WEBVTT - Alphabet, Amazon, Apple and Meta Antitrust Showdown Status

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<v Speaker 1>Big tech platforms Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Meta are all

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<v Speaker 1>feeling the sting of the Biden administration's aggressive anti trust enforcers.

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<v Speaker 1>All four have been sued by the US Department of

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<v Speaker 1>Justice or the Federal Trade Commission for alleged monopolization, and

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<v Speaker 1>the DOJ just notched a win in one of its

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<v Speaker 1>cases against Google. What are these lawsuits about, where do

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<v Speaker 1>they stand, and what's next. This is a Votes and

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<v Speaker 1>Verdicts Brief.

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<v Speaker 2>Welcome to Votes and Verdicts hosted by Bloomberg Intelligence, part

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<v Speaker 2>of Bloomberg's Research department, comprised of five hundred analysts and

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<v Speaker 2>strategists working across all major world markets. Our coverage includes

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<v Speaker 2>over two thousand equities and credits, as well as outlooks

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<v Speaker 2>on more than nine d industries, one hundred market indices, currencies,

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<v Speaker 2>and come. In this podcast series, we talk about the

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<v Speaker 2>intersection of business policy and law. I'm Justin Teresi, a

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<v Speaker 2>litigation and policy analyst with Bloomberg Intelligence covering anti trust matters.

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<v Speaker 1>And I'm Jennifer Ree, a senior analyst that also covers

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<v Speaker 1>US anti trust litigation and policy.

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<v Speaker 2>Our Votes and Verdicts Brief series highlights our research reports

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<v Speaker 2>on the Bloomberg terminal, giving listeners a quick takeaway to

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<v Speaker 2>help grasp key litigation or policy topics covered in that research. Today,

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<v Speaker 2>my colleague Jen and I are going to talk about

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<v Speaker 2>ongoing government anti trust actions against the four big tech

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<v Speaker 2>platforms Jen mentioned at the start of the podcast, providing

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<v Speaker 2>a snapshot of each case and where it stands. So Jen,

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<v Speaker 2>so much going on here. Obviously, Let's start with Google,

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<v Speaker 2>since the company faces two anti trust monopolization suits right

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<v Speaker 2>now brought by the United States Department of Justice, and

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<v Speaker 2>Google just lost one of them. That was the first

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<v Speaker 2>suit brought against the company by DOJ back in twenty twenty,

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<v Speaker 2>and it targeted Google's conduct relation to its search engine business.

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<v Speaker 2>Can you give us a short summary of that ruling

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<v Speaker 2>in the suit?

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<v Speaker 1>Sure? Justin and you are right. That ruling was just

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<v Speaker 1>issued against Google on August fifth. Pretty big deal since

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<v Speaker 1>it's one of the first monopolization cases brought by the

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<v Speaker 1>DOJ since Microsoft all the way back in the nineteen nineties.

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<v Speaker 1>And here the judge determined that Google has monopoly power

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<v Speaker 1>and markets for general search services and something called general

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<v Speaker 1>search text ads. Those are the ads that you see

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<v Speaker 1>when you do a search and they come up at

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<v Speaker 1>the top of the search results page and they say sponsored.

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<v Speaker 1>They kind of look like search results. So the judge

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<v Speaker 1>also decided that Google had engaged in illegal conduct intended

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<v Speaker 1>to maintain those monopolies, because just having that monopoly in

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<v Speaker 1>search isn't illegal. It's all about the conduct and what

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<v Speaker 1>Google is doing to try to either get to that

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<v Speaker 1>monopoly or maintain the monopoly. So the crux of the

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<v Speaker 1>conduct in this case was these distribution agreements Google had

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<v Speaker 1>with a number of third parties, and Google would pay

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<v Speaker 1>these companies a lot of money to set Google Search

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<v Speaker 1>Engine as a default for most of the access points

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<v Speaker 1>on the Internet. So specifically, the company paid about twenty

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<v Speaker 1>six billion a year to companies like Apple and Mozilla,

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<v Speaker 1>as well as makers of Android phones and sellers of phones,

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<v Speaker 1>so that people accessing the web using these browsers or

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<v Speaker 1>these devices were automatically using Google Search, sometimes without even

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<v Speaker 1>knowing it. And the judge determined that those agreements were

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<v Speaker 1>exclusionary because what they did is they foreclosed other search

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<v Speaker 1>engine competitors like Being or duc duc Go, And what

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<v Speaker 1>that did is it prevented those competitors from gaining the

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<v Speaker 1>scale they needed to improve because essentially the more searches

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<v Speaker 1>that are done in the search engine, the better the

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<v Speaker 1>search engine becomes. This decision was only on liability, so

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<v Speaker 1>that means just deciding was Google doing something illegal or not,

