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Speaker 1: Welcome to you stuff you should know from house Stuff

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Speaker 1: Works dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast Don't

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Speaker 1: Josh Clark with Charles W. Chuck Bryant and Jerry. How

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Speaker 1: do Jerry? How's he going? I wish I wish we

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Speaker 1: didn't have to pay money for playing music because I

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Speaker 1: really wanted Maxwell's and I always feel like somebody's watching

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Speaker 1: me to be or leading. You don't have to pay

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Speaker 1: for your own rendition coming in at any time. No

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Speaker 1: great song though, Yeah, And it turns out he's right,

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Speaker 1: someone is watching. Well, he was cooked to the gills,

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Speaker 1: which was his thing, was he did you not see

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Speaker 1: the video? No? Oh man, he's like looking out the

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Speaker 1: blinds and everything, dancing his living room. Yeah, he was

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Speaker 1: cooked up. How was a kid? I didn't understand that that.

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Speaker 1: I didn't either. Um, he was right though, that's the

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Speaker 1: point cocaine or know. He was correct? Yeah, especially nowadays,

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Speaker 1: like you don't need drugs to be paranoid. You can

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Speaker 1: just like be paranoid and be totally correct. Uh yeah,

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Speaker 1: you know, especially if you're gainfully employed. Yes, that is

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Speaker 1: true because what I found out from this article, Chuck,

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Speaker 1: is that if it's not the n S a eavesdropping

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Speaker 1: on you or surveiling you. It's your employer. Yeah. And

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Speaker 1: not only that, but you have implicitly agreed to be

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Speaker 1: spied on, because it is no doubt somewhere in your

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Speaker 1: work contract or your work agreement that they can do

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Speaker 1: exactly that that would be explicitly agreed. You're just probably

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Speaker 1: duped into it. What say, yeah, explicit Yeah, but I

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Speaker 1: mean if you don't know that you agreed to it, yeah,

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Speaker 1: because who reads that stuff? I know? It is the thing, like,

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Speaker 1: there's a there's a growing trend among employers to basically

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Speaker 1: slide some claws into your employee handbook that you have

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Speaker 1: to sign, uh, your employment agreement applications sometimes have them

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Speaker 1: now where it basically says I consent to being surveilled

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Speaker 1: electronically in you know, X number of forms or any

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Speaker 1: form you guys can come up with. And like you said,

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Speaker 1: people don't read that and they're not aware of it.

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Speaker 1: And the other devious part of the whole thing about

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Speaker 1: employee surveillance is that they don't buy law. I have

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Speaker 1: to tell you that you're being surveilled. Right. There's two states,

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Speaker 1: Connecticut and Delaware that require employers say, hey, we're watching you,

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Speaker 1: and Delaware barely even counts. I love Delaware. I was kidding. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's the screen door capital, isn't it according to the Simpsons.

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Speaker 1: I think, so we're going to Delaware. I've done some

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Speaker 1: camping at the Delaware Water Gap. It's nice. Nice. Actually,

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Speaker 1: I don't even think that's in Delaware though, is it not?

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Speaker 1: To look that up? It might be in New Jersey.

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Speaker 1: It's in the Aegean. That's funny. So I guess we

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Speaker 1: kind of answered the question that this this Um episode asked,

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Speaker 1: was is your employer spying on you? And the answer

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Speaker 1: is almost decidedly yes. So we found from our research

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Speaker 1: that stats are really old. It seems like there was

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Speaker 1: a flurry of research and discussion in like the early

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Speaker 1: to mid to late nineties when the Internet was new,

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Speaker 1: and then it just died off because apparently employers won.

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Speaker 1: Like there was there were ethical questions, there were legal

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Speaker 1: questions like can this happen? And uh, everybody said yeah,

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Speaker 1: Well the court said yeah totally. And if they're in

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Speaker 1: your office and they're working on your computers, and yeah,

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Speaker 1: you sure have the right. I do have some stats

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Speaker 1: from and this is the most recent thing I could

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Speaker 1: find is about three and a half years ago, which

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Speaker 1: is brand new, Yeah, compared to other stuff. Yeah, a

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Speaker 1: lot of these things are citing like surveys done in

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Speaker 1: two thousand and two thousand one. That's a different world

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Speaker 1: back then. I mean even current articles are using that

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Speaker 1: like there's just no data out there, no shame. Well,

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Speaker 1: here's some stuff from a few years ago. UM percent

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Speaker 1: of employers have fired UH workers for email misuse at

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Speaker 1: this point, for UM sixty of those were violating company policies,

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Speaker 1: were inappropriate language. There must be some overlap because they're

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Speaker 1: already over UM excessive personally used confidentiality breaching. Uhtent of

