area? Rules that fit local needs. And

618
00:35:18,719 --> 00:35:20,839
Speaker 3: this is something we've been kind of hammering on. It's

619
00:35:20,880 --> 00:35:23,279
Speaker 3: got to be the local parties that come up with

620
00:35:23,320 --> 00:35:28,960
Speaker 3: these rules. The addition of outside people stepping in it

621
00:35:29,000 --> 00:35:31,520
Speaker 3: seems to be when all of the problems start because

622
00:35:31,560 --> 00:35:33,719
Speaker 3: their interests are not the same as local interests.

623
00:35:34,239 --> 00:35:36,920
Speaker 2: Yeah, history kind of tells us that when outside groups

624
00:35:36,920 --> 00:35:39,239
Speaker 2: come in and start pushing the people who've been using

625
00:35:39,320 --> 00:35:42,600
Speaker 2: this thing for a thousand years, pushing them around. Yeah,

626
00:35:43,960 --> 00:35:47,080
Speaker 2: it just doesn't go very wellpeatly because the outside groups

627
00:35:47,120 --> 00:35:50,600
Speaker 2: don't necessarily understand this. And as we'll see, that doesn't

628
00:35:50,600 --> 00:35:53,320
Speaker 2: mean that there shouldn't be the involvement of any outside groups.

629
00:35:53,560 --> 00:35:56,520
Speaker 2: What Ostrom was saying that she found from these studies

630
00:35:56,600 --> 00:36:00,080
Speaker 2: is that you have to begin the base the the

631
00:36:00,840 --> 00:36:03,160
Speaker 2: people who are really laying the groundwork and setting the

632
00:36:03,280 --> 00:36:05,480
Speaker 2: rules for this. They have to be the people who

633
00:36:05,520 --> 00:36:07,160
Speaker 2: are actually using this resource.

634
00:36:07,280 --> 00:36:10,360
Speaker 3: Yeah, for sure. The third one is group decision making,

635
00:36:10,480 --> 00:36:13,680
Speaker 3: so it's not just a couple of people or a

636
00:36:13,719 --> 00:36:16,719
Speaker 3: small board deciding these things, like get as many people

637
00:36:16,760 --> 00:36:20,920
Speaker 3: in there as possible, local people monitoring. You have to

638
00:36:21,000 --> 00:36:23,600
Speaker 3: have people monitoring, and you know, she used her forest

639
00:36:23,680 --> 00:36:26,680
Speaker 3: land example in Japan was one where she was like, hey,

640
00:36:26,680 --> 00:36:30,520
Speaker 3: they had locals monitoring the stuff and levying fines. So

641
00:36:30,560 --> 00:36:32,480
Speaker 3: you've got to know that someone is out there doing this,

642
00:36:32,880 --> 00:36:35,320
Speaker 3: so people, you know, know they're going to be held accountable.

643
00:36:35,800 --> 00:36:38,239
Speaker 3: And then the next one ties into that. And then

644
00:36:38,280 --> 00:36:41,400
Speaker 3: when you do that, you've got to start out small

645
00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:43,440
Speaker 3: with these sanctions. It's got to be like a warning

646
00:36:43,480 --> 00:36:46,279
Speaker 3: first and then a small fine. You can't just come

647
00:36:46,320 --> 00:36:49,239
Speaker 3: in there with the billy club and say you're out.

648
00:36:50,040 --> 00:36:54,200
Speaker 3: It's you've got to encourage people to stick around and like,

649
00:36:54,239 --> 00:36:56,759
Speaker 3: all right, here's a warning, but you can't keep letting

650
00:36:56,800 --> 00:36:58,799
Speaker 3: this happen. That kind of thing I was.