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<v Speaker 1>So there wasn't really evidence directly focused on what the

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<v Speaker 1>appropriate remedies would be at trials should Google lose the case.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, So, I think a lot of people this week

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<v Speaker 2>generally scratching their heads and they're saying, you know, given

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<v Speaker 2>that this was just kind of a determination that Google

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<v Speaker 2>broke the law, what really happens next? And how long

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<v Speaker 2>do you think it'll be before there's some kind of

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<v Speaker 2>indication about what kind of an injunction might be issued,

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<v Speaker 2>what that might look like.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you know, justin I even think this might be

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<v Speaker 1>the tougher part of the case, And usually proving that

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<v Speaker 1>somebody is engaged in illegal monopolization is pretty tall task

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<v Speaker 1>for a plaintiff, but we managed to do that here.

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<v Speaker 1>But right the what is the remedy going to be

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<v Speaker 1>to fix this? I think that's very complicated. And what's

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<v Speaker 1>going to happen here at least is we're starting out

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<v Speaker 1>with a hearing on September sixth, But that's just to

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<v Speaker 1>hammer out a schedule. So that's not really about what

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<v Speaker 1>the remedies would be. It's just to say, what's our

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<v Speaker 1>schedule going forward in order to try to determine what

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<v Speaker 1>the remedy should be. And I think the whole process

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<v Speaker 1>is going to take. We should expect at least six months,

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<v Speaker 1>probably longer. I mean, we don't have very good examples,

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<v Speaker 1>but that's about how much time I think they'll need.

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<v Speaker 1>In the meantime, Google's definitely going to appeal this decision

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<v Speaker 1>on liability, and I assume what they will also do

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<v Speaker 1>is seek to stay this whole process pending the appeal,

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<v Speaker 1>But that alone could take another twelve to eighteen months.

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<v Speaker 1>So what I think is most likely is that the

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<v Speaker 1>judge goes forward with this remedy's process just to decide

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<v Speaker 1>on what they should be, but stays their actual implementation

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<v Speaker 1>until the appeal has been decided.

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<v Speaker 2>Got it? So, I mean nothing in litigation happens overnight.

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<v Speaker 2>I think we all know that's the case, right right,

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<v Speaker 2>So I have to ask next, what do you think

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<v Speaker 2>Google's chances are on the appeal?

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<v Speaker 1>You know, I think they're low. I think it's a

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<v Speaker 1>really well reasoned decision. It wasn't really novel or unique.

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<v Speaker 1>It wasn't really a stretch under the antitrust laws. It

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<v Speaker 1>was based on a traditional anti trust theory of harm.

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<v Speaker 1>And I think also to the extent that some of

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<v Speaker 1>the judges calls were based on his view and interpretation

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<v Speaker 1>of the evidence that was presented, such as his rejection

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<v Speaker 1>of Google's offered justifications for these default agreements. The appellate

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<v Speaker 1>judges will have to give those calls deference because it's

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<v Speaker 1>based on an interpretation of the evidence that the trial

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<v Speaker 1>court heard, not the appeals court judges. And that's a

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<v Speaker 1>pretty high standard.

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<v Speaker 2>For rehearsal Right, it makes sense, makes sense. So with

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<v Speaker 2>this behind us, now, so there's this second case against

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<v Speaker 2>Google by the DOJ that I have to say, from

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<v Speaker 2>my own perspective, is super complicated. I'm still diving into

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<v Speaker 2>this case, and says you and I have discussed. I'll

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<v Speaker 2>be attending the trial in September for the next Google

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<v Speaker 2>case while you're attending the trial here in New York

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<v Speaker 2>for FTC's case against Tapestry and Capri looking to break

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<v Speaker 2>to block that merger. But the suit against Google, it

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<v Speaker 2>deals with ad tech products. And still I am very

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<v Speaker 2>much still getting up to speed on the case itself.

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<v Speaker 2>Can you tell us about that suit and where it

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<v Speaker 2>stands right now?

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<v Speaker 1>I'll tell you justin I'm so glad you're going to

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<v Speaker 1>that trial because it really.

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<v Speaker 2>Be careful what you wish for. Jed the careful what

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<v Speaker 2>you wish for.

