WEBVTT - Lock and Key 0:00:00.160 --> 0:00:07.160 Brought to you by Toyota. Let's go places. Welcome to 0:00:07.360 --> 0:00:15.240 Forward Thinking, Pater and welcome to Forward Thinking, the podcast 0:00:15.320 --> 0:00:17.279 that looks at the future and says they take you 0:00:17.360 --> 0:00:21.000 away and throw away the key. I'm Jonathan Strickland, I'm 0:00:21.079 --> 0:00:23.840 Lauren bo and I'm Joe McCormick, and i want to 0:00:23.840 --> 0:00:26.439 ask you guys a question. I'll go to the prom 0:00:26.440 --> 0:00:31.080 with you. You guys are so sweet. It wasn't the prom, 0:00:31.120 --> 0:00:34.440 it was the enchantment under the seat. That's thank goodness, 0:00:34.479 --> 0:00:37.240 because it's two thousand and fifteen. You know what year 0:00:37.320 --> 0:00:40.239 that is. To the future too. Anyway, what's your what's 0:00:40.240 --> 0:00:42.880 your actual question? No, no, no, I may have made 0:00:42.880 --> 0:00:45.280 this comparison before, but I've got to make it again. 0:00:46.159 --> 0:00:51.400 Do you remember all the Internet paranoia in the nineties, Yeah, yeah, 0:00:51.520 --> 0:00:54.840 And so thinking back on it now, it's often very 0:00:54.960 --> 0:00:58.560 funny because we were all thinking back then, oh no, 0:00:58.720 --> 0:01:02.160 what if evil techno criminals used the net to do 0:01:02.240 --> 0:01:06.000 horrible things? And and it's funny how some of the 0:01:06.040 --> 0:01:09.160 fears we had back then turned out to be hilariously 0:01:09.319 --> 0:01:12.640 wrong and overblown, you know, like Sandra Bullock gets caught 0:01:12.640 --> 0:01:16.119 in the net. Yeah, it turns out. She was perfectly fine. 0:01:16.160 --> 0:01:18.280 She never got she got caught in a net, but 0:01:18.319 --> 0:01:21.920 it wasn't the net. But then, uh, some of it 0:01:22.040 --> 0:01:25.800 represented threats that we actually do have to deal with 0:01:25.880 --> 0:01:30.600 now that we're in this this internet, ubiquitous future. Identity, theft, 0:01:30.720 --> 0:01:34.040 privacy compromises. I mean, these were things people were worried 0:01:34.080 --> 0:01:36.479 about back in the nineties and that they turned out 0:01:36.520 --> 0:01:40.399 to become reality. Sure, yeah, not everything depicted in those 0:01:40.400 --> 0:01:43.160 films was completely off base, although it was almost always 0:01:43.720 --> 0:01:47.039 you know, because it has imagined in a hilarious way, 0:01:47.280 --> 0:01:53.240 overly dramatized. And that certainly that the user operating systems 0:01:53.280 --> 0:01:58.680 were like nothing that we've ever seen. I know this UM, 0:01:58.720 --> 0:02:00.920 and I think we're sort of living in a similar 0:02:01.040 --> 0:02:05.840 era for three D printing. Sure we don't know yet 0:02:05.920 --> 0:02:09.320 what we're worrying about too much and what we're not 0:02:09.400 --> 0:02:13.079 worrying about enough. Sure, well, especially for people who have 0:02:13.160 --> 0:02:16.200 had very limited experience with three D printers. They've heard 0:02:16.200 --> 0:02:19.480 about them but never had direct experience. Joe, as someone 0:02:19.520 --> 0:02:23.079 who has had direct experience with three D printers, would 0:02:23.120 --> 0:02:25.480 you say that the three D printer we have here 0:02:25.480 --> 0:02:28.880 in the office would be capable of printing anything that 0:02:28.960 --> 0:02:32.240 someone should be worried about remotely. Are you worried about 0:02:32.280 --> 0:02:35.359 tangled masses of plastic hair? Yeah? See, here's the thing. 