WEBVTT - NBA Facing Video Privacy Suit, Judges & NLRB

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<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg Law with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 2>The NBA will have to face a class action video

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<v Speaker 2>privacy lawsuit which accuses it of sharing personal data from

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<v Speaker 2>viewers of videos on its website. The plaintiff, Michael Salazar,

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<v Speaker 2>signed up for the NBA's online email newsletter and alleges

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<v Speaker 2>that when he watched videos on NBA dot com, the

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<v Speaker 2>league shared his video watching history with Meta without his permission.

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<v Speaker 2>A federal judge dismissed his lawsuit, but the Second Circuit

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<v Speaker 2>Court of Appeals has reinstated it. Joining me is Ira Steinberg,

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<v Speaker 2>a partner at Greenberg Glusker, tell us about the case.

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<v Speaker 1>Sure The plaintiffs in this case alleges that he signed

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<v Speaker 1>up for a newsletter from the NBA, and that as

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<v Speaker 1>part of signing up for this newsletter, he gave the

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<v Speaker 1>NBA's information, and that the NBA's website has video content

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<v Speaker 1>on it and their newsletter has video content in it,

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<v Speaker 1>and that by signing up for this newsletter and watching

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<v Speaker 1>the video content, some of the information about the videos

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<v Speaker 1>he watched were transmitted to third parties and that was

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<v Speaker 1>a violation of a law called the Video Privacy Protection

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<v Speaker 1>Act the VPPA, and the VPPA was passed in nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>eighty eight after Robert Bork's video rental history was published

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<v Speaker 1>in a newspaper article and Senator Patrick Leahy, the Democrat

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<v Speaker 1>from Vermont, became offended by this among others, and they

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<v Speaker 1>passed this law which makes it illegal to share personal

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<v Speaker 1>identifying information regarding the video rentals of a renter, purchaser,

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<v Speaker 1>or subscriber of goods or services from a company. And

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<v Speaker 1>so the NBA case is really about whether the plaintiffs

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<v Speaker 1>was signed up for a newsletter, was a subscriber under

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<v Speaker 1>the VPPA, and whether the news let letter would goods

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<v Speaker 1>or services that would trigger the VPPA.

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<v Speaker 2>And what does the NBA say.

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<v Speaker 1>The NBA's argument is that when he signed up for

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<v Speaker 1>the newsletter, when Salazar signed up for the newsletter, he

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<v Speaker 1>didn't sign up for audio visual content. He didn't pay

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<v Speaker 1>for audio visual content. He signed up to receive a

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<v Speaker 1>written newsletter with news and updates about the NBA and

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<v Speaker 1>that letter. His sign up for the newsletter had nothing

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<v Speaker 1>to do with the audio visual content he received that

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<v Speaker 1>whatever he was a subscriber to, if he was a

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<v Speaker 1>subscriber at all, it wasn't a audio visual content.

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<v Speaker 2>As you mentioned, the VPPA was enacted in nineteen eighty eight,

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<v Speaker 2>before there were these kinds of websites or you know,

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<v Speaker 2>tracking people online. The second circuit said, it's no dinosaur statute,

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<v Speaker 2>But is it a dinosaur statute? It doesn't seem to

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<v Speaker 2>match what's happening nowadays.

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<v Speaker 1>This is actually fairly common in a lot of these

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<v Speaker 1>disputes that are coming up in multiple states. I practice

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<v Speaker 1>in California, That's what I know best. Than in California,

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<v Speaker 1>like many other places, there is no data privacy law

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<v Speaker 1>that you can sue a company under directly, Like for example,

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<v Speaker 1>in California, we have the California Consumer Privacy Act, the CCPA,

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<v Speaker 1>and it lets a consumer sue if there's a hack.

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<v Speaker 1>But if you just think that you know, you're on

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<v Speaker 1>a website and it's sharing your data, you can't ordinarily

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<v Speaker 1>sue that business. And so consumers are looking for different

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<v Speaker 1>laws to borrow from to sue under, and those laws

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<v Speaker 1>are often older, pre internet laws. So there's a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of lawsuits under old wire tapping laws and under the VPPA,

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<v Speaker 1>and so it's actually pretty common. It happens in a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of areas where courts are trying to wrestle through

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<v Speaker 1>how do you apply a pre Internet law that wasn't

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<v Speaker 1>built for the Internet to a data privacy claim. Courts

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<v Speaker 1>so far have been very open to the idea that

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<v Speaker 1>just because the law is pre Internet doesn't mean it

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<v Speaker 1>can't include data privacy claims. But then you have a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of cases like the sales are case, where there's

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit of a square peg in a round

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<v Speaker 1>hole problem, where it's hard to figure out how a

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<v Speaker 1>law that was written, you know, in a very different

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<v Speaker 1>context would apply to the Internet. I mean, the VPPA

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<v Speaker 1>applies to videotape service providers, right, the NBA is obviously

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<v Speaker 1>not literally a videotape service provider anymore if it ever was.

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<v Speaker 1>But many courts have held that it's actually broader. It

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<v Speaker 1>can apply to all sorts of businesses that provide audio

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<v Speaker 1>visual content, even if it's not literally a video tape.

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<v Speaker 1>And so that's a good example of how the courts

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<v Speaker 1>are really wrestling through how do you apply these pre

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<v Speaker 1>Internet statutes to modern data privacy claims.

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<v Speaker 2>D NBH told the Appeals Court that all kinds of businesses,

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<v Speaker 2>from news outlets to serial companies have been hit with

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<v Speaker 2>baseless video privacy class actions by consumers who merely viewed

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<v Speaker 2>free videos on company websites. Has there been a flood

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<v Speaker 2>of these video privacy class actions?

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<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, the NBA is right about that part. I guess

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<v Speaker 1>baseless as a matter of opinion. But then MBA is

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<v Speaker 1>correct that there has been a huge increase in data

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<v Speaker 1>privacy litigation under the VPPA and also, as I mentioned before,

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<v Speaker 1>under wire capping laws and similar pre Internet laws in

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<v Speaker 1>a variety of states. They're absolutely right about that.

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<v Speaker 2>I understand that in the past year there have been

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of dismissals of these cases. Does the Second

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<v Speaker 2>Circuit decision stand in contrast to other courts.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, absolutely so. In California. In the Ninth Circuit, which

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<v Speaker 1>the Federal appeals jurisdiction for most of the West Coast

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<v Speaker 1>and the Western US, the courts have been a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit more skeptical than the Second Circuit has about certain

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<v Speaker 1>aspects of the salas our decisions, in particular the goods

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<v Speaker 1>and services issue and the subscriber issues. So in the

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<v Speaker 1>Ninth Circuit there's more cases holding that the goods and

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<v Speaker 1>services component of the VPPA applies only to audio visual

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<v Speaker 1>goods and services.

