1 00:00:00,320 --> 00:00:04,760 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,840 --> 00:00:09,160 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,280 --> 00:00:21,840 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. Welcome 4 00:00:21,880 --> 00:00:24,080 Speaker 1: back to the show. My name is Matt, my name 5 00:00:24,120 --> 00:00:26,560 Speaker 1: is Noel, and I am then you are you that 6 00:00:26,600 --> 00:00:30,480 Speaker 1: makes this stuff they don't want you to know? And today, folks, 7 00:00:30,880 --> 00:00:36,319 Speaker 1: we are diving into something that's that's more recent than 8 00:00:36,360 --> 00:00:39,320 Speaker 1: we would often cover. And think of it this way. 9 00:00:39,680 --> 00:00:45,400 Speaker 1: Imagine that there's a crowded intersection and auto intersection, the 10 00:00:45,400 --> 00:00:50,640 Speaker 1: biggest in the world, and right now there's an enormous accident. 11 00:00:50,800 --> 00:00:55,040 Speaker 1: Cars are blowing up and derailing, a flying off the median, 12 00:00:55,440 --> 00:00:58,840 Speaker 1: and now we as stuff theyn't want you to know. 13 00:00:59,240 --> 00:01:02,960 Speaker 1: So you and Matt Nolan I have decided to stumble 14 00:01:03,000 --> 00:01:07,080 Speaker 1: into this accident while it's occurring to see what's going on. 15 00:01:07,400 --> 00:01:12,240 Speaker 1: Today we're talking about the Panama papers, which means we 16 00:01:12,280 --> 00:01:14,600 Speaker 1: need to do a disclaimer at the beginning. Yeah, this 17 00:01:14,680 --> 00:01:17,680 Speaker 1: is an ongoing story. I mean we've and by we 18 00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:21,039 Speaker 1: I mean you know, the information that's out there barely 19 00:01:21,200 --> 00:01:23,800 Speaker 1: is even beginning to scratch the surface on this um. 20 00:01:23,800 --> 00:01:25,680 Speaker 1: So they're going to be new details that are going 21 00:01:25,720 --> 00:01:28,319 Speaker 1: to be constantly coming out as this develops. And this 22 00:01:28,400 --> 00:01:30,760 Speaker 1: is definitely the kind of story that we will continue 23 00:01:30,800 --> 00:01:33,640 Speaker 1: to follow up on for sure. Right so by the 24 00:01:33,680 --> 00:01:37,120 Speaker 1: time you're hearing this, you may already know some things 25 00:01:37,160 --> 00:01:40,480 Speaker 1: that happened after we record it, and we'll we'll talk 26 00:01:40,480 --> 00:01:43,200 Speaker 1: about that a little bit as well. To keep seeing 27 00:01:43,240 --> 00:01:46,800 Speaker 1: new things every day, every hour, you know, something new 28 00:01:46,840 --> 00:01:49,320 Speaker 1: pops up. As we were going into the studio, we 29 00:01:49,320 --> 00:01:52,200 Speaker 1: were we were adding to our notes here. But what's 30 00:01:52,240 --> 00:01:55,880 Speaker 1: what's the GISs here? Okay, So this month that we 31 00:01:55,880 --> 00:02:00,880 Speaker 1: were recording this podcast as correct, a group of journalists 32 00:02:00,960 --> 00:02:06,200 Speaker 1: revealed that the largest leak in human history has occurred. 33 00:02:06,720 --> 00:02:09,320 Speaker 1: And we're talking about eleven and a half million files 34 00:02:09,360 --> 00:02:13,680 Speaker 1: that are looking at uh secretive financial arrangements that have 35 00:02:13,760 --> 00:02:16,840 Speaker 1: been occurring since the nineteen seventies all the way up 36 00:02:16,919 --> 00:02:21,760 Speaker 1: until this past year. And and it's this thing that 37 00:02:21,800 --> 00:02:24,440 Speaker 1: we've all decided to call the Panama Papers. And this 38 00:02:24,520 --> 00:02:26,800 Speaker 1: is these are digital files. This is two point six 39 00:02:26,960 --> 00:02:30,720 Speaker 1: terabytes of data. So think about the size of a 40 00:02:30,960 --> 00:02:35,680 Speaker 1: word document on your computer. It's a couple of k'm 41 00:02:35,760 --> 00:02:38,160 Speaker 1: barely a megabyte most of the time. So to think 42 00:02:38,480 --> 00:02:43,320 Speaker 1: about two point six terabytes of basically text. That's insane. 43 00:02:43,720 --> 00:02:47,520 Speaker 1: It is the German paper, Sue Deutsche Tongue, which I 44 00:02:47,560 --> 00:02:51,840 Speaker 1: may be mispronouncing, received this information more than a year 45 00:02:51,880 --> 00:02:55,919 Speaker 1: beforehand from an anonymous source identifying his or herself in 46 00:02:56,000 --> 00:03:00,520 Speaker 1: a burst of creativity as John Doe. Y. It's an 47 00:03:00,520 --> 00:03:03,040 Speaker 1: old sandby. Don't fix it if it ain't broken. So 48 00:03:03,760 --> 00:03:07,359 Speaker 1: this German paper, one of the things we found is 49 00:03:07,400 --> 00:03:10,679 Speaker 1: that in the course of our investigation, ironically enough, while 50 00:03:10,680 --> 00:03:14,000 Speaker 1: we're investigating this big exposure of secrets, we're finding a 51 00:03:14,000 --> 00:03:17,040 Speaker 1: bunch of other things that are also murky, unexplained or 52 00:03:17,120 --> 00:03:20,040 Speaker 1: still secret, one of them, of course, being the identity 53 00:03:20,200 --> 00:03:23,639 Speaker 1: of John Doe. Another being the timeline, because on their 54 00:03:23,680 --> 00:03:26,880 Speaker 1: official record they'll only say they received it more than 55 00:03:26,919 --> 00:03:29,720 Speaker 1: a year ago exactly, and they have to have that 56 00:03:29,919 --> 00:03:34,800 Speaker 1: sort of ambiguity, perhaps to protect this John Doe character. 57 00:03:34,880 --> 00:03:38,000 Speaker 1: But anyway, when this German paper realized the scope of 58 00:03:38,040 --> 00:03:42,160 Speaker 1: the league, as as Noel said, uh terabytes of data, 59 00:03:42,400 --> 00:03:44,240 Speaker 1: they knew they had to ask for help. So they 60 00:03:44,240 --> 00:03:48,960 Speaker 1: contacted a place called the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 61 00:03:49,280 --> 00:03:52,640 Speaker 1: and soon reporters around the globe. We're digging into these 62 00:03:52,680 --> 00:03:56,160 Speaker 1: dirty documents. But it should be noted here that uh, 63 00:03:56,200 --> 00:03:59,760 Speaker 1: they are only releasing a small amount of the data 64 00:03:59,800 --> 00:04:03,960 Speaker 1: that they received, right the Glenn Greenwald Edward Snowden approach, 65 00:04:04,080 --> 00:04:07,240 Speaker 1: which is to not do a massive data dump that 66 00:04:07,320 --> 00:04:11,800 Speaker 1: can be ignored after a news cycle, but to continually 67 00:04:11,920 --> 00:04:14,360 Speaker 1: feed things. And of course, you know, the people who 68 00:04:14,360 --> 00:04:16,800 Speaker 1: don't want that kind of information to be known have 69 00:04:17,000 --> 00:04:21,000 Speaker 1: adapted the way they do a news cycle to cyclically 70 00:04:21,040 --> 00:04:23,360 Speaker 1: ignore the new things or find something else to have 71 00:04:23,920 --> 00:04:26,240 Speaker 1: the spotlight. Yeah, some other breaking news that comes in, 72 00:04:26,320 --> 00:04:28,240 Speaker 1: and now this is the big important thing, And a 73 00:04:28,240 --> 00:04:30,520 Speaker 1: lot of people may even say that that's what the 74 00:04:30,520 --> 00:04:33,640 Speaker 1: Panama papers are, but we'll get to that later. So 75 00:04:33,800 --> 00:04:37,520 Speaker 1: what we already know about the Panama papers um includes 76 00:04:37,600 --> 00:04:41,640 Speaker 1: definitely some of these kind of more let's say, gossipy 77 00:04:41,839 --> 00:04:45,120 Speaker 1: kind of details that people definitely get interested in. And 78 00:04:45,160 --> 00:04:49,840 Speaker 1: it's pretty good clickbait material because it involves the super 79 00:04:49,960 --> 00:04:55,120 Speaker 1: rich and their attempts successful attempts to cover up uh, 80 00:04:56,080 --> 00:04:59,640 Speaker 1: parts of their wealth in order to avoid paying taxes 81 00:05:00,040 --> 00:05:04,080 Speaker 1: in a way that many people would not normally understand. 82 00:05:04,200 --> 00:05:06,120 Speaker 1: Like it's tough to get your hands around some of 83 00:05:06,160 --> 00:05:10,039 Speaker 1: these more abstract concepts, but hopefully we can help shed 84 00:05:10,120 --> 00:05:12,880 Speaker 1: some light on it. The next question with the Panama 85 00:05:12,960 --> 00:05:16,640 Speaker 1: Papers is well, where did all this stuff come from? Hey, guys, 86 00:05:16,720 --> 00:05:19,280 Speaker 1: you might be saying to yourself, I can just rack 87 00:05:19,480 --> 00:05:25,200 Speaker 1: up over two terabytes of nonsense and email it to somebody. 