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Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray.

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Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology with

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff works dot Com. Join Josh

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Speaker 1: how stuff Works dot Com, available now exclusively on iTunes. Hi, There, everybody,

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Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Polette.

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Speaker 1: I'm an editor here at how stuff works dot com

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Speaker 1: and as usual I have sitting next to me senior

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Speaker 1: writer Jonathan Strickland. How all right? How do you? And

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Speaker 1: today we thought we'd try something brand new. You know,

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Speaker 1: we've done a couple of different sort of theme podcasts

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Speaker 1: in the past, and this time it's yeah, okay, a couple. Well,

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Speaker 1: we've done a couple of you know, Christmas, we've done

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Speaker 1: the New Years, We've done focus on the innovators. This

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Speaker 1: time we're doing a listener mail round up. Yes, let's

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Speaker 1: get along, little dogies. So this first listener mail comes

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Speaker 1: from John from Medford, New York. Guys can you tell

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Speaker 1: me if there is an easy way to track the

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Speaker 1: GPS in someone's phone. I've seen all sorts of services

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Speaker 1: and expensive equipment out there, but there must be some

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Speaker 1: inexpensive or easy way to it. I think he means

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Speaker 1: to do it. Yeah. UM, listen here, John, We've learned

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Speaker 1: the hard way about this topic. UM. So GPS receivers.

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Speaker 1: The key word in that is receivers. A receiver receives signals.

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Speaker 1: It does not transmit signals. So if you're in a

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Speaker 1: with a phone is a little different. But let's say

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Speaker 1: you just have a regular GPS receiver. That receiver is

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Speaker 1: not indsmitting any data to any other device or service. Um.

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Speaker 1: What it's doing is it's acting like essentially in antenna

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Speaker 1: and and and there's a computer in there that analyzes

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Speaker 1: the data, which then tells you where you are. But

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Speaker 1: it's just receiving signals that are being sent out by

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Speaker 1: GPS satellites. And these things are just sending They're just

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Speaker 1: bombarding the Earth with signals, radio signals. That's it. Um.

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Speaker 1: It's like any other radio tower. It's not directed specifically

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Speaker 1: at any individual. It's just hitting a specific area of

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Speaker 1: the world. Yes, and that's how that's how the receiver

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Speaker 1: tells it goes you know, hey, I seem to be

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Speaker 1: this far from satellite an't seen to be that far

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Speaker 1: from satellite B. I should be right about here exactly,

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Speaker 1: although usually it's also there's a satellite see but simplifying

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Speaker 1: sites so um so yeah, but yeah, what it's doing

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Speaker 1: is it's taking these signals and it's comparing the time

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Speaker 1: stamps and by telling how how long it takes the

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Speaker 1: signal to get to the receiver. That's that's how it

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Speaker 1: kind of figures out where on Earth you must be,

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Speaker 1: because it's like there's only one spot on Earth where

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Speaker 1: this would happen, so you have to be here. So

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Speaker 1: I'm guessing that John wants to find Carmen san Diego. Yes,

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Speaker 1: if Carmen san Diego has a GPS receiver and no

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Speaker 1: other device on her, you're just gonna have to follow

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Speaker 1: those clues like the rest of us. Um my guess

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Speaker 1: is she's probably stealing Beethoven. But uh, oh my gosh,

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Speaker 1: I can't believe I can't even remember anything about Carmen

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Speaker 1: san Diego. You know, I just do it out there

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Speaker 1: is a one time or all I have to say

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Speaker 1: is rock on rockapella. So anyway, the so so just

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Speaker 1: you know, the current copyright holders are going to be

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Speaker 1: all over this. No no, that's always said was rockafella.

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Speaker 1: We didn't sing the song. We're fine. So yeah. The

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Speaker 1: thing is, I'm not quite sure why you want to

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Speaker 1: track somebody else's GPS and I'm not gonna ask, right,

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Speaker 1: that's tricky. Let's play. Let's play the game. Let's assume

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Speaker 1: that whomever it is you wish to try wants you

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Speaker 1: to be able to find him or her, because that

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Speaker 1: is a lot easier to talk about than you have

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Speaker 1: an interest in a particular person and you want to

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Speaker 1: be able to follow them and they not know about it,

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Speaker 1: because that's kind of creepy. So John, we figure you're

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Speaker 1: a stand up guy. Uh And so let's say that

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Speaker 1: you know, you and your buddy you want to you

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Speaker 1: want a way to be able to tell where where

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Speaker 1: people are so that you know, you can, like how

