WEBVTT - Tech News: Give Me Liberty And Give Me Tech 0:00:04.400 --> 0:00:07.800 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 0:00:12.160 --> 0:00:14.920 Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 0:00:15.040 --> 0:00:18.080 Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 0:00:18.160 --> 0:00:20.560 and allow of all things tech. And this is the 0:00:20.560 --> 0:00:25.280 tech news for Thursday, July one, twenty one. We're heading 0:00:25.280 --> 0:00:28.479 into the fourth of July weekend around the world, but 0:00:28.560 --> 0:00:30.960 here in the U s. It's a holiday, and so 0:00:31.640 --> 0:00:35.360 it seems fitting that a lot of my topics today 0:00:35.720 --> 0:00:40.960 have to do with tech and things like liberty and freedom. 0:00:41.000 --> 0:00:44.960 So on Wednesday of this week, the state of Maine 0:00:45.440 --> 0:00:50.080 past into law with unanimous support, a a law that 0:00:50.159 --> 0:00:53.960 places tight restrictions on how state agencies can use facial 0:00:54.040 --> 0:00:58.800 recognition technology. In fact, the restrictions are so tight that 0:00:59.040 --> 0:01:02.560 most state aid agencies are just flat out not allowed 0:01:02.720 --> 0:01:06.400 to use facial recognition technology at all. The state government 0:01:06.440 --> 0:01:10.240 also banned it's used for the purposes of surveillance. Now, 0:01:10.319 --> 0:01:14.119 there are some exceptions that allow certain agencies to use 0:01:14.200 --> 0:01:19.039 facial recognition technology, so law enforcement is allowed to use 0:01:19.080 --> 0:01:22.679 it if they are investigating a serious crime. Uh. The 0:01:22.720 --> 0:01:25.440 state also might use it in order to identify someone 0:01:25.480 --> 0:01:30.760 who is deceased, missing, or endangered, so in cases where 0:01:30.800 --> 0:01:34.680 you're talking about someone's life or safety, that is an 0:01:34.680 --> 0:01:37.320 exception as well. However, for the most part, the state 0:01:37.480 --> 0:01:41.919 is not to use facial recognition technology starting in October 0:01:41.959 --> 0:01:44.920 of this year. That's when the law takes effect. The 0:01:45.040 --> 0:01:49.120 law also requires police to go through proper channels and 0:01:49.200 --> 0:01:52.800 to obtain access to facial recognition technology on a case 0:01:52.880 --> 0:01:57.600 by case basis. UH civil liberties organizations had expressed approval 0:01:57.640 --> 0:02:00.360 of these new measures. They point to main as being 0:02:00.400 --> 0:02:03.400 the leading edge of protecting citizen privacy and shielding them 0:02:03.400 --> 0:02:09.440 from surveillance. The essential argument was that you know this 0:02:09.520 --> 0:02:13.960 is this is technology that has disproportionate ability to do 0:02:14.120 --> 0:02:19.520 harm to someone, and the benefits do not outweigh that 0:02:19.639 --> 0:02:24.840 disproportionate harm. Maybe this will spur similar state laws across 0:02:24.880 --> 0:02:27.720 the country. We have seen a law in Washington that 0:02:27.720 --> 0:02:30.120 didn't go nearly as far as the one in Maine, 0:02:30.919 --> 0:02:34.480 so maybe we'll see other states follow suit. Perhaps will 0:02:34.520 --> 0:02:38.239 even eventually see a federal law that covers this issue 0:02:38.280 --> 0:02:42.360 here in the US. Sticking with tech and civil liberties, 0:02:42.680 --> 0:02:46.880 during a government hearing, attorneys for cloud service companies plus 0:02:47.200 --> 0:02:52.359 one executive from Microsoft spoke to lawmakers about the government's 0:02:52.360 --> 0:02:57.560 practice of seeking personal information of company customers. In addition, 0:02:57.639 --> 0:03:01.640 the discussion included the practice of having such requests hidden 0:03:01.760 --> 0:03:06.360 from public view. They're filed under secret court orders with 0:03:06.440 --> 0:03:09.480 the demand that whatever the cloud service company is, you know, 0:03:09.560 --> 0:03:14.000 like Microsoft, they aren't supposed to acknowledge that any investigation 0:03:14.160 --> 0:03:19.200 is ongoing. Very cloak and dagger kind of approach, and 0:03:19.240 --> 0:03:22.480 a lot of people for years have been raising concerns 0:03:22.560 --> 0:03:25.440 about this kind of thing. This actually follows in the 0:03:25.440 --> 0:03:29.440 wake of a recent revelation that the Department of Justice 0:03:29.560 --> 0:03:34.560 under former President Trump sought phone records of Democratic representatives 0:03:34.639 --> 0:03:37.720 as well as certain reporters, and the d o J 0:03:38.120 --> 0:03:41.839 used secret subpoenas to seek out that kind of information. 