88 00:05:25,240 --> 00:05:29,520 Speaker 1: They're not that special. Uh. The origin of this information, 89 00:05:29,560 --> 00:05:33,159 Speaker 1: which does appear to be true, UH, is rooted in 90 00:05:33,200 --> 00:05:37,360 Speaker 1: a place that gives credibility and a profoundly disturbing credibility 91 00:05:37,400 --> 00:05:39,360 Speaker 1: to the claims. We're talking about a law firm named 92 00:05:39,360 --> 00:05:44,200 Speaker 1: Massak Fonseka. This is a Panamanian law firm Panama Papers. 93 00:05:44,320 --> 00:05:49,240 Speaker 1: There we go, uh. In their primary business since ninety 94 00:05:49,360 --> 00:05:54,640 Speaker 1: seven has been to create offshore corporate entities organizational structure 95 00:05:54,760 --> 00:05:57,640 Speaker 1: shell companies for clients around the globe. At one point 96 00:05:57,720 --> 00:06:00,800 Speaker 1: they have more than three hundred thousands. Uh. But for 97 00:06:00,839 --> 00:06:03,120 Speaker 1: a long time we didn't know the specifics of their 98 00:06:03,200 --> 00:06:07,560 Speaker 1: business or their clients because this kind of stuff offshore 99 00:06:07,760 --> 00:06:11,880 Speaker 1: organizational structures, the stuff hinges on privacy. It's like how 100 00:06:11,920 --> 00:06:16,520 Speaker 1: all the cool clubs are never yelp or they're never 101 00:06:16,680 --> 00:06:19,560 Speaker 1: on social media. You just have to find the right 102 00:06:19,600 --> 00:06:23,560 Speaker 1: door in the right alley. Yeah, Privacy is the the 103 00:06:23,600 --> 00:06:26,760 Speaker 1: whole reason that that company really even exists is to 104 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:31,120 Speaker 1: maintain privacy for individuals and corporations. So so what are 105 00:06:31,120 --> 00:06:35,360 Speaker 1: these Panama papers specifically? Know that you talked about terabytes? Right, Yeah, 106 00:06:35,360 --> 00:06:38,559 Speaker 1: so it's two point six terabytes of data. UM. That 107 00:06:38,960 --> 00:06:43,520 Speaker 1: includes details of around two sixteen thousand, most like Finesska clients. 108 00:06:43,839 --> 00:06:48,200 Speaker 1: And again these clients are you know, heavy hitters in politics, 109 00:06:48,480 --> 00:06:53,520 Speaker 1: in the entertainment world, um, business people, athletes, very affluent 110 00:06:53,560 --> 00:06:56,880 Speaker 1: people who are known um And we'll get to who 111 00:06:56,880 --> 00:06:59,000 Speaker 1: some of those people are in a bit. But some 112 00:06:59,080 --> 00:07:02,440 Speaker 1: of these details include techniques that are actually used to 113 00:07:02,600 --> 00:07:06,440 Speaker 1: establish these shell companies, um, the amounts of money that 114 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:11,520 Speaker 1: have been you know, tucked away, names, dates, owners. Often 115 00:07:11,520 --> 00:07:14,119 Speaker 1: people are actually linked to someone who controls the money. 116 00:07:14,160 --> 00:07:16,960 Speaker 1: So someone will do it on behalf of a client, 117 00:07:17,400 --> 00:07:19,360 Speaker 1: a proxy, and in a case that we'll talk about 118 00:07:19,360 --> 00:07:22,240 Speaker 1: a little later, could be a family member someone that's 119 00:07:22,360 --> 00:07:24,560 Speaker 1: you know, setting up the shell company. But you know 120 00:07:24,600 --> 00:07:26,440 Speaker 1: this is are these are terms I'm sure you've heard 121 00:07:26,760 --> 00:07:29,280 Speaker 1: in you know, heist movies or gangster movies and a 122 00:07:29,280 --> 00:07:32,400 Speaker 1: lot of times associated with even even going so far 123 00:07:32,400 --> 00:07:36,280 Speaker 1: as to call it laundering money, right, like the funds 124 00:07:36,280 --> 00:07:40,440 Speaker 1: if it would be deposited in an unmocked this bank 125 00:07:40,480 --> 00:07:47,720 Speaker 1: account under the name global plumber Global plumber. Nice, i'mone 126 00:07:47,800 --> 00:07:50,680 Speaker 1: to use that and then messed up on you would die. 127 00:07:53,520 --> 00:07:56,760 Speaker 1: So some of these terms we are somewhat familiar with, 128 00:07:56,800 --> 00:07:59,000 Speaker 1: like you said, because we have we live in a 129 00:07:59,040 --> 00:08:02,480 Speaker 1: pop culture worlds and we you know, there's a lot 130 00:08:02,480 --> 00:08:05,320 Speaker 1: of corruption to go around, so we write stories about it. Um, 131 00:08:05,400 --> 00:08:07,560 Speaker 1: So let's just describe what it is. What what is 132 00:08:07,600 --> 00:08:11,440 Speaker 1: this stuff? Actually? So all of this is like you said, noll, 133 00:08:12,120 --> 00:08:14,640 Speaker 1: it's tax avoidance. That's at the heart of that, at 134 00:08:14,720 --> 00:08:16,880 Speaker 1: the heart of this, that's what it is. Um. The 135 00:08:17,000 --> 00:08:19,680 Speaker 1: usage of tax havens and shell companies to reduce the 136 00:08:19,680 --> 00:08:21,560 Speaker 1: amount that you're going to have to pay when you 137 00:08:21,640 --> 00:08:25,800 Speaker 1: make income as a corporation or as an individual. Um. 138 00:08:25,920 --> 00:08:28,960 Speaker 1: Now here, here's the way they do that. They go offshore, 139 00:08:29,360 --> 00:08:32,679 Speaker 1: So in another country, in another state, even if you're 140 00:08:32,679 --> 00:08:36,160 Speaker 1: in the US or another country that has separate states 141 00:08:36,320 --> 00:08:39,840 Speaker 1: or localities. UM. It's really interesting how all these different 142 00:08:39,920 --> 00:08:43,080 Speaker 1: laws and rules are written, because it will change. You go, 143 00:08:43,320 --> 00:08:47,360 Speaker 1: you know, a couple hundred miles and you're all the 144 00:08:47,440 --> 00:08:51,960 Speaker 1: laws are different. Um. So what exactly is a tax haven. 145 00:08:52,160 --> 00:08:55,360 Speaker 1: So there's several different examples of tax havens, one being 146 00:08:55,480 --> 00:08:59,200 Speaker 1: countries or different states that actually have financial secrecy laws 147 00:08:59,240 --> 00:09:03,440 Speaker 1: in place which allow them to attract investment from outside 148 00:09:03,440 --> 00:09:06,080 Speaker 1: of their borders. And I think the important distinction here 149 00:09:06,120 --> 00:09:10,080 Speaker 1: with this is that these activities are not illegal in 150 00:09:10,200 --> 00:09:13,240 Speaker 1: the places where they are being carried out. The way 151 00:09:13,280 --> 00:09:17,120 Speaker 1: it connects to our country and our laws is a 152 00:09:17,160 --> 00:09:20,120 Speaker 1: different story entirely, And that's a great point. We can 153 00:09:20,160 --> 00:09:24,320 Speaker 1: take it a step further. Shell companies themselves are not 154 00:09:24,440 --> 00:09:28,320 Speaker 1: inherently illegal, you know what I mean. It's like using 155 00:09:28,679 --> 00:09:32,160 Speaker 1: tour is not inherently illegal so far that's how you 156 00:09:32,280 --> 00:09:35,439 Speaker 1: use it, right. Um, So there are some great examples 157 00:09:35,600 --> 00:09:38,800 Speaker 1: of of tax havens. We're talking a lot of islands, 158 00:09:38,800 --> 00:09:42,000 Speaker 1: a lot of vacation destinations, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the 159 00:09:42,040 --> 00:09:45,520 Speaker 1: British version, Virgin Islands. Wait wait, great examples are like 160 00:09:47,080 --> 00:09:48,480 Speaker 1: oh yeah, I guess they are great. I mean they're 161 00:09:48,480 --> 00:09:51,520 Speaker 1: great examples if you wanna, you know, park your yacht somewhere, 162 00:09:51,679 --> 00:09:57,719 Speaker 1: like textbook examples of textbook example. Um, we're talking to 163 00:09:57,720 --> 00:10:01,920 Speaker 1: Puerto Rico, Switzerland, Singapore, I Ireland, even some U S. 164 00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:09,960 Speaker 1: States like we mentioned before, like Wyoming, Nevada, and even Delaware, Delaware. 