651
00:36:58,840 --> 00:37:02,920
Speaker 2: Really curious with the ultimate punishment is for repeat offenders,

652
00:37:03,080 --> 00:37:05,640
Speaker 2: And the only example I could find was among a

653
00:37:05,680 --> 00:37:13,560
Speaker 2: group in Bali. And ostracism is what the person ultimately faces, which, yeah,

654
00:37:13,560 --> 00:37:17,640
Speaker 2: and that's bad enough in like like a Western society,

655
00:37:17,800 --> 00:37:20,880
Speaker 2: you know, but also you can make do you know,

656
00:37:21,239 --> 00:37:23,880
Speaker 2: there's the internet. If you go into a store, the

657
00:37:23,880 --> 00:37:26,520
Speaker 2: person basically has to take your money for food. In

658
00:37:26,760 --> 00:37:30,840
Speaker 2: a more traditional culture, ostracisms like you're in big trouble

659
00:37:31,000 --> 00:37:34,239
Speaker 2: because groups rely on one another for help. And the

660
00:37:34,280 --> 00:37:36,920
Speaker 2: example they gave was if one of your relatives dies,

661
00:37:37,239 --> 00:37:40,640
Speaker 2: there's certain rights you have to perform, and if you're ostracized,

662
00:37:40,719 --> 00:37:43,040
Speaker 2: you have to figure that out all by yourself because

663
00:37:43,080 --> 00:37:44,799
Speaker 2: the community is not going to show up and help

664
00:37:44,840 --> 00:37:49,360
Speaker 2: you for these death rights that your ancestors demand of you,

665
00:37:49,560 --> 00:37:51,360
Speaker 2: because that's just tradition.

666
00:37:51,840 --> 00:37:55,560
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, for sure. The last three of the eighth

667
00:37:56,239 --> 00:38:00,440
Speaker 3: easy dispute resolution, so just something on the on the

668
00:38:00,680 --> 00:38:03,200
Speaker 3: cheap that's pretty informal and not some big, drawn out

669
00:38:03,239 --> 00:38:05,759
Speaker 3: expensive you know, tribunal or something like that.

670
00:38:06,160 --> 00:38:08,359
Speaker 2: Yeah, no wigs, no powdered wigs.

671
00:38:08,040 --> 00:38:10,720
Speaker 3: No potter wigs at all. You have to have support

672
00:38:10,760 --> 00:38:15,120
Speaker 3: from authorities. And it may be a local thing, but

673
00:38:15,160 --> 00:38:18,640
Speaker 3: you've got to have the blessing of a larger government

674
00:38:18,680 --> 00:38:21,080
Speaker 3: body to at the very least not get in there

675
00:38:21,120 --> 00:38:23,000
Speaker 3: and mucket up themselves and just sort of let you

676
00:38:23,040 --> 00:38:27,120
Speaker 3: do your thing, but maybe also support and then finally

677
00:38:27,160 --> 00:38:31,200
Speaker 3: building up to a larger system. So again, keep it local,

678
00:38:31,640 --> 00:38:35,360
Speaker 3: but if it's a system that connects to a larger system,

679
00:38:35,440 --> 00:38:38,319
Speaker 3: like a creek that connects to a larger watershed, you're

680
00:38:38,320 --> 00:38:40,480
Speaker 3: going to have to start linking up with other local

681
00:38:40,520 --> 00:38:42,319
Speaker 3: groups and make it a larger thing.

682
00:38:43,120 --> 00:38:46,640
Speaker 2: Right. But the point that she made too is that

683
00:38:46,640 --> 00:38:50,920
Speaker 2: that works, that's actually scalable, which is good because, like

684
00:38:50,960 --> 00:38:52,920
Speaker 2: you said, you know, a creek is one thing, but

685
00:38:53,120 --> 00:38:56,239
Speaker 2: it depends on a watershed. And so if you can

686
00:38:56,440 --> 00:38:59,520
Speaker 2: get together with other people who are managing their own creeks,

687
00:38:59,560 --> 00:39:03,600
Speaker 2: you can manage the watershed based on the individual common

688
00:39:05,080 --> 00:39:07,319
Speaker 2: I guess rules that that groups have come up with,

689
00:39:07,520 --> 00:39:10,600
Speaker 2: and that you can scale that into more modern systems too. Right, So,

690
00:39:11,120 --> 00:39:15,880
Speaker 2: like say a city has somehow created a cap on

691
00:39:15,960 --> 00:39:19,880
Speaker 2: how much emissions that the factories in the cities can create.

