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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio

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Speaker 1: and allow of all things tech. And this is the

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Speaker 1: tech news for Thursday, July one, twenty one. We're heading

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Speaker 1: into the fourth of July weekend around the world, but

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Speaker 1: here in the U s. It's a holiday, and so

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Speaker 1: it seems fitting that a lot of my topics today

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Speaker 1: have to do with tech and things like liberty and freedom.

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Speaker 1: So on Wednesday of this week, the state of Maine

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Speaker 1: past into law with unanimous support, a a law that

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Speaker 1: places tight restrictions on how state agencies can use facial

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Speaker 1: recognition technology. In fact, the restrictions are so tight that

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Speaker 1: most state aid agencies are just flat out not allowed

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Speaker 1: to use facial recognition technology at all. The state government

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Speaker 1: also banned it's used for the purposes of surveillance. Now,

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Speaker 1: there are some exceptions that allow certain agencies to use

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Speaker 1: facial recognition technology, so law enforcement is allowed to use

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Speaker 1: it if they are investigating a serious crime. Uh. The

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Speaker 1: state also might use it in order to identify someone

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Speaker 1: who is deceased, missing, or endangered, so in cases where

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Speaker 1: you're talking about someone's life or safety, that is an

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Speaker 1: exception as well. However, for the most part, the state

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Speaker 1: is not to use facial recognition technology starting in October

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Speaker 1: of this year. That's when the law takes effect. The

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Speaker 1: law also requires police to go through proper channels and

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Speaker 1: to obtain access to facial recognition technology on a case

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Speaker 1: by case basis. UH civil liberties organizations had expressed approval

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Speaker 1: of these new measures. They point to main as being

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Speaker 1: the leading edge of protecting citizen privacy and shielding them

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Speaker 1: from surveillance. The essential argument was that you know this

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Speaker 1: is this is technology that has disproportionate ability to do

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Speaker 1: harm to someone, and the benefits do not outweigh that

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Speaker 1: disproportionate harm. Maybe this will spur similar state laws across

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Speaker 1: the country. We have seen a law in Washington that

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Speaker 1: didn't go nearly as far as the one in Maine,

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Speaker 1: so maybe we'll see other states follow suit. Perhaps will

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Speaker 1: even eventually see a federal law that covers this issue

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Speaker 1: here in the US. Sticking with tech and civil liberties,

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Speaker 1: during a government hearing, attorneys for cloud service companies plus

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Speaker 1: one executive from Microsoft spoke to lawmakers about the government's

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Speaker 1: practice of seeking personal information of company customers. In addition,

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Speaker 1: the discussion included the practice of having such requests hidden

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Speaker 1: from public view. They're filed under secret court orders with

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Speaker 1: the demand that whatever the cloud service company is, you know,

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Speaker 1: like Microsoft, they aren't supposed to acknowledge that any investigation

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Speaker 1: is ongoing. Very cloak and dagger kind of approach, and

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Speaker 1: a lot of people for years have been raising concerns

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Speaker 1: about this kind of thing. This actually follows in the

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Speaker 1: wake of a recent revelation that the Department of Justice

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Speaker 1: under former President Trump sought phone records of Democratic representatives

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Speaker 1: as well as certain reporters, and the d o J

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Speaker 1: used secret subpoenas to seek out that kind of information.

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Speaker 1: And the cloud service companies, or rather the lawyers representing

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Speaker 1: those companies, are arguing that the government should have to

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Speaker 1: follow the exact same sort of processes they have to

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Speaker 1: follow if they want to access, you know, physical files

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Speaker 1: stored in filing cabinets, if you have to have a

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Speaker 1: warrant to search at then you need to have the

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Speaker 1: equivalent in order to search digital data stored in the cloud.

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Speaker 1: The executive from Microsoft, Tom Burt, said that over the

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Speaker 1: last five years Microsoft has received between two thousand, four

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Speaker 1: hundred to three thousand, five hundred secrecy orders each year,

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Speaker 1: so at minimum two thousand, four hundred, at max around

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Speaker 1: thirty undred, and that these orders appeared to be quote

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Speaker 1: unsupported by any meaningful legal or factual analysis end quote.

