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Speaker 1: Mission Implausible is now something you can watch. Just go

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Speaker 1: to YouTube and search Mission Implausible podcasts, or click on

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Speaker 1: the link to our channel. In our show notes, I'm

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Speaker 1: John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea.

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Speaker 2: We have over sixty years of experience as clandestine officers

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Speaker 2: in the CIA, serving in high risk areas all around

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Speaker 2: the world, and part.

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Speaker 3: Of our job was creating conspiracies to deceive our adversaries.

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Speaker 2: Now we're going to use that experience to investigate the

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Speaker 2: conspiracy theories everyone's talking about, as well as some you

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Speaker 2: may not have heard.

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Speaker 3: Could they be true or are we being manipulated?

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Speaker 2: We'll find out now on Mission Implausible. Our guest today

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Speaker 2: is Christopher Steele. Christopher is a former British intelligence officer

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Speaker 2: and longtime Russia specialist who founded the private intelligence firm

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Speaker 2: Orbist Business Intelligence. He's the author of Unredacted Russia, Trump

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Speaker 2: and the Fight for Democracy and in twenty sixteen, Christopher

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Speaker 2: produced a series of intelligence memos that were leaked and

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Speaker 2: widely called the Steel Dussier, containing allegations about Russia's interference

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Speaker 2: in the US election and links between Trump World and

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Speaker 2: the Kremlin. When BuzzFeed published the memmals in early twenty seventeen,

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Speaker 2: without Steal's permission, Dosier became a cultural and political accelerant,

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Speaker 2: treated by some of Proof and others as garbage. Field

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Speaker 2: then found himself in a prolonged storm of political attacks,

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Speaker 2: referrals and investigations and lawsuits, including Trump's failed UK suit

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Speaker 2: against Orbis. It ended with a court ordering Trump to

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Speaker 2: pay substantial legal fees. So welcome Christopher. Great to have

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Speaker 2: you with us.

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Speaker 4: Thank you for having me on.

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Speaker 2: So Trump sued you. Has he paid?

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Speaker 4: I didn't expect that as the first question. I'm not

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Speaker 4: as sure there's a conspiracy surroundings. It's not rocket science.

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Speaker 4: But he seems to think that the fact that his

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Speaker 4: name is on the cost order from the High Court

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Speaker 4: here in London doesn't mean that he has to pay,

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Speaker 4: that his incompetent lawyers from the initial part of the

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Speaker 4: case should pay. So that is essentially what's holding out

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Speaker 4: at the moment. But we are still an active both

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Speaker 4: enforcement and negotiation on this. But it's a real eye open,

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Speaker 4: I think into the way Trump works and sort of

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Speaker 4: people employees. It's appalling. These people are dreadful, dishonest people.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and that I didn't spec to go on that

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Speaker 3: rabbit hole either. But no, that's interesting because your dossier

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Speaker 3: and I don't like that word either. We can maybe

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Speaker 3: touch on that in a bit what it actually did produce.

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Speaker 3: But they claim it's been discredited and it was wrong.

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Speaker 3: And yet when Trump sued you, he couldn't sue you

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Speaker 3: for libel? Is that right? Because that would be too broad.

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Speaker 3: He had to pick one or two fix and she

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Speaker 3: tried to sue you for like a data breach of

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Speaker 3: like one or two sentences? Could you take it? Why

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Speaker 3: he was afraid to actually sue you because afraid that

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Speaker 3: the truth would come out?

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Speaker 4: Chris, Well, there are a whole different set of arguments that.

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Speaker 4: I mean, one thing is for sure is that we

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Speaker 4: didn't publish the dossier, right so in libel law, certainly

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Speaker 4: in England, if you and we had proved this in

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Speaker 4: a previous case actually in the High Court twenty twenty,

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Speaker 4: which we want against a Russian oligarch called Kuberov, that

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Speaker 4: we hadn't published it. And therefore I think any kind

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Speaker 4: of attempt at a libel suit here would have been

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Speaker 4: doomed to failure, not least because that judgment had actually

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Speaker 4: been set. And of course you know English law is

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Speaker 4: case law, so that was the case law on it.

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Speaker 4: So in a sense, one of the arguments that you

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Speaker 4: know he never got to test in, of course, will

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Speaker 4: be one of his defenses. But the reality is that

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Speaker 4: when you're in a court situation, a legal situation like that,

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Speaker 4: you win as quickly and as cheaply as he possibly can.

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Speaker 4: And that's what we've done in each of these cases.

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Speaker 4: We managed to strike out the data protection case, not

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Speaker 4: least because it was brought under the wrong law, which

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Speaker 4: is fairly extraordinary and very fortunate for us.

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Speaker 2: So let me go first talk about Russia a little bit. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: what pulled you into diplomatic intelligence work with a focus

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Speaker 2: on Russia? And what are some of the key things

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Speaker 2: you learned in your time focusing on the Kremlin?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean I what drew me into it, I

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Speaker 4: think was that it was obviously a fascinating place politically,

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Speaker 4: particularly when I was coming through in the mid to

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Speaker 4: late eighties from university and afterwards, but also in our

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Speaker 4: particular profession, John has probably shared this view that it

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Speaker 4: was the as I say, they outed a gam it

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Speaker 4: was the cream of the cream. It was that it was,

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Speaker 4: as we say in Europe, the Champions League of Espionage

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Speaker 4: rather than the Premier League of.

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Speaker 2: The Yankee Stadium of Espionage.

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Speaker 4: So yeah, I guess there's okay, well we'll go on

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Speaker 4: with that. But yeah, so it was the most challenging

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Speaker 4: environment to work in. It was an exciting diplomatic environment

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Speaker 4: to work in at times. Of course it isn't now

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Speaker 4: it's absolutely moribund, but all ends in as a as

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Speaker 4: a sort of young officer who was ambitious and wanted

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Speaker 4: to do exciting things, it was the perfect place to

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Speaker 4: go and I got into it. And now often, as

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Speaker 4: you know, when you have a specialty like that, you

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Speaker 4: don't then escape very easily. And here I am nearly

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Speaker 4: forty years later.

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Speaker 3: So, Chris, your your name is synonymous with the word dossier,

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Speaker 3: and I know you don't like that term, and I don't,

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Speaker 3: and I don't think any good intelligence office or does.

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Speaker 3: And I think the outside world doesn't understand really what

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Speaker 3: intelligence is. And so if maybe if you could take

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Speaker 3: us through what actually it is. It's a group of unverified,

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Speaker 3: raw intelligence reports. And in our world, and especially in

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Speaker 3: a closed society like Russia, you do the best with

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Speaker 3: what you got. And it's not law enforcement. It's not.

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Speaker 3: You're coming up with ninety nine percent like certainty of this.

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Speaker 3: You're coming up with the best information that you try

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Speaker 3: to verify, and it doesn't have to be one hundred percent.

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Speaker 3: Seventy percent is pretty friggin good for Russia. So maybe

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Speaker 3: if you could take us to what exactly that you

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Speaker 3: came up with, and then we could talk about whether

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Speaker 3: it's been verified or unverified or discredit which I don't

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Speaker 3: think it has been. Please go ahead.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, So in general, with intelligence, you're not looking to

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Speaker 4: bring people into court and to charge them with almost

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Speaker 4: ninety nine percent certainty. It's not the way it works.

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Speaker 4: And for all sorts of reasons that's the case, including

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Speaker 4: souls protect in particular, which is paramount. I mean, I

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Speaker 4: remember going back, you know, if you go back into

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Speaker 4: the nineteen eighties, I think there was a diplomat you

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Speaker 4: had in Vienna, I think called Felix Bloc who was

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Speaker 4: pretty well well used, photographed, I believe taking a suitcase

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Speaker 4: offer or a briefcase offer Russian intelligence officer. That still

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Speaker 4: wasn't enough to bring him to court and to try

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Speaker 4: him in front of a jury. So I think intelligence

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Speaker 4: is not the same as evidence. It's not the same

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Speaker 4: as legal certainty. What it does is it gives you

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Speaker 4: really the key judgments that it's making a right, the

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Speaker 4: key assertions it's making a right, then it's worthwhile. And

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Speaker 4: I think that's what we have in this case where

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Speaker 4: we did have multiple sources. It's important to say that

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Speaker 4: multiple sources were involved in this work, that those sources

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Speaker 4: had been run for years and had proved themselves to

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Speaker 4: be reliable and good and straight, if you like, over

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Speaker 4: a whole range of different issues and projects that we

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Speaker 4: had run as a company. So we had good reason

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Speaker 4: to have confidence in what we didn't do really because

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Speaker 4: it was a live situation. We were providing a live

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Speaker 4: feed if you like, into the client structure, which was

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Speaker 4: the Hillary for America campaign, mediated sorry by Fusion. GPS

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Speaker 4: was effectively speaking notes the raw intelligence on an almost

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Speaker 4: daily basis as we went through the two months of

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Speaker 4: the campaign. So it was quite an unusual work mode

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Speaker 4: modus operandi. But I still would maintain that the main

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Speaker 4: thrust of the reporting was correct. And we can talk

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Speaker 4: about the reporting itself and our sources to some extent,

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Speaker 4: but we can also talk about extraneous evidence that we

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Speaker 4: have that would support the main assertions that we had,

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Speaker 4: which were as fourfold, that there was a major interference

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Speaker 4: campaign being launched in the American elections from Russia, that

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Speaker 4: it was sanctioned from the top, that it involved favoring

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Speaker 4: Donald Trump and damaging Hillary Clinton and the elements of

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Speaker 4: the Trump campaign, and possible Trump himself involved in what

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Speaker 4: has been termed collusion or cooperation with the Russians, with

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Speaker 4: Russian agents in order to further those aims. So that

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Speaker 4: is essentially what it was arguing. And I personally think

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Speaker 4: that those have held up pretty well over time.

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Speaker 3: They have. Yeah, it's certainly the Muller report has underlined that,

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Speaker 3: and that, you know, just to add to that, that

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Speaker 3: Russia sought to cultivate people in Trump's orbit, and that's

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Speaker 3: been you know, Maniford and Trump Junior and all those

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Speaker 3: That's clearly been the case.

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Speaker 2: So let's we want to talk about that a little bit.

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Speaker 2: What I'm interested in is a piece of what you

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Speaker 2: did when that reporting came out, which of course you

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Speaker 2: didn't publicize, but was leaked and publicized prior to that.

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Speaker 2: One of the things you did do is you alerted

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Speaker 2: US authorities. You went to the FBI, and whether or

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Speaker 2: not people believe the reporting. I find it important that

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Speaker 2: you went to the FBI when nobody in the Trump

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Speaker 2: orbit went to the FBI to report inappropriate context. Why

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Speaker 2: would anybody running for a primary election in Iowa need

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Speaker 2: have hundreds of Russians involved in your campaign? So to me,

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Speaker 2: a British businessman who was showing more responsibility in frankly

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Speaker 2: patriotism than anyone in the Trump orbit did. So, what

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Speaker 2: is it that was most troubling at that time that

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Speaker 2: made you go to the FBI.

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Speaker 4: Well, it's important to realize that we were already working

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Speaker 4: for the FBI as a contractor, I would argue, not

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Speaker 4: as a cheers as they seemed to claiming their paperwork,

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Speaker 4: and they used to come around the office and talk

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Speaker 4: to other members of my staff, my fellow director Chris

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Speaker 4: Burrows and so on. Doesn't really strike you as being

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Speaker 4: what they would call an agent relationship. But essentially what

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Speaker 4: alarmed us, obviously was the fact that we had clear evidence,

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Speaker 4: which we weren't expecting to find when we set off

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Speaker 4: on this path, that a candidate to become president of

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Speaker 4: the US could well have been compromised by the Russian

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Speaker 4: Russians over many years and in serious ways, and that

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Speaker 4: our own national security here because, as we were saying earlier,

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Speaker 4: how hardwired we all are in to get out of

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Speaker 4: work I'd done with the American intelligence couit to Marshall,

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Speaker 4: was very extensive. Would be put at jeopardy if it

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Speaker 4: were the case that a candidate was subject to leverage

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Speaker 4: from Moscow and got into offers. So, yes, I was

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Speaker 4: a patriot, but I was primarily a British patriot. But

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Speaker 4: I was also loyal to the people in the FBI

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Speaker 4: with whom we were working, and I felt that that

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Speaker 4: was absolutely what we should do. And of course the

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Speaker 4: conspiracy THEORI is saying, you know, this was all an

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Speaker 4: attempt by Hillary Clinton to use me and my professional

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Speaker 4: reputation to feed false information into the FBI to unravel

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Speaker 4: the undermine the Trump campaign. No such thing. I mean,

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Speaker 4: I was the one that proposed that we went to

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Speaker 4: the FBI. Actually, the Hillary campaign and Fusion GPS were

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Speaker 4: not very enthusiastic about it. They took quite a lot

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Speaker 4: of persuading until I put my foot down and said, no,

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Speaker 4: we're working for these people. There are our allies. This

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Speaker 4: is what I'm going to do, whether you like it

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Speaker 4: or not. And they accepted that. So that immediately debunks

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Speaker 4: one of the main conspiracy theories that floats around this,

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Speaker 4: and of course led to this ludicrous reco case in Florida,

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Speaker 4: which you're aware of, with multiple defendants, which we should

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Speaker 4: talk about later.