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Speaker 1: employers have fired people for Internet misuse, not email, but internet,

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Speaker 1: and that means surfing inappropriate content was of that, like

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Speaker 1: you know, you're looking at porn at work, get fired

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Speaker 1: for that. UM And then nowadays with social networking, UM

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Speaker 1: they six sixty six percent they estimate or monitoring Internet

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Speaker 1: connections to see what websites your browsing on a day

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Speaker 1: to day basis. I think there's ridiculously low. There's no

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Speaker 1: way that that's it. Well, I mean just because and

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Speaker 1: then in the article points out just because they are

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Speaker 1: set up to do so doesn't mean they are um

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Speaker 1: like generally, the one guy in the article says they

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Speaker 1: would be doing nothing but looking at activity if they

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Speaker 1: were really spying on everyone all the time. They say, generally,

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Speaker 1: it's if there's a problem with an employee or something

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Speaker 1: and someone is flagged that they will probably start paying attention.

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Speaker 1: But you know, this is all opinion. No one knows, right,

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Speaker 1: you know, employees aren't being too terribly forthcoming. Our job

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Speaker 1: is different though, because we with our research, we can

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Speaker 1: be looking at virtually anything. You know, this stuff we've

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Speaker 1: looked at online here. I can't tell you how many

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Speaker 1: lists we must be on just from the research we've

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Speaker 1: like the marijuana one alone. Yeah, it was like these

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Speaker 1: guys do nothing. The research like human trafficking and and

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Speaker 1: hookers and marijuana and bombmaking. Yeah, it's it's it's crazy

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Speaker 1: and and we can We're all over social media, so

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Speaker 1: that's part of our job. So yeah, no, I know,

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Speaker 1: it's kind of It was different to see like the

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Speaker 1: other side of it. But at the same time, I

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Speaker 1: was like, wow, I really feel bad for like, you know,

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Speaker 1: the average employee. If you go on to Twitter, no

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Speaker 1: I have If you go onto Twitter or something for

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Speaker 1: a minute or two, like you can get fired. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's weird. My my chicken software job that I have

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Speaker 1: before this one, the famous chicken software job. You know,

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Speaker 1: nothing on the internet is applicable to what you do.

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Speaker 1: So if the boss walks by and you're just checking

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Speaker 1: the Brave score from ESPN and you feel like you

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Speaker 1: have to hide it real quick, sure where now, I'm like,

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Speaker 1: come on, you know you check a score, No big deal.

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Speaker 1: And some employers don't care. I saw this one UM

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Speaker 1: article from UH. It was some sort of a Christian

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Speaker 1: organization that ended up firing employees, and he said, I

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Speaker 1: didn't care if they were on Facebook and doing that

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Speaker 1: other stuff, but when they started to talk some about

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Speaker 1: the company is when they got riled up and fired people. Supposedly,

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Speaker 1: there's UM that's what employers are looking for, is there.

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Speaker 1: They're looking for employees that are, like you said, talking

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Speaker 1: smack about the company, divulging company's secrets, ye leaking information.

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Speaker 1: That's probably the biggest one they're looking for. And then

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Speaker 1: um like grossly misusing time yea, or or like sexually

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Speaker 1: harassing or something that's that one makes total sense sending

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Speaker 1: inappropriate jokes around here, like the guy in the office

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Speaker 1: ending like overt inappropriate emails all around the office. Then yeah,

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Speaker 1: they're gonna they're gonna tag you. Right, So they aren't

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Speaker 1: necessarily watching you at all times, but the system is

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Speaker 1: most likely set up to where they can to where

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Speaker 1: if you do something that is that tricks triggers a

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Speaker 1: filter or something that somebody's going to get an email,

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Speaker 1: they're going to examine it and it's going to get

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Speaker 1: sent to HR if it fits the criteria. Right, yeah,

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Speaker 1: pretty much, UM, But like you said, they could, I mean,

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Speaker 1: they're most companies are set up now with what they

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Speaker 1: call continuous since systematic surveillance. UM. So if they wanted

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Speaker 1: to be bored out of their mind, they most companies

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Speaker 1: could literally look at everything you're doing at all times.

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Speaker 1: For this system had been for that having to watch

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Speaker 1: all that exactly. So we said that, UM, employers don't

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Speaker 1: have to tell you that they're surveilling you. As a

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Speaker 1: matter of fact, legally speaking, they can lie and tell

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Speaker 1: you that they're not surveilling you, and then if you

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Speaker 1: bust them and take them to court, you will lose

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Speaker 1: as far back as an employee for Pillsbury, you know, right, um. He.

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Speaker 1: I guess he didn't really like his job that much.