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<v Speaker 3>Right.

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<v Speaker 1>So the NBA and their arguments in the salves Our

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<v Speaker 1>case talk about how if you had gone to a

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<v Speaker 1>hardware store and bought a hammer and then watched a video,

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<v Speaker 1>you would in theory be subject to the VPPA because

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<v Speaker 1>you bought a good and then you watched a video

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<v Speaker 1>and that was subject to the law. And in California,

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<v Speaker 1>that kind of a case would probably be less successful

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<v Speaker 1>than it would be in New York in the second

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<v Speaker 1>circuit under the salas Our decision. And then again as

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<v Speaker 1>the salas Our decision points out, there's several different jurisdictions

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<v Speaker 1>all trying to understand what a subscriber is under the VPPA,

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<v Speaker 1>and they agree on some baseline points, like, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>you don't necessarily have to pay to be a subscriber,

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<v Speaker 1>but you have to give something of value. And where

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<v Speaker 1>you draw that line of what counts as a subscriber,

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<v Speaker 1>what's valuable enough to make you a subscriber as opposed

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<v Speaker 1>to someone who just watched video for free. We're starting

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<v Speaker 1>to see variation among the judicial district It reminds me

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of the Americans with Disabilities Act litigation for websites,

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<v Speaker 1>where there was a big wave of that it's receiving

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit, but there's still a fair amount of it.

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<v Speaker 1>Where New York and the Second Circuit were initially very

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<v Speaker 1>open to those claims. They said that, you know, an

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<v Speaker 1>Internet based business with no physical location is absolutely subject

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<v Speaker 1>to Title three of the ADA, and that opened up

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<v Speaker 1>a flood of ADA litigation against websites, and the Ninth Circuit,

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<v Speaker 1>the Western US was a little more skeptical of those

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<v Speaker 1>claims and tended to require a nexus between the website

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<v Speaker 1>and a physical place of public location and did not

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<v Speaker 1>open EIGHTYA claims to purely internet businesses. And so I'm

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<v Speaker 1>seeing a little bit of a parallel where the Second

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<v Speaker 1>Circuit is opening the doors more widely to consumer cases

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<v Speaker 1>than in other judicial districts, including the Ninth Circuit.

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<v Speaker 2>Tell me what exactly you think this decision stands for.

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<v Speaker 1>I think it stands for least in the Second Circuit,

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<v Speaker 1>it's going to be fairly easy for a consumer to

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<v Speaker 1>come under the VPPA, and the litigated issue in a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of these cases is going to shift from whether

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<v Speaker 1>the consumer is even subject to the law to whether

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<v Speaker 1>the website is improperly shared aring personal identifying information. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>as a practical matter, and what that means is it's

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<v Speaker 1>going to be a lot harder for a business to

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<v Speaker 1>get these cases dismissed very early on. You know, in

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<v Speaker 1>the sala is Our case, the NBA filed a motion

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<v Speaker 1>to dismiss, which is a very early motion to get

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<v Speaker 1>rid of a case, and the second Circuit essentially said

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<v Speaker 1>that motion should have been denied. And I think now

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<v Speaker 1>it's going to be a lot harder to get rid

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<v Speaker 1>of these cases early on because they're going to really

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<v Speaker 1>be focused much more on the merits of the data

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<v Speaker 1>practices of the alleged videotape service provider.

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<v Speaker 2>What can companies do? I mean, there is possibility right

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<v Speaker 2>of getting consent.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so compliance with the VPPA is a little bit tricky,

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<v Speaker 1>and that's because the consent provisions in the statute require

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<v Speaker 1>that consent be given in a standalone agreement. You can't

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<v Speaker 1>fold your privacy disclosure and consent into your larger terms

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<v Speaker 1>of service or privacy policy like you would in other cases.

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<v Speaker 1>For example, when we you know, will put on a

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<v Speaker 1>consent defense to a wire tapping case in California, oftentimes

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<v Speaker 1>the website will have a privacy policy in terms of

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<v Speaker 1>service and we could rely on the disclosures and the

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<v Speaker 1>consents in those larger documents. You can't do that for

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<v Speaker 1>the VPPA, so the consent process is a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>more tricky under that law. The first layer of defense

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<v Speaker 1>with these types of consumer claims to me is always

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<v Speaker 1>your dispute resolution policy, because it's going to be harder

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<v Speaker 1>and harder to stop people from filing these claims and

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<v Speaker 1>getting them dismissed early on. So you want to make

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<v Speaker 1>sure that essentially the forum that you're litigating in the

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<v Speaker 1>architecture of the dispute is set up so that it's

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<v Speaker 1>manageable and it's fair from the perspective of both parties,

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<v Speaker 1>and that it's enforceable. We've seen a lot of companies

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<v Speaker 1>fall into what's called the arbitration trap in other consumer

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<v Speaker 1>data privacy claims, where they have an arbitration provision and

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<v Speaker 1>they have a class action waiver, and so instead of

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<v Speaker 1>filing a class action, you'll see ten thousand or a

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<v Speaker 1>few thousand or a few hundred arbitration claimants all come

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<v Speaker 1>together and then file these mass claims. And since arbitration

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<v Speaker 1>fees are the filing fees, they're usually assessed on the

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<v Speaker 1>business on a per claimant basis, it could massively increase

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<v Speaker 1>the cost of defense, and that's been very problematic for

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<v Speaker 1>some large companies defending these data privacy claims. So it's

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<v Speaker 1>really important to get your dispute resolution policy really squared away,

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<v Speaker 1>top notch, organized and well thought through. Beyond that, you're

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<v Speaker 1>right if your company is at high risk of a

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<v Speaker 1>VPPA claim because you are very much in the business

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<v Speaker 1>of audio visual content and you're sharing data and all

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<v Speaker 1>those kinds of things, you might want to consider whether

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<v Speaker 1>you can incorporate into your website or your newsletter or

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<v Speaker 1>whatever you're doing, some kind of standalone consent that would

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<v Speaker 1>comply with the VPPA. Otherwise, if you can't get that

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<v Speaker 1>consent in, you just need to think about what data

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<v Speaker 1>you're sharing and whether or not you can adjust the

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<v Speaker 1>process or the way you engage with your consumers to

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<v Speaker 1>make sure that they are not technically subscribers into the VPPA. Unfortunately,

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<v Speaker 1>there's not a very easy answer for the VPPA, at

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<v Speaker 1>least under the second circuit decision still developing, So there's

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<v Speaker 1>not a lot of bright lines where we could say,

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<v Speaker 1>if you do this, you'll be safe. There's only things

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<v Speaker 1>we could do to turn the dials to reduce risk

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<v Speaker 1>where we can.