0:02:36.280 --> 0:02:38.120 It sounds like the plot of a Japanese horror movie 0:02:38.160 --> 0:02:43.640 actually if it's in front of the person's face. Uh So, 0:02:44.360 --> 0:02:46.600 we have printed stuff out with a three D printer 0:02:46.760 --> 0:02:49.360 here at the office. It's just it takes a lot 0:02:49.480 --> 0:02:52.400 of of paying attention, Like you can't just hit the 0:02:52.400 --> 0:02:56.079 print and walk away because the materials themselves in our case, 0:02:56.120 --> 0:02:58.440 I think we're using p L A plastic, but the 0:02:58.480 --> 0:03:02.440 materials themselves are uh you know there. They need a 0:03:02.480 --> 0:03:05.480 certain temperature to operate at, and beyond that you're either 0:03:05.560 --> 0:03:09.200 not going to get the meltedness you need for extrusion, 0:03:09.520 --> 0:03:11.320 or it's going to be too warm and then the 0:03:11.800 --> 0:03:15.680 stability of the build will be compromised. Or the build 0:03:15.760 --> 0:03:20.280 plate isn't leveled, or you haven't aligned everything correctly in 0:03:20.320 --> 0:03:23.480 your your pre planning phase, trying to print at a 0:03:23.560 --> 0:03:26.600 level below where the plate is or something, or your 0:03:26.680 --> 0:03:29.840 design has a key element missing some kind of structural 0:03:29.919 --> 0:03:32.079 bit to it that just isn't quite there right. I 0:03:32.360 --> 0:03:36.240 recently had a mask three D printed for a costume 0:03:36.520 --> 0:03:39.680 and in that case, the mask was divided into three pieces, 0:03:39.720 --> 0:03:42.240 because if we had tried to print it as one 0:03:42.320 --> 0:03:45.000 full piece, it would have been very It would have 0:03:45.040 --> 0:03:47.520 been a miracle if it had come through with the 0:03:47.640 --> 0:03:52.000 structural integrity intact and not folded in on itself. The 0:03:52.040 --> 0:03:55.000 point being that three D printing, at least on the 0:03:55.000 --> 0:03:58.080 consumer level, has come a long way, but it's it's 0:03:58.120 --> 0:04:02.120 still fairly primitive, and it's it's not like you can 0:04:02.200 --> 0:04:05.720 hit print and you get a gorgeous coffee mug at 0:04:05.720 --> 0:04:07.640 the end of it. You're gonna get something that's made 0:04:07.640 --> 0:04:10.680 out of plastic. Depending upon the sophistication of your printer, 0:04:10.760 --> 0:04:15.880 it may be fairly there may be some fairly obvious edges, 0:04:16.480 --> 0:04:19.440 especially like just between the layers of the plastic that's 0:04:19.440 --> 0:04:23.520 been like a plastic plastic pixelation. Yeah, yeah, it's it's 0:04:23.520 --> 0:04:26.320 not like a smooth surface like you would get from 0:04:26.360 --> 0:04:30.120 something that was molded plastic. Well, I mean, certainly, to 0:04:30.160 --> 0:04:32.160 a certain degree, you're right, But also I mean, if 0:04:32.160 --> 0:04:33.880 you're willing to shell out a lot of money, there 0:04:33.920 --> 0:04:36.880 are some really good printers out there. These show absolutely 0:04:36.880 --> 0:04:39.960 and in labs and research labs, there are extremely good 0:04:39.960 --> 0:04:44.680 printers that can print with with metals and with glass even. Yeah, 0:04:44.720 --> 0:04:47.080 it's it's a little bit beyond even the pro summer 0:04:47.160 --> 0:04:50.320 level obviously, But the point being that, uh, some of 0:04:50.360 --> 0:04:54.600 the fears around three D printers might be a little premature, right, 0:04:54.960 --> 0:04:57.039 But but there are all kinds of fears people have 0:04:57.240 --> 0:05:00.440 because I mean, obviously it's not exactly analogous the Internet, 0:05:00.480 --> 0:05:03.880 because the Internet was a more ubiquitous kind of information technology. 0:05:03.920 --> 0:05:06.960 You know what, anything that people could do to you 0:05:07.160 --> 0:05:11.120 socially in general life that didn't involve physical contact they 0:05:11.160 --> 0:05:14.840 could do over the Internet. Sure, but there's there's there 0:05:14.880 --> 0:05:17.919 are fears that some of which are are vaguely valid 0:05:18.120 --> 0:05:21.520 in the like like especially for the future about three 0:05:21.600 --> 0:05:24.200 D printers. Uh, you know it's not all the like 0:05:24.240 --> 0:05:27.200 Oh no, cats and dogs three D printing together. Uh, 0:05:27.839 --> 0:05:31.400 copyright infringement. I suppose that the fair fear sort of 0:05:31.400 --> 0:05:34.160 the I mean, it's almost difficult to even call it copyright. 