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Speaker 1: He was known for talking smack and in two different

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Speaker 1: emails um which he assured were confidential, weren't used for

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Speaker 1: disciplinary action and just were his own. Um, he said

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Speaker 1: that they should kill the backstabbing bastards about one group

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Speaker 1: of people, and he referred to the company Christmas party

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Speaker 1: as the Jim Jones kool Aid affair. And he got

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Speaker 1: fired for every company Christmas party, right, He got fired

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Speaker 1: for that, but he took Pillsbury court. Was like, they

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Speaker 1: said that they weren't paying attention to these emails and

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Speaker 1: that they wouldn't use them against me, And the court said,

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Speaker 1: so what man, It's like you said, the court has

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Speaker 1: decided that if you were using their device, or you're

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Speaker 1: using their network on their time that's even off of

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Speaker 1: their time, especially on their time, then they have a

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Speaker 1: right to protect their business by monitoring what's going on

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Speaker 1: with their business devices, on their business network with their employees. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: I think within reasons, some of that does make sense.

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Speaker 1: You don't want your employees divulging secrets or sending lured

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Speaker 1: emails around to everyone and all the all of a sudden,

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Speaker 1: you're slapt with the lawsuit um, which I think is

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Speaker 1: what it ultimately boils. And so some of this is understandable,

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Speaker 1: I get it. The thing is, though, is it's so

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Speaker 1: slippery of it's already just so draconian. Then it's there's

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Speaker 1: it's just completely lopsided, like how do you surveil your

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Speaker 1: own employer? How do you do that? Like shouldn't it

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Speaker 1: be shouldn't it be more balanced than that? I mean,

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Speaker 1: the whole thing just let me get on my soapbox

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Speaker 1: and we'll get down a breast text. But the whole

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Speaker 1: thing stinks of you just being indebted to your employer

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Speaker 1: for giving you a job, Like it just kind of

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Speaker 1: has that whole mentality attached to it, like your employer

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Speaker 1: can do whatever you want. If you don't like it,

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Speaker 1: you can go hit the breadline, Rusky. You know, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I'm done. No, I'm with you, man. That's it's definitely like,

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Speaker 1: you know, as an employee, to feel like someone has

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Speaker 1: their foot on your throat. There's fifty people in Anglory

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Speaker 1: who would kill for your job right now, we could

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Speaker 1: get them over here, right you know, it just makes

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Speaker 1: me sad. It is sad. That is the state of things. Uh, So,

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Speaker 1: I guess we should talk a little bit about how

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Speaker 1: how they're spying on you. And there are many ways, um,

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Speaker 1: but there five pretty likely ones that you probably have

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Speaker 1: in your office, um, and we'll go through them in

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Speaker 1: more detail. But I had a sixth that added, well

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Speaker 1: we'll hear in a minute, Okay, packet sniffers, log files,

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Speaker 1: desktop monitoring programs, phones, and close circuit cameras. And I'm

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Speaker 1: gonna go ahead and say phones as a two parter

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Speaker 1: because the company issues cell phones, um as well, So

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Speaker 1: what's your what's your other one? GPS. GPS was kept

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Speaker 1: out of this because that was one of the original

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Speaker 1: means of surveillance in the workplace, Yeah, with the little

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Speaker 1: trackers that they put on like delivery trucks or whatever

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Speaker 1: to make sure they're doing what they're supposed to do.

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Speaker 1: But now it's been extended to things like employees cell phones.

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Speaker 1: About three percent of companies track their employees using GPS

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Speaker 1: by tracking their cell phone, and then one percent track

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Speaker 1: their employees by tracking um they're like there keyless entry cards, man. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: well one percent. Thankfully that's like, I mean, what company

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Speaker 1: is that, I don't know, but it's probably a pretty

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Speaker 1: pedantic company. That's not an enjoyable company. I would think

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Speaker 1: it's like a highly sensitive, like you know, someone who's

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Speaker 1: making Yeah, I mean that makes sense. Well, they are

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Speaker 1: the one percent at least. Let's dig in and let's

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Speaker 1: start with packet sniffers. I love that those two words

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Speaker 1: together just yeah, they're great packets sniffers. Yes, they've been

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Speaker 1: around for a while, it's nothing new. Uh. And they

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Speaker 1: monitor the computer network and they performed tests and diagnostic

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Speaker 1: tests and troubleshoot all sorts of things. So they're not

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Speaker 1: inherently they're just too uh root out you know what

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Speaker 1: you're emailing to your buddy. No, it's like that's how

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Speaker 1: they sort of spam out from your regular stuff. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So it's not nefarious in and of itself, but it

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Speaker 1: can be when it's set to something called promiscuous mode,

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Speaker 1: which I thought was pretty funny too. Yeah, std mode,

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Speaker 1: And that means instead of just looking for certain keywords

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Speaker 1: that like, they can basically look at all of it.