0:03:42.040 --> 0:03:45.840 And the cloud service companies, or rather the lawyers representing 0:03:46.000 --> 0:03:49.160 those companies, are arguing that the government should have to 0:03:49.280 --> 0:03:52.280 follow the exact same sort of processes they have to 0:03:52.320 --> 0:03:56.000 follow if they want to access, you know, physical files 0:03:56.120 --> 0:03:58.800 stored in filing cabinets, if you have to have a 0:03:58.880 --> 0:04:01.560 warrant to search at then you need to have the 0:04:01.640 --> 0:04:06.240 equivalent in order to search digital data stored in the cloud. 0:04:06.920 --> 0:04:10.640 The executive from Microsoft, Tom Burt, said that over the 0:04:10.720 --> 0:04:14.280 last five years Microsoft has received between two thousand, four 0:04:14.360 --> 0:04:18.520 hundred to three thousand, five hundred secrecy orders each year, 0:04:18.960 --> 0:04:22.119 so at minimum two thousand, four hundred, at max around 0:04:22.120 --> 0:04:25.880 thirty undred, and that these orders appeared to be quote 0:04:26.000 --> 0:04:30.919 unsupported by any meaningful legal or factual analysis end quote. 0:04:30.960 --> 0:04:35.040 So in other words, there didn't appear to be any 0:04:35.680 --> 0:04:41.520 you know, you know, reasonable purpose for the search orders, 0:04:41.680 --> 0:04:44.520 and yet these companies were being compelled to agree with 0:04:44.560 --> 0:04:48.080 them by the government. So, like the widespread use of 0:04:48.120 --> 0:04:51.720 facial recognition technology, this practice seems to be in violation 0:04:51.880 --> 0:04:55.560 of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 0:04:55.600 --> 0:05:00.080 Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, and 0:05:00.120 --> 0:05:03.640 that amendment states that no warrants shall be issued but 0:05:04.040 --> 0:05:08.240 with probable cause. According to Microsoft, that doesn't seem like 0:05:08.320 --> 0:05:11.839 that was the case in the majority of these secrecy 0:05:11.960 --> 0:05:15.360 orders that the company received. And you know, you could 0:05:15.440 --> 0:05:18.840 argue that if everything is valid and lawful, as in, 0:05:19.080 --> 0:05:22.640 if the government is following a valid and lawful process, 0:05:23.160 --> 0:05:25.720 why would the orders need to be secret. Why would 0:05:25.720 --> 0:05:31.040 these companies be not allowed to even acknowledge that they 0:05:31.080 --> 0:05:34.920 had received the requests. Currently, it sounds as the lawmakers 0:05:35.000 --> 0:05:37.600 on both sides of the aisle are taking these proceedings 0:05:37.600 --> 0:05:40.640 to heart, though obviously we'll have to wait and see 0:05:40.680 --> 0:05:43.920 if any actual legislation follows, if we see the laws 0:05:44.400 --> 0:05:47.680 change as a result of this, But for the time being, 0:05:47.720 --> 0:05:50.240 it sounds like everyone's kind of on the same page 0:05:50.240 --> 0:05:55.720 as saying, yo, this is not in line with the 0:05:56.160 --> 0:06:01.400 basic tenants of US government. Now, we ain't done with 0:06:01.480 --> 0:06:04.640 tech in US politics yet, which seems fitting because of 0:06:04.680 --> 0:06:07.760 heading into that fourth of July weekend. A federal judge 0:06:07.800 --> 0:06:11.560 on Wednesday slapped down a Florida state law that was 0:06:11.720 --> 0:06:15.640 aimed at social networking sites like Facebook. This Florida law 0:06:15.839 --> 0:06:19.080 would have given that state the authority to place enormous 0:06:19.120 --> 0:06:24.760 fines on social networking sites should they ever ban political candidates. Now, 0:06:24.760 --> 0:06:28.039 as you might imagine, this too appears to stem from 0:06:28.120 --> 0:06:32.280 former President Trump, who received bands from Facebook and Twitter, 0:06:32.360 --> 0:06:37.480 among other platforms, for you know, violating platform policies like 0:06:37.560 --> 0:06:42.640 spreading misinformation and swing dangerous rhetoric that was unsupported by 0:06:42.880 --> 0:06:47.279 you know reality. The federal judge in this case said 0:06:47.320 --> 0:06:51.480 that the Florida law ironically was violating the First Amendment. 