0:05:34.160 --> 0:05:37.920 It is certainly intellectual property. The idea of of let's 0:05:37.920 --> 0:05:40.200 say that you own a furniture store. Someone comes in, 0:05:40.320 --> 0:05:43.839 takes pictures of a table that you have designed, and 0:05:43.880 --> 0:05:47.040 then goes and uses additive manufacturing a three D printing 0:05:47.080 --> 0:05:51.919 process to essentially replicate that table. There's they're stealing your work. 0:05:52.400 --> 0:05:54.640 You could at least you could argue that this is 0:05:54.680 --> 0:05:58.600 my plastic table now. Yeah, or or especially with art 0:05:58.760 --> 0:06:01.160 or something like if you really wanted a sculpture and 0:06:01.200 --> 0:06:04.039 you had an extremely good three D printer, then you 0:06:04.080 --> 0:06:06.760 know that sucks for the artist. Yeah. I thought it 0:06:06.839 --> 0:06:09.920 was funny back when everybody freaked out that somebody three 0:06:10.000 --> 0:06:14.760 D printed a gun, because I was like, you can 0:06:14.800 --> 0:06:18.040 buy guns a lot more easily than you could three 0:06:18.080 --> 0:06:21.320 D print one. Well, let's say you've got a criminal record, 0:06:21.360 --> 0:06:25.000 but you also have a large bank account. You buy 0:06:25.000 --> 0:06:26.719 a three D printer and you can print as many 0:06:26.720 --> 0:06:29.040 guns as you would, But you can go into any 0:06:29.480 --> 0:06:33.840 you know, legitimate establishment and have difficulty buying guns. Not 0:06:33.880 --> 0:06:36.120 great if you have a criminal background. You probably also, 0:06:36.240 --> 0:06:38.479 i mean, assuming it's a large amount of money, you 0:06:38.560 --> 0:06:41.200 probably can illegally obtain a gun with you know, a 0:06:41.240 --> 0:06:44.160 good ten dollars anyway, Right, But it's still one of 0:06:44.200 --> 0:06:46.000 those things that you know, you think, oh, well, this 0:06:46.040 --> 0:06:49.920 could suddenly put a not only could it put guns 0:06:49.920 --> 0:06:52.960 in the hands of people, and that's kind of scary, 0:06:53.040 --> 0:06:56.920 you know, without any sort of regulations right. But also 0:06:57.040 --> 0:07:00.240 on the other side of it, beyond that scary thought 0:07:00.360 --> 0:07:04.520 is if the person is not careful with the materials 0:07:04.560 --> 0:07:06.880 they're using to build their gun, you could end up 0:07:06.880 --> 0:07:09.840 with something that maims the person who built it. Even 0:07:09.880 --> 0:07:11.640 if they are just like, Hey, look at this cool 0:07:11.680 --> 0:07:13.760 thing I built. I'm going to take it out to 0:07:13.840 --> 0:07:15.840 the shooting range and I'm going to shoot it there. 0:07:15.840 --> 0:07:18.360 I'm not playing on shooting anyone else. You're talking about 0:07:18.440 --> 0:07:20.480 using something that's you know, if you're not using the 0:07:20.560 --> 0:07:24.360 right plastic, the forces of a of a bullet being 0:07:24.400 --> 0:07:27.680 fired could be enough to shatter that and severely hurt 0:07:27.720 --> 0:07:30.120 the person who's actually using the gun. Oh. Absolutely, the 0:07:30.160 --> 0:07:33.240 type of plastic that Cody Wilson used in that demonstration, 0:07:33.360 --> 0:07:36.560 we were far beyond the grade of the usual p 0:07:36.720 --> 0:07:40.520 l A that's found in most commercial level three D printers. Yeah, 0:07:40.560 --> 0:07:44.600 his gun was called the Liberator. Jonathan and I did 0:07:44.600 --> 0:07:49.320 an entire episode in which we mostly contained our snark 0:07:49.840 --> 0:07:56.240 about defense distributed Tody Wilson um back in it was 0:07:56.240 --> 0:07:58.520 called printing a gun that was over on tech stuff. 