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Speaker 1: And a packet is just a piece of information. Well,

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Speaker 1: it's like if you send me an email saying, hey, Josh,

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Speaker 1: that might be split up into X number of packets

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Speaker 1: and then my computer busily recombines it into the full

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Speaker 1: email and and combines the packets together, and the packets

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Speaker 1: sniffer to sniffs all those packets to look for Hi, Josh,

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Speaker 1: I'm gonna bring a gun to work tomorrow and you're

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Speaker 1: in trouble. That's a bad way to do that. You're

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Speaker 1: not supposed to send a warning. Yeah, you're not supposed

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Speaker 1: to do that at all. Yeah. Hell, let's not give

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Speaker 1: advice to office shooters. I think that's a wise policy.

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Speaker 1: What you would do is give advice, say Josh, don't

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Speaker 1: come into work tomorrow because that happens. Oh really Yeah,

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Speaker 1: with with shooters, they'll they'll say sometimes they'll they will

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Speaker 1: have warned like the one person they like at work. Okay,

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Speaker 1: if I were you, I wouldn't come in tomorrow, which

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Speaker 1: is when you pick up the phone. You have a

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Speaker 1: moral obligation to protect the lives of us. You don't say, sweet,

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Speaker 1: I don't have to come in tomorrow, right, you know,

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Speaker 1: crazy guy gave me the day off. Yeah, called the cops. Um.

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Speaker 1: So with the packet sniffing, they're filtered, and unfiltered modes

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Speaker 1: and unfiltered will will capture everything, and filtered is when

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Speaker 1: they're looking for like keywords or in any sort of

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Speaker 1: specific data like I would imagine the name of your company. Ye,

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Speaker 1: like dangerous words like like going, um, drug related words,

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Speaker 1: that kind of stuff. Kilo, sure in my trunk, right,

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Speaker 1: that kind of thing at my desk. That's a bad

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Speaker 1: one with kilo. Oh yeah, Kilo at my desk. Um.

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Speaker 1: So if something is packet sniffing, they can see what

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Speaker 1: websites you're visiting, what you're doing there, what you're downloading,

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Speaker 1: the emails you're sending, what's in those emails, basically any

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Speaker 1: everything you're doing. And you can set up a packet

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Speaker 1: sniffer on like say your computer, your systematman can set

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Speaker 1: it up on your computer, and um it would it

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Speaker 1: would basically just be able to see what your computer

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Speaker 1: is doing, what websites is visiting, what emails it's sending.

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Speaker 1: It's basically just like eaves dropping onto a transmission cable.

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Speaker 1: Yeah you know. Um. The thing is is that kind

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Speaker 1: of raises some legal um ramifications, which we'll talk about later.

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Speaker 1: So there's a certain way you have to do it.

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Speaker 1: But if you put that packet sniffer on like a

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Speaker 1: your server for the whole company's network, it can pick

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Speaker 1: up all all that traffic. Yeah, if it's right there

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Speaker 1: in the middle of the action. Yeah. Yeah. And by

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Speaker 1: the way, if you're digging this kind of stuff, if

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Speaker 1: you like words like packet sniffers and servers and Kilo,

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Speaker 1: then you should go listen to tech Stuff, which is

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Speaker 1: like an all tech, very good UM related podcasts here

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Speaker 1: at how stuff Works dot com. Yeah, from our colleagues

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Speaker 1: Jonathan and Lauren, and I bet they have covered this. Uh,

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Speaker 1: I'm better than we are about to, which is why

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Speaker 1: I'm saying, like, go listen to those guys. If you're

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Speaker 1: liking this for the less jokey, more informative version, more

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Speaker 1: pun filled. Yeah that's true. Yeah. Another way, and this

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Speaker 1: is the one that's really um draconian and common, is

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Speaker 1: a desktop monitoring software. So if you're sitting at your

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Speaker 1: computer and you're typing something in, you're sending a signal

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Speaker 1: throughout your computer. And there are software systems that either

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Speaker 1: physically installed hard on your laptop hard or remotely installed

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Speaker 1: the trojan horse, like, hey, install this program because you

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Speaker 1: need it, but there's also this hidden program in there

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Speaker 1: that you don't need and you don't even know, and

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Speaker 1: it's going to track all of your activity on your computer.