165 00:10:11,040 --> 00:10:15,920 Speaker 1: You guys remember that from Wayne's World. I'm in New York. 166 00:10:15,960 --> 00:10:18,440 Speaker 1: I got a gun. Let's go to a Broadway showing. Yeah, 167 00:10:19,679 --> 00:10:22,160 Speaker 1: this is just a quick, quick, little side note. Delaware 168 00:10:22,160 --> 00:10:25,599 Speaker 1: has been fascinating to me because I for years to 169 00:10:25,640 --> 00:10:27,319 Speaker 1: get these bills from back of America or whatever, and 170 00:10:27,320 --> 00:10:30,120 Speaker 1: it's always from Delaware. As it turns out, there's a 171 00:10:30,200 --> 00:10:34,760 Speaker 1: very good reason for that. Delaware has some interesting laws 172 00:10:34,840 --> 00:10:37,959 Speaker 1: that and possibly from an article in the New York Times, 173 00:10:38,120 --> 00:10:42,240 Speaker 1: Delaware actually just has some slightly unusual malleable shall we say, 174 00:10:42,480 --> 00:10:46,480 Speaker 1: tax laws and consequently, uh, there is one particular address 175 00:10:46,520 --> 00:10:50,599 Speaker 1: there's referenced in this article. That's twelve and nine North Orange, Delaware, 176 00:10:50,920 --> 00:10:54,720 Speaker 1: that two five thousand separate businesses use and it's basically 177 00:10:54,760 --> 00:10:58,360 Speaker 1: just a giant array of mailboxes. Wow. So anyway I 178 00:10:58,440 --> 00:11:01,200 Speaker 1: heard about this place. Yeah. Uh, And it's just to 179 00:11:01,280 --> 00:11:05,000 Speaker 1: maintain a business address and fall under that legal jurisdiction, 180 00:11:05,160 --> 00:11:11,040 Speaker 1: right exactly. So there are some stats from the Federation 181 00:11:11,080 --> 00:11:14,840 Speaker 1: of State Public Interest Research Groups that we would like 182 00:11:14,960 --> 00:11:18,439 Speaker 1: to explore at the moment. Yes, this is from October 183 00:11:19,679 --> 00:11:23,959 Speaker 1: and they hold that Fortune five hundred companies together are 184 00:11:23,960 --> 00:11:28,160 Speaker 1: holding more than two point one trillion dollars in profits 185 00:11:28,160 --> 00:11:31,480 Speaker 1: off off shores for for these tax purposes to try 186 00:11:31,480 --> 00:11:35,760 Speaker 1: and save money on them, and at least three hundred 187 00:11:35,800 --> 00:11:39,440 Speaker 1: and fifty eight of those companies, nearly seventy of the 188 00:11:39,440 --> 00:11:44,600 Speaker 1: Fortune five hundred, operate these different subsidiaries and tax havens 189 00:11:44,640 --> 00:11:47,200 Speaker 1: to do just that. And they hold that these same 190 00:11:47,240 --> 00:11:51,200 Speaker 1: companies maintain at least seven thousand, six hundred and twenty 191 00:11:51,240 --> 00:11:55,160 Speaker 1: two tax haven subsidiaries or these things we're calling shell companies. 192 00:11:55,200 --> 00:11:58,280 Speaker 1: All right, and let's let's take a second right there, 193 00:11:58,559 --> 00:12:02,000 Speaker 1: just to sumit all T L d R. What these 194 00:12:02,080 --> 00:12:07,319 Speaker 1: papers show that people who have an extraordinary amount of money. 195 00:12:08,880 --> 00:12:11,960 Speaker 1: I don't wanna. I think we're dwelling a lot on 196 00:12:12,000 --> 00:12:14,960 Speaker 1: the tax thing. Because it's not just taxation. It's not 197 00:12:15,000 --> 00:12:19,800 Speaker 1: just taxation. We're also talking about criminal activities, ill gotten gains. 198 00:12:20,200 --> 00:12:24,960 Speaker 1: We're talking about corruption and bribery. It's money you want 199 00:12:25,040 --> 00:12:27,160 Speaker 1: to hide, not money you want to take home to 200 00:12:27,160 --> 00:12:29,840 Speaker 1: meet your parents. And it could fall under the idea 201 00:12:29,840 --> 00:12:33,880 Speaker 1: of money laundering. Yes, yes, it's almost to me. I 202 00:12:33,920 --> 00:12:37,800 Speaker 1: was thinking about it as let's say let's just say, 203 00:12:37,840 --> 00:12:40,880 Speaker 1: for instance, I'm going to make a purchase that I 204 00:12:41,000 --> 00:12:43,600 Speaker 1: don't want to show up on my on my credit 205 00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:46,240 Speaker 1: card or something like that. Pull a little bit of 206 00:12:46,280 --> 00:12:49,040 Speaker 1: cash out, and I'll go and make whatever purchase or 207 00:12:49,120 --> 00:12:52,000 Speaker 1: transition to do that in cash. To me, this is 208 00:12:52,080 --> 00:12:55,760 Speaker 1: almost like that for a massive corporation or an individual 209 00:12:55,800 --> 00:12:58,199 Speaker 1: that has a whole bunch of money, So you can 210 00:12:58,200 --> 00:13:01,040 Speaker 1: siphon a little bit out of that account that is 211 00:13:01,120 --> 00:13:04,480 Speaker 1: under somebody else's name and then use that for whatever 212 00:13:04,679 --> 00:13:07,880 Speaker 1: thing you're gonna do. It doesn't necessarily mean that it's illegal. 213 00:13:08,280 --> 00:13:09,840 Speaker 1: It just means that you don't want anybody else to 214 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:13,199 Speaker 1: know about it. Okay, So that's that's a good way 215 00:13:13,240 --> 00:13:15,040 Speaker 1: to put it in a shell company, you know, a 216 00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:16,960 Speaker 1: shell company. Like you said, Noel is one of the 217 00:13:18,000 --> 00:13:22,439 Speaker 1: one of the favored ways to launder money. Right. In 218 00:13:22,840 --> 00:13:27,600 Speaker 1: a sense, it's more abstract, more corporatized version of the 219 00:13:27,640 --> 00:13:32,959 Speaker 1: old trope in crime movies, where let's let's say, uh, 220 00:13:33,120 --> 00:13:36,560 Speaker 1: Noel is quickly becoming like a cocaine kingpin or something, 221 00:13:36,960 --> 00:13:40,160 Speaker 1: and then you're shady underworld accountant says, well, you've got 222 00:13:40,160 --> 00:13:44,719 Speaker 1: to buy a laundromat or nails law and deli a deli, right, 223 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:47,920 Speaker 1: or just the p O box in Delaware? Yeah, but 224 00:13:48,040 --> 00:13:50,760 Speaker 1: a deli would be so much fun. He's a question, 225 00:13:50,800 --> 00:13:56,680 Speaker 1: and this is really I'm asking, Um, isn't this sort 226 00:13:56,679 --> 00:13:59,880 Speaker 1: of just like a slightly lower level version of the 227 00:14:00,040 --> 00:14:05,840 Speaker 1: way huge corporations sometimes restructure, like Alphabet for example in Google? Like, 228 00:14:05,960 --> 00:14:07,840 Speaker 1: is that is there any connection there at all? I 229 00:14:07,920 --> 00:14:12,000 Speaker 1: know it's definitely for not tax reasons, but it's it's 230 00:14:12,040 --> 00:14:15,120 Speaker 1: regulatory reasons maybe, I mean, or is there a connection 231 00:14:15,160 --> 00:14:18,960 Speaker 1: there or just it's a It's a similar operation in 232 00:14:19,000 --> 00:14:21,720 Speaker 1: many ways. Yeah. The The difference I would say is 233 00:14:21,760 --> 00:14:24,640 Speaker 1: that when you have a restructuring like that, you're gonna 234 00:14:24,680 --> 00:14:28,800 Speaker 1: have operating procedures that function under this new thing that 235 00:14:28,880 --> 00:14:32,400 Speaker 1: you create. UB. There are operating procedures that happened with Alphabet. 236 00:14:32,520 --> 00:14:35,440 Speaker 1: With some of these it would be just a like. 237 00:14:35,480 --> 00:14:37,160 Speaker 1: That's why it's called a shell because it just kind 238 00:14:37,160 --> 00:14:39,800 Speaker 1: of sits there, doesn't really do anything. It's like a 239 00:14:39,880 --> 00:14:43,000 Speaker 1: front it is. It's very much like a front company. 240 00:14:43,480 --> 00:14:45,080 Speaker 1: The first thing we need to know is what a 241 00:14:45,160 --> 00:14:48,400 Speaker 1: front company is. And Ben, we've talked about this before, 242 00:14:48,800 --> 00:14:51,320 Speaker 1: uh in our video series a couple of times about 243 00:14:51,520 --> 00:14:56,200 Speaker 1: different versions of front companies. UM. It can be UH subsidiary, 244 00:14:56,520 --> 00:14:59,640 Speaker 1: it can be a shell company. UH. It's usually from 245 00:14:59,680 --> 00:15:02,040 Speaker 1: a large a company that almost always wants to hide 246 00:15:02,120 --> 00:15:05,440 Speaker 1: some bit of information about a company or an individual. 