692
00:39:21,360 --> 00:39:24,000
Speaker 2: You can combine that with other cities, and now you're

693
00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:26,239
Speaker 2: starting to manage a larger part of the atmosphere. And

694
00:39:26,320 --> 00:39:28,719
Speaker 2: then that the state can come in and work with

695
00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:30,640
Speaker 2: all of those cities, and then the state can work

696
00:39:30,640 --> 00:39:32,080
Speaker 2: with other states, and all of a sudden, now you

697
00:39:32,160 --> 00:39:36,120
Speaker 2: have regional air quality being controlled from the rules that

698
00:39:36,239 --> 00:39:40,759
Speaker 2: are based on the actual stakeholders in each individual community.

699
00:39:41,120 --> 00:39:44,359
Speaker 3: That's right, And did she win something for this work?

700
00:39:44,960 --> 00:39:49,320
Speaker 2: She won the Nobel which Livia foot in parentheses fake

701
00:39:49,520 --> 00:39:52,960
Speaker 2: Nobel Prize and economic science is because that's not one

702
00:39:53,000 --> 00:39:57,520
Speaker 2: that the no that was actually organized originally.

703
00:39:57,520 --> 00:40:00,520
Speaker 3: She meant by that, but what one of the things

704
00:40:00,520 --> 00:40:02,720
Speaker 3: that that came out of the book. There's a University

705
00:40:02,760 --> 00:40:06,360
Speaker 3: of Chicago legal scholar name named lee Ann Fennel who

706
00:40:06,719 --> 00:40:10,080
Speaker 3: points to that book and says, you know, this is

707
00:40:10,120 --> 00:40:14,680
Speaker 3: sort of a corrects these legal theories that say property

708
00:40:14,760 --> 00:40:16,400
Speaker 3: is all or nothing, like you either own it or

709
00:40:16,600 --> 00:40:19,560
Speaker 3: and have total control over it, or you don't. And

710
00:40:19,640 --> 00:40:23,560
Speaker 3: it's actually possible. You can have a common you can

711
00:40:23,719 --> 00:40:28,120
Speaker 3: have an area that people share and the example that

712
00:40:29,080 --> 00:40:31,120
Speaker 3: and still have some autonomy. And the example that Livia

713
00:40:31,160 --> 00:40:33,640
Speaker 3: gave was like a house and if you got a

714
00:40:33,719 --> 00:40:36,200
Speaker 3: family in the house, you know, let's say you know

715
00:40:36,280 --> 00:40:40,200
Speaker 3: two people that have coupled up and have children. You know,

716
00:40:40,280 --> 00:40:44,040
Speaker 3: it's a collective. But like you know, generally speaking, unless

717
00:40:44,080 --> 00:40:46,400
Speaker 3: you live in a in a terrible house with an

718
00:40:46,400 --> 00:40:50,040
Speaker 3: authoritarian dictator as the head of the household.

719
00:40:49,800 --> 00:40:51,880
Speaker 2: Or a stepdad, that makes you feel stupid.

720
00:40:51,640 --> 00:40:53,920
Speaker 3: Yeah stepdad and makes you feel dumb. You've got you know,

721
00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:55,440
Speaker 3: your kid has your room, and you know what you

722
00:40:55,440 --> 00:40:58,520
Speaker 3: can This is your room. You know, you have a

723
00:40:58,600 --> 00:41:01,520
Speaker 3: right to your room and you can basically decorate it

724
00:41:01,600 --> 00:41:03,600
Speaker 3: how you want, within within reason, and do what you

725
00:41:03,640 --> 00:41:06,120
Speaker 3: want in here. But it's still part of the.