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<v Speaker 2>And do you think that this decision will lead to

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<v Speaker 2>more lawsuits under the VPPA?

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<v Speaker 1>Oh, I know it will absolutely.

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<v Speaker 2>I don't usually get such definitive answers. So what are

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<v Speaker 2>the damages here? If the NBA.

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<v Speaker 1>Loses, it's twenty five hundred dollars per person. It's technically

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<v Speaker 1>actual damages, but not less than twenty five hundred. And

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<v Speaker 1>in reality, most planetfs aren't going to have actual damages,

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<v Speaker 1>so effectively it's twenty five hundred dollars per person. But

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<v Speaker 1>one of the key issues is attorney sees right, the

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<v Speaker 1>VPPA allows damages. That's twenty five hundred in all likelihood

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<v Speaker 1>punitive damages, which I think would be pretty uncommon in

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<v Speaker 1>the case like this. But three is attorney speed, and

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<v Speaker 1>that could be substantial. If you have a reputable firm

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<v Speaker 1>litigating on behalf of a class, that attorney's spies claim

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<v Speaker 1>could be significant.

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<v Speaker 2>And what kind of advice would you give companies who

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<v Speaker 2>might fit under the VPPA.

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<v Speaker 1>The Thalasar case highlights the fact that there is a

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<v Speaker 1>large increase in data privacy litigation not just under the VPPA,

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<v Speaker 1>but under an assortment of state and federal laws and

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<v Speaker 1>It's really important to get your privacy disclosures right, get

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<v Speaker 1>your terms of service correct, at your dispute resolution policies

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<v Speaker 1>shaped up, and to begin to prepare your business for

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<v Speaker 1>what could be one of these claims. You know, if

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<v Speaker 1>you haven't talked to your in house counsel or your

0:12:32.120 --> 0:12:34.840
<v Speaker 1>outside council about what you can do to mitigate your risk.

0:12:34.960 --> 0:12:37.280
<v Speaker 1>I think that you know now is the time, because

0:12:37.800 --> 0:12:39.720
<v Speaker 1>this litigation is only accelerating.

0:12:39.960 --> 0:12:41.800
<v Speaker 2>It's great to have you on the show. Ira, Thanks

0:12:41.800 --> 0:12:46.760
<v Speaker 2>so much. That's Ara Steinberg of Greenberg Glusker. President Joe

0:12:46.840 --> 0:12:50.439
<v Speaker 2>Biden is on track to match or even surpass the

0:12:50.559 --> 0:12:54.760
<v Speaker 2>number of federal judges appointed by former President Donald Trump.

0:12:55.080 --> 0:12:58.880
<v Speaker 2>Biden has appointed two hundred and thirteen federal judges so

0:12:59.080 --> 0:13:02.800
<v Speaker 2>far to Trump's total of two hundred and thirty one.

0:13:03.360 --> 0:13:06.440
<v Speaker 2>But the next president is unlikely to be able to

0:13:06.480 --> 0:13:10.600
<v Speaker 2>make an impact on the federal bench because the numbers

0:13:10.840 --> 0:13:14.640
<v Speaker 2>just won't be there. Joining me is federal judiciary expert

0:13:14.720 --> 0:13:18.040
<v Speaker 2>Carl Tobias, a professor at the University of Richmond School

0:13:18.120 --> 0:13:22.080
<v Speaker 2>of Law. When Biden leaves office, he and Trump will

0:13:22.080 --> 0:13:26.120
<v Speaker 2>have in just eight years appointed about half of all

0:13:26.160 --> 0:13:30.199
<v Speaker 2>the eight hundred and ninety life tenured federal judges across

0:13:30.240 --> 0:13:34.280
<v Speaker 2>the country. Is that an unusual amount for eight years?

0:13:35.000 --> 0:13:41.199
<v Speaker 3>It is unusual. And the reason is both administrations and

0:13:41.440 --> 0:13:45.720
<v Speaker 3>the majority they've had in the Senate in those years

0:13:46.040 --> 0:13:48.520
<v Speaker 3>have been on the same party and of the same mind,

0:13:48.640 --> 0:13:53.080
<v Speaker 3>and that is to fill the bench with people they

0:13:53.120 --> 0:13:58.319
<v Speaker 3>believe will be most effective. And they've been very effective

0:13:58.640 --> 0:14:02.640
<v Speaker 3>in nominating to affirming people in that situation because the

0:14:02.679 --> 0:14:07.800
<v Speaker 3>majority rules in the Senate, and so that's what we see.

0:14:08.080 --> 0:14:10.959
<v Speaker 3>So it shouldn't be too surprising that there aren't a

0:14:11.000 --> 0:14:13.920
<v Speaker 3>lot of opportunities for the next president, whoever it is

0:14:14.200 --> 0:14:15.160
<v Speaker 3>in terms of numbers.

0:14:15.760 --> 0:14:20.040
<v Speaker 2>And also there aren't opportunities because the judges taking senior

0:14:20.120 --> 0:14:25.120
<v Speaker 2>status are shrinking as well. And is that because both

0:14:25.160 --> 0:14:27.560
<v Speaker 2>these presidents appointed younger judges.

0:14:27.960 --> 0:14:30.720
<v Speaker 3>Yes, I think that's clear. I mean, did data show

0:14:30.800 --> 0:14:34.600
<v Speaker 3>that they intentionally did that? And that goes back I

0:14:34.640 --> 0:14:37.880
<v Speaker 3>think at least to the time of George W. Bush

0:14:37.920 --> 0:14:41.920
<v Speaker 3>and maybe even earlier, but it has become much more

0:14:41.960 --> 0:14:45.760
<v Speaker 3>of a focus an emphasis, and sometimes the senators and

0:14:45.920 --> 0:14:51.560
<v Speaker 3>the party opposing the president do point out that people

0:14:51.600 --> 0:14:54.360
<v Speaker 3>are quite young and don't have a lot of experience

0:14:54.800 --> 0:14:59.800
<v Speaker 3>and so they criticize the nominees for that, but when

0:14:59.880 --> 0:15:05.280
<v Speaker 3>we Jordy votes, they often then confirmed those types of judges.