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Speaker 3: We talk on the show a lot about conspiracy theories,

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Speaker 3: but we also talk about conspiracies. And it seems pretty

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Speaker 3: clear to me, as an ex intelligence officer, that there

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Speaker 3: was a conspiracy against you in the media and in

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Speaker 3: the political circles to call the to call your reporting,

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Speaker 3: or say, if we use that word discredited now the

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Speaker 3: fact that some or a hoax, some of it is uncorroboratible,

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Speaker 3: or you know, we're not certain yet. But there's a

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Speaker 3: difference between saying we haven't proved it comma yet, but

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Speaker 3: it's certainly plausible, to saying it's discredited and yeah, so

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Speaker 3: that's that is that is completely untrue. And I wonder

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Speaker 3: if you get a sense of, like in Britain too,

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Speaker 3: in the media, whether this is people immediately say the

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Speaker 3: discredited Steel report and it isn't.

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Speaker 4: Now there's a big difference in my sort of reputation

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Speaker 4: in the UK than there is in America. I think

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Speaker 4: in America, it's what we would call a marmite character.

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Speaker 4: You either love me or you hate me. I think

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Speaker 4: over here there's a wide acceptance both within politics and

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Speaker 4: within the media, right across the spectrum. I have to say,

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Speaker 4: with the possible exception of Reform UK, which is an

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Speaker 4: insurgent right wing party, I'm a serious person and I've

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Speaker 4: done serious work and what I say should be taken seriously.

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Speaker 4: I'm not going to go into the details of that,

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Speaker 4: but I have the ear and the attention pretty much

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Speaker 4: everybody in the UK that matters right to the very top.

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Speaker 4: So I think there is a difference, and I think

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Speaker 4: obviously it's about part of a politics in America. And now ironically,

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Speaker 4: what we were doing was, you know, we were, if

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Speaker 4: you like, spying on Russia. But we'd been doing that

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Speaker 4: in terms of what they'd been interfering with in European

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Speaker 4: elections before that, and the fact that Fusial gps knew

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Speaker 4: that we'd done the work that we called Project Charnamagne

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Speaker 4: in the previous six months led to us being employed

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Speaker 4: to do this project. But that's what we were doing.

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Speaker 4: We are absolutely not a party, political partisan organization. We're

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Speaker 4: a professional intelligence company, And if we'd gone around making

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Speaker 4: stuff up and telling clients what they wanted to hear

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Speaker 4: over the years, we would not have been successful in

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Speaker 4: our business. And we were extremely successful in our business

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Speaker 4: and still are. Despite all the attacks that have been

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Speaker 4: launched at US, and even despite a lot of the

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Speaker 4: conspiracy theories that get banned around in the US, and

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Speaker 4: we can talk about John Durham and other things, we

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Speaker 4: still have quite a lot of American clients and associates who, yes,

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Speaker 4: they're worried about being exposed because of the backclash from Trump,

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Speaker 4: but are determined to carry on working with US.

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Speaker 2: I want it, certainly come back to this and how

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Speaker 2: it's affected you personally, and talk a little bit more

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Speaker 2: about the Russia stuff. But let's go back to a

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Speaker 2: little bit about your you know, we're talking so much

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Speaker 2: your post intelligence career. Let's talk a little bit about

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Speaker 2: when you were inside. We obviously know from reporting that

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Speaker 2: you worked in Russia and have an expertise on Russia,

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Speaker 2: but like intelligence officers like us, you work in different

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Speaker 2: places and do different things. And I think, if I

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Speaker 2: remember correctly, at one point you were associated or at

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Speaker 2: least had some knowledge about what was happening in Paris

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Speaker 2: at the time of Diana's murder. Like, if we're going

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Speaker 2: to talk about conspiracies, that's one of the great ones

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Speaker 2: that's out there, the whole of Diana, her death, not

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Speaker 2: her murder or maybe well I guess at yeah, that's

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Speaker 2: a good point. My apologies, but yeah, can you tell

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Speaker 2: us a little bit about your experience while you're inside

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Speaker 2: dealing with something like that that became such a big

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Speaker 2: political issue.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, I have to be careful what I

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Speaker 4: say to some extent on this because when I was serving,

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Speaker 4: obviously that is a lot of it's classified. But I

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Speaker 4: can say that obviously it's public record fact that I

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Speaker 4: arrived in Paris about a year after Diana died there,

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Speaker 4: and when I arrived, people in the embassy, certain people

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Speaker 4: including my colleagues and my predecessor and others, were a

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Speaker 4: key use quite openly of having conspired to murder her.

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Speaker 4: And it was a very serious allegation. It was publicized,

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Speaker 4: of course by Muhammad al Fired you remember, the father

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Speaker 4: of Dodi fired W who was Diand's boyfriend who died

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Speaker 4: in the crash, which is extremely tragic, but nonetheless Muhammad

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Speaker 4: al Fired both financed and publicized a lot of disinformation

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Speaker 4: and conspiracy theories about what me and my colleagues had

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Speaker 4: done or not done. And I can tell you from obviously,

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Speaker 4: one of the first things I did when I arrived

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Speaker 4: there was have a good look at the files and

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Speaker 4: there was absolutely no basis for any of it. And

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Speaker 4: you know, it had a really malign impact upon the

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Speaker 4: life of the named individuals concerned, and one of whom

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Speaker 4: was still there with me in the embassy that two

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Speaker 4: of them were, and you know, their families and their

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Speaker 4: safety and their security, their ability to work and so on,

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Speaker 4: and the failure really of the media and others to

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Speaker 4: shut this down. One of the main newspapers in Britain,

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Speaker 4: the Daily Mail, gave this conspiracy theory significant boosts and

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Speaker 4: publicity in a way that was deeply irresponsible and utterly wrong,

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Speaker 4: and simply done to improve clicks and sales.

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Speaker 2: They don't care about the lives of the people they're

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Speaker 2: messing with. And we see that with these narratives and

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Speaker 2: conspiracy theories, and we've now learned that even politicians can

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Speaker 2: weaponize them for their own problem.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, obviously I'm both accused of being a

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Speaker 4: conspiracy theorist, but also on the same people accused of

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Speaker 4: being part of the world's greatest ever conspiracy. So I

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Speaker 4: can't win either way, neither of which is true. Incidentally,

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Speaker 4: of course, and I think that you know, when you

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Speaker 4: look at the election and everything, you look at the

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Speaker 4: work done by someone like John Durham when he was

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Speaker 4: special counsel or special prosecutor, and then you look at

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Speaker 4: this reco case down in Florida. It is well, obviously

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Speaker 4: hugely defamatory. But the point is that the whole premise

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Speaker 4: of this is completely wrong has been disproven. So there

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Speaker 4: we go. And in terms of what has and hasn't

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Speaker 4: proven up from the dossier, obviously, I'm in possession of

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Speaker 4: reporting subsequently to that, some of which I've never been

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Speaker 4: able to make public for source protection reasons. But I

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Speaker 4: could tell you that I'm confident that at least seventy

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Speaker 4: percent of it's correct, and the main accusations are correct.

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Speaker 4: There's geolocation intelligence, there are other sources coming in over

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Speaker 4: the last years, and I'm relatively confident and most of

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Speaker 4: it's right.

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Speaker 3: Horseshoes and hand grenades and intelligence. Seventy percent is still

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Speaker 3: pretty darn good.

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Speaker 2: So in your.

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Speaker 3: The Darty will use that term one of the court things.

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Speaker 2: To that thing.

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Speaker 4: I mean, it's very interesting. So if you go down

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Speaker 4: to the weed, and we shouldn't go too much into weas,

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Speaker 4: but I'll just give you one example. So this issue

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Speaker 4: about Trump's behavior in twenty thirteen at the Miss Universe

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Speaker 4: contest and the allegation that there were prostitutes involved and

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Speaker 4: all the rest of it, that who had turned out

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Speaker 4: with that in January twenty seventeen when the DOSI was published,

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Speaker 4: and that fuss made about it by Trump is put

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Speaker 4: into perspective if you look deep in the Muller Investigation

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Speaker 4: report in the annex, there is a reference to an

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Speaker 4: email exchange between Michael Cohen and a Russian in Moscow

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Speaker 4: in October twenty sixteen about the existence of these sex

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Speaker 4: tapes and what was being done suppressed them. And nobody's

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Speaker 4: picked up on that. So the Trump campaign knew about

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Speaker 4: these sex tapes and the allegations about them months before

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Speaker 4: the dossier became public. But I bet you that not

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Speaker 4: one in one hundred Americans is aware of that.

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Speaker 3: And I don't think even his supporters would say that, oh,

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Speaker 3: that's not within his character, right. I mean, this we

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Speaker 3: know the guy by now. But one of the core

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Speaker 3: findings you had, and even Trump aside, was that there

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Speaker 3: was a strategy by Putin a conspiracy, if you will,

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Speaker 3: an operation to damage US democracy, to make us fight

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Speaker 3: amongst ourselves, even Trump beside. And I want to run

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Speaker 3: with that just for a second, because you mentioned Project Charlemagne,

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Speaker 3: and in that you note that in France, Italy, Germany, Turkey,

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Speaker 3: the United Kingdom, Putin was doing the same basic thing.

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Speaker 3: He was just trying to destroy the democratic underpinnings Turkey aside,

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Speaker 3: but democratic underpinnings of these countries. And that this is

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Speaker 3: a core Russian strategy to set us against ourselves and

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Speaker 3: to destroy our democratic underpinnings. And I don't think that

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Speaker 3: should be controversial at all. And do you have a

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Speaker 3: can you maybe say a few words on like overall

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Speaker 3: Russian attempts to damage the West large, not just the

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Speaker 3: US and not just with Trump, but also with UK

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Speaker 3: and Brexit and with France and lepenn and so forth,

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Speaker 3: Germany and the AfD.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, it's a huge issue, but a job will well know,

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Speaker 4: you know, we have what is effectively a KGB government

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Speaker 4: in Russia. And if you don't understand the mindset of

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Speaker 4: the KGB, you're not going to get near to understanding

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Speaker 4: or predicting how Russia operates. The other thing that's important

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Speaker 4: to understand is that Russia has very malign intent but

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Speaker 4: very limited capabilities. And you can see that on the

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Speaker 4: frontline Ukraine, where they made no real progress in three

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Speaker 4: years despite losing hundreds of thousands killed and injured. So

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Speaker 4: Russia is effectively a weak country and it has to

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Speaker 4: make up for that. It has to compensate for that

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Speaker 4: by fighting in an asymmetrical way, fighting in a rogue stateway,

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Speaker 4: fighting in the grazone. So that's where they're going to

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Speaker 4: have their impact, and they're actually being quite good at

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Speaker 4: that over the years, I would say, and have stayed

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Speaker 4: one or two steps ahead of us the way in which,

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Speaker 4: for example, that they've moved from a position where they

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Speaker 4: had bots in Saint Petersburg that were churning out things

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Speaker 4: or unreal people doing it and so on, to the

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Speaker 4: point now where they've got real people initiating information. It's

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Speaker 4: picked up on X, which is one of their big

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Speaker 4: magnifiers and big sort of loud speakers is weaponized. So

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Speaker 4: what they've done very cleverly is that they've realized the

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Speaker 4: weaknesses in our system and they have piggybacked on them

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Speaker 4: for their own aims and their own aims, it's create

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Speaker 4: a division, uncertainty, and so on, and to undermine the

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Speaker 4: trust and the alliances we have. And Trump has been

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Speaker 4: a very willing operator in that area, and unfortunately the

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Speaker 4: likes of Steve Wikoff, who as you may know, is

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Speaker 4: known here as dim Philby, are really helping him along

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Speaker 4: in that way.

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Speaker 3: This is not a conspiracy theory. This is a real conspiracy.

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Speaker 3: I think it's really important.

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Speaker 4: Well, it's their is in the grass doctrine. Pluton has

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Speaker 4: talked about it. I don't think there's any doubt that

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Speaker 4: when you have a KGB officer with Putin's mentality and power,

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Speaker 4: that's going to be reflected in the way that Russia

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Speaker 4: operates and behaves.

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Speaker 2: Totally agree with all of that, and you mentioned, for example,

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Speaker 2: the detail in the footnotes of the Muller report that

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Speaker 2: never come out. But I think that's one of the

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Speaker 2: what are the right term as gifts or whatever of

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Speaker 2: Trump and Trump administration is they know that if they

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Speaker 2: just go on the offensive and they attack, they create

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Speaker 2: a false narrative, and they've sort of forced people just

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Speaker 2: to sort of stay away. If you immediately start saying, hoax,

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Speaker 2: rush Rushi, Russia, They're attacking me. I'm a victim, and

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Speaker 2: you go on and on and you never come around.

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Speaker 2: People back off. And I even think what the FBI

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Speaker 2: and others are not looking into and chose not to

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Speaker 2: look into things because they are nervous about getting attacked.

428
00:22:42,744 --> 00:22:45,984
Speaker 2: But to go back to the case that I think

429
00:22:46,224 --> 00:22:48,704
Speaker 2: your Dosier made, but then follow up to that, what

430
00:22:48,744 --> 00:22:52,144
Speaker 2: we've seen is very simple. I mean, Trump's long standing

431
00:22:52,184 --> 00:22:55,024
Speaker 2: ties to Russia in Russian organized crime, and his lifestyle

432
00:22:55,144 --> 00:22:58,504
Speaker 2: practices and his business practice made him uniquely vulnerable to

433
00:22:58,504 --> 00:23:01,144
Speaker 2: blackmail and extortion by the country that's probably the best

434
00:23:01,144 --> 00:23:03,824
Speaker 2: at it in the world. And then his campaign team,

435
00:23:04,104 --> 00:23:08,464
Speaker 2: who all had unusual shady ties to Russia, was totally

436
00:23:08,464 --> 00:23:10,984
Speaker 2: willing to work with a hostile foreign power and eager

437
00:23:11,024 --> 00:23:14,984
Speaker 2: to accept materials stolen from Americans. None of them reported

438
00:23:14,984 --> 00:23:18,424
Speaker 2: those illicit contexts, and then many of them were subsequently arrested.