0:06:51.960 --> 0:06:54.880 That's the amendment that guarantees the freedom of speech here 0:06:54.880 --> 0:06:58.159 in the United States. So see, the Florida legislators were 0:06:58.240 --> 0:07:01.359 arguing that social networks were prov ending the free speech 0:07:01.400 --> 0:07:04.680 of candidates. But here's the problem with that. The amendment 0:07:04.720 --> 0:07:09.720 to the Constitution that only guarantees protection from the government 0:07:09.800 --> 0:07:12.960 infringing upon free speech. It's saying that the government is 0:07:13.000 --> 0:07:17.240 not allowed to do that. Facebook, while it is bigger 0:07:17.240 --> 0:07:19.720 than a lot of governments around the world, is not 0:07:20.240 --> 0:07:23.120 the government. It's not the U. S. Government. So the 0:07:23.160 --> 0:07:25.840 company has the right to decide who can and cannot 0:07:25.960 --> 0:07:30.480 publish on that platform. The federal judge argued that restricting 0:07:30.520 --> 0:07:34.080 Facebook from being able to make that determination would in 0:07:34.160 --> 0:07:39.040 effect violate the free speech of tech companies like Facebook. 0:07:39.480 --> 0:07:42.240 The Florida law would have allowed for fines of up 0:07:42.280 --> 0:07:46.800 to two hundred fifty thousand dollars per day of any 0:07:46.880 --> 0:07:51.360 band that went beyond fourteen days for statewide candidates, you know, 0:07:51.440 --> 0:07:55.760 smaller candidates in local elections would have been a smaller fine, 0:07:55.800 --> 0:07:58.960 but quarter million dollars per day according to that law. 0:07:59.200 --> 0:08:01.600 The federal judge also pointed out that the Florida law 0:08:01.680 --> 0:08:04.520 was clearly unbalanced, I mean, beyond the fact that it 0:08:04.560 --> 0:08:10.680 had this enormous scope. It also had allowances for certain companies, 0:08:10.920 --> 0:08:14.960 like certain companies would not be held to this standard, 0:08:15.080 --> 0:08:19.360 namely companies that operate theme parks in the state of Florida. 0:08:19.720 --> 0:08:24.440 You know, companies like Disney and NBC Universal. So why 0:08:24.520 --> 0:08:26.960 is that, Well, it's because those are huge money makers. 0:08:26.960 --> 0:08:29.360 They bring in lots of cash to the state of Florida. 0:08:29.600 --> 0:08:32.520 So the sacred right of candidates being able to spread 0:08:32.559 --> 0:08:36.560 misinformation and violate social platform policies does not extend to 0:08:36.720 --> 0:08:39.760 big companies that make Florida lots of money. Now you 0:08:39.880 --> 0:08:42.240 might sense that I'm a bit fed up with Florida, 0:08:42.679 --> 0:08:46.880 and You're right. This is honestly just a thinly veiled 0:08:46.880 --> 0:08:50.880 attempt to create a state run media agency, and that 0:08:50.920 --> 0:08:54.400 would not serve the citizens of Florida well at all. 0:08:55.000 --> 0:08:57.840 All right, more laws and tech. This is also in 0:08:57.840 --> 0:09:01.840 the United States. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration or 0:09:02.000 --> 0:09:06.160 nht s A has passed a law, or rather a rule. 0:09:06.240 --> 0:09:08.080 It's not a law, but it's a new rule that 0:09:08.160 --> 0:09:12.360 will require all companies that offer semi autonomous driving assist 0:09:12.400 --> 0:09:17.160 features within vehicles to report all crashes in which an 0:09:17.160 --> 0:09:21.720 autonomous or semi autonomous feature was involved. So, in other words, 0:09:22.160 --> 0:09:25.320 if someone is in a Tesla vehicle and they get 0:09:25.320 --> 0:09:28.920 into a wreck and it's determined that the vehicle was 0:09:29.000 --> 0:09:33.480 in autopilot mode, Tesla would be legally required to report 0:09:33.600 --> 0:09:36.960 that crash to the nh T s A. Uh not 0:09:37.160 --> 0:09:40.280 just Tesla, mind you, this rule applies to all companies 0:09:40.320 --> 0:09:44.320 operating vehicles that have autonomous features. Tesla tends to be 0:09:44.400 --> 0:09:47.120 the one that a lot of people single out simply 0:09:47.160 --> 0:09:49.560 because it's the