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<v Speaker 1>So in this case, the DOJ and a number of

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<v Speaker 1>states along with it, sue Google. This was in the

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<v Speaker 1>first quarter of twenty twenty three. Over how it operates,

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<v Speaker 1>As you said, it's ad tech business. Ad tech products

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<v Speaker 1>are pretty complicated, and you know, they're not used by

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<v Speaker 1>everyday people like us, so we don't really know how

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<v Speaker 1>they work, not at all. Really. They're used by digital

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<v Speaker 1>advertisers and publishers to buy and sell the ads and

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<v Speaker 1>impressions that we see on the websites when we're on

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<v Speaker 1>the internet, right, And these products basically consist of sort

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<v Speaker 1>of what we call a stack of products. There's an

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<v Speaker 1>AD server that's used by large publishers to manage their

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<v Speaker 1>inventory of I think of it as sort of space

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<v Speaker 1>on their websites. And then they're ad buying tools on

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<v Speaker 1>the other end that are used by advertisers to connect

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<v Speaker 1>to an ad exchange, and the ad exchange is what

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<v Speaker 1>sits right in between, and it's a real time auction

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<v Speaker 1>marketplace that matches multiple buyers and multiple sellers to actually

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<v Speaker 1>complete a transaction. Show that ad when you justin go

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<v Speaker 1>to let's say CNN dot com or some other website.

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<v Speaker 1>All of this is called the ad tech stack, and

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<v Speaker 1>Google owns products across that entire stack. So the allegation here,

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<v Speaker 1>because remember I said in the other case, it's all

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<v Speaker 1>about conduct. Really, I mean, obviously you have to first

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<v Speaker 1>prove that a company has a monopoly position, but once

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<v Speaker 1>that's done, it's about conduct. And the allegation here is

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<v Speaker 1>that Google's engaged in this very long list of sort

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<v Speaker 1>of different strategies, initiatives and product changes that sort of

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<v Speaker 1>all in different ways end up kind of manipulating this

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<v Speaker 1>process to favor Google, so it keeps them, it keeps

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<v Speaker 1>customers within Google stack using its products, kind of ensures

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<v Speaker 1>that the actual transaction takes place on Google's at exchange,

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<v Speaker 1>and then extracts fees all along the way. And that's

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<v Speaker 1>kind of a general way of talking about a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of allegations that are actually quite nitty gritty and complicated.

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<v Speaker 1>The case is going to trial, as you mentioned in

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<v Speaker 1>September in the Eastern District of Virginia. It's going to

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<v Speaker 1>be a bench trial before a judge, and the judges

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<v Speaker 1>in that district. I mean, as you know, justin move pretty.

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<v Speaker 2>Fast, right right, rocket docketive sorts.

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<v Speaker 1>Rocket docket, right. So I'm thinking, I mean guessing maybe

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<v Speaker 1>a decision could even be issued within six months or

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<v Speaker 1>so of trial completing. But we know that's just a guess.

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<v Speaker 1>And once that trial's done, we're going to be asking

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<v Speaker 1>you what you think is going to happen case I haven't.

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's a good case for the DOJ, But

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<v Speaker 1>as you know, we have to see what happens in

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<v Speaker 1>trial and what the evidence look like looks like to

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<v Speaker 1>make a better call. And I can't wait to hear

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<v Speaker 1>what you think of it.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and I'm really hoping to have some of some

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<v Speaker 2>opinions sorted out by then too, That is my hope anyway.

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<v Speaker 2>So there are other lawsuits really similar to this one

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<v Speaker 2>pending against Google as well, and we know there's one

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<v Speaker 2>brought by a group of state attorneys general and a

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<v Speaker 2>proposed class action by publishers and advertisers. It's pretty much

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<v Speaker 2>the same issues. So how come there's some simultaneous litigations

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<v Speaker 2>happening over the same thing in different courts.

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<v Speaker 1>It's really a crazy situation, and I don't endy Google

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<v Speaker 1>for the position it's in. So usually, as is the

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<v Speaker 1>case when the government sues a large company, or even

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<v Speaker 1>when the reports break that the government's investigating a company

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<v Speaker 1>from monopilization, the aggrieved buyers of the products in this case,

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<v Speaker 1>the publishers and advertisers will sue for monetary damages. In

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<v Speaker 1>this case, they did actually sue first while the dj

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<v Speaker 1>was still investigating and hadn't yet filed their suit. All

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<v Speaker 1>of those suits were consolidated into one litigation, but the

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<v Speaker 1>federal government is exempt from that consolidation process, so when

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<v Speaker 1>the Department of Justice brought their own suit, it was

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<v Speaker 1>separate and they were able to keep it separate. Now. Also,

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<v Speaker 1>seventeen states that were led by Texas also sued, and

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<v Speaker 1>this is all pretty much over the same products, the

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<v Speaker 1>same conduct, the ad tech stack, the manipulation. These states

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<v Speaker 1>sued before the DOJ as well, and originally their suit

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<v Speaker 1>was consolidated with the publishers and advertisers suit in a

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<v Speaker 1>New York court, but then the states were able to

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<v Speaker 1>move it back to Texas, where it was originally filed

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<v Speaker 1>after a new law went into effect in December of

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<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty two. That was called the State Antitrust Enforcement

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<v Speaker 1>Venue Act, and it was signed into law as part