439
00:23:18,584 --> 00:23:22,024
Speaker 2: And then when the issue came out publicly, every single

440
00:23:22,064 --> 00:23:24,264
Speaker 2: one of them lied and covered up their actions. And

441
00:23:24,304 --> 00:23:27,384
Speaker 2: then Trump attacked all the institutions that could hold them

442
00:23:27,424 --> 00:23:31,384
Speaker 2: to account, and sought to obstruction and obstruct investigations, pardoned

443
00:23:31,424 --> 00:23:34,944
Speaker 2: anyone who could provide any evidence of wrongdoing. And to me,

444
00:23:35,064 --> 00:23:37,184
Speaker 2: the thing that's most interesting and where I really get

445
00:23:37,264 --> 00:23:40,464
Speaker 2: upset at the media is after all of that, no

446
00:23:40,464 --> 00:23:44,024
Speaker 2: one has ever pushed him to provide an explanation. There's

447
00:23:44,104 --> 00:23:48,264
Speaker 2: never been an innocent explanation of why a domestic political

448
00:23:48,304 --> 00:23:51,464
Speaker 2: campaign would need to engage with the hostile foreign power.

449
00:23:51,624 --> 00:23:55,224
Speaker 2: Why why all these Russians Never he just attacked and

450
00:23:55,264 --> 00:23:57,304
Speaker 2: everybody backed off, so and lie about it?

451
00:23:57,424 --> 00:24:00,264
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, I mean. The other thing to emphasize, of course,

452
00:24:00,504 --> 00:24:02,664
Speaker 4: and general will know this as well, is that the

453
00:24:02,744 --> 00:24:07,384
Speaker 4: KGB and its successful organizations have always targeted businessmen. You know,

454
00:24:07,424 --> 00:24:09,904
Speaker 4: when Trump was a businessman visiting Russia, they have been

455
00:24:09,944 --> 00:24:13,664
Speaker 4: interested in compromising and recruiting people of that sort for

456
00:24:13,744 --> 00:24:18,184
Speaker 4: various reasons. And therefore it doesn't matter that Trump was

457
00:24:18,224 --> 00:24:19,944
Speaker 4: a businessman in the past. That doesn't mean that he

458
00:24:20,024 --> 00:24:22,864
Speaker 4: wasn't being targeted, and he would have come to their

459
00:24:22,864 --> 00:24:25,504
Speaker 4: attention as soon as he married Ivana in the nineteen

460
00:24:25,544 --> 00:24:29,544
Speaker 4: seventies and started going to Czechoslovakia, where there was incredibly

461
00:24:29,584 --> 00:24:33,584
Speaker 4: close intelligence liaison with a KGB. I think people need

462
00:24:33,624 --> 00:24:37,544
Speaker 4: to understand Russian modus operanda, the fact that every major

463
00:24:37,544 --> 00:24:40,904
Speaker 4: hotel in Osco is wired for sound and view, that

464
00:24:40,944 --> 00:24:44,144
Speaker 4: the KGB uses what they call swallows. Isn't it last

465
00:24:44,144 --> 00:24:47,824
Speaker 4: touch key in Russia in order to entrap businessmen. We

466
00:24:47,904 --> 00:24:50,264
Speaker 4: know of other cases where businessmen have been entrapped, and

467
00:24:50,544 --> 00:24:56,263
Speaker 4: we've seen their own politicians and prosecutor General Skaratov and

468
00:24:56,304 --> 00:24:59,464
Speaker 4: the Prime Minister at Kasyanov and so on having been

469
00:24:59,464 --> 00:25:03,424
Speaker 4: compromising exactly this way by the Russian intelligence services. So

470
00:25:03,424 --> 00:25:06,464
Speaker 4: why anyone would find this surprising? I just don't know.

471
00:25:06,784 --> 00:25:09,304
Speaker 2: Even our houses, Christopher, when you and I lived in Moscow,

472
00:25:09,744 --> 00:25:12,504
Speaker 2: had audio and video in our houses. So they both

473
00:25:12,544 --> 00:25:15,304
Speaker 2: have big files of every sort of personal.

474
00:25:15,224 --> 00:25:19,184
Speaker 4: Well to wonder whether you know any anything like that.

475
00:25:22,304 --> 00:25:25,184
Speaker 4: Maybe there are some rules among sleeves even now and

476
00:25:26,024 --> 00:25:26,704
Speaker 4: rule that out.

477
00:25:48,104 --> 00:25:51,704
Speaker 3: So Chris is as as successful as you are. It

478
00:25:51,864 --> 00:25:56,704
Speaker 3: is untrue that you began the Crossfire Hurricane operation right

479
00:25:56,744 --> 00:26:00,224
Speaker 3: with the FBI, despite the fact that over and over

480
00:26:00,344 --> 00:26:04,424
Speaker 3: again inside the United States there is the claim that

481
00:26:04,504 --> 00:26:09,504
Speaker 3: the Steele dossier kicked off the FBI's investigation of Trump

482
00:26:09,584 --> 00:26:13,184
Speaker 3: World completely untrue and also untrue. I just want to

483
00:26:13,224 --> 00:26:16,984
Speaker 3: get this out there that the assessment done by the

484
00:26:17,024 --> 00:26:20,504
Speaker 3: in the last days of the Obama White House, that

485
00:26:20,664 --> 00:26:24,624
Speaker 3: it did not depend on the points that you brought forward, right,

486
00:26:25,224 --> 00:26:29,504
Speaker 3: you know, perhaps uncorroborated or uncorroborated. Yet neither of those

487
00:26:29,544 --> 00:26:32,224
Speaker 3: things are true, despite the fact, and coming back to

488
00:26:32,264 --> 00:26:34,904
Speaker 3: what John was saying that this is perhaps in a

489
00:26:34,944 --> 00:26:37,984
Speaker 3: conspiracy over and over again in the US media, this

490
00:26:38,144 --> 00:26:41,464
Speaker 3: is claimed, So you didn't do that, but you've done

491
00:26:41,464 --> 00:26:43,184
Speaker 3: lots of other things.

492
00:26:43,544 --> 00:26:45,664
Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean again, you know, let's let's look at

493
00:26:45,664 --> 00:26:48,864
Speaker 4: the conspiracy theory here. I had my first meeting with

494
00:26:48,944 --> 00:26:52,304
Speaker 4: my FBI contact or something like the fifth of July

495
00:26:52,904 --> 00:26:56,144
Speaker 4: twenty sixteen, and handed out him over two or three reports,

496
00:26:56,784 --> 00:27:00,024
Speaker 4: and then I continue to supply him with several reports thereafter.

497
00:27:00,944 --> 00:27:04,184
Speaker 4: Those reports apparently were sent to the wrong place. They

498
00:27:04,224 --> 00:27:06,544
Speaker 4: went to the New York office of the FBI.

499
00:27:07,824 --> 00:27:09,104
Speaker 3: We never do that in the CIA.

500
00:27:09,824 --> 00:27:13,624
Speaker 4: Lately sat in a cupboard for six weeks before anyone

501
00:27:13,664 --> 00:27:17,104
Speaker 4: did anything about And it doesn't really strike you as

502
00:27:17,184 --> 00:27:21,464
Speaker 4: being a very likely conspiracy. In fact, cock up would

503
00:27:21,504 --> 00:27:24,184
Speaker 4: be written all over it, and it was actually it

504
00:27:24,304 --> 00:27:27,144
Speaker 4: was a travesty that the material wasn't fed in earlier,

505
00:27:27,464 --> 00:27:29,584
Speaker 4: and then we weren't able to do more joint work

506
00:27:29,624 --> 00:27:32,304
Speaker 4: on it before it all burst out into the open.

507
00:27:32,704 --> 00:27:35,944
Speaker 4: So I think again, the conspiracy theories are completely up

508
00:27:36,024 --> 00:27:38,304
Speaker 4: the creek, and the idea that you know, in this

509
00:27:38,384 --> 00:27:43,184
Speaker 4: recocase in Florida, forty defendants or whatever, we've got most

510
00:27:43,224 --> 00:27:45,544
Speaker 4: those people I've never met, and in the communicated with,

511
00:27:45,664 --> 00:27:48,104
Speaker 4: I didn't even know who they were, frankly, and yet

512
00:27:48,304 --> 00:27:52,504
Speaker 4: there's an attempt to encapsulate the conspiracy theory in this

513
00:27:52,584 --> 00:27:55,944
Speaker 4: civil recocase, which has failed at every turn, but it's

514
00:27:55,944 --> 00:27:59,504
Speaker 4: still got wheels even now, nine years after the event.

515
00:27:59,944 --> 00:28:02,064
Speaker 2: So I eventually want to get to how this affected

516
00:28:02,104 --> 00:28:05,384
Speaker 2: you personally. I mean, you were the subject of incredible attacks,

517
00:28:05,384 --> 00:28:07,904
Speaker 2: and that's got a weird on you. I'd be really

518
00:28:07,904 --> 00:28:09,464
Speaker 2: interested in there. But first I want to ask about

519
00:28:09,584 --> 00:28:13,424
Speaker 2: another detail. Was in the reports about China. People have

520
00:28:13,464 --> 00:28:16,264
Speaker 2: forgotten about this altogether, and I interested in your thoughts

521
00:28:16,264 --> 00:28:18,224
Speaker 2: of whether this was something or it was nothing, because

522
00:28:18,224 --> 00:28:21,024
Speaker 2: obviously these are pieces just of source reporting. But I

523
00:28:21,064 --> 00:28:23,544
Speaker 2: recall in one one of your sources, in a report

524
00:28:23,584 --> 00:28:26,424
Speaker 2: commented on China, I guess. So he claims that Trump

525
00:28:26,504 --> 00:28:29,984
Speaker 2: was relatively relaxed about media focus on Russia because it

526
00:28:30,064 --> 00:28:34,104
Speaker 2: distracted attention from Trump's business dealings in China and other

527
00:28:34,184 --> 00:28:38,064
Speaker 2: emerging markets where there was large bribes and kickbacks. What

528
00:28:38,104 --> 00:28:39,904
Speaker 2: can you say, is there anything to that? Was there

529
00:28:39,944 --> 00:28:42,064
Speaker 2: more to that or is that just a side note?

530
00:28:42,344 --> 00:28:46,224
Speaker 4: Well it is, you know what it states. And I

531
00:28:46,264 --> 00:28:49,264
Speaker 4: think that one of the other things that comes to

532
00:28:49,304 --> 00:28:51,784
Speaker 4: mind in this context, and I think this is also

533
00:28:51,944 --> 00:28:54,824
Speaker 4: out there in my book, is that, of course. And

534
00:28:54,864 --> 00:28:56,704
Speaker 4: one of the things we haven't discussed is the fact

535
00:28:56,744 --> 00:28:59,864
Speaker 4: that I was I knew it was friendly with Ivanka

536
00:28:59,904 --> 00:29:04,304
Speaker 4: Trump during the previous period, which undermines again the idea

537
00:29:04,344 --> 00:29:06,664
Speaker 4: that I was out somehow to get her family or

538
00:29:06,664 --> 00:29:10,584
Speaker 4: whatever get them. It's just nonsense. But when I had

539
00:29:10,664 --> 00:29:15,104
Speaker 4: business interactions with Anka Trump at an earlier stage, they

540
00:29:15,104 --> 00:29:19,064
Speaker 4: were very interested in Chinese business contacts and Chinese business deals.

541
00:29:19,064 --> 00:29:21,904
Speaker 4: It's all there. It recorded a memo of a call,

542
00:29:22,104 --> 00:29:25,104
Speaker 4: in fact, put her in touch with one of my

543
00:29:25,784 --> 00:29:29,264
Speaker 4: formost senior Scionologists colleagues who went and called them. So

544
00:29:29,264 --> 00:29:32,304
Speaker 4: it's very clear that Trump Org or whatever was looking

545
00:29:32,344 --> 00:29:35,864
Speaker 4: to do business, was trying to do business with China

546
00:29:36,024 --> 00:29:39,504
Speaker 4: in the period I would say twenty ten to twenty fifteen,

547
00:29:39,584 --> 00:29:42,304
Speaker 4: and none of that's really come out. It's extraordinary, but

548
00:29:42,344 --> 00:29:42,784
Speaker 4: it hasn't.

549
00:29:43,104 --> 00:29:45,784
Speaker 3: Well, let's talk just briefly before we move on about

550
00:29:45,824 --> 00:29:51,224
Speaker 3: an even bigger sensation, Epstein. Now you have been you

551
00:29:51,304 --> 00:29:56,184
Speaker 3: have gone on record as talking about Epstein's likely relationships

552
00:29:56,264 --> 00:29:59,304
Speaker 3: with Russian intelligence and whether or not and or whether

553
00:29:59,384 --> 00:30:01,224
Speaker 3: or not they didn't picks. I'm Trump. I've read a

554
00:30:01,224 --> 00:30:02,784
Speaker 3: few things that you've said, but I was wondering if

555
00:30:02,824 --> 00:30:05,304
Speaker 3: you could take us a little further into what you

556
00:30:05,384 --> 00:30:08,104
Speaker 3: know or what you suspect or what makes sense as

557
00:30:08,144 --> 00:30:11,384
Speaker 3: far as Epstein and Gal Maxwell's father, who also him

558
00:30:11,664 --> 00:30:15,024
Speaker 3: relationships with Russian intelligence. So if you could maybe take

559
00:30:15,064 --> 00:30:18,464
Speaker 3: a few minutes. Epstein's though one of the sensations of

560
00:30:18,504 --> 00:30:20,144
Speaker 3: the day. What is it that we need to know

561
00:30:20,184 --> 00:30:22,384
Speaker 3: about this? And looking forward? Where do you think this

562
00:30:22,424 --> 00:30:24,664
Speaker 3: is headache with Epstein and Russian intelligence.

