Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Grosseo from Bloomberg Radio.
Speaker 2: I have an open spot or the Federal Reserve Board.
Speaker 2: I'm very happy about that.
Speaker 1: President Donald Trump suddenly has a chance to fill an
Speaker 1: opening at the Federal Reserve earlier than expected, after FED
Speaker 1: Governor Adrianna Kugler announced her resignation on Friday. Kugler's exit
Speaker 1: unfolds amid unprecedented political pressure from the White House on
Speaker 1: the Central Bank over monetary policy, with Trump often launching
Speaker 1: personal insults at your own Powell. The current chair joining
Speaker 1: me is Catherine Judge, a professor at Columbia Law School. Kate,
Speaker 1: what's your reaction to Kugler's departure.
Speaker 3: I was surprised she is the next governor to leave. Naturally,
Speaker 3: her term expires early in twenty twenty six, so it's
Speaker 3: clearly a spot that President Trump is going to be
Speaker 3: able to have available in the relatively near future. But
Speaker 3: this short window of time changes dynamics in a meaningful way.
Speaker 3: Among other things, her spot was seen as a like
Speaker 3: b position for the person that President Trump would like
Speaker 3: to bring in to be the next chair, So this
Speaker 3: really potentially accelerates that process and could lead to even
Speaker 3: more intense pressure on Powell to step down from his
Speaker 3: position as chair.
Speaker 1: When President Trump was leaving the White House on Friday,
Speaker 1: he said that he was very happy to have an
Speaker 1: open spot, and he told reporters that she was stepping
Speaker 1: down because she disagreed with quote too late on the
Speaker 1: interest rates. That's his derogatory term for Powell. But does
Speaker 1: that align with her publicly stated views.
Speaker 3: We have not seen anything to that effect in what
Speaker 3: she has stated publicly. We have seen disagreement with Van
Speaker 3: Koogler and Michael Barr on the one hand, and other
Speaker 3: members of the board on the other hand. Are matters
Speaker 3: of regulation, and it does look as though the current board,
Speaker 3: under the effective leadership of a vice chare for supervision
Speaker 3: Michelle Bowman, is going to engage in a deregulatory agenda.
Speaker 3: So on that front, it does look like there was
Speaker 3: a difference of opinion, But that's not necessarily a reason
Speaker 3: for her to accelerate her departure. If anything, that's the
Speaker 3: reason for her to stick around and to let her
Speaker 3: voice and vote be heard.
Speaker 1: Trump says he's going to appoint the next FED governor.
Speaker 1: Will you explain why he basically has to appoint the
Speaker 1: next FED governor to fill her spot, so.
Speaker 3: He has to choose the chair among the governors. Powell's
Speaker 3: term as chair expires in May of next year. His
Speaker 3: term his governor doesn't expire until twenty twenty eight. It
Speaker 3: is possible that Powell stepped down as governor at the
Speaker 3: same time he sets down share, but that is by
Speaker 3: no means guaranteed, and because there are no other additional
Speaker 3: slots open, Chris Waller, who's a Republican who Trump previously
Speaker 3: put on the Board of Governors, is a possibility or
Speaker 3: FED chair, as if he wants to promote Waller, then
Speaker 3: he wouldn't need to use this slot for purposes of
Speaker 3: introducing somebody who would then take over as chair. But
Speaker 3: if he does want Kevin Hassett or Kevin warsh or
Speaker 3: any of the other names that have been bandied about,
Speaker 3: this slot might be his critical opportunity.
Speaker 1: Are there any indications as to whom he's favoring for
Speaker 1: the role.
Speaker 3: There's been rumors that hast has been taking over as lead.
Speaker 3: Kevin Worsh's names has been around for a long time.
Speaker 3: We have certainly seen both of them actively campaigning for
Speaker 3: the job in their public statements have been very supportive
Speaker 3: of the lower interesting streat policies that Trump would otherwise
Speaker 3: like to see in place, But we have heard nothing
Speaker 3: official from the White House the respect who's likely to
Speaker 3: be the next comanee.