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Speaker 1: I would guess that if you're getting if your employers

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Speaker 1: tracking you're spying on you, they're not going to use

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Speaker 1: the troch and horses more like a hacker tactic. But

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Speaker 1: the result is the same. I mean, there's a program

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Speaker 1: on there now where whereas like a packet sniffer is

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Speaker 1: keeping track of like where your computer is going on

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Speaker 1: the Internet. Remember that old Microsoft commercial where do you

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Speaker 1: want to go today? The old Windows commercial. So it's

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Speaker 1: keeping track of where you're going today and who you're

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Speaker 1: talking to along the way. This um the desktop monitoring programs.

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Speaker 1: That's like any key stroke you make is logging, and

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Speaker 1: so you don't you can be writing a note to

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Speaker 1: yourself that you never save. You just trash afterwards. You

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Speaker 1: never save it, so it's never saved onto your system.

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Speaker 1: This desktop monitoring system is keeping track of your key strokes,

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Speaker 1: so it sees everything that goes on on your on

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Speaker 1: your desktop. Yeah, and when you get that company issued laptop,

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Speaker 1: it very likely already has it installed. And again the

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Speaker 1: system admin can remotely install it because you're on the

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Speaker 1: same network as them and they have administrative sway over

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Speaker 1: your computer. They're like Svengali or if the I T

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Speaker 1: guy comes by and says the new drow leptop for

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Speaker 1: an hour because they need to install some sort of

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Speaker 1: program that sounds familiar. Beware of that of that message.

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Speaker 1: You know that that that impression was dead on. Okay, Um,

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Speaker 1: there are alert systems that are on some of these programs.

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Speaker 1: Oh wait, hold on, before we move on to alert systems,

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Speaker 1: there's a that desktop monitoring thing. So with key strokes,

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Speaker 1: you know, Um, it's it's picking up all the key

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Speaker 1: strokes and it's basically redirecting them to whoever's watching your

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Speaker 1: computer at that moment. And so maybe they have a

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Speaker 1: text file that's open and it's just seeing what's being

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Speaker 1: typed as it's going on, or it can be saved

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Speaker 1: for later as a text file and then like emailed

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Speaker 1: to the system admin, or it can the same programs

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Speaker 1: can intersect what's being sent to your video card or

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Speaker 1: what your video card is sending out to your monitor

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Speaker 1: and redirected, split and then redirected to your system admin

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Speaker 1: or whoever spying on you, and they can recreate what

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Speaker 1: you're seeing on your desktop by intercepting your video cards.

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Speaker 1: Trans transmission within your operating system. That's that's some serious

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Speaker 1: spying on you, some serious spying uh in the alert

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Speaker 1: system I mentioned, that's part of the monitoring software UM.

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Speaker 1: Where again sort of like keywords are certain alerts or

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Speaker 1: maybe websites, whereas some companies just block websites altogether. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: like face booker, you know, and anything they consider to

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Speaker 1: be a time waster UM or it can be set

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Speaker 1: up on an alert system where they just know that

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Speaker 1: you were spending way too much time online gambling if

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Speaker 1: you had a problem, which would be any time if

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Speaker 1: your work, you know, I doubt if they allow for

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Speaker 1: like payoffs you get ten minutes today the homeline online

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Speaker 1: or otherwise you can play craps at your desk. Right.

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Speaker 1: Another way, if you think that hey, I delete all

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Speaker 1: my stuff and I cover my paper trail, my e

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Speaker 1: paper trail, you were wrong because you have log files

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Speaker 1: in your computer. That um, even when you've deleted something,

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Speaker 1: there's a log file somewhere in your computer. Most likely

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Speaker 1: that that logs exactly what you have just done. Right,

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Speaker 1: Like when you delete that email, it's not really deleted

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Speaker 1: at least initially. Yeah, and those log files can be

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Speaker 1: gotten to remotely if you're on the same network again,

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Speaker 1: or they can set up, UM, some sort of program

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Speaker 1: that emails log files to them, especially ones that are

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Speaker 1: trigger some sort of filter and log files. I mean

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Speaker 1: those are normal, they're they're part of your operating system.

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Speaker 1: But um, they can be gotten to. In other words,

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Speaker 1: they can be used against you. That's true. Yeah, and

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Speaker 1: normally they're used for bugs, or originally they were used

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Speaker 1: for bugs. Yeah. It's like the the computer tracked its

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Speaker 1: own activity and then if something happened, somebody who could

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Speaker 1: read that kind of code could go back and say, oh, well,

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Speaker 1: here's here's the problem, this is why it crashed, and

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Speaker 1: then fix that bug. I bet desktop monitoring software is

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Speaker 1: the bulk of how they're getting this information. Uh. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I would imagine that like a company that's involved in

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Speaker 1: this does um desktop monitoring and packet sniffing, packets sniffing. UM.