726
00:41:06,320 --> 00:41:11,600
Speaker 2: House, right and technically your parents own that room. Yeah,

727
00:41:11,600 --> 00:41:16,520
Speaker 2: but because of custom, custom and tradition, they probably respect

728
00:41:16,600 --> 00:41:18,200
Speaker 2: that room as your private space.

729
00:41:18,920 --> 00:41:21,600
Speaker 3: Yeah. And that's something as a parent I found is

730
00:41:21,719 --> 00:41:25,360
Speaker 3: super important because at a certain age, and this has

731
00:41:25,400 --> 00:41:28,040
Speaker 3: been the last couple of years with Ruby, like you know,

732
00:41:28,120 --> 00:41:30,160
Speaker 3: I'm gonna go into my room and shut the.

733
00:41:30,160 --> 00:41:33,440
Speaker 2: Door, yeah, and you're like, no, you're not, well.

734
00:41:33,239 --> 00:41:36,040
Speaker 3: I'll open the door because I just like and it's

735
00:41:36,040 --> 00:41:37,680
Speaker 3: not in a spy way. I just like peeking in

736
00:41:37,760 --> 00:41:40,239
Speaker 3: and seeing the fun stuff she's doing. And Emily's like,

737
00:41:40,320 --> 00:41:41,879
Speaker 3: you know, leave the door shut. You get she's got

738
00:41:41,880 --> 00:41:42,680
Speaker 3: to have that autonomy.

739
00:41:42,719 --> 00:41:45,960
Speaker 2: And I'm like, good for Emily, that's really sweet. When

740
00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:47,600
Speaker 2: you open the door, do you suddenly open and go

741
00:41:47,640 --> 00:41:48,120
Speaker 2: what are you doing?

742
00:41:49,120 --> 00:41:51,040
Speaker 3: I'll give it you. I'll give a little knock now,

743
00:41:51,239 --> 00:41:54,400
Speaker 3: you know. And you know she's usually in their drawing

744
00:41:54,440 --> 00:41:55,799
Speaker 3: pictures of cats and listening.

745
00:41:55,600 --> 00:41:57,400
Speaker 2: To music, reading Team Beat.

746
00:41:57,960 --> 00:41:58,680
Speaker 3: Yeah.

747
00:41:59,080 --> 00:42:02,080
Speaker 2: Man, do you remember? So was your room your own

748
00:42:02,120 --> 00:42:03,799
Speaker 2: private sanctuary? Yeah?

749
00:42:03,800 --> 00:42:05,680
Speaker 3: I mean Scott and I shared a room until I

750
00:42:05,840 --> 00:42:12,000
Speaker 3: was I feel like I was probably ten or eleven.

751
00:42:12,360 --> 00:42:14,640
Speaker 2: That's the that's the room age right there.

752
00:42:14,800 --> 00:42:17,640
Speaker 3: Yeah, and that's when we split. But we were upstairs

753
00:42:17,640 --> 00:42:21,080
Speaker 3: at our house. It was just two bedrooms and separated

754
00:42:21,120 --> 00:42:25,960
Speaker 3: by a joined bathroom. And my sweet brother, he I

755
00:42:26,040 --> 00:42:29,440
Speaker 3: was so sad about moving out of his room. At first,

756
00:42:29,560 --> 00:42:32,800
Speaker 3: he agreed to keep his bathroom door open so I

757
00:42:32,800 --> 00:42:34,880
Speaker 3: could lay in bed and see through the bathroom to

758
00:42:34,960 --> 00:42:35,879
Speaker 3: him and his work.

759
00:42:35,960 --> 00:42:39,799
Speaker 2: God, he is such a he'd be the rancher that

760
00:42:39,880 --> 00:42:41,880
Speaker 2: would be like, I'm not overgrazing all.