247 00:15:05,760 --> 00:15:09,360 Speaker 1: And usually it's used to protect them from liability. Let's say, 248 00:15:09,440 --> 00:15:12,600 Speaker 1: is something that the company does, they want to protect 249 00:15:12,640 --> 00:15:16,440 Speaker 1: the owners or again the individual. UM. And that's from 250 00:15:16,440 --> 00:15:19,480 Speaker 1: anything of any kind of scrutiny, even negative press. You 251 00:15:19,600 --> 00:15:21,560 Speaker 1: just don't want somebody to see it. Do it in 252 00:15:21,560 --> 00:15:23,880 Speaker 1: the front company. Let's say you get caught messing with 253 00:15:23,920 --> 00:15:26,800 Speaker 1: your stockholders or something like that. Then maybe all it 254 00:15:26,840 --> 00:15:28,600 Speaker 1: takes to make some of that go away is to 255 00:15:28,720 --> 00:15:30,680 Speaker 1: change the name of your company and be out of 256 00:15:30,680 --> 00:15:33,880 Speaker 1: the public eye for a little while exactly. And again 257 00:15:33,880 --> 00:15:36,440 Speaker 1: we're gonna stay here. It is not out and out 258 00:15:36,480 --> 00:15:41,640 Speaker 1: illegal to own or operate, quote operate a front company 259 00:15:41,760 --> 00:15:45,360 Speaker 1: in most countries. In most countries. So another example is 260 00:15:45,400 --> 00:15:47,560 Speaker 1: shell corporations and a lot of this stuff. I know 261 00:15:47,640 --> 00:15:49,920 Speaker 1: it's very closely related, but it's I think if there's 262 00:15:49,960 --> 00:15:52,720 Speaker 1: some little distinctions that are important. A shell corporation can 263 00:15:52,720 --> 00:15:56,680 Speaker 1: be described as a corporation that doesn't necessarily have active 264 00:15:56,720 --> 00:16:00,480 Speaker 1: business operations. Or really any money doesn't act, it doesn't 265 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:03,480 Speaker 1: really do anything. And these are commonly formed when you're 266 00:16:03,520 --> 00:16:06,160 Speaker 1: in the process of starting corporation UM. It sort of 267 00:16:06,200 --> 00:16:10,080 Speaker 1: has a formality to get the initial financing UM. And 268 00:16:10,120 --> 00:16:13,240 Speaker 1: then they can also be used in tax avoidance schemes 269 00:16:13,640 --> 00:16:18,440 Speaker 1: by legitimate businesses UM, which is not not legal, right Yeah, 270 00:16:18,600 --> 00:16:21,120 Speaker 1: that part would not be legal, but again, the whole 271 00:16:21,240 --> 00:16:22,840 Speaker 1: I mean, we just I want to keep saying this 272 00:16:22,880 --> 00:16:25,120 Speaker 1: because it's just kind of get it in your head, like, 273 00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:28,800 Speaker 1: this is not in itself illegal to have a shell corporation. 274 00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:31,800 Speaker 1: It's right right on board if you're doing if you're 275 00:16:31,880 --> 00:16:37,400 Speaker 1: using it for legal purposes, right Yeah. Another example, which 276 00:16:38,280 --> 00:16:41,120 Speaker 1: probably has the more enjoyable name of these three that 277 00:16:41,160 --> 00:16:45,800 Speaker 1: were mentioned, is the dummy corporation. A dummy corporation appears 278 00:16:45,880 --> 00:16:52,520 Speaker 1: to be a functioning thing. Global Plumbing is a shell corporation. 279 00:16:52,760 --> 00:16:57,160 Speaker 1: If Global Plumbing has no assets, has no owner, does nothing, 280 00:16:57,880 --> 00:17:01,560 Speaker 1: a dummy corporation. Global Plumb is a dummy corporation if 281 00:17:01,560 --> 00:17:04,200 Speaker 1: it appears to be real, you know, if it seems 282 00:17:04,240 --> 00:17:07,320 Speaker 1: to have the signs of an active company. Yeah, there's 283 00:17:07,359 --> 00:17:10,800 Speaker 1: the created maybe their books there on the books. Yeah, 284 00:17:10,840 --> 00:17:15,440 Speaker 1: but in actuality. It doesn't have the ability to function 285 00:17:15,760 --> 00:17:20,520 Speaker 1: by itself exactly. And we have We've put a playlist 286 00:17:20,600 --> 00:17:22,720 Speaker 1: on our YouTube page so you can go through show 287 00:17:22,760 --> 00:17:25,280 Speaker 1: your friends and your family, like, hey, this is what 288 00:17:25,640 --> 00:17:27,359 Speaker 1: a friend company is and how it works, just so 289 00:17:27,400 --> 00:17:29,119 Speaker 1: you can get everybody on the same page if you 290 00:17:29,119 --> 00:17:31,440 Speaker 1: want to have a conversation about this. Um. You know, 291 00:17:31,560 --> 00:17:33,399 Speaker 1: maybe you don't want to talk about this with your family, 292 00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:36,560 Speaker 1: but you know it might be a good idea. So 293 00:17:37,040 --> 00:17:40,800 Speaker 1: let's name some names. If you are listening to this show, 294 00:17:40,960 --> 00:17:44,240 Speaker 1: Odds are that you have already heard of the Prime 295 00:17:44,280 --> 00:17:49,040 Speaker 1: Minister of Iceland who went on leave as of the 296 00:17:49,119 --> 00:17:53,320 Speaker 1: seventh of April twenty sixteen. Uh, no news yet they 297 00:17:53,359 --> 00:17:59,320 Speaker 1: held emergency like elections, right the recall of some kind yep. 298 00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:03,440 Speaker 1: And this also affects heads of state like the President 299 00:18:03,480 --> 00:18:07,800 Speaker 1: of Argentina, King Salomon of Saudi Arabia, the President of 300 00:18:07,840 --> 00:18:11,280 Speaker 1: the u a E. President of Ukraine, Prime Minister of 301 00:18:11,320 --> 00:18:14,640 Speaker 1: the United Kingdom, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, that's yeah, 302 00:18:14,720 --> 00:18:18,880 Speaker 1: Prime Minister of Pakistan, even uh, Prime Minister of Jordan's, 303 00:18:19,480 --> 00:18:24,280 Speaker 1: Prime Minister of Moldolva Iraq Italy Cutter. The list goes 304 00:18:24,280 --> 00:18:30,080 Speaker 1: on and then numerous other government officials. And another thing 305 00:18:30,080 --> 00:18:34,440 Speaker 1: that we see is that celebrities were named as well. 306 00:18:35,480 --> 00:18:38,840 Speaker 1: Jackie Chan is in there, of all people, and pro 307 00:18:39,119 --> 00:18:43,480 Speaker 1: Motivar the director. Apparently this his was set up by 308 00:18:43,520 --> 00:18:46,720 Speaker 1: his brother in the nineties and has has been closed. 309 00:18:46,760 --> 00:18:49,000 Speaker 1: But the fact that is even in there shows you 310 00:18:49,040 --> 00:18:52,080 Speaker 1: how far back this information goes and how exacting and 311 00:18:52,119 --> 00:18:54,560 Speaker 1: precise it is. Um, he did you know women on 312 00:18:54,600 --> 00:18:57,880 Speaker 1: the mevergement of his breakdown, and um, he's still active, 313 00:18:58,119 --> 00:19:01,600 Speaker 1: but he apparently took a took a leave of his 314 00:19:01,920 --> 00:19:04,760 Speaker 1: press tour when this information draws and it's you know, 315 00:19:04,840 --> 00:19:06,640 Speaker 1: the thing about it is too that we're gonna get 316 00:19:06,640 --> 00:19:10,360 Speaker 1: to um just a bit is it's not necessarily always 317 00:19:11,040 --> 00:19:14,000 Speaker 1: prosecutable or like like directly illegal. A lot of it 318 00:19:14,040 --> 00:19:16,320 Speaker 1: has to do with just it's kind of kind of 319 00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:18,160 Speaker 1: a crappy thing to do. It's kind of the way 320 00:19:18,280 --> 00:19:21,800 Speaker 1: the game is played. Yes, and a lot of you listening, 321 00:19:22,240 --> 00:19:24,200 Speaker 1: a lot of us already know that this is how 322 00:19:24,200 --> 00:19:27,040 Speaker 1: the game is played, right, but some of this is 323 00:19:27,080 --> 00:19:30,240 Speaker 1: coming as a real shock to others. Well. The it's 324 00:19:30,240 --> 00:19:36,439 Speaker 1: the difference between suspecting someone of a crime and seeing 325 00:19:36,480 --> 00:19:41,159 Speaker 1: it conducted because make no mistake, however, this is spun. 326 00:19:41,760 --> 00:19:44,680 Speaker 1: You should surprise no one that FIFA, for instance, is 327 00:19:44,800 --> 00:19:49,040 Speaker 1: just riddled with corruption. However, in this case, this stuff 328 00:19:49,040 --> 00:19:52,000 Speaker 1: goes further because in addition to the heads of states, 329 00:19:52,080 --> 00:19:56,359 Speaker 1: the celebrities, the aristocrats that are named, and there's a 330 00:19:56,359 --> 00:20:00,720 Speaker 1: heck of event diagram there, there's also uh their organ eyes, criminals, 331 00:20:00,880 --> 00:20:06,720 Speaker 1: mafiosa's bank robbers hiding uh millions of pounds of money. 332 00:20:07,040 --> 00:20:10,960 Speaker 1: Pound the denomination of the not not like a physical 333 00:20:11,000 --> 00:20:13,640 Speaker 1: pound of money. You know, we're we're also seeing one 334 00:20:13,640 --> 00:20:15,920 Speaker 1: of the tropes that we see in pop culture where 335 00:20:16,000 --> 00:20:20,480 Speaker 1: you'll some rich person will give money in their relatives name. 336 00:20:20,680 --> 00:20:25,600 Speaker 1: We're seeing tons of relatives of highly influential, ridiculously wealthy people. 