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<v Speaker 1>of the omnibus spending bill at the end of twenty

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<v Speaker 1>twenty two. So what that did is it made the

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<v Speaker 1>state attorney general anti Truss actions exempt from consolidation just

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<v Speaker 1>like the federal government. Right, so Texas got their case

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<v Speaker 1>moved back. Means we have three different suits in three

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<v Speaker 1>different courts, and even though the DOJ suit was brought

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<v Speaker 1>after all of these, as I mentioned, it's in the

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<v Speaker 1>Rocket docket, so it's moving faster. The Texas suit is

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<v Speaker 1>scheduled to go to trial in March of twenty twenty five,

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<v Speaker 1>and the private suits are way behind that and don't

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<v Speaker 1>have a trial scheduled yet. But the upshot is that

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<v Speaker 1>Google's in this unfortunate position of having defended the same

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<v Speaker 1>case in three different courts and three different trials, assuming

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<v Speaker 1>no settlements of any of them.

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<v Speaker 2>Got I got it, so really complicated issues, and I

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<v Speaker 2>think some really complicated procedure to go along with it.

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<v Speaker 2>It sounds like that really doesn't look to be resolved

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<v Speaker 2>for maybe the next few years.

0:11:34.840 --> 0:11:35.600
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I think so.

0:11:36.120 --> 0:11:38.640
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, yeah, but so I should ask too, how about

0:11:38.720 --> 0:11:41.280
<v Speaker 2>meta or we'll go with a Facebook for the purposes

0:11:41.320 --> 0:11:44.680
<v Speaker 2>of this podcast. But I understand Facebook was first hued

0:11:44.720 --> 0:11:48.199
<v Speaker 2>by the Trump administration's FTC quite a while ago, now

0:11:48.240 --> 0:11:52.200
<v Speaker 2>obviously from monopolization, and that matter is still being continued

0:11:52.200 --> 0:11:55.040
<v Speaker 2>by the current FTC. What's going on in that case

0:11:55.080 --> 0:11:56.040
<v Speaker 2>and where does that stand?

0:11:56.240 --> 0:11:58.440
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so that has been pretty slow moving when you

0:11:58.480 --> 0:12:02.319
<v Speaker 1>think about it long it's been out there. The allegation

0:12:02.480 --> 0:12:04.360
<v Speaker 1>in this case, I think that doesn't get a lot

0:12:04.360 --> 0:12:07.920
<v Speaker 1>of press attention these days, but it is a big deal.

0:12:08.600 --> 0:12:11.920
<v Speaker 1>The allegation is that Facebook has engaged in strategies to

0:12:12.000 --> 0:12:16.600
<v Speaker 1>target potential competitive threats to its social networking dominance. Now

0:12:16.600 --> 0:12:18.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to say dominance because at the time this

0:12:18.679 --> 0:12:21.120
<v Speaker 1>was brought it was dominant, but TikTok has changed for

0:12:21.160 --> 0:12:22.320
<v Speaker 1>a little bit in the meantime.

0:12:22.600 --> 0:12:24.640
<v Speaker 2>The whole New world, yes, the whole New world.

0:12:24.679 --> 0:12:27.920
<v Speaker 1>But anyway, what Facebook was doing was looking for new

0:12:27.960 --> 0:12:31.560
<v Speaker 1>startups in social networking. Our companies are kind of adjacent

0:12:31.640 --> 0:12:33.920
<v Speaker 1>to social networking, and then buying them up before they

0:12:33.920 --> 0:12:36.600
<v Speaker 1>could become a competitive force. At least that's the allegation,

0:12:37.160 --> 0:12:40.920
<v Speaker 1>and the FTC is targeting two specific acquisitions that Facebook

0:12:40.960 --> 0:12:45.360
<v Speaker 1>has made, Instagram and WhatsApp. So the FTC claims Facebook

0:12:45.400 --> 0:12:49.040
<v Speaker 1>originally tried to compete with Instagram by improving its own product,

0:12:49.320 --> 0:12:51.720
<v Speaker 1>but then ultimately chose just to buy it rather than

0:12:51.760 --> 0:12:54.400
<v Speaker 1>to compete with it, and likewise with What's App, and

0:12:54.440 --> 0:12:57.880
<v Speaker 1>the allegation is that both could have eventually become competitors

0:12:57.880 --> 0:13:01.720
<v Speaker 1>in social networking over time. In the lawsuit, the FTC

0:13:01.800 --> 0:13:04.280
<v Speaker 1>is seeking a court order that one or both of

0:13:04.280 --> 0:13:07.640
<v Speaker 1>these companies be divested. Now, I should say this lawsuit's

0:13:07.840 --> 0:13:12.280
<v Speaker 1>pretty controversial because it wasn't a unanimous decision by the FTC.