one that's had some of the most 0:09:49.679 --> 0:09:54.120 high profile accidents while in this autopilot mode. The n 0:09:54.240 --> 0:09:57.439 h T s A aims to have a better understanding 0:09:57.440 --> 0:10:01.800 of how safe or unsafe these autonomous systems are, and 0:10:01.840 --> 0:10:05.240 there then we'll be able to identify any that are 0:10:05.280 --> 0:10:09.360 particularly unsafe. So like, statistically, if we were to say 0:10:09.400 --> 0:10:12.560 Tesla actually is more unsafe, we would be able to 0:10:12.559 --> 0:10:16.120 know that because of this information. Right now, it's anecdotal, right, 0:10:16.160 --> 0:10:19.840 I mean, the Tesla accidents are very high profile, so 0:10:19.920 --> 0:10:22.800 at least on the surface level, it seems like you 0:10:22.840 --> 0:10:27.120 could argue that those are potentially the most unsafe, but 0:10:27.320 --> 0:10:31.280 without data across the industry, that's impossible to say for sure. 0:10:31.640 --> 0:10:33.880 It may just be because those happen to be very 0:10:33.960 --> 0:10:37.040 high profile accidents. So it could turn out that like 0:10:37.160 --> 0:10:40.480 you know, way Mo vehicles get into more traffic accidents 0:10:40.720 --> 0:10:45.520 than Tesla does, and that would be, you know, something 0:10:45.520 --> 0:10:49.240 we would be unaware of without this kind of rule. Uh, 0:10:49.280 --> 0:10:52.400 there is a threshold for accidents. The nh T s 0:10:52.440 --> 0:10:56.600 A is not asking for every single accident to get reported. 0:10:56.679 --> 0:10:59.920 It's really interested in tracking the more serious cases, including 0:11:00.320 --> 0:11:04.480 those with quote a hospital treated injury, a fatality, a 0:11:04.600 --> 0:11:08.040 vehicle tow away and air bag deployment, or a vulnerable 0:11:08.120 --> 0:11:11.640 road users such as pedestrian or bic cicklist end quote. 0:11:11.880 --> 0:11:16.840 So it's not about like minor fender benders or paint 0:11:16.920 --> 0:11:20.720 scrapings or something. It's rather ones that represent a potential 0:11:20.760 --> 0:11:25.280 threat to life and safety and property damage. So companies 0:11:25.320 --> 0:11:29.040 are also to submit monthly reports that detail any and 0:11:29.280 --> 0:11:33.280 all incidents with self driving vehicles in that self driving 0:11:33.320 --> 0:11:37.199 mode that include injury or damage to property. If they 0:11:37.240 --> 0:11:41.080 do not submit a monthly report, they will be find 0:11:41.280 --> 0:11:44.640 nearly twenty three thousand dollars per day that they failed 0:11:44.640 --> 0:11:49.719 to respond, up to a maximum of one hundred million dollars. Ideally, 0:11:50.200 --> 0:11:52.880 this sort of reporting will lead to federal and state 0:11:52.920 --> 0:11:56.400 governments having a better understanding of the performance of autonomous 0:11:56.400 --> 0:11:59.840 and semi autonomous vehicles and whether it's wise to allow 0:11:59.840 --> 0:12:03.600 them on public roads, or if new legislation should apply 0:12:03.720 --> 0:12:06.960 to the companies that are operating or offering these kinds 0:12:06.960 --> 0:12:10.520 of vehicles. It will also give a more accurate view 0:12:10.600 --> 0:12:14.559 of how effective or ineffective these technologies actually are, something 0:12:14.559 --> 0:12:16.880 that right now is impossible to do because for the 0:12:16.920 --> 0:12:19.440 most part, these companies keep all of those sorts of 0:12:19.480 --> 0:12:23.680 records internally, and obviously the companies have a vested interest 0:12:23.720 --> 0:12:28.080 in promoting the technologies as being safe because that's you know, 0:12:28.120 --> 0:12:30.680 where they're going to get their revenues. So hopefully this 0:12:30.760 --> 0:12:34.120 new rule add some accountability to the picture and ultimately 0:12:34.240 --> 0:12:38.120 lead to better, safer, and more reliable vehicles. Now, I 0:12:38.200 --> 0:12:41.880 fully believe that the future of cars is autonomous, but 0:12:41.960 --> 0:12:44.680 I also believe that we're still pretty good ways away 0:12:44.679 --> 0:12:48.000 from having vehicles that can safely operate in all scenarios 0:12:48.360 --> 0:12:51.800 that a human driver might find themselves in. So this 0:12:51.880 --> 0:12:54.560 is a good step toward