337 00:20:25,960 --> 00:20:30,200 Speaker 1: And we'll get into the crimes that are the crimes 338 00:20:30,240 --> 00:20:33,160 Speaker 1: their associated what crimes may or may not exist. After 339 00:20:33,200 --> 00:20:51,040 Speaker 1: a brief word from our sponsor, here's where it gets crazy. 340 00:20:52,280 --> 00:20:55,960 Speaker 1: So what what crimes exist? I don't know why it 341 00:20:56,080 --> 00:20:58,720 Speaker 1: sounded a little woody allen there, but what what what 342 00:20:58,920 --> 00:21:03,320 Speaker 1: crimes actually occurred? Because we know what most Fonseka said, Yes, 343 00:21:03,359 --> 00:21:06,800 Speaker 1: we know Roman Fonseca, who is the co founder of 344 00:21:06,920 --> 00:21:10,080 Speaker 1: most Econseca. He came forward and said, the company hasn't 345 00:21:10,119 --> 00:21:13,880 Speaker 1: done any wrongdoing, just completely denied that they've done anything wrong. 346 00:21:13,920 --> 00:21:16,600 Speaker 1: They just set up these offshore financial accounts with these 347 00:21:16,640 --> 00:21:21,040 Speaker 1: anonymous shell companies for clients, and look, we're not involved 348 00:21:21,080 --> 00:21:23,679 Speaker 1: in how they use these things once we set them up. 349 00:21:23,680 --> 00:21:25,520 Speaker 1: But even went so far as to say the only 350 00:21:25,640 --> 00:21:28,320 Speaker 1: crime associated with the Panama papers at all was the 351 00:21:28,359 --> 00:21:32,520 Speaker 1: hack of acting of their servers itself. Yeah, and there's 352 00:21:32,560 --> 00:21:35,520 Speaker 1: an interesting idea there too, because if we're being if 353 00:21:35,520 --> 00:21:39,680 Speaker 1: we're objectively approaching that kind of statement, then it leads 354 00:21:39,680 --> 00:21:44,680 Speaker 1: to another question. Should a gun manufacturer, a bullet manufacturer 355 00:21:44,920 --> 00:21:48,840 Speaker 1: be held responsible for deaths that happened as a result 356 00:21:48,920 --> 00:21:54,920 Speaker 1: of crime. Should auto manufacturers be held responsible for deaths 357 00:21:55,080 --> 00:21:58,120 Speaker 1: or crimes that occur in the course of using something 358 00:21:58,200 --> 00:22:00,000 Speaker 1: they built. Obviously this is in the scope of our 359 00:22:00,280 --> 00:22:03,920 Speaker 1: show really or the episode, but I mean auto manufacturers 360 00:22:03,920 --> 00:22:08,000 Speaker 1: are held responsible when it's a malfunction or negligence on 361 00:22:08,119 --> 00:22:11,480 Speaker 1: their part um. The gun argument is a fascinating one, 362 00:22:11,560 --> 00:22:14,240 Speaker 1: but it tends to come up. It seems like no, 363 00:22:14,760 --> 00:22:16,679 Speaker 1: as long as they're doing everything in their power to 364 00:22:16,760 --> 00:22:19,399 Speaker 1: make their weapons traceable. And you know able to be 365 00:22:19,520 --> 00:22:22,719 Speaker 1: pinned to a crime. And I'm glad you brought that up, 366 00:22:22,760 --> 00:22:24,960 Speaker 1: because if we look at that car example as well, 367 00:22:25,400 --> 00:22:28,639 Speaker 1: You're absolutely right. If there is a defect inherent in 368 00:22:28,680 --> 00:22:31,919 Speaker 1: the product they create, then they and then and only 369 00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:35,480 Speaker 1: then are they liable. It's completely fine to build a 370 00:22:35,520 --> 00:22:39,040 Speaker 1: car that goes two hundred miles an hour, even though 371 00:22:39,080 --> 00:22:45,600 Speaker 1: that's illegal everywhere in like on every public road. Well, 372 00:22:45,600 --> 00:22:47,679 Speaker 1: they're probably a few words not You don't often though 373 00:22:47,800 --> 00:22:51,919 Speaker 1: here about death resulting from malfunctions of firearms. Usually the 374 00:22:51,960 --> 00:22:55,520 Speaker 1: death result from them working exactly as advertising. They're human error. 375 00:22:55,960 --> 00:22:58,919 Speaker 1: And that applies as well to the kinds of services 376 00:22:58,960 --> 00:23:03,280 Speaker 1: that this firm provided. Right, these services are working. This 377 00:23:03,320 --> 00:23:06,760 Speaker 1: is this was a huge firm and they were doing well. 378 00:23:06,840 --> 00:23:10,280 Speaker 1: Would assume what they were designed to do. You don't 379 00:23:10,280 --> 00:23:14,440 Speaker 1: get hundreds of thousands of clients by making dud. Yeah, 380 00:23:14,440 --> 00:23:18,280 Speaker 1: since the nine seventies and they were still functioning successfully. 381 00:23:18,760 --> 00:23:21,040 Speaker 1: And I do think I will say to Knowle's point 382 00:23:21,320 --> 00:23:27,040 Speaker 1: that I found it uh somewhere between delicious, disgusting and hilarious. 383 00:23:27,240 --> 00:23:30,600 Speaker 1: When people like the Prime Minister of the UK Cameron 384 00:23:30,840 --> 00:23:33,840 Speaker 1: come out and say, well, you know now, privacy is important, 385 00:23:34,000 --> 00:23:38,240 Speaker 1: especially considering the UK has the highest the highest density 386 00:23:38,320 --> 00:23:44,000 Speaker 1: of closed circuit televisions in the world per kilometer, and 387 00:23:44,000 --> 00:23:46,639 Speaker 1: and it's also the population the UK is one of 388 00:23:46,680 --> 00:23:51,760 Speaker 1: the most closely and continually surveiled on the planet. Dude, yeah, 389 00:23:52,040 --> 00:23:54,840 Speaker 1: I get that same feeling when you read this another 390 00:23:54,920 --> 00:23:57,960 Speaker 1: quote from the same du the co founder of and 391 00:23:58,000 --> 00:24:01,159 Speaker 1: he says quote when he's and this is referring to 392 00:24:01,320 --> 00:24:04,359 Speaker 1: the hack on this company. Quote, this is a crime, 393 00:24:04,600 --> 00:24:08,399 Speaker 1: a felony. Privacy is a fundamental human right that is 394 00:24:08,440 --> 00:24:11,920 Speaker 1: being eroded more and more in the modern world. Each 395 00:24:12,000 --> 00:24:14,760 Speaker 1: person has a right to privacy, whether they are king 396 00:24:15,240 --> 00:24:19,880 Speaker 1: or a baker clutching the pearls noble argument. Let's let's 397 00:24:19,880 --> 00:24:22,359 Speaker 1: go into this king or beggar argument, because one thing 398 00:24:22,400 --> 00:24:25,160 Speaker 1: that pops out to me as guys like David Cameron, 399 00:24:25,840 --> 00:24:27,760 Speaker 1: you know who are meant to be looking out for 400 00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:30,560 Speaker 1: the little guy in theory, you know your politician, you're 401 00:24:30,560 --> 00:24:33,680 Speaker 1: supposed to represent, you know your people, all of your people. 402 00:24:33,920 --> 00:24:38,040 Speaker 1: Then it turns out that you're cheating the system doesn't 403 00:24:38,080 --> 00:24:40,439 Speaker 1: come off so well, doesn't look very good. Guys, it 404 00:24:40,520 --> 00:24:46,320 Speaker 1: was only thirty thousand pounds come on of what of 405 00:24:46,480 --> 00:24:52,720 Speaker 1: goldusand pounds of jelly pounds Sterling Township. Thank you. So 406 00:24:53,119 --> 00:24:58,240 Speaker 1: there's there's another thing there now that we have hopefully 407 00:24:58,240 --> 00:25:02,760 Speaker 1: outlined for you what this stuff indicates and why it's 408 00:25:02,800 --> 00:25:06,480 Speaker 1: important and giving you a look at the level of 409 00:25:06,640 --> 00:25:11,760 Speaker 1: money we're talking about. Let's flip it and look at 410 00:25:11,760 --> 00:25:15,480 Speaker 1: the other side, because there are numerous people who believe 411 00:25:15,880 --> 00:25:18,960 Speaker 1: that there's more to the Panama papers than you have 412 00:25:19,040 --> 00:25:22,280 Speaker 1: been told or than journalists are releasing. And for instance, 413 00:25:22,560 --> 00:25:24,960 Speaker 1: it all goes back to the same question motive. Who 414 00:25:25,040 --> 00:25:28,600 Speaker 1: leaked the papers and why? So, like, what what do 415 00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:30,440 Speaker 1: we know about this John Doe guy? Not a whole 416 00:25:30,520 --> 00:25:33,359 Speaker 1: lot at this point, which makes sense considering how fresh 417 00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:36,639 Speaker 1: the story is and how bloody much information there is 418 00:25:36,680 --> 00:25:39,720 Speaker 1: in these in this league. So the anonymous whistleblower who 419 00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:41,879 Speaker 1: contacted the German newspaper we talked about at the top 420 00:25:41,920 --> 00:25:44,560 Speaker 1: of the show more than a year ago had some 421 00:25:44,920 --> 00:25:47,359 Speaker 1: pretty interesting claims. I'm going here are a few of them. 422 00:25:47,480 --> 00:25:50,760 Speaker 1: John Doe didn't want any financial conversation for exposing this info. 423 00:25:51,400 --> 00:25:54,960 Speaker 1: That's very telling. Um also didn't want to be known. 