761
00:42:42,120 --> 00:42:45,400
Speaker 3: I know. He's one of the best. But yeah, so

762
00:42:45,480 --> 00:42:48,040
Speaker 3: I had my own room and it was like my

763
00:42:48,160 --> 00:42:50,839
Speaker 3: sports posters and I went through a Marylyn and Roe

764
00:42:50,840 --> 00:42:52,680
Speaker 3: phez for some reason, where I had a bunch of

765
00:42:52,719 --> 00:42:53,600
Speaker 3: hard posters up.

766
00:42:53,920 --> 00:42:56,240
Speaker 2: I went through a James phase that was similar.

767
00:42:56,440 --> 00:42:58,399
Speaker 3: Yeah, exactly, But yeah, it was my room. I took

768
00:42:58,440 --> 00:43:00,359
Speaker 3: a lot of pride in decorating it and doing my thing.

769
00:43:00,400 --> 00:43:04,480
Speaker 3: And my parents my father literally did not come upstairs.

770
00:43:05,640 --> 00:43:08,799
Speaker 3: That's a whole other story, and my mom did for

771
00:43:08,840 --> 00:43:11,440
Speaker 3: a while, but basically, I mean that was our zone

772
00:43:11,600 --> 00:43:12,319
Speaker 3: for the most part.

773
00:43:12,640 --> 00:43:16,880
Speaker 2: That's awesome, you know. I remember they're not being anything

774
00:43:16,920 --> 00:43:21,640
Speaker 2: more satisfying than undertaking a total remodeling of your room,

775
00:43:22,000 --> 00:43:24,120
Speaker 2: moving stuff around, furniture all of a sudden, the beds

776
00:43:24,120 --> 00:43:27,840
Speaker 2: over here, and like doing that, it was it was

777
00:43:27,920 --> 00:43:30,839
Speaker 2: so it just changed everything. I'd love that so much.

778
00:43:30,880 --> 00:43:32,600
Speaker 2: I have so many great memories of my room.

779
00:43:32,880 --> 00:43:34,680
Speaker 3: Yeah, me too, And I used to do that two

780
00:43:34,680 --> 00:43:39,480
Speaker 3: apartments I lived in, uh and I had ironically recently

781
00:43:39,520 --> 00:43:41,200
Speaker 3: had a thought about how much I used to enjoy

782
00:43:41,239 --> 00:43:44,200
Speaker 3: that and how like our house there, you can't really

783
00:43:44,320 --> 00:43:46,120
Speaker 3: do that, Like it's set up in a in a

784
00:43:46,160 --> 00:43:48,680
Speaker 3: way that I can't be like, hey, let's rearrange our

785
00:43:48,760 --> 00:43:51,120
Speaker 3: living room. It's like, well, you can't because.

786
00:43:51,680 --> 00:43:53,160
Speaker 2: Let's move the built ins outside.

787
00:43:53,239 --> 00:43:56,480
Speaker 3: Yeah, exactly, So those days are over for me unfortunately. Yeah.

788
00:43:56,600 --> 00:43:59,240
Speaker 2: Same here. That's just how it goes as you get older.

789
00:43:59,239 --> 00:44:01,560
Speaker 2: It's one more thing that brings you joy or brought

790
00:44:01,600 --> 00:44:04,839
Speaker 2: you joy that's now dead, old leaf.