0:07:58.560 --> 0:08:01.520 So if you somehow missed that story, you've been living 0:08:01.560 --> 0:08:03.280 under a rock for a couple of years and or 0:08:03.320 --> 0:08:05.240 you'd like to go back and hear some details about it. 0:08:05.800 --> 0:08:08.320 Go ahead and check that out. It is on the interwebs. Yeah, 0:08:08.360 --> 0:08:13.160 but like all of your security information, speaking of security, okay, Yes, 0:08:13.240 --> 0:08:18.960 that that seguates us into into a story about Yeah, 0:08:19.280 --> 0:08:22.280 it ends up getting us to a story about how 0:08:22.400 --> 0:08:27.040 three D printing could cause a threat to one element 0:08:27.120 --> 0:08:30.240 of security. In fact, has that. It's not could, it's 0:08:30.280 --> 0:08:33.719 it's happened. It's it's out there. It's going on right now. 0:08:33.840 --> 0:08:36.960 We're all do it's your keys, it's your key, specific 0:08:37.040 --> 0:08:43.679 your luggage. It could be any key, but specifically, we're 0:08:43.679 --> 0:08:47.080 gonna start talking about the t s A approved locks 0:08:47.120 --> 0:08:49.520 that you would use on your luggage. Yeah, so I'm 0:08:49.520 --> 0:08:55.640 gonna tell a little story. On November, the Washington Post 0:08:55.800 --> 0:08:59.560 ran a story by Ashley Halsey the third titled the 0:08:59.600 --> 0:09:02.679 Secret Life of Baggage? Where does your luggage go at 0:09:02.679 --> 0:09:06.240 the airport? It sounds like it sounds like one of 0:09:06.240 --> 0:09:09.720 the movies they would watch on Best of the Worst Media. 0:09:09.840 --> 0:09:12.720 It's so magical, like your luggage has a little magic 0:09:12.760 --> 0:09:14.800 gnome kingdom and you know, you know, I would have 0:09:14.840 --> 0:09:17.240 that plinky music that do do do do do do 0:09:17.240 --> 0:09:19.520 do do do do as you watch it go through anyway, 0:09:19.640 --> 0:09:22.320 Sorry you were saying no no. So it was an 0:09:22.400 --> 0:09:27.520 article looking into US Transportation Security Administration. So that's the 0:09:27.520 --> 0:09:31.400 t s A. You're probably familiar with it screening practices 0:09:31.480 --> 0:09:33.960 for checked bags, and it was telling the story of 0:09:33.960 --> 0:09:37.040 what happens to your stuff after you check it, and 0:09:37.080 --> 0:09:39.280 I thought it was a pretty interesting article. Actually, it 0:09:39.280 --> 0:09:42.080 talked about the machinery and the procedures used to screen 0:09:42.200 --> 0:09:46.560 traveling containers. And the key part of the story that's 0:09:46.559 --> 0:09:51.840 relevant to this topic is that the author talks about 0:09:51.920 --> 0:09:54.480 how the t s A has a set of master 0:09:54.640 --> 0:09:58.800 keys that can open all t s A approved locks 0:09:58.800 --> 0:10:03.959 on luggage, which makes sense if your job is to 0:10:03.760 --> 0:10:06.920 to be certain that stuff going through the airport, going 0:10:06.960 --> 0:10:10.599 onto airplanes doesn't contain dangerous materials. Right. The t s 0:10:10.640 --> 0:10:13.320 A started saying, well, we need to screen this luggage 0:10:13.360 --> 0:10:17.280 for important security purposes, but if people are putting locks 0:10:17.280 --> 0:10:19.360 on their luggage, then we might have to cut their 0:10:19.400 --> 0:10:21.680 locks off, which is, you know, a waste of that 0:10:21.720 --> 0:10:25.079 person's resources. So please buy these t s A approved 0:10:25.080 --> 0:10:27.000 locks that the t s A has master keys for, 0:10:27.400 --> 0:10:30.920 and then we can rifle through your personal belongings without 0:10:31.000 --> 0:10:34.480 destroying any of them on purpose, and you'll never know 0:10:34.800 --> 0:10:40.000 because the lock will be back on them again. Yeah, 0:10:40.040 --> 0:10:42.400 But anyway, so people are people. If you want to 0:10:42.440 --> 0:10:45.000 lock your luggage to keep people out of it, but 0:10:45.320 --> 0:10:47.880 you don't use the t s A approved lock, and 0:10:47.920 --> 0:10:50.440 the t s A agent wants to check what's inside 0:10:50.480 --> 0:10:53.640 your bag, they'll just use bolt cutters, which I guess 0:10:53.720 --> 0:10:56.480 is is at least a little better than you know, 0:10:57.160 --> 0:11:00.240 damaging your bag directly to get at what's inside of it, right, 0:11:00.320 --> 0:11:03.600 knife in the side of the bag just barely better 0:11:03.640 --> 0:11:08.560 than that. So the problem is that somebody published a 0:11:08.679 --> 0:11:12.560 version of this story that contained a very problematic picture. 