Speaker 1: The Open Market Committee voted nine to two to leave
Speaker 1: rates unchanged, so one more vote won't necessarily make a difference.
Speaker 3: It's hard to know. I mean, then this is really hard.
Speaker 3: So first of all, the site is already facing an
Speaker 3: environment in which they might be changing course independent of
Speaker 3: a new chair coming in. The most recent jobs numbers
Speaker 3: look weaker than they expected, and there have been some
Speaker 3: revisions for a variety of reasons to think that there
Speaker 3: might have already been a modest changing course underway. But
Speaker 3: you're right, I mean, one of the key things to
Speaker 3: keep in mind is the Federal Open Market Committee is
Speaker 3: a twelve member committee, and the chair or kind of
Speaker 3: the expected chair, is only one of those votes. As
Speaker 3: one of the things that Trump past to kind of
Speaker 3: keep in mind, and that we all have to keep
Speaker 3: in mind as we're watching, is how effective is the
Speaker 3: new going to be garnering support for a meaningfully different
Speaker 3: trajectory for policy. And that's going to be one of
Speaker 3: the open questions as something new comes in, both what
Speaker 3: is the interest rate corrector they want to see and
Speaker 3: what are the tools they're going to use to try
Speaker 3: to convince fella members of the Federal Open Market Committee,
Speaker 3: But actually a different policy courses for the best in.
Speaker 1: The past have fed Governor's not been able to convince
Speaker 1: the Open Market Committee to do what they want.
Speaker 3: What we haven't seen in the past is quite as
Speaker 3: clear of a mismatch between what the President wants to
Speaker 3: see happen and what the current interust rate policy is.
Speaker 3: So we've certainly seen nominees come in because they are
Speaker 3: meant to kind of change the directory. Paul Volker famously
Speaker 3: was appointed because there was suddenly an appreciation that inflation
Speaker 3: and managing inflation had to be the priority. That being said,
Speaker 3: that was an insight that the Board also shared and
Speaker 3: that President shared. So we did have some struggle at
Speaker 3: times with aspects of his policy getting the level of
Speaker 3: support he wanted. On the other hand, he was actually
Speaker 3: pushing against the president, pushing against short term political will
Speaker 3: and pushing for kind of a longer term vision than
Speaker 3: aligned with the core mission of the Federal Reserve, which
Speaker 3: is fighting inflation and promoting maximum employment. So in that instance,
Speaker 3: it was a very different set of dynamics. So this
Speaker 3: is a different type of transition because we have a
Speaker 3: president who had just been so outspoken for such a
Speaker 3: long time about wanting monetary policy to look dramatically different
Speaker 3: than it has.
Speaker 1: Have you ever seen this kind of pressure from the
Speaker 1: White House on the FED.
Speaker 3: Chair, No, No one has. We've certainly seen pressure from
Speaker 3: the White House on the FED chair in the past,
Speaker 3: and on the pig reserve in the past. The classic
Speaker 3: concern is that the president always wants monetary policy to
Speaker 3: be some more accommodative than the said oftentimes wants it
Speaker 3: to be. There's certain times that those interests are allives.
Speaker 3: During a depression, during difficult times, accommodated monetary policy is
Speaker 3: the right policy given the FEDS du a manadate. But
Speaker 3: in moments like now, where the Fed's looking long term
Speaker 3: and trying to think about what does it need to
Speaker 3: do to make sure that it successfully fights off the
Speaker 3: reason bout of inflation, there's a possibility for conflict, and
Speaker 3: so LBJ famously kind of pushed around William mcchezie martinin.