0:15:05.480 --> 0:15:09.000
<v Speaker 3>And so that's what you have I think, and I

0:15:09.080 --> 0:15:13.200
<v Speaker 3>do think to some extent, we're seeing a number of judges,

0:15:13.840 --> 0:15:18.680
<v Speaker 3>especially Indian palate courts, only thinking senior status or resigning

0:15:19.120 --> 0:15:21.400
<v Speaker 3>when the person in the White House is of the

0:15:21.440 --> 0:15:24.320
<v Speaker 3>same party, which used to be only a Supreme court

0:15:24.440 --> 0:15:28.920
<v Speaker 3>or principally a Supreme court type of tradition, and even

0:15:28.960 --> 0:15:32.960
<v Speaker 3>then honored sometimes in the breach. But now it happens

0:15:33.120 --> 0:15:36.680
<v Speaker 3>quite a bit. And what you saw, I think, for example,

0:15:37.080 --> 0:15:41.440
<v Speaker 3>as Trump was coming in, was many Republicans assuming senior status,

0:15:41.480 --> 0:15:45.840
<v Speaker 3>and then when Biden was elected, you saw a number

0:15:45.880 --> 0:15:49.440
<v Speaker 3>of Democratic appointees then assuming senior status.

0:15:49.600 --> 0:15:53.360
<v Speaker 2>There are sixty seven vacancies currently on the federal bench

0:15:53.800 --> 0:15:56.200
<v Speaker 2>or expected to open up. How many of those could

0:15:56.240 --> 0:16:00.080
<v Speaker 2>Biden possibly fill before he leaves office.

0:16:00.320 --> 0:16:05.280
<v Speaker 3>Well, I think on the floor right now are twenty eight,

0:16:06.480 --> 0:16:10.840
<v Speaker 3>So that would only leave forty or so vacancies working

0:16:10.880 --> 0:16:14.600
<v Speaker 3>from the present figures, which is very low, especially at

0:16:14.600 --> 0:16:18.400
<v Speaker 3>the pellate level. I think right now there's six vacancies

0:16:18.440 --> 0:16:22.840
<v Speaker 3>and four of them and maybe five or even six

0:16:23.000 --> 0:16:27.120
<v Speaker 3>could be confirmed, and that would leave virtually no vacancy

0:16:27.280 --> 0:16:30.440
<v Speaker 3>in the appellate system, and that's where both parties concentrate,

0:16:30.560 --> 0:16:34.000
<v Speaker 3>because appellate judges make more policy. They are the supreme

0:16:34.040 --> 0:16:36.840
<v Speaker 3>courts in ninety nine percent of cases in the states

0:16:36.880 --> 0:16:40.800
<v Speaker 3>within the circuit where they sit, and so everyone is

0:16:40.880 --> 0:16:44.000
<v Speaker 3>focused on that. And I think at one point Trump

0:16:44.160 --> 0:16:49.640
<v Speaker 3>actually had filled every single appellate vacancy, and that hadn't

0:16:49.680 --> 0:16:52.600
<v Speaker 3>happened since nineteen eighty four when Reagan was president. So

0:16:52.720 --> 0:16:55.720
<v Speaker 3>they focused like a laser on that. But so has Biden,

0:16:55.760 --> 0:16:58.000
<v Speaker 3>and so he may end up with forty eight, forty

0:16:58.080 --> 0:17:00.800
<v Speaker 3>nine to fifty points at the appellate level, which is

0:17:00.920 --> 0:17:04.639
<v Speaker 3>very close to the fifty four Trump was able to confirm.

0:17:05.080 --> 0:17:09.400
<v Speaker 2>So according to the American Constitution Society, which looked into

0:17:09.440 --> 0:17:12.919
<v Speaker 2>how many judges might be taking senior status over the

0:17:12.920 --> 0:17:16.320
<v Speaker 2>next four years, it came out to be one hundred

0:17:16.320 --> 0:17:19.720
<v Speaker 2>and sixteen appointed by Republican presidents and one hundred and

0:17:19.720 --> 0:17:23.679
<v Speaker 2>seventeen by Democratic presidents, which seemed awfully close to me

0:17:24.359 --> 0:17:28.320
<v Speaker 2>since I thought that Democratic presidents were behind Republican presidents

0:17:28.400 --> 0:17:29.560
<v Speaker 2>on appointees.

0:17:30.480 --> 0:17:34.960
<v Speaker 3>Well, I think it has even doubt during Biden's time.

0:17:36.080 --> 0:17:40.360
<v Speaker 3>If you think back Bush had eight years, Obama had

0:17:40.400 --> 0:17:43.960
<v Speaker 3>eight years, Trump had four, Biden had four. So I'm

0:17:43.960 --> 0:17:47.479
<v Speaker 3>not terribly surprised that that's where we are. But I

0:17:47.520 --> 0:17:52.119
<v Speaker 3>think it's fair to say Democrats have learned from Republicans

0:17:52.160 --> 0:17:56.080
<v Speaker 3>how to be more ruthless about nominations in confirmation. It

0:17:56.119 --> 0:17:59.359
<v Speaker 3>depends on your perspective, but to some extent that's to

0:17:59.400 --> 0:18:01.680
<v Speaker 3>be expected. I mean, I think that's the norm now,

0:18:02.119 --> 0:18:04.639
<v Speaker 3>and so the majority rules in the Senate, and as

0:18:04.720 --> 0:18:06.840
<v Speaker 3>long as the White House is amenable and the President

0:18:07.040 --> 0:18:09.800
<v Speaker 3>is effective, that's what I think you're going to see

0:18:10.040 --> 0:18:10.720
<v Speaker 3>going forward.

0:18:11.400 --> 0:18:14.000
<v Speaker 2>And I've been talking about judges for so long, but

0:18:14.080 --> 0:18:16.800
<v Speaker 2>yet I didn't know this fact that it was President

0:18:16.880 --> 0:18:20.119
<v Speaker 2>Jimmy Carter who has the record for the most judicial

0:18:20.119 --> 0:18:23.560
<v Speaker 2>appointments in a single term two hundred and sixty two.

0:18:24.000 --> 0:18:26.080
<v Speaker 2>And that was at a time when we didn't know

0:18:26.119 --> 0:18:28.359
<v Speaker 2>it was as important as it is now.

