WEBVTT - Are ETFs Killing Future Stock Market Returns?

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to a Trilliance. I'm Joel Wepper and I'm Eric

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<v Speaker 1>call Tunics. So Eric and all of our time together,

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<v Speaker 1>I think I've missed only a couple interviews and this

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<v Speaker 1>was one of them, which I'm bummed about because you

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<v Speaker 1>went into a research territory and uh and and talk

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<v Speaker 1>to somebody about UM indexing. And I always like to

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<v Speaker 1>know more about this space because it's not maybe directly

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<v Speaker 1>linked to sort of takeaway investment advice, but it informs

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<v Speaker 1>how e t f s are structured and how investors

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<v Speaker 1>might need to think about the space overall. So joining us, um,

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<v Speaker 1>Joining you on this episode of Trilliance was Martin Schmalls,

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<v Speaker 1>who's a professor at the University of Oxford's Business School

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<v Speaker 1>where he teaches finance and economics. He recently wrote a paper.

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<v Speaker 1>CO wrote a paper index funds, asset prices and the

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<v Speaker 1>Welfare of Investors. Why did you want to talk to him? Yeah, UM,

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<v Speaker 1>passive is growing. Ets taken all this money, index fense

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<v Speaker 1>taken all this money, and people like to study them. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>People have been commenting on the rise of passive in

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<v Speaker 1>the worries. You know, it's a whole chapter in my

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<v Speaker 1>vocal book. Some worry and there's been all these worries

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<v Speaker 1>and UM, this particular person I've met over Twitter and

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<v Speaker 1>we've debated a little bit. Nice guy, UM, really smart.

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<v Speaker 1>I think between the two of us, he brings up

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<v Speaker 1>our average i Q about fifteen points. As you can

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<v Speaker 1>see from his credentials, he knows what he's doing and

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<v Speaker 1>he's studied in his latest paper, the idea that index

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<v Speaker 1>funds might even be too good for their own good

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<v Speaker 1>because they're so good and cheap. They're basically allowing more

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<v Speaker 1>people to come into the market and that is going

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<v Speaker 1>to decrease expected returns in the future, which UM is

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<v Speaker 1>to the it doesn't benefit anybody going forward. It's sort

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<v Speaker 1>of like bad for the common good. And this is

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<v Speaker 1>one of a couple other common good arguments UM that

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<v Speaker 1>have been made by academics. So we also discussed common ownership,

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<v Speaker 1>which is another one which we'll go into. I won't

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<v Speaker 1>you know ruin it now, but basically, if you are

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<v Speaker 1>an next funder passive owner, UM, you know what what

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<v Speaker 1>is happening with your money? Like, what are the larger

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<v Speaker 1>ripple effects and implications? Is there anything to worry about?

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<v Speaker 1>Do we need public policy on this and that's what

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<v Speaker 1>we explored, and we covered a lot. You know, I

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<v Speaker 1>know you weren't here, but we I must have asked

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<v Speaker 1>them twenty questions. We delved into it and the deep weeds.

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<v Speaker 1>This is probably why you're needed on this show, because

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think we would have got as deep maybe

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<v Speaker 1>for this episode. It was a good thing though, because

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<v Speaker 1>we really nerded out. But I will say he was

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<v Speaker 1>real good about being short with his answers so he

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't go on and on. It's a it's a nice

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<v Speaker 1>back and forth about several of these sort of concerns

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<v Speaker 1>over the rise of index funds and passive. I think

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<v Speaker 1>you'll enjoy it, especially if you're anybody at all interested

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<v Speaker 1>in how markets work. Is famine Trillians Martin Schmall's alright,

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<v Speaker 1>So Martin, welcome to the show. We've never met in person.

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<v Speaker 1>We've interacted on Twitter here and there, and I've gotten

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<v Speaker 1>to know you a bit over the years through digitally,

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<v Speaker 1>I guess. So it's nice to have you on and

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<v Speaker 1>finally meet you. And I think we have the you know,

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<v Speaker 1>pretty nice civil debates on this, as I do with

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<v Speaker 1>many other people. This concept of passive is a is

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<v Speaker 1>a concept that is studied, because it's getting bigger and bigger.

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<v Speaker 1>As you know, I tend to write off most of

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<v Speaker 1>the worries. A lot of them come from active managers.

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<v Speaker 1>You're an academic, so I think that gives you some

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<v Speaker 1>objectivity that I would give you a little more attention.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a couple issues we're going to bring up. Let's

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<v Speaker 1>go over your latest paper, though, just give me the

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<v Speaker 1>what's it called? Like, what is this sort of thesis called?

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<v Speaker 1>And what is it? What is the worry here that

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<v Speaker 1>you're looking at UM? So the papers called index funds,

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<v Speaker 1>as at prices and the welfare off investors. And I

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't say that we're looking at a particular warrior. We

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<v Speaker 1>didn't start with the warrior. We started with a question,

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<v Speaker 1>and the question is simply how indexing textbook indexing, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>holding the market portfolio UM would affect the level of

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<v Speaker 1>S prices and how that would affect investor welfare. So

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<v Speaker 1>that's what we started out with. And I suppose one

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<v Speaker 1>could say that it leads to a warrior. I would

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<v Speaker 1>just call it a result, which is that it raises

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<v Speaker 1>a surprices the level of a survices and thereby reduces

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<v Speaker 1>expected returns. That's the baseline of the finding. So Matt Levine,

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<v Speaker 1>who's got away with words, who many people know rich

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<v Speaker 1>for Bloomer opinion. Here's how he put it. An index

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<v Speaker 1>fund is a good way to hold stocks. It has

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<v Speaker 1>low fees and offers their versification. Therefore, if index funds

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<v Speaker 1>are easy and cheap, more people will invest in the

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<v Speaker 1>stock market. Then if there were no index funds, this

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<v Speaker 1>will push up the price of stocks, pushing down their

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<v Speaker 1>expected returns, and therefore index funds are bad for investors.

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<v Speaker 1>So that is exactly accurate. Um, I think pretty much

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<v Speaker 1>every step of the way here should be obvious and

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<v Speaker 1>mostly un arguable, except the last. Perhaps the last one

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<v Speaker 1>at least was not obvious to me, and it's still

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<v Speaker 1>not to present obvious to me. That is just what

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<v Speaker 1>the computer simulations spit out. So bad for investors in

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<v Speaker 1>this case means reducing welfare of investors. That's a welfare

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<v Speaker 1>part in the title. So I totally agree with the

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<v Speaker 1>characterization of Matt Levin that the product. Well, let me

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<v Speaker 1>ask you this, then, is this really an index fund issue?

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<v Speaker 1>Mutual funds were introduced a hundred years ago. You could

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<v Speaker 1>argue they brought in a ton of investors, and up

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<v Speaker 1>until the late nineties of active mutual fund assets or

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<v Speaker 1>mutual fund assets was an active funds. So was that

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<v Speaker 1>a similar issue? Then, like why is it index funds

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<v Speaker 1>and not mutual funds in general? So this is fair

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<v Speaker 1>what you're asking here, and um, there's no distinction in

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<v Speaker 1>the model between an active fund or UM an index fund.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, there are no active funds in the model.

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<v Speaker 1>The only thing that matters is whether it has become

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<v Speaker 1>cheaper to hold a diversified portfolio. And that's obviously what

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<v Speaker 1>index funds do, and much more successfully than active funds,

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<v Speaker 1>which is you know why I hold inext funds. So

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<v Speaker 1>if active funds had similarly brought down the cost of

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<v Speaker 1>holding a diversified portfolio, they would also riise UM and

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<v Speaker 1>enterprises and thereby reduced returns and as a result of

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<v Speaker 1>reduced investment welfare. So in some ways it's really about financialization. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>then about index fense. I think that's fair. So I

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<v Speaker 1>guess we already concluded that it's not about passive versus

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<v Speaker 1>active as much as much of the debate about passive

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<v Speaker 1>investing really is. So a natural reaction to this would

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<v Speaker 1>be well, some people argue not enough people are invested,

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<v Speaker 1>like here in America only fifty of the population has

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<v Speaker 1>any exposure to stocks and bonds, right, And this is

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<v Speaker 1>added to the wealth gap because you know, you're getting

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<v Speaker 1>that equity market premium and the income from bonds. And

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<v Speaker 1>so as someone who replied to me on Twitter at

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<v Speaker 1>economic he said this, why is it better for people

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<v Speaker 1>to be investors in steef twelve percent return then for

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<v Speaker 1>fifty people to be investors and receive eight percent return?

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<v Speaker 1>I would almost go further and say, well, what about

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<v Speaker 1>a percent investors? Like I guess your thesis almost seems

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<v Speaker 1>like you're rooting for only some people to be invested.

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<v Speaker 1>That's that's a really that's a brilliant question. This is

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<v Speaker 1>really really good. Where do we start? So, first of all,

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<v Speaker 1>it is true that without cheap index funds, you would

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<v Speaker 1>mostly get the very rich and least risk averse people

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<v Speaker 1>to hold the equities, and they would get them for cheap, right,

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<v Speaker 1>because the returns are high because nobody else is buying them,

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<v Speaker 1>And indeed that would lead to a widening of wealth

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<v Speaker 1>and equality. And that is true in the model as well.