791
00:44:06,239 --> 00:44:08,880
Speaker 3: All right, Well, let's finish up on tragedy of the commons,

792
00:44:09,000 --> 00:44:14,800
Speaker 3: because we can use an example of Maine lobster fisheries

793
00:44:14,840 --> 00:44:19,600
Speaker 3: as a pretty good example of how people can start

794
00:44:19,640 --> 00:44:23,880
Speaker 3: to do the wrong thing but correct course on their own. Yeah,

795
00:44:23,920 --> 00:44:26,080
Speaker 3: And that was the case in the nineteenth century when

796
00:44:26,160 --> 00:44:29,360
Speaker 3: the state of Maine started setting legal minimum sizes for

797
00:44:29,440 --> 00:44:33,040
Speaker 3: catching lobsters, and they couldn't enforce it that well at first,

798
00:44:33,040 --> 00:44:35,680
Speaker 3: and people broke the rules and we're like, you know,

799
00:44:35,760 --> 00:44:38,160
Speaker 3: trying to make extra money or keep more lobsters than

800
00:44:38,160 --> 00:44:41,160
Speaker 3: they should for a while. But eventually they were like, hey,

801
00:44:41,200 --> 00:44:44,799
Speaker 3: wait a minute, we're not doing ourselves any favors here,

802
00:44:44,840 --> 00:44:47,640
Speaker 3: and if we're going to all continue this to sustain

803
00:44:47,760 --> 00:44:50,600
Speaker 3: our living doing this, we got to work together. So

804
00:44:50,640 --> 00:44:54,960
Speaker 3: they form harbor gangs to start self policing.

805
00:44:55,040 --> 00:44:59,960
Speaker 2: Basically, so main lobsterman harbor gangs. Is there anything scared

806
00:45:00,360 --> 00:45:02,319
Speaker 2: than the sound of that? Just seeing them kind of

807
00:45:02,360 --> 00:45:04,320
Speaker 2: slowly come up on your boat and they're all like

808
00:45:04,600 --> 00:45:06,080
Speaker 2: they have chains in their hands.

809
00:45:06,360 --> 00:45:09,160
Speaker 3: Don't go over that. That's where the Hobba gangs are

810
00:45:09,800 --> 00:45:10,360
Speaker 3: very nice.

811
00:45:10,600 --> 00:45:12,239
Speaker 2: Boy, you just took me to cabit Coat.

812
00:45:13,280 --> 00:45:16,680
Speaker 3: So they started self policing, and everyone bought into this

813
00:45:16,840 --> 00:45:20,640
Speaker 3: idea that let's not ruin all of our livelihood here.

814
00:45:21,239 --> 00:45:24,279
Speaker 3: And one thing that gets pointed out is you can

815
00:45:24,400 --> 00:45:26,360
Speaker 3: do this in a case like that because lobsters are

816
00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:30,960
Speaker 3: close to shore. It's a small, small community. It's local

817
00:45:31,000 --> 00:45:33,879
Speaker 3: people in the case of cod. And at some point

818
00:45:33,920 --> 00:45:36,640
Speaker 3: we should do one on the Cod Wars because that's

819
00:45:36,680 --> 00:45:40,400
Speaker 3: where this factors in cod travel long distances and so

820
00:45:40,520 --> 00:45:43,480
Speaker 3: it's hard to regulate something like that that's widespread and

821
00:45:43,520 --> 00:45:44,800
Speaker 3: there's different countries involved.

822
00:45:46,200 --> 00:45:48,719
Speaker 2: So yeah, I guess tragedy of the Comments has been

823
00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:53,480
Speaker 2: largely debunked, even though it completely altered the world for

824
00:45:53,719 --> 00:45:55,359
Speaker 2: decades and decades and still does.

825
00:45:56,440 --> 00:45:58,799
Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean either blamed or credited with the birth

826
00:45:58,800 --> 00:45:59,600
Speaker 3: of capitalism.

827
00:45:59,600 --> 00:46:03,520
Speaker 2: This no small thing, it's pretty big. Yeah, yeah, Yeah,

828
00:46:03,520 --> 00:46:05,719
Speaker 2: So we're gonna do one on fencing of the commons

829
00:46:05,719 --> 00:46:07,200
Speaker 2: one day, and then we're also going to do one

830
00:46:07,200 --> 00:46:09,120
Speaker 2: on neoliberalism.