0:13:13.000 --> 0:13:16.240
<v Speaker 1>Unlike the Department of Justice, the FTC is run by

0:13:16.240 --> 0:13:19.120
<v Speaker 1>five commissioners when they have a full slate, and when

0:13:19.160 --> 0:13:21.240
<v Speaker 1>they decide to sue, it's by vote and it has

0:13:21.280 --> 0:13:23.120
<v Speaker 1>to be a majority vote. So this was a three

0:13:23.160 --> 0:13:27.319
<v Speaker 1>to two vote, with two Republicans of the three dissenting,

0:13:27.920 --> 0:13:31.679
<v Speaker 1>and they had policy concerns because the FTC had previously

0:13:31.720 --> 0:13:35.640
<v Speaker 1>evaluated these acquisitions, it had the authority to review mergers

0:13:35.640 --> 0:13:38.240
<v Speaker 1>before they close, right it still does, and had cleared

0:13:38.240 --> 0:13:41.160
<v Speaker 1>both of the deals so one commissioner at least wrote

0:13:41.200 --> 0:13:43.760
<v Speaker 1>that it's bad policy to undermine the integrity of this

0:13:43.840 --> 0:13:48.120
<v Speaker 1>pre merger notification review process, particularly given that these companies

0:13:48.120 --> 0:13:50.679
<v Speaker 1>rely on a clearance decision and then move forward as

0:13:50.679 --> 0:13:54.280
<v Speaker 1>a merging business. Right now, we're in what's called the

0:13:54.320 --> 0:13:58.640
<v Speaker 1>summary judgment phase of this case, and that's where the

0:13:58.640 --> 0:14:01.760
<v Speaker 1>defendants can once again try to get the case dismissed.

0:14:01.800 --> 0:14:04.600
<v Speaker 1>And I actually think there's some possibility here Facebook could

0:14:04.600 --> 0:14:08.120
<v Speaker 1>win a dismissal before trial in this phase. And I

0:14:08.200 --> 0:14:11.920
<v Speaker 1>say that because when the judge sustained the second complaint

0:14:12.080 --> 0:14:14.760
<v Speaker 1>early on in a motion to dismiss, what he said

0:14:14.880 --> 0:14:16.720
<v Speaker 1>was that the agency is going to face a tall

0:14:16.800 --> 0:14:20.080
<v Speaker 1>task to prove its allegations. And he noted that what

0:14:20.120 --> 0:14:22.760
<v Speaker 1>the FTC has to show is that these acquisitions harmed

0:14:22.840 --> 0:14:27.440
<v Speaker 1>the competitive process and harmed consumers. But because Facebook, Instagram,

0:14:27.480 --> 0:14:30.440
<v Speaker 1>and WhatsApp are all free to consumers, what the FDC

0:14:30.560 --> 0:14:32.560
<v Speaker 1>is going to have to show is that the harm

0:14:32.640 --> 0:14:36.400
<v Speaker 1>is that it resulted in poorer quality, less choice, less innovation.

0:14:37.200 --> 0:14:39.840
<v Speaker 1>And these are hard to prove, and that's particularly hard

0:14:39.880 --> 0:14:42.800
<v Speaker 1>given that Facebook's invested in the products and grown them

0:14:42.840 --> 0:14:45.640
<v Speaker 1>since having acquired them. And they're both really very popular.

0:14:45.680 --> 0:14:49.920
<v Speaker 1>Consumers like those products. So the briefing is ongoing, as

0:14:49.920 --> 0:14:52.920
<v Speaker 1>I said, and I would expect a decision maybe toward

0:14:52.960 --> 0:14:56.000
<v Speaker 1>the end of this year or in the first half ultimately.

0:14:56.040 --> 0:14:57.840
<v Speaker 1>In terms of a trial, there is no trial date

0:14:57.920 --> 0:14:59.000
<v Speaker 1>set yet in this case.

0:14:59.480 --> 0:15:03.280
<v Speaker 2>Okay, So moving on to the next big bad tech platform.

0:15:04.520 --> 0:15:08.960
<v Speaker 2>Apparently the antire trust enforcers didn't want Amazon or Apple

0:15:09.040 --> 0:15:11.600
<v Speaker 2>to feel left out, it looks like so they've both

0:15:11.640 --> 0:15:15.240
<v Speaker 2>been accused of monopolistic conduct as well, but the cases

0:15:15.240 --> 0:15:18.400
<v Speaker 2>are not as developed as the ones against Google and Facebook, right,

0:15:18.440 --> 0:15:20.520
<v Speaker 2>I mean, let's start with Apple. What's going on there?

0:15:20.600 --> 0:15:21.200
<v Speaker 2>Right now?