424 00:25:55,040 --> 00:25:58,680 Speaker 1: I wanted to remain anonymous. No direct contact with the investigators. 425 00:25:58,960 --> 00:26:01,080 Speaker 1: We can kind of see why that makes sense from 426 00:26:01,080 --> 00:26:04,000 Speaker 1: looking at Snowdon Wiki leaks all these other things. Did 427 00:26:04,040 --> 00:26:07,280 Speaker 1: not want to be exiled from the land. Um. The 428 00:26:07,359 --> 00:26:10,560 Speaker 1: source also said their life would be endangered by any exposure, 429 00:26:10,720 --> 00:26:16,040 Speaker 1: which definitely rings true. Um, considering the powerful people involved 430 00:26:16,160 --> 00:26:20,000 Speaker 1: in these kinds of deals, you're basically shining a light 431 00:26:20,240 --> 00:26:22,040 Speaker 1: in a place where you know, I mean, you know, 432 00:26:22,240 --> 00:26:25,240 Speaker 1: even like the most upstanding people on this list certainly 433 00:26:25,280 --> 00:26:27,080 Speaker 1: wouldn't want this information out there. But as we know, 434 00:26:27,440 --> 00:26:32,439 Speaker 1: talking about the whole idea of hiding criminal enterprises, you 435 00:26:32,480 --> 00:26:35,160 Speaker 1: could certainly put a target on your back by by 436 00:26:35,240 --> 00:26:38,760 Speaker 1: being out there, you know, in the in public. Um. Also, 437 00:26:39,280 --> 00:26:44,200 Speaker 1: this individual claimed this was a moral imperative, like most 438 00:26:44,200 --> 00:26:47,520 Speaker 1: sex clients were doing harm to the world and had 439 00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:52,480 Speaker 1: to be stopped. So here we are with an anonymous 440 00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:57,960 Speaker 1: source does not say how they acquired documents, where they 441 00:26:58,000 --> 00:27:01,240 Speaker 1: come from, and supplies his motive nation only that they 442 00:27:01,280 --> 00:27:05,320 Speaker 1: feel it is the right thing to do. Again, how noble, 443 00:27:06,200 --> 00:27:10,560 Speaker 1: how forthright, how Edwards snowed in of him. See, I 444 00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:13,320 Speaker 1: I'm so torn here because I I want to believe 445 00:27:13,359 --> 00:27:17,359 Speaker 1: that story that somebody just got it in themselves, that 446 00:27:17,440 --> 00:27:20,119 Speaker 1: this is the morally correct thing to do. These are 447 00:27:20,160 --> 00:27:22,280 Speaker 1: people that I believe are doing harm. So I'm going 448 00:27:22,320 --> 00:27:25,320 Speaker 1: to show the world, or at least in this case, 449 00:27:25,560 --> 00:27:28,119 Speaker 1: a group of journalists going to show them this and 450 00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:31,200 Speaker 1: hopefully they will report it the way it should be reported. Well, 451 00:27:31,200 --> 00:27:33,760 Speaker 1: that's definitely what they said, right, That's what they said, 452 00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:36,960 Speaker 1: and I want to believe that. But it's just it's 453 00:27:37,080 --> 00:27:40,160 Speaker 1: it's tough when you don't have somebody like in Edward 454 00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:42,680 Speaker 1: Snowden to put a picture in your head of who 455 00:27:42,680 --> 00:27:44,680 Speaker 1: this is, to actually come out and say these things. 456 00:27:45,080 --> 00:27:48,160 Speaker 1: You just have it written down or told to you exactly, 457 00:27:48,200 --> 00:27:53,359 Speaker 1: which gives rise to one of the more popular, or 458 00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:58,560 Speaker 1: for some more fascinating, intriguing conspiracy theories already surrounding the 459 00:27:58,600 --> 00:28:03,520 Speaker 1: Panama Papers. Just through a note for those following the 460 00:28:03,560 --> 00:28:07,320 Speaker 1: structure and asking who are the they in the Panama Papers, Well, 461 00:28:07,320 --> 00:28:09,679 Speaker 1: the definite they would be the hundreds of thousands of 462 00:28:09,720 --> 00:28:12,320 Speaker 1: clients who didn't want people to know that their money 463 00:28:12,480 --> 00:28:15,920 Speaker 1: was in the Virgin Islands. However, there's more than one 464 00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:20,520 Speaker 1: they in this show, ladies and gentlemen, because they, being 465 00:28:20,600 --> 00:28:23,679 Speaker 1: John Doe, don't want you to know who he or 466 00:28:23,720 --> 00:28:27,080 Speaker 1: she is or if it's one person and this leads 467 00:28:27,119 --> 00:28:31,360 Speaker 1: to another, this leads to a conspiracy theory hot off 468 00:28:31,400 --> 00:28:36,400 Speaker 1: the presses once the Panama Papers came out, allegations, uh 469 00:28:36,440 --> 00:28:39,640 Speaker 1: that John Doe was somehow related to the US or 470 00:28:39,680 --> 00:28:44,479 Speaker 1: another state level actor. Oh and British Version Islands, not 471 00:28:44,760 --> 00:28:50,360 Speaker 1: Virgin Islands. British Virgin Islands, slightly slightly different. Right, Okay, 472 00:28:50,400 --> 00:28:53,000 Speaker 1: But but so what's what's the story about possible state 473 00:28:53,120 --> 00:28:57,560 Speaker 1: level involvement. Well, we've heard just tons and tons of 474 00:28:57,880 --> 00:29:01,080 Speaker 1: theories coming out ideas of out who this may or 475 00:29:01,160 --> 00:29:05,480 Speaker 1: may not be, everything from uh intelligence in Britain to 476 00:29:05,920 --> 00:29:11,320 Speaker 1: intelligence in the US or I've even heard Australia maybe involved. 477 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:17,040 Speaker 1: So let's let's focus on one. A man named Bradley Berkenfeld. 478 00:29:17,280 --> 00:29:20,800 Speaker 1: So he's this American banker who was working at UBS, 479 00:29:20,800 --> 00:29:23,800 Speaker 1: a financial institution that Ben and I have spoken about before. 480 00:29:23,840 --> 00:29:26,920 Speaker 1: We made a video about that, talking about it was 481 00:29:27,040 --> 00:29:33,280 Speaker 1: the most money any bank had been charged. Yeah, the 482 00:29:33,400 --> 00:29:35,120 Speaker 1: fine that they had to pay back in the day. 483 00:29:35,360 --> 00:29:36,760 Speaker 1: And I think this is around the time when he 484 00:29:36,800 --> 00:29:39,040 Speaker 1: was blowing the whistle on them. This is in two 485 00:29:39,080 --> 00:29:41,880 Speaker 1: thousand nine. So he disclosed to the U. S. Government 486 00:29:41,880 --> 00:29:44,400 Speaker 1: this massive tax of Asian scheme that was going on 487 00:29:45,040 --> 00:29:50,880 Speaker 1: by Americans in Switzerland using these secret accounts. Now, he 488 00:29:50,960 --> 00:29:55,000 Speaker 1: was awarded a hundred and four million dollars by the 489 00:29:55,040 --> 00:29:57,600 Speaker 1: I R. S. Whistle Blower Office for his efforts in 490 00:29:57,640 --> 00:30:01,320 Speaker 1: doing this, also got to spend two years in a 491 00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:05,760 Speaker 1: federal prison here in the States. Why well, uh, because 492 00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:09,680 Speaker 1: I guess he was. He was implicated in it, and 493 00:30:09,720 --> 00:30:14,080 Speaker 1: he was also doing something that is frowned upon me. Okay, 494 00:30:14,240 --> 00:30:17,960 Speaker 1: And so what does he believe happen with the Panama papers. Well, 495 00:30:18,000 --> 00:30:22,240 Speaker 1: he points his finger towards the good old Central Intelligence Agency, 496 00:30:22,320 --> 00:30:25,800 Speaker 1: and he thinks they're behind it, because he says, these 497 00:30:25,880 --> 00:30:29,920 Speaker 1: leaks have impacted mostly countries with tense relationships with the 498 00:30:30,040 --> 00:30:33,680 Speaker 1: United States. Although at this point, listeners, some of some 499 00:30:33,800 --> 00:30:39,239 Speaker 1: of us will doubtlessly remember that according to some of 500 00:30:39,280 --> 00:30:43,160 Speaker 1: the latest analysis, we've been able to find intermediaries of 501 00:30:43,200 --> 00:30:46,920 Speaker 1: the CIA did work with this company, but not We 502 00:30:46,960 --> 00:30:49,840 Speaker 1: don't have any hard proof of CIA involved, true, no 