563
00:30:24,704 --> 00:30:26,824
Speaker 4: I think you need to look at the modus operandi

564
00:30:26,904 --> 00:30:29,424
Speaker 4: first of all, and the degree of sophistication of it

565
00:30:29,584 --> 00:30:31,664
Speaker 4: and the extent of it, and who was being targeted,

566
00:30:31,744 --> 00:30:35,704
Speaker 4: which is an important point starting point. But to my mind,

567
00:30:35,864 --> 00:30:39,144
Speaker 4: we have our own sources, and we know of other sources,

568
00:30:39,344 --> 00:30:44,784
Speaker 4: and we know of documentary sources which point to the

569
00:30:44,824 --> 00:30:47,704
Speaker 4: fact that if you join up the dots here, you

570
00:30:47,864 --> 00:30:50,864
Speaker 4: end up with it looking and most likely to be

571
00:30:50,904 --> 00:30:55,024
Speaker 4: a Russian instigated operation. And I don't say that lightly,

572
00:30:55,424 --> 00:31:00,024
Speaker 4: but for example, one of the things is unanswered is

573
00:31:00,144 --> 00:31:03,944
Speaker 4: how Epstein met Galay Maxwell, who was really not his

574
00:31:04,024 --> 00:31:07,624
Speaker 4: own generation. And the obvious answer to that is through

575
00:31:07,704 --> 00:31:10,144
Speaker 4: Robert Maxwell. And when you look at what rob Maxwell

576
00:31:10,184 --> 00:31:13,904
Speaker 4: was doing in Russia Soviet Union, actually towards the end

577
00:31:14,544 --> 00:31:19,224
Speaker 4: he was exfiltrating Soviet Jews to go to Israel and

578
00:31:19,224 --> 00:31:20,864
Speaker 4: then the quid pro quo for that, and this is

579
00:31:20,904 --> 00:31:23,704
Speaker 4: something I've known for some time, was that he was

580
00:31:24,104 --> 00:31:26,664
Speaker 4: investing would be a polite term laundering, would be more

581
00:31:26,824 --> 00:31:30,424
Speaker 4: likely savier hard currency into the West as the system

582
00:31:30,464 --> 00:31:34,384
Speaker 4: was collapsing. Now, anyone that was drawn into that network,

583
00:31:34,944 --> 00:31:39,744
Speaker 4: I believe that Maxwell was working with Russian intelligence elements

584
00:31:39,824 --> 00:31:43,304
Speaker 4: to do that. I believe those investments are still out there,

585
00:31:43,824 --> 00:31:46,984
Speaker 4: will realize that he almost certainly not only introduced Gullain

586
00:31:47,624 --> 00:31:50,464
Speaker 4: to Epstein, but Epstein was working with him on that.

587
00:31:50,624 --> 00:31:53,544
Speaker 4: And this is where quite likely a lot of Epstein's

588
00:31:53,624 --> 00:31:56,704
Speaker 4: money came from because this has not been explained. When

589
00:31:56,704 --> 00:31:58,984
Speaker 4: he talked to people about you know which big deals,

590
00:31:59,024 --> 00:32:02,344
Speaker 4: financial deals at Epstein doing Wall Street and everything, no

591
00:32:02,384 --> 00:32:04,704
Speaker 4: one can tell you. So the money has to have

592
00:32:04,744 --> 00:32:08,344
Speaker 4: come from somewhere. And my own conviction and what sources

593
00:32:08,384 --> 00:32:10,584
Speaker 4: tell me is that some of it or a lot

594
00:32:10,624 --> 00:32:14,024
Speaker 4: of it came from the Soviet Communist Party. And once

595
00:32:14,064 --> 00:32:16,424
Speaker 4: you then build up from that, you've got a situation

596
00:32:16,544 --> 00:32:21,224
Speaker 4: where he was proven adept at operating in the same

597
00:32:21,264 --> 00:32:23,984
Speaker 4: way that the Russians operates. And when you look at

598
00:32:23,984 --> 00:32:26,624
Speaker 4: the people around him, you had these women who were there.

599
00:32:26,704 --> 00:32:29,304
Speaker 4: There was one of them who had been a significant

600
00:32:29,304 --> 00:32:34,544
Speaker 4: figure in NASHI, the Kremlin nationalist youth organization, and several

601
00:32:34,584 --> 00:32:38,664
Speaker 4: of them, and it just smells this Belyakov guy who'd

602
00:32:38,704 --> 00:32:42,664
Speaker 4: been a KGB or FSB academy officer who was under

603
00:32:42,664 --> 00:32:45,664
Speaker 4: some sort of cover in the government, was a close

604
00:32:45,744 --> 00:32:49,424
Speaker 4: contact of Epstein. It very much looks as the more

605
00:32:49,424 --> 00:32:52,264
Speaker 4: of this comes out and piece it together, more and

606
00:32:52,304 --> 00:32:57,384
Speaker 4: more likely that this was fundamentally a Russian intelligence operation.

607
00:32:57,744 --> 00:32:59,424
Speaker 2: And many of the girls came from Russia.

608
00:32:59,424 --> 00:32:59,664
Speaker 3: That's right.

609
00:32:59,824 --> 00:33:02,864
Speaker 2: For that matter. Yeah, I've spoken about this I just

610
00:33:03,024 --> 00:33:05,704
Speaker 2: did an interview on that Rest Is Classified podcast to

611
00:33:05,744 --> 00:33:07,904
Speaker 2: talk about this, and one of the things I think,

612
00:33:08,104 --> 00:33:10,104
Speaker 2: and I think Christopher and I said, is the Russians

613
00:33:10,144 --> 00:33:12,704
Speaker 2: look at intelligence differently than we do. They use their

614
00:33:12,704 --> 00:33:16,024
Speaker 2: intelligence services really as the central focus of the government.

615
00:33:16,064 --> 00:33:19,624
Speaker 2: It's their foreign policy. It is an intelligence state. And therefore,

616
00:33:20,224 --> 00:33:23,424
Speaker 2: like us in the West, sure they run some covert spies.

617
00:33:23,904 --> 00:33:26,784
Speaker 2: They provide intelligence, and they have analysts that look at that,

618
00:33:27,024 --> 00:33:31,664
Speaker 2: but they also do these things assassinations, covert attacks, disinformation,

619
00:33:32,184 --> 00:33:35,744
Speaker 2: and they utilize a much wider group of people than

620
00:33:35,784 --> 00:33:39,024
Speaker 2: we probably would in the West. So even if Epstein

621
00:33:39,144 --> 00:33:41,784
Speaker 2: or Frankly Trump for that matter, were not covert super

622
00:33:41,824 --> 00:33:45,624
Speaker 2: secret run spies like Jerry and Christopher and I did

623
00:33:45,744 --> 00:33:47,584
Speaker 2: in our work inside, where we try to keep it

624
00:33:47,624 --> 00:33:51,464
Speaker 2: totally secret and train someone to report very accurately on

625
00:33:51,504 --> 00:33:55,304
Speaker 2: something they would find somebody like Epstein useful. There's no

626
00:33:55,424 --> 00:33:57,544
Speaker 2: way you can be involved with Russian money and travel

627
00:33:57,544 --> 00:34:01,224
Speaker 2: in Russia. Saying with Trump without having Russian intelligence pay

628
00:34:01,264 --> 00:34:03,384
Speaker 2: attention to you and follow you and try to use

629
00:34:03,424 --> 00:34:05,264
Speaker 2: that to their benefit and use it to their benefit

630
00:34:05,304 --> 00:34:07,264
Speaker 2: could mean yeah, they run you as a spy maybe,

631
00:34:07,824 --> 00:34:11,663
Speaker 2: or you are doing their bidding, and you're helping them anyway,

632
00:34:11,744 --> 00:34:16,263
Speaker 2: whether you're laundering money, you're pushing their viewpoints, whether you're

633
00:34:16,344 --> 00:34:19,904
Speaker 2: getting involved in elite areas that are causing problems in

634
00:34:19,944 --> 00:34:22,864
Speaker 2: their criminal issues in the States. So I think Epstein

635
00:34:23,104 --> 00:34:26,303
Speaker 2: certainly was being used by and I think this about

636
00:34:26,304 --> 00:34:29,263
Speaker 2: Trump too, used by Russian intelligence. I don't know that

637
00:34:29,344 --> 00:34:33,064
Speaker 2: he was a covert source that was actually this whole

638
00:34:33,104 --> 00:34:35,504
Speaker 2: thing was set up by Russian intelligence, but like you said,

639
00:34:35,544 --> 00:34:37,503
Speaker 2: it's not inconceivable either.

640
00:34:38,424 --> 00:34:40,223
Speaker 4: No, and I think you're absolutely right. And when you

641
00:34:40,223 --> 00:34:42,624
Speaker 4: talk about him being an agent, there are different types

642
00:34:42,663 --> 00:34:45,464
Speaker 4: of agents who perform different functions, and one of them

643
00:34:45,544 --> 00:34:48,183
Speaker 4: is a facilitator, a facilities agent. I think that's what

644
00:34:48,223 --> 00:34:51,864
Speaker 4: he was to start with. Then you've got your clandestine

645
00:34:51,864 --> 00:34:55,143
Speaker 4: agent who's stealing the nuclear secrets from their job in

646
00:34:55,344 --> 00:34:59,623
Speaker 4: the armed forces, meeting Russians under bushes in Eastern Europe

647
00:35:00,504 --> 00:35:02,624
Speaker 4: or was in the old days. And then you've got

648
00:35:02,663 --> 00:35:05,544
Speaker 4: your agent of influence, who could be in politics or

649
00:35:05,584 --> 00:35:08,703
Speaker 4: in the media, pushing the Russian lines out. And then

650
00:35:08,783 --> 00:35:11,184
Speaker 4: you have a high level contact, which is obviously something

651
00:35:11,183 --> 00:35:12,504
Speaker 4: that might have been one of those things in the

652
00:35:12,544 --> 00:35:14,984
Speaker 4: past and has now found themselves in power, and of

653
00:35:14,984 --> 00:35:17,384
Speaker 4: course that's why I would you know, class Trump has

654
00:35:17,424 --> 00:35:19,863
Speaker 4: now a high level contact rather than an agent of

655
00:35:19,904 --> 00:35:23,183
Speaker 4: influence or a facilities agent. But in the case of Epstein,

656
00:35:23,703 --> 00:35:27,383
Speaker 4: you're talking about someone who probably evolved from being a

657
00:35:27,384 --> 00:35:31,464
Speaker 4: facilities agent fundamentally and then had some elements of agent

658
00:35:31,504 --> 00:35:34,064
Speaker 4: of influence knocked onto him or added on to him

659
00:35:34,104 --> 00:35:37,223
Speaker 4: as he went a lot. He was operating almost like

660
00:35:37,743 --> 00:35:40,263
Speaker 4: a Russian intelligence officer in anyway, in the way that

661
00:35:40,304 --> 00:35:45,064
Speaker 4: he compromised people and then built relationships with them and dependencies.

662
00:35:45,504 --> 00:35:47,343
Speaker 4: It's classic espionage work.

663
00:35:47,783 --> 00:35:49,703
Speaker 2: I think that's right. Yeah, there's other terms he would

664
00:35:49,743 --> 00:35:52,223
Speaker 2: use of as winning collaborator, or the Russians have their

665
00:35:52,304 --> 00:35:55,823
Speaker 2: term useful idiot or whatever. But his activities, it's very

666
00:35:55,824 --> 00:35:59,544
Speaker 2: clear to say benefited Russian interests.

667
00:35:59,143 --> 00:36:01,104
Speaker 3: An air set in the truest sense of the word.

668
00:36:01,143 --> 00:36:02,824
Speaker 3: He is an airset to the Russian state.

669
00:36:03,183 --> 00:36:07,104
Speaker 4: Yeah, there's a visa application. I believe that's come out

670
00:36:07,104 --> 00:36:09,503
Speaker 4: of this for twenty eleven. I think there is, yeah,

671
00:36:09,783 --> 00:36:13,783
Speaker 4: where he's visited some Russian special forces organization. I mean,

672
00:36:13,783 --> 00:36:17,504
Speaker 4: it's just is that normal for someone in his position?

673
00:36:17,584 --> 00:36:20,823
Speaker 4: Obviously not, And the fact is that he was in touch,

674
00:36:20,864 --> 00:36:24,384
Speaker 4: as we know from this now and to what extend FBI.

675
00:36:24,663 --> 00:36:26,303
Speaker 4: They must have known some of this with people like

676
00:36:26,384 --> 00:36:28,104
Speaker 4: Cherkin and so on. He was in New York at

677
00:36:28,104 --> 00:36:33,584
Speaker 4: the time, he had extensive ties with Russian diplomatic and others.

678
00:36:33,783 --> 00:36:35,623
Speaker 4: And you're coming back to know what was going on

679
00:36:35,663 --> 00:36:38,303
Speaker 4: at the time. Well, of course you have. And this

680
00:36:38,703 --> 00:36:40,984
Speaker 4: was the last point I made in my book unredacted.