0:18:28.600 --> 0:18:31.960
<v Speaker 3>I think that's correct. And there were fewer judges then

0:18:32.160 --> 0:18:35.159
<v Speaker 3>because there were a couple of judge ship bills after that.

0:18:35.240 --> 0:18:39.159
<v Speaker 3>But what's most telling is they passed the nineteen seventy

0:18:39.160 --> 0:18:42.480
<v Speaker 3>eight Judge Ships Act, which created I think thirty five

0:18:42.560 --> 0:18:46.200
<v Speaker 3>appellate judge ships in sixty or seventy or maybe even

0:18:46.280 --> 0:18:49.840
<v Speaker 3>more district ones, and so he had an enormous opportunity

0:18:49.920 --> 0:18:53.760
<v Speaker 3>there and he seed it. That explains it, even though

0:18:53.800 --> 0:18:57.600
<v Speaker 3>there were other criticisms of his presidency and he wasn't

0:18:57.600 --> 0:19:01.879
<v Speaker 3>re elected. But he also, as you remember, was instrumental

0:19:02.200 --> 0:19:09.399
<v Speaker 3>in beginning the diversification of the courts in terms of ethnicity, gender,

0:19:09.800 --> 0:19:14.600
<v Speaker 3>and experience and appointed many people of color. All the

0:19:14.960 --> 0:19:19.520
<v Speaker 3>Democratic presidents since then have made diversity important, and some

0:19:19.600 --> 0:19:21.399
<v Speaker 3>of the Republicans have as well.

0:19:21.920 --> 0:19:25.320
<v Speaker 2>We have to factor in the fact that if the

0:19:25.359 --> 0:19:30.119
<v Speaker 2>president the next president has a Senate that the opposing

0:19:30.160 --> 0:19:33.800
<v Speaker 2>party has a majority in, is it going to be

0:19:33.880 --> 0:19:38.399
<v Speaker 2>tougher to get judges appointed. The answer is yes, I

0:19:38.480 --> 0:19:39.960
<v Speaker 2>will that answer, but I thought i'd give you a

0:19:39.960 --> 0:19:40.600
<v Speaker 2>softball there.

0:19:40.960 --> 0:19:47.040
<v Speaker 3>Yeah. Right. And the real telling point is twenty fifteen sixteen,

0:19:47.080 --> 0:19:52.960
<v Speaker 3>after Republicans in twenty fourteen captures the majority because Mitch

0:19:53.040 --> 0:19:59.280
<v Speaker 3>McConnell as majority leader, only allowed two of President Obama's

0:19:59.480 --> 0:20:02.320
<v Speaker 3>nominee he's at the appellate level to be confirmed in

0:20:02.359 --> 0:20:06.960
<v Speaker 3>the last two years, and not very many district nominees

0:20:07.400 --> 0:20:10.199
<v Speaker 3>that's what led to Trump being able to appoint fifty

0:20:10.240 --> 0:20:14.080
<v Speaker 3>four because there were so many vacancies held over by McConnell.

0:20:14.119 --> 0:20:18.359
<v Speaker 3>And of course, the classic example everybody remembers is what

0:20:18.480 --> 0:20:22.880
<v Speaker 3>he did with Merrick Garland and Justice Scalia's vacancy, and

0:20:22.920 --> 0:20:26.040
<v Speaker 3>that's what led, I think, in part to what we

0:20:26.119 --> 0:20:29.040
<v Speaker 3>see in terms of the majority on the Supreme Court now.

0:20:29.840 --> 0:20:33.440
<v Speaker 2>Mike Davis, a Trump ally and founder of the Conservative

0:20:34.040 --> 0:20:38.800
<v Speaker 2>Judiciary focused advocacy group Article three Project, he said the

0:20:38.840 --> 0:20:43.040
<v Speaker 2>next president will finish the transformation of the judiciary one

0:20:43.040 --> 0:20:46.280
<v Speaker 2>way or the other. Do you think he's right about that?

0:20:47.119 --> 0:20:51.360
<v Speaker 3>Well, to some extent, But remember it's the appellate judges

0:20:51.400 --> 0:20:56.040
<v Speaker 3>who really make the policy, and they're just not going

0:20:56.119 --> 0:21:00.119
<v Speaker 3>to be many vacancies there. So some of what he

0:21:00.200 --> 0:21:03.520
<v Speaker 3>is saying is hyperbolic, but there is a lot at stake.

0:21:03.760 --> 0:21:06.560
<v Speaker 3>I just don't think the opportunity is there in a

0:21:06.600 --> 0:21:11.200
<v Speaker 3>way that it has been historically because of the small numbers,

0:21:11.359 --> 0:21:15.520
<v Speaker 3>and as we've talked about, the unlikelihood of very many

0:21:15.600 --> 0:21:19.160
<v Speaker 3>turnovers in the next four years, and then the whole

0:21:19.240 --> 0:21:21.679
<v Speaker 3>question of who's going to have the majority, because it

0:21:21.720 --> 0:21:24.879
<v Speaker 3>may be that that's which is this time or not,

0:21:25.400 --> 0:21:27.600
<v Speaker 3>but it's going to be very close no matter what.

0:21:28.040 --> 0:21:31.080
<v Speaker 3>And there's every chance that even if Democrats lose the

0:21:31.119 --> 0:21:34.879
<v Speaker 3>majority in this election year, they will recapture it in

0:21:34.920 --> 0:21:38.480
<v Speaker 3>twenty six and so I just don't think that there's

0:21:38.520 --> 0:21:40.800
<v Speaker 3>going to be much of an opportunity to do what

0:21:40.920 --> 0:21:44.280
<v Speaker 3>Davis is talking about. But I've seen what he has said,

0:21:44.440 --> 0:21:46.719
<v Speaker 3>and they even are critical of some of the fifty

0:21:46.760 --> 0:21:51.560
<v Speaker 3>four whom Trump appointed as being not sufficiently loyal, if

0:21:51.600 --> 0:21:53.640
<v Speaker 3>you will, to the former president.

0:21:54.680 --> 0:22:01.119
<v Speaker 2>There's this theory that some federal judges of tryout for

0:22:01.200 --> 0:22:06.440
<v Speaker 2>the Supreme Court by writing opinions that they think will

0:22:06.440 --> 0:22:09.560
<v Speaker 2>get them noticed. Have you seen that happening lately.