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Speaker 1: I guess we can talk about how about this after

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Speaker 1: this message break, we'll talk about old school eavesdropping, the

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Speaker 1: wire style. All right, you don't necessarily even have to

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Speaker 1: be on your laptop to get spied on because your

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Speaker 1: phone might be bugged. That's true. I guess the simplest

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Speaker 1: way to say right. Well, yeah, especially if you have

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Speaker 1: a work issued phone or iPad or whatever. You're um like,

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Speaker 1: they can just totally eavesdrop on that. But if it's

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Speaker 1: like your phone at your desk, there's almost a hundred

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Speaker 1: percent chances being eaves dropped on. Well, it's just twelve

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Speaker 1: in here. Well. So, another very very old statistic that

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Speaker 1: I still see sighted today is that companies eaves dropped

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Speaker 1: on like four million calls a year. But that was

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Speaker 1: from nine seven, number right right, which I find it

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Speaker 1: sad that the a c l U hasn't done any

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Speaker 1: report on workplace surveillance, workplace spying, anything like that since

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Speaker 1: the late nineties. It's two thousand, fourteen a c l U.

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Speaker 1: Let's get on the ball. Yeah, I mean it's a

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Speaker 1: it's not all Naziason clansman, you know, like there are

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Speaker 1: other issues to be addressed. You just did jazz hands

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Speaker 1: to Nazeason klansmen. Um. Here's the thing though, with wire tapping,

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Speaker 1: supposedly federal losses, you can't wire tap because you need

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Speaker 1: consent from the party, But the Privacy Electronic Communication Privacy

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Speaker 1: Act of nineteen six said they can eavesdrop on job

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Speaker 1: related talk. And how do you know if it's job

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Speaker 1: related unless you listen in for a few minutes first, right,

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Speaker 1: so they're protected, it's all. It's a loophole. They can

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Speaker 1: listen to all your calls. Yeah all don't know how

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Speaker 1: how long they can listen, but long enough to determine

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Speaker 1: if you're going to be talking about work. So that's

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Speaker 1: that's a pretty wide margin. I think a couple of

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Speaker 1: minutes is is UM routinely argued for in cases like that,

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Speaker 1: and the UM Electronic Protection Act UM, the Electronic Communications

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Speaker 1: Privacy Act says there's two types of communication and once

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Speaker 1: protected and one's not stored, communication is not UM. Communication

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Speaker 1: that's simultaneously transmitted and received is protected. And they were

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Speaker 1: staying like they were basically protecting a phone call because

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Speaker 1: we could possibly come in the future to supplant the

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Speaker 1: phone covers exactly. So phone calls are very much protected

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Speaker 1: again except for that work around with with business where

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Speaker 1: they can't tell if it's personel or business and for

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Speaker 1: for a couple of minutes. But then emails fall into

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Speaker 1: this weird category because emails are transmitted there in motion UM,

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Speaker 1: so apparently you can't you can't scoop up people's emails

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Speaker 1: when they're being transmitted. But emails also have the characteristic

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Speaker 1: of sitting on an outgoing server for a minute, right, well,

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Speaker 1: not a minute, but for however long it takes before

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Speaker 1: it's sent. It could be a second, and that still

409
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Speaker 1: counts even less. While it's sitting on that server, it

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Speaker 1: can be copied and analyzed and all sorts of stuff

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Speaker 1: can be totally within the law. Yeah, and I love

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Speaker 1: the analogy. And here if that doesn't quite make sense, um,

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Speaker 1: they drop the analogy of It's like if your standard

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Speaker 1: mail that your mail carrier delivers to your house. While

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Speaker 1: they're delivering it, you can't, you know, you can't go

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Speaker 1: open your neighbor's mail. But once it sits in that mailbox,

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Speaker 1: then you can go read your neighbor's mail. But you

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Speaker 1: can't do that though, that's insane. No, you can't. You

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Speaker 1: can't do that with your neighbor's mail. You can't with

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Speaker 1: email exactly. And you have said quite accurately that the

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Speaker 1: court generally sides with well, they side with citizens when

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Speaker 1: it comes to privacy in general, But once you become

423
00:26:04,320 --> 00:26:10,720
Speaker 1: an employee, the employer has most of the almost exclusively

424
00:26:10,880 --> 00:26:14,280
Speaker 1: they've ruled in favor of the employer, because the network

425
00:26:14,359 --> 00:26:19,320
Speaker 1: belongs to the employer. UM, and the devices often belong

426
00:26:19,400 --> 00:26:22,280
Speaker 1: to the employer, And we should say that's a trend

427
00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:25,520
Speaker 1: that may be going away. There's a UM there's something