Speaker 3: So we've certainly seen presidents in those past that have
Speaker 3: pushed around FED chairs and pushed around the FED, and
Speaker 3: that's because they oftentimes do want monetary policy to be
Speaker 3: somewhat more commodative. Then is prudence given the medium to
Speaker 3: longer term interest in trying to mainstain stable prices. And
Speaker 3: that's when those conflicts have come into place. But what
Speaker 3: we haven't seen is this type of continual pressure where
Speaker 3: the FED chair is really targeted in an ongoing and
Speaker 3: repeated way, and where the President isn't just suggesting that
Speaker 3: rate should be a little lower or that monetary condition
Speaker 3: should be somewhat more accommodative, but is really seeking but
Speaker 3: seems to be a very different approach to monetary policy
Speaker 3: than the current Federal Reserve is pursuing at a time
Speaker 3: where there is still some reason at least to worry
Speaker 3: about inflation.
Speaker 1: The nominee, whoever Trump chooses, will have to be confirmed
Speaker 1: by the Senate. But if that person is then chosen
Speaker 1: as the chair that does or doesn't need Senate confirmation.
Speaker 3: That also is a Senate confirmation process. And there's also
Speaker 3: this additional oddity this person is going to face kind
Speaker 3: of the ringer. There's a Senate confirmation to fulfill the
Speaker 3: remainder of Coogler's term. But the way this sat a
Speaker 3: reserve works oftentimes for agencies, once you are confirmed, you
Speaker 3: have a period in office that dates from when you
Speaker 3: are confirms You might have five years from the time
Speaker 3: you actually take office. For example. The way the fatal
Speaker 3: reserve works is there are these fourteen year terms on
Speaker 3: a staggered basis, and they are fourteen year terms in
Speaker 3: part to limit the ability of anyone president to appoint
Speaker 3: too many different governors, but partly because of that distinct
Speaker 3: staggered structure. When somebody is nominated to fulfill a seat
Speaker 3: for somebody who's leaving before their end of the term,
Speaker 3: as Cooper is, they only are confirmed to the end
Speaker 3: of that term. So in theory, if this person manages
Speaker 3: to go through hearings and confirmations in time to fill
Speaker 3: the seat before it naturally become vacant, there might have
Speaker 3: to be a nominal second process to have a person
Speaker 3: actually confirmed again when the term expires.
Speaker 1: Trump on Friday call for the Board of Governors to
Speaker 1: usurp the power of the FED chair. He said in
Speaker 1: all caps, the board should assume control and do what
Speaker 1: everyone knows has to do be done.
Speaker 3: I mean, there's a lot of things to say there.
Speaker 3: So first of all, as we were discussing earlier, each
Speaker 3: member of the FMC is not just the board the FOMC.
Speaker 3: The Federal Up the Market Committee, which determines monetary policy,
Speaker 3: is a twelve member committee, so all seven members of
Speaker 3: the board governors have votes on that committee, but so
Speaker 3: do five presidents. So the policy makers involved are not
Speaker 3: just governors, and the governors are exercising their independent judgments.
Speaker 3: We saw two governors actually dissent and they did suggest
Speaker 3: that more accommodative monetary policy was appropriate, but we saw
Speaker 3: the rest of the governors go along and actually agree
Speaker 3: with Powell that the preferred approach was the right approach
Speaker 3: to take.
Speaker 1: The Supreme Court in a May decision suggested that Trump
Speaker 1: couldn't remove Powell because of policy disagreements. Is there any
Speaker 1: feeling for whether the administration is still trying to get
Speaker 1: him removed.
Speaker 3: Yeah, there's two different issues. So one we did to
Speaker 3: be this effort with the renovations, which really looks pretextable. Right.
Speaker 3: What we know is Trump wants lower interest rates. He
Speaker 3: blames Powells for the interest rates being what they are,
Speaker 3: and so he was looking at the cost overruns and
Speaker 3: trying to use that as potentially a basist for removing
Speaker 3: Powell for cause that has seemed to have passed at
Speaker 3: least modestly passed. But it does suggest that Trump might
Speaker 3: still be on the lookout for other pretextual grounds for removal.