681
00:36:41,703 --> 00:36:45,984
Speaker 4: This guy, Alex Smolikov, who was I think the deputy

682
00:36:46,064 --> 00:36:50,384
Speaker 4: foreign policy advisor the Kramlin to Ushakov at this time

683
00:36:50,464 --> 00:36:55,383
Speaker 4: into the twenty fourteen to twenty seventeen eighteen, and he

684
00:36:55,544 --> 00:36:59,064
Speaker 4: was exultrated by CIA, presumably because they feared that Trump

685
00:36:59,064 --> 00:37:01,663
Speaker 4: would blow him to the Russians. But he must know

686
00:37:01,743 --> 00:37:04,224
Speaker 4: an awful lot about this. He must know about Epstein

687
00:37:04,304 --> 00:37:06,544
Speaker 4: as well, not at least because he had been posted

688
00:37:06,544 --> 00:37:10,343
Speaker 4: in America and we've not heard a peep out of

689
00:37:10,384 --> 00:37:13,743
Speaker 4: this guy. He was exposed as living in the suburbs

690
00:37:13,783 --> 00:37:18,264
Speaker 4: of Virginia or whatever he was squirreled away. He must

691
00:37:18,263 --> 00:37:21,384
Speaker 4: have a lot to say, not least about what happened

692
00:37:21,424 --> 00:37:24,623
Speaker 4: after the dossier and sold became public and whether the

693
00:37:24,663 --> 00:37:26,863
Speaker 4: line was Oh, this is fine because it's all this

694
00:37:26,984 --> 00:37:29,504
Speaker 4: information or whether the line was actually we need to

695
00:37:29,544 --> 00:37:31,784
Speaker 4: cover this up, make sure we shut down these sources.

696
00:37:32,504 --> 00:37:35,584
Speaker 4: I suspect the fact that we've heard nothing about this.

697
00:37:35,703 --> 00:37:37,703
Speaker 4: I think if it had been if he had been

698
00:37:37,743 --> 00:37:41,384
Speaker 4: exculled patriary his intelligence about Trump and others, we'd have

699
00:37:41,424 --> 00:37:43,864
Speaker 4: heard about it. But if it was in call patree,

700
00:37:43,904 --> 00:37:46,584
Speaker 4: which I suspect it was, well, would not have heard

701
00:37:46,623 --> 00:37:48,624
Speaker 4: about it. And we haven't heard about it.

702
00:37:48,703 --> 00:37:52,024
Speaker 3: And it continues to develop. So all of der Pasca,

703
00:37:52,344 --> 00:37:55,703
Speaker 3: this Russian or at least it's sort of an oldigark,

704
00:37:55,864 --> 00:38:00,623
Speaker 3: very close developed. Letterman putin famously that Paul Menaport, who

705
00:38:00,783 --> 00:38:06,623
Speaker 3: was Trump's campaign manager and was passing secretly passing internal

706
00:38:06,663 --> 00:38:10,904
Speaker 3: documents from the Trump campaign to a Russian intelligence officer, Caytantinekliminic,

707
00:38:10,984 --> 00:38:14,984
Speaker 3: to pierce the dera Pasca that Epstein also, it turns

708
00:38:14,984 --> 00:38:18,504
Speaker 3: out it's close to dere Pasca, right, So there's only

709
00:38:18,544 --> 00:38:22,064
Speaker 3: so many overlaps between and we're discovering. I think we're

710
00:38:22,064 --> 00:38:25,743
Speaker 3: going to discover more between Epstein and Trump world and

711
00:38:26,384 --> 00:38:29,464
Speaker 3: Soviet intelligence related matters in people.

712
00:38:29,824 --> 00:38:32,944
Speaker 4: Yeah. Absolutely, there's another three million documents come out, and

713
00:38:32,984 --> 00:38:36,024
Speaker 4: I think this is just putting the icing on the cake,

714
00:38:36,104 --> 00:38:39,704
Speaker 4: ause this guy Peter Listterman they talk about as having

715
00:38:39,743 --> 00:38:43,183
Speaker 4: been involved in procuring women, who seems to have been

716
00:38:43,183 --> 00:38:45,824
Speaker 4: a visitor to Epstein's flat and was very much active

717
00:38:45,824 --> 00:38:48,303
Speaker 4: in Russia and in Moscow with the leadership. So there

718
00:38:48,304 --> 00:38:50,663
Speaker 4: are all sorts of leads here that need to be

719
00:38:50,703 --> 00:38:54,104
Speaker 4: properly investigated, which are not just criminal, but which have

720
00:38:54,223 --> 00:38:58,504
Speaker 4: a sort of counterintelligence significance, I believe over the years,

721
00:38:58,743 --> 00:39:01,864
Speaker 4: and I suspect that people in government and in the

722
00:39:01,904 --> 00:39:04,504
Speaker 4: system actually quite worried about the damage this is going

723
00:39:04,584 --> 00:39:07,343
Speaker 4: to do if it is investigated properly. But it's better

724
00:39:07,384 --> 00:39:10,343
Speaker 4: to clear house now that let it feed out over

725
00:39:10,424 --> 00:39:11,824
Speaker 4: the next five years.

726
00:39:12,024 --> 00:39:15,544
Speaker 3: So it's also come out that Epstein has had over

727
00:39:15,584 --> 00:39:22,064
Speaker 3: a billion dollars worth of shady transactions money transactions into

728
00:39:22,143 --> 00:39:24,944
Speaker 3: Russia and the former Soviet Union, and a lot of

729
00:39:24,984 --> 00:39:28,303
Speaker 3: them were to women. So let me just ask if

730
00:39:28,304 --> 00:39:33,503
Speaker 3: Epstein is importing women from Russia to his island where

731
00:39:33,544 --> 00:39:37,984
Speaker 3: they are interacting or being abused by senior men inside

732
00:39:38,024 --> 00:39:41,304
Speaker 3: the United States and Europe, and they go back to Russia.

733
00:39:42,024 --> 00:39:45,024
Speaker 3: I mean, these people have you know that they're now

734
00:39:45,223 --> 00:39:48,024
Speaker 3: under the control of the Russian government, they're able to testify,

735
00:39:48,223 --> 00:39:50,903
Speaker 3: of course they're not. What sort of leverage does that

736
00:39:51,104 --> 00:39:54,703
Speaker 3: give the Kremlin that they actually have the women who

737
00:39:54,743 --> 00:39:58,623
Speaker 3: were involved in Epstein's Sepskin's they're living inside of, you know,

738
00:39:58,703 --> 00:40:00,743
Speaker 3: the side of their state right now that Russians must

739
00:40:00,743 --> 00:40:01,343
Speaker 3: know who they are.

740
00:40:02,743 --> 00:40:04,903
Speaker 2: No, that's for you, man. Yeah, I mean.

741
00:40:06,544 --> 00:40:09,104
Speaker 4: It's leverage rights not so obvious, but what is it?

742
00:40:09,183 --> 00:40:11,304
Speaker 4: Quite dressing? I then know, if you've heard of this character,

743
00:40:11,663 --> 00:40:15,623
Speaker 4: is it John Dugan, this detective from Palm Beach who

744
00:40:15,663 --> 00:40:19,263
Speaker 4: defected to Russia. You heard about this guy? So he

745
00:40:19,304 --> 00:40:22,424
Speaker 4: claims to have affected to Russia. Interesting in twenty sixty

746
00:40:23,104 --> 00:40:26,183
Speaker 4: when he was under investigation for fraud or something down there,

747
00:40:26,223 --> 00:40:30,623
Speaker 4: but he defected to Russia with he claims large amounts

748
00:40:30,663 --> 00:40:33,864
Speaker 4: of material from the Epstein investigation down at Palm Beach.

749
00:40:34,544 --> 00:40:36,544
Speaker 4: Now he might be a bit of a crank. I

750
00:40:36,584 --> 00:40:38,584
Speaker 4: suspect he is. But the fact is that the Russians

751
00:40:38,623 --> 00:40:41,064
Speaker 4: would not have accepted someone like that as a defector,

752
00:40:41,504 --> 00:40:43,584
Speaker 4: and as he had something of value to offer them,

753
00:40:44,024 --> 00:40:47,143
Speaker 4: And that's still sitting out. There's another angle to this

754
00:40:47,263 --> 00:40:51,584
Speaker 4: that's never really been properly explored, and as I say,

755
00:40:51,663 --> 00:40:54,304
Speaker 4: he defected in twenty sixteen, right at the key time.

756
00:40:54,663 --> 00:40:58,423
Speaker 4: There's another guy in Russia called David Giovannes, about whom

757
00:40:58,424 --> 00:41:02,464
Speaker 4: there's been one media article who appears to have been

758
00:41:02,504 --> 00:41:05,303
Speaker 4: Trump's fixer there in the early sort of two thousands,

759
00:41:05,703 --> 00:41:08,183
Speaker 4: again had a terrible reputation for this kind of thing,

760
00:41:08,663 --> 00:41:10,663
Speaker 4: possibly linked to it. I have no idea, but it

761
00:41:10,703 --> 00:41:13,703
Speaker 4: would be worth investigating. That guy is now hiding out

762
00:41:13,703 --> 00:41:15,623
Speaker 4: in Russia and never came back to the US, I

763
00:41:15,663 --> 00:41:19,183
Speaker 4: believe after twenty sixteen. So there are numerous things here

764
00:41:19,183 --> 00:41:23,143
Speaker 4: that absolutely point in one direction that the media and

765
00:41:23,183 --> 00:41:26,064
Speaker 4: the politicians in America have chosen to ignore. Maybe one

766
00:41:26,143 --> 00:41:29,424
Speaker 4: reason is because the extent and scale of it is

767
00:41:29,504 --> 00:41:32,823
Speaker 4: so frightening and scary that they don't want to turn

768
00:41:32,864 --> 00:41:35,024
Speaker 4: over the stone. They want to look under the rock.

769
00:41:35,584 --> 00:41:38,104
Speaker 4: We've got that here now, you know, with our royal

770
00:41:38,143 --> 00:41:41,863
Speaker 4: family and serious trouble. I believe because they didn't act

771
00:41:41,944 --> 00:41:44,783
Speaker 4: quickly enough on this and shut it down years ago.

772
00:41:46,104 --> 00:41:49,303
Speaker 2: Yeah, and I'm skeptical that the investigators here are really

773
00:41:49,344 --> 00:41:52,703
Speaker 2: going to dig it. There's no professional benefit to dig

774
00:41:52,743 --> 00:41:55,423
Speaker 2: into these things now with this administration. You'll just get

775
00:41:56,104 --> 00:41:58,904
Speaker 2: fired or attact, and so I hope others British and

776
00:41:58,944 --> 00:42:01,304
Speaker 2: others are doing it, or that will happen in due time.

777
00:42:14,104 --> 00:42:17,144
Speaker 2: So what was it like to become a front page

778
00:42:17,263 --> 00:42:20,784
Speaker 2: character in American politics that the President of the United

779
00:42:20,824 --> 00:42:23,823
Speaker 2: States attack personally and regularly?

780
00:42:23,944 --> 00:42:24,024
Speaker 3: Like?

781
00:42:24,104 --> 00:42:26,663
Speaker 2: How did that change your day to day life, your security?

782
00:42:27,024 --> 00:42:29,863
Speaker 2: How did professionally emotionally? So what was that like?

783
00:42:30,143 --> 00:42:31,423
Speaker 3: Can you still come to us?

784
00:42:32,143 --> 00:42:33,224
Speaker 4: Probably not at the moment.

785
00:42:33,344 --> 00:42:34,183
Speaker 3: No, I wouldn't.

786
00:42:34,263 --> 00:42:36,423
Speaker 4: I think it would be most unwise. I did come

787
00:42:36,464 --> 00:42:39,344
Speaker 4: to launch the book in October twenty four. Obviously I

788
00:42:39,344 --> 00:42:41,303
Speaker 4: had a clean bill of health at that point. But

789
00:42:41,743 --> 00:42:44,343
Speaker 4: is suspect I mean cash, don't forget cash. Bartel came

790
00:42:44,384 --> 00:42:48,383
Speaker 4: to London when he was working at the House Intelligence Committee,

791
00:42:48,703 --> 00:42:50,623
Speaker 4: literally to try and hunt me down. He came to

792
00:42:50,663 --> 00:42:53,904
Speaker 4: my office, I tried to come to our solicitor's office,

793
00:42:53,984 --> 00:42:58,904
Speaker 4: our lawyer's office. Totally unauthorized, I mean, a complete rogue operator.

794
00:42:59,344 --> 00:43:01,623
Speaker 4: He's now head of the FBI. But if the head

795
00:43:01,663 --> 00:43:04,584
Speaker 4: of the FBI has a sworn personal enemy of you, you're

796
00:43:04,623 --> 00:43:07,743
Speaker 4: not going to step into his potential trap. So I

797
00:43:07,743 --> 00:43:10,104
Speaker 4: can't come to the US, which is ironic given how

798
00:43:10,223 --> 00:43:14,264
Speaker 4: close I was to American intelligence and politics and business

799
00:43:14,304 --> 00:43:17,584
Speaker 4: over decades. Half my family were American and et cetera.

800
00:43:18,143 --> 00:43:21,463
Speaker 4: I can't come back, and that's why. So I think

801
00:43:21,504 --> 00:43:23,984
Speaker 4: that it's it's very difficult and how did it feel? Well,

802
00:43:24,024 --> 00:43:26,104
Speaker 4: it's coplee areal, of course, isn't it, John. I mean,

803
00:43:26,703 --> 00:43:29,024
Speaker 4: you can imagine It's like a nuclear bomb going off.

804
00:43:29,104 --> 00:43:31,424
Speaker 4: I'd spent my whole career in the shadows. I've been

805
00:43:31,464 --> 00:43:34,703
Speaker 4: at central things, but never part of the story, and

806
00:43:34,824 --> 00:43:37,784
Speaker 4: suddenly I was on. My name was on every single

807
00:43:37,864 --> 00:43:41,343
Speaker 4: newspaper in the world. It's just I suspect there's never

808
00:43:41,384 --> 00:43:43,743
Speaker 4: been a case quite like it, and that may never

809
00:43:43,783 --> 00:43:44,304
Speaker 4: be again.