0:11:12.920 --> 0:11:15.320 And I word it that way because I honestly can't 0:11:15.360 --> 0:11:18.400 tell if the image that I'm going to talk about 0:11:18.400 --> 0:11:20.880 originally ran with the story when it was published on 0:11:20.880 --> 0:11:23.840 the Washington Post page, or if it only appeared in 0:11:23.880 --> 0:11:26.800 a reprinting of the story on a site called Harold 0:11:26.840 --> 0:11:30.720 dot net, which some sources refer to. Uh. The Washington 0:11:30.760 --> 0:11:33.240 Post version of the story does not have the offending 0:11:33.280 --> 0:11:36.160 image anymore, if it ever did, got you, but that 0:11:36.240 --> 0:11:40.720 offending image would be a picture of a hand holding 0:11:40.960 --> 0:11:44.600 a series of the master keys for the various types 0:11:44.640 --> 0:11:47.000 of T s A locks. Yeah, it's a close up 0:11:47.080 --> 0:11:49.839 image of all of the master keys that can get 0:11:49.880 --> 0:11:52.880 into all your bags. So in other words, if you 0:11:52.960 --> 0:11:55.200 take a look at this, you can see the shapes 0:11:55.640 --> 0:11:59.840 of each of those keys. Whoops, which you know all right. 0:12:00.080 --> 0:12:03.120 Back in the day, it would have taken quite a 0:12:03.160 --> 0:12:06.760 lot of work to create a key to you know, 0:12:06.960 --> 0:12:09.200 use like a piece of metal and then grind it 0:12:09.240 --> 0:12:13.000 down just right based upon the way it looks in 0:12:13.040 --> 0:12:15.240 a picture. But that could have been done and we'll 0:12:15.240 --> 0:12:19.800 talk about that later. Yeah, well, certainly before computer run 0:12:20.360 --> 0:12:25.000 key creating machines. Words are apparently not in my head 0:12:25.040 --> 0:12:28.960 today it's terrific, and also before algorithms that can end 0:12:29.080 --> 0:12:31.920 up looking at a pattern and making a really close 0:12:32.040 --> 0:12:35.960 estimation of what that pattern represents. Right, Because the resolution 0:12:36.000 --> 0:12:38.679 on these images is not so high that you could 0:12:38.760 --> 0:12:42.199 just zoom. You couldn't zoom and enhance over and over. 0:12:42.280 --> 0:12:43.760 So you've got a good picture, you need you need 0:12:43.800 --> 0:12:46.120 a computer that has some good guesswork with it too. 0:12:46.520 --> 0:12:50.360 But now we're in the era, the combined era of 0:12:50.679 --> 0:12:58.520 sophisticated object recognition image software and additive manufacturing that is 0:12:58.600 --> 0:13:02.839 three D printing. Joe, Please tell me, please tell me 0:13:03.360 --> 0:13:06.000 that is impossible for someone to take the images that 0:13:06.559 --> 0:13:09.120 are here in front of us and turned that into 0:13:09.200 --> 0:13:13.240 an actual physical thing, thus manufacturing their own master keys 0:13:13.360 --> 0:13:15.880 for T. S A. Locks. Well, I don't know about 0:13:15.960 --> 0:13:18.880 this image, but it's definitely possible to do from a photo, 0:13:19.080 --> 0:13:21.760 and it has been done, and people have tried the 0:13:21.800 --> 0:13:23.520 keys and they work. So I'm going to tell the 0:13:23.559 --> 0:13:28.520 story of that now. Apparently somebody tried to delete this 0:13:28.600 --> 0:13:32.280 photo after they had published it, But silly person, Nothing 0:13:32.320 --> 0:13:35.280 gets deleted off the Internet. What's the rule about the Internet? 0:13:35.400 --> 0:13:39.160 The Internet is forever Archive dot org, We salute you, 0:13:39.679 --> 0:13:45.079 and so on. Auguste Remember that original article was last year, 0:13:45.720 --> 0:13:47.760 so it was out for a while. I don't know 0:13:47.840 --> 0:13:51.320 when the image got deleted, So I don't know exactly 0:13:51.360 --> 0:13:54.000 who was the first person to point out this problem, 0:13:54.000 --> 0:13:59.280 but several sources linked to an August one tweet by 0:13:59.440 --> 0:14:03.840 a guy who calls himself an independent journalist named Luke Rudkowski, 0:14:04.600 --> 0:14:06.760 and it shared the image of the master keys and 0:14:06.800 --> 0:14:10.360 said does at Washington Post and brilliant T s A. No, 0:14:10.480 --> 0:14:13.360 they just compromise their locking system by