Speaker 3: The other issue that remains an issue particularly and actually
Speaker 3: becomes more of a live issue since Coopler is stepping down,
Speaker 3: is might he try to appoint somebody else as chair
Speaker 3: and not remove Powell but merely demote Powell? And here
Speaker 3: are the laws little tricky and the Supreme Court decision
Speaker 3: which wasn't even really a decision as part of their
Speaker 3: shadow docket, did it resolve the question of whether Powell
Speaker 3: can be devoted. The statutory language is very clear governors
Speaker 3: of the SUTA Reserve can be moved from the role
Speaker 3: of governors only for cost, so there's very clear statutory protection.
Speaker 3: There By contrast, the chair and the various vie chairs
Speaker 3: have four year terms. The vote is to fourteen year
Speaker 3: terms and there's no explicit four cause removal protection. There's
Speaker 3: arguments that he can still be demoted only for cause
Speaker 3: and not for policy. Differences, but there is a real
Speaker 3: risk that that legal question will be tested in a
Speaker 3: more pressing way now that the window of time between
Speaker 3: when he can get a new nominee onto the board
Speaker 3: and when Powell's terms chair comes to a natural end.
Speaker 3: Now that the window is to come Bonger, this falls.
Speaker 1: Into the more questions than answers category. Thanks so much, Catherine.
Speaker 1: That's Professor Catherine Judge of Columbia Law School.
Speaker 2: The US Treasury has taken in one hundred and fifty
Speaker 2: billion dollars from tariffs, and we'll be adding about two
Speaker 2: hundred billion dollars next month, four totals that nobody's ever
Speaker 2: seen before.
Speaker 1: Frankly, the challengers to President Trump's tariffs say they rest
Speaker 1: on a quote breath taking claim to power that no
Speaker 1: president has asserted in two hundred years, and a federal
Speaker 1: appeals court appeared skeptical about Trump's authority to issue the
Speaker 1: sweeping global tariffs under an emergency law that has never
Speaker 1: been used for that purpose and doesn't even mention tariffs.
Speaker 1: In May, the U s Court of International Trade ruled
Speaker 1: that the vast majority of President Trump's levies were issued
Speaker 1: illegally and ordered them blocked. The Federal Circuit Court of
Speaker 1: Appeals gave the Trump administration a temporary reprieve, but during
Speaker 1: the high stakes oral arguments last week before the circuit's
Speaker 1: entire slate of eleven active judges, it appeared that several
Speaker 1: were skeptical of the government's arguments. A decision finding against
Speaker 1: the tariffs will almost certainly be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Speaker 1: My guest is Simmy Garula, a professor at Notre Dame
Speaker 1: Law School and the former Undersecretary for Enforcement at the
Speaker 1: Department of the Treasury. Jimmy, will you start by explaining
Speaker 1: what authority President Trump is using to impose these tariffs.
Speaker 4: Now, President Trump is using a law called the International
Speaker 4: Emergency Economic Powers Act, and it goes by the acrony
Speaker 4: i EPA, and IIPA does authorize the President to impose
Speaker 4: economic sanctions on individuals, entities, even countries in response to
Speaker 4: an unusual and extraordinary emergency. So that's the precondition for
Speaker 4: the exercise of these economic sanctions. The President has to
Speaker 4: declare that there is an unusual and extraordinary emergency that
Speaker 4: has its source in whole or in substantial part outside
Speaker 4: the United State, and further that threatens national security, foreign policy,
Speaker 4: or the economy of the United States. So that's the
Speaker 4: statute that the president is relying upon. There's a couple
Speaker 4: of very serious problems with using IIPA. First and foremost,
Speaker 4: AIPA never mentions tariffs. The word tariff does not occur
Speaker 4: even one time in the text of the statute. And second,
Speaker 4: AIPA was enacted to Congress in nineteen seventy seven, and
Speaker 4: no president in the history of AIPA has ever cited
Speaker 4: AIPA as the authority to authorize the position of tariffs.
Speaker 4: So this is the only president in the entire history
Speaker 4: of AIPA that's ever cited aipa's authority for imposing tariffs
Speaker 4: on foreign countries.