getting more information so that 0:12:54.600 --> 0:12:58.080 we can start to make decisions about when is it 0:12:58.120 --> 0:13:03.600 appropriate to kind of transition to an autonomous vehicle. Uh reality, 0:13:03.960 --> 0:13:06.920 All right, let's keep this train going. So the f 0:13:07.120 --> 0:13:10.240 c C, the Federal Communications Commission here in the United States, 0:13:10.559 --> 0:13:13.880 passed rules to require carriers, that is, like cell phone 0:13:13.920 --> 0:13:17.600 carriers in the US, to combat spoofing. Now, that's when 0:13:17.600 --> 0:13:21.079 someone uses a system to mask a real phone number, 0:13:21.440 --> 0:13:25.680 and typically spoofing involves presenting a number to your caller 0:13:25.800 --> 0:13:29.880 I D that's pretty close to your number. That way, 0:13:29.880 --> 0:13:31.760 when you get a call and you see it's from 0:13:31.760 --> 0:13:34.440 a phone number that's similar to yours, it's in your 0:13:34.840 --> 0:13:38.720 local area code, psychologically, you might be more likely to 0:13:38.760 --> 0:13:41.160 answer that call. You might think, oh, this is probably 0:13:41.200 --> 0:13:44.360 someone I know. I just don't recognize the number. It's 0:13:44.400 --> 0:13:48.120 a pretty scummy way for various entities to try and 0:13:48.200 --> 0:13:51.880 get you on the phone. The FCC said we've had 0:13:52.000 --> 0:13:54.240 enough of this, and they gave a mandate to the 0:13:54.360 --> 0:13:58.040 major carriers to implement systems that would prevent people from 0:13:58.080 --> 0:14:02.000 spoofing numbers. And now all three major carriers in the 0:14:02.120 --> 0:14:04.960 US those being T Mobile, Verizon, and A T and 0:14:05.040 --> 0:14:08.240 T have systems in place to do this. The carriers 0:14:08.240 --> 0:14:11.080 will verify that a number calling into you is in 0:14:11.200 --> 0:14:15.400 fact the actual number of the originating call before allowing 0:14:15.400 --> 0:14:17.880 it to go through. The protocol that the companies are 0:14:17.960 --> 0:14:21.920 using is called stir slash shaken, which feels very James 0:14:22.160 --> 0:14:26.440 Bondy to me. Maybe James Bondage. No wait, no, never mind, 0:14:26.480 --> 0:14:31.960 no scratch that. The deadline for implementing the protocols was yesterday, 0:14:32.120 --> 0:14:37.760 June one, for all the major carriers. Smaller regional carriers 0:14:37.800 --> 0:14:40.440 will actually still have two years to implement the protocols. 0:14:40.800 --> 0:14:44.000 So it's a good thing that the major carriers are compliant, 0:14:44.120 --> 0:14:46.960 or else they would be held liable for it. And 0:14:47.000 --> 0:14:49.880 this is all part of an ongoing battle against robo 0:14:50.000 --> 0:14:53.320 calls and spam calls and and stuff like that. And 0:14:53.400 --> 0:14:56.200 I don't know about you, but I almost never answer 0:14:56.280 --> 0:14:59.160 my phone. I definitely don't answer it. If I don't 0:14:59.160 --> 0:15:01.720 recognize the number, I just let it go to voicemail. 0:15:02.040 --> 0:15:05.520 And usually there's never you know, it's pretty rare that 0:15:05.560 --> 0:15:08.920 I get a voicemail. Most people just give up, nor 0:15:09.040 --> 0:15:12.160 most robots give up. I don't think it's even people 0:15:12.200 --> 0:15:14.160 most of the time. And that's just to me that 0:15:14.240 --> 0:15:16.640 whomever was trying to call me it wasn't about something 0:15:16.680 --> 0:15:19.160 important because they didn't bother to leave a message. Now, 0:15:19.200 --> 0:15:22.400 all these protocols won't mean the end of nuisance calls. 0:15:22.800 --> 0:15:26.760 I think every little bit helps. We've got a few 0:15:26.920 --> 0:15:29.360 more news items that I want to cover today, but 0:15:29.440 --> 0:15:39.880 we're running a bit long, so let's take a quick break. Okay, 0:15:39.880 --> 0:15:42.920 we're back and back. In April, hackers managed to gain 0:15:43.000 --> 0:15:46.720 access to a folder in Sony's network that contained the 0:15:46.880 --> 0:15:51.920 serial I D numbers for PlayStation three consoles, like all 0:15:51.960 --> 0:15:55.400 of them, every number relating to every gamer with a 0:15:55.480 --> 0:15:59.960 p S three that was registered with Sony's network. And subsequently, 0:16:00.080 --> 0:16:03.480 some gamers have noticed that their PlayStation accounts appeared to 0:16:03.520 --> 0:16:06.960 be inaccessible. They receive an error message. That error message 0:16:06.960 --> 0:16:10.240 has a number. That number is eight zero seven one 0:16:10.520 --> 0:16:15.000 zero zero six, and some players, after going to reregister 0:16:15.240 --> 0:16:19.040 and activate two factor authentication, managed to regain control of 0:16:19.040 --> 0:16:21.920 their accounts, but for others it's a bit more complicated. 