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Speaker 1: So in other words, there didn't appear to be any

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Speaker 1: you know, you know, reasonable purpose for the search orders,

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Speaker 1: and yet these companies were being compelled to agree with

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Speaker 1: them by the government. So, like the widespread use of

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Speaker 1: facial recognition technology, this practice seems to be in violation

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Speaker 1: of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The

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Speaker 1: Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, and

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Speaker 1: that amendment states that no warrants shall be issued but

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Speaker 1: with probable cause. According to Microsoft, that doesn't seem like

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Speaker 1: that was the case in the majority of these secrecy

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Speaker 1: orders that the company received. And you know, you could

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Speaker 1: argue that if everything is valid and lawful, as in,

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Speaker 1: if the government is following a valid and lawful process,

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Speaker 1: why would the orders need to be secret. Why would

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Speaker 1: these companies be not allowed to even acknowledge that they

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Speaker 1: had received the requests. Currently, it sounds as the lawmakers

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Speaker 1: on both sides of the aisle are taking these proceedings

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Speaker 1: to heart, though obviously we'll have to wait and see

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Speaker 1: if any actual legislation follows, if we see the laws

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Speaker 1: change as a result of this, But for the time being,

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Speaker 1: it sounds like everyone's kind of on the same page

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Speaker 1: as saying, yo, this is not in line with the

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Speaker 1: basic tenants of US government. Now, we ain't done with

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Speaker 1: tech in US politics yet, which seems fitting because of

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Speaker 1: heading into that fourth of July weekend. A federal judge

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Speaker 1: on Wednesday slapped down a Florida state law that was

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Speaker 1: aimed at social networking sites like Facebook. This Florida law

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Speaker 1: would have given that state the authority to place enormous

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Speaker 1: fines on social networking sites should they ever ban political candidates. Now,

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Speaker 1: as you might imagine, this too appears to stem from

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Speaker 1: former President Trump, who received bands from Facebook and Twitter,

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Speaker 1: among other platforms, for you know, violating platform policies like

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Speaker 1: spreading misinformation and swing dangerous rhetoric that was unsupported by

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Speaker 1: you know reality. The federal judge in this case said

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Speaker 1: that the Florida law ironically was violating the First Amendment.

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Speaker 1: That's the amendment that guarantees the freedom of speech here

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Speaker 1: in the United States. So see, the Florida legislators were

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Speaker 1: arguing that social networks were prov ending the free speech

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Speaker 1: of candidates. But here's the problem with that. The amendment

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Speaker 1: to the Constitution that only guarantees protection from the government

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Speaker 1: infringing upon free speech. It's saying that the government is

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Speaker 1: not allowed to do that. Facebook, while it is bigger

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Speaker 1: than a lot of governments around the world, is not

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Speaker 1: the government. It's not the U. S. Government. So the

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Speaker 1: company has the right to decide who can and cannot

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Speaker 1: publish on that platform. The federal judge argued that restricting

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Speaker 1: Facebook from being able to make that determination would in

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Speaker 1: effect violate the free speech of tech companies like Facebook.

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Speaker 1: The Florida law would have allowed for fines of up

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Speaker 1: to two hundred fifty thousand dollars per day of any

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Speaker 1: band that went beyond fourteen days for statewide candidates, you know,

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Speaker 1: smaller candidates in local elections would have been a smaller fine,

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Speaker 1: but quarter million dollars per day according to that law.

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Speaker 1: The federal judge also pointed out that the Florida law

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Speaker 1: was clearly unbalanced, I mean, beyond the fact that it

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Speaker 1: had this enormous scope. It also had allowances for certain companies,

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Speaker 1: like certain companies would not be held to this standard,

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Speaker 1: namely companies that operate theme parks in the state of Florida.

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Speaker 1: You know, companies like Disney and NBC Universal. So why

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Speaker 1: is that, Well, it's because those are huge money makers.

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Speaker 1: They bring in lots of cash to the state of Florida.