503 00:30:49,920 --> 00:30:52,880 Speaker 1: hard proof, But we also know that the CIA itself 504 00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:56,880 Speaker 1: is pretty fond of using front companies, right ben spy 505 00:30:57,040 --> 00:31:00,720 Speaker 1: spy agencies in general, So I s I m odd 506 00:31:00,840 --> 00:31:05,520 Speaker 1: all of my five and my six so that I mean, yeah, 507 00:31:05,920 --> 00:31:08,400 Speaker 1: but that that in itself is the real is one 508 00:31:08,440 --> 00:31:10,600 Speaker 1: of the big reasons that people look at this and 509 00:31:10,720 --> 00:31:13,600 Speaker 1: kind of their eye twitches because they are aware of 510 00:31:13,440 --> 00:31:18,640 Speaker 1: these facts. Um so. Mr Birkenfeld also has said that 511 00:31:18,680 --> 00:31:23,239 Speaker 1: he thinks David Cameron was some unfortunate collateral damage in 512 00:31:23,280 --> 00:31:28,040 Speaker 1: this league. And he also stated that, ohh this the 513 00:31:28,080 --> 00:31:32,160 Speaker 1: company Mossac Fonseca was just one tiny part in a 514 00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:35,760 Speaker 1: vast offshore maze that's used by bankers and lawyers to 515 00:31:35,880 --> 00:31:40,680 Speaker 1: hide money from taxip I have no doubt in my 516 00:31:40,720 --> 00:31:44,280 Speaker 1: mind that that's the case. Sure, yeah, this brings us 517 00:31:44,320 --> 00:31:49,480 Speaker 1: to some some other things, some consequences, some conclusions, some 518 00:31:50,200 --> 00:31:53,520 Speaker 1: current developments, almost a colorful development. So you know, I 519 00:31:53,560 --> 00:31:56,560 Speaker 1: guess that would work. No earlier you had mentioned to 520 00:31:56,640 --> 00:31:59,200 Speaker 1: us at the top of the show that just as 521 00:31:59,280 --> 00:32:03,320 Speaker 1: we were going in, uh, some s was starting to 522 00:32:03,400 --> 00:32:06,160 Speaker 1: hit the f which I know that just sounds weird. 523 00:32:06,200 --> 00:32:10,960 Speaker 1: Let's say something different. The badgers were hitting the bag. Know, 524 00:32:11,560 --> 00:32:14,320 Speaker 1: the badgers were biting the bat. The badgers were biting 525 00:32:14,320 --> 00:32:17,120 Speaker 1: the bat. The badgers began to bite the bat as 526 00:32:17,120 --> 00:32:21,040 Speaker 1: we were walking in. What happened? What's this new news story. Yeah, 527 00:32:21,160 --> 00:32:25,400 Speaker 1: so the headquarters of Mussak Fonseca were actually rated by 528 00:32:25,600 --> 00:32:30,160 Speaker 1: the Panamanian police yesterday April the twelve, yesterday when we're 529 00:32:30,160 --> 00:32:33,920 Speaker 1: recording this, and you know, you know about this, right, oh, yeah, 530 00:32:34,040 --> 00:32:37,800 Speaker 1: a little bit. They're they're searching for evidence of any 531 00:32:37,880 --> 00:32:42,040 Speaker 1: kind of money laundering and documents anything about the financing 532 00:32:42,080 --> 00:32:44,880 Speaker 1: of terrorism, which we have not mentioned, but it seems 533 00:32:44,920 --> 00:32:47,880 Speaker 1: like a really big concern in the right. Yeah, this 534 00:32:48,000 --> 00:32:51,480 Speaker 1: is a huge concern in this that bin laden money. Yeah, 535 00:32:51,560 --> 00:32:56,160 Speaker 1: that house of sowd money exactly. And and the police 536 00:32:56,160 --> 00:32:58,760 Speaker 1: officers that are doing this are part of an organized 537 00:32:58,800 --> 00:33:02,920 Speaker 1: crime unit, so they they know about all this money laundry. 538 00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:05,160 Speaker 1: I guess that's part of their specialty. They're also looking 539 00:33:05,200 --> 00:33:08,400 Speaker 1: at several subsidiaries of the firm at a even a 540 00:33:08,400 --> 00:33:12,920 Speaker 1: computer support center which may hold documents there, right, files 541 00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:17,120 Speaker 1: of different illegal activities that did not somehow get connected 542 00:33:17,240 --> 00:33:21,200 Speaker 1: or collected in that initial suite. And the big buzz 543 00:33:21,240 --> 00:33:25,800 Speaker 1: around our conspiracy at least is that are they going 544 00:33:25,840 --> 00:33:28,680 Speaker 1: to destroy documents when they find them because they're corrupt 545 00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:32,360 Speaker 1: in any way or working together with you know, the 546 00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:36,000 Speaker 1: heads of state that that's the subreddit our conspiracy not 547 00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:41,000 Speaker 1: Oh are you subredit? Yeah, that's fascinating because it does 548 00:33:41,160 --> 00:33:46,440 Speaker 1: lead us to believe multiple new stories are going to 549 00:33:46,440 --> 00:33:51,160 Speaker 1: be forthcoming within the next few days, weeks, who knows 550 00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:54,920 Speaker 1: how long. Multiple journalists have stated that more stories are 551 00:33:54,960 --> 00:33:58,320 Speaker 1: on the way, and again, this is just so much 552 00:33:58,480 --> 00:34:02,000 Speaker 1: stuff people are still analyzing it. So I want to 553 00:34:02,040 --> 00:34:09,399 Speaker 1: ask you, guys, what are the consequences if any of this. Well, 554 00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:12,759 Speaker 1: one thing is that countries are being accused of censoring 555 00:34:12,840 --> 00:34:16,520 Speaker 1: the information that's coming out about this um too. I mean, 556 00:34:16,560 --> 00:34:17,920 Speaker 1: for a lot of reasons, but one of the main 557 00:34:17,960 --> 00:34:21,200 Speaker 1: ones just to prevent citizens inside their country from knowing 558 00:34:21,200 --> 00:34:24,239 Speaker 1: about it. Because the less the public knows about the 559 00:34:24,280 --> 00:34:28,600 Speaker 1: heads of their state perhaps or even their celebrities, the 560 00:34:28,680 --> 00:34:31,759 Speaker 1: less they know about them doing these nefarious things, allegedly 561 00:34:31,800 --> 00:34:35,560 Speaker 1: nefarious things, the better. And thankfully, we live in the 562 00:34:35,600 --> 00:34:38,320 Speaker 1: age of you know, information being the tips of our fingers, 563 00:34:38,320 --> 00:34:41,120 Speaker 1: so it's a lot more difficult for governments to keep 564 00:34:41,120 --> 00:34:43,480 Speaker 1: information like this from people that you know, know where 565 00:34:43,520 --> 00:34:47,640 Speaker 1: to look, right, you know, that's a stupe because we've 566 00:34:47,640 --> 00:34:50,360 Speaker 1: said this before on this show, I believe, but back 567 00:34:50,400 --> 00:34:53,400 Speaker 1: in let's see the forties or the thirties or fifties, 568 00:34:53,560 --> 00:34:56,680 Speaker 1: and the way you would blackout an entire population something, 569 00:34:56,880 --> 00:35:00,840 Speaker 1: the way you would hide something is just remove it. 570 00:35:00,960 --> 00:35:03,200 Speaker 1: So if you had a needle you didn't want people 571 00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:05,920 Speaker 1: to see, you would just take the needle. But now 572 00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:09,320 Speaker 1: the methods have changed and the best way to hide 573 00:35:09,360 --> 00:35:11,719 Speaker 1: the needle is to surround it with a bunch of 574 00:35:11,719 --> 00:35:14,279 Speaker 1: other needles. I was doing a needle in a haystack thing, 575 00:35:14,360 --> 00:35:17,319 Speaker 1: but I got derailed somewhere along the way. And now 576 00:35:17,360 --> 00:35:23,719 Speaker 1: I'm just describing some sort of heroin fans. You're totally right, man. 577 00:35:23,760 --> 00:35:26,319 Speaker 1: It's a needle and a needle stack. Now that's that's 578 00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:29,000 Speaker 1: a needle and a needle stack. You save that one. Well, 579 00:35:29,040 --> 00:35:33,240 Speaker 1: here's an example of that, because if you recall, uh, recently, 580 00:35:33,320 --> 00:35:37,799 Speaker 1: before this news hit the press and became the you know, 581 00:35:37,960 --> 00:35:41,200 Speaker 1: the thing that everyone was focusing on, there was another scandal, 582 00:35:41,239 --> 00:35:45,279 Speaker 1: another leak and investigation into a company known as Una 583 00:35:45,360 --> 00:35:48,120 Speaker 1: Oil right the I believe they were based in Monaco 584 00:35:48,440 --> 