0:16:22.280 --> 0:16:25.200 So it looks like hackers have started to use some 0:16:25.320 --> 0:16:29.040 of those exposed accounts in order to act as proxies 0:16:29.440 --> 0:16:35.320 for malicious activity, essentially stuff that violates Sony's policies. So 0:16:35.320 --> 0:16:39.160 Sony sees that these particular ideas connected to these particular 0:16:39.200 --> 0:16:42.680 consoles are doing shady stuff. They've gone and started to 0:16:42.720 --> 0:16:47.800 ban those accounts. Unfortunately, that means that the legitimate players 0:16:47.840 --> 0:16:51.600 who had their information exposed are now not able to 0:16:51.640 --> 0:16:54.360 get access to their accounts, even though they didn't do 0:16:54.440 --> 0:16:58.240 anything wrong, and considering that some of those accounts likely 0:16:58.320 --> 0:17:01.480 belonged to players who are miners, that's another really thorny 0:17:01.560 --> 0:17:04.840 element to the story because the information is out there now. 0:17:05.240 --> 0:17:07.560 Knowing that credentials are making the rounds on the dark 0:17:07.600 --> 0:17:10.879 web isn't great. It appears as though Sony took no 0:17:11.040 --> 0:17:14.520 real steps to secure this folder, which made it easy 0:17:14.600 --> 0:17:17.399 pickings for the hackers once they actually gained access to 0:17:17.400 --> 0:17:21.280 Sony systems, and that too has raised some pretty tough questions. 0:17:21.520 --> 0:17:24.640 I have not yet seen a company response from Sony 0:17:24.720 --> 0:17:27.280 to this issue, but I will continue to update the 0:17:27.320 --> 0:17:32.240 story if we learn more. Speaking of data breaches, the 0:17:32.440 --> 0:17:36.360 social network LinkedIn has experienced something similar to one, though 0:17:36.440 --> 0:17:39.880 technically it's not actually a breach. The company saw a 0:17:39.920 --> 0:17:44.479 massive data scrape, that is, someone collected a ton of 0:17:44.560 --> 0:17:47.760 data off of linked In profiles, and that happened back 0:17:47.760 --> 0:17:51.720 in May. Hackers scrape data from half a billion linked 0:17:51.760 --> 0:17:55.560 In user profiles. But now a VPN called privacy Shark 0:17:56.000 --> 0:17:59.639 says that a user with the handle tom Liner showed 0:17:59.680 --> 0:18:04.280 that they have a document that includes seven hundred million 0:18:04.600 --> 0:18:08.800 LinkedIn user records in it. That represents more than of 0:18:09.000 --> 0:18:12.080 all LinkedIn users. So, in other words, if you have 0:18:12.200 --> 0:18:15.440 a LinkedIn account, the odds are very good that your 0:18:15.480 --> 0:18:20.120 information is in that big file. Tomliner, by the way, 0:18:20.240 --> 0:18:23.400 is planning to sell that information off because data has 0:18:23.440 --> 0:18:26.359 a price. Just you know, those of us who are 0:18:26.359 --> 0:18:29.320 actually creating the data rarely get to reap the benefits 0:18:29.480 --> 0:18:32.600 of that data apart from you know, having the privilege 0:18:32.640 --> 0:18:35.919 of using these various online platforms. That is what the 0:18:35.960 --> 0:18:39.920 same ones that are unfortunately allowing that data to roam free. 0:18:40.800 --> 0:18:43.800 The information contained with tom Liner's collection includes stuff like 0:18:44.080 --> 0:18:48.199 full names, phone numbers, addresses, that kind of stuff. It 0:18:48.240 --> 0:18:50.520 does seem that this is the result of entities just 0:18:50.600 --> 0:18:54.760 scraping public data off of LinkedIn files, which is similar 0:18:54.800 --> 0:18:57.240 to something I talked about recently when LinkedIn when after 0:18:57.359 --> 0:19:00.119 another company that essentially did the same sort of thing ing. 0:19:00.600 --> 0:19:03.240 So in a way, you could say that people