putting this out. 0:14:15.280 --> 0:14:19.600 So ouch, yeah, some hackers got to work. So I'm 0:14:19.640 --> 0:14:21.760 going to try to explain what happened as far as 0:14:22.040 --> 0:14:24.360 as best I can understand it, because there was a 0:14:24.400 --> 0:14:27.840 kind of complicated series of events. But in early September, 0:14:27.960 --> 0:14:31.800 a group of lock pickers and security hobbyists published to 0:14:32.000 --> 0:14:35.760 get hub, a collection of CAD files based on the 0:14:35.800 --> 0:14:37.920 images of the t s A master keys that have 0:14:38.000 --> 0:14:40.520 become available on the internet. And it looks like it 0:14:40.600 --> 0:14:44.440 probably wasn't just the Washington Post image. And I'll say 0:14:44.440 --> 0:14:46.720 more about that in a minute. But yeah, let's break down. 0:14:46.760 --> 0:14:48.880 Let's let's unpack a couple of terms for those of 0:14:48.880 --> 0:14:50.800 you who might not be familiar with get hub and 0:14:50.840 --> 0:14:54.960 cat images. Sure. So, get hub is essentially a repository. 0:14:55.000 --> 0:14:58.640 It's a place where you put open source code. Typically, 0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:01.640 so let's say that you create a program and you 0:15:01.640 --> 0:15:03.920 want to make it open source so other people can 0:15:03.960 --> 0:15:08.160 take your code, tweak it, change it, upload their own versions, 0:15:08.240 --> 0:15:11.160 you know, do transformative work with it. Get hub is 0:15:11.200 --> 0:15:14.320 sort of the centralized place that you would go and 0:15:14.600 --> 0:15:16.920 store that so other people could get at the code 0:15:16.920 --> 0:15:18.600 you had created. Right, So, if you want to make 0:15:18.640 --> 0:15:21.560 something like a Google deep dream available to the public. 0:15:21.640 --> 0:15:23.520 You can put it up on geth hubs, so people 0:15:23.560 --> 0:15:26.040 can make their own apps to do things with it, right, Yeah, 0:15:27.040 --> 0:15:29.760 but then also their CAD files. The CAD just stands 0:15:29.800 --> 0:15:32.880 for computer aided design. So if you want to put 0:15:32.920 --> 0:15:35.720 together a digital shape to make on your three D 0:15:35.800 --> 0:15:38.840 printer in three dimensions, you'll probably make it in a 0:15:38.880 --> 0:15:40.800 CAD program you can. You can think of a CAD 0:15:40.840 --> 0:15:43.720 program as a kind of MS paint for three D objects. Yeah. 0:15:43.760 --> 0:15:46.160 I remember I had a friend who did a lot 0:15:46.160 --> 0:15:50.400 of work with CAD programs back in high school. But 0:15:50.480 --> 0:15:54.000 that was specifically in design classes where you're trying to 0:15:54.080 --> 0:15:58.360 create a a three dimensional object, a plan for a 0:15:58.360 --> 0:16:00.920 three dimensional object. It's also used a lot in architecture 0:16:01.000 --> 0:16:03.080 firms that kind of thing, right. So CAD is bigger 0:16:03.120 --> 0:16:05.280 than just three D print, but it's a way to 0:16:05.320 --> 0:16:07.600 get the file you want to you want to print 0:16:07.640 --> 0:16:12.320 in a three D printer. So apparently after these files 0:16:12.320 --> 0:16:14.920 went up on geth hub, it was literally only a 0:16:14.920 --> 0:16:18.480 few hours before somebody downloaded them and printed one of 0:16:18.520 --> 0:16:22.680 these things and it worked. There are now images online 0:16:22.680 --> 0:16:25.880 of people using these three D printed keys based on 0:16:25.920 --> 0:16:28.960 these images to pop open their t s A approved 0:16:29.200 --> 0:16:32.960 luggage locks. Yeah, and you know, to be fair, some 0:16:33.040 --> 0:16:35.160 of the t s A locks feel like they could 0:16:35.280 --> 0:16:38.080 open if you sneezed on them. But maybe that's just 0:16:38.240 --> 0:16:42.320 my experience with t s A luggage locks. I've never 0:16:42.400 --> 0:16:46.200 used one I travel. I traveled just enough where I've 0:16:46.280 --> 0:16:50.440 used them a few times. Uh And and I often 0:16:50.520 --> 0:16:53.720 question why I go through the trouble, but I still 0:16:53.800 --> 0:16:57.400 do it. Yeah. Well, some users report being able to 0:16:57.400 --> 0:17:01.480 open the locks with unmodified prints of keys using plain 0:17:01.520 --> 0:17:03.560 old p l A. So these are plastic keys. You 0:17:03.560 --> 0:17:05.639 don't need a print him in metal or anything. And 0:17:05.720 --> 0:17:09.680 p l A is not not the sturdiest plastic. I've 0:17:09.680 --> 0:17:12.000 got some little p l A trinkets on my desk 0:17:12.119 --> 0:17:14.399 that I made in our in our printer in the office. 