810
00:43:44,584 --> 00:43:47,343
Speaker 2: Our friend Peter Struck, in a smaller fashion, was one

811
00:43:47,344 --> 00:43:50,344
Speaker 2: of these people that was attacked, and another very serious

812
00:43:50,344 --> 00:43:53,464
Speaker 2: professional person doing work, no intention for it to ever

813
00:43:53,504 --> 00:43:56,264
Speaker 2: have a public face whatsoever, and all of a suddenly

814
00:43:56,384 --> 00:43:59,024
Speaker 2: president attacks you. This is something that we've never really

815
00:43:59,024 --> 00:43:59,863
Speaker 2: experienced here.

816
00:44:00,663 --> 00:44:03,343
Speaker 4: And the President's still attacking me. I mean, when this

817
00:44:03,824 --> 00:44:07,904
Speaker 4: epsty thing popped up last summer, having been quiet about

818
00:44:07,904 --> 00:44:10,224
Speaker 4: it since I'd beaten in me court here in London,

819
00:44:10,623 --> 00:44:12,904
Speaker 4: he started going on about me again and naming me

820
00:44:12,984 --> 00:44:15,783
Speaker 4: in the White House, in the Oval Office, and then

821
00:44:15,824 --> 00:44:19,223
Speaker 4: over here when he's a press conference, and very significantly,

822
00:44:19,223 --> 00:44:20,984
Speaker 4: because I think trub gives the game away a lot

823
00:44:21,024 --> 00:44:25,384
Speaker 4: of the time, sort of consciousness of guilt, he started

824
00:44:25,424 --> 00:44:29,184
Speaker 4: talking about, oh, the Epstein hoax, just like the Russia hoax,

825
00:44:29,783 --> 00:44:33,464
Speaker 4: and I thought, I wonder if there's a link. He

826
00:44:34,263 --> 00:44:36,904
Speaker 4: thinks all knows that the Russians have Epstein or the

827
00:44:36,904 --> 00:44:39,544
Speaker 4: Epstein material in their possession, and therefore he's trying to

828
00:44:39,584 --> 00:44:42,663
Speaker 4: discredit one off the back of trying to discredit the other.

829
00:44:43,223 --> 00:44:46,064
Speaker 2: Did any institutions in the UK or the US provide

830
00:44:46,104 --> 00:44:48,383
Speaker 2: any meaningful protection or guidance for.

831
00:44:48,384 --> 00:44:54,623
Speaker 4: You, Yes and no. Not in the US, and we

832
00:44:54,663 --> 00:44:56,624
Speaker 4: could come back to that. But in the UK yes,

833
00:44:56,663 --> 00:45:02,703
Speaker 4: my former service were reasonably supportive, but they that they

834
00:45:02,743 --> 00:45:05,504
Speaker 4: were only up to a point supportive, and in fact

835
00:45:06,104 --> 00:45:08,423
Speaker 4: there was a disagreement there because the person I took

836
00:45:08,464 --> 00:45:12,464
Speaker 4: the intelligence to as far, who subsequently died very sadly

837
00:45:12,544 --> 00:45:15,544
Speaker 4: of cancer, was hugely supportive of what we've done and

838
00:45:15,623 --> 00:45:18,544
Speaker 4: wanted to follow it up and protect us and everything else.

839
00:45:18,584 --> 00:45:21,663
Speaker 4: And he was overruled effectively by the Prime Minister of

840
00:45:21,663 --> 00:45:24,623
Speaker 4: the day, Theresa May, who then set about trying to

841
00:45:24,623 --> 00:45:27,064
Speaker 4: deny that we were anything to do with the government,

842
00:45:27,104 --> 00:45:30,183
Speaker 4: even though I'd literally had in my office I think

843
00:45:30,223 --> 00:45:33,343
Speaker 4: a week before the dossier story broke, suddenly from the

844
00:45:33,384 --> 00:45:36,784
Speaker 4: Cabinet Office described discussing one of their papers on Russia

845
00:45:36,824 --> 00:45:39,384
Speaker 4: with me. So it was hugely disappointed in the degree

846
00:45:39,384 --> 00:45:42,823
Speaker 4: of political cowardice that came out of this around me

847
00:45:42,984 --> 00:45:45,584
Speaker 4: was the real eye opener, I think, and probably political

848
00:45:45,623 --> 00:45:47,944
Speaker 4: cowardice is the theme of the moment.

849
00:45:48,183 --> 00:45:51,263
Speaker 3: So John has mentioned how it's impected you with the

850
00:45:51,304 --> 00:45:53,864
Speaker 3: things that's really important to me and to our national

851
00:45:54,104 --> 00:46:00,064
Speaker 3: both our national national securities is the relationship between the

852
00:46:00,143 --> 00:46:02,743
Speaker 3: US and the UK and the Five Eyes, And with

853
00:46:03,263 --> 00:46:06,424
Speaker 3: the Trump administration going off at it and its own

854
00:46:06,864 --> 00:46:11,783
Speaker 3: uncertainty about NATO close to with the Russians, it's extraordinarily

855
00:46:11,783 --> 00:46:16,104
Speaker 3: difficult to understand. Do you have a feeling on whither

856
00:46:16,464 --> 00:46:21,984
Speaker 3: Five Eyes and whether the US UK intelligence relationship and

857
00:46:22,064 --> 00:46:25,544
Speaker 3: would you be willing to venture the era or sort

858
00:46:25,544 --> 00:46:28,143
Speaker 3: of a prediction. Can we get over this three years

859
00:46:28,143 --> 00:46:30,184
Speaker 3: from now if things go well, or is the damage

860
00:46:30,223 --> 00:46:30,784
Speaker 3: so deep.

861
00:46:30,623 --> 00:46:32,863
Speaker 4: That I don't know. I don't think we could say,

862
00:46:32,984 --> 00:46:35,504
Speaker 4: we can't say. I think the point is that there

863
00:46:35,544 --> 00:46:38,584
Speaker 4: are still a lot of good people in the intelligence

864
00:46:38,584 --> 00:46:42,744
Speaker 4: community and the dramatic community in America and for America

865
00:46:43,143 --> 00:46:46,464
Speaker 4: who are trying to do the right things, and I

866
00:46:46,544 --> 00:46:51,224
Speaker 4: understand are actively undermining some of the directives they're getting

867
00:46:51,263 --> 00:46:54,143
Speaker 4: from the top. There's even a suggestion that Wick, Coff

868
00:46:54,183 --> 00:46:56,823
Speaker 4: and Rubio are trying to undermine each other on a

869
00:46:56,864 --> 00:47:00,584
Speaker 4: daily basis take over the Ukraine negotiations. So it's a

870
00:47:00,623 --> 00:47:03,143
Speaker 4: very mixed picture. But of course, what I mentioned to

871
00:47:03,183 --> 00:47:05,704
Speaker 4: you earlier, which is the fact that at mar Largo

872
00:47:05,864 --> 00:47:09,303
Speaker 4: there were British nuclear secrets taken and nobody knows quite

873
00:47:09,304 --> 00:47:11,984
Speaker 4: what happened to them, although they were recovered. I believe

874
00:47:12,024 --> 00:47:15,263
Speaker 4: the documents obviously, that's how we know they were. There's

875
00:47:15,304 --> 00:47:18,104
Speaker 4: a real pause for thought that some of our most

876
00:47:18,143 --> 00:47:21,744
Speaker 4: precious national secrets were being treated, at the very best,

877
00:47:21,783 --> 00:47:25,383
Speaker 4: in an utterly cavalier manner by Trump and his supporters

878
00:47:25,384 --> 00:47:28,984
Speaker 4: and his enablers, and at worst were being traded in

879
00:47:29,024 --> 00:47:32,584
Speaker 4: some way with foreign interests and foreign powers. So that's

880
00:47:32,623 --> 00:47:36,183
Speaker 4: a very serious matter, and it's one which my government

881
00:47:36,304 --> 00:47:39,223
Speaker 4: here is very afraid to address and to recognize. In fact,

882
00:47:39,263 --> 00:47:43,064
Speaker 4: they denied eventually on the record that this was the case,

883
00:47:43,104 --> 00:47:45,143
Speaker 4: and yeah, I know it was. I think there's an

884
00:47:45,223 --> 00:47:48,663
Speaker 4: understanding of this. There's also an understand there's a hope

885
00:47:48,703 --> 00:47:51,303
Speaker 4: if you like, it's the hope that kills, isn't it

886
00:47:51,384 --> 00:47:54,343
Speaker 4: not the not the instant they say, his hope that

887
00:47:54,424 --> 00:47:57,503
Speaker 4: kills you. That this is an aberration and the US

888
00:47:57,544 --> 00:47:59,584
Speaker 4: will go back to what it was before. Well, I

889
00:47:59,623 --> 00:48:05,104
Speaker 4: suppose before twenty twenty four, but certainly before twenty twenty sixteen.

890
00:48:05,384 --> 00:48:07,544
Speaker 4: I'm not so sure. I have to say, I think

891
00:48:07,584 --> 00:48:10,584
Speaker 4: the jury's out, and I would be very reluctant to

892
00:48:10,623 --> 00:48:13,424
Speaker 4: the moment to share intelligence from high level sources on

893
00:48:13,504 --> 00:48:15,783
Speaker 4: the key issues with America in any way that we'll

894
00:48:15,783 --> 00:48:18,504
Speaker 4: get to Trump in the PDB or otherwise, whether it's Russia,

895
00:48:18,584 --> 00:48:20,504
Speaker 4: China or the Middle East. And I think we're going

896
00:48:20,544 --> 00:48:24,064
Speaker 4: to see now a rift actually between Britain and the

897
00:48:24,183 --> 00:48:27,464
Speaker 4: US over Iran. I think it's already happening, and it's

898
00:48:27,544 --> 00:48:30,984
Speaker 4: quite interesting to see NeSSI Yahoo, the Israeli Prime Minister

899
00:48:31,104 --> 00:48:33,783
Speaker 4: turning up in Washington and shaking hands with Trump. You

900
00:48:33,824 --> 00:48:35,944
Speaker 4: can't even come to Britain any longer because he's an

901
00:48:35,944 --> 00:48:38,383
Speaker 4: indicted war criminal. These are the things that are going

902
00:48:38,424 --> 00:48:40,864
Speaker 4: to play out. I think over the next few years.

903
00:48:41,504 --> 00:48:43,504
Speaker 2: I think you're right. I don't think most of the

904
00:48:43,504 --> 00:48:47,864
Speaker 2: public understands the importance and the depth of our relationships

905
00:48:47,904 --> 00:48:50,983
Speaker 2: on military, diplomatic, intelligence things and how much we help

906
00:48:51,024 --> 00:48:55,143
Speaker 2: each other, and by throwing those things away, how damages

907
00:48:55,304 --> 00:48:57,863
Speaker 2: is going to be to US national security even now,

908
00:48:57,904 --> 00:49:02,624
Speaker 2: Like there's so many US bases for military in Europe

909
00:49:02,623 --> 00:49:05,703
Speaker 2: that are necessary if you really believe it makes sense

910
00:49:05,743 --> 00:49:08,303
Speaker 2: to go after Iran, you're going to need those things

911
00:49:08,304 --> 00:49:11,984
Speaker 2: in Europe, and Europe could easily say in the future, no, sorry,

912
00:49:12,024 --> 00:49:12,303
Speaker 2: we're not.

913
00:49:12,663 --> 00:49:15,944
Speaker 4: I think we're saying you know now, I understand. Just

914
00:49:15,984 --> 00:49:17,903
Speaker 4: going back to the previous point. You know, we used

915
00:49:17,944 --> 00:49:20,584
Speaker 4: to get statistics come back to us about how many

916
00:49:20,584 --> 00:49:23,304
Speaker 4: of our reports that appeared or feature in the PDB,

917
00:49:23,464 --> 00:49:26,343
Speaker 4: the Presidential Daily Briefing. That was something we were really

918
00:49:26,384 --> 00:49:28,183
Speaker 4: proud of back in the day. I think you'd be

919
00:49:28,263 --> 00:49:31,703
Speaker 4: terrified now of people your reppause were in the.

920
00:49:32,104 --> 00:49:33,864
Speaker 2: Let me ask you a little bit about your Russia

921
00:49:33,904 --> 00:49:37,823
Speaker 2: experience and how it might help us understand US politics

922
00:49:37,904 --> 00:49:42,064
Speaker 2: right now. But how are our politics becoming like Russia

923
00:49:42,143 --> 00:49:44,584
Speaker 2: based on your Russia experience? One of the things I

924
00:49:44,623 --> 00:49:47,703
Speaker 2: see is this administration seems very good at creating a

925
00:49:47,743 --> 00:49:50,944
Speaker 2: false narrative that it then uses for its political benefit.

926
00:49:50,984 --> 00:49:52,703
Speaker 2: And I think that's something I think we saw quite

927
00:49:52,703 --> 00:49:55,743
Speaker 2: a bit in Russia. And to give an example, I

928
00:49:55,783 --> 00:49:58,944
Speaker 2: see in the intelligence community now, the top leaders of

929
00:49:58,944 --> 00:50:03,184
Speaker 2: our intelligence community are declassifying material. They're cherry picking, they're

930
00:50:03,263 --> 00:50:06,704
Speaker 2: declassifying specific things to fit a narrative that they want,

931
00:50:07,104 --> 00:50:10,064
Speaker 2: even if that report that came out might not actually

932
00:50:10,104 --> 00:50:13,143
Speaker 2: be something that was then verified or made sense or

933
00:50:13,344 --> 00:50:15,703
Speaker 2: fit into the larger pattern or the analyst that it's

934
00:50:15,743 --> 00:50:19,664
Speaker 2: not true. They're declassifying because they want to create a story.