0:22:10.160 --> 0:22:13.200
<v Speaker 3>It's just hard to say, though I think it's fair

0:22:13.240 --> 0:22:15.760
<v Speaker 3>to say if you look at the fifty four pallat judges,

0:22:16.320 --> 0:22:18.320
<v Speaker 3>there are a number of them who seem to be

0:22:18.480 --> 0:22:21.240
<v Speaker 3>trying out and a lot of people have said that

0:22:21.840 --> 0:22:27.199
<v Speaker 3>for the Supreme Court. And it's a hierarchical institution, but

0:22:27.280 --> 0:22:30.119
<v Speaker 3>there are not very many seats on the US Supreme Court,

0:22:30.680 --> 0:22:34.560
<v Speaker 3>so we'll see. But especially in the Fifth Circuit, for example,

0:22:34.880 --> 0:22:38.760
<v Speaker 3>Trump has a number of appointees, and the Eleventh Circuit

0:22:39.240 --> 0:22:43.280
<v Speaker 3>and they are people who have made their mark with

0:22:43.480 --> 0:22:46.040
<v Speaker 3>you know in some ways on certain cases. And even

0:22:46.080 --> 0:22:49.399
<v Speaker 3>the Supreme Court has found the Fifth Circuit to be

0:22:50.040 --> 0:22:53.560
<v Speaker 3>too extreme for its taste on certain issues like the

0:22:53.600 --> 0:22:56.080
<v Speaker 3>abortion pill and some other cases.

0:22:56.520 --> 0:23:02.040
<v Speaker 2>Yes, the Fifth Circuit often tends to push the legal envelope,

0:23:02.320 --> 0:23:05.800
<v Speaker 2>so to speak. Thanks so much, Carl. That's Professor Carl

0:23:05.840 --> 0:23:09.760
<v Speaker 2>Tobias of the University of Richmond Law School. Coming up

0:23:09.760 --> 0:23:13.480
<v Speaker 2>next on the Bloomberg Law Show. A landmark doctrine of

0:23:13.560 --> 0:23:17.240
<v Speaker 2>the NLRB is at stake in a Ninth Circuit case.

0:23:17.600 --> 0:23:22.440
<v Speaker 2>I'm June Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg. A decision

0:23:22.480 --> 0:23:26.600
<v Speaker 2>by the Ninth Circuit Appellate Court could have major implications

0:23:26.640 --> 0:23:32.040
<v Speaker 2>on a game changing NLRB decision on union organizing designed

0:23:32.040 --> 0:23:36.040
<v Speaker 2>to clean up representation elections and provide a path to

0:23:36.200 --> 0:23:40.000
<v Speaker 2>unionization without a formal vote. Joining me is Bloomberg Law

0:23:40.119 --> 0:23:45.280
<v Speaker 2>Senior legal reporter Robert Aafola explain what the semex doctrine is.

0:23:46.280 --> 0:23:49.840
<v Speaker 4>So this is mainly about the National Labor Relations Board

0:23:50.200 --> 0:23:54.840
<v Speaker 4>efforts to prevent employers from committeing put for labor practices

0:23:55.000 --> 0:23:59.440
<v Speaker 4>before an election. Basically, the board looked at how things work,

0:23:59.720 --> 0:24:05.400
<v Speaker 4>and because the remedy for violations before an election, if

0:24:05.440 --> 0:24:09.040
<v Speaker 4>the union loses, the remedy is normally a rerun election,

0:24:09.440 --> 0:24:12.240
<v Speaker 4>and employers tend to do better and rerun elections. The

0:24:12.359 --> 0:24:15.040
<v Speaker 4>board looked and said, you know, this is not enough

0:24:15.080 --> 0:24:18.399
<v Speaker 4>of a disincentive. So we're going to rework how this

0:24:18.480 --> 0:24:21.400
<v Speaker 4>all work. And they've set up a system now where

0:24:22.160 --> 0:24:25.240
<v Speaker 4>if the union comes to an employer and says, look,

0:24:25.280 --> 0:24:28.000
<v Speaker 4>we have a majority support, the majority of the workers

0:24:28.040 --> 0:24:32.400
<v Speaker 4>here want to unionize, the employer has two choices. They

0:24:32.400 --> 0:24:36.720
<v Speaker 4>can either accept that and recognize the union and start bargaining,

0:24:37.240 --> 0:24:41.359
<v Speaker 4>or they can file their own petition for an election.

0:24:42.000 --> 0:24:46.040
<v Speaker 4>If they go the election route, if they commit any

0:24:46.160 --> 0:24:50.879
<v Speaker 4>labor law violations leading up to the election, then the

0:24:50.920 --> 0:24:54.400
<v Speaker 4>board will issue what's now known as a systemics bargaining order,

0:24:55.359 --> 0:24:58.639
<v Speaker 4>just basically saying you have to recognize and bargain with

0:24:58.680 --> 0:25:01.840
<v Speaker 4>this union. Sort of how the doctrine works, Well.

0:25:01.720 --> 0:25:03.840
<v Speaker 2>What's the issue in the case. What is CEMEX saying.

0:25:04.720 --> 0:25:08.120
<v Speaker 4>So there was an oral argument at the Ninth Circuit

0:25:08.160 --> 0:25:12.160
<v Speaker 4>about the SEMX doctrine. The company Sex which the case

0:25:12.240 --> 0:25:16.320
<v Speaker 4>is named after the doctrine is named after, is challenging

0:25:16.560 --> 0:25:22.520
<v Speaker 4>the NLRB's basically legal authority to issue this rule to

0:25:22.600 --> 0:25:27.919
<v Speaker 4>create this framework, this SEMX doctrine. Basically, there was a

0:25:28.000 --> 0:25:31.919
<v Speaker 4>Supreme Court decision from the late sixties called NLRB versus

0:25:31.920 --> 0:25:36.200
<v Speaker 4>Ghissel that set up the format for when the board

0:25:36.240 --> 0:25:40.199
<v Speaker 4>would issue these sort of bargaining orders. Under Ghissel, they

0:25:40.200 --> 0:25:43.320
<v Speaker 4>would only issue these bargaining orders when there was severe

0:25:43.359 --> 0:25:48.120
<v Speaker 4>and pervasive labor law violations such that there was no

0:25:48.240 --> 0:25:52.720
<v Speaker 4>chance of holding a fair election. Just the lawbreaking was

0:25:52.760 --> 0:25:56.679
<v Speaker 4>so intense that it destroyed that opportunity. And the company

0:25:56.720 --> 0:26:01.520
<v Speaker 4>is saying, that's the rule. The NLRB can't go in

0:26:01.640 --> 0:26:05.679
<v Speaker 4>and change how they issue bargaining orders, you know, in

0:26:05.760 --> 0:26:10.399
<v Speaker 4>this new semax doctrine, And that was the argument they

0:26:10.440 --> 0:26:12.560
<v Speaker 4>presented at the Circuit Court yesterday.