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<v Speaker 1>And as you make holding a diversified portfolio cheaper, say

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<v Speaker 1>by the introduction of an index fund, say, um, more

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<v Speaker 1>people invest, And you're exactly right that this actually reduces

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<v Speaker 1>the difference between the expected well of the very rich

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<v Speaker 1>and the middle class. It reduces wealth inequality. So what

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<v Speaker 1>I thought the intuition was going to be of this

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<v Speaker 1>model is that the very rich get harmed by the

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<v Speaker 1>introduction of index funds, but the middle class and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the poor would actually benefit. But it just turns out

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<v Speaker 1>that this is not the case. It just turns out

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<v Speaker 1>that the middle class had held a much smaller fraction

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<v Speaker 1>of stocks to start with. They also get hurt, and

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<v Speaker 1>get hurt enough by the reduction, and they expected returns

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<v Speaker 1>that on net, they don't actually benefit. And that's a

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<v Speaker 1>surprising part of the result. I'm not sure I like it,

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<v Speaker 1>but that's what the math says. Are you sort of

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<v Speaker 1>saying that index funds or mutual funds in general, especially

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<v Speaker 1>as they get cheaper and cheaper, which again I just

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<v Speaker 1>wrote a book about this called the Bogel Effect. I

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<v Speaker 1>do think that high cost to low cost is the

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<v Speaker 1>real trend, because in mutual funds to ETFs, passive to active,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of gray area there, but high cost

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<v Speaker 1>to low cost, which I think I give Vanguard and

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<v Speaker 1>Bogel a lot of credit for ushering that in. Is

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<v Speaker 1>like everywhere, and clearly the lower thing cost things get,

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<v Speaker 1>the more people will use them. I totally agree. I

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<v Speaker 1>guess my question is, are you sort of saying that

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<v Speaker 1>the cheaper and easier that things get or access points,

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<v Speaker 1>the people who come in later, like in a Ponzi

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<v Speaker 1>scheme are going to get the worst returns than the

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<v Speaker 1>rich people who were already in here. I understand where

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<v Speaker 1>your tradition intuition comes from, but it's not exactly what

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<v Speaker 1>the model says. So first of all, the model is static,

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<v Speaker 1>so there's no such thing as early investors and late investors.

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<v Speaker 1>There's just a comparison bit between. If today you asked

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<v Speaker 1>investors or you measured whether they would be better off

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<v Speaker 1>UM without index funds compared to index funds costing zero,

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<v Speaker 1>the answer would be yes, it would be better off. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>So it's a comparison within time. It's sort a comparison

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<v Speaker 1>over um time. So there's no Ponzi scheme here in

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<v Speaker 1>the sense of bubble building. It's just a boring statement

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<v Speaker 1>about the level of asset prices being higher, so I think.

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<v Speaker 1>But what I should explain in though, is what what

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<v Speaker 1>exactly I mean by investors being better off without index funds,

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<v Speaker 1>or that index funds harm investor welfare. So let me

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<v Speaker 1>be very clear, for every individual who learns about index

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<v Speaker 1>funds and ditches holding individual stocks and or active expensive

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<v Speaker 1>funds and buys cheap index funds, that's good for them,

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<v Speaker 1>There's no question about it. That's we explained that very

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<v Speaker 1>clearly in the paper. It's a very different statement to

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<v Speaker 1>say investors overall as a group would they be better

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<v Speaker 1>off and the entire distribution of investors would they be

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<v Speaker 1>better off if no index funds were around. So this

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<v Speaker 1>is like a tragedy of the commons problem, right, So

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<v Speaker 1>where you have you have a common resource um that

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<v Speaker 1>gets depleted I don't know whatever fish, atlantic salmon or

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know what, like not farm raised salmon, and

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<v Speaker 1>if left to its own devices, um, individual fishermen will

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<v Speaker 1>buy big, big, big ships and deplete the resource and

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<v Speaker 1>it'd all be better off if there were restrictions on

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<v Speaker 1>the side of ships or the size of the fleet.

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<v Speaker 1>And it's similar in this case. I'm not saying it's

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<v Speaker 1>stupid for an individual to buy index funds. Um. I

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<v Speaker 1>preach um since decades, and I live what I preached

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<v Speaker 1>by buying index funds myself. But that doesn't mean that

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<v Speaker 1>overall it's good for investors that they're around. That is

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<v Speaker 1>really interesting, and I'm glad you admitted that, because that

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<v Speaker 1>was gonna be one of my questions. I have found

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of times you you get a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>attention if you say indexing and passive is going to

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<v Speaker 1>be a bubble, or it's a worry. The press will

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<v Speaker 1>cover you. It's just like any other worry. People who

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<v Speaker 1>worry get a lot of press coverage. So but when

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<v Speaker 1>you add, when you actually ask them what do you hold,

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<v Speaker 1>they'll say index funds, and I'm like, well, then you're

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<v Speaker 1>part of the problem. Or because here's my big question

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<v Speaker 1>is let's just say people listening or I agree with

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<v Speaker 1>this premise, and we all kind of come to the

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<v Speaker 1>inclusion that index funds probably should be somehow curbed. Nobody

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<v Speaker 1>that holds index funds, I can pretty much say them

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<v Speaker 1>is willing to take one for the team and jump

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<v Speaker 1>over to a eighty basis points blend active mutual fund

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<v Speaker 1>for their kids education. They want that money for them.

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<v Speaker 1>So I think part of the issue is, and this

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<v Speaker 1>is like to get your take on this, When Vanguard

0:12:15.720 --> 0:12:17.800
<v Speaker 1>came out in the seventies and they started lowering fees

0:12:17.840 --> 0:12:21.360
<v Speaker 1>over the next forty five years, Active mutual funds didn't.

0:12:21.360 --> 0:12:23.839
<v Speaker 1>They didn't share any economies of scale. And when the

0:12:23.920 --> 0:12:26.360
<v Speaker 1>world kind of turned and the Internet really spread information

0:12:26.880 --> 0:12:30.840
<v Speaker 1>and Vanguard got below ten basis points man that caused

0:12:30.880 --> 0:12:33.640
<v Speaker 1>this frenzy of money to move over to indexing, and

0:12:33.760 --> 0:12:36.280
<v Speaker 1>it was like Active was so far behind at that

0:12:36.360 --> 0:12:39.319
<v Speaker 1>point they they just missed it completely and got disrupted

0:12:39.360 --> 0:12:43.240
<v Speaker 1>by Vanguard big time. And so what you're I think

0:12:44.200 --> 0:12:47.880
<v Speaker 1>experiencing here is just an industry that that failed to

0:12:48.000 --> 0:12:52.120
<v Speaker 1>see what was coming and recognized an opportunity. But we

0:12:52.280 --> 0:12:55.760
<v Speaker 1>are seeing Active lower their fees. So as Active gets cheaper.

0:12:55.880 --> 0:12:57.920
<v Speaker 1>In et F last year, they took in fourteen percent

0:12:57.960 --> 0:13:00.560
<v Speaker 1>of the flows but all went to pretty low us Active.

0:13:01.000 --> 0:13:04.199
<v Speaker 1>So I think the Vogel effect or Vanguard effect is

0:13:04.240 --> 0:13:07.600
<v Speaker 1>actually one that could help solve this because Active gets

0:13:07.679 --> 0:13:09.800
<v Speaker 1>cheaper and more appealing because a lot of people are

0:13:09.840 --> 0:13:12.240
<v Speaker 1>fans of Active, just not the cost, and so as

0:13:12.280 --> 0:13:15.280
<v Speaker 1>it gets lower, you might find a little more balance.

0:13:15.800 --> 0:13:17.480
<v Speaker 1>What do you say about that, like just sort of

0:13:17.520 --> 0:13:20.000
<v Speaker 1>let letting the market figure this out. Well, so I

0:13:20.240 --> 0:13:25.199
<v Speaker 1>agree with um basically everything you said in that Vanguard

0:13:25.280 --> 0:13:28.160
<v Speaker 1>is a cost leader, a price leader is responsible for

0:13:28.600 --> 0:13:31.960
<v Speaker 1>the depression of fees, and every single investor is happy

0:13:32.000 --> 0:13:34.760
<v Speaker 1>about that, right because every single investor has to has

0:13:34.840 --> 0:13:38.400
<v Speaker 1>to pay these fees. Now, if it leads to active

0:13:38.440 --> 0:13:41.880
<v Speaker 1>funds also becoming cheaper, well, that leads to more stock

0:13:41.920 --> 0:13:44.839
<v Speaker 1>market participation. And as we discussed a few minutes ago,

0:13:45.200 --> 0:13:47.520
<v Speaker 1>of course it's desirable on many levels because it's going

0:13:47.559 --> 0:13:50.640
<v Speaker 1>to reduce wealth inequality, right, but it will not solve

0:13:50.679 --> 0:13:53.360
<v Speaker 1>the problem of the essetprises being high and the return

0:13:53.480 --> 0:13:55.440
<v Speaker 1>is being low because it doesn't need to more companies

0:13:56.000 --> 0:13:59.520
<v Speaker 1>producing higher profits for for shareholders. It's just a greater

0:13:59.600 --> 0:14:03.600
<v Speaker 1>sharehold rebays sharing these profits. And again, if you're if

0:14:03.600 --> 0:14:06.000
<v Speaker 1>you just want to reduce wealth inequality, I'm all with you.

0:14:06.400 --> 0:14:11.520
<v Speaker 1>And that's what the model indeed predicts that index fund's

0:14:11.520 --> 0:14:15.560
<v Speaker 1>helped reduce wealth inequality and expected wealth, but every single

0:14:15.640 --> 0:14:17.599
<v Speaker 1>one of the investors is still worse off. They'd be

0:14:17.720 --> 0:14:21.720
<v Speaker 1>better off with the with the ad basis point mutual

0:14:21.800 --> 0:14:25.720
<v Speaker 1>fund from the ninety eighties in terms of their risk

0:14:25.800 --> 0:14:29.400
<v Speaker 1>return trade off compared to everybody else. Right, So the

0:14:29.640 --> 0:14:33.320
<v Speaker 1>resolution of the apparent paradox is, yes, nobody is willing

0:14:33.360 --> 0:14:36.080
<v Speaker 1>to give up their zero percent index fund for an

0:14:36.120 --> 0:14:39.440
<v Speaker 1>ad basis point active fund, except if everybody else would

0:14:39.480 --> 0:14:42.320
<v Speaker 1>do it too. And that's a statement, right, So it

0:14:42.480 --> 0:14:45.320
<v Speaker 1>is not about individuals are being irrational. It is about

0:14:45.800 --> 0:14:49.000
<v Speaker 1>investors as a group are harming each other by driving

0:14:49.080 --> 0:14:51.760
<v Speaker 1>up the asset prices. But they're acting out of their

0:14:51.800 --> 0:14:56.280
<v Speaker 1>self interest though, which it has everybody excerationally, but it

0:14:56.400 --> 0:15:06.680
<v Speaker 1>has to be that way. So this expected return, right,

0:15:07.480 --> 0:15:09.880
<v Speaker 1>is that also just part of the FED, right. The

0:15:09.920 --> 0:15:12.800
<v Speaker 1>FED and central banks around the world kept rates very low,

0:15:12.920 --> 0:15:17.160
<v Speaker 1>did qui Asset prices lifted probably beyond what valuations, you know,

0:15:17.320 --> 0:15:20.080
<v Speaker 1>what earnings would suggest, and it created a little bit

0:15:20.120 --> 0:15:22.320
<v Speaker 1>of a FED bubble. A lot of people thought this

0:15:22.440 --> 0:15:24.480
<v Speaker 1>was the passive bubble. I said, no, it's a FED bubble.