935
00:50:19,703 --> 00:50:21,984
Speaker 2: They want to change what the past looks like, and

936
00:50:22,024 --> 00:50:24,743
Speaker 2: they want to change what information comes to them in

937
00:50:24,783 --> 00:50:27,424
Speaker 2: the future. And so that seems very Russian to me.

938
00:50:27,783 --> 00:50:29,424
Speaker 2: So do you see those same parallels that I do,

939
00:50:29,464 --> 00:50:31,303
Speaker 2: And what does your Russian experience tell you about that?

940
00:50:31,904 --> 00:50:35,544
Speaker 4: Yeah, I think it tells me that Trump would quite

941
00:50:35,623 --> 00:50:38,943
Speaker 4: like to run America as Putin runs Russia. Let's put

942
00:50:38,984 --> 00:50:42,263
Speaker 4: it like that, that he wants a situation where there's

943
00:50:42,304 --> 00:50:46,024
Speaker 4: an oligarchic class who create and manage wealth for the

944
00:50:46,024 --> 00:50:50,104
Speaker 4: political leadership, and that they couch themselves they wrap themselves

945
00:50:50,183 --> 00:50:52,984
Speaker 4: in a nationalist sort of blanket, and I think that

946
00:50:53,104 --> 00:50:55,904
Speaker 4: is what's happening in America. I think the difference is

947
00:50:55,944 --> 00:51:01,464
Speaker 4: obviously America is a massively sophisticated society, pluralist society, very

948
00:51:01,504 --> 00:51:05,344
Speaker 4: strong civil society. But I think fundamentally the big difference,

949
00:51:05,504 --> 00:51:08,223
Speaker 4: and this will tell in the end, is a rule

950
00:51:08,223 --> 00:51:10,344
Speaker 4: of law. And we've seen it today where the tariffs

951
00:51:10,344 --> 00:51:13,064
Speaker 4: have been voted down. And despite the fact that Trump

952
00:51:13,143 --> 00:51:15,784
Speaker 4: has tried to stuff the courts with as many judges

953
00:51:15,824 --> 00:51:18,864
Speaker 4: as he possibly can and has you know, in terms

954
00:51:18,864 --> 00:51:22,864
Speaker 4: of the Supreme Court certainly things he's got a majority

955
00:51:22,904 --> 00:51:26,303
Speaker 4: of yes men and women in there. The reality is

956
00:51:26,344 --> 00:51:30,183
Speaker 4: that what led to Russia becoming reverting so easy to

957
00:51:30,223 --> 00:51:33,903
Speaker 4: autocracy after two thousand was the weakness of the rule

958
00:51:33,944 --> 00:51:36,584
Speaker 4: of law and the independence of the judiciary. And that

959
00:51:36,703 --> 00:51:39,623
Speaker 4: is not the case in America. And my hope and

960
00:51:39,944 --> 00:51:43,784
Speaker 4: my belief is that in the end the law will prevail.

961
00:51:43,864 --> 00:51:46,703
Speaker 4: The rule of law will prevail in America. The Congress

962
00:51:46,703 --> 00:51:50,784
Speaker 4: has failed totally at the moment to act as checks

963
00:51:50,783 --> 00:51:53,303
Speaker 4: and balances, But I think the rule of law is

964
00:51:53,344 --> 00:51:55,143
Speaker 4: and that's where the great hope has got to be.

965
00:51:55,783 --> 00:51:58,544
Speaker 3: Both you and John have dealt with Russians in Russian

966
00:51:58,544 --> 00:52:04,104
Speaker 3: ear Russian I would say Russian patriots who can't abide

967
00:52:04,143 --> 00:52:07,544
Speaker 3: the Russian government, the totalitarian, authoritarian government that they have,

968
00:52:07,984 --> 00:52:10,584
Speaker 3: And often how we find the true about what happened

969
00:52:10,584 --> 00:52:13,984
Speaker 3: in Russia is through espionage. The spies come out and

970
00:52:14,024 --> 00:52:17,304
Speaker 3: they have to tell us the truth. Can you think now,

971
00:52:17,783 --> 00:52:23,623
Speaker 3: what sort of Russian would trust CIA now or American

972
00:52:23,703 --> 00:52:26,383
Speaker 3: intelligence if they were to come out and say I've

973
00:52:26,384 --> 00:52:30,584
Speaker 3: got the goods on Epstein, who would they go? And

974
00:52:30,743 --> 00:52:32,743
Speaker 3: hopefully they would go to the Brits? Who did they

975
00:52:32,783 --> 00:52:37,183
Speaker 3: go to? Who does a potential Russian spy patriot, you know,

976
00:52:37,263 --> 00:52:40,064
Speaker 3: a new Tolkachev, how would they reach out?

977
00:52:41,223 --> 00:52:44,064
Speaker 4: I think it depends what they're motivated by. I always

978
00:52:44,104 --> 00:52:47,104
Speaker 4: thought there were some differences between US and the Americans

979
00:52:47,703 --> 00:52:50,703
Speaker 4: in this, in that the Americans always had much more

980
00:52:50,743 --> 00:52:53,544
Speaker 4: resource to throw at these things, and if people were

981
00:52:53,584 --> 00:52:57,384
Speaker 4: motivated by resources, they'd probably go to the Americans. The

982
00:52:57,424 --> 00:53:01,264
Speaker 4: Brits have this quaint way of cultivating people and creating

983
00:53:01,304 --> 00:53:04,424
Speaker 4: trust in the long term with people, and former colleagues

984
00:53:04,424 --> 00:53:07,663
Speaker 4: were great at this, and they built up hugely positive

985
00:53:07,703 --> 00:53:11,464
Speaker 4: relations of trust with Russian over many years. Those Russians

986
00:53:11,464 --> 00:53:13,584
Speaker 4: who are motivated, as we say, more by ethics and

987
00:53:13,623 --> 00:53:17,064
Speaker 4: ideology were more likely to gravitate to US, and those

988
00:53:17,104 --> 00:53:20,663
Speaker 4: that were more motivated by resources were more like to

989
00:53:20,703 --> 00:53:24,584
Speaker 4: gravitate to the US. I think, and the US had

990
00:53:25,584 --> 00:53:29,104
Speaker 4: John Will know this to some extent. The Americans were

991
00:53:29,143 --> 00:53:32,623
Speaker 4: always more prepared to use intelligence, some people would say,

992
00:53:32,703 --> 00:53:35,783
Speaker 4: leak intelligence for a political objective out there in the

993
00:53:35,824 --> 00:53:39,024
Speaker 4: real world, in the public square, than we were. So

994
00:53:39,504 --> 00:53:43,703
Speaker 4: if that Russian was particularly paranoid about being publicity or

995
00:53:43,703 --> 00:53:46,223
Speaker 4: his material appearing in the media and all the rest

996
00:53:46,263 --> 00:53:49,303
Speaker 4: of it, again, that had probably gravitated towards US. So

997
00:53:49,344 --> 00:53:52,024
Speaker 4: I think there are differences, but at the moment I

998
00:53:52,024 --> 00:53:53,823
Speaker 4: think the trust has broken. I mean, if I was

999
00:53:53,864 --> 00:53:57,343
Speaker 4: a Russian now, I would absolutely not work for the

1000
00:53:57,464 --> 00:54:00,863
Speaker 4: US intelligence services. Now there'll be people that already were

1001
00:54:00,904 --> 00:54:03,623
Speaker 4: and no doubt still aren't, and they have great case

1002
00:54:03,663 --> 00:54:06,584
Speaker 4: officers and a lot of reassurance and measures will be

1003
00:54:06,663 --> 00:54:09,903
Speaker 4: taken to protect them and keep their information away from

1004
00:54:09,984 --> 00:54:12,703
Speaker 4: some of these lunatics running the intelligence community now at

1005
00:54:12,783 --> 00:54:15,584
Speaker 4: Chelsea Gabbard. But it must be a very worrying time.

1006
00:54:15,623 --> 00:54:18,504
Speaker 4: And I referred earlier to the case of Aleik Smolankov,

1007
00:54:18,584 --> 00:54:20,943
Speaker 4: and this was back in the first Trump administration where

1008
00:54:20,944 --> 00:54:23,944
Speaker 4: a major source was being run inside the system in

1009
00:54:24,024 --> 00:54:26,584
Speaker 4: Russia and it was felt that source would not be

1010
00:54:26,663 --> 00:54:28,984
Speaker 4: able to stay there any longer because it was too dangerous.

1011
00:54:29,384 --> 00:54:31,864
Speaker 4: And believe me, we don't want defectors. We want people

1012
00:54:31,944 --> 00:54:34,223
Speaker 4: to work in place and to carry on working in

1013
00:54:34,304 --> 00:54:38,303
Speaker 4: situ and providing live feed intelligence rather than defecting and

1014
00:54:38,384 --> 00:54:41,663
Speaker 4: having an assessment done of what they've damaged caused. And

1015
00:54:41,783 --> 00:54:45,183
Speaker 4: also you know, closed down that line of reporting. So

1016
00:54:45,263 --> 00:54:47,143
Speaker 4: I think it's very clear at the moment, and with

1017
00:54:47,263 --> 00:54:49,104
Speaker 4: mar Laga and all the things I was saying about

1018
00:54:49,104 --> 00:54:53,343
Speaker 4: that that this utterly cavalt. It's doing massive damage to

1019
00:54:53,424 --> 00:54:56,584
Speaker 4: the US's reputation in places like Russia and China in

1020
00:54:56,663 --> 00:54:58,864
Speaker 4: terms of potential agent recruitment going forward.

1021
00:54:59,024 --> 00:55:01,984
Speaker 2: I totally agree that one thing that we had working

1022
00:55:02,024 --> 00:55:03,943
Speaker 2: for US in the US, it wasn't that we were

1023
00:55:04,223 --> 00:55:06,783
Speaker 2: better spies than anybody else, certainly, you know, doing it

1024
00:55:06,864 --> 00:55:08,703
Speaker 2: as long as the British or anything else. It said

1025
00:55:08,703 --> 00:55:10,544
Speaker 2: we represented the unat States, and there's a lot of

1026
00:55:10,544 --> 00:55:12,383
Speaker 2: people in the world who saw the United States as

1027
00:55:12,424 --> 00:55:15,343
Speaker 2: something special. You were a place to go if you

1028
00:55:15,384 --> 00:55:18,783
Speaker 2: were dealing with corrupt governments or the chance to change things.

1029
00:55:19,663 --> 00:55:21,944
Speaker 2: I don't know that we're the special place to go anymore,

1030
00:55:21,984 --> 00:55:23,943
Speaker 2: and I don't know that in that I think that's

1031
00:55:23,944 --> 00:55:25,823
Speaker 2: going to hurt us getting the kind of sources we

1032
00:55:25,864 --> 00:55:27,664
Speaker 2: need to understand the world going forward.

1033
00:55:27,703 --> 00:55:30,223
Speaker 4: And we don't know. We suspect and we see some

1034
00:55:30,344 --> 00:55:32,984
Speaker 4: of the evidence of this what exactly is going on

1035
00:55:33,584 --> 00:55:37,104
Speaker 4: in the high level level dialogue now between this administration

1036
00:55:37,344 --> 00:55:40,024
Speaker 4: and the people around it, Trump's family and so on,

1037
00:55:40,263 --> 00:55:43,463
Speaker 4: and the Russians, Because any Russian that's got sit into

1038
00:55:43,504 --> 00:55:46,384
Speaker 4: that is going to not be impressed, is going to

1039
00:55:46,384 --> 00:55:49,783
Speaker 4: think that America is becoming corrupt oligarchy like Russia, and

1040
00:55:49,864 --> 00:55:51,864
Speaker 4: it's going to be worried for their own security. I

1041
00:55:51,904 --> 00:55:53,823
Speaker 4: think there's a lot of very bad stuff going on

1042
00:55:54,424 --> 00:55:57,224
Speaker 4: in the background here where quid pro quos and business

1043
00:55:57,223 --> 00:55:59,903
Speaker 4: deals and so on are being spun out, sometimes through

1044
00:55:59,904 --> 00:56:03,703
Speaker 4: intermediate sometimes not. And that's a massive matter for concern,

1045
00:56:03,783 --> 00:56:07,663
Speaker 4: I think in intelligence work, because as you say, you know,

1046
00:56:07,703 --> 00:56:11,104
Speaker 4: America was this hugely powerful country and change to teach

1047
00:56:11,143 --> 00:56:14,464
Speaker 4: it the weather and the climate and everything else and

1048
00:56:14,584 --> 00:56:16,703
Speaker 4: the past and if you wanted something done, you would

1049
00:56:16,703 --> 00:56:20,384
Speaker 4: go to the Americans, sometimes to Us, but mainly directly.

1050
00:56:20,984 --> 00:56:24,584
Speaker 4: Now absolutely not the case, and I think Ukraine it's

1051
00:56:24,623 --> 00:56:27,223
Speaker 4: in particular if I was Ukrainian, I would not be

1052
00:56:27,304 --> 00:56:29,384
Speaker 4: trusting American government at the moment.