00:35:51,799 Speaker 1: and they I believe it was Monico. If I am 585 00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:54,680 Speaker 1: wrong on that, please right in and let me get 586 00:35:54,680 --> 00:36:00,680 Speaker 1: a correction on air. What we found was that these 587 00:36:00,840 --> 00:36:05,560 Speaker 1: this organization was brokering corrupt deals for a lot of 588 00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:11,879 Speaker 1: large corporate large companies rather and conglomerates to get favorable 589 00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:15,800 Speaker 1: business arrangements in a lot of developing countries and practice 590 00:36:15,840 --> 00:36:20,160 Speaker 1: resource extraction. But now no one's really talking about that. 591 00:36:20,280 --> 00:36:23,560 Speaker 1: So I don't know if the timing works out. Since 592 00:36:23,920 --> 00:36:26,160 Speaker 1: if this was indeed more than a year in the making, 593 00:36:26,200 --> 00:36:28,920 Speaker 1: it sounds like the journalists are telling the truth. Then 594 00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:32,120 Speaker 1: maybe it's just a coincidence that, you know, oil popped 595 00:36:32,160 --> 00:36:36,120 Speaker 1: up and disappeared. Maybe it is. I don't know, Ben. 596 00:36:36,200 --> 00:36:38,680 Speaker 1: I think you're right that this the un oil story 597 00:36:38,800 --> 00:36:40,520 Speaker 1: was huge, and we but we were talking about it 598 00:36:40,560 --> 00:36:43,480 Speaker 1: a lot just around the office, and I feel like, 599 00:36:44,320 --> 00:36:46,319 Speaker 1: I think maybe we need to talk about it in 600 00:36:46,360 --> 00:36:49,640 Speaker 1: more detail sometime in the future, just so it doesn't 601 00:36:49,680 --> 00:36:53,120 Speaker 1: go away, right, And we want to hear from you. 602 00:36:53,160 --> 00:36:57,799 Speaker 1: What are your opinions on the Panama Papers. What part 603 00:36:57,800 --> 00:37:01,120 Speaker 1: of the world do you do you call home? What 604 00:37:01,120 --> 00:37:03,600 Speaker 1: what do people your neck of the Global woods think 605 00:37:03,680 --> 00:37:07,480 Speaker 1: about the Panama Papers? You can find us on Facebook 606 00:37:07,520 --> 00:37:09,239 Speaker 1: and Twitter. We'd love to hear from you there. We 607 00:37:09,320 --> 00:37:14,759 Speaker 1: are conspiracy stuff at both of those And speaking of 608 00:37:15,200 --> 00:37:19,879 Speaker 1: hearing from you, I think it's time for shut at Conners. 609 00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:25,800 Speaker 1: The first shout out goes to Hannah f who wrote 610 00:37:25,840 --> 00:37:30,000 Speaker 1: to us about UFO sightings in Canada and a younger listener. Yes, 611 00:37:30,120 --> 00:37:33,160 Speaker 1: I I remember seeing thirteen and then like that's when 612 00:37:33,160 --> 00:37:37,759 Speaker 1: she started listening when she was thirteen and as eighteen. Now, yeah, 613 00:37:37,800 --> 00:37:41,160 Speaker 1: thanks so much for Riyan Hanaff And we're checking the 614 00:37:41,320 --> 00:37:45,280 Speaker 1: Canadian UFO report. Pretty I don't know, we're going pretty 615 00:37:45,320 --> 00:37:48,759 Speaker 1: hard on the pan. It's so much fun. I like it. Uh. 616 00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:52,799 Speaker 1: And Gail Gerard writes into us and says, uh, she 617 00:37:52,960 --> 00:37:55,560 Speaker 1: listens to us while waiting in the caroline to pick 618 00:37:55,680 --> 00:37:58,840 Speaker 1: up her son from school. Well, Gail, we hope that 619 00:37:58,920 --> 00:38:02,280 Speaker 1: we're making you one of the cool moms. Oh, Gail, 620 00:38:02,360 --> 00:38:05,040 Speaker 1: come on, you're absolutely cool. Mom. Do you roll your 621 00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:11,440 Speaker 1: windows down when you're listening so everybody else. Finally, we 622 00:38:11,480 --> 00:38:14,440 Speaker 1: have one from Taylor and who sent us several personal 623 00:38:14,480 --> 00:38:19,239 Speaker 1: stories about unusual and strange experiences in national parks, as 624 00:38:19,280 --> 00:38:23,279 Speaker 1: well as another explanation for the disappearances UM, which was 625 00:38:23,560 --> 00:38:27,480 Speaker 1: a secret space program that includes moon bases created in 626 00:38:27,520 --> 00:38:29,719 Speaker 1: the nineteen sixties. I'm not sure about that one, but 627 00:38:29,760 --> 00:38:35,320 Speaker 1: that's it's pretty great. He he describes. It's not his theory. Uh, 628 00:38:35,360 --> 00:38:37,480 Speaker 1: I don't know if it's I can't remember if he 629 00:38:37,520 --> 00:38:39,879 Speaker 1: said it was someone in his family or a friend. 630 00:38:39,960 --> 00:38:43,080 Speaker 1: But they described in the nineteen sixties we've been we've 631 00:38:43,080 --> 00:38:45,160 Speaker 1: had people on the moon, and we need people to 632 00:38:45,200 --> 00:38:49,200 Speaker 1: work these sites on the moon. So so they've been 633 00:38:49,200 --> 00:38:53,960 Speaker 1: abducting people just you know, willy nilly out in national parks. 634 00:38:54,000 --> 00:38:56,520 Speaker 1: To be a script, we need adoption. This is a 635 00:38:56,560 --> 00:39:00,000 Speaker 1: good idea. All right, Well, uh, Taylor in you are 636 00:38:59,840 --> 00:39:04,120 Speaker 1: attached officially as producer and co writer on that project. 637 00:39:04,160 --> 00:39:06,000 Speaker 1: That's the least we can do, right, And one last 638 00:39:06,000 --> 00:39:08,040 Speaker 1: thing here before we take off. If any of you 639 00:39:08,080 --> 00:39:12,000 Speaker 1: are out there going hey guys, Matt Noel, then why 640 00:39:12,080 --> 00:39:15,760 Speaker 1: didn't you talk about the Americans and why they aren't 641 00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:20,680 Speaker 1: talked about in these papers? Well guess what there are 642 00:39:20,719 --> 00:39:22,799 Speaker 1: some and what what I need you to do is 643 00:39:22,800 --> 00:39:25,640 Speaker 1: head over to zero heads dot com because they're they're 644 00:39:25,640 --> 00:39:28,960 Speaker 1: pretty good about giving links out to other places as well. 645 00:39:29,000 --> 00:39:30,919 Speaker 1: It's just a really good place to start. They name 646 00:39:31,000 --> 00:39:35,160 Speaker 1: names in there that are talked about UM, specifically Americans, 647 00:39:36,040 --> 00:39:38,640 Speaker 1: parts of like the New York Global Group in or 648 00:39:38,680 --> 00:39:42,719 Speaker 1: in their UM people in Bellevue, Washington, all kinds of 649 00:39:42,719 --> 00:39:45,399 Speaker 1: people are in there. Check it out and you'll find 650 00:39:45,400 --> 00:39:48,680 Speaker 1: what you're looking for. That is an excellent point, met, 651 00:39:48,880 --> 00:39:52,279 Speaker 1: and that is where we are going to end this 652 00:39:52,400 --> 00:39:55,920 Speaker 1: show today for now, at least our part of it, 653 00:39:55,960 --> 00:39:59,520 Speaker 1: because now it's your part, folks listening. We want to 654 00:39:59,560 --> 00:40:04,480 Speaker 1: hear again where you're from, what people are saying about this. 655 00:40:04,640 --> 00:40:07,399 Speaker 1: Where you're at, Do people care? Do people not care? 656 00:40:07,920 --> 00:40:12,640 Speaker 1: Our websites blocked in in your country? If so, you know, 657 00:40:13,040 --> 00:40:15,080 Speaker 1: it occurs to me the podcast maybe one of the 658 00:40:15,120 --> 00:40:17,880 Speaker 1: few ways people are hearing about this, which is baffling 659 00:40:17,960 --> 00:40:20,520 Speaker 1: to think about, isn't it. Yeah, it is. So your 660 00:40:20,600 --> 00:40:23,560 Speaker 1: job keep tabs on this as you go forward because 661 00:40:23,560 --> 00:40:26,120 Speaker 1: they're gonna be other big stories that pop in the front, 662 00:40:26,120 --> 00:40:28,040 Speaker 1: and know everyone will talk about those and this will 663 00:40:28,080 --> 00:40:31,040 Speaker 1: just go by the wayside. Keep tabs on it, you know, 664 00:40:31,480 --> 00:40:34,160 Speaker 1: maybe write a little note to yourself to look at 665 00:40:34,200 --> 00:40:36,600 Speaker 1: it in two months from now, just to see where 666 00:40:36,600 --> 00:40:39,240 Speaker 1: we're at, what other revelations have come out, And feel 667 00:40:39,280 --> 00:40:43,080 Speaker 1: free to forward that note to us at conspiracy at 668 00:40:43,080 --> 00:41:09,280 Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com.