0:26:13.000 --> 0:26:18.400
<v Speaker 2>Did the judges talk about the presidential value of Gissele.

0:26:18.800 --> 0:26:19.440
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, yeah.

0:26:19.440 --> 0:26:24.159
<v Speaker 4>There was some debate over whether what the Supreme Court

0:26:24.280 --> 0:26:28.960
<v Speaker 4>said in its pres Gisole ruling, whether what they were

0:26:28.960 --> 0:26:32.600
<v Speaker 4>saying was this is a permissible way for the board

0:26:32.680 --> 0:26:36.040
<v Speaker 4>to issue bargaining orders, or this is the only way

0:26:36.480 --> 0:26:39.840
<v Speaker 4>that the board can issue the bargaining orders. The democratic

0:26:39.960 --> 0:26:43.480
<v Speaker 4>point of judges in the judicial panel that was hearing

0:26:43.520 --> 0:26:48.119
<v Speaker 4>the case, they seemed to signal that they felt that

0:26:48.600 --> 0:26:52.280
<v Speaker 4>Gissole was about what the Board could do, not what

0:26:52.320 --> 0:26:56.399
<v Speaker 4>the Board must do, which suggests that at least at

0:26:56.480 --> 0:26:59.040
<v Speaker 4>this stage, the NLRB may prevail.

0:26:59.600 --> 0:27:03.000
<v Speaker 2>What's the NLRB's argument at the Ninth Circuit.

0:27:03.480 --> 0:27:06.120
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, the board's argument of the Ninth Circuit is this

0:27:06.160 --> 0:27:10.320
<v Speaker 4>is within their authority, and this is basically how the

0:27:10.440 --> 0:27:14.280
<v Speaker 4>NLRB sets labor law policy for the country. They decide

0:27:14.320 --> 0:27:22.040
<v Speaker 4>individual cases and from those cases they create general frameworks

0:27:22.119 --> 0:27:26.600
<v Speaker 4>that sort of govern different areas of labor management relations.

0:27:27.000 --> 0:27:30.720
<v Speaker 4>So they're saying, hey, we've had different standards through our

0:27:30.840 --> 0:27:36.560
<v Speaker 4>history about what it takes to issue a bargaining order.

0:27:36.880 --> 0:27:40.600
<v Speaker 4>There was a time before Gissel. It was what's known

0:27:40.600 --> 0:27:45.480
<v Speaker 4>as the Joy Silks doctrine, in which if a union

0:27:45.600 --> 0:27:49.919
<v Speaker 4>came to an employer and said we have a majority support,

0:27:50.400 --> 0:27:53.359
<v Speaker 4>unless that employer had a good faith reason to doubt

0:27:53.400 --> 0:27:57.320
<v Speaker 4>that majority support, they were required to bargain. So it

0:27:57.440 --> 0:28:01.080
<v Speaker 4>was a much more union friendly standard, and that was allowed,

0:28:02.000 --> 0:28:04.960
<v Speaker 4>you know, in the fifties and sixties before Gissel happened.

0:28:05.720 --> 0:28:10.520
<v Speaker 4>So the NLRB is saying, look, we've changed our standards before,

0:28:10.840 --> 0:28:12.720
<v Speaker 4>and this is what we've changed to. Now, this is

0:28:12.760 --> 0:28:14.960
<v Speaker 4>what we think the best way to do it is,

0:28:15.000 --> 0:28:17.480
<v Speaker 4>and you know we have that power.

0:28:17.920 --> 0:28:22.359
<v Speaker 2>So you write that the semex lawyer raised lowper Bright,

0:28:22.480 --> 0:28:26.359
<v Speaker 2>which was the decision by the Supreme Court at the

0:28:26.520 --> 0:28:30.960
<v Speaker 2>end of less term that ended Chevron difference or judicial

0:28:31.040 --> 0:28:35.879
<v Speaker 2>deference to agencies interpretations where the laws are ambiguous. What

0:28:36.080 --> 0:28:37.800
<v Speaker 2>happened when that was raised?

0:28:38.600 --> 0:28:43.920
<v Speaker 4>So one of the Democratic appointed judges spoke about part

0:28:43.960 --> 0:28:48.800
<v Speaker 4>of the Locoerbright decision in which there are times when

0:28:49.200 --> 0:28:52.960
<v Speaker 4>Congress has basically handed down some power to the agencies

0:28:53.400 --> 0:28:56.480
<v Speaker 4>to kind of fill in the blanks and do this

0:28:56.600 --> 0:28:59.360
<v Speaker 4>sort of doctrine setting for lack of a better term,

0:28:59.600 --> 0:29:02.760
<v Speaker 4>and the judge pointed out that, you know, some of

0:29:02.760 --> 0:29:06.200
<v Speaker 4>the cases that the Court and Loperbright referred to was,

0:29:06.320 --> 0:29:09.720
<v Speaker 4>you know, cases about the National Libor Relations Act, which

0:29:09.760 --> 0:29:12.320
<v Speaker 4>is what empowers the NLRB. So I think she was

0:29:12.360 --> 0:29:15.480
<v Speaker 4>basically saying Locribrid doesn't affect anything in this case.

0:29:15.680 --> 0:29:19.600
<v Speaker 2>Because if you look at the Supreme Court decisions in

0:29:19.680 --> 0:29:24.920
<v Speaker 2>recent years on unions, it's almost always against the union.

0:29:25.360 --> 0:29:29.120
<v Speaker 2>So I wonder if this came up to the Supreme Court.

0:29:29.160 --> 0:29:31.160
<v Speaker 2>I don't know if it will, but whether they would

0:29:31.160 --> 0:29:35.280
<v Speaker 2>sort of not endorse it the sex doctrine.