1053
00:56:30,263 --> 00:56:35,183
Speaker 2: So clearly Russian activity and active measures and subversion have

1054
00:56:35,304 --> 00:56:38,504
Speaker 2: had an impact here politically. It's damaged our politics and

1055
00:56:38,504 --> 00:56:41,584
Speaker 2: our damaged our trust in each other. But also in England,

1056
00:56:41,984 --> 00:56:46,464
Speaker 2: they really took advantage of financial laws, your lawyers, a

1057
00:56:46,504 --> 00:56:48,903
Speaker 2: lot of things they got into your system. What are

1058
00:56:48,944 --> 00:56:51,544
Speaker 2: the things that both of our countries that the West

1059
00:56:51,544 --> 00:56:54,784
Speaker 2: should do to try to protect against these Russian attacks

1060
00:56:54,783 --> 00:56:56,183
Speaker 2: we see in Europe now all these what do you

1061
00:56:56,183 --> 00:56:58,823
Speaker 2: want to call them hybrid attacks? They're hiring criminals and

1062
00:56:58,864 --> 00:57:02,064
Speaker 2: their sending drone and sabotage. To me, it seems like

1063
00:57:02,104 --> 00:57:04,263
Speaker 2: the way you hit back at them as you support Ukraine, right,

1064
00:57:04,263 --> 00:57:06,303
Speaker 2: that's where you cause the most damaged to putin. But

1065
00:57:06,384 --> 00:57:08,183
Speaker 2: like in terms of our laws and stuff, what do we.

1066
00:57:08,143 --> 00:57:11,143
Speaker 4: Do well, We're looking at one here in the UK

1067
00:57:11,223 --> 00:57:13,664
Speaker 4: at the moment where we have an elections bill coming

1068
00:57:13,703 --> 00:57:17,584
Speaker 4: into the Parliament in the next few weeks, where we've

1069
00:57:17,664 --> 00:57:20,984
Speaker 4: chipped in and contributed to the debate about it. Where

1070
00:57:20,984 --> 00:57:25,384
Speaker 4: things like crypto currency political donations are going to be outlawed,

1071
00:57:25,424 --> 00:57:28,344
Speaker 4: and where our Election Commission is going to be strengthened,

1072
00:57:28,384 --> 00:57:30,463
Speaker 4: and where unlimited companies are not going to be able

1073
00:57:30,504 --> 00:57:33,864
Speaker 4: to contribute, and where due diligence is going to be

1074
00:57:34,024 --> 00:57:37,944
Speaker 4: enforced within political parties and within the law with serious punishments.

1075
00:57:38,424 --> 00:57:41,624
Speaker 4: I think there's a lot we can do, particularly here

1076
00:57:41,624 --> 00:57:44,424
Speaker 4: now there is a consensus, a lot certainly between the

1077
00:57:44,424 --> 00:57:47,823
Speaker 4: main three political parties. Reform UK accepted that this has

1078
00:57:48,144 --> 00:57:51,304
Speaker 4: got to be stopped, and actually the Conservative Party has

1079
00:57:51,384 --> 00:57:54,704
Speaker 4: changed from being complicit in this and a beneficiary of

1080
00:57:54,704 --> 00:57:56,744
Speaker 4: this to being an opponent of it, which is a

1081
00:57:56,744 --> 00:57:59,224
Speaker 4: good thing. So there's no need for despair. But we

1082
00:57:59,264 --> 00:58:01,343
Speaker 4: need to tighten our laws. We need to make the

1083
00:58:01,384 --> 00:58:04,064
Speaker 4: public more aware of the threat. We need to explain

1084
00:58:04,144 --> 00:58:07,984
Speaker 4: how it's being exercised. And I think that we had

1085
00:58:08,024 --> 00:58:11,383
Speaker 4: a case here where an agent of influence, Nathan Gill,

1086
00:58:11,424 --> 00:58:13,704
Speaker 4: who was working for a form UK, was in prison

1087
00:58:13,744 --> 00:58:16,104
Speaker 4: for ten years for working as an agent of influence

1088
00:58:16,184 --> 00:58:18,584
Speaker 4: for the Kremlin. So I think there's a lot going

1089
00:58:18,584 --> 00:58:20,864
Speaker 4: on and hopefully it's moving in the right direction.

1090
00:58:21,064 --> 00:58:24,504
Speaker 3: So Christopher can give us any sort of glimpse of

1091
00:58:24,544 --> 00:58:27,384
Speaker 3: hope on the horizon. Is there any reason to be

1092
00:58:27,504 --> 00:58:31,544
Speaker 3: confident hopefully that American democracy is more resilient than we

1093
00:58:31,704 --> 00:58:34,023
Speaker 3: than we realize, or that we're discussing here on the show,

1094
00:58:34,224 --> 00:58:37,383
Speaker 3: or that NATO may prove to be more resilient either

1095
00:58:37,464 --> 00:58:41,264
Speaker 3: without the United States intelligence officers tend not to be

1096
00:58:41,624 --> 00:58:46,184
Speaker 3: optimistic guys. But I don't like but but at the

1097
00:58:46,304 --> 00:58:47,624
Speaker 3: end of the day, we sort of have to be

1098
00:58:47,704 --> 00:58:48,304
Speaker 3: right because.

1099
00:58:48,064 --> 00:58:52,904
Speaker 4: We're I'm yeah by Nhure. I was always known in

1100
00:58:52,944 --> 00:58:55,744
Speaker 4: the business as the guy, the glass half full guy,

1101
00:58:55,864 --> 00:58:58,624
Speaker 4: rather than the class half empty that was Chris Burrow's

1102
00:58:58,624 --> 00:59:01,024
Speaker 4: mind partner. I think there were two things I would say.

1103
00:59:01,024 --> 00:59:04,704
Speaker 4: One is that an object for hope and confirm today,

1104
00:59:04,704 --> 00:59:08,304
Speaker 4: I think is the American legal system will prevent you

1105
00:59:08,424 --> 00:59:11,224
Speaker 4: becoming a fully authoritarian state. And I think that is

1106
00:59:11,264 --> 00:59:14,544
Speaker 4: a massive plus. The other thing that's a massive plus

1107
00:59:14,584 --> 00:59:17,104
Speaker 4: is just how weak Russia really is. And when people

1108
00:59:17,144 --> 00:59:20,344
Speaker 4: realize that they're enforces are shot, their economy is shot,

1109
00:59:20,824 --> 00:59:23,664
Speaker 4: and even China is in big trouble. It's one child

1110
00:59:23,664 --> 00:59:26,704
Speaker 4: policy is going to have a horrendous effect on its economy.

1111
00:59:26,864 --> 00:59:29,424
Speaker 4: In terms of dependency of older people in the population

1112
00:59:29,584 --> 00:59:33,624
Speaker 4: going forward. And these people don't actually trust each other.

1113
00:59:33,704 --> 00:59:36,304
Speaker 4: These countries can't trust each other, they don't do alliances

1114
00:59:36,344 --> 00:59:39,304
Speaker 4: like we do, they don't have that collective strength. I

1115
00:59:39,304 --> 00:59:41,624
Speaker 4: think all of those things are true, and they're all

1116
00:59:41,744 --> 00:59:43,104
Speaker 4: reasons to be optimistic.

1117
00:59:43,584 --> 00:59:46,104
Speaker 3: So you're saying they're just more fucked up than we are.

1118
00:59:47,224 --> 00:59:50,504
Speaker 4: They don't do trust, they don't do alliances, they don't

1119
00:59:50,504 --> 00:59:53,903
Speaker 4: do the sort of relationships that I had with John

1120
00:59:53,944 --> 00:59:56,824
Speaker 4: and his colleagues in the past. This just doesn't happen

1121
00:59:56,864 --> 00:59:59,984
Speaker 4: in these places. It's not what's done. They are incapable

1122
01:00:00,024 --> 01:00:02,024
Speaker 4: of doing it because of the system they're living in.

1123
01:00:02,304 --> 01:00:04,824
Speaker 4: And it's a system which is fundamentally corrupt and dishonest,

1124
01:00:04,864 --> 01:00:07,863
Speaker 4: and it will not end up stronger than our US

1125
01:00:07,864 --> 01:00:10,504
Speaker 4: and our pluralists democrats rule of lole system.

1126
01:00:10,664 --> 01:00:13,304
Speaker 2: And they also don't do immigration right, and so that

1127
01:00:13,344 --> 01:00:16,584
Speaker 2: they have problems with bursts and growth that we can

1128
01:00:16,624 --> 01:00:19,184
Speaker 2: still do. We're obviously pushing against immigration now. One of

1129
01:00:19,224 --> 01:00:20,984
Speaker 2: the things I think also that's going to make this

1130
01:00:21,464 --> 01:00:24,343
Speaker 2: better for us is the Russians always go too far

1131
01:00:24,384 --> 01:00:26,464
Speaker 2: and screw things up. Like I remember after nine to eleven,

1132
01:00:26,904 --> 01:00:29,144
Speaker 2: I was the deputy of our Russia group working worldwid

1133
01:00:29,184 --> 01:00:32,584
Speaker 2: Russian things work over Moscow, and I remember talking and

1134
01:00:32,624 --> 01:00:35,144
Speaker 2: they were starting to pull people off into counter terrorism work,

1135
01:00:35,144 --> 01:00:37,584
Speaker 2: which made sense obviously at the time. I remember the

1136
01:00:37,624 --> 01:00:40,824
Speaker 2: head working with the head of the area that oversaw

1137
01:00:40,864 --> 01:00:42,983
Speaker 2: Russia stuff talking to someone and he's don't worry about

1138
01:00:42,984 --> 01:00:45,184
Speaker 2: this putin In. The Russians will do something that's so

1139
01:00:45,224 --> 01:00:47,584
Speaker 2: stupid that we'll start to put resources back into doing

1140
01:00:47,664 --> 01:00:50,144
Speaker 2: Russia stuff. And it's true, like you could argue that

1141
01:00:50,544 --> 01:00:53,504
Speaker 2: Putin really had his way after twenty sixteen and stuff,

1142
01:00:53,544 --> 01:00:56,904
Speaker 2: that this invasion of Ukraine has now taken the blinders

1143
01:00:56,904 --> 01:00:59,104
Speaker 2: off of everybody. His ability to do these hybrid tax

1144
01:00:59,184 --> 01:01:02,024
Speaker 2: has got harder. Now everybody understands he's a bad actor.

1145
01:01:02,344 --> 01:01:04,624
Speaker 2: Everybody understands he's willing to invade his neighbors, and so

1146
01:01:04,664 --> 01:01:06,943
Speaker 2: it's going to be harder for him to use any

1147
01:01:07,064 --> 01:01:10,624
Speaker 2: kind of covert or soft power whatsoever. Listen, we've kept

1148
01:01:10,664 --> 01:01:13,664
Speaker 2: you way too long, and we really we could talk

1149
01:01:13,664 --> 01:01:16,544
Speaker 2: to you forever. I would encourage people to read your book,

1150
01:01:16,864 --> 01:01:19,104
Speaker 2: But what are some other things that people are interested

1151
01:01:19,144 --> 01:01:21,664
Speaker 2: in this and haven't been following you? Is there a

1152
01:01:21,704 --> 01:01:23,863
Speaker 2: way that they can, or are you just happy to

1153
01:01:23,904 --> 01:01:26,744
Speaker 2: go back and work privately for the company and move

1154
01:01:26,744 --> 01:01:27,383
Speaker 2: forward that way.

1155
01:01:28,064 --> 01:01:31,384
Speaker 4: I do make quite a lot of media interventions on

1156
01:01:31,464 --> 01:01:34,664
Speaker 4: all sorts of issues, and it's almost daily, frankly, that

1157
01:01:34,744 --> 01:01:38,264
Speaker 4: there is a Russia related or an intelligence related story

1158
01:01:38,304 --> 01:01:40,624
Speaker 4: going around, so you can catch me on the media.

1159
01:01:40,664 --> 01:01:42,464
Speaker 4: It's a shame that the US media is not more

1160
01:01:42,504 --> 01:01:44,863
Speaker 4: engaged with me. I think they're afraid to be. I

1161
01:01:44,904 --> 01:01:47,904
Speaker 4: think my publisher was afraid to promote my book properly

1162
01:01:47,944 --> 01:01:50,744
Speaker 4: in the US, having invested heavily in it. And I

1163
01:01:50,784 --> 01:01:54,224
Speaker 4: think that, as I say, political cowardice is the seam

1164
01:01:54,264 --> 01:01:56,104
Speaker 4: of the moment, and that's what we've got to combat.

1165
01:01:56,224 --> 01:01:59,943
Speaker 3: Christopher is the saying in German, feel fine, feel air,

1166
01:02:00,544 --> 01:02:03,744
Speaker 3: which means the more enemies you have, the more honor

1167
01:02:03,784 --> 01:02:05,744
Speaker 3: you likely have. So I think you've got to be

1168
01:02:05,784 --> 01:02:08,704
Speaker 3: one of the more honorable guys. That that's the most

1169
01:02:08,704 --> 01:02:09,784
Speaker 3: honorable guy I know.

1170
01:02:10,864 --> 01:02:12,584
Speaker 2: But we're not one of your enemies. So thank you

1171
01:02:12,704 --> 01:02:15,064
Speaker 2: so much for spending time with us. We really appreciate it.

1172
01:02:19,144 --> 01:02:24,184
Speaker 5: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'sha, John Cipher,

1173
01:02:24,504 --> 01:02:25,784
Speaker 5: and Jonathan Stern.

1174
01:02:25,984 --> 01:02:28,344
Speaker 1: The associate producer is Rachel Harner.

1175
01:02:28,584 --> 01:02:32,383
Speaker 5: Mission Implausible is a production of honorable mention and abominable

1176
01:02:32,424 --> 01:02:34,383
Speaker 5: pictures for iHeart Podcasts.