0:15:25.000 --> 0:15:27.720
<v Speaker 1>And they associated the rise of the last fifteen years

0:15:27.760 --> 0:15:30.440
<v Speaker 1>with all the index funds. But now that bubble is broken,

0:15:30.640 --> 0:15:32.440
<v Speaker 1>the FED is hiking. For the past year and a half,

0:15:33.080 --> 0:15:35.480
<v Speaker 1>people still buying index funds, but the market's going down.

0:15:35.640 --> 0:15:37.680
<v Speaker 1>Clearly index funds were not enough to wag the dog

0:15:37.800 --> 0:15:40.240
<v Speaker 1>or anything, and stocks are all over the place. There's

0:15:40.240 --> 0:15:43.440
<v Speaker 1>plenty of dispersion, so I think the hiking sort of

0:15:43.520 --> 0:15:45.920
<v Speaker 1>show that the markets acting pretty much as it does.

0:15:46.600 --> 0:15:48.480
<v Speaker 1>But I guess my bigger point to you is, is

0:15:48.520 --> 0:15:51.080
<v Speaker 1>the expected return being low really more of a function

0:15:51.120 --> 0:15:53.920
<v Speaker 1>of the FED and their policy over the past fifteen

0:15:54.000 --> 0:15:56.840
<v Speaker 1>years rather than just the rise of index funds? Yeah?

0:15:56.920 --> 0:16:00.640
<v Speaker 1>Probably yes, so Uh. The paper does not have the

0:16:00.680 --> 0:16:04.160
<v Speaker 1>addition to try and explain the reasons for declining the

0:16:04.200 --> 0:16:08.440
<v Speaker 1>expected returns or argue that this is primarily driven driven

0:16:08.480 --> 0:16:11.480
<v Speaker 1>by nix fins. The The ambition is really just to

0:16:11.600 --> 0:16:14.200
<v Speaker 1>understand what the effect of indextend an asset prices is,

0:16:14.720 --> 0:16:17.400
<v Speaker 1>and I think probably also shift our thinking on how

0:16:17.480 --> 0:16:21.160
<v Speaker 1>we think about certain policy tradeoffs, such as you know,

0:16:21.920 --> 0:16:25.440
<v Speaker 1>people thinking that indexing necessarily benefits investors, but then there

0:16:25.520 --> 0:16:28.360
<v Speaker 1>might be side effects, and maybe to rein in the

0:16:28.400 --> 0:16:31.280
<v Speaker 1>side effects we would have to harm investors. And this

0:16:31.440 --> 0:16:33.560
<v Speaker 1>is how the tradeoff and the policy debate gets and

0:16:33.760 --> 0:16:37.520
<v Speaker 1>gets characterized. And what this paper shows, um, but the

0:16:37.640 --> 0:16:39.440
<v Speaker 1>math shows is just that this is probably not the

0:16:39.560 --> 0:16:41.440
<v Speaker 1>right way of thinking about it, because it's less than

0:16:41.520 --> 0:16:46.720
<v Speaker 1>perfectly obvious that cheap diversification even benefits investors as a group.

0:16:46.920 --> 0:16:49.880
<v Speaker 1>Of course, it benefits every individual investor, but it's not

0:16:49.960 --> 0:16:53.080
<v Speaker 1>clear that it benefits and as a group. So one

0:16:53.120 --> 0:16:55.240
<v Speaker 1>thing I think that you're talking about and that I

0:16:55.320 --> 0:16:56.560
<v Speaker 1>see in the flows and I want to get your

0:16:56.560 --> 0:16:58.680
<v Speaker 1>take on, is it seems like we're going to move

0:16:58.720 --> 0:17:02.800
<v Speaker 1>into this new world where passive takes up the core

0:17:02.880 --> 0:17:06.080
<v Speaker 1>of most portfolios, and then people are going to look

0:17:06.119 --> 0:17:08.640
<v Speaker 1>for something that's very, very different than passive to sort

0:17:08.680 --> 0:17:10.880
<v Speaker 1>of decorate with almost like adding a little hot sauce

0:17:10.920 --> 0:17:13.879
<v Speaker 1>and otherwise boring meal. This is the lane that like

0:17:14.040 --> 0:17:18.040
<v Speaker 1>Cathy Wood lives in an arc even crypto um. And

0:17:18.160 --> 0:17:20.639
<v Speaker 1>I think active managers over time are either gonna have

0:17:20.680 --> 0:17:22.680
<v Speaker 1>to get cheap or shiny. They're going to have to

0:17:22.760 --> 0:17:28.800
<v Speaker 1>be really producing some high returns two A attract investors

0:17:28.880 --> 0:17:31.520
<v Speaker 1>attention and be get used as a compliment. And so

0:17:32.000 --> 0:17:36.640
<v Speaker 1>could you argue that over time that active slice will

0:17:36.760 --> 0:17:39.320
<v Speaker 1>start to produce some really big winners and you will

0:17:39.400 --> 0:17:42.400
<v Speaker 1>see some money go to those more active active managers,

0:17:42.920 --> 0:17:45.879
<v Speaker 1>and the net result will be a rooting out of

0:17:45.920 --> 0:17:48.800
<v Speaker 1>the bad managers giving money to the good ones, um,

0:17:48.920 --> 0:17:51.239
<v Speaker 1>and you still will have active setting prices. Is there

0:17:51.240 --> 0:17:54.120
<v Speaker 1>anything wrong with that world. I don't see that there's

0:17:54.119 --> 0:17:57.080
<v Speaker 1>anything particularly wrong with that world. Nope. I think that's

0:17:57.200 --> 0:18:00.320
<v Speaker 1>that's probably a reasonable prediction. But I would have to

0:18:00.359 --> 0:18:02.600
<v Speaker 1>admit that I have not done a whole lot of

0:18:02.920 --> 0:18:06.119
<v Speaker 1>research on how enterprises get set when active and passive

0:18:06.160 --> 0:18:09.040
<v Speaker 1>managers coexist. I find that that distinction I think you

0:18:09.119 --> 0:18:12.320
<v Speaker 1>alluded to it. I find that distinction not super useful

0:18:12.640 --> 0:18:15.560
<v Speaker 1>these days. Whereas you know, it qualifies as a passive

0:18:15.640 --> 0:18:19.040
<v Speaker 1>fund to follow an index that is a bespoke index

0:18:19.160 --> 0:18:22.320
<v Speaker 1>just designed to follow a particular portfolio. And so when

0:18:22.400 --> 0:18:25.159
<v Speaker 1>when I say passive, I really mean, you know, market

0:18:25.240 --> 0:18:27.800
<v Speaker 1>level indexing like in the textbook, which is different from

0:18:27.920 --> 0:18:30.400
<v Speaker 1>what passive means in in the real world these days.

0:18:30.480 --> 0:18:32.320
<v Speaker 1>But just to be clear, I think what has happened

0:18:32.320 --> 0:18:34.600
<v Speaker 1>because the S and P isn't even passive. I mean

0:18:34.640 --> 0:18:38.040
<v Speaker 1>there is run by a committee. Um, there's rules, and

0:18:38.080 --> 0:18:40.000
<v Speaker 1>then you get to other indexes like the Russell one

0:18:40.040 --> 0:18:43.160
<v Speaker 1>thousands a little different. I mean, I think really your

0:18:43.240 --> 0:18:46.800
<v Speaker 1>point is more about just people in funds rather than

0:18:47.320 --> 0:18:51.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, people buying funds today holding them because they're

0:18:51.080 --> 0:18:55.560
<v Speaker 1>cheap and good rather than passive and active. Um yeah,

0:18:55.560 --> 0:18:58.240
<v Speaker 1>I think so, yeah, very much. The true benchmark would

0:18:58.240 --> 0:19:02.240
<v Speaker 1>be you holding a market value waited portfolio of all

0:19:02.640 --> 0:19:04.960
<v Speaker 1>the world's risky assets, right, And I think we can

0:19:05.000 --> 0:19:06.720
<v Speaker 1>all agree that the S and P five is not

0:19:06.800 --> 0:19:09.560
<v Speaker 1>that Not even you as equities is that, right. So

0:19:09.680 --> 0:19:12.560
<v Speaker 1>in theory you have to have exposure to Chinese real

0:19:12.720 --> 0:19:14.399
<v Speaker 1>estate or I don't know what, right, So this is

0:19:14.440 --> 0:19:18.240
<v Speaker 1>true passive in the textbook, and anything that's labeled passive

0:19:18.320 --> 0:19:21.520
<v Speaker 1>these days is very far removed from that. So for

0:19:21.640 --> 0:19:23.800
<v Speaker 1>for that reason alone, I don't think a lot of

0:19:23.840 --> 0:19:27.040
<v Speaker 1>the headline discussion and the public discussion about passive verse

0:19:27.080 --> 0:19:29.479
<v Speaker 1>effective makes a whole lot of sense, because look, if

0:19:29.520 --> 0:19:34.320
<v Speaker 1>I build a portfolio of passive funds, but every of

0:19:34.400 --> 0:19:37.399
<v Speaker 1>these passive funds contains one stock, then this is literally

0:19:37.440 --> 0:19:39.920
<v Speaker 1>the same thing as active investing. So I don't think

0:19:40.000 --> 0:19:43.200
<v Speaker 1>that that these labels are as meaningful as they perhaps

0:19:43.280 --> 0:19:45.960
<v Speaker 1>used to be fifteen years ago. I agree, Um, there's

0:19:46.000 --> 0:19:47.920
<v Speaker 1>just too much gray area. I still use it because

0:19:47.960 --> 0:19:50.520
<v Speaker 1>you have to communicate quickly sometimes, but that's very totally

0:19:51.160 --> 0:19:53.960
<v Speaker 1>That's why I again I go back to our phrase

0:19:54.000 --> 0:19:56.640
<v Speaker 1>the great cost migration. Most of this is just high

0:19:56.680 --> 0:20:01.040
<v Speaker 1>cost low cost. What makes pass passive was ninety basis points,

0:20:01.119 --> 0:20:04.280
<v Speaker 1>it would be fringe at best. Um, it's because it's free.