who 0:19:03.320 --> 0:19:06.000 are selling this information are able to do so simply 0:19:06.040 --> 0:19:10.000 because we as users have allowed this information to be 0:19:10.119 --> 0:19:12.800 public It's just that the people who are collecting this 0:19:12.880 --> 0:19:16.160 information were able to do it at scale, and they 0:19:16.240 --> 0:19:20.280 likely exploited LinkedIn's application interface in order to create an 0:19:20.280 --> 0:19:25.280 app that automatically ended up collecting all this data. Since 0:19:25.320 --> 0:19:28.400 it's not a breach, this gets a little complicated. I mean, 0:19:28.440 --> 0:19:32.240 LinkedIn didn't make our data vulnerable so much as it 0:19:32.320 --> 0:19:35.240 had an ap I that facilitated the mass collection of 0:19:35.320 --> 0:19:39.160 data publicly available on the platform. What does this mean 0:19:39.200 --> 0:19:43.040 for you? If your data was in there? Probably means 0:19:43.080 --> 0:19:45.200 you're gonna end up on a lot of other lists 0:19:45.200 --> 0:19:49.280 for stuff like spam and robo calls, possibly with phishing 0:19:49.560 --> 0:19:52.560 or maybe even spear phishing attacks. Spear Fishing is when 0:19:52.920 --> 0:19:55.960 you've actually got some data about your target to work with, 0:19:56.200 --> 0:19:59.359 which means you can craft your attack to be potentially 0:19:59.400 --> 0:20:04.760 more effective and increase its likelihood of success. It's a bummer. Next, 0:20:05.000 --> 0:20:07.439 the investing platform of robin Hood is going to have 0:20:07.480 --> 0:20:10.480 to pay almost seventy million dollars in fines to the 0:20:10.520 --> 0:20:15.199 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority or finn raw f I n 0:20:15.359 --> 0:20:18.760 r A in order to settle allegations that robin Hood 0:20:18.800 --> 0:20:23.119 caused quote widespread and significant harm end quote to customers 0:20:23.440 --> 0:20:28.560 mostly through misinformation. That misinformation includes charges that the company 0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:31.560 misled customers on how much money they had in their 0:20:31.600 --> 0:20:35.199 accounts UH and whether or not they would be allowed 0:20:35.240 --> 0:20:38.960 to place trades on margin. Finner found that the misinformation 0:20:39.119 --> 0:20:43.719 meant customers collectively lost around seven million dollars, and honestly, 0:20:43.720 --> 0:20:45.800 I think that's supposed to be the opposite of what 0:20:45.960 --> 0:20:49.560 investment firms tend to promise their customers. It's a rare 0:20:49.600 --> 0:20:52.199 thing to see an investment platform say, use us, we 0:20:52.240 --> 0:20:54.880 can lose your money more effectively than anyone else can. 0:20:55.800 --> 0:20:58.120 Robin Hood was in the news earlier this year when 0:20:58.160 --> 0:21:02.200 independent investors were jumping on the game Stop stock roller coaster. 0:21:02.640 --> 0:21:05.879 Robin Hood ended up placing tight restrictions on game Stop 0:21:06.160 --> 0:21:10.720 stock trades, meaning if you were an independent investor and 0:21:10.800 --> 0:21:12.719 you wanted to get in on the game Stop action, 0:21:13.240 --> 0:21:16.480 you hit a major roadblock. The company's official statement at 0:21:16.480 --> 0:21:18.600 that time was that it was trying to protect the 0:21:18.600 --> 0:21:22.640 company and investors UH in a situation that had volderle 0:21:22.680 --> 0:21:27.520 stock trades and also some regulatory issues, But some skeptical 0:21:27.560 --> 0:21:30.760 investors argued that major parties that own a stake in 0:21:30.880 --> 0:21:34.240 robin Hood had a vested interest in game Stop stock 0:21:34.320 --> 0:21:37.480 going down and value, and thus the company was acting 0:21:37.480 --> 0:21:41.200 in a conflict of interest with its customers. Google is 0:21:41.320 --> 0:21:43.960 rolling out a new feature for Android users starting in 0:21:44.000 --> 0:21:46.520 the United States that will let them store a digital 0:21:46.600 --> 0:21:50.520 vaccine card called a COVID card. It will also support 0:21:50.560 --> 0:21:54.520 storing COVID test results. The card will include information such 0:21:54.520 --> 0:21:58.520 as where you received your vaccination, when that vaccination happened, 0:21:58.560 --> 0:22:01.800 and possibly some other information sation like which vaccine you received. 