Speaker 1: The challenges here were a group of democratic led states
Speaker 1: and small businesses. Is what was their basic argument.
Speaker 4: Their basic argument was, first that a EPA just doesn't apply,
Speaker 4: that it does not provide authority for the president to
Speaker 4: impose economic sanctions. And again for the reason the basic
Speaker 4: particulate character i'll mention of the statute, no president has
Speaker 4: ever used a EPA to justify the imposition of terrorists,
Speaker 4: So that's argument number one. Argument number two is that
Speaker 4: even if AEFA did apply that there's some serious questions
Speaker 4: about whether or not the president is properly using or
Speaker 4: satisfied the requirements of a EPA. You know, for example,
Speaker 4: what is the unusual and extraordinary emergency that justifies economic
Speaker 4: sanctions in the form of terrorists? And here the president
Speaker 4: has articulated many different so called emergency. On the one hand,
Speaker 4: it's a trade deficit, you know, that's the unusual exurin
Speaker 4: or emergency. On the other hand, it's the fetanyl crisis,
Speaker 4: the importation of the fetanyl from Mexico, Canada and China.
Speaker 4: And the third yes, and even cited immigration. You know,
Speaker 4: the immigration is the emergency. But first there's a question about, well,
Speaker 4: is a trade deficit really an unusual insternary emergency. We've
Speaker 4: had trade deficits with countries around the world for decades.
Speaker 4: I mean, that's nothing new. Trade deficit with China, trade
Speaker 4: deficit with Mexico, Canada, with the EU, that's nothing new.
Speaker 4: So what is so usual and extraordinary about trade deficits today?
Speaker 4: That again triggers the application of a EPOS. And then
Speaker 4: there's another problem with the actual application of the statute.
Speaker 4: And when we look at the feedinyl crisis, for example,
Speaker 4: approximately eighty eight percent of fetanol that consumed in the
Speaker 4: United States comes to across the Mexican border, the border
Speaker 4: with the US and Mexico. Only eight percent comes across
Speaker 4: the Canadian board. So if AIPA is being used or
Speaker 4: the emergency is fetnol involving the importation from Canada, Canada
Speaker 4: is only responsible for a very small percentage of fetnol
Speaker 4: coming across the US Canada borders. But there doesn't appear
Speaker 4: to be a nexus or a close nexus between the
Speaker 4: so called crisis and the targets of the tariffs and
Speaker 4: the sanctioned They are being closed on various countries.
Speaker 1: So what was the government's response to that.
Speaker 4: One response is that, well, this involves foreign affairs, and
Speaker 4: in the area of foreign affairs, the Supreme Court is
Speaker 4: recognized that the president has sundery powers. You know, the
Speaker 4: government needs to speak with one voice in dealing with
Speaker 4: foreign affairs, and that one voice should be of them,
Speaker 4: you know, the executive branch. So it's again the president
Speaker 4: has plenary, you know, virtually unlimited powers in dealing with
Speaker 4: other countries. On the other hand, that argument runs into
Speaker 4: a serious problem, and that serious problem is the US
Speaker 4: Constitution itself because Article Launce, Section eight was one state
Speaker 4: that Congress shall have the power to lay collect taxes. Duties, infosts,
Speaker 4: and excises and tariffs are really a form of attax.
Speaker 4: It's a form of attax. And therefore the power to
Speaker 4: lay and collect taxes fall within the power of comus,
Speaker 4: you know, not the present. And I think there's one
Speaker 4: other very important argument, and I don't think it came
Speaker 4: up in this recent argument before the US Court of
Speaker 4: Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and it's a very basic
Speaker 4: fundamental principle of our democracy and our founding fathers. We're
Speaker 4: very concerned about too much power residing in the hands
Speaker 4: of any one person or any one branch of government.
Speaker 4: And that's why we have a democracy based upon separation
Speaker 4: of powers. And here, if you follow the government, it's
Speaker 4: all even reasoning. Then the president has this unwomaned power.