0:20:04.760 --> 0:20:07.880
<v Speaker 1>That's why it's a big deal. Um, let's let's move

0:20:07.960 --> 0:20:09.960
<v Speaker 1>to to what should be done here? I mean, is

0:20:10.000 --> 0:20:13.560
<v Speaker 1>there any real solution here or is it just Hey,

0:20:13.840 --> 0:20:17.200
<v Speaker 1>there's more people invested. The FED lowered rates for fifteen years.

0:20:17.680 --> 0:20:19.240
<v Speaker 1>It's created It created a little bit of a of

0:20:19.320 --> 0:20:21.439
<v Speaker 1>a bubble. And now look, returns are gonna be low

0:20:21.440 --> 0:20:24.600
<v Speaker 1>for a while because of the you know, sort of

0:20:24.680 --> 0:20:26.760
<v Speaker 1>a return to the mean, Like you can't escape the mean,

0:20:27.200 --> 0:20:29.920
<v Speaker 1>so you're gonna have lower turns. Is that generally the take?

0:20:30.040 --> 0:20:32.960
<v Speaker 1>Or is there a way to solve this? So I

0:20:33.400 --> 0:20:36.639
<v Speaker 1>don't think that there is immediate policy implications from this paper,

0:20:36.720 --> 0:20:38.399
<v Speaker 1>but rather that we should think of it as a

0:20:38.480 --> 0:20:43.840
<v Speaker 1>stepping stone to towards thinking more accurately about what other

0:20:43.960 --> 0:20:47.040
<v Speaker 1>policy tradeoff should be about. So, um, you know, I

0:20:47.760 --> 0:20:50.879
<v Speaker 1>did a bunch of research on how diversified ownership of

0:20:51.000 --> 0:20:55.560
<v Speaker 1>firms might affect competition, and these policy trade offs look

0:20:55.600 --> 0:20:59.600
<v Speaker 1>completely different. Um, once you endotonize, a survises, So what

0:20:59.640 --> 0:21:01.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean by that is once you take it into

0:21:01.560 --> 0:21:05.879
<v Speaker 1>account the effect of diversified ownership on asset prices, then

0:21:06.000 --> 0:21:08.600
<v Speaker 1>if you basically ignored that link. So I don't think

0:21:08.600 --> 0:21:11.080
<v Speaker 1>the paper itself has a problem that needs to be

0:21:11.200 --> 0:21:14.359
<v Speaker 1>solved and therefore no policy implications, but I think it

0:21:14.480 --> 0:21:18.520
<v Speaker 1>informs how we should think about other side effects that

0:21:18.720 --> 0:21:21.159
<v Speaker 1>people have debated in passive. So let's talk about one

0:21:21.200 --> 0:21:23.000
<v Speaker 1>of those, which you wrote about and I covered in

0:21:23.040 --> 0:21:25.680
<v Speaker 1>my book as well, which is called common ownership, which

0:21:25.720 --> 0:21:31.080
<v Speaker 1>is very communist, communist side term. That's basically I'll summarize it.

0:21:31.119 --> 0:21:33.600
<v Speaker 1>You correct me um or clean clean it up at all. Okay,

0:21:33.640 --> 0:21:36.240
<v Speaker 1>So common ownership. What this says is that like, hey,

0:21:36.320 --> 0:21:40.359
<v Speaker 1>if if index funds own, say all of the airlines,

0:21:41.240 --> 0:21:44.119
<v Speaker 1>or they own all the carmakers, there's a vested interest

0:21:44.320 --> 0:21:48.120
<v Speaker 1>or a motivation for those all those car companies two

0:21:48.920 --> 0:21:52.359
<v Speaker 1>raise prices because if you own them all, there's no

0:21:52.480 --> 0:21:55.720
<v Speaker 1>reason to care about who wins or loses. You want

0:21:55.800 --> 0:21:58.240
<v Speaker 1>them all just to have higher prices. And that's the

0:21:58.400 --> 0:22:01.960
<v Speaker 1>danger of having only a few firms, especially diverse. But

0:22:02.040 --> 0:22:06.879
<v Speaker 1>index funds owned, say of each stock. Is that about right?

0:22:08.000 --> 0:22:10.320
<v Speaker 1>That is about right? This is not this is not

0:22:10.560 --> 0:22:13.800
<v Speaker 1>terribly wrong. But let me point out to two things

0:22:13.920 --> 0:22:17.439
<v Speaker 1>that we could gain an even more nuanced understanding about.

0:22:17.960 --> 0:22:19.720
<v Speaker 1>Then perhaps I will also offer you my story of

0:22:19.760 --> 0:22:21.800
<v Speaker 1>what I think is going on. So the first part

0:22:21.920 --> 0:22:25.000
<v Speaker 1>is about index funds. The research I did does not

0:22:25.119 --> 0:22:27.840
<v Speaker 1>single out index funds at all, has really nothing to

0:22:27.920 --> 0:22:30.400
<v Speaker 1>do with index funds. So we call a common ownership.

0:22:31.000 --> 0:22:33.679
<v Speaker 1>But what we mean by that is simply a measure

0:22:33.760 --> 0:22:37.520
<v Speaker 1>of the extent to which, um, the largest and most

0:22:37.600 --> 0:22:41.520
<v Speaker 1>influential investors of one firm also hold the competition, whether

0:22:41.600 --> 0:22:45.159
<v Speaker 1>that's index funds or whether it's Bill Gates family office,

0:22:45.760 --> 0:22:48.440
<v Speaker 1>or whether it's Berkshire Headaway. UM. We don't make a

0:22:48.520 --> 0:22:52.960
<v Speaker 1>distinction in that paper about that, right, And empirically, I'm

0:22:53.040 --> 0:22:56.560
<v Speaker 1>sure the listeners of this podcast have noticed that Warren

0:22:56.600 --> 0:22:58.919
<v Speaker 1>Buffett was one of the largest or actually the largest

0:22:58.960 --> 0:23:02.959
<v Speaker 1>shareholder of whole bunch of airlines until the pandemic hit

0:23:03.520 --> 0:23:05.639
<v Speaker 1>UM and he's clearly not an index fence, right. So

0:23:05.800 --> 0:23:08.359
<v Speaker 1>that that is the first piece of nuance that it's

0:23:08.400 --> 0:23:10.680
<v Speaker 1>really not about index funds at all, but the public

0:23:10.720 --> 0:23:13.000
<v Speaker 1>commentary has very much been about it. And then the

0:23:13.080 --> 0:23:16.520
<v Speaker 1>second nuance is about whether the Carmakers or airlines or

0:23:16.560 --> 0:23:19.000
<v Speaker 1>what not have an incentive to raise prices once they

0:23:19.040 --> 0:23:22.359
<v Speaker 1>figure out that their investors are really the same as

0:23:22.359 --> 0:23:25.159
<v Speaker 1>the investors of the competition, as opposed to whether the

0:23:25.200 --> 0:23:28.520
<v Speaker 1>managers simply get lazy, but the managers get lazy because

0:23:28.520 --> 0:23:32.119
<v Speaker 1>they don't get monitored quite as actively as if I

0:23:32.160 --> 0:23:35.160
<v Speaker 1>don't know, Elon Musk was the largest shareholder of Jeff

0:23:35.200 --> 0:23:39.560
<v Speaker 1>bahos Or or Mark Zuckerberg, and therefore simply don't reduce

0:23:39.680 --> 0:23:43.200
<v Speaker 1>costs quite as effectively as they otherwise wouldn't, right, And

0:23:43.280 --> 0:23:47.240
<v Speaker 1>that's basically my story. My story is. Look, and I

0:23:47.320 --> 0:23:51.160
<v Speaker 1>think I would think that you and I probably agree

0:23:51.760 --> 0:23:56.520
<v Speaker 1>that the governance activities of Vanguard or black Rock do

0:23:56.720 --> 0:23:59.960
<v Speaker 1>differ in some ways of Elon Musk's governance activities. Yeah,

0:24:00.880 --> 0:24:03.760
<v Speaker 1>and that those could ostensibly lead to differences and how

0:24:03.800 --> 0:24:07.800
<v Speaker 1>aggressively management costs costs. That seems kind of obvious too.

0:24:08.440 --> 0:24:10.480
<v Speaker 1>That's basically the entire story. All I'm saying is that

0:24:11.240 --> 0:24:13.680
<v Speaker 1>um I, Vanguard doesn't do anything. I mean, they do something,

0:24:13.800 --> 0:24:17.520
<v Speaker 1>but if they did absolutely nothing to hold management accountable,

0:24:17.680 --> 0:24:20.920
<v Speaker 1>then probably this firm's costs would be higher. Well, the

0:24:21.000 --> 0:24:23.199
<v Speaker 1>firm's costs is the firm's costs are higher than it's

0:24:23.200 --> 0:24:25.680
<v Speaker 1>going to set higher prices. So that's my story. My

0:24:25.760 --> 0:24:30.160
<v Speaker 1>story is, look, index once are probably not the best. UM.

0:24:30.440 --> 0:24:34.280
<v Speaker 1>You know, activists investors to hold management accountable, and you're

0:24:34.280 --> 0:24:36.639
<v Speaker 1>going to see that in the firm's productivity and therefore

0:24:36.720 --> 0:24:39.320
<v Speaker 1>in product prices. Okay, so it's not a giant conspiracy.

0:24:39.520 --> 0:24:42.480
<v Speaker 1>Go ahead, Yeah, I agree. I agree because UM one

0:24:42.560 --> 0:24:45.640
<v Speaker 1>quick anecdote here and I just love this story. Eric Posner,

0:24:45.680 --> 0:24:48.480
<v Speaker 1>who did he? Did you work with Eric Posner of Chicago?