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Speaker 1: So the sacred right of candidates being able to spread

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Speaker 1: misinformation and violate social platform policies does not extend to

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Speaker 1: big companies that make Florida lots of money. Now you

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Speaker 1: might sense that I'm a bit fed up with Florida,

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Speaker 1: and You're right. This is honestly just a thinly veiled

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Speaker 1: attempt to create a state run media agency, and that

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Speaker 1: would not serve the citizens of Florida well at all.

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Speaker 1: All right, more laws and tech. This is also in

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Speaker 1: the United States. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration or

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Speaker 1: nht s A has passed a law, or rather a rule.

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Speaker 1: It's not a law, but it's a new rule that

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Speaker 1: will require all companies that offer semi autonomous driving assist

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Speaker 1: features within vehicles to report all crashes in which an

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Speaker 1: autonomous or semi autonomous feature was involved. So, in other words,

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Speaker 1: if someone is in a Tesla vehicle and they get

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Speaker 1: into a wreck and it's determined that the vehicle was

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Speaker 1: in autopilot mode, Tesla would be legally required to report

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Speaker 1: that crash to the nh T s A. Uh not

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Speaker 1: just Tesla, mind you, this rule applies to all companies

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Speaker 1: operating vehicles that have autonomous features. Tesla tends to be

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Speaker 1: the one that a lot of people single out simply

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Speaker 1: because it's the one that's had some of the most

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Speaker 1: high profile accidents while in this autopilot mode. The n

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Speaker 1: h T s A aims to have a better understanding

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Speaker 1: of how safe or unsafe these autonomous systems are, and

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Speaker 1: there then we'll be able to identify any that are

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Speaker 1: particularly unsafe. So like, statistically, if we were to say

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Speaker 1: Tesla actually is more unsafe, we would be able to

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Speaker 1: know that because of this information. Right now, it's anecdotal, right,

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Speaker 1: I mean, the Tesla accidents are very high profile, so

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Speaker 1: at least on the surface level, it seems like you

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Speaker 1: could argue that those are potentially the most unsafe, but

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Speaker 1: without data across the industry, that's impossible to say for sure.

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Speaker 1: It may just be because those happen to be very

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Speaker 1: high profile accidents. So it could turn out that like

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Speaker 1: you know, way Mo vehicles get into more traffic accidents

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Speaker 1: than Tesla does, and that would be, you know, something

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Speaker 1: we would be unaware of without this kind of rule. Uh,

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Speaker 1: there is a threshold for accidents. The nh T s

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Speaker 1: A is not asking for every single accident to get reported.

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Speaker 1: It's really interested in tracking the more serious cases, including

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Speaker 1: those with quote a hospital treated injury, a fatality, a

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Speaker 1: vehicle tow away and air bag deployment, or a vulnerable

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Speaker 1: road users such as pedestrian or bic cicklist end quote.

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Speaker 1: So it's not about like minor fender benders or paint

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Speaker 1: scrapings or something. It's rather ones that represent a potential

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Speaker 1: threat to life and safety and property damage. So companies

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Speaker 1: are also to submit monthly reports that detail any and

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Speaker 1: all incidents with self driving vehicles in that self driving

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Speaker 1: mode that include injury or damage to property. If they

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Speaker 1: do not submit a monthly report, they will be find

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Speaker 1: nearly twenty three thousand dollars per day that they failed

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Speaker 1: to respond, up to a maximum of one hundred million dollars. Ideally,

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Speaker 1: this sort of reporting will lead to federal and state

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Speaker 1: governments having a better understanding of the performance of autonomous

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Speaker 1: and semi autonomous vehicles and whether it's wise to allow

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Speaker 1: them on public roads, or if new legislation should apply

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Speaker 1: to the companies that are operating or offering these kinds

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Speaker 1: of vehicles. It will also give a more accurate view

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Speaker 1: of how effective or ineffective these technologies actually are, something

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Speaker 1: that right now is impossible to do because for the

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Speaker 1: most part, these companies keep all of those sorts of

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Speaker 1: records internally, and obviously the companies have a vested interest

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Speaker 1: in promoting the technologies as being safe because that's you know,

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Speaker 1: where they're going to get their revenues. So hopefully this

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Speaker 1: new rule add some accountability to the picture and ultimately