428
00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:30,840
Speaker 1: called bring your own device movement. Yeah, where companies are

429
00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:35,080
Speaker 1: starting to basically say, you need to supply your own computer,

430
00:26:35,760 --> 00:26:38,280
Speaker 1: You definitely need to supply your own phone. Maybe you

431
00:26:38,359 --> 00:26:41,359
Speaker 1: need to supply your own iPad. Perhaps we'll give you

432
00:26:41,440 --> 00:26:45,200
Speaker 1: a little bit of a stipend to offset the cost

433
00:26:45,320 --> 00:26:50,200
Speaker 1: of using your own phone. But UM, that raises a

434
00:26:50,320 --> 00:26:56,080
Speaker 1: lot of questions about the legality then of snooping on

435
00:26:56,240 --> 00:27:00,320
Speaker 1: you while you're not on your company's network. That's me.

436
00:27:00,920 --> 00:27:04,360
Speaker 1: I bought my own laptop right because I wanted to Mac. Yeah,

437
00:27:04,480 --> 00:27:06,080
Speaker 1: they wouldn't give me one, so I was like, all right,

438
00:27:06,080 --> 00:27:08,480
Speaker 1: I'll go buy one and that's what I use exclusively.

439
00:27:08,640 --> 00:27:12,080
Speaker 1: And then as long as you're not on the company network,

440
00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:15,560
Speaker 1: you're not you should not be subject to any kind

441
00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:19,040
Speaker 1: of snooping or spying. Well, they can't, but if they do,

442
00:27:19,359 --> 00:27:21,359
Speaker 1: you would have a pretty good lawsuit on your hands.

443
00:27:21,920 --> 00:27:24,399
Speaker 1: But if they had bought that Mac for you, or

444
00:27:24,560 --> 00:27:28,520
Speaker 1: if your Mac is on the company network, they are

445
00:27:29,119 --> 00:27:31,800
Speaker 1: virtually free to do to look at whatever they want.

446
00:27:32,640 --> 00:27:34,880
Speaker 1: You know. Yeah, but when I am not at work,

447
00:27:34,960 --> 00:27:38,080
Speaker 1: I'm not on the company network. That's good. So there

448
00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:41,439
Speaker 1: it is impossible for them to know what I'm doing, right,

449
00:27:41,840 --> 00:27:45,159
Speaker 1: But I think I would guess. Also, I'm not a lawyer,

450
00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:51,280
Speaker 1: but if you opened up, say your personal email account

451
00:27:51,840 --> 00:27:55,120
Speaker 1: on the company network, if they had software, and I'm

452
00:27:55,960 --> 00:28:00,200
Speaker 1: I fully believe that this exists, um, that could just

453
00:28:00,359 --> 00:28:03,200
Speaker 1: basically go in and like copy all the files in

454
00:28:03,280 --> 00:28:07,359
Speaker 1: your personal email while you're on the company network. That

455
00:28:07,520 --> 00:28:10,560
Speaker 1: that would be legal. Yeah, And don't and don't be

456
00:28:10,640 --> 00:28:13,719
Speaker 1: fooled by that htt P S in front of your

457
00:28:13,720 --> 00:28:16,840
Speaker 1: Facebook account, because that is not protecting you like you

458
00:28:16,920 --> 00:28:19,800
Speaker 1: think it is, right if you're at work and it's

459
00:28:19,840 --> 00:28:24,080
Speaker 1: supposed to the hyper hypertext Transfer protocols secure, it's not

460
00:28:24,320 --> 00:28:28,600
Speaker 1: secure when you're at work on the work network. So

461
00:28:28,720 --> 00:28:30,359
Speaker 1: we'll talk about what you can do about all this

462
00:28:31,400 --> 00:28:37,760
Speaker 1: in a minute. We've got another message break, So chuck um,

463
00:28:39,480 --> 00:28:42,360
Speaker 1: if you if you six, if your employer doesn't tell

464
00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:46,520
Speaker 1: you that you are being surveiled, and you want to know, like,

465
00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:49,400
Speaker 1: how could you possibly find out that kind of thing? Well,

466
00:28:49,520 --> 00:28:52,160
Speaker 1: I would recommend reading the article how to Tell if

467
00:28:52,200 --> 00:28:55,560
Speaker 1: your boss is spying on you in Forbes from about

468
00:28:55,560 --> 00:28:58,280
Speaker 1: a year and a half ago. Um, but that's current

469
00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:00,240
Speaker 1: for this topic. It is. I'm gonna summary right some

470
00:29:00,320 --> 00:29:02,320
Speaker 1: of it here though, because it's a great article. Uh.