0:24:49.800 --> 0:24:51.359
<v Speaker 1>I didn't work with him my home very well, but

0:24:51.480 --> 0:24:53.600
<v Speaker 1>we we haven't worked together yet. So he also wrote

0:24:53.600 --> 0:24:56.159
<v Speaker 1>about this, and I um went and when I was

0:24:56.240 --> 0:24:59.400
<v Speaker 1>researching the Bogel book, I found a video of Jack

0:24:59.480 --> 0:25:03.600
<v Speaker 1>Bogel in a little Princeton office with Bert Malchiel, Cliff Fastness,

0:25:03.680 --> 0:25:06.360
<v Speaker 1>Andrew Low of m I t there was like seven

0:25:06.440 --> 0:25:10.040
<v Speaker 1>or eight heavyweight thinkers in there, and Eric and Jack

0:25:10.160 --> 0:25:12.520
<v Speaker 1>just wanted to talk this out because it was getting

0:25:12.560 --> 0:25:14.840
<v Speaker 1>some media attention. This is like six months before he

0:25:14.840 --> 0:25:17.920
<v Speaker 1>passed away. That's how hardcore Bogel was and how passionate

0:25:18.000 --> 0:25:20.200
<v Speaker 1>he was towards this stuff. But I I watched the

0:25:20.240 --> 0:25:22.840
<v Speaker 1>whole video. They didn't really come to any conclusion. I

0:25:23.040 --> 0:25:25.359
<v Speaker 1>felt that the passive side one, but I might have

0:25:25.400 --> 0:25:27.720
<v Speaker 1>been rooting for that side. I don't know. Um, but

0:25:27.840 --> 0:25:30.040
<v Speaker 1>people should go just google it. It's um on the

0:25:30.080 --> 0:25:33.399
<v Speaker 1>Princeton website and you can watch it and make up

0:25:33.440 --> 0:25:35.240
<v Speaker 1>your own mind. But one of the things that was

0:25:35.280 --> 0:25:37.000
<v Speaker 1>in there was this Gus Souter, who was c i

0:25:37.080 --> 0:25:39.400
<v Speaker 1>O at the time when Vanguard was getting bigger and bigger.

0:25:40.119 --> 0:25:42.960
<v Speaker 1>He was like, we've we do not collude with black Rock.

0:25:43.040 --> 0:25:45.040
<v Speaker 1>We we're we're honestly trying to vote in a way

0:25:45.080 --> 0:25:46.840
<v Speaker 1>that's you know, for the benefit of the of the

0:25:46.920 --> 0:25:49.119
<v Speaker 1>company's long term health. And if you look, they have

0:25:49.200 --> 0:25:52.600
<v Speaker 1>corporate governance teams that pay attention to this stuff and

0:25:52.640 --> 0:25:55.040
<v Speaker 1>they do vote differently. Even black Rock differs from Vanguard

0:25:55.080 --> 0:25:57.879
<v Speaker 1>in certain votes. Um, we've studied it. I would I

0:25:57.920 --> 0:26:01.159
<v Speaker 1>would agree it's not aggressive, it's not active. So given that,

0:26:01.359 --> 0:26:02.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, knowing their voting to try to keep the

0:26:02.960 --> 0:26:05.400
<v Speaker 1>company honest and do a good job, you still think

0:26:05.480 --> 0:26:09.840
<v Speaker 1>this common ownership is a problem. Yeah, So, um again,

0:26:09.920 --> 0:26:12.719
<v Speaker 1>I agree with everything you said. Um. So, the most

0:26:12.760 --> 0:26:15.800
<v Speaker 1>important part is that none of this this theory that

0:26:16.040 --> 0:26:19.560
<v Speaker 1>is being discussed here really has anything to do with collusion,

0:26:20.240 --> 0:26:24.120
<v Speaker 1>actually explicitly not not collusion between firms, not collusion between

0:26:24.160 --> 0:26:28.159
<v Speaker 1>different types of shareholders. Whenever an industry representative talks about

0:26:28.480 --> 0:26:31.480
<v Speaker 1>how they don't collude, that's a complete strong man. None

0:26:31.520 --> 0:26:35.080
<v Speaker 1>of these series is about collusion. Again, the theory is

0:26:35.160 --> 0:26:38.320
<v Speaker 1>just about they are probably not as active owners as

0:26:38.359 --> 0:26:41.119
<v Speaker 1>other investors. So let me tell you a story, and

0:26:41.160 --> 0:26:43.159
<v Speaker 1>I'm want to get your take on this. Two or

0:26:43.240 --> 0:26:46.399
<v Speaker 1>three years ago, this small company called Tanger Outlets. I

0:26:46.520 --> 0:26:48.399
<v Speaker 1>might even be pronouncing it wrong, that's how small this

0:26:48.480 --> 0:26:51.200
<v Speaker 1>company was. There was a time when it had fifty

0:26:51.359 --> 0:26:54.720
<v Speaker 1>five or sixty percent of its shares owned by index

0:26:54.800 --> 0:26:58.000
<v Speaker 1>funds and ETFs. It's a long story, but this dividend

0:26:58.040 --> 0:27:02.480
<v Speaker 1>fund owned because that stock was going down and it

0:27:02.600 --> 0:27:05.480
<v Speaker 1>kicked out a big dividend. But Active was selling off

0:27:05.520 --> 0:27:08.920
<v Speaker 1>the stock, but Passive liked the yield, so Passive ended

0:27:08.960 --> 0:27:11.320
<v Speaker 1>up buying it from Active over like two years, and

0:27:11.359 --> 0:27:14.359
<v Speaker 1>all of a sudden, Passive I called the I R

0:27:14.440 --> 0:27:17.440
<v Speaker 1>woman and I and I asked her, you know, what,

0:27:18.160 --> 0:27:20.960
<v Speaker 1>what do you think of this? Like? Is this um? Uh?

0:27:21.640 --> 0:27:23.400
<v Speaker 1>She goes, I don't think of it at all. I said,

0:27:23.560 --> 0:27:25.520
<v Speaker 1>she goes. I will say that the passive owners are

0:27:25.520 --> 0:27:29.560
<v Speaker 1>a little less engaged. But we're trying to like make payrolls,

0:27:29.600 --> 0:27:31.600
<v Speaker 1>like we're trying to make money here, We're not really

0:27:31.640 --> 0:27:33.840
<v Speaker 1>we don't really care who owns us. We are we

0:27:33.960 --> 0:27:36.520
<v Speaker 1>have bigger fish to fry. So isn't it true that

0:27:36.640 --> 0:27:40.639
<v Speaker 1>just business and capitalism also just kind of solves this

0:27:40.800 --> 0:27:43.399
<v Speaker 1>and we don't have to worry about that much? Have

0:27:43.560 --> 0:27:46.119
<v Speaker 1>you talked to a Twitter employee lately? I mean, it

0:27:46.160 --> 0:27:49.040
<v Speaker 1>doesn't It strikes me that the change in ownership that

0:27:49.200 --> 0:27:51.440
<v Speaker 1>came with Elon Musk buying a large stick in the

0:27:51.520 --> 0:27:54.119
<v Speaker 1>firm and putting a huge amount of pressure on that

0:27:54.200 --> 0:27:58.840
<v Speaker 1>thing becoming profitable rather changed the cost cutting incentives um

0:27:59.080 --> 0:28:01.880
<v Speaker 1>off the CEO or of the firm. No, so, I'm

0:28:01.920 --> 0:28:03.840
<v Speaker 1>not saying Mega doesn't do anything. I'm saying they do

0:28:03.960 --> 0:28:08.959
<v Speaker 1>less right, And perhaps a better comparison is um berta

0:28:09.000 --> 0:28:11.280
<v Speaker 1>had Away. Right, So let's think of Warren Buffett. Warren

0:28:11.320 --> 0:28:14.879
<v Speaker 1>Buffett occasionally by his firms and gets engaged in governance. No,

0:28:15.080 --> 0:28:18.359
<v Speaker 1>so we all immediately think of Coca Cola presumably or

0:28:18.400 --> 0:28:22.159
<v Speaker 1>American Express. Right, So, Warren Buffet ocation would put himself

0:28:22.200 --> 0:28:25.480
<v Speaker 1>on the board. Now, let's take the other situation. Warren

0:28:25.520 --> 0:28:28.520
<v Speaker 1>Buffett by is huge steaks in the three or four

0:28:28.600 --> 0:28:31.119
<v Speaker 1>largest airlines in the US. Did he put himself on

0:28:31.160 --> 0:28:34.280
<v Speaker 1>the board as well? And the answer is no, right,

0:28:34.520 --> 0:28:36.360
<v Speaker 1>so he did not put himself on the board. There

0:28:36.800 --> 0:28:41.160
<v Speaker 1>he gets less actively engaged UM with companies where he

0:28:41.240 --> 0:28:44.400
<v Speaker 1>also buys the competition. And that's exactly what economic theory

0:28:44.480 --> 0:28:47.760
<v Speaker 1>would predict. You simply don't have an incentive to engage

0:28:47.800 --> 0:28:50.440
<v Speaker 1>strongly with one company with part of the one company's

0:28:50.440 --> 0:28:53.160
<v Speaker 1>success comes at the expense of another company that you

0:28:53.240 --> 0:28:55.640
<v Speaker 1>own as well. So my point as well, there's a

0:28:55.760 --> 0:28:58.960
<v Speaker 1>reason Vanguard and Black Rock have governance teams, but the

0:28:59.040 --> 0:29:03.040
<v Speaker 1>governance teams are nowhere close to um, you know, the

0:29:03.120 --> 0:29:06.360
<v Speaker 1>intensity of the Bill Ackman or you know, any type

0:29:06.400 --> 0:29:11.040
<v Speaker 1>of activist investor who's the alternative largest shareholder of the firm. So, yeah,

0:29:11.080 --> 0:29:13.080
<v Speaker 1>that is something, But is it good enough? Well, I

0:29:13.120 --> 0:29:16.800
<v Speaker 1>mean it's less right. And if management is held to

0:29:16.920 --> 0:29:20.200
<v Speaker 1>account less actively UM, then the costs are going to

0:29:20.280 --> 0:29:22.240
<v Speaker 1>be higher and the price is going to be higher.

0:29:22.600 --> 0:29:25.200
<v Speaker 1>So that's it. It's a very boring story in some ways.