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Speaker 1: lead to better, safer, and more reliable vehicles. Now, I

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Speaker 1: fully believe that the future of cars is autonomous, but

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Speaker 1: I also believe that we're still pretty good ways away

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Speaker 1: from having vehicles that can safely operate in all scenarios

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Speaker 1: that a human driver might find themselves in. So this

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Speaker 1: is a good step toward getting more information so that

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Speaker 1: we can start to make decisions about when is it

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Speaker 1: appropriate to kind of transition to an autonomous vehicle. Uh reality,

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Speaker 1: All right, let's keep this train going. So the f

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Speaker 1: c C, the Federal Communications Commission here in the United States,

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Speaker 1: passed rules to require carriers, that is, like cell phone

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Speaker 1: carriers in the US, to combat spoofing. Now, that's when

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Speaker 1: someone uses a system to mask a real phone number,

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Speaker 1: and typically spoofing involves presenting a number to your caller

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Speaker 1: I D that's pretty close to your number. That way,

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Speaker 1: when you get a call and you see it's from

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Speaker 1: a phone number that's similar to yours, it's in your

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Speaker 1: local area code, psychologically, you might be more likely to

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Speaker 1: answer that call. You might think, oh, this is probably

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Speaker 1: someone I know. I just don't recognize the number. It's

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Speaker 1: a pretty scummy way for various entities to try and

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Speaker 1: get you on the phone. The FCC said we've had

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Speaker 1: enough of this, and they gave a mandate to the

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Speaker 1: major carriers to implement systems that would prevent people from

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Speaker 1: spoofing numbers. And now all three major carriers in the

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Speaker 1: US those being T Mobile, Verizon, and A T and

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Speaker 1: T have systems in place to do this. The carriers

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Speaker 1: will verify that a number calling into you is in

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Speaker 1: fact the actual number of the originating call before allowing

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Speaker 1: it to go through. The protocol that the companies are

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Speaker 1: using is called stir slash shaken, which feels very James

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Speaker 1: Bondy to me. Maybe James Bondage. No wait, no, never mind,

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Speaker 1: no scratch that. The deadline for implementing the protocols was yesterday,

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Speaker 1: June one, for all the major carriers. Smaller regional carriers

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Speaker 1: will actually still have two years to implement the protocols.

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Speaker 1: So it's a good thing that the major carriers are compliant,

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Speaker 1: or else they would be held liable for it. And

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Speaker 1: this is all part of an ongoing battle against robo

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Speaker 1: calls and spam calls and and stuff like that. And

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Speaker 1: I don't know about you, but I almost never answer

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Speaker 1: my phone. I definitely don't answer it. If I don't

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Speaker 1: recognize the number, I just let it go to voicemail.

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Speaker 1: And usually there's never you know, it's pretty rare that

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Speaker 1: I get a voicemail. Most people just give up, nor

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Speaker 1: most robots give up. I don't think it's even people

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Speaker 1: most of the time. And that's just to me that

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Speaker 1: whomever was trying to call me it wasn't about something

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Speaker 1: important because they didn't bother to leave a message. Now,

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Speaker 1: all these protocols won't mean the end of nuisance calls.

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Speaker 1: I think every little bit helps. We've got a few

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Speaker 1: more news items that I want to cover today, but

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Speaker 1: we're running a bit long, so let's take a quick break. Okay,

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Speaker 1: we're back and back. In April, hackers managed to gain

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Speaker 1: access to a folder in Sony's network that contained the

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Speaker 1: serial I D numbers for PlayStation three consoles, like all

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Speaker 1: of them, every number relating to every gamer with a

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Speaker 1: p S three that was registered with Sony's network. And subsequently,

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Speaker 1: some gamers have noticed that their PlayStation accounts appeared to

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Speaker 1: be inaccessible. They receive an error message. That error message

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Speaker 1: has a number. That number is eight zero seven one

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Speaker 1: zero zero six, and some players, after going to reregister

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Speaker 1: and activate two factor authentication, managed to regain control of

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Speaker 1: their accounts, but for others it's a bit more complicated.