0:17:14.760 --> 0:17:17.679 I read about one user in this Wired article that 0:17:17.760 --> 0:17:20.800 I'm currently referring to who had to modify the scale 0:17:20.840 --> 0:17:23.960 of the key, but otherwise it worked. And this Wired 0:17:24.040 --> 0:17:27.480 article talked to a lockpicker and University of Pennsylvania compside 0:17:27.480 --> 0:17:30.679 professor named Matt Blaze about it, and he made some 0:17:30.760 --> 0:17:34.159 interesting points I thought. First of all, he pointed out that, uh, 0:17:34.280 --> 0:17:36.520 not that it really changes the thrust of the story, 0:17:36.600 --> 0:17:38.800 but just for the record, he thinks the image in 0:17:38.880 --> 0:17:42.479 question leaked somewhere before the Washington Post story, so they 0:17:42.560 --> 0:17:47.880 might not don't line up with your pitchforks only there. 0:17:48.119 --> 0:17:51.560 Yeah uh. He also says that a good lockpicker, you know, 0:17:51.600 --> 0:17:53.720 could probably pick the locks in less time and was 0:17:54.000 --> 0:17:56.440 with less trouble than it would take to print the keys, 0:17:56.480 --> 0:17:59.560 since he says, and I quote, I find it's actually 0:17:59.640 --> 0:18:01.919 quicker to pick the t s A locks than to 0:18:02.040 --> 0:18:05.119 look for my key sometimes. Yeah. Now, these are not 0:18:05.280 --> 0:18:07.919 terribly sophisticated locks. They're not meant to be. They're just 0:18:07.920 --> 0:18:10.359 meant to be a deterrent. And the other point he 0:18:10.440 --> 0:18:12.720 makes is that the parties in questions should have known 0:18:12.800 --> 0:18:15.760 better than allowing people to photograph the keys, because photo 0:18:15.760 --> 0:18:19.200 security and physical keys is a known issue, and we'll 0:18:19.240 --> 0:18:21.640 get to more about that in a minute. But there 0:18:21.680 --> 0:18:24.960 have been more developments since then. According to a timeline 0:18:25.000 --> 0:18:27.800 that I read, which was created by a lockpicker involved 0:18:27.840 --> 0:18:31.199 with the T s A Key story, which I found 0:18:31.280 --> 0:18:36.119 linked in another article for The Intercept by Jenna McLaughlin, boy, 0:18:36.000 --> 0:18:39.600 the trail of of sights here is is impressive. Well, 0:18:39.640 --> 0:18:43.159 I'm just trying to lead you through my thoughts. But anyway, 0:18:43.320 --> 0:18:47.200 the printed keys were actually based on additional imagery dug 0:18:47.280 --> 0:18:50.240 up by the hackers, So it wasn't just the Washington 0:18:50.359 --> 0:18:53.440 Post image that leaked, but it was sort of inspired 0:18:53.480 --> 0:18:56.400 by the Washington Post league that hackers said, I wonder 0:18:56.440 --> 0:18:58.720 if we can find any more images of these keys, 0:18:59.080 --> 0:19:01.320 and they went out and looked for him, and they did. 0:19:01.480 --> 0:19:05.160 They found, whether by legitimate or illegitimate means. I'm not sure, 0:19:05.680 --> 0:19:09.360 photos contained in a document called Guide to Travel Century 0:19:09.400 --> 0:19:13.399 pass Keys, which was created by a group called Travel Century, 0:19:13.480 --> 0:19:16.280 which they have a kind of complicated relationship with the 0:19:16.320 --> 0:19:18.880 t s A and the lockmakers. They are not lock 0:19:19.000 --> 0:19:22.000 manufacturers and they are not the t s A. But 0:19:22.240 --> 0:19:26.480 I understand that there's some sort of liaison organization. I 0:19:26.560 --> 0:19:30.560 got a third party kind of that. Yeah, like they 0:19:31.440 --> 0:19:35.840 according to this article, they generate