0:29:25.240 --> 0:29:27.240
<v Speaker 1>You know, it has nothing to do with collusion, has

0:29:27.280 --> 0:29:29.720
<v Speaker 1>nothing to do with evil motives. It just has something

0:29:29.760 --> 0:29:32.920
<v Speaker 1>to do with incentives to engage in corporate governance and

0:29:33.400 --> 0:29:36.640
<v Speaker 1>you know costs being a little higher when the shareholders

0:29:36.680 --> 0:29:41.920
<v Speaker 1>basically let management room free. So with that said, you know,

0:29:42.120 --> 0:29:46.360
<v Speaker 1>Vanguard and black Rock and Schwab have all announced initial

0:29:46.440 --> 0:29:50.720
<v Speaker 1>pilot programs to decentralize the share voting so that it's

0:29:50.760 --> 0:29:53.680
<v Speaker 1>not so centralized it's just them now. I would say

0:29:53.720 --> 0:29:56.400
<v Speaker 1>that the individual voters, like the thirty million Vanguard and voters,

0:29:56.720 --> 0:29:59.120
<v Speaker 1>many may just opt to have Vanguard do it, but

0:29:59.760 --> 0:30:01.360
<v Speaker 1>many may opt to have a third party to it.

0:30:01.920 --> 0:30:04.640
<v Speaker 1>Schwab is looking at polling just to get there where

0:30:04.640 --> 0:30:06.320
<v Speaker 1>their head is at and then vote that way, because

0:30:06.480 --> 0:30:08.360
<v Speaker 1>I don't think an individual investor. What's the deal with

0:30:08.440 --> 0:30:11.120
<v Speaker 1>all of these proxy votes? It's really boring and time

0:30:11.200 --> 0:30:14.680
<v Speaker 1>consuming and most of them are not really consequential. Um,

0:30:15.040 --> 0:30:18.480
<v Speaker 1>do you think that decentralized trend could help this at all?

0:30:19.640 --> 0:30:22.360
<v Speaker 1>I think you just said it right. Um. So, first

0:30:22.400 --> 0:30:24.440
<v Speaker 1>of all, it's a it's an interesting question, it's a

0:30:24.520 --> 0:30:28.560
<v Speaker 1>very interesting question. But if the problem is that Vanguard's

0:30:28.600 --> 0:30:32.080
<v Speaker 1>governance team with the cloud of all these assets and

0:30:32.240 --> 0:30:36.080
<v Speaker 1>the associated votes if they don't use that very effectively

0:30:36.160 --> 0:30:38.640
<v Speaker 1>because they don't have incentives, and now you give it

0:30:38.680 --> 0:30:42.200
<v Speaker 1>to shareholders that are equally diversified, but having even lower

0:30:42.240 --> 0:30:45.320
<v Speaker 1>incentive and less expertise to be engaged. It's not clear

0:30:45.360 --> 0:30:47.640
<v Speaker 1>that this is going to help the problem. Right, So

0:30:48.840 --> 0:30:51.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm doubtful that this would be a solution to the problem.

0:30:52.480 --> 0:30:54.320
<v Speaker 1>But and let's go to the problem one more time.

0:30:55.040 --> 0:30:58.000
<v Speaker 1>I lam a sniff test guy, you know, and I

0:30:58.080 --> 0:31:02.760
<v Speaker 1>think that matters. I haven't really seen anything that I

0:31:02.800 --> 0:31:05.640
<v Speaker 1>can touch or feel that has been a byproduct of

0:31:05.720 --> 0:31:09.280
<v Speaker 1>this concern. Like, it seems like competitions alive, and I

0:31:09.320 --> 0:31:12.680
<v Speaker 1>haven't seen one industry where prices just got crazy. I mean,

0:31:12.720 --> 0:31:15.480
<v Speaker 1>I know inflation went up recently, but that was largely

0:31:15.520 --> 0:31:17.640
<v Speaker 1>a function of you know, the lockdown and the FED

0:31:17.720 --> 0:31:21.240
<v Speaker 1>and whatnot. So have you seen anything specific that is

0:31:21.280 --> 0:31:23.760
<v Speaker 1>a direct result of this or is it just a

0:31:23.880 --> 0:31:25.720
<v Speaker 1>little too hard to measure or a little too early

0:31:25.800 --> 0:31:29.040
<v Speaker 1>to measure? Yeah, So look, that's a that's the crux

0:31:29.520 --> 0:31:32.760
<v Speaker 1>that theory that I'm pronouncing here that's been around for decades.

0:31:32.840 --> 0:31:35.360
<v Speaker 1>It was actually a Princeton guy as well, Prince Princeton

0:31:35.400 --> 0:31:37.520
<v Speaker 1>graduate who came up with that in his first job

0:31:37.600 --> 0:31:40.840
<v Speaker 1>at a M I. T Um. And if you try

0:31:40.920 --> 0:31:43.800
<v Speaker 1>to test that using the time series of our overall

0:31:43.880 --> 0:31:46.760
<v Speaker 1>price levels higher or lower, you can't get very far right,

0:31:46.800 --> 0:31:50.040
<v Speaker 1>because there's all these alternative explanations. But the claim to

0:31:50.120 --> 0:31:55.360
<v Speaker 1>fame of that first paper is that we study differences

0:31:55.560 --> 0:31:59.560
<v Speaker 1>in particular roots. So say you know, some airlines become

0:31:59.640 --> 0:32:02.000
<v Speaker 1>more owned by say the black Rocks and bang Ards

0:32:02.080 --> 0:32:06.520
<v Speaker 1>and perhaps the Berkshire Hathaways over time, so they become

0:32:06.560 --> 0:32:09.680
<v Speaker 1>more commonly owned. And in the theory, that would make

0:32:09.800 --> 0:32:12.800
<v Speaker 1>those and the roots where they compete set higher prices

0:32:13.200 --> 0:32:16.120
<v Speaker 1>whereas other airlines don't. Right. So there's Richard Branson owning

0:32:17.040 --> 0:32:20.959
<v Speaker 1>Virgin America and being behind the CEO and cost cutting

0:32:21.120 --> 0:32:23.120
<v Speaker 1>and going to the media all the time promoting the

0:32:23.200 --> 0:32:27.400
<v Speaker 1>products and so forth, right, And the test um the

0:32:27.480 --> 0:32:29.960
<v Speaker 1>proof of the pudding of the theory here was in

0:32:30.120 --> 0:32:33.880
<v Speaker 1>seeing how say, the Virgin America has compete with the

0:32:34.000 --> 0:32:36.440
<v Speaker 1>Deltas in the United's of this world. And what you

0:32:36.480 --> 0:32:39.920
<v Speaker 1>see very clearly there is that the prices go up

0:32:40.360 --> 0:32:44.480
<v Speaker 1>when the airlines become more commonly owned, compared to price

0:32:44.600 --> 0:32:48.040
<v Speaker 1>changes in routs where there's less common ownership, and the

0:32:48.080 --> 0:32:50.120
<v Speaker 1>common ownership does not go up. Yeah it doesn't. That

0:32:50.240 --> 0:32:52.160
<v Speaker 1>is where the proof of the pudding is. Yeah, it doesn't.

0:32:52.200 --> 0:32:55.200
<v Speaker 1>The common ownership self police itself because if you are

0:32:55.240 --> 0:32:57.040
<v Speaker 1>a common owner of all the airlines, you're also a

0:32:57.080 --> 0:32:59.320
<v Speaker 1>common owner of, like I don't know, all of the

0:32:59.400 --> 0:33:02.680
<v Speaker 1>tech company season all of the industrial companies. And if

0:33:02.720 --> 0:33:06.880
<v Speaker 1>airline prices go up, then it's gonna hurt business travel,

0:33:07.000 --> 0:33:08.920
<v Speaker 1>which might just end up hurting a lot of the

0:33:08.960 --> 0:33:13.880
<v Speaker 1>other sectors that you own. So doesn't higher prices ruin

0:33:14.280 --> 0:33:18.640
<v Speaker 1>other things? Therefore, you would, as as an index fun owner,

0:33:19.200 --> 0:33:21.880
<v Speaker 1>not want that because you're you're looking after all the sectors,

0:33:21.960 --> 0:33:24.800
<v Speaker 1>not just this one. Yeah. I think that's an argument

0:33:24.880 --> 0:33:29.080
<v Speaker 1>that makes sense in in some cases more so than

0:33:29.120 --> 0:33:32.160
<v Speaker 1>in others. Right, So airlines, most of the tickets get

0:33:32.200 --> 0:33:34.080
<v Speaker 1>sold to the end, to the end consumers and not

0:33:34.200 --> 0:33:36.840
<v Speaker 1>to other businesses. But you could say, well, what about

0:33:36.880 --> 0:33:39.680
<v Speaker 1>oil companies. A lot of the airlines cost is oil,

0:33:40.040 --> 0:33:41.720
<v Speaker 1>So what if you have common ownership between the oil

0:33:41.760 --> 0:33:44.800
<v Speaker 1>companies and the air line companies. And indeed there's evidence

0:33:44.880 --> 0:33:47.880
<v Speaker 1>that this leads to lower prices. So more common ownership

0:33:48.240 --> 0:33:52.720
<v Speaker 1>between vertically related firms so suppliers and customers actually tends

0:33:52.720 --> 0:33:55.480
<v Speaker 1>to lower prices, which is one more reason why it's

0:33:55.520 --> 0:33:59.560
<v Speaker 1>really not about indexing. Right, So the problem for competition

0:33:59.680 --> 0:34:02.160
<v Speaker 1>is not come from indexing, or at least nobody has

0:34:02.200 --> 0:34:05.360
<v Speaker 1>shown that it does. The problem with competition comes from

0:34:05.960 --> 0:34:10.120
<v Speaker 1>the same investors holding horizontal competitors. And what the overall

0:34:10.120 --> 0:34:14.200
<v Speaker 1>effect on indexing or passive is on competition. Nobody has

0:34:14.280 --> 0:34:17.560
<v Speaker 1>even started to properly address that. And that's actually where

0:34:17.680 --> 0:34:20.239
<v Speaker 1>you know, that first paper we talked about comes in again.