0:15:21.240 --> 0:15:23.920
<v Speaker 1>This is the newest case, and I actually think one

0:15:23.960 --> 0:15:26.200
<v Speaker 1>of the weakest to get the big tech platforms. It

0:15:26.280 --> 0:15:29.200
<v Speaker 1>was just filed this past March after a really long

0:15:29.280 --> 0:15:32.800
<v Speaker 1>investigation by the DOJ, and like the other suits, a

0:15:32.840 --> 0:15:36.240
<v Speaker 1>number of states have joined it. And Apple's basically accused

0:15:36.280 --> 0:15:39.080
<v Speaker 1>of engaging in a series of actions that profit the

0:15:39.120 --> 0:15:42.720
<v Speaker 1>company but aren't useful or beneficial for customers, and are

0:15:42.720 --> 0:15:45.560
<v Speaker 1>intended to make it hard to switch to an Android phone.

0:15:46.440 --> 0:15:48.480
<v Speaker 1>There are several examples. I'm not going to run through

0:15:48.520 --> 0:15:51.080
<v Speaker 1>all of them, but there are things like Apple refusing

0:15:51.240 --> 0:15:54.640
<v Speaker 1>to allow super apps. Super apps are apps that provide

0:15:54.720 --> 0:15:58.080
<v Speaker 1>broad functionality in a single app, and the DOJ claims

0:15:58.120 --> 0:16:01.200
<v Speaker 1>that super apps would reduce the users dependence on the

0:16:01.200 --> 0:16:04.560
<v Speaker 1>iPhone and the operating system and the app store because

0:16:04.600 --> 0:16:06.760
<v Speaker 1>if they act as sort of a middleware, right, allow

0:16:06.840 --> 0:16:09.160
<v Speaker 1>developers to kind of go around the operating system and

0:16:09.200 --> 0:16:11.520
<v Speaker 1>the users to go around the operating system. And then

0:16:11.560 --> 0:16:15.240
<v Speaker 1>one other example, because gaming is so popular, are cloud

0:16:15.360 --> 0:16:19.480
<v Speaker 1>streaming game apps. So Apple allows games on the device obviously,

0:16:19.520 --> 0:16:22.320
<v Speaker 1>but not the apps that allow you to play games

0:16:22.320 --> 0:16:25.840
<v Speaker 1>stream through the cloud. So according to the DOJ, these

0:16:25.920 --> 0:16:28.800
<v Speaker 1>kinds of apps would decrease the importance of expensive hardware

0:16:28.880 --> 0:16:31.480
<v Speaker 1>for people who want to play high compute games, and

0:16:31.520 --> 0:16:33.320
<v Speaker 1>it would allow a serious gamer to play on a

0:16:33.400 --> 0:16:36.920
<v Speaker 1>less expensive smartphone. So again it's the idea of keeping

0:16:36.920 --> 0:16:39.880
<v Speaker 1>people on the Apple phone and getting them not to

0:16:39.920 --> 0:16:43.200
<v Speaker 1>switch those. As I said, those are just a few examples,

0:16:43.480 --> 0:16:45.760
<v Speaker 1>So this is a really new case. We're just in

0:16:45.800 --> 0:16:48.560
<v Speaker 1>the motion to dismiss stage. I think they're still a

0:16:48.600 --> 0:16:51.640
<v Speaker 1>few years of litigation ahead of us. The briefing on

0:16:51.680 --> 0:16:55.000
<v Speaker 1>the motion to dismiss won't be done till October you know,

0:16:55.000 --> 0:16:57.520
<v Speaker 1>maybe we'll get in an opinion probably at some point

0:16:57.520 --> 0:17:00.040
<v Speaker 1>next year, maybe in the first half. You know. So

0:17:00.120 --> 0:17:02.840
<v Speaker 1>it's pretty easy to surpass, survive in motion to dismiss.

0:17:02.880 --> 0:17:06.400
<v Speaker 1>There's a very low bar there, and so I would

0:17:06.400 --> 0:17:08.800
<v Speaker 1>suspect the case will survivive. I don't know about its

0:17:08.840 --> 0:17:11.440
<v Speaker 1>long term survival, but I think it'll least get into

0:17:11.480 --> 0:17:13.560
<v Speaker 1>the thick of litigation. And we've got a couple of

0:17:13.600 --> 0:17:14.840
<v Speaker 1>years ahead of us on that one.

0:17:15.560 --> 0:17:20.000
<v Speaker 2>Okay, okay, another drawn out litigation. It sounds like, I mean,

0:17:20.200 --> 0:17:22.520
<v Speaker 2>so the last but certainly not least you know, how

0:17:22.520 --> 0:17:26.280
<v Speaker 2>about Amazon? It seems like Amazon is consumer friendly at

0:17:26.359 --> 0:17:29.400
<v Speaker 2>least in terms of the convenience and involves for users

0:17:29.440 --> 0:17:32.600
<v Speaker 2>and quick delivery. I know, I use Amazon Prime myself.