0:22:02.400 --> 0:22:05.520 Google designed the system so that the information remains on 0:22:05.600 --> 0:22:08.840 your device, so, in other words, there's no copy of 0:22:08.880 --> 0:22:11.600 this information sent to the cloud that could represent a 0:22:11.640 --> 0:22:16.639 possible privacy risk. Google will collect some meta information about 0:22:16.640 --> 0:22:19.760 the app, such as how frequently you actually use the card. 0:22:20.160 --> 0:22:22.679 This could come in handy should vaccine cards become a 0:22:22.720 --> 0:22:25.920 requirement for certain things, you know, like travel to specific 0:22:25.920 --> 0:22:30.000 countries or attending specific events, though here in the US 0:22:30.080 --> 0:22:32.520 we're seeing an awful lot of resistance to those sort 0:22:32.520 --> 0:22:34.960 of things, going so far as to have some state 0:22:35.000 --> 0:22:38.480 governors declare that a vaccination requirement will not be tolerated 0:22:38.480 --> 0:22:41.800 for big events because I guess it's just more important 0:22:41.800 --> 0:22:44.199 for potentially sick people to be able to go to 0:22:44.240 --> 0:22:47.040 these public events than it is to ensure the safety 0:22:47.119 --> 0:22:50.960 of those who are already in attendance. I don't know, 0:22:51.720 --> 0:22:55.480 because I can't see the logic in it. Next half 0:22:55.520 --> 0:22:59.360 a century ago, Stephen Hawking proposed a theorem that stated 0:22:59.400 --> 0:23:03.240 a black holes event horizon, that is the boundary around 0:23:03.320 --> 0:23:05.760 the black hole that marks the point of no escape. 0:23:05.800 --> 0:23:08.920 If you cross the event horizon, you will be pulled 0:23:08.960 --> 0:23:12.400 into that black hole. You cannot escape. That theorem says 0:23:12.440 --> 0:23:15.920 that the event horizon would never shrink. The math worked 0:23:15.920 --> 0:23:18.840 out that way, but that was all you could say 0:23:18.840 --> 0:23:21.639 about it, is that mathematically it makes sense. And for 0:23:21.720 --> 0:23:24.160 fifty years that's all we had to go on because 0:23:24.160 --> 0:23:26.720 we had no real means of making observations that could 0:23:26.760 --> 0:23:30.640 either confirm or deny that theorem. But that has changed. 0:23:31.040 --> 0:23:33.560 Scientists at M I T and a few other research 0:23:33.640 --> 0:23:36.720 facilities announced in a paper that was published in Physical 0:23:36.760 --> 0:23:40.600 Review Letters that they have observed gravitational waves that confirm 0:23:40.720 --> 0:23:44.480 Hawking's theorem for the first time. Now, I wish I 0:23:44.520 --> 0:23:47.480 could explain the process of how they did this, but 0:23:47.840 --> 0:23:49.919 I read over it about three or four times and 0:23:49.960 --> 0:23:53.520 it's well beyond my ability to really understand it. So 0:23:53.640 --> 0:23:56.560 rather than attempt to explain something and then get it 0:23:56.560 --> 0:23:59.240 all wrong, I'm instead just going to report that the 0:23:59.320 --> 0:24:03.560 scientists say they have a confidence that their observations mean 0:24:03.600 --> 0:24:07.080 that Hawking's theorem is correct. This is another example of 0:24:07.119 --> 0:24:10.879 how super deeper smart people have looked at the world 0:24:10.960 --> 0:24:14.120 and the universe and they've used mathematics to describe it 0:24:14.359 --> 0:24:17.720 and then predict something that is unobservable or at least 0:24:17.920 --> 0:24:22.040 unobservable at the time, and then later we found out 0:24:22.119 --> 0:24:25.280 it proved to be true. Einstein is famous for this 0:24:25.359 --> 0:24:27.639 kind of stuff, and it really floors me. And I 0:24:27.640 --> 0:24:30.720 suppose it shows that there is a logical order when 0:24:30.720 --> 0:24:33.240 you get down to the nuts and bolts of the universe, 0:24:33.560 --> 0:24:38.159 and if there weren't, then stuff like math just wouldn't work. Really, 0:24:38.320 --> 0:24:41.040 nothing would work the way we understand it. Reality would 0:24:41.080 --> 0:24:44.280 be fundamentally different. I may see if I can get 0:24:44.280 --> 0:24:46.520 an expert on tech stuff at some point to talk 0:24:46.560 --> 0:24:48.960