0:34:20.560 --> 0:34:22.200
<v Speaker 1>You know, when you look at the airlines alone and

0:34:22.239 --> 0:34:25.840
<v Speaker 1>then just say look and the economy consists of a

0:34:25.880 --> 0:34:29.319
<v Speaker 1>whole bunch of industries, they become more commonly owned. Let's

0:34:29.320 --> 0:34:32.360
<v Speaker 1>fix the problem that's prohibit indexing. Well, let does not

0:34:32.520 --> 0:34:35.520
<v Speaker 1>take into account that there are vertically related firms. It

0:34:35.600 --> 0:34:39.040
<v Speaker 1>does not take into account that, hey, asset prices might

0:34:39.120 --> 0:34:40.960
<v Speaker 1>go up. And here's the thing that was missing from

0:34:40.960 --> 0:34:43.480
<v Speaker 1>the first paper. When asset prices are up and expected

0:34:43.520 --> 0:34:47.480
<v Speaker 1>returns are low, well, uh, that actually reduces the cost

0:34:47.560 --> 0:34:50.719
<v Speaker 1>of capital firms. And wouldn't that be something that potentially

0:34:50.800 --> 0:34:53.800
<v Speaker 1>makes some expand output, right, And those are things that

0:34:53.880 --> 0:34:56.920
<v Speaker 1>are simply not present in the economic theories um of

0:34:57.080 --> 0:34:59.359
<v Speaker 1>the day, and those are just directing limitations one has

0:34:59.440 --> 0:35:03.440
<v Speaker 1>to acknowledge when debating these policy proposals. So in the

0:35:03.480 --> 0:35:06.920
<v Speaker 1>common ownership last question on this, is there a public policy?

0:35:07.040 --> 0:35:08.400
<v Speaker 1>I know the first one you said, there's really no

0:35:08.760 --> 0:35:11.320
<v Speaker 1>policy recommendation. Would you have a policy recommendation on the

0:35:11.320 --> 0:35:14.520
<v Speaker 1>common ownership issue? Is like maybe, um, you can't own

0:35:14.560 --> 0:35:18.359
<v Speaker 1>more than three or of the industry. I mean, would

0:35:18.400 --> 0:35:22.160
<v Speaker 1>you before instituting something like that, which would also ultimately

0:35:22.239 --> 0:35:26.920
<v Speaker 1>make index funds illegal. So that's a good one, right, So, UM,

0:35:27.239 --> 0:35:31.280
<v Speaker 1>there are policy proposals. I'm saying I have not myself

0:35:31.880 --> 0:35:35.360
<v Speaker 1>endorsed any or or made any but in the legal scholarship,

0:35:36.040 --> 0:35:38.960
<v Speaker 1>the journals are full in the last five years of

0:35:39.040 --> 0:35:42.800
<v Speaker 1>all the policy proposals that go from anywhere from you know,

0:35:43.080 --> 0:35:46.360
<v Speaker 1>let's just take all the voting rights away from index funds,

0:35:46.600 --> 0:35:50.960
<v Speaker 1>or let's say we provide a safe haven for any

0:35:51.040 --> 0:35:54.359
<v Speaker 1>investor who holds less than one percent of all the firms, um,

0:35:54.600 --> 0:35:57.680
<v Speaker 1>and otherwise you know, the antitrust laws apply. So other

0:35:57.680 --> 0:36:00.800
<v Speaker 1>people have made these proposals, and I have, and basically

0:36:00.880 --> 0:36:04.080
<v Speaker 1>for the reasons that I just that I just mentioned, Um,

0:36:04.360 --> 0:36:07.160
<v Speaker 1>there's a whole bunch of open questions that I think

0:36:07.200 --> 0:36:09.319
<v Speaker 1>have to be addressed. But another reason is there's much

0:36:09.360 --> 0:36:12.279
<v Speaker 1>more low hanging fruit. Why why do we focus on

0:36:12.840 --> 0:36:15.200
<v Speaker 1>the black rocks and the vanguards of this world? Why

0:36:15.280 --> 0:36:20.080
<v Speaker 1>nobody takes any issue with Berkshire Hathaway buying in the

0:36:20.160 --> 0:36:24.239
<v Speaker 1>competing airlines. Nobody raises an eyebrow or and this is

0:36:24.280 --> 0:36:29.120
<v Speaker 1>a that's a literal example, Bill Gates family office buying

0:36:29.239 --> 0:36:32.920
<v Speaker 1>thirty percent stakes in the publicly traded waste management companies,

0:36:33.480 --> 0:36:36.360
<v Speaker 1>Like why why do we debate whether Vanguard has an

0:36:36.400 --> 0:36:38.480
<v Speaker 1>effect on passive? Why we just tolerate that and not

0:36:38.560 --> 0:36:41.960
<v Speaker 1>even scrutinize it. So I think the there's much more

0:36:42.040 --> 0:36:44.400
<v Speaker 1>low hanging fruit. And and there's no none of these

0:36:44.440 --> 0:36:47.040
<v Speaker 1>concerns that we just mentioned about vertically integrated firms and

0:36:47.120 --> 0:36:49.600
<v Speaker 1>equilibrium effects and all this good stuff. We don't have

0:36:49.719 --> 0:36:53.160
<v Speaker 1>to debate that when it's about a particular relatively small

0:36:53.200 --> 0:36:57.840
<v Speaker 1>investor basically deliberately buying shares and competitors um, then I

0:36:57.840 --> 0:37:01.680
<v Speaker 1>don't really understand why why we're putting so much attention

0:37:02.360 --> 0:37:04.919
<v Speaker 1>on the big index funds. So I think there's lower

0:37:04.960 --> 0:37:09.319
<v Speaker 1>hanging fruit for the policy makers than debate these structural proposals. Uh, yeah,

0:37:09.360 --> 0:37:11.239
<v Speaker 1>I know those are good points. Um. And I brought

0:37:11.400 --> 0:37:14.200
<v Speaker 1>these worries up with Bogel and um one of my

0:37:14.320 --> 0:37:16.800
<v Speaker 1>interviews with him just before he passed away, and he

0:37:16.960 --> 0:37:20.759
<v Speaker 1>addressed Eric Posner specifically that you know, you get these

0:37:20.800 --> 0:37:22.080
<v Speaker 1>worries all of a sudden, they get into the New

0:37:22.120 --> 0:37:24.520
<v Speaker 1>York Times, and they get written about the wrong way

0:37:24.560 --> 0:37:26.760
<v Speaker 1>straw man, as you would say, and all of a sudden,

0:37:26.880 --> 0:37:30.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, he specifically mentioned Elizabeth Warren sees it as

0:37:30.520 --> 0:37:33.400
<v Speaker 1>something she can run on because it's like her versus

0:37:33.440 --> 0:37:36.600
<v Speaker 1>the big guys, and all of a sudden, bam, you

0:37:36.800 --> 0:37:39.400
<v Speaker 1>just ruined this golden goose for small investors, which is

0:37:39.480 --> 0:37:42.080
<v Speaker 1>a cheap index fund. And that's the worry of the

0:37:42.160 --> 0:37:46.800
<v Speaker 1>some worry articles. So so look, I'm laughing because this

0:37:46.920 --> 0:37:49.880
<v Speaker 1>is where the circle closes. And that makes me a

0:37:49.920 --> 0:37:53.719
<v Speaker 1>little happy. Right. The policy trade of as it is illustrated,

0:37:53.920 --> 0:37:57.120
<v Speaker 1>is being thought of as diversification is good for the

0:37:57.200 --> 0:38:00.799
<v Speaker 1>small investors. But if we inter emed, then we would

0:38:00.840 --> 0:38:03.240
<v Speaker 1>take that away from them. And that's what's so important

0:38:03.239 --> 0:38:06.040
<v Speaker 1>about the first paper, the first paper which says, wait,

0:38:06.239 --> 0:38:09.439
<v Speaker 1>it's actually much less obvious than we thought whether cheap

0:38:09.480 --> 0:38:13.400
<v Speaker 1>indexing is actually good for small investors. All right, So

0:38:13.680 --> 0:38:15.960
<v Speaker 1>my point is I think that first paper doesn't have

0:38:16.040 --> 0:38:19.360
<v Speaker 1>policy implications on its own, but it does make you

0:38:19.440 --> 0:38:22.200
<v Speaker 1>think differently about the policy trade offs that are to

0:38:22.280 --> 0:38:24.440
<v Speaker 1>be considered when it goes when we're talking about these

0:38:24.480 --> 0:38:27.200
<v Speaker 1>other side effects, like the effects on competition. There's a

0:38:27.239 --> 0:38:37.239
<v Speaker 1>lot of layers to this. You own passive, right, This

0:38:37.400 --> 0:38:39.280
<v Speaker 1>is where I really like, I just want to close

0:38:39.360 --> 0:38:43.000
<v Speaker 1>with this. What what what would you need to see

0:38:43.560 --> 0:38:46.960
<v Speaker 1>to make you take one for the team and move

0:38:47.080 --> 0:38:50.600
<v Speaker 1>over to a high cost or a higher cost active

0:38:50.640 --> 0:38:53.560
<v Speaker 1>fund or something different with your money, because I think

0:38:53.640 --> 0:38:55.799
<v Speaker 1>that's sort of what other people would need to see

0:38:56.080 --> 0:38:58.680
<v Speaker 1>because if you, who looks right at this closest, is

0:38:58.719 --> 0:39:01.319
<v Speaker 1>still in index funds, it's gonna take a whole lot

0:39:01.400 --> 0:39:07.319
<v Speaker 1>more to convince anyone else to leave. No. So, um, yeah,

0:39:07.360 --> 0:39:11.040
<v Speaker 1>you're not gonna get me to divest from passive until

0:39:11.080 --> 0:39:14.319
<v Speaker 1>you make it expensive. Now, So that's what regulation is for. Look,

0:39:14.360 --> 0:39:16.719
<v Speaker 1>I'll tell you a story of little Martin being in

0:39:16.760 --> 0:39:19.040
<v Speaker 1>the grocery store when I was I don't know, seven

0:39:19.120 --> 0:39:22.640
<v Speaker 1>years old, and my mom showed me how the flowers

0:39:22.800 --> 0:39:25.640
<v Speaker 1>were flown in from I don't know, South America or

0:39:25.680 --> 0:39:28.520
<v Speaker 1>Africa or I don't know where, and how that bad

0:39:28.640 --> 0:39:30.680
<v Speaker 1>was that for the climate, and therefore we should just

0:39:30.800 --> 0:39:34.680
<v Speaker 1>shun that and not buy these products and so forth. Look,

0:39:34.800 --> 0:39:38.160
<v Speaker 1>what I see is that despite these effects, these efforts

0:39:38.200 --> 0:39:41.080
<v Speaker 1>by my mom um to get people to not buy

0:39:41.200 --> 0:39:44.680
<v Speaker 1>what is attractive to them, somehow they took over and

0:39:44.840 --> 0:39:47.120
<v Speaker 1>flowers are still being grown and flown around the globe.