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Speaker 1: So it looks like hackers have started to use some

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Speaker 1: of those exposed accounts in order to act as proxies

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Speaker 1: for malicious activity, essentially stuff that violates Sony's policies. So

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Speaker 1: Sony sees that these particular ideas connected to these particular

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Speaker 1: consoles are doing shady stuff. They've gone and started to

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Speaker 1: ban those accounts. Unfortunately, that means that the legitimate players

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Speaker 1: who had their information exposed are now not able to

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Speaker 1: get access to their accounts, even though they didn't do

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Speaker 1: anything wrong, and considering that some of those accounts likely

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Speaker 1: belonged to players who are miners, that's another really thorny

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Speaker 1: element to the story because the information is out there now.

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Speaker 1: Knowing that credentials are making the rounds on the dark

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Speaker 1: web isn't great. It appears as though Sony took no

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Speaker 1: real steps to secure this folder, which made it easy

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Speaker 1: pickings for the hackers once they actually gained access to

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Speaker 1: Sony systems, and that too has raised some pretty tough questions.

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Speaker 1: I have not yet seen a company response from Sony

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Speaker 1: to this issue, but I will continue to update the

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Speaker 1: story if we learn more. Speaking of data breaches, the

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Speaker 1: social network LinkedIn has experienced something similar to one, though

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Speaker 1: technically it's not actually a breach. The company saw a

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Speaker 1: massive data scrape, that is, someone collected a ton of

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Speaker 1: data off of linked In profiles, and that happened back

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Speaker 1: in May. Hackers scrape data from half a billion linked

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Speaker 1: In user profiles. But now a VPN called privacy Shark

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Speaker 1: says that a user with the handle tom Liner showed

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Speaker 1: that they have a document that includes seven hundred million

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Speaker 1: LinkedIn user records in it. That represents more than of

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Speaker 1: all LinkedIn users. So, in other words, if you have

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Speaker 1: a LinkedIn account, the odds are very good that your

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Speaker 1: information is in that big file. Tomliner, by the way,

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Speaker 1: is planning to sell that information off because data has

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Speaker 1: a price. Just you know, those of us who are

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Speaker 1: actually creating the data rarely get to reap the benefits

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Speaker 1: of that data apart from you know, having the privilege

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Speaker 1: of using these various online platforms. That is what the

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Speaker 1: same ones that are unfortunately allowing that data to roam free.

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Speaker 1: The information contained with tom Liner's collection includes stuff like

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Speaker 1: full names, phone numbers, addresses, that kind of stuff. It

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Speaker 1: does seem that this is the result of entities just

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Speaker 1: scraping public data off of LinkedIn files, which is similar

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Speaker 1: to something I talked about recently when LinkedIn when after

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Speaker 1: another company that essentially did the same sort of thing ing.

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Speaker 1: So in a way, you could say that people who

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Speaker 1: are selling this information are able to do so simply

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Speaker 1: because we as users have allowed this information to be

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Speaker 1: public It's just that the people who are collecting this

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Speaker 1: information were able to do it at scale, and they

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Speaker 1: likely exploited LinkedIn's application interface in order to create an

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Speaker 1: app that automatically ended up collecting all this data. Since

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Speaker 1: it's not a breach, this gets a little complicated. I mean,

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Speaker 1: LinkedIn didn't make our data vulnerable so much as it

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Speaker 1: had an ap I that facilitated the mass collection of

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Speaker 1: data publicly available on the platform. What does this mean

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Speaker 1: for you? If your data was in there? Probably means

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Speaker 1: you're gonna end up on a lot of other lists

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Speaker 1: for stuff like spam and robo calls, possibly with phishing

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Speaker 1: or maybe even spear phishing attacks. Spear Fishing is when

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Speaker 1: you've actually got some data about your target to work with,

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Speaker 1: which means you can craft your attack to be potentially

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Speaker 1: more effective and increase its likelihood of success. It's a bummer. Next,

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Speaker 1: the investing platform of robin Hood is going to have

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Speaker 1: to pay almost seventy million dollars in fines to the

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Speaker 1: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority or finn raw f I n

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Speaker 1: r A in order to settle allegations that robin Hood