0:17:32.680 --> 0:17:34.919
<v Speaker 2>I mean, you know, I think a lot of folks do.

0:17:35.440 --> 0:17:37.520
<v Speaker 2>But what is it that Amazon is doing that the

0:17:37.640 --> 0:17:41.560
<v Speaker 2>FTC particularly have views as a violation of monopolization laws.

0:17:41.920 --> 0:17:44.439
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you know, justin it's probably shameful how many Amazon

0:17:44.480 --> 0:17:46.040
<v Speaker 1>boxes show up at my house.

0:17:46.240 --> 0:17:48.760
<v Speaker 2>All the time, all the time. I can't keep track anymore.

0:17:48.880 --> 0:17:49.640
<v Speaker 2>J I really wow.

0:17:50.880 --> 0:17:53.840
<v Speaker 1>Right, so we are back to the Federal Trade Commission now, right,

0:17:53.920 --> 0:17:56.720
<v Speaker 1>So this suit was brought by the Commission in September

0:17:56.760 --> 0:17:59.720
<v Speaker 1>of twenty twenty three, like the others, joined by several

0:17:59.760 --> 0:18:03.240
<v Speaker 1>state and in this case, the FTC is accusing Amazon

0:18:03.400 --> 0:18:07.280
<v Speaker 1>of engaging in anti competitive conduct to maintain a monopoly

0:18:07.359 --> 0:18:09.760
<v Speaker 1>in two different markets. One of them is the online

0:18:09.800 --> 0:18:13.120
<v Speaker 1>superstore market that encompasses the e commerce business that's us

0:18:13.200 --> 0:18:15.960
<v Speaker 1>buying products right. And then the other market is an

0:18:16.040 --> 0:18:19.800
<v Speaker 1>online marketplace service market, and that's Amazon's third party business

0:18:20.080 --> 0:18:23.520
<v Speaker 1>that connects sellers with online buyers, so allowing third party

0:18:23.560 --> 0:18:28.720
<v Speaker 1>sellers to sell on its platform. So Amazon allegedly has

0:18:28.720 --> 0:18:32.760
<v Speaker 1>illegally monopolized these markets through two distinct practices, and the

0:18:32.800 --> 0:18:36.000
<v Speaker 1>first is what the FTC is calling anti discounting conduct.

0:18:36.200 --> 0:18:38.320
<v Speaker 1>I kind of think of it as as price parity

0:18:38.400 --> 0:18:41.880
<v Speaker 1>or most Favored Nation clause. But in the allegation here

0:18:41.920 --> 0:18:46.520
<v Speaker 1>is that Amazon generally requires or pushes sellers to offer

0:18:46.560 --> 0:18:49.439
<v Speaker 1>the lowest price on Amazon, and they can't offer the

0:18:49.440 --> 0:18:52.119
<v Speaker 1>product on some other website for a lower price, but

0:18:52.160 --> 0:18:54.119
<v Speaker 1>it might be less expensive for them to sell it

0:18:54.160 --> 0:18:58.280
<v Speaker 1>on that other website. And what this does is artificially

0:18:58.280 --> 0:19:02.760
<v Speaker 1>inflates prices on these other rival retailers. Then the second

0:19:02.880 --> 0:19:07.040
<v Speaker 1>conduct that the FTC's targeting is that Amazon allegedly coerces

0:19:07.080 --> 0:19:10.040
<v Speaker 1>sellers to use its fulfillment services for a fee, of course,

0:19:10.400 --> 0:19:12.679
<v Speaker 1>if they want to be eligible for Amazon Prime, and

0:19:12.760 --> 0:19:15.800
<v Speaker 1>Prime is obviously really valuable for companies that are selling

0:19:15.840 --> 0:19:18.840
<v Speaker 1>products on the platform. Now, the really interesting thing to

0:19:18.880 --> 0:19:21.080
<v Speaker 1>me about this case is that very similar claims were

0:19:21.080 --> 0:19:23.159
<v Speaker 1>made against the company in the UK and the EU,

0:19:23.280 --> 0:19:24.920
<v Speaker 1>and Amazon managed.

0:19:24.640 --> 0:19:26.680
<v Speaker 2>To settle both of those cases, okay.

0:19:26.520 --> 0:19:29.200
<v Speaker 1>Right, and it agreed to a bunch of behavioral changes.