0:39:47.920 --> 0:39:50.359
<v Speaker 1>Perhaps that's bad for the for the climate. But it's

0:39:50.480 --> 0:39:54.000
<v Speaker 1>not the job of individual consumers to fix that. That's

0:39:54.040 --> 0:39:56.759
<v Speaker 1>the job of policy makers. So you know, that's a

0:39:56.800 --> 0:40:00.600
<v Speaker 1>broader point. But the entire structure of the problem that

0:40:00.640 --> 0:40:04.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm talking about is that for individual investors, it is

0:40:04.400 --> 0:40:08.279
<v Speaker 1>perfectly rational to keep buying passive funds. And that's what

0:40:08.400 --> 0:40:10.400
<v Speaker 1>I do, because you know, I try to be a

0:40:10.520 --> 0:40:13.799
<v Speaker 1>rational person most of the time. But that doesn't mean

0:40:13.840 --> 0:40:16.960
<v Speaker 1>that it's good for you know, societies. And that's what

0:40:17.040 --> 0:40:19.719
<v Speaker 1>the role of the role of policymakers is, which is

0:40:19.760 --> 0:40:21.759
<v Speaker 1>why you know, I see it so critically or with

0:40:21.840 --> 0:40:24.839
<v Speaker 1>so much concern when politicians lean back and go like, look,

0:40:24.960 --> 0:40:27.920
<v Speaker 1>let's just hand over world world government to you know,

0:40:28.080 --> 0:40:30.759
<v Speaker 1>the big asset managers. Surely they care about the world

0:40:30.840 --> 0:40:33.680
<v Speaker 1>just as much as you know people do. And so

0:40:33.840 --> 0:40:36.120
<v Speaker 1>I think that's just faulty logic. That is literally the

0:40:36.280 --> 0:40:40.000
<v Speaker 1>role that politicians are supposed to play in an economic system,

0:40:40.040 --> 0:40:41.840
<v Speaker 1>and not the investors. So I don't think the investors

0:40:41.840 --> 0:40:46.040
<v Speaker 1>are to blame, nor should they change anything. The ball

0:40:46.160 --> 0:40:47.880
<v Speaker 1>is in the court of the politicians here. Okay, So

0:40:48.040 --> 0:40:51.680
<v Speaker 1>let's say the politicians said they reversed the Vanguard effect

0:40:51.719 --> 0:40:54.359
<v Speaker 1>from forty five years and said index funds can exist,

0:40:54.440 --> 0:40:56.680
<v Speaker 1>but they can be no cheaper than ninety basis points.

0:40:57.480 --> 0:41:00.279
<v Speaker 1>How would you as an individual investor that hold index funds,

0:41:00.320 --> 0:41:04.520
<v Speaker 1>feels like, what would your reaction to that be. I mean, look,

0:41:04.640 --> 0:41:07.279
<v Speaker 1>I'm kind of rich, so I would probably still hold

0:41:07.320 --> 0:41:10.000
<v Speaker 1>funds and make way higher returns, So I'd probably benefit

0:41:10.040 --> 0:41:15.680
<v Speaker 1>from that policy, and you're probably among that camp as well.

0:41:17.120 --> 0:41:19.840
<v Speaker 1>But well, I would feel bummed because I've looked at

0:41:19.880 --> 0:41:23.600
<v Speaker 1>the numbers. If you pay even one percent more over

0:41:23.680 --> 0:41:27.000
<v Speaker 1>fifty years of compounding, we're talking hundreds of thousands of

0:41:27.080 --> 0:41:30.080
<v Speaker 1>dollars that go to the industry and not you. It

0:41:30.200 --> 0:41:33.600
<v Speaker 1>adds up over time, and so even ninety basis points

0:41:33.719 --> 0:41:36.959
<v Speaker 1>or a hundred and fifty even ten over enough time

0:41:37.120 --> 0:41:38.920
<v Speaker 1>can be a lot of dollars and cents. And I

0:41:38.960 --> 0:41:41.640
<v Speaker 1>think that's where if you're an individual investor who's looked

0:41:41.680 --> 0:41:44.360
<v Speaker 1>at those charts, you'd be like, wow, what a bummer.

0:41:44.920 --> 0:41:49.919
<v Speaker 1>Absolutely so look, um, we were on the same page

0:41:49.960 --> 0:41:53.800
<v Speaker 1>on that. I just started a bunch of college savings

0:41:53.840 --> 0:41:56.440
<v Speaker 1>accounts for my kids, and in Europe you do not

0:41:56.560 --> 0:42:00.440
<v Speaker 1>get excess necessarily to these fantastically cheap index products. I

0:42:00.520 --> 0:42:03.600
<v Speaker 1>got one for what like ad basis points from some

0:42:03.760 --> 0:42:07.759
<v Speaker 1>local German bank and it makes me amazingly upset. It's

0:42:07.800 --> 0:42:10.840
<v Speaker 1>basically a rip off, and I'm very upset at that.

0:42:11.280 --> 0:42:13.920
<v Speaker 1>I get even more upset when I think about how

0:42:13.960 --> 0:42:17.520
<v Speaker 1>many millions of German savers there are UM that are

0:42:17.560 --> 0:42:20.640
<v Speaker 1>being ripped off without understanding that it could be so

0:42:20.760 --> 0:42:22.960
<v Speaker 1>much cheaper. We're totally on the same page about that.

0:42:23.520 --> 0:42:27.120
<v Speaker 1>But the reason for that is because um, here's a

0:42:27.200 --> 0:42:30.920
<v Speaker 1>few UM you know that's called it less sophisticated or

0:42:31.120 --> 0:42:35.400
<v Speaker 1>more heavily regulated UM investors that don't have access to

0:42:35.520 --> 0:42:38.600
<v Speaker 1>the cheap funds, but they still suffer from the lower

0:42:38.680 --> 0:42:41.520
<v Speaker 1>expected returns. So this is where the that's where the

0:42:41.560 --> 0:42:45.120
<v Speaker 1>trucks comes in. Of course, everybody agrees that cheaper funds

0:42:45.160 --> 0:42:47.919
<v Speaker 1>are better than more expensive funds at the same time,

0:42:48.080 --> 0:42:51.680
<v Speaker 1>but if nobody else was able to invest um at

0:42:52.000 --> 0:42:54.359
<v Speaker 1>such low costs, and therefore asset prices would be lower,

0:42:54.440 --> 0:42:56.360
<v Speaker 1>I think a lot of people would be happy. You know,

0:42:56.400 --> 0:42:58.520
<v Speaker 1>it's the same thing about houses, right, So I mean,

0:42:58.719 --> 0:43:01.080
<v Speaker 1>go in the street and talk to a twenty five

0:43:01.160 --> 0:43:04.000
<v Speaker 1>year old about whether they are happy or unhappy about

0:43:04.080 --> 0:43:07.279
<v Speaker 1>high house prices. Look, I mean, it's it's kind of

0:43:07.360 --> 0:43:09.560
<v Speaker 1>obvious that we're unhappy about that. That we spend a

0:43:09.640 --> 0:43:13.279
<v Speaker 1>greater fraction of our savings on assets that have a

0:43:13.360 --> 0:43:16.080
<v Speaker 1>particular dollar return. If we have to pay more for it,

0:43:16.280 --> 0:43:19.120
<v Speaker 1>we're clearly worse off. Right, So if you told them, hey,

0:43:19.320 --> 0:43:23.520
<v Speaker 1>let's um institute a reform that makes housing prices lower,

0:43:23.800 --> 0:43:26.120
<v Speaker 1>surely they would be happy about that, even though in

0:43:26.200 --> 0:43:28.120
<v Speaker 1>the face of it you can't immediately see it because

0:43:28.480 --> 0:43:30.920
<v Speaker 1>made you think about the fee that you're paying, but

0:43:31.040 --> 0:43:34.000
<v Speaker 1>you don't immediately understand that the equilibrium effect would be

0:43:34.400 --> 0:43:36.480
<v Speaker 1>that the prices are lower and you you get to

0:43:36.520 --> 0:43:39.480
<v Speaker 1>benefit from higher returns. All right, Well, Martin, we have

0:43:39.520 --> 0:43:42.000
<v Speaker 1>a fun way of closing the show. Um, we ask

0:43:42.160 --> 0:43:45.400
<v Speaker 1>everybody on here, what is your favorite e t F ticker.

0:43:46.840 --> 0:43:53.160
<v Speaker 1>It's VT the Vanguard Total World, which is a that's

0:43:53.239 --> 0:43:56.719
<v Speaker 1>total World stock index, fundily tax book indexing. That's what

0:43:56.840 --> 0:43:59.440
<v Speaker 1>I do. Nice that is that is as close to

0:43:59.560 --> 0:44:01.640
<v Speaker 1>pass of as you can get with an et F.

0:44:01.800 --> 0:44:05.400
<v Speaker 1>So that's it. Beautiful irony here that that that's your

0:44:05.440 --> 0:44:08.440
<v Speaker 1>favorite figure. It is good place to end anyway, Martin,

0:44:08.480 --> 0:44:11.319
<v Speaker 1>thank you for joining us on Trillions. Thank you very

0:44:11.400 --> 0:44:19.440
<v Speaker 1>much for the opportunity. Thanks for listening to Trillions until

0:44:19.560 --> 0:44:21.400
<v Speaker 1>next time. You can find us on the Bloomberg terminals,

0:44:21.520 --> 0:44:25.320
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot com, Apple Podcast, Spotify, and wherever else you

0:44:25.400 --> 0:44:27.839
<v Speaker 1>like to listen. We'd love to hear from you. We're

0:44:27.880 --> 0:44:31.719
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter. I'm at Joel Weaper Show. He's at Eric Caltuness.

0:44:32.600 --> 0:44:36.319
<v Speaker 1>This episode of Trillions was produced by Magnus Hendrickson. Bye