0:29:35.160 --> 0:29:38.840
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, it's certainly a pretty high degree of likelihood that

0:29:39.280 --> 0:29:42.520
<v Speaker 4>different employers will challenge when they're hit with the SEMX doctrine,

0:29:42.560 --> 0:29:47.640
<v Speaker 4>they'll challenge that in court. Just yesterday, a n LRB

0:29:47.880 --> 0:29:51.000
<v Speaker 4>judge issued a SEMs order against Starbucks. So you can

0:29:51.040 --> 0:29:54.240
<v Speaker 4>imagine that there will be what's known as a circuit split,

0:29:54.320 --> 0:29:58.560
<v Speaker 4>where two different circuit courts disagree on an issue, and

0:29:59.160 --> 0:30:01.040
<v Speaker 4>that's when the Supreme Court is supposed to come in

0:30:01.080 --> 0:30:04.200
<v Speaker 4>and they're supposed to resolve that circuit split. So you

0:30:04.240 --> 0:30:07.480
<v Speaker 4>could definitely see a situation in which the Court was

0:30:08.000 --> 0:30:11.720
<v Speaker 4>called upon to settle this issue. And as you point out,

0:30:11.840 --> 0:30:15.200
<v Speaker 4>given the leanings of the current Supreme Court majority, you

0:30:15.240 --> 0:30:18.120
<v Speaker 4>could imagine that the board might have an uphill battle.

0:30:18.360 --> 0:30:20.960
<v Speaker 2>How big a blow would it be to union organizing

0:30:21.400 --> 0:30:24.920
<v Speaker 2>if there's a decision rejecting the sex doctrine.

0:30:25.160 --> 0:30:26.840
<v Speaker 4>It's kind of hard to answer that with a lot

0:30:26.880 --> 0:30:32.239
<v Speaker 4>of specificity, but we have seen in the Board just

0:30:32.320 --> 0:30:36.560
<v Speaker 4>released some statistics recently about an increase in the amount

0:30:36.560 --> 0:30:40.280
<v Speaker 4>of election petitions that are being filed, and I was

0:30:40.320 --> 0:30:43.160
<v Speaker 4>speaking to some labor law experts recently about that, and

0:30:44.280 --> 0:30:47.000
<v Speaker 4>an argument was made that, hey, that shows that the

0:30:47.000 --> 0:30:50.920
<v Speaker 4>sex doctrine is working. That shows that unions and workers

0:30:51.040 --> 0:30:54.840
<v Speaker 4>see that sex is providing sort of a stick to

0:30:55.200 --> 0:30:58.800
<v Speaker 4>hold employers accountable so they won't violate the law right

0:30:58.800 --> 0:31:00.960
<v Speaker 4>before an election to intend that eight workers not to

0:31:01.280 --> 0:31:04.320
<v Speaker 4>vote for unions, and we have seen an upsurge in

0:31:05.200 --> 0:31:07.480
<v Speaker 4>unionization over the past few years. There's a lot of

0:31:07.480 --> 0:31:10.560
<v Speaker 4>different reasons for that. It's not just the SEMEX doctrine,

0:31:10.720 --> 0:31:13.400
<v Speaker 4>but it seems reasonable to say that that's part of it.

0:31:13.480 --> 0:31:17.720
<v Speaker 4>So the board was to lose the SEMX doctrine, Yeah,

0:31:17.720 --> 0:31:19.720
<v Speaker 4>that would be not so great for unions.

0:31:19.960 --> 0:31:25.120
<v Speaker 2>Does SEMEX actually contradict Gissle because it sets a whole

0:31:25.160 --> 0:31:27.200
<v Speaker 2>different way of handling things?

0:31:27.280 --> 0:31:31.640
<v Speaker 4>Right, Yeah, I don't know that it contradicts Ghistle, but

0:31:31.720 --> 0:31:37.040
<v Speaker 4>it does represent a different framework. And as I mentioned before,

0:31:37.520 --> 0:31:40.360
<v Speaker 4>the board has argued, Look, we've had different frameworks before,

0:31:40.840 --> 0:31:44.640
<v Speaker 4>some more permissive, you know, some more union friendly than CEMX.

0:31:45.040 --> 0:31:48.600
<v Speaker 4>Ghisle was more employer friendly than CEMX. But it may

0:31:48.640 --> 0:31:53.240
<v Speaker 4>come down to a technical question about what exactly did

0:31:53.280 --> 0:31:55.960
<v Speaker 4>the Supreme court say in that I think it was

0:31:56.040 --> 0:31:59.120
<v Speaker 4>nineteen sixty nine, was the Ghissele ruling. Did they create

0:31:59.160 --> 0:32:01.360
<v Speaker 4>a situation where they said this is the only way

0:32:01.360 --> 0:32:04.320
<v Speaker 4>you can do it? Or did they rule that yes,

0:32:04.480 --> 0:32:09.040
<v Speaker 4>is the permissible way to do it. But implicitly they're saying, board,

0:32:09.120 --> 0:32:11.160
<v Speaker 4>you you could set up another way.

0:32:11.240 --> 0:32:13.400
<v Speaker 2>So how do you think this Ninth Circuit panel is

0:32:13.400 --> 0:32:14.000
<v Speaker 2>going to come out?

0:32:14.560 --> 0:32:18.960
<v Speaker 4>Courts? Thelitization, you know, it seems to be there where

0:32:19.360 --> 0:32:22.240
<v Speaker 4>you can't decide the outcome just based on the composition

0:32:22.320 --> 0:32:25.520
<v Speaker 4>of the panel. But here we had two Biden appointees

0:32:25.840 --> 0:32:30.560
<v Speaker 4>and one George W. Bush appointee, and watching the arguments,

0:32:30.560 --> 0:32:32.800
<v Speaker 4>it did seem that the two Biden appointees were a

0:32:32.800 --> 0:32:36.440
<v Speaker 4>lot more supportive of the board's position, and that the

0:32:36.480 --> 0:32:40.240
<v Speaker 4>George W. Bush appointee was more skeptical of the board's position.

0:32:40.480 --> 0:32:43.640
<v Speaker 4>So they seem to signal that they would end up

0:32:43.680 --> 0:32:46.880
<v Speaker 4>approving the stomach's doctrine. But we'll have to see.

0:32:46.720 --> 0:32:49.000
<v Speaker 2>An important labor case no matter which way you look

0:32:49.040 --> 0:32:52.200
<v Speaker 2>at it. Thanks so much, Robert. That's Robert aya Follet,

0:32:52.480 --> 0:32:55.600
<v Speaker 2>senior legal reporter for Bloomberg Law. And that's it for

0:32:55.640 --> 0:32:58.680
<v Speaker 2>this edition of the Bloomberg Law Podcast. Remember you can

0:32:58.720 --> 0:33:01.640
<v Speaker 2>always get the latest legal new by subscribing and listening

0:33:01.680 --> 0:33:05.400
<v Speaker 2>to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at Bloomberg

0:33:05.440 --> 0:33:09.480
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0:33:09.600 --> 0:33:10.880
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