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Speaker 1: I see that he's in the mall too, I can

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Speaker 1: go by and just say, hey, uh well, the GPS

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Speaker 1: receiver by itself is not going to do that. However,

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Speaker 1: there are devices that use other methods of distributing information

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Speaker 1: that can help you, For instance, there are smartphones that

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Speaker 1: have a GPS receiver, and of course a smartphone also

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Speaker 1: is a phone, I mean, otherwise it's not a phone, right,

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Speaker 1: So that makes sense. Right. So, in the way the

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Speaker 1: smartphone can send out signals via either cellular or maybe

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Speaker 1: even radio signals like WiFi. UM, that could send data

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Speaker 1: about your location to other people. And there are plenty

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Speaker 1: of services that do use this kind of method. Oh yeah,

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Speaker 1: they'll they will absolutely do that and do it for free,

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Speaker 1: you know, if you're if you're willing to spend the

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Speaker 1: battery it takes in order for it to constantly update

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Speaker 1: your location through your cellular provider. Um. You can install

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Speaker 1: one of many many applications to your smartphone that will

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Speaker 1: allow you to do this, and and some of them

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Speaker 1: don't even use the GPS receivers. Some of them just

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Speaker 1: tulate triangulate through the cell towers. Right now, that's not

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Speaker 1: as accurate your Wi Fi networks networks, which is even

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Speaker 1: less accurate, right, so you can kind of in those cases,

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Speaker 1: you'll just get sort of a general location. UM, you

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Speaker 1: won't be able to pinpoint someone's location, so you can't

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Speaker 1: send the murder bots to you know, the corner of

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Speaker 1: fifth and Maine. You're gonna be like, um, search this

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Speaker 1: three block area and then find my victim. Hold off Ninja's.

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Speaker 1: I can't send in just yet, Right, you should just

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Speaker 1: send the pirates anyway, because they'll maraud through the entire

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Speaker 1: town there. You know, Ninja's are very precise and Uh, anyway,

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Speaker 1: we're getting off topic. So the if you have a

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Speaker 1: phone that uses the sort of uh, the sort of applications,

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Speaker 1: then you can keep track of someone if that person

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Speaker 1: has installed those applications on his or her phone and

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Speaker 1: usually designates you as someone who can look at that information. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: some of them, some of them broadcast the information to

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Speaker 1: the general public, but others are more like there's a network,

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Speaker 1: like a kind of a network of friends like you

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Speaker 1: would have on Twitter, where just people within that network

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Speaker 1: can see where you are at any given time. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean there are there are other devices too. There

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Speaker 1: aren't phones like the Spark Nano from Lightning gps UM.

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Speaker 1: It's a little gadget. It's about size of nine volt battery. Um.

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Speaker 1: It cost two and forty five dollars a month for

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Speaker 1: the service, which is probably the expensive thing you were

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Speaker 1: talking about. Uh, And this this actually got a lot

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Speaker 1: of press. I saw lots and lots of articles about

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Speaker 1: this one. Must have good pr folks anyway, UM, basically,

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Speaker 1: what it does is it, you know, lets you track somebody.

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Speaker 1: You sign up for it and it sends information back

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Speaker 1: to the service and says, hey, this person is at

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Speaker 1: this location. UM. One application you could use this for

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Speaker 1: is say you had a student latchkey kid. Uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: your son or daughter, and you wanted to know are

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Speaker 1: they gonna be okay? You know, are they going to

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Speaker 1: make it home because they're walking home, They're gonna let

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Speaker 1: themselves in when they get there. Well, it actually will

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Speaker 1: tell you if they hit the safe zone. So you

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Speaker 1: can designate this location, this GPS location as a safety zone. UM,

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Speaker 1: and it will Basically you can go on the website

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Speaker 1: and go, oh yeah, Chester made at home, Fine, everything's

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Speaker 1: all right. There is a panic button too. If something happens,

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Speaker 1: it can summon help. So I mean that's the exact

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Speaker 1: kind of thing that it could be used. But um,

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Speaker 1: similar devices have been used by law enforcement authorities. Sure,

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Speaker 1: and uh, you know they could be attached to a

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Speaker 1: car there even UM, there are other applications to athletes

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Speaker 1: use them and their coaches can tell how fast they're

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Speaker 1: going because it's using GPS information to see, well, they

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Speaker 1: made it this far in this amount of time. Um.

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Speaker 1: There's all kinds of stuff that this is being used for. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And you know there are questions when the police use

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Speaker 1: it over whether or not it's a violation of privacy

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Speaker 1: and things like that. As a matter of fact, there's

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Speaker 1: a case right here in Georgia where they're considering passing

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Speaker 1: a law that would make it a violation privacy for

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Speaker 1: anybody other than like the owner of a vehicle or

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Speaker 1: you know, the police to track a GPS like that.

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Speaker 1: What would Sting want with all that information? Oh, the

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Speaker 1: municipal police, the cops, you know, those people that they

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Speaker 1: have the show on TV about don't stand so close

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Speaker 1: to me. Um. But one of the for example, one

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Speaker 1: of the applications we talked about earlier that a good

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Speaker 1: example would be the Google My Location which I have

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Speaker 1: on my HTC G one Google Android phone. And yeah,

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Speaker 1: that one triangulates through cell towers and people can see

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Speaker 1: if they're added to your network, they can see where

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Speaker 1: you are. I don't have anyone added to my network,

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Speaker 1: so I only see me. And it's kind of sad,

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Speaker 1: but I know where I am, which, by the way,

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Speaker 1: came in handy when I was walking around other cities.

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Speaker 1: Yeah yeah, but things like bright kite, Yeah, who's fire Eagle,

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Speaker 1: there's They are all kinds of services out there. Oh yeah, yeah. Well,

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Speaker 1: the thing is you can use these for, uh, for

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Speaker 1: all kinds of great social networking applications if you really

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Speaker 1: want to. I mean, you can open up your location

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Speaker 1: to the general public and people will find you and go, hey,

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Speaker 1: I'm down the street you want to meet up for

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Speaker 1: a drink, And if you're willing to meet a complete

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Speaker 1: stranger who randomly said, hey, I found you through your

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Speaker 1: GPS location and I know where exactly where you are,

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Speaker 1: and then of course there's a fine. There was a

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Speaker 1: boost mobile you had the where You're where you at campaign,

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Speaker 1: But yeah, that was the same sort of thing and

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Speaker 1: has triangulated and sent that information to people within your

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Speaker 1: network so that that way they would know where you

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Speaker 1: were at any given time. UM. I don't know that

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Speaker 1: I would necessarily add people to mind network. I don't

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Speaker 1: know that I want people to know where I am

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Speaker 1: all the time. Uh, I'm pretty sure they don't want

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Speaker 1: to know where I am all the time, So I

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Speaker 1: don't see why they would add me, to be perfectly honest,

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Speaker 1: unless they just wanted to have fair warning before I

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Speaker 1: shoved up like belling the cat. That that I totally understand,

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Speaker 1: But I hope that answers your question. Really, what it

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Speaker 1: comes down to is, if the person wants to share

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Speaker 1: that information, it's easy. If the person does not want

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Speaker 1: to share that information, it probably shouldn't be looking into it.

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Speaker 1: And it's not easy, and it's probably not going to

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Speaker 1: be legal, especially if this uh, this new law sets

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Speaker 1: a precedent if it gets passed, and should say, because

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Speaker 1: it is still not passed. Um, And I'm not quite

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Speaker 1: sure how you would steal a signal. I mean, what

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Speaker 1: we're talking about there is the law enforcement authorities or

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Speaker 1: private investigators or whomever clipping a GPS device to you.

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Speaker 1: So I mean that's one thing. Stealing somebody else's signal.

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Speaker 1: I'm not you'd have to command near the frequency. It

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Speaker 1: would only make sense if you're talking about like like

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Speaker 1: the parent of a child and you enable this feature

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Speaker 1: on a phone and the child is unable to disable

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Speaker 1: the feature. That would make sense. You know that's true,

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Speaker 1: all right? Well, then, uh, I guess that will move

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Speaker 1: us on to our second email. Okay, I'm not gonna

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Speaker 1: do the warning signal this time, all right? So this

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Speaker 1: comes from Ben m Hey, guys, love your podcast and

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Speaker 1: all the things I learned on my daily walks. I

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Speaker 1: was coming home from work the other day and thought

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Speaker 1: of an issue that I thought might make a cool

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Speaker 1: podcast for you. A lot of credit cards these days

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Speaker 1: have a little square gold chip on the front of

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Speaker 1: the card. What is that for and what what does

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Speaker 1: it do that a regular credit card doesn't? As well

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Speaker 1: as a couple of years back, there was talk about

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Speaker 1: innovations to credit cards and debit cards for that matter,

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Speaker 1: that stores may soon be able to scan your card

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Speaker 1: and your purchases barcodes as you leave the store and

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Speaker 1: debit the amount off your card without you having to

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Speaker 1: go through a checkout at all. Does any of this

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Speaker 1: ring a bell with something that you two have heard

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Speaker 1: of or does it make no sense at all? If

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Speaker 1: you could find anything or know anything, I would love

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Speaker 1: to hear it in a future podcast. Thanks guys. Ben.

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Speaker 1: Well Ben, if you're in Europe, you've been using this

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Speaker 1: for a while, so I'm guessing you are one of

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Speaker 1: our fellow Americans, because over in Europe and other parts

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Speaker 1: of the world, the this is not an unusual thing

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Speaker 1: at all. In fact, it's pretty much common practice, almost

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Speaker 1: to the point now where it can be problematic for

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Speaker 1: an American traveling overseas to purchase things using an old

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Speaker 1: fashioned credit card. UM. And this this comes down to

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Speaker 1: four letters. Uh. Those would be r F I, N

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Speaker 1: D radio frequency identification and Uh. Basically, the chip that

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Speaker 1: you're talking about is UM is a little piece of

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Speaker 1: transistor material that circuits, yes, and in grace circuit that

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Speaker 1: carries material. And they can be made of a lot

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Speaker 1: of different things. They can actually have a little computer

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Speaker 1: on board, although those are you know, kind of expensive

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Speaker 1: and and they're usually found in things other than credit

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Speaker 1: and debit cards. We should go ahead and first say

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Speaker 1: that these smart chips is kind of the common term

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Speaker 1: for them. But these smart chips can be found in

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Speaker 1: all sorts of different cards, not just credit cards or

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Speaker 1: debit cards. UM. For example, Palette and I both use

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Speaker 1: one on a daily basis just to get to work

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Speaker 1: because we take the public transportation system here in Atlanta

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Speaker 1: called Marta, and they rely on something called a breeze card,

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Speaker 1: and the Breeze card has the this sort of smart

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Speaker 1: chip technology in it, and that's what allows you to

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Speaker 1: go through the low turnstiles and it Uh the ones

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Speaker 1: that we have keep track of what date they were activated,

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Speaker 1: and then uh others might keep track of how many

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Speaker 1: trips are on the card. But that's the same sort

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Speaker 1: of thing. It's this this technology. You put it to

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Speaker 1: a scanner, the scanner identifies the card, it knows whether

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Speaker 1: or not the card is valid, and then it activates

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Speaker 1: or doesn't at debate the turnstyle. And the Reefs card

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Speaker 1: is made of paper. So if you are in Atlanta

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Speaker 1: or if you have a transportation authority that uses a

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Speaker 1: similar card, you can hold it up to the light

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Speaker 1: and you'll see the wiring inside of it. It's kind

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Speaker 1: of it's kind of funny. Um, but that sort of

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Speaker 1: isn't exactly what you were talking about. I did think

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Speaker 1: of another application that we use every day. Both of

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Speaker 1: us use a g S M cell phone. Oh, yes,

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Speaker 1: that's true, and uh those come with little itty bitty

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Speaker 1: smart cards. If you have a cell phone from a

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Speaker 1: GSM provider, uh such as T Mobile or a T

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Speaker 1: n T, you'll see they came with a big credit

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Speaker 1: card sized thing, and generally they break out this itty

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Speaker 1: bitty smart chip and they stick at your phone, and

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Speaker 1: that chip is what allows the phone to communicate with

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Speaker 1: a network. So you might think, okay, well, if I

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Speaker 1: can get a credit card that has this chip in

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Speaker 1: it and you can just sort of, you know, wave

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Speaker 1: it in front of a scanner, um and then purchase something,

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Speaker 1: how safe is that? Well, if that were all there

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Speaker 1: were to it, that's not safe at all, because there

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Speaker 1: are actually devices out there that can record the signature

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Speaker 1: of and of one of these smart chips and sort

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Speaker 1: of create a copy of it. It's called spoofing. UM.

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Speaker 1: And if that were all there were to it, where

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Speaker 1: you just had to spoof the signature of this card,

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Speaker 1: that would be a nightmare, uh, because it would mean

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Speaker 1: that someone could easily steal someone's credit card number essentially

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Speaker 1: and go on a shopping spree. H. Fortunately, most of

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Speaker 1: the credit and debit cards that use this technology over

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Speaker 1: in Europe also require the user to enter a pen number.

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Speaker 1: So it's the chip and pen system or pin and chip.

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Speaker 1: I think, and uh, you know, the card says okay,

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Speaker 1: this is this is what lets me buy stuff. The

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Speaker 1: pin number verifies it and then you can purchase whatever.

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Speaker 1: So that way, if someone just were to accidentally leave

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Speaker 1: their card behind and I don't know a restaurant that

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Speaker 1: they frequent way too often, like me, UM, you wouldn't

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Speaker 1: have to worry about someone just picking it up and

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Speaker 1: then going out and buying tons and tons of stuff

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Speaker 1: because they also need your pin number before they could

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Speaker 1: do it. So it's actually fairly secure. It's not you know.

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Speaker 1: When I first heard about it, I was like, what

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Speaker 1: keeps anyone from just copying the signal and just going

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Speaker 1: crazy and you know, running up and down Oxford Street

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Speaker 1: buying everything they can. I mean, that's that's the thing.

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Speaker 1: It's it's ultra convenient to uh, to imagine, and and

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Speaker 1: there are some places in the United States that do that.

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Speaker 1: I can think of a couple of gas companies where

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Speaker 1: you can buy gas using their proprietary smart chip UM.

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Speaker 1: And there are some fast food companies I could think

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Speaker 1: of too that that read the cards UM, JP, Morgan

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Speaker 1: Chase in American Express have had smart chips in their

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Speaker 1: cards for years. As a matter of fact, the Blue Card,

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Speaker 1: I remember the ads saying that that chip protects you

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Speaker 1: when you go online. I was going, yeah, but that's

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Speaker 1: an notified chip. I'm not sure how that protects you

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Speaker 1: when you're plugging the numbers in and your um and

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Speaker 1: somebody writes and ask I'll have to find out. But

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Speaker 1: in the meantime, UM, we're just gonna skip right over. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: we're gonna skip right over it because I don't get it. Uh.

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Speaker 1: The other thing to keep in mind, um, okay, so

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Speaker 1: that's ultraconvenient, and it can be very secure if you

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Speaker 1: combine it with something like a pin. But okay, so

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Speaker 1: what you're talking about, the shopping thing, you've got to

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Speaker 1: plug in. In order for that system to work. You

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Speaker 1: have to plug in an r f I D chip

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Speaker 1: on every single product, and that can be expensive. Well,

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Speaker 1: not only that, but you also have to create, you know,

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Speaker 1: build in our f I D readers, scanners and all

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Speaker 1: of those businesses. That's the main reason why we haven't

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Speaker 1: seen this in a wide range rollout in the United States.

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Speaker 1: It's because it would be really expensive to replace all

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Speaker 1: that equipment, and and that's what's holding people back. That's

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Speaker 1: what's holding back. You know, the banks and financial institutions

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Speaker 1: are are really slow to adopt this technology just because

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Speaker 1: it's a huge headache to try and convert everything over um.

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Speaker 1: That also means it's a huge headache for anyone traveling

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Speaker 1: overseas because we're using the old magnetic strip on our

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Speaker 1: credit cards and debit cards, and a lot of the

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Speaker 1: places in Europe have switched over so that it only

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Speaker 1: reads the smart ship. That you put the card in

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Speaker 1: a reader and it it detects the smart ship and

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Speaker 1: then prints out your receipt. Um. Well, if you don't

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Speaker 1: have a smart chip, it can't do that. And some

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Speaker 1: of them don't have the magnetic readers anymore for the strip,

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Speaker 1: so you have to see if they have one of

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Speaker 1: those old credit card carbon copy machines in the back.

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Speaker 1: But uh, I mean it's that's a that's a problem,

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Speaker 1: and hopefully the United States will eventually switch over to

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Speaker 1: the smart chip technology to at least make it easier

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Speaker 1: for global travelers like you know yours truly, I like

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Speaker 1: to I like to jet set. Well, you know, if

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Speaker 1: you do like to jet set your your passport if

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Speaker 1: you get a new passport, the United States does have

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Speaker 1: a smart ship in that passport, which also freaks people

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Speaker 1: out because they have to deal with the idea that

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Speaker 1: somebody might be able to scan their identity just by

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Speaker 1: walking nearby with an antenna. And there are there are

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Speaker 1: a lot of other people who I mean, they're they're

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Speaker 1: extremes that you can take this to. Like some people

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Speaker 1: have actually gone to the trouble to have their r

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Speaker 1: f I d uh chips implanted in their bodies. Um.

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Speaker 1: I read an article about a guy who actually keyed

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Speaker 1: his motorcycle with an r f I D chip, So

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Speaker 1: all he had to do was put his hand on

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Speaker 1: it and it would it would function as the key.

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Speaker 1: He can repress the starter and it would read the

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Speaker 1: r f I D chip in his hand and know

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Speaker 1: it was him and start the engine. I just wanted

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Speaker 1: that story to end with. And then the motorcycle was

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Speaker 1: stolen and we now call the guy lefty. No, I

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Speaker 1: wasn't going to go there. There are also people who

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Speaker 1: see biblical interpretations of this and say this is the

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Speaker 1: you know, mark of the beast you can't do the

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Speaker 1: business with. Regardless of whether you believe it or not.

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Speaker 1: It's kind of interesting to think about because you went, well, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean if they did away with other uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: with other means of paying for stuff, and I had

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Speaker 1: to have the number implanted in me. Wow, that's kind

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Speaker 1: of creepy, you know that that you could see that

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Speaker 1: the how people would make that connection. I don't necessarily

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Speaker 1: believe that that, you know, is the case, but I

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Speaker 1: think it's you know, it makes sense that someone would

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Speaker 1: make that connection, sure, is what I said. I So

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Speaker 1: there are people, there are people who are you know,

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Speaker 1: seeing this in all sorts of different in all sorts

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Speaker 1: of different ways, and people who are making wallets that

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Speaker 1: are you know, basically restricting the signal from being transmitted

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Speaker 1: outside your your wallets so that if someone bumps you

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Speaker 1: with an R F I D reader that they can't

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Speaker 1: steal that information off the chip. And I have heard

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Speaker 1: that it is actually harder to spoof the information off

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Speaker 1: of the smart chip than it is the magnetic um

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Speaker 1: essentially magnetic tape, the magnetic strip that we have on

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Speaker 1: our cards right now. So theoretically it's that would be good. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: theoretically it's easier to actually copy the technology we're using

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Speaker 1: now than it is to copy the smart chips. You

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Speaker 1: just have to have the right equipment to and we've

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Speaker 1: we've seen this happen. We've seen you know, uh, rings

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Speaker 1: of credit card thieves who had installed software on various

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Speaker 1: UM scanners in different stores, and they were collecting credit

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Speaker 1: card numbers and debit card numbers and pen numbers as well.

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Speaker 1: And UM, so, I mean it sounds at first when

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Speaker 1: you start talking about wireless you always think, oh, well,

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Speaker 1: that's automatically less secure than, uh, than any other like

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Speaker 1: a hard copy method or whatever, something that's not necessarily wireless. Uh.

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Speaker 1: In this case, UM, I think we can say that

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Speaker 1: the smartship technology is at least as secure, or if

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Speaker 1: you prefer, as insecure as the dominant technology in the

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Speaker 1: United States. Yes, you tse it. It It will completely fall

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Speaker 1: to pieces because it's insecure. It took me a second.

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Speaker 1: That was like a little joke grenade. I hope I

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Speaker 1: jumped on that for the rest of you. Um, I'm done. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I don't. I don't really have anything else to add

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Speaker 1: to it, and I don't have any more emails to

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Speaker 1: go through for this for this episode. Okay, So we

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Speaker 1: hope to do more of these in the future. We

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Speaker 1: very much like to um respond to readers. So if

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Speaker 1: you have a question, if it's a short one, that's okay,

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Speaker 1: we can group them together like we have here. If

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Speaker 1: it's all longer answer them. We'll we'll tackle that as well.

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Speaker 1: You could write us at tech stuff at how stuff

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00:22:21,280 --> 00:22:24,520
Speaker 1: works dot com. And remember we have blogs up. You

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00:22:24,560 --> 00:22:28,359
Speaker 1: can follow our blogging exploits. Chris and I blog once

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Speaker 1: per day, and uh, we have lots of interesting things

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Speaker 1: to say there that we don't necessarily cover in the podcast,

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Speaker 1: so check those out too. You can go to house

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Speaker 1: stuff works dot com look in the right hand side.

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Speaker 1: You'll see the links there. And of course, if you

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Speaker 1: want to read more about r F I D technology

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Speaker 1: and other things like credit card technology, we have articles

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Speaker 1: up on the site that that how stuff works dot

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Speaker 1: com and we will talk to you again really soon.

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Speaker 1: For more on this and thousands of other topics, visit

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Speaker 1: how staff works dot com and be sure to check

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Speaker 1: out the new tech stuff blog now on the house

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Speaker 1: stufforks homepage. Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand

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Speaker 1: twelve camera. It's ready, are you