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Speaker 1: caused quote widespread and significant harm end quote to customers

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Speaker 1: mostly through misinformation. That misinformation includes charges that the company

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Speaker 1: misled customers on how much money they had in their

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Speaker 1: accounts UH and whether or not they would be allowed

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Speaker 1: to place trades on margin. Finner found that the misinformation

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Speaker 1: meant customers collectively lost around seven million dollars, and honestly,

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Speaker 1: I think that's supposed to be the opposite of what

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Speaker 1: investment firms tend to promise their customers. It's a rare

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Speaker 1: thing to see an investment platform say, use us, we

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Speaker 1: can lose your money more effectively than anyone else can.

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Speaker 1: Robin Hood was in the news earlier this year when

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Speaker 1: independent investors were jumping on the game Stop stock roller coaster.

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Speaker 1: Robin Hood ended up placing tight restrictions on game Stop

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Speaker 1: stock trades, meaning if you were an independent investor and

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Speaker 1: you wanted to get in on the game Stop action,

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Speaker 1: you hit a major roadblock. The company's official statement at

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Speaker 1: that time was that it was trying to protect the

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Speaker 1: company and investors UH in a situation that had volderle

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Speaker 1: stock trades and also some regulatory issues, But some skeptical

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Speaker 1: investors argued that major parties that own a stake in

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Speaker 1: robin Hood had a vested interest in game Stop stock

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Speaker 1: going down and value, and thus the company was acting

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Speaker 1: in a conflict of interest with its customers. Google is

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Speaker 1: rolling out a new feature for Android users starting in

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Speaker 1: the United States that will let them store a digital

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Speaker 1: vaccine card called a COVID card. It will also support

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Speaker 1: storing COVID test results. The card will include information such

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Speaker 1: as where you received your vaccination, when that vaccination happened,

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Speaker 1: and possibly some other information sation like which vaccine you received.

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Speaker 1: Google designed the system so that the information remains on

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Speaker 1: your device, so, in other words, there's no copy of

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Speaker 1: this information sent to the cloud that could represent a

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Speaker 1: possible privacy risk. Google will collect some meta information about

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Speaker 1: the app, such as how frequently you actually use the card.

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Speaker 1: This could come in handy should vaccine cards become a

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Speaker 1: requirement for certain things, you know, like travel to specific

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Speaker 1: countries or attending specific events, though here in the US

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Speaker 1: we're seeing an awful lot of resistance to those sort

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Speaker 1: of things, going so far as to have some state

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Speaker 1: governors declare that a vaccination requirement will not be tolerated

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Speaker 1: for big events because I guess it's just more important

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Speaker 1: for potentially sick people to be able to go to

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Speaker 1: these public events than it is to ensure the safety

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Speaker 1: of those who are already in attendance. I don't know,

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Speaker 1: because I can't see the logic in it. Next half

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Speaker 1: a century ago, Stephen Hawking proposed a theorem that stated

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Speaker 1: a black holes event horizon, that is the boundary around

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Speaker 1: the black hole that marks the point of no escape.

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Speaker 1: If you cross the event horizon, you will be pulled

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Speaker 1: into that black hole. You cannot escape. That theorem says

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Speaker 1: that the event horizon would never shrink. The math worked

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Speaker 1: out that way, but that was all you could say

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Speaker 1: about it, is that mathematically it makes sense. And for

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Speaker 1: fifty years that's all we had to go on because

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Speaker 1: we had no real means of making observations that could

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Speaker 1: either confirm or deny that theorem. But that has changed.

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Speaker 1: Scientists at M I T and a few other research

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Speaker 1: facilities announced in a paper that was published in Physical

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Speaker 1: Review Letters that they have observed gravitational waves that confirm

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Speaker 1: Hawking's theorem for the first time. Now, I wish I

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Speaker 1: could explain the process of how they did this, but

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Speaker 1: I read over it about three or four times and

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Speaker 1: it's well beyond my ability to really understand it. So

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Speaker 1: rather than attempt to explain something and then get it

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Speaker 1: all wrong, I'm instead just going to report that the

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Speaker 1: scientists say they have a confidence that their observations mean