831
00:46:08,280 --> 00:46:10,320
Speaker 3: Someday and the cod Wars.

832
00:46:10,640 --> 00:46:14,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, and the cod Wars. There you go. Well, since

833
00:46:14,160 --> 00:46:17,480
Speaker 2: Chuck corrected me and added cod Wars, of course, that

834
00:46:17,520 --> 00:46:19,319
Speaker 2: means it's time everybody for listening to mail.

835
00:46:21,440 --> 00:46:25,160
Speaker 3: Uh. First of all, quick correction to a correction. When

836
00:46:25,200 --> 00:46:29,240
Speaker 3: we got written in about the hodgepodge, I kept saying

837
00:46:29,280 --> 00:46:34,600
Speaker 3: modgepodge right, it is modpodge, and the corrector got it right.

838
00:46:34,680 --> 00:46:38,320
Speaker 3: I just kept saying it wrong, wow, And I played

839
00:46:38,320 --> 00:46:40,880
Speaker 3: it off to myself as his joke, but it was not.

840
00:46:41,719 --> 00:46:44,800
Speaker 2: Modgepodge is better. I think the inventor of mod podge

841
00:46:44,840 --> 00:46:47,680
Speaker 2: is just like, oh, why didn't I call it mogepodge?

842
00:46:47,760 --> 00:46:48,279
Speaker 3: Mister vote?

843
00:46:48,400 --> 00:46:51,040
Speaker 2: That rhymes even I wonder if it was from the

844
00:46:51,040 --> 00:46:53,360
Speaker 2: time when mod squad was out, because it does have

845
00:46:53,480 --> 00:46:56,600
Speaker 2: kind of like a hippie dippy flower look to it,

846
00:46:56,600 --> 00:46:57,080
Speaker 2: doesn't it.

847
00:46:57,480 --> 00:47:00,400
Speaker 3: Well. Decoupage is a very old thing, and I suppose

848
00:47:00,480 --> 00:47:04,719
Speaker 3: that meant a modern des coupage, is my guess.

849
00:47:05,120 --> 00:47:09,520
Speaker 2: Okay, don't you think I don't know? I didn't ever

850
00:47:09,560 --> 00:47:11,600
Speaker 2: think about it more than I have in the last

851
00:47:11,680 --> 00:47:15,920
Speaker 2: couple of weeks. I know, right, we should never brought

852
00:47:15,960 --> 00:47:16,319
Speaker 2: it up.

853
00:47:16,440 --> 00:47:18,640
Speaker 3: Oh man, how do you go?

854
00:47:18,840 --> 00:47:18,960
Speaker 2: Oh?

855
00:47:19,120 --> 00:47:21,359
Speaker 3: I remember now we mentioned Martha Stewart and I said,

856
00:47:21,360 --> 00:47:25,440
Speaker 3: there's the Hodgepodge everywhere. M all right. So this is

857
00:47:25,480 --> 00:47:28,600
Speaker 3: from a friend in the Netherlands who said, good luck

858
00:47:28,600 --> 00:47:31,759
Speaker 3: pronouncing the name. But I think I've nailed it, so

859
00:47:31,800 --> 00:47:32,359
Speaker 3: we're going to see.

860
00:47:32,560 --> 00:47:33,920
Speaker 2: Okay, stay tuned for the end.

861
00:47:34,320 --> 00:47:36,880
Speaker 3: Hey, guys, just finished finished the episode on automats, and

862
00:47:36,880 --> 00:47:38,440
Speaker 3: I felt I needed to write in I'm from the

863
00:47:38,480 --> 00:47:41,360
Speaker 3: Netherlands and believe it or not, automats are still a

864
00:47:41,360 --> 00:47:44,839
Speaker 3: big thing there. And I remember now after I got

865
00:47:44,840 --> 00:47:47,280
Speaker 3: a couple of emails about these of being in Amsterdam,

866
00:47:47,760 --> 00:47:49,680
Speaker 3: Amsterdam and seeing these feebos.