and enforced security guidelines 0:19:35.880 --> 0:19:41.640 for T s A approved locks, whatever that means. Huh okay. 0:19:41.840 --> 0:19:46.720 So so in the face of this mishap, the t 0:19:46.880 --> 0:19:50.080 s A responded, Yeah, and this is one of the 0:19:50.119 --> 0:19:53.040 most troubling parts that that piece in the intercept I 0:19:53.080 --> 0:19:56.359 talked about got a t s A official to talk 0:19:56.440 --> 0:19:59.080 about the late the leak and the three D printed 0:19:59.119 --> 0:20:02.240 master keys, and I just thought i'd read a select 0:20:02.359 --> 0:20:05.399 quote this was pretty interesting. Okay, sure. The t s 0:20:05.440 --> 0:20:08.399 A spokesperson Mike England sent in an email to the 0:20:08.440 --> 0:20:12.040 Intercept the reported ability to create keys for t s 0:20:12.080 --> 0:20:15.080 A approved suitcase locks from a digital image does not 0:20:15.280 --> 0:20:19.760 create a threat to aviation security. These consumer products are 0:20:19.960 --> 0:20:23.280 peace of mind devices, not part of t s AS 0:20:23.320 --> 0:20:28.720 aviation security regime. And also, and the same guy said, 0:20:29.240 --> 0:20:31.399 carried in check bags are subject to the t s 0:20:31.480 --> 0:20:35.480 AS electronics screening and manual inspection. In addition, the reported 0:20:35.480 --> 0:20:39.240 availability of keys to unauthorized persons causes no loss of 0:20:39.280 --> 0:20:42.320 physical security to bags while they are under t s 0:20:42.400 --> 0:20:45.720 A control. In fact, the vast majority of bags are 0:20:45.760 --> 0:20:50.760 not locked when checked in prior to flight. So what 0:20:50.800 --> 0:20:54.960 they're saying is that, well, we're concerned with national security, 0:20:55.200 --> 0:21:02.280 not your luggage is security. So it's not really our problem. Yeah, 0:21:02.400 --> 0:21:05.719 not our problem. No, it's yeah, essentially don't matter. The 0:21:05.720 --> 0:21:08.080 t s A. The t s AS purpose is not 0:21:08.160 --> 0:21:11.119 to make certain that the bag you packed has the 0:21:11.160 --> 0:21:13.360 same stuff in it when you get to where you're 0:21:13.400 --> 0:21:16.560 going as when you left. It's just to make sure 0:21:16.600 --> 0:21:19.040 that you're not going to hurt the airplane or anybody 0:21:19.080 --> 0:21:22.800 on it, which I should put in is a is 0:21:22.840 --> 0:21:26.960 a valid thing to want. Yeah, this perhaps was maybe 0:21:27.000 --> 0:21:30.280 not the best way to communicate it, since it seems 0:21:30.320 --> 0:21:34.040 like it's by by this way, I mean, this quote 0:21:34.119 --> 0:21:36.920 almost seems like they are flipping me the bird and 0:21:37.080 --> 0:21:40.479 saying saying, don't worry your stuff doesn't matter. They might 0:21:40.520 --> 0:21:43.119 as well say, don't put a lock on it, you know, 0:21:43.240 --> 0:21:46.480 because here they're saying, well, you know, it's it's going 0:21:46.520 --> 0:21:48.600 to be within our care the whole time. I mean, 0:21:48.640 --> 0:21:50.480 no one else is going to have access to it. 0:21:50.520 --> 0:21:55.240 And I'm thinking the people that are handling the luggage 0:21:55.359 --> 0:21:57.960 all along the pathway from the point where I handed 0:21:58.000 --> 0:22:01.520 off to the point where I pick it up aren't 0:22:01.560 --> 0:22:08.400 all necessarily upstanding citizens. I say that because I know 0:22:08.520 --> 0:22:11.920 there have been incidents where people have found stuff missing 0:22:12.880 --> 0:22:15.680 from their I mean, there's there's also just the mere 0:22:15.720 --> 0:22:19.040 fact that if you're if you are distrustful of human people, 0:22:19.200 --> 0:22:22.840 and you perhaps don't make it to the baggage carousel 0:22:23.240 --> 0:22:26.400 exactly at the moment when your suitcase comes out, then 0:22:26.760 --> 0:22:29.840 you know, a dishonest human person could walk up and 0:22:29.880 --> 0:22:31.840 just kind of rummage through your stuff. It takes some 0:22:31.880 --> 0:22:34.080 of it out. Yeah, well, yeah, especially if it's one 0:22:34.080 --> 0:22:36.919