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Speaker 1: that Hawking's theorem is correct. This is another example of

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Speaker 1: how super deeper smart people have looked at the world

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Speaker 1: and the universe and they've used mathematics to describe it

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Speaker 1: and then predict something that is unobservable or at least

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Speaker 1: unobservable at the time, and then later we found out

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Speaker 1: it proved to be true. Einstein is famous for this

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Speaker 1: kind of stuff, and it really floors me. And I

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Speaker 1: suppose it shows that there is a logical order when

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Speaker 1: you get down to the nuts and bolts of the universe,

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Speaker 1: and if there weren't, then stuff like math just wouldn't work. Really,

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Speaker 1: nothing would work the way we understand it. Reality would

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Speaker 1: be fundamentally different. I may see if I can get

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Speaker 1: an expert on tech stuff at some point to talk

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Speaker 1: about this in greater detail and to kind of answer

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Speaker 1: questions about it and the actual process of validating or

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Speaker 1: or confirming Hawking's theorem, because I would love to learn

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Speaker 1: more myself, and I just know that I lack the

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Speaker 1: understanding necessary to be able to explain it properly. More

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Speaker 1: than a decade ago, I wrote an article for How

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Speaker 1: Stuff Works about quantum computers, talking about stuff that's difficult

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Speaker 1: to understand. At the time when I wrote the article,

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Speaker 1: there were only a few very rudimentary quantum computers even

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Speaker 1: in development. A quantum computers basic unit of information is

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Speaker 1: the cubit or quantum bit. So a normal bit is

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Speaker 1: either a zero or a one. It has to be

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Speaker 1: one or the other. Cubits can be different. They can

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Speaker 1: technically inhabit both values simultaneously. In fact, they can technically

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Speaker 1: inhabit all values in between zero and one. That means

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Speaker 1: that with the right kind of computational problems, a quantum

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Speaker 1: computer could arrive at solutions far faster and more reliably

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Speaker 1: than a classical you know computer could. It wouldn't be

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Speaker 1: great for everything, right, A quantum computer would not be

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Speaker 1: better than a classical computer in every application. You wouldn't

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Speaker 1: want to use a quantum computer to run the latest

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Speaker 1: version of Call of Duty, for example, But for this

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Speaker 1: subset of computer problems it could change the world. Now,

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Speaker 1: IBM has become the first company to make practical use

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Speaker 1: of a quantum computer in a way that proves it

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Speaker 1: is advantageous over classical computing. The researchers at IBM published

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Speaker 1: their work in Nature Physics in an article titled Quantum

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Speaker 1: advantage for Computations with limited space, which sounds like they

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Speaker 1: were trying to use a computer in my old dorm

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Speaker 1: room at college, but no. They performed an experiment in

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Speaker 1: which they pitted a classical computer against a quantum computer.

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Speaker 1: They tried to control for as many variables as possible,

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Speaker 1: and they found that for a specific subset of computational problems,

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Speaker 1: the quantum computer could perform flawlessly, while the classical computer

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Speaker 1: would have at best an error rate of around twelve percent.

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00:26:52,119 --> 00:26:56,000
Speaker 1: Quantum computers have the potential to disrupt fields like encryption,

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00:26:56,400 --> 00:26:59,840
Speaker 1: because a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could be able to

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00:27:00,040 --> 00:27:04,080
Speaker 1: brake encryption essentially through brute force, in a fraction of

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00:27:04,119 --> 00:27:07,480
Speaker 1: the time it would take a classical computer. For classical computers,

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00:27:07,520 --> 00:27:10,120
Speaker 1: you might be looking at, you know, tens of thousands

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00:27:10,119 --> 00:27:12,840
Speaker 1: of years to do this, whereas a quantum computer might

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00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:16,240
Speaker 1: do it in a few minutes. Now, if that's the case,

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00:27:16,320 --> 00:27:18,800
Speaker 1: if that in fact does come to pass, then this

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00:27:18,840 --> 00:27:22,800
Speaker 1: will necessitate a massive change in how we encrypt digital information,

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00:27:23,160 --> 00:27:26,119
Speaker 1: because it's effectively the same thing as handing out skeleton

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00:27:26,200 --> 00:27:29,240
Speaker 1: keys for all the locks that are out there, which

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00:27:29,280 --> 00:27:34,240
Speaker 1: is both scary and exciting stuff. Finally, Tim Burner's leave

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00:27:34,359 --> 00:27:37,919
Speaker 1: recently auction off and n f T or non fungible

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00:27:37,920 --> 00:27:42,040
Speaker 1: token representing the original source code for the Worldwide Web.