867
00:47:49,360 --> 00:47:53,239
Speaker 2: F e b o places I've not heard of that.

868
00:47:53,560 --> 00:47:57,240
Speaker 3: Well, it's an automat basically, except instead of a huge restaurant,

869
00:47:57,239 --> 00:48:00,879
Speaker 3: it's just like a you know, a smallish room. We

870
00:48:00,920 --> 00:48:02,799
Speaker 3: refer to it as eating out of the wall. These

871
00:48:02,800 --> 00:48:05,319
Speaker 3: places mostly just sort of deep pried food, but in

872
00:48:05,360 --> 00:48:08,759
Speaker 3: general is quite fresh. Not sure why they're still so

873
00:48:08,840 --> 00:48:11,160
Speaker 3: popular though. Maybe it's because the Dutch aren't really known

874
00:48:11,520 --> 00:48:14,280
Speaker 3: for they're fine dining, as we just want our meals

875
00:48:14,280 --> 00:48:16,840
Speaker 3: to be efficient and cheap. Nevertheless, if you ever around

876
00:48:16,880 --> 00:48:19,320
Speaker 3: and invite you to take one of our famous croquettes

877
00:48:19,480 --> 00:48:22,480
Speaker 3: or bitter balls out of the wall, which are especially

878
00:48:22,480 --> 00:48:25,800
Speaker 3: good after a night of heavy drinking, I love the

879
00:48:25,840 --> 00:48:29,279
Speaker 3: show best regards, and that is from Hez.

880
00:48:30,880 --> 00:48:34,359
Speaker 2: Nice. Will you spell that for us non Dutch speakers?

881
00:48:35,120 --> 00:48:36,799
Speaker 3: At least that's how I was told to say it.

882
00:48:36,800 --> 00:48:43,759
Speaker 3: It is pronounced or as I'm sorry spelled, Gijs said, Hes.

883
00:48:43,840 --> 00:48:46,960
Speaker 2: That is fantastic. That looks like I just like brushed

884
00:48:47,000 --> 00:48:48,040
Speaker 2: up against the keyboard.

885
00:48:49,200 --> 00:48:49,880
Speaker 3: It really does.

886
00:48:50,160 --> 00:48:51,520
Speaker 2: Can you pronounce it one more time?

887
00:48:52,440 --> 00:48:54,560
Speaker 3: What I've gotten and what I'm sticking with is Hez.

888
00:48:55,239 --> 00:48:58,120
Speaker 2: That is great. I hope you nailed it, Chuck, you

889
00:48:58,200 --> 00:49:02,160
Speaker 2: deserve too of them. I will say thanks a lot, Hes.

890
00:49:03,640 --> 00:49:07,240
Speaker 3: The name you're trying to pronounce is Hez.

891
00:49:08,880 --> 00:49:11,400
Speaker 2: We appreciate the email. Thanks for filling us in. I

892
00:49:11,480 --> 00:49:14,520
Speaker 2: had no idea about bitter balls and eating from the

893
00:49:14,560 --> 00:49:17,880
Speaker 2: wall through out of the wall in Amsterdam, So thank you.

894
00:49:18,200 --> 00:49:22,720
Speaker 2: And if you want to be like the name is Hes,

895
00:49:23,800 --> 00:49:26,799
Speaker 2: then you can send us an email to send it

896
00:49:26,840 --> 00:49:32,440
Speaker 2: off to Stuff podcast at iHeartRadio dot com.

897
00:49:32,640 --> 00:49:35,520
Speaker 3: Stuff you should know is a production of iHeartRadio. For

898
00:49:35,600 --> 00:49:39,759
Speaker 3: more podcasts my heart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts,

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00:49:39,880 --> 00:49:41,720
Speaker 3: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.