0:19:29.960 --> 0:19:33.520
<v Speaker 1>It'll give vendors equal placement alongside Amazon's own goods near

0:19:33.720 --> 0:19:36.639
<v Speaker 1>what's called the buybox. That's a feature that's very beneficial

0:19:36.640 --> 0:19:39.600
<v Speaker 1>for sellers. It also pledged that it wouldn't use rival

0:19:39.640 --> 0:19:42.679
<v Speaker 1>sellers marketplace data to gain an unfair advantage when it

0:19:42.680 --> 0:19:45.440
<v Speaker 1>sells its own products. And it's also going to allow

0:19:45.520 --> 0:19:48.760
<v Speaker 1>third party businesses to negotiate the rates directly with other

0:19:48.840 --> 0:19:51.719
<v Speaker 1>providers of Prime delivery services, so that way, essentially they

0:19:51.760 --> 0:19:54.800
<v Speaker 1>don't have to use fulfillment by Amazon. So it seems

0:19:54.920 --> 0:19:56.879
<v Speaker 1>like this case could settle at some point in the

0:19:56.880 --> 0:19:59.840
<v Speaker 1>future because that's kind of a blueprint, and we'll know,

0:20:00.240 --> 0:20:02.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, as time goes by, how things are working

0:20:02.200 --> 0:20:04.560
<v Speaker 1>out with all of those commitments that Amazon made in

0:20:04.600 --> 0:20:07.080
<v Speaker 1>Europe as the months go by, and I think there's

0:20:07.119 --> 0:20:10.920
<v Speaker 1>particularly a potential for a settlement if the personnel of

0:20:11.000 --> 0:20:14.560
<v Speaker 1>the FTC changes with a change in administration. But you know,

0:20:14.760 --> 0:20:17.080
<v Speaker 1>like the DOJ's case against Apple, this one is in

0:20:17.160 --> 0:20:19.520
<v Speaker 1>early stages. It's got a long way to go. It

0:20:19.560 --> 0:20:22.000
<v Speaker 1>does have a trial date set in October of twenty

0:20:22.080 --> 0:20:24.639
<v Speaker 1>twenty six. We do have a motion to dismiss the

0:20:24.680 --> 0:20:27.920
<v Speaker 1>suit pending. The briefing on that finished up in March

0:20:27.960 --> 0:20:31.119
<v Speaker 1>of twenty twenty four, and maybe we could get a

0:20:31.119 --> 0:20:33.520
<v Speaker 1>decision on that this year, but I wouldn't be surprised

0:20:33.560 --> 0:20:36.240
<v Speaker 1>if it pushed into next year one que or even

0:20:36.280 --> 0:20:38.360
<v Speaker 1>the first half. And as I said, those are sort

0:20:38.359 --> 0:20:41.200
<v Speaker 1>of tough to win. So I don't think the case

0:20:41.240 --> 0:20:43.360
<v Speaker 1>would get dismissed at this stage, and I think we'll

0:20:43.400 --> 0:20:45.760
<v Speaker 1>be watching the We'll be watching the suit for a

0:20:45.760 --> 0:20:49.359
<v Speaker 1>long time yet. So anyway, for now, justin that's it

0:20:49.520 --> 0:20:52.760
<v Speaker 1>with respect to suits by the government against tech platforms.

0:20:52.840 --> 0:20:55.920
<v Speaker 1>I should note that the Department of Justice has also

0:20:55.960 --> 0:20:59.440
<v Speaker 1>sued Live Nation from anobilization, a very popular suit with

0:20:59.440 --> 0:21:00.479
<v Speaker 1>Taylor's wife fans.

0:21:00.840 --> 0:21:02.280
<v Speaker 2>Yes, it is right, but.

0:21:02.200 --> 0:21:04.200
<v Speaker 1>That's gonna have to be the subject for a future

0:21:04.240 --> 0:21:07.840
<v Speaker 1>podcast because today we were just focusing on meta alphabet,

0:21:07.960 --> 0:21:09.200
<v Speaker 1>Amazon and Apple.

0:21:09.680 --> 0:21:12.400
<v Speaker 2>All right, Jen, Never a dull moment in antitrust, I think,

0:21:12.560 --> 0:21:14.960
<v Speaker 2>especially as it relates to big tech these days. But

0:21:15.359 --> 0:21:17.920
<v Speaker 2>thanks so much for your quick overview of the anti

0:21:17.960 --> 0:21:21.199
<v Speaker 2>trust cases pending against the four big tech platforms in

0:21:21.200 --> 0:21:23.680
<v Speaker 2>the US and where they stand. And with that that's

0:21:23.720 --> 0:21:26.720
<v Speaker 2>today's briefs. For Jen's full reports on the topic and

0:21:26.800 --> 0:21:29.600
<v Speaker 2>all of our research, please visit BI laws on the

0:21:29.640 --> 0:21:32.919
<v Speaker 2>Bloomberg terminal and of course, most importantly thanks to you

0:21:33.160 --> 0:21:36.240
<v Speaker 2>the listener for tuning in. This was Votes and Verdicts.