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00:27:42,600 --> 00:27:45,680
Speaker 1: This n f T sold for five point four million

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00:27:45,760 --> 00:27:49,119
Speaker 1: dollars at auction and quick reminder and n f T

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00:27:49,800 --> 00:27:54,200
Speaker 1: is kind of like a receipt or a certificate of ownership.

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00:27:54,320 --> 00:27:57,119
Speaker 1: It doesn't actually give anyone access to the thing it

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00:27:57,200 --> 00:28:01,800
Speaker 1: represents necessarily, nor does it prevent anyone from making copies

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00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:06,080
Speaker 1: of that thing. It's more like the representation of ownership.

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00:28:06,520 --> 00:28:09,400
Speaker 1: And he might ask the question, well, what practical good

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00:28:09,440 --> 00:28:13,720
Speaker 1: is that? And my response is, oh, n f T

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00:28:13,880 --> 00:28:16,000
Speaker 1: s have become a bit of a commodity. However, I

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00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:19,400
Speaker 1: would say they aren't quite in the same space as

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00:28:19,400 --> 00:28:21,240
Speaker 1: they were a couple of months ago when people were

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00:28:21,280 --> 00:28:25,320
Speaker 1: really going gaga for them. That's when the popularity really spiked.

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00:28:25,440 --> 00:28:28,800
Speaker 1: They are built on top of a blockchain. That means

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00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:31,800
Speaker 1: it is easy to trace and authenticate the ownership of

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00:28:31,840 --> 00:28:34,080
Speaker 1: an n f T, so While you might not be

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00:28:34,119 --> 00:28:37,199
Speaker 1: able to do anything practical with the thing that the

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00:28:37,280 --> 00:28:39,520
Speaker 1: n f T represents, you could at least point to

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00:28:39,560 --> 00:28:42,200
Speaker 1: the blockchain and say, but I for reals own it,

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00:28:42,440 --> 00:28:44,680
Speaker 1: and you can see right here because it's part of

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00:28:44,720 --> 00:28:49,720
Speaker 1: the blockchain of transactions. So I don't know. Humans are weird.

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Speaker 1: And that wraps up the news for Thursday, July one,

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Speaker 1: twenty twenty one. I hope all of you out there

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00:28:58,440 --> 00:29:00,760
Speaker 1: in the United States have a safe Fourth of July

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00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:05,200
Speaker 1: weekend as you celebrate. Do be careful if you are celebrating.

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00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:07,800
Speaker 1: For those of you with dogs, I wish you a

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00:29:07,960 --> 00:29:11,440
Speaker 1: quiet night or quiet weekend because I know how my

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00:29:11,520 --> 00:29:14,760
Speaker 1: dog is with fireworks going off nearby, so my heart

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00:29:14,800 --> 00:29:17,920
Speaker 1: goes out to you. For everyone everywhere else, obviously, have

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00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:21,160
Speaker 1: a safe weekend a happy one. You just probably won't

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00:29:21,160 --> 00:29:23,840
Speaker 1: be celebrating Fourth of July. And if you have any

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00:29:23,840 --> 00:29:26,640
Speaker 1: suggestions for future topics of tech stuff, reach out to me.

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00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:29,640
Speaker 1: Do so on Twitter. The handle is text stuff h

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00:29:29,880 --> 00:29:33,640
Speaker 1: s W and I'll talk to you again really soon.

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00:29:38,560 --> 00:29:41,600
Speaker 1: Text Stuff is an I Heart Radio production. For more

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00:29:41,680 --> 00:29:45,080
Speaker 1: podcasts from my Heart Radio, visit the I Heart Radio app,

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00:29:45,200 --> 00:29:48,360
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows