WEBVTT - Is your employer spying on you?

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to you stuff you should know from house Stuff

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<v Speaker 1>Works dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast Don't

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<v Speaker 1>Josh Clark with Charles W. Chuck Bryant and Jerry. How

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<v Speaker 1>do Jerry? How's he going? I wish I wish we

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<v Speaker 1>didn't have to pay money for playing music because I

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<v Speaker 1>really wanted Maxwell's and I always feel like somebody's watching

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<v Speaker 1>me to be or leading. You don't have to pay

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<v Speaker 1>for your own rendition coming in at any time. No

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<v Speaker 1>great song though, Yeah, And it turns out he's right,

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<v Speaker 1>someone is watching. Well, he was cooked to the gills,

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<v Speaker 1>which was his thing, was he did you not see

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<v Speaker 1>the video? No? Oh man, he's like looking out the

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<v Speaker 1>blinds and everything, dancing his living room. Yeah, he was

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<v Speaker 1>cooked up. How was a kid? I didn't understand that that.

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<v Speaker 1>I didn't either. Um, he was right though, that's the

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<v Speaker 1>point cocaine or know. He was correct? Yeah, especially nowadays,

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<v Speaker 1>like you don't need drugs to be paranoid. You can

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<v Speaker 1>just like be paranoid and be totally correct. Uh yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, especially if you're gainfully employed. Yes, that is

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<v Speaker 1>true because what I found out from this article, Chuck,

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<v Speaker 1>is that if it's not the n S a eavesdropping

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<v Speaker 1>on you or surveiling you. It's your employer. Yeah. And

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<v Speaker 1>not only that, but you have implicitly agreed to be

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<v Speaker 1>spied on, because it is no doubt somewhere in your

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<v Speaker 1>work contract or your work agreement that they can do

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<v Speaker 1>exactly that that would be explicitly agreed. You're just probably

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<v Speaker 1>duped into it. What say, yeah, explicit Yeah, but I

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<v Speaker 1>mean if you don't know that you agreed to it, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>because who reads that stuff? I know? It is the thing, like,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a there's a growing trend among employers to basically

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<v Speaker 1>slide some claws into your employee handbook that you have

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<v Speaker 1>to sign, uh, your employment agreement applications sometimes have them

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<v Speaker 1>now where it basically says I consent to being surveilled

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<v Speaker 1>electronically in you know, X number of forms or any

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<v Speaker 1>form you guys can come up with. And like you said,

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<v Speaker 1>people don't read that and they're not aware of it.

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<v Speaker 1>And the other devious part of the whole thing about

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<v Speaker 1>employee surveillance is that they don't buy law. I have

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<v Speaker 1>to tell you that you're being surveilled. Right. There's two states,

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<v Speaker 1>Connecticut and Delaware that require employers say, hey, we're watching you,

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<v Speaker 1>and Delaware barely even counts. I love Delaware. I was kidding. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's the screen door capital, isn't it according to the Simpsons.

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<v Speaker 1>I think, so we're going to Delaware. I've done some

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<v Speaker 1>camping at the Delaware Water Gap. It's nice. Nice. Actually,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't even think that's in Delaware though, is it not?

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<v Speaker 1>To look that up? It might be in New Jersey.

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<v Speaker 1>It's in the Aegean. That's funny. So I guess we

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<v Speaker 1>kind of answered the question that this this Um episode asked,

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<v Speaker 1>was is your employer spying on you? And the answer

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<v Speaker 1>is almost decidedly yes. So we found from our research

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<v Speaker 1>that stats are really old. It seems like there was

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<v Speaker 1>a flurry of research and discussion in like the early

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<v Speaker 1>to mid to late nineties when the Internet was new,

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<v Speaker 1>and then it just died off because apparently employers won.

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<v Speaker 1>Like there was there were ethical questions, there were legal

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<v Speaker 1>questions like can this happen? And uh, everybody said yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>Well the court said yeah totally. And if they're in

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<v Speaker 1>your office and they're working on your computers, and yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you sure have the right. I do have some stats

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<v Speaker 1>from and this is the most recent thing I could

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<v Speaker 1>find is about three and a half years ago, which

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<v Speaker 1>is brand new, Yeah, compared to other stuff. Yeah, a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of these things are citing like surveys done in

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand and two thousand one. That's a different world

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<v Speaker 1>back then. I mean even current articles are using that

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<v Speaker 1>like there's just no data out there, no shame. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>here's some stuff from a few years ago. UM percent

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<v Speaker 1>of employers have fired UH workers for email misuse at

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<v Speaker 1>this point, for UM sixty of those were violating company policies,

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<v Speaker 1>were inappropriate language. There must be some overlap because they're

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<v Speaker 1>already over UM excessive personally used confidentiality breaching. Uhtent of

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<v Speaker 1>employers have fired people for Internet misuse, not email, but internet,

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<v Speaker 1>and that means surfing inappropriate content was of that, like

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<v Speaker 1>you know, you're looking at porn at work, get fired

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<v Speaker 1>for that. UM And then nowadays with social networking, UM

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<v Speaker 1>they six sixty six percent they estimate or monitoring Internet

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<v Speaker 1>connections to see what websites your browsing on a day

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<v Speaker 1>to day basis. I think there's ridiculously low. There's no

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<v Speaker 1>way that that's it. Well, I mean just because and

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<v Speaker 1>then in the article points out just because they are

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<v Speaker 1>set up to do so doesn't mean they are um

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<v Speaker 1>like generally, the one guy in the article says they

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<v Speaker 1>would be doing nothing but looking at activity if they

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<v Speaker 1>were really spying on everyone all the time. They say, generally,

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<v Speaker 1>it's if there's a problem with an employee or something

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<v Speaker 1>and someone is flagged that they will probably start paying attention.

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<v Speaker 1>But you know, this is all opinion. No one knows, right,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, employees aren't being too terribly forthcoming. Our job

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<v Speaker 1>is different though, because we with our research, we can

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<v Speaker 1>be looking at virtually anything. You know, this stuff we've

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<v Speaker 1>looked at online here. I can't tell you how many

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<v Speaker 1>lists we must be on just from the research we've

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<v Speaker 1>like the marijuana one alone. Yeah, it was like these

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<v Speaker 1>guys do nothing. The research like human trafficking and and

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<v Speaker 1>hookers and marijuana and bombmaking. Yeah, it's it's it's crazy

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<v Speaker 1>and and we can We're all over social media, so

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<v Speaker 1>that's part of our job. So yeah, no, I know,

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<v Speaker 1>it's kind of It was different to see like the

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<v Speaker 1>other side of it. But at the same time, I

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<v Speaker 1>was like, wow, I really feel bad for like, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the average employee. If you go on to Twitter, no

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<v Speaker 1>I have If you go onto Twitter or something for

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<v Speaker 1>a minute or two, like you can get fired. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's weird. My my chicken software job that I have

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<v Speaker 1>before this one, the famous chicken software job. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>nothing on the internet is applicable to what you do.

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<v Speaker 1>So if the boss walks by and you're just checking

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<v Speaker 1>the Brave score from ESPN and you feel like you

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<v Speaker 1>have to hide it real quick, sure where now, I'm like,

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<v Speaker 1>come on, you know you check a score, No big deal.

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<v Speaker 1>And some employers don't care. I saw this one UM

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<v Speaker 1>article from UH. It was some sort of a Christian

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<v Speaker 1>organization that ended up firing employees, and he said, I

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<v Speaker 1>didn't care if they were on Facebook and doing that

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<v Speaker 1>other stuff, but when they started to talk some about

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<v Speaker 1>the company is when they got riled up and fired people. Supposedly,

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<v Speaker 1>there's UM that's what employers are looking for, is there.

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<v Speaker 1>They're looking for employees that are, like you said, talking

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<v Speaker 1>smack about the company, divulging company's secrets, ye leaking information.

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<v Speaker 1>That's probably the biggest one they're looking for. And then

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<v Speaker 1>um like grossly misusing time yea, or or like sexually

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<v Speaker 1>harassing or something that's that one makes total sense sending

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<v Speaker 1>inappropriate jokes around here, like the guy in the office

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<v Speaker 1>ending like overt inappropriate emails all around the office. Then yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>they're gonna they're gonna tag you. Right, So they aren't

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<v Speaker 1>necessarily watching you at all times, but the system is

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<v Speaker 1>most likely set up to where they can to where

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<v Speaker 1>if you do something that is that tricks triggers a

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<v Speaker 1>filter or something that somebody's going to get an email,

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<v Speaker 1>they're going to examine it and it's going to get

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<v Speaker 1>sent to HR if it fits the criteria. Right, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>pretty much, UM, But like you said, they could, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>they're most companies are set up now with what they

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<v Speaker 1>call continuous since systematic surveillance. UM. So if they wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to be bored out of their mind, they most companies

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<v Speaker 1>could literally look at everything you're doing at all times.

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<v Speaker 1>For this system had been for that having to watch

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<v Speaker 1>all that exactly. So we said that, UM, employers don't

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<v Speaker 1>have to tell you that they're surveilling you. As a

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<v Speaker 1>matter of fact, legally speaking, they can lie and tell

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<v Speaker 1>you that they're not surveilling you, and then if you

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<v Speaker 1>bust them and take them to court, you will lose

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<v Speaker 1>as far back as an employee for Pillsbury, you know, right, um. He.

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<v Speaker 1>I guess he didn't really like his job that much.

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<v Speaker 1>He was known for talking smack and in two different

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<v Speaker 1>emails um which he assured were confidential, weren't used for

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<v Speaker 1>disciplinary action and just were his own. Um, he said

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<v Speaker 1>that they should kill the backstabbing bastards about one group

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<v Speaker 1>of people, and he referred to the company Christmas party

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<v Speaker 1>as the Jim Jones kool Aid affair. And he got

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<v Speaker 1>fired for every company Christmas party, right, He got fired

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<v Speaker 1>for that, but he took Pillsbury court. Was like, they

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<v Speaker 1>said that they weren't paying attention to these emails and

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<v Speaker 1>that they wouldn't use them against me, And the court said,

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<v Speaker 1>so what man, It's like you said, the court has

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<v Speaker 1>decided that if you were using their device, or you're

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<v Speaker 1>using their network on their time that's even off of

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<v Speaker 1>their time, especially on their time, then they have a

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<v Speaker 1>right to protect their business by monitoring what's going on

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<v Speaker 1>with their business devices, on their business network with their employees. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>I think within reasons, some of that does make sense.

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<v Speaker 1>You don't want your employees divulging secrets or sending lured

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<v Speaker 1>emails around to everyone and all the all of a sudden,

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<v Speaker 1>you're slapt with the lawsuit um, which I think is

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<v Speaker 1>what it ultimately boils. And so some of this is understandable,

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<v Speaker 1>I get it. The thing is, though, is it's so

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<v Speaker 1>slippery of it's already just so draconian. Then it's there's

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<v Speaker 1>it's just completely lopsided, like how do you surveil your

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<v Speaker 1>own employer? How do you do that? Like shouldn't it

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<v Speaker 1>be shouldn't it be more balanced than that? I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>the whole thing just let me get on my soapbox

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<v Speaker 1>and we'll get down a breast text. But the whole

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<v Speaker 1>thing stinks of you just being indebted to your employer

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<v Speaker 1>for giving you a job, Like it just kind of

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<v Speaker 1>has that whole mentality attached to it, like your employer

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<v Speaker 1>can do whatever you want. If you don't like it,

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<v Speaker 1>you can go hit the breadline, Rusky. You know, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm done. No, I'm with you, man. That's it's definitely like,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, as an employee, to feel like someone has

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<v Speaker 1>their foot on your throat. There's fifty people in Anglory

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<v Speaker 1>who would kill for your job right now, we could

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<v Speaker 1>get them over here, right you know, it just makes

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<v Speaker 1>me sad. It is sad. That is the state of things. Uh, So,

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<v Speaker 1>I guess we should talk a little bit about how

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<v Speaker 1>how they're spying on you. And there are many ways, um,

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<v Speaker 1>but there five pretty likely ones that you probably have

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<v Speaker 1>in your office, um, and we'll go through them in

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<v Speaker 1>more detail. But I had a sixth that added, well

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<v Speaker 1>we'll hear in a minute, Okay, packet sniffers, log files,

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<v Speaker 1>desktop monitoring programs, phones, and close circuit cameras. And I'm

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<v Speaker 1>gonna go ahead and say phones as a two parter

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<v Speaker 1>because the company issues cell phones, um as well, So

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<v Speaker 1>what's your what's your other one? GPS. GPS was kept

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<v Speaker 1>out of this because that was one of the original

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<v Speaker 1>means of surveillance in the workplace, Yeah, with the little

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<v Speaker 1>trackers that they put on like delivery trucks or whatever

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<v Speaker 1>to make sure they're doing what they're supposed to do.

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<v Speaker 1>But now it's been extended to things like employees cell phones.

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<v Speaker 1>About three percent of companies track their employees using GPS

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<v Speaker 1>by tracking their cell phone, and then one percent track

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<v Speaker 1>their employees by tracking um they're like there keyless entry cards, man. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>well one percent. Thankfully that's like, I mean, what company

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<v Speaker 1>is that, I don't know, but it's probably a pretty

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<v Speaker 1>pedantic company. That's not an enjoyable company. I would think

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<v Speaker 1>it's like a highly sensitive, like you know, someone who's

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<v Speaker 1>making Yeah, I mean that makes sense. Well, they are

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<v Speaker 1>the one percent at least. Let's dig in and let's

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<v Speaker 1>start with packet sniffers. I love that those two words

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<v Speaker 1>together just yeah, they're great packets sniffers. Yes, they've been

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<v Speaker 1>around for a while, it's nothing new. Uh. And they

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<v Speaker 1>monitor the computer network and they performed tests and diagnostic

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<v Speaker 1>tests and troubleshoot all sorts of things. So they're not

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<v Speaker 1>inherently they're just too uh root out you know what

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<v Speaker 1>you're emailing to your buddy. No, it's like that's how

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<v Speaker 1>they sort of spam out from your regular stuff. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's not nefarious in and of itself, but it

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<v Speaker 1>can be when it's set to something called promiscuous mode,

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<v Speaker 1>which I thought was pretty funny too. Yeah, std mode,

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<v Speaker 1>And that means instead of just looking for certain keywords

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<v Speaker 1>that like, they can basically look at all of it.

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<v Speaker 1>And a packet is just a piece of information. Well,

0:13:29.200 --> 0:13:31.920
<v Speaker 1>it's like if you send me an email saying, hey, Josh,

0:13:32.400 --> 0:13:34.880
<v Speaker 1>that might be split up into X number of packets

0:13:35.320 --> 0:13:39.880
<v Speaker 1>and then my computer busily recombines it into the full

0:13:40.000 --> 0:13:43.840
<v Speaker 1>email and and combines the packets together, and the packets

0:13:43.840 --> 0:13:47.360
<v Speaker 1>sniffer to sniffs all those packets to look for Hi, Josh,

0:13:47.440 --> 0:13:50.280
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna bring a gun to work tomorrow and you're

0:13:50.360 --> 0:13:53.640
<v Speaker 1>in trouble. That's a bad way to do that. You're

0:13:53.640 --> 0:13:57.040
<v Speaker 1>not supposed to send a warning. Yeah, you're not supposed

0:13:57.080 --> 0:13:59.400
<v Speaker 1>to do that at all. Yeah. Hell, let's not give

0:13:59.440 --> 0:14:02.920
<v Speaker 1>advice to office shooters. I think that's a wise policy.

0:14:04.160 --> 0:14:06.280
<v Speaker 1>What you would do is give advice, say Josh, don't

0:14:06.320 --> 0:14:09.880
<v Speaker 1>come into work tomorrow because that happens. Oh really Yeah,

0:14:09.960 --> 0:14:13.240
<v Speaker 1>with with shooters, they'll they'll say sometimes they'll they will

0:14:13.280 --> 0:14:15.880
<v Speaker 1>have warned like the one person they like at work. Okay,

0:14:15.880 --> 0:14:17.920
<v Speaker 1>if I were you, I wouldn't come in tomorrow, which

0:14:18.000 --> 0:14:20.560
<v Speaker 1>is when you pick up the phone. You have a

0:14:20.680 --> 0:14:24.440
<v Speaker 1>moral obligation to protect the lives of us. You don't say, sweet,

0:14:24.480 --> 0:14:26.440
<v Speaker 1>I don't have to come in tomorrow, right, you know,

0:14:26.800 --> 0:14:30.440
<v Speaker 1>crazy guy gave me the day off. Yeah, called the cops. Um.

0:14:30.800 --> 0:14:33.600
<v Speaker 1>So with the packet sniffing, they're filtered, and unfiltered modes

0:14:33.640 --> 0:14:37.040
<v Speaker 1>and unfiltered will will capture everything, and filtered is when

0:14:37.080 --> 0:14:40.720
<v Speaker 1>they're looking for like keywords or in any sort of

0:14:40.840 --> 0:14:45.560
<v Speaker 1>specific data like I would imagine the name of your company. Ye,

0:14:47.520 --> 0:14:53.880
<v Speaker 1>like dangerous words like like going, um, drug related words,

0:14:54.640 --> 0:14:59.600
<v Speaker 1>that kind of stuff. Kilo, sure in my trunk, right,

0:15:00.160 --> 0:15:04.880
<v Speaker 1>that kind of thing at my desk. That's a bad

0:15:04.920 --> 0:15:07.600
<v Speaker 1>one with kilo. Oh yeah, Kilo at my desk. Um.

0:15:07.800 --> 0:15:11.160
<v Speaker 1>So if something is packet sniffing, they can see what

0:15:11.320 --> 0:15:14.119
<v Speaker 1>websites you're visiting, what you're doing there, what you're downloading,

0:15:14.560 --> 0:15:17.640
<v Speaker 1>the emails you're sending, what's in those emails, basically any

0:15:18.200 --> 0:15:20.680
<v Speaker 1>everything you're doing. And you can set up a packet

0:15:20.760 --> 0:15:25.680
<v Speaker 1>sniffer on like say your computer, your systematman can set

0:15:25.720 --> 0:15:28.880
<v Speaker 1>it up on your computer, and um it would it

0:15:28.920 --> 0:15:31.560
<v Speaker 1>would basically just be able to see what your computer

0:15:31.720 --> 0:15:34.680
<v Speaker 1>is doing, what websites is visiting, what emails it's sending.

0:15:35.320 --> 0:15:39.040
<v Speaker 1>It's basically just like eaves dropping onto a transmission cable.

0:15:39.720 --> 0:15:43.680
<v Speaker 1>Yeah you know. Um. The thing is is that kind

0:15:43.720 --> 0:15:49.880
<v Speaker 1>of raises some legal um ramifications, which we'll talk about later.

0:15:50.400 --> 0:15:52.000
<v Speaker 1>So there's a certain way you have to do it.

0:15:52.760 --> 0:15:55.720
<v Speaker 1>But if you put that packet sniffer on like a

0:15:56.400 --> 0:15:59.600
<v Speaker 1>your server for the whole company's network, it can pick

0:15:59.680 --> 0:16:01.680
<v Speaker 1>up all all that traffic. Yeah, if it's right there

0:16:01.680 --> 0:16:03.880
<v Speaker 1>in the middle of the action. Yeah. Yeah. And by

0:16:03.920 --> 0:16:05.640
<v Speaker 1>the way, if you're digging this kind of stuff, if

0:16:05.680 --> 0:16:09.320
<v Speaker 1>you like words like packet sniffers and servers and Kilo,

0:16:10.240 --> 0:16:13.960
<v Speaker 1>then you should go listen to tech Stuff, which is

0:16:14.000 --> 0:16:18.480
<v Speaker 1>like an all tech, very good UM related podcasts here

0:16:18.520 --> 0:16:21.760
<v Speaker 1>at how stuff Works dot com. Yeah, from our colleagues

0:16:22.200 --> 0:16:25.200
<v Speaker 1>Jonathan and Lauren, and I bet they have covered this. Uh,

0:16:25.400 --> 0:16:28.160
<v Speaker 1>I'm better than we are about to, which is why

0:16:28.200 --> 0:16:30.760
<v Speaker 1>I'm saying, like, go listen to those guys. If you're

0:16:30.800 --> 0:16:34.600
<v Speaker 1>liking this for the less jokey, more informative version, more

0:16:34.760 --> 0:16:38.440
<v Speaker 1>pun filled. Yeah that's true. Yeah. Another way, and this

0:16:38.680 --> 0:16:43.840
<v Speaker 1>is the one that's really um draconian and common, is

0:16:44.040 --> 0:16:48.880
<v Speaker 1>a desktop monitoring software. So if you're sitting at your

0:16:48.920 --> 0:16:51.480
<v Speaker 1>computer and you're typing something in, you're sending a signal

0:16:51.560 --> 0:16:56.120
<v Speaker 1>throughout your computer. And there are software systems that either

0:16:56.200 --> 0:17:02.520
<v Speaker 1>physically installed hard on your laptop hard or remotely installed

0:17:02.680 --> 0:17:06.200
<v Speaker 1>the trojan horse, like, hey, install this program because you

0:17:06.280 --> 0:17:09.280
<v Speaker 1>need it, but there's also this hidden program in there

0:17:10.080 --> 0:17:11.960
<v Speaker 1>that you don't need and you don't even know, and

0:17:12.040 --> 0:17:16.639
<v Speaker 1>it's going to track all of your activity on your computer.

0:17:16.880 --> 0:17:21.240
<v Speaker 1>I would guess that if you're getting if your employers

0:17:21.600 --> 0:17:24.679
<v Speaker 1>tracking you're spying on you, they're not going to use

0:17:24.720 --> 0:17:27.399
<v Speaker 1>the troch and horses more like a hacker tactic. But

0:17:27.520 --> 0:17:29.639
<v Speaker 1>the result is the same. I mean, there's a program

0:17:29.720 --> 0:17:32.600
<v Speaker 1>on there now where whereas like a packet sniffer is

0:17:33.320 --> 0:17:36.000
<v Speaker 1>keeping track of like where your computer is going on

0:17:36.080 --> 0:17:38.480
<v Speaker 1>the Internet. Remember that old Microsoft commercial where do you

0:17:38.520 --> 0:17:41.440
<v Speaker 1>want to go today? The old Windows commercial. So it's

0:17:41.480 --> 0:17:43.400
<v Speaker 1>keeping track of where you're going today and who you're

0:17:43.400 --> 0:17:48.160
<v Speaker 1>talking to along the way. This um the desktop monitoring programs.

0:17:48.840 --> 0:17:53.359
<v Speaker 1>That's like any key stroke you make is logging, and

0:17:53.520 --> 0:17:56.399
<v Speaker 1>so you don't you can be writing a note to

0:17:56.520 --> 0:18:00.840
<v Speaker 1>yourself that you never save. You just trash afterwards. You

0:18:00.960 --> 0:18:03.560
<v Speaker 1>never save it, so it's never saved onto your system.

0:18:03.920 --> 0:18:08.040
<v Speaker 1>This desktop monitoring system is keeping track of your key strokes,

0:18:08.320 --> 0:18:11.080
<v Speaker 1>so it sees everything that goes on on your on

0:18:11.200 --> 0:18:14.160
<v Speaker 1>your desktop. Yeah, and when you get that company issued laptop,

0:18:14.359 --> 0:18:19.040
<v Speaker 1>it very likely already has it installed. And again the

0:18:19.119 --> 0:18:22.560
<v Speaker 1>system admin can remotely install it because you're on the

0:18:22.600 --> 0:18:26.920
<v Speaker 1>same network as them and they have administrative sway over

0:18:27.000 --> 0:18:30.200
<v Speaker 1>your computer. They're like Svengali or if the I T

0:18:30.320 --> 0:18:32.200
<v Speaker 1>guy comes by and says the new drow leptop for

0:18:32.320 --> 0:18:34.000
<v Speaker 1>an hour because they need to install some sort of

0:18:34.040 --> 0:18:40.400
<v Speaker 1>program that sounds familiar. Beware of that of that message.

0:18:40.480 --> 0:18:45.600
<v Speaker 1>You know that that that impression was dead on. Okay, Um,

0:18:46.960 --> 0:18:49.960
<v Speaker 1>there are alert systems that are on some of these programs.

0:18:50.000 --> 0:18:52.840
<v Speaker 1>Oh wait, hold on, before we move on to alert systems,

0:18:53.720 --> 0:18:57.560
<v Speaker 1>there's a that desktop monitoring thing. So with key strokes,

0:18:57.600 --> 0:19:00.239
<v Speaker 1>you know, Um, it's it's picking up all the key

0:19:00.280 --> 0:19:04.959
<v Speaker 1>strokes and it's basically redirecting them to whoever's watching your

0:19:04.960 --> 0:19:07.200
<v Speaker 1>computer at that moment. And so maybe they have a

0:19:07.280 --> 0:19:10.040
<v Speaker 1>text file that's open and it's just seeing what's being

0:19:10.160 --> 0:19:13.000
<v Speaker 1>typed as it's going on, or it can be saved

0:19:13.000 --> 0:19:15.360
<v Speaker 1>for later as a text file and then like emailed

0:19:15.400 --> 0:19:21.040
<v Speaker 1>to the system admin, or it can the same programs

0:19:21.119 --> 0:19:24.320
<v Speaker 1>can intersect what's being sent to your video card or

0:19:24.440 --> 0:19:26.399
<v Speaker 1>what your video card is sending out to your monitor

0:19:27.320 --> 0:19:31.040
<v Speaker 1>and redirected, split and then redirected to your system admin

0:19:31.119 --> 0:19:34.560
<v Speaker 1>or whoever spying on you, and they can recreate what

0:19:34.680 --> 0:19:38.359
<v Speaker 1>you're seeing on your desktop by intercepting your video cards.

0:19:38.440 --> 0:19:44.400
<v Speaker 1>Trans transmission within your operating system. That's that's some serious

0:19:44.440 --> 0:19:47.320
<v Speaker 1>spying on you, some serious spying uh in the alert

0:19:47.359 --> 0:19:51.080
<v Speaker 1>system I mentioned, that's part of the monitoring software UM.

0:19:51.280 --> 0:19:54.480
<v Speaker 1>Where again sort of like keywords are certain alerts or

0:19:54.560 --> 0:19:59.440
<v Speaker 1>maybe websites, whereas some companies just block websites altogether. Yeah,

0:19:59.600 --> 0:20:02.639
<v Speaker 1>like face booker, you know, and anything they consider to

0:20:02.720 --> 0:20:06.040
<v Speaker 1>be a time waster UM or it can be set

0:20:06.119 --> 0:20:08.680
<v Speaker 1>up on an alert system where they just know that

0:20:09.000 --> 0:20:14.040
<v Speaker 1>you were spending way too much time online gambling if

0:20:14.080 --> 0:20:16.320
<v Speaker 1>you had a problem, which would be any time if

0:20:16.359 --> 0:20:19.879
<v Speaker 1>your work, you know, I doubt if they allow for

0:20:19.960 --> 0:20:24.640
<v Speaker 1>like payoffs you get ten minutes today the homeline online

0:20:24.720 --> 0:20:27.080
<v Speaker 1>or otherwise you can play craps at your desk. Right.

0:20:29.080 --> 0:20:33.119
<v Speaker 1>Another way, if you think that hey, I delete all

0:20:33.200 --> 0:20:37.040
<v Speaker 1>my stuff and I cover my paper trail, my e

0:20:37.200 --> 0:20:40.879
<v Speaker 1>paper trail, you were wrong because you have log files

0:20:41.080 --> 0:20:44.920
<v Speaker 1>in your computer. That um, even when you've deleted something,

0:20:45.560 --> 0:20:48.600
<v Speaker 1>there's a log file somewhere in your computer. Most likely

0:20:49.040 --> 0:20:53.520
<v Speaker 1>that that logs exactly what you have just done. Right,

0:20:53.880 --> 0:20:56.280
<v Speaker 1>Like when you delete that email, it's not really deleted

0:20:56.400 --> 0:21:00.480
<v Speaker 1>at least initially. Yeah, and those log files can be

0:21:00.560 --> 0:21:03.120
<v Speaker 1>gotten to remotely if you're on the same network again,

0:21:03.400 --> 0:21:07.040
<v Speaker 1>or they can set up, UM, some sort of program

0:21:07.160 --> 0:21:10.479
<v Speaker 1>that emails log files to them, especially ones that are

0:21:11.040 --> 0:21:14.679
<v Speaker 1>trigger some sort of filter and log files. I mean

0:21:14.720 --> 0:21:17.639
<v Speaker 1>those are normal, they're they're part of your operating system.

0:21:18.280 --> 0:21:21.160
<v Speaker 1>But um, they can be gotten to. In other words,

0:21:21.240 --> 0:21:25.720
<v Speaker 1>they can be used against you. That's true. Yeah, and

0:21:25.840 --> 0:21:29.520
<v Speaker 1>normally they're used for bugs, or originally they were used

0:21:29.560 --> 0:21:32.719
<v Speaker 1>for bugs. Yeah. It's like the the computer tracked its

0:21:32.760 --> 0:21:37.440
<v Speaker 1>own activity and then if something happened, somebody who could

0:21:37.480 --> 0:21:40.959
<v Speaker 1>read that kind of code could go back and say, oh, well,

0:21:41.000 --> 0:21:43.240
<v Speaker 1>here's here's the problem, this is why it crashed, and

0:21:43.280 --> 0:21:48.040
<v Speaker 1>then fix that bug. I bet desktop monitoring software is

0:21:48.200 --> 0:21:53.400
<v Speaker 1>the bulk of how they're getting this information. Uh. Yeah,

0:21:53.560 --> 0:21:56.440
<v Speaker 1>I would imagine that like a company that's involved in

0:21:56.520 --> 0:22:03.680
<v Speaker 1>this does um desktop monitoring and packet sniffing, packets sniffing. UM.

0:22:04.119 --> 0:22:06.240
<v Speaker 1>I guess we can talk about how about this after

0:22:06.320 --> 0:22:10.280
<v Speaker 1>this message break, we'll talk about old school eavesdropping, the

0:22:10.400 --> 0:22:24.480
<v Speaker 1>wire style. All right, you don't necessarily even have to

0:22:24.520 --> 0:22:26.439
<v Speaker 1>be on your laptop to get spied on because your

0:22:26.440 --> 0:22:30.679
<v Speaker 1>phone might be bugged. That's true. I guess the simplest

0:22:30.680 --> 0:22:32.879
<v Speaker 1>way to say right. Well, yeah, especially if you have

0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:39.639
<v Speaker 1>a work issued phone or iPad or whatever. You're um like,

0:22:39.720 --> 0:22:41.760
<v Speaker 1>they can just totally eavesdrop on that. But if it's

0:22:41.800 --> 0:22:46.160
<v Speaker 1>like your phone at your desk, there's almost a hundred

0:22:46.200 --> 0:22:49.520
<v Speaker 1>percent chances being eaves dropped on. Well, it's just twelve

0:22:49.920 --> 0:22:55.440
<v Speaker 1>in here. Well. So, another very very old statistic that

0:22:55.520 --> 0:22:58.919
<v Speaker 1>I still see sighted today is that companies eaves dropped

0:22:59.000 --> 0:23:02.600
<v Speaker 1>on like four million calls a year. But that was

0:23:02.680 --> 0:23:07.480
<v Speaker 1>from nine seven, number right right, which I find it

0:23:07.640 --> 0:23:10.080
<v Speaker 1>sad that the a c l U hasn't done any

0:23:10.200 --> 0:23:15.359
<v Speaker 1>report on workplace surveillance, workplace spying, anything like that since

0:23:15.440 --> 0:23:19.200
<v Speaker 1>the late nineties. It's two thousand, fourteen a c l U.

0:23:19.440 --> 0:23:21.960
<v Speaker 1>Let's get on the ball. Yeah, I mean it's a

0:23:22.080 --> 0:23:24.679
<v Speaker 1>it's not all Naziason clansman, you know, like there are

0:23:24.720 --> 0:23:27.480
<v Speaker 1>other issues to be addressed. You just did jazz hands

0:23:28.119 --> 0:23:33.359
<v Speaker 1>to Nazeason klansmen. Um. Here's the thing though, with wire tapping,

0:23:34.520 --> 0:23:38.359
<v Speaker 1>supposedly federal losses, you can't wire tap because you need

0:23:38.440 --> 0:23:43.439
<v Speaker 1>consent from the party, But the Privacy Electronic Communication Privacy

0:23:43.480 --> 0:23:48.040
<v Speaker 1>Act of nineteen six said they can eavesdrop on job

0:23:48.080 --> 0:23:50.760
<v Speaker 1>related talk. And how do you know if it's job

0:23:50.800 --> 0:23:54.000
<v Speaker 1>related unless you listen in for a few minutes first, right,

0:23:54.320 --> 0:23:56.800
<v Speaker 1>so they're protected, it's all. It's a loophole. They can

0:23:56.880 --> 0:24:00.399
<v Speaker 1>listen to all your calls. Yeah all don't know how

0:24:00.600 --> 0:24:03.880
<v Speaker 1>how long they can listen, but long enough to determine

0:24:03.880 --> 0:24:05.600
<v Speaker 1>if you're going to be talking about work. So that's

0:24:05.640 --> 0:24:07.720
<v Speaker 1>that's a pretty wide margin. I think a couple of

0:24:07.800 --> 0:24:13.399
<v Speaker 1>minutes is is UM routinely argued for in cases like that,

0:24:13.960 --> 0:24:20.680
<v Speaker 1>and the UM Electronic Protection Act UM, the Electronic Communications

0:24:20.720 --> 0:24:24.800
<v Speaker 1>Privacy Act says there's two types of communication and once

0:24:24.840 --> 0:24:30.720
<v Speaker 1>protected and one's not stored, communication is not UM. Communication

0:24:30.800 --> 0:24:36.040
<v Speaker 1>that's simultaneously transmitted and received is protected. And they were

0:24:36.080 --> 0:24:39.720
<v Speaker 1>staying like they were basically protecting a phone call because

0:24:40.800 --> 0:24:43.720
<v Speaker 1>we could possibly come in the future to supplant the

0:24:43.760 --> 0:24:47.520
<v Speaker 1>phone covers exactly. So phone calls are very much protected

0:24:47.880 --> 0:24:50.720
<v Speaker 1>again except for that work around with with business where

0:24:50.760 --> 0:24:53.159
<v Speaker 1>they can't tell if it's personel or business and for

0:24:53.440 --> 0:24:56.400
<v Speaker 1>for a couple of minutes. But then emails fall into

0:24:56.440 --> 0:25:01.560
<v Speaker 1>this weird category because emails are transmitted there in motion UM,

0:25:01.920 --> 0:25:05.960
<v Speaker 1>so apparently you can't you can't scoop up people's emails

0:25:06.000 --> 0:25:09.440
<v Speaker 1>when they're being transmitted. But emails also have the characteristic

0:25:09.560 --> 0:25:12.800
<v Speaker 1>of sitting on an outgoing server for a minute, right, well,

0:25:12.840 --> 0:25:15.160
<v Speaker 1>not a minute, but for however long it takes before

0:25:15.200 --> 0:25:17.360
<v Speaker 1>it's sent. It could be a second, and that still

0:25:17.440 --> 0:25:19.840
<v Speaker 1>counts even less. While it's sitting on that server, it

0:25:19.920 --> 0:25:23.080
<v Speaker 1>can be copied and analyzed and all sorts of stuff

0:25:23.080 --> 0:25:25.320
<v Speaker 1>can be totally within the law. Yeah, and I love

0:25:25.359 --> 0:25:28.800
<v Speaker 1>the analogy. And here if that doesn't quite make sense, um,

0:25:29.200 --> 0:25:31.840
<v Speaker 1>they drop the analogy of It's like if your standard

0:25:31.920 --> 0:25:34.880
<v Speaker 1>mail that your mail carrier delivers to your house. While

0:25:34.920 --> 0:25:38.000
<v Speaker 1>they're delivering it, you can't, you know, you can't go

0:25:38.160 --> 0:25:40.680
<v Speaker 1>open your neighbor's mail. But once it sits in that mailbox,

0:25:41.280 --> 0:25:44.119
<v Speaker 1>then you can go read your neighbor's mail. But you

0:25:44.240 --> 0:25:47.520
<v Speaker 1>can't do that though, that's insane. No, you can't. You

0:25:47.600 --> 0:25:49.399
<v Speaker 1>can't do that with your neighbor's mail. You can't with

0:25:49.560 --> 0:25:55.159
<v Speaker 1>email exactly. And you have said quite accurately that the

0:25:55.240 --> 0:26:01.720
<v Speaker 1>court generally sides with well, they side with citizens when

0:26:01.800 --> 0:26:04.320
<v Speaker 1>it comes to privacy in general, But once you become

0:26:04.320 --> 0:26:10.720
<v Speaker 1>an employee, the employer has most of the almost exclusively

0:26:10.880 --> 0:26:14.280
<v Speaker 1>they've ruled in favor of the employer, because the network

0:26:14.359 --> 0:26:19.320
<v Speaker 1>belongs to the employer. UM, and the devices often belong

0:26:19.400 --> 0:26:22.280
<v Speaker 1>to the employer, And we should say that's a trend

0:26:22.359 --> 0:26:25.520
<v Speaker 1>that may be going away. There's a UM there's something

0:26:25.560 --> 0:26:30.840
<v Speaker 1>called bring your own device movement. Yeah, where companies are

0:26:31.480 --> 0:26:35.080
<v Speaker 1>starting to basically say, you need to supply your own computer,

0:26:35.760 --> 0:26:38.280
<v Speaker 1>You definitely need to supply your own phone. Maybe you

0:26:38.359 --> 0:26:41.359
<v Speaker 1>need to supply your own iPad. Perhaps we'll give you

0:26:41.440 --> 0:26:45.200
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of a stipend to offset the cost

0:26:45.320 --> 0:26:50.200
<v Speaker 1>of using your own phone. But UM, that raises a

0:26:50.320 --> 0:26:56.080
<v Speaker 1>lot of questions about the legality then of snooping on

0:26:56.240 --> 0:27:00.320
<v Speaker 1>you while you're not on your company's network. That's me.

0:27:00.920 --> 0:27:04.360
<v Speaker 1>I bought my own laptop right because I wanted to Mac. Yeah,

0:27:04.480 --> 0:27:06.080
<v Speaker 1>they wouldn't give me one, so I was like, all right,

0:27:06.080 --> 0:27:08.480
<v Speaker 1>I'll go buy one and that's what I use exclusively.

0:27:08.640 --> 0:27:12.080
<v Speaker 1>And then as long as you're not on the company network,

0:27:12.800 --> 0:27:15.560
<v Speaker 1>you're not you should not be subject to any kind

0:27:15.600 --> 0:27:19.040
<v Speaker 1>of snooping or spying. Well, they can't, but if they do,

0:27:19.359 --> 0:27:21.359
<v Speaker 1>you would have a pretty good lawsuit on your hands.

0:27:21.920 --> 0:27:24.399
<v Speaker 1>But if they had bought that Mac for you, or

0:27:24.560 --> 0:27:28.520
<v Speaker 1>if your Mac is on the company network, they are

0:27:29.119 --> 0:27:31.800
<v Speaker 1>virtually free to do to look at whatever they want.

0:27:32.640 --> 0:27:34.880
<v Speaker 1>You know. Yeah, but when I am not at work,

0:27:34.960 --> 0:27:38.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm not on the company network. That's good. So there

0:27:38.160 --> 0:27:41.439
<v Speaker 1>it is impossible for them to know what I'm doing, right,

0:27:41.840 --> 0:27:45.159
<v Speaker 1>But I think I would guess. Also, I'm not a lawyer,

0:27:46.400 --> 0:27:51.280
<v Speaker 1>but if you opened up, say your personal email account

0:27:51.840 --> 0:27:55.120
<v Speaker 1>on the company network, if they had software, and I'm

0:27:55.960 --> 0:28:00.200
<v Speaker 1>I fully believe that this exists, um, that could just

0:28:00.359 --> 0:28:03.200
<v Speaker 1>basically go in and like copy all the files in

0:28:03.280 --> 0:28:07.359
<v Speaker 1>your personal email while you're on the company network. That

0:28:07.520 --> 0:28:10.560
<v Speaker 1>that would be legal. Yeah, And don't and don't be

0:28:10.640 --> 0:28:13.719
<v Speaker 1>fooled by that htt P S in front of your

0:28:13.720 --> 0:28:16.840
<v Speaker 1>Facebook account, because that is not protecting you like you

0:28:16.920 --> 0:28:19.800
<v Speaker 1>think it is, right if you're at work and it's

0:28:19.840 --> 0:28:24.080
<v Speaker 1>supposed to the hyper hypertext Transfer protocols secure, it's not

0:28:24.320 --> 0:28:28.600
<v Speaker 1>secure when you're at work on the work network. So

0:28:28.720 --> 0:28:30.359
<v Speaker 1>we'll talk about what you can do about all this

0:28:31.400 --> 0:28:37.760
<v Speaker 1>in a minute. We've got another message break, So chuck um,

0:28:39.480 --> 0:28:42.360
<v Speaker 1>if you if you six, if your employer doesn't tell

0:28:42.400 --> 0:28:46.520
<v Speaker 1>you that you are being surveiled, and you want to know, like,

0:28:46.600 --> 0:28:49.400
<v Speaker 1>how could you possibly find out that kind of thing? Well,

0:28:49.520 --> 0:28:52.160
<v Speaker 1>I would recommend reading the article how to Tell if

0:28:52.200 --> 0:28:55.560
<v Speaker 1>your boss is spying on you in Forbes from about

0:28:55.560 --> 0:28:58.280
<v Speaker 1>a year and a half ago. Um, but that's current

0:28:58.360 --> 0:29:00.240
<v Speaker 1>for this topic. It is. I'm gonna summary right some

0:29:00.320 --> 0:29:02.320
<v Speaker 1>of it here though, because it's a great article. Uh.

0:29:02.400 --> 0:29:04.720
<v Speaker 1>They said, whether or not you can tell it depends

0:29:04.760 --> 0:29:07.520
<v Speaker 1>a lot on where it's being done. If it's um,

0:29:07.680 --> 0:29:09.720
<v Speaker 1>they said, if it's upstream at the firewall, it's gonna

0:29:09.720 --> 0:29:13.200
<v Speaker 1>be hard for you to know. But at that point

0:29:13.320 --> 0:29:15.520
<v Speaker 1>in the stream, they're probably just gonna be able to tell,

0:29:15.520 --> 0:29:17.720
<v Speaker 1>like what websites you're going to. If they want to

0:29:17.760 --> 0:29:20.360
<v Speaker 1>get more granular and like poke into your emails and

0:29:20.400 --> 0:29:24.680
<v Speaker 1>see what you're doing, then um, they're gonna have to

0:29:24.720 --> 0:29:28.040
<v Speaker 1>be using some sort of monitoring software. And if you

0:29:28.080 --> 0:29:29.560
<v Speaker 1>want to check and see if that is running on

0:29:29.600 --> 0:29:32.479
<v Speaker 1>your computer. Um, if you have a PC, you can

0:29:32.560 --> 0:29:35.320
<v Speaker 1>go hit control all delete, pull up your task Manager

0:29:35.520 --> 0:29:38.120
<v Speaker 1>and go to the processes tab and then look at

0:29:38.120 --> 0:29:41.200
<v Speaker 1>all your process On a Mac. Um, I just typed

0:29:41.240 --> 0:29:45.400
<v Speaker 1>in activity monitor and that's where you want to end up.

0:29:45.680 --> 0:29:48.080
<v Speaker 1>And so like it's gonna bring up these really weirdly

0:29:48.280 --> 0:29:51.520
<v Speaker 1>named dot e x E file like everything that your

0:29:51.560 --> 0:29:54.160
<v Speaker 1>computer is doing that you don't even know what's doing

0:29:54.920 --> 0:29:57.600
<v Speaker 1>and look at the names they say, you can compare yours.

0:29:58.080 --> 0:29:59.920
<v Speaker 1>If you're at work, just put your laptop and I

0:30:00.120 --> 0:30:03.440
<v Speaker 1>to your cubicle buddy and see if the same processes

0:30:03.480 --> 0:30:05.920
<v Speaker 1>are running. If they're the same, that doesn't help you much.

0:30:05.960 --> 0:30:07.959
<v Speaker 1>But if you have something running that they don't, then

0:30:08.040 --> 0:30:10.040
<v Speaker 1>that might be a red flag. Well, it could help you,

0:30:10.160 --> 0:30:12.040
<v Speaker 1>and that like you're both employees and you're both being

0:30:12.080 --> 0:30:14.760
<v Speaker 1>surveilled at the same time. True, but it won't help

0:30:14.840 --> 0:30:18.000
<v Speaker 1>you really know necessarily. Yeah, but you can also like

0:30:18.600 --> 0:30:22.080
<v Speaker 1>search for those names on on the internet, right, Yeah,

0:30:22.160 --> 0:30:24.760
<v Speaker 1>you can. If anything stands out as something you've never

0:30:24.840 --> 0:30:28.000
<v Speaker 1>heard of, just google it and UM see if it's

0:30:28.040 --> 0:30:31.840
<v Speaker 1>spyware and then go check it out. UM. One of

0:30:31.880 --> 0:30:33.440
<v Speaker 1>the funny things though, is they point out in this

0:30:33.600 --> 0:30:38.920
<v Speaker 1>article is that spyware programs are flagged by anti virus

0:30:39.000 --> 0:30:45.360
<v Speaker 1>and malware programs is malicious. So UM companies are making

0:30:45.440 --> 0:30:48.880
<v Speaker 1>as what they call white lists, so the I T

0:30:49.000 --> 0:30:55.360
<v Speaker 1>Department knows uh to say, no, this isn't bad, and

0:30:55.560 --> 0:30:57.320
<v Speaker 1>so I need to put it on a separate list.

0:30:58.120 --> 0:31:02.200
<v Speaker 1>And they said in many cases those lists public Okay,

0:31:02.480 --> 0:31:04.080
<v Speaker 1>So apparently you can tell that way. I'm not really

0:31:04.120 --> 0:31:07.320
<v Speaker 1>sure how that works though, but it is in the

0:31:07.440 --> 0:31:10.200
<v Speaker 1>article that I mentioned in Forbes. I mean that I

0:31:10.320 --> 0:31:12.680
<v Speaker 1>bet tech stuff has a better step by step guide.

0:31:13.400 --> 0:31:16.200
<v Speaker 1>But um, yeah, I mean look at your processes, see

0:31:16.200 --> 0:31:18.760
<v Speaker 1>what's running. Yeah, and then once you find out that

0:31:18.840 --> 0:31:23.560
<v Speaker 1>your company is surveiling you, you have zero recourse against it. Yeah,

0:31:23.600 --> 0:31:25.520
<v Speaker 1>and we were talking earlier. If you do look at

0:31:25.520 --> 0:31:28.240
<v Speaker 1>your processes, it might have an obvious name like what

0:31:28.360 --> 0:31:30.560
<v Speaker 1>what did you say? Like we are watching you dot

0:31:30.640 --> 0:31:33.040
<v Speaker 1>e xc. Yeah, but it might not because a lot

0:31:33.120 --> 0:31:37.800
<v Speaker 1>of these are disguised. So um, like everything's cool dot

0:31:37.920 --> 0:31:45.280
<v Speaker 1>ex um. And there's, like I said, very little you

0:31:45.360 --> 0:31:48.680
<v Speaker 1>can do if not nothing. But luckily, the courts are

0:31:49.360 --> 0:31:53.040
<v Speaker 1>starting to rule or have on one specific thing in

0:31:53.200 --> 0:31:57.040
<v Speaker 1>favor of employees or people seeking employment. Um. There was

0:31:57.080 --> 0:32:01.720
<v Speaker 1>a growing trend among companies where they were demanding the

0:32:01.880 --> 0:32:07.280
<v Speaker 1>social media passwords and log in for like Facebook pages

0:32:07.320 --> 0:32:10.400
<v Speaker 1>and stuff like that when the applicants Facebook page wasn't

0:32:10.440 --> 0:32:14.160
<v Speaker 1>publicly visible. But yeah, and people would hand that over yeah,

0:32:14.200 --> 0:32:18.360
<v Speaker 1>and they were ye yes of the as a condition

0:32:18.440 --> 0:32:22.520
<v Speaker 1>of even being considered. Um. And so some states started

0:32:22.560 --> 0:32:26.360
<v Speaker 1>to outlaw that pretty quick, which is good. Yeah, that's terrible.

0:32:26.440 --> 0:32:29.680
<v Speaker 1>I mean I don't do anything on Facebook that anyone

0:32:29.760 --> 0:32:33.400
<v Speaker 1>would care about, but a lot of people do. So

0:32:33.600 --> 0:32:37.240
<v Speaker 1>if you're looking for a job, if you have a job,

0:32:38.120 --> 0:32:40.760
<v Speaker 1>especially if you suspect your company is more straight laced

0:32:40.800 --> 0:32:45.720
<v Speaker 1>than you are, you just want to post everything with

0:32:45.920 --> 0:32:49.520
<v Speaker 1>the idea, send every email, is it, every website with

0:32:49.600 --> 0:32:53.760
<v Speaker 1>the idea that you're being watched and you have zero

0:32:54.040 --> 0:32:57.280
<v Speaker 1>expectation of privacy. The courts have found when you are

0:32:57.400 --> 0:32:59.840
<v Speaker 1>on a company network, on a company device, and then

0:33:00.080 --> 0:33:03.880
<v Speaker 1>even beyond that, there have been instances where people have

0:33:04.040 --> 0:33:08.160
<v Speaker 1>been fired and lost lawsuits as a result um for

0:33:08.400 --> 0:33:11.120
<v Speaker 1>stuff they did that was maybe related to work, that

0:33:11.440 --> 0:33:13.440
<v Speaker 1>was not on the company device, that was not on

0:33:13.520 --> 0:33:16.240
<v Speaker 1>company time or on a company network, but it was

0:33:16.320 --> 0:33:18.720
<v Speaker 1>like they were blogging about, you know, making fun of

0:33:18.800 --> 0:33:22.520
<v Speaker 1>their coworkers. Still got fired. So basically, you just have

0:33:22.720 --> 0:33:25.120
<v Speaker 1>to I don't know what you have to do, but

0:33:25.200 --> 0:33:27.680
<v Speaker 1>it's sad. It's a sad state of affairs when even

0:33:27.800 --> 0:33:31.840
<v Speaker 1>your own personal stuff, your own personal opinions done on

0:33:31.960 --> 0:33:35.719
<v Speaker 1>your personal blog like can get you fired legally. Oh

0:33:35.800 --> 0:33:39.200
<v Speaker 1>and we didn't even mention cameras. Oh yeah, most offices

0:33:39.480 --> 0:33:43.040
<v Speaker 1>have cameras in their office. Um, I know we do.

0:33:44.800 --> 0:33:48.520
<v Speaker 1>We do. Yeah, well, you know the little bubble and

0:33:48.560 --> 0:33:54.800
<v Speaker 1>the ceilings. As I thought they were rain collectors, not

0:33:55.000 --> 0:33:57.840
<v Speaker 1>rank collectors. Um. Yeah, companies have camera set up to

0:33:58.160 --> 0:34:04.040
<v Speaker 1>uh for fitzcreepers and like, um, theft. Yeah, but they

0:34:04.080 --> 0:34:07.480
<v Speaker 1>can also see you know, if you're having a liaison

0:34:07.720 --> 0:34:10.399
<v Speaker 1>in a coffee room. Well they can, like if you're

0:34:10.440 --> 0:34:13.640
<v Speaker 1>that dumb, they can watch what you're doing on your computer.

0:34:14.200 --> 0:34:17.320
<v Speaker 1>They can surveil your computer, your desktop, just from watching

0:34:17.440 --> 0:34:21.080
<v Speaker 1>your pointed towards your screen. This is where Josh said,

0:34:21.080 --> 0:34:24.920
<v Speaker 1>you haven't You've got like four of those above your desk. Shoot.

0:34:25.640 --> 0:34:28.000
<v Speaker 1>Uh and did you read the IKEA story that I

0:34:28.080 --> 0:34:30.880
<v Speaker 1>sent you? I did. It seemed above and beyond the

0:34:31.280 --> 0:34:35.000
<v Speaker 1>um the realm of acceptability. Yeah. A woman, a twelve

0:34:35.120 --> 0:34:38.240
<v Speaker 1>year employee. UM, sort of high level. She was deputy

0:34:38.320 --> 0:34:41.399
<v Speaker 1>director of Communications and Merchandizing for all of France. I'd

0:34:41.400 --> 0:34:44.040
<v Speaker 1>call it fairly high level for stores and France is

0:34:44.080 --> 0:34:49.560
<v Speaker 1>their third biggest market. Really. Her name was Virginie Pauline.

0:34:50.880 --> 0:34:53.279
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure there's a weal better French way to say that,

0:34:53.880 --> 0:34:56.320
<v Speaker 1>but she got hepotetic c and had to take a

0:34:56.400 --> 0:34:59.879
<v Speaker 1>year off of work. And IKEA thought, well, I don't

0:35:00.040 --> 0:35:02.200
<v Speaker 1>I think she's as sick as she says, And so

0:35:02.480 --> 0:35:04.879
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna hire a private investigator. We're going to give

0:35:04.920 --> 0:35:07.879
<v Speaker 1>them their her social Security number, her personal cell phone number,

0:35:08.080 --> 0:35:11.239
<v Speaker 1>her bank account details, and whatever else they need and

0:35:11.360 --> 0:35:13.480
<v Speaker 1>you go find out how sick she is. And a

0:35:13.560 --> 0:35:16.280
<v Speaker 1>lot of those things were ill gotten to from corrupt

0:35:16.360 --> 0:35:22.040
<v Speaker 1>like public workers, cops and stuff. So people were rightfully outraged.

0:35:22.080 --> 0:35:24.200
<v Speaker 1>And I think it's in court still because this was

0:35:24.280 --> 0:35:27.160
<v Speaker 1>late last year, uh, seeing if they broke the law

0:35:27.239 --> 0:35:30.759
<v Speaker 1>by doing this. But apparently IKEA has been doing this,

0:35:31.000 --> 0:35:33.279
<v Speaker 1>like said the hundreds of employees of course, of the

0:35:33.360 --> 0:35:37.080
<v Speaker 1>last decade. So when you get that crappy furniture that

0:35:37.160 --> 0:35:39.720
<v Speaker 1>you don't know how to put together, or the lamp

0:35:39.800 --> 0:35:42.879
<v Speaker 1>ad if you like that ad, someone posted that it's

0:35:42.880 --> 0:35:46.719
<v Speaker 1>really good, it's great. Yeah, the lamp doesn't move apparently, No,

0:35:47.080 --> 0:35:49.440
<v Speaker 1>I think I said it was computer animated. It's just

0:35:49.520 --> 0:35:53.359
<v Speaker 1>a lamp. What towns Spike Jones that made it seem

0:35:53.400 --> 0:35:56.480
<v Speaker 1>real with his Oh it was a Spike Jones joint. Yeah.

0:35:57.120 --> 0:36:01.719
<v Speaker 1>Nice talented dude, he really is. And her was great, Um,

0:36:01.840 --> 0:36:03.120
<v Speaker 1>and I want to point out one thing you said.

0:36:03.160 --> 0:36:05.200
<v Speaker 1>If you said, if you think your company is more

0:36:05.280 --> 0:36:07.839
<v Speaker 1>straight laced, I would even say, like, if you think

0:36:07.920 --> 0:36:10.879
<v Speaker 1>your company like, no way would they do this, don't

0:36:10.920 --> 0:36:13.800
<v Speaker 1>be fooled. You know, if you think it's just some

0:36:13.920 --> 0:36:17.560
<v Speaker 1>super cool, hip, hipster young company, they might be spine

0:36:17.600 --> 0:36:19.120
<v Speaker 1>on you as well. Yeah, I mean if they want

0:36:19.160 --> 0:36:24.640
<v Speaker 1>you out, like you're just giving them dirt. Pretty much,

0:36:24.719 --> 0:36:27.279
<v Speaker 1>in any tech type company or anything that has any

0:36:27.280 --> 0:36:31.320
<v Speaker 1>sort of trade secrets, I'm sure you're being heavily, heavily monitored.

0:36:33.280 --> 0:36:36.239
<v Speaker 1>So I guess go forth and relax everybody. Yeah, I

0:36:36.360 --> 0:36:39.759
<v Speaker 1>feel good about everything. Uh. If you want to know

0:36:39.960 --> 0:36:42.319
<v Speaker 1>more about being surveiled at work again, go check out

0:36:42.360 --> 0:36:45.280
<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff. You'll like it. Uh. And you can type

0:36:45.320 --> 0:36:52.160
<v Speaker 1>the keywords employers spying in the search part how stuff

0:36:52.200 --> 0:36:54.520
<v Speaker 1>works dot Com. It will likely bring up this article.

0:36:55.120 --> 0:36:57.279
<v Speaker 1>And since I said search parts, time for a listener mail.

0:36:59.600 --> 0:37:04.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna call this Norbert the Hungarian. Hi guys, this

0:37:04.680 --> 0:37:07.879
<v Speaker 1>is Norbert. I live in a small town in Hungary,

0:37:07.920 --> 0:37:10.080
<v Speaker 1>about forty miles away from the capitol. I always listened

0:37:10.080 --> 0:37:12.400
<v Speaker 1>to the podcast while commuting and love the show. I

0:37:12.480 --> 0:37:14.440
<v Speaker 1>work for an I t company, Hey, how about that?

0:37:16.320 --> 0:37:19.680
<v Speaker 1>Think about that? Giving email, chat and phone support for

0:37:19.719 --> 0:37:23.160
<v Speaker 1>American users, mostly from New Jersey, North Carolina, and Illinois.

0:37:23.520 --> 0:37:25.360
<v Speaker 1>And here's the thing. I'm not sure whether it is

0:37:25.440 --> 0:37:29.719
<v Speaker 1>due to cultural differences, but what I have noticed is

0:37:29.800 --> 0:37:34.799
<v Speaker 1>that almost none of the users greet us he said, great, us,

0:37:35.960 --> 0:37:39.680
<v Speaker 1>sweet norber when we answer their calls or when receiving

0:37:39.760 --> 0:37:44.080
<v Speaker 1>emails from them, neither a simple hey nor a good morning. Nothing.

0:37:44.600 --> 0:37:47.080
<v Speaker 1>The conversation usually starts off from their side with a

0:37:47.200 --> 0:37:52.480
<v Speaker 1>long yeah. Is there a reason why this is so? Guys?

0:37:52.960 --> 0:37:56.960
<v Speaker 1>I also need to add talking to you who norbert us? No,

0:37:57.200 --> 0:38:00.760
<v Speaker 1>I'm saying like who people who go Yeah, New Jersey,

0:38:00.800 --> 0:38:03.600
<v Speaker 1>North Carolina and Illinois. But it's like the boss from

0:38:03.680 --> 0:38:06.800
<v Speaker 1>office space. Yeah, that's exactly what I was thinking. I

0:38:06.880 --> 0:38:09.920
<v Speaker 1>also need to add to this that here we are

0:38:09.960 --> 0:38:13.960
<v Speaker 1>talking about educated people and not end users, street people.

0:38:14.040 --> 0:38:18.279
<v Speaker 1>That's what he's over here. In Europe, this is unacceptable.

0:38:18.360 --> 0:38:20.360
<v Speaker 1>It is a sign of disrespect and ignorance as this

0:38:20.480 --> 0:38:22.680
<v Speaker 1>normal practice in US. Should I worry about it? You

0:38:22.760 --> 0:38:28.600
<v Speaker 1>guys could answer? That would be amazing. Yeah, norm, Here's

0:38:28.640 --> 0:38:32.400
<v Speaker 1>my deal is you can sniff out sales calls and things,

0:38:32.840 --> 0:38:35.120
<v Speaker 1>and I'm never friendly to those. In fact, most of

0:38:35.160 --> 0:38:39.080
<v Speaker 1>those aren't even a person. Now it's just a recording. Yeah, right,

0:38:39.160 --> 0:38:42.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, but um, if you are offering I T support,

0:38:43.200 --> 0:38:47.040
<v Speaker 1>if it's unsolicited cold calls, I am not surprised that

0:38:47.239 --> 0:38:50.600
<v Speaker 1>there there he's getting that. But if like this is

0:38:50.680 --> 0:38:53.440
<v Speaker 1>the company, Yeah, he said he's giving email, chat and

0:38:53.480 --> 0:38:57.359
<v Speaker 1>phone support. So he's trying to So I guess he's

0:38:57.440 --> 0:39:00.359
<v Speaker 1>responding to a request. I would guess then, right, I guess.

0:39:00.360 --> 0:39:01.920
<v Speaker 1>The only thing I can think of, Norbert, is that

0:39:02.040 --> 0:39:06.520
<v Speaker 1>maybe there you're supporting them because something's not working and

0:39:06.600 --> 0:39:09.200
<v Speaker 1>so they're ticked off. Maybe. Yeah, Americans get stressed out

0:39:09.239 --> 0:39:12.160
<v Speaker 1>when computer's malfunction. Yeah, and there's a tendency to shoot

0:39:12.160 --> 0:39:16.160
<v Speaker 1>the messenger in all cultures. I think. Yeah. I think

0:39:16.200 --> 0:39:19.480
<v Speaker 1>we've said yeah to start every sentence in the last

0:39:19.560 --> 0:39:22.840
<v Speaker 1>like thirty seconds. Anyway, Norbert, I apologize on behalf of Americans.

0:39:22.920 --> 0:39:25.720
<v Speaker 1>And if you ever call me buddy, I'm gonna say, hey, Norbert,

0:39:25.760 --> 0:39:28.200
<v Speaker 1>how are you doing, buddy? Good morning Norbert, and then

0:39:28.600 --> 0:39:30.840
<v Speaker 1>we'll just get going from there. That's a T shirt.

0:39:31.480 --> 0:39:35.520
<v Speaker 1>Get what good morning, Norbert? Yeah? Yeah? Have you ever

0:39:35.600 --> 0:39:38.880
<v Speaker 1>been hungry? I have you have to. Yeah, you mean

0:39:38.920 --> 0:39:40.920
<v Speaker 1>I went to Budapest. It's beautiful. That's where I went.

0:39:40.960 --> 0:39:42.600
<v Speaker 1>I thought it was beautiful, to one of the most

0:39:42.640 --> 0:39:46.600
<v Speaker 1>beautiful cities around. Yeah, and it was inexpensive and um,

0:39:46.880 --> 0:39:49.400
<v Speaker 1>the people were beautiful and nice, museums were great. Did

0:39:49.440 --> 0:39:52.200
<v Speaker 1>you go to the hospital in the rock? Uh? Now,

0:39:52.360 --> 0:39:58.600
<v Speaker 1>what's up? It's this cavern system underneath Budapest that was

0:39:58.680 --> 0:40:03.719
<v Speaker 1>converted in the thirty into a secret bunker and hospital

0:40:04.040 --> 0:40:07.600
<v Speaker 1>and like power plant to where the city could hide

0:40:08.320 --> 0:40:11.160
<v Speaker 1>under the city. And it came in Handy and World

0:40:11.200 --> 0:40:12.960
<v Speaker 1>War two and during the Cold War, and it was

0:40:13.000 --> 0:40:15.600
<v Speaker 1>a secret up until like the sixties, seventies, maybe eighties,

0:40:17.080 --> 0:40:21.680
<v Speaker 1>maybe like until the end of communism in Hungary. Um,

0:40:21.920 --> 0:40:27.160
<v Speaker 1>it was in the pest side, I believe. Yeah, but

0:40:27.280 --> 0:40:32.719
<v Speaker 1>it's it's this amazing museum now filled with um mannequins,

0:40:32.960 --> 0:40:36.640
<v Speaker 1>dummies who are like being having surgery performed upon them.

0:40:36.760 --> 0:40:38.960
<v Speaker 1>Some are like bleeding. It's supposed to take place in

0:40:39.040 --> 0:40:42.479
<v Speaker 1>the context of war. There's a mannequins screaming. I didn't

0:40:42.480 --> 0:40:45.520
<v Speaker 1>even know they made those things. But it's really awesome.

0:40:45.600 --> 0:40:48.440
<v Speaker 1>Like they have old timey medical equipment and if you

0:40:48.560 --> 0:40:51.839
<v Speaker 1>go on a tour of this museum. The last tour

0:40:51.920 --> 0:40:54.399
<v Speaker 1>of the night is a flashlight tour, so they turn

0:40:54.480 --> 0:40:57.040
<v Speaker 1>all the lights out and you're walking around with flashlights

0:40:57.080 --> 0:40:59.520
<v Speaker 1>and like coming like face to face with these like

0:40:59.719 --> 0:41:02.000
<v Speaker 1>dumb means when you come around the corner, it is

0:41:02.320 --> 0:41:04.440
<v Speaker 1>really neat. I need to go back to Budapest. Yeah,

0:41:04.440 --> 0:41:06.880
<v Speaker 1>I want to go back as well. When I was

0:41:06.920 --> 0:41:08.560
<v Speaker 1>I was younger, so I didn't you know, I do

0:41:08.840 --> 0:41:11.839
<v Speaker 1>your differently if at this age for sure? Oh yeah, sure?

0:41:11.920 --> 0:41:14.320
<v Speaker 1>Were you like backpack in here? Yeah? Yeah, And we

0:41:14.400 --> 0:41:16.239
<v Speaker 1>did some museums, but it was also a lot of

0:41:16.320 --> 0:41:21.480
<v Speaker 1>just walking around and people watching and getting drunk on

0:41:21.640 --> 0:41:25.279
<v Speaker 1>schnops in Budapest. Actually we had the bulls Blood wine

0:41:25.320 --> 0:41:27.680
<v Speaker 1>there because it was like a dollar a bottle, right, Yeah,

0:41:27.920 --> 0:41:30.440
<v Speaker 1>I didn't find it anywhere. No, No, I don't believe

0:41:30.480 --> 0:41:35.240
<v Speaker 1>I had any like the Apricot stops for good beautiful

0:41:35.560 --> 0:41:38.920
<v Speaker 1>all right. So that's hungry everybody. Uh. If you want

0:41:38.920 --> 0:41:41.120
<v Speaker 1>to get in touch with me and Chuck like Norbert did,

0:41:41.200 --> 0:41:44.280
<v Speaker 1>you can tweet to us s Y s K podcast.

0:41:44.360 --> 0:41:46.360
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0:41:46.360 --> 0:41:49.719
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0:41:50.320 --> 0:41:54.200
<v Speaker 1>It's Instagram slash s y s K podcast right, and

0:41:54.360 --> 0:41:58.440
<v Speaker 1>look up pinterest dot com slash Josh and Chuck great uh.

0:41:58.480 --> 0:42:01.360
<v Speaker 1>And then you can send us an email to Stuff

0:42:01.400 --> 0:42:04.839
<v Speaker 1>Podcast at how stuff works dot com and you can

0:42:04.920 --> 0:42:06.279
<v Speaker 1>hang out with us at our home on the web.

0:42:06.480 --> 0:42:13.640
<v Speaker 1>Stuff you Should Know dot com. For more on this

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0:42:16.320 --> 0:42:16.719
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