Speaker 4: One person can decide to impose tariffs on any country
Speaker 4: or every country in the world, can decide what the
Speaker 4: percentage of the tariff should be, should be, ten percent,
Speaker 4: should be, twenty and twenty five percent against what countries
Speaker 4: and for what we And so it seems to me
Speaker 4: that the president's position really flies in the base of
Speaker 4: this very fundamental bedrock principle of separation of powers on
Speaker 4: which are democracy is based.
Speaker 1: So the panel of judges seem to sharply question the
Speaker 1: government's position. One judge said, tariffs seemed to have no
Speaker 1: friends in the text of the emergent see law. Do
Speaker 1: you think that a majority of the judges might rule
Speaker 1: against the tariffs?
Speaker 4: I think, based upon the questions and the tenor and
Speaker 4: some of the questions that were asked me the oral argument,
Speaker 4: I think the Federal opelate Court is very skeptical of
Speaker 4: the government's position that i provides authority from the President
Speaker 4: to impose terriffs. So I'm cautiously optimistic that the appelic
Speaker 4: Court will likely reject the government's argument and then find
Speaker 4: that i APE has been in a supply here. So
Speaker 4: then the credible next question, the credibal next step is
Speaker 4: going to be before the Supreme Court, because if the
Speaker 4: government loses, there's no question that they'll appeal the matter
Speaker 4: to the United States Supreme Court, and there the outcome
Speaker 4: is really up in the air.
Speaker 1: Because it's an on bank panel, the decision here can
Speaker 1: be appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Speaker 4: Yeah, and there. What we've seen is that, you know, historically,
Speaker 4: just you know, the first six months of the Trump administration,
Speaker 4: the US Supreme Court has been very differential to the
Speaker 4: executive branch with respect to claims of executive authority or
Speaker 4: Trump adminspiration. The Supreme Court determined, first and foremost, the
Speaker 4: president is immutial from criminal prosecution excepting very very rare
Speaker 4: limited exceptions, and the President can on his own dismantled
Speaker 4: federalations without consulting with or attaining the approval of Commerce,
Speaker 4: and with whole bonds that have been appropriated by commers
Speaker 4: and fire Inspector General and fire other key government personnelities
Speaker 4: without any consultation or approval from Congress. And so the
Speaker 4: president might be a more favorable audience imported Supreme Court
Speaker 4: than he received before the US Court of Appeals for
Speaker 4: the Federal.
Speaker 1: Circuit is Supreme Court president. On the Challengers, they cited
Speaker 1: two of the Biden administration's biggest losses before the Supreme Court,
Speaker 1: in fights over restrictions on pandemic era evictions and canceling
Speaker 1: federal student loan debt to support their position that Trump
Speaker 1: now can't try to read more power into the economic
Speaker 1: emergency law than it offers on its face.
Speaker 4: Well, here's a difference. I think the difference here is
Speaker 4: that the Supreme Court again could focus on the fact
Speaker 4: that these tariffs involve foreign affairs and the president's ole
Speaker 4: oregon for the country on issues involving international affairs. The
Speaker 4: cases that you cited involved domestic statutes, you know, domestic law,
Speaker 4: not international foreign affairs. And so here the court might
Speaker 4: seize on that recognized and the president has those plenary
Speaker 4: powers in the field of foreign affairs, and again be
Speaker 4: more pathetic, you know, to the argument. At the same time,
Speaker 4: I mean, if the Court were to rule against the president,
Speaker 4: I mean, just think of the repercussions of that ruling
Speaker 4: with respect to the tariffs that the President has set,
Speaker 4: the tariffs that have gone into effect, the tariffs that
Speaker 4: are going to be going into effect in a few weeks.
Speaker 4: I mean, they would have just literally global ramification of
Speaker 4: the Supreme Court held that the President did not have
Speaker 4: the authority to impose these tariffs foreign countries across across
Speaker 4: the globe.
Speaker 1: Could the US then be forced to refund duties that
Speaker 1: have already been collected, Would the ruling be retroactive?
Speaker 4: Would really just be you know, perspective, and so the
Speaker 4: scope of the ruling we would have to see, you know,
Speaker 4: what the application scope of the ruling would be. But
Speaker 4: that certainly could be one of the one of the
Speaker 4: implications if it rules against against the president. And so
Speaker 4: maybe again the Supreme Court just doesn't want to take
Speaker 4: that on. They don't want to rule in a way
Speaker 4: it's going to create these kinds of political and economic
Speaker 4: and you know, sea waves across the globe.
Speaker 1: Does Trump have other tools to impose tariffs?
Speaker 4: The tool would be the I think the appropriately too,
Speaker 4: it would be just simply to build to Congress. And
Speaker 4: so there's certainly nothing that prohibits the president from going
Speaker 4: to Congress and actually Congress to enact legislation that would
Speaker 4: authorize the president to impose tariffs of particular countries for
Speaker 4: particular reasons. You would think, in light of the fact
Speaker 4: that that both the House and the Senate are controlled
Speaker 4: by the Republican Party, that he would receive a very
Speaker 4: receptive audience there and they would respond accordingly. And the
Speaker 4: legislation that the president has a question. But here I think,
Speaker 4: you know, there's maybe something more you know, more fundamental,
Speaker 4: more basic. That's that play here, and that's again the
Speaker 4: power of the of the executive branch. And we've seen
Speaker 4: a president that has been really pushing and stretching the
Speaker 4: limits to his Article to powers. So maybe that's even
Speaker 4: more important to the Presidence being able to say no,
Speaker 4: I have it, or I don't have to go to confrege.
Speaker 4: I can do this on my own. I don't need
Speaker 4: Congress and support. But at the end of the days,
Speaker 4: the pragmatic matter, he could accomplish what he's trying to
Speaker 4: accomplish by going to Congress, the course and process would
Speaker 4: be much slower in enacting the necessary legislation and procedurally.
Speaker 1: This is an appeal from a decision in May of
Speaker 1: the US Court of International Trade which struck down both
Speaker 1: the April second Liberation Day tariffs and the migration related tariffs.
Speaker 1: Was that a forceful decision from the US Court of
Speaker 1: International Trade?
Speaker 4: I think it was the written opinion articulated many of
Speaker 4: the reasons and many of the arguments that will raised
Speaker 4: again before the Pellet Court the Federal of Pelt Court,
Speaker 4: and which the Federal of Pelt Coort seemed to agree
Speaker 4: that those arguments also seem to resonate with the Federal Circuit,
Speaker 4: and so I think I think the underlying decision is
Speaker 4: sound based upon oral argument here before the Federal Circuit
Speaker 4: Court of Appeals, it appears that they're probably going to
Speaker 4: be incorporating many of those arguments and reasons that were
Speaker 4: articulated below in their opinion if in fact they rule
Speaker 4: against the President.
Speaker 1: You dealt with tariffs when you work for the government,
Speaker 1: what struck you about these?
Speaker 4: I found it significant. I did a little bit of
Speaker 4: due diligence on the opioid crisis in fetanol, and the
Speaker 4: CDC in twenty twenty four reported there's been a twenty
Speaker 4: seven percent decrease in overdoes death from fetanol compared to
Speaker 4: twenty twenty three. And so even that that argument, the
Speaker 4: unusual extraordinary emergency is the fedenyl crisis that has seemed
Speaker 4: to have subsided or reduced significantly over the last couple
Speaker 4: of years. Last year it is twenty twenty four, and
Speaker 4: so I think it further under touch. The presidents claimed that,
Speaker 4: you know, that's an emergency that justifies the imposition of
Speaker 4: carols against Mexico, China, and Canada.
Speaker 1: It will probably be several weeks before we hear a
Speaker 1: decision from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Thanks so much, Jimmy.
Speaker 1: That's Professor Jimmy Garoule of Notre Dame Law School. And
Speaker 1: that's it for this edition of The Bloomberg Law Show.
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Speaker 4: Mhmm.