471
00:29:02,400 --> 00:29:04,720
Speaker 1: They said, whether or not you can tell it depends

472
00:29:04,760 --> 00:29:07,520
Speaker 1: a lot on where it's being done. If it's um,

473
00:29:07,680 --> 00:29:09,720
Speaker 1: they said, if it's upstream at the firewall, it's gonna

474
00:29:09,720 --> 00:29:13,200
Speaker 1: be hard for you to know. But at that point

475
00:29:13,320 --> 00:29:15,520
Speaker 1: in the stream, they're probably just gonna be able to tell,

476
00:29:15,520 --> 00:29:17,720
Speaker 1: like what websites you're going to. If they want to

477
00:29:17,760 --> 00:29:20,360
Speaker 1: get more granular and like poke into your emails and

478
00:29:20,400 --> 00:29:24,680
Speaker 1: see what you're doing, then um, they're gonna have to

479
00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:28,040
Speaker 1: be using some sort of monitoring software. And if you

480
00:29:28,080 --> 00:29:29,560
Speaker 1: want to check and see if that is running on

481
00:29:29,600 --> 00:29:32,479
Speaker 1: your computer. Um, if you have a PC, you can

482
00:29:32,560 --> 00:29:35,320
Speaker 1: go hit control all delete, pull up your task Manager

483
00:29:35,520 --> 00:29:38,120
Speaker 1: and go to the processes tab and then look at

484
00:29:38,120 --> 00:29:41,200
Speaker 1: all your process On a Mac. Um, I just typed

485
00:29:41,240 --> 00:29:45,400
Speaker 1: in activity monitor and that's where you want to end up.

486
00:29:45,680 --> 00:29:48,080
Speaker 1: And so like it's gonna bring up these really weirdly

487
00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:51,520
Speaker 1: named dot e x E file like everything that your

488
00:29:51,560 --> 00:29:54,160
Speaker 1: computer is doing that you don't even know what's doing

489
00:29:54,920 --> 00:29:57,600
Speaker 1: and look at the names they say, you can compare yours.

490
00:29:58,080 --> 00:29:59,920
Speaker 1: If you're at work, just put your laptop and I

491
00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:03,440
Speaker 1: to your cubicle buddy and see if the same processes

492
00:30:03,480 --> 00:30:05,920
Speaker 1: are running. If they're the same, that doesn't help you much.

493
00:30:05,960 --> 00:30:07,959
Speaker 1: But if you have something running that they don't, then

494
00:30:08,040 --> 00:30:10,040
Speaker 1: that might be a red flag. Well, it could help you,

495
00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:12,040
Speaker 1: and that like you're both employees and you're both being

496
00:30:12,080 --> 00:30:14,760
Speaker 1: surveilled at the same time. True, but it won't help

497
00:30:14,840 --> 00:30:18,000
Speaker 1: you really know necessarily. Yeah, but you can also like

498
00:30:18,600 --> 00:30:22,080
Speaker 1: search for those names on on the internet, right, Yeah,

499
00:30:22,160 --> 00:30:24,760
Speaker 1: you can. If anything stands out as something you've never

500
00:30:24,840 --> 00:30:28,000
Speaker 1: heard of, just google it and UM see if it's

501
00:30:28,040 --> 00:30:31,840
Speaker 1: spyware and then go check it out. UM. One of

502
00:30:31,880 --> 00:30:33,440
Speaker 1: the funny things though, is they point out in this

503
00:30:33,600 --> 00:30:38,920
Speaker 1: article is that spyware programs are flagged by anti virus

504
00:30:39,000 --> 00:30:45,360
Speaker 1: and malware programs is malicious. So UM companies are making

505
00:30:45,440 --> 00:30:48,880
Speaker 1: as what they call white lists, so the I T

506
00:30:49,000 --> 00:30:55,360
Speaker 1: Department knows uh to say, no, this isn't bad, and

507
00:30:55,560 --> 00:30:57,320
Speaker 1: so I need to put it on a separate list.

508
00:30:58,120 --> 00:31:02,200
Speaker 1: And they said in many cases those lists public Okay,

509
00:31:02,480 --> 00:31:04,080
Speaker 1: So apparently you can tell that way. I'm not really

510
00:31:04,120 --> 00:31:07,320
Speaker 1: sure how that works though, but it is in the

511
00:31:07,440 --> 00:31:10,200
Speaker 1: article that I mentioned in Forbes. I mean that I

512
00:31:10,320 --> 00:31:12,680
Speaker 1: bet tech stuff has a better step by step guide.

513
00:31:13,400 --> 00:31:16,200
Speaker 1: But um, yeah, I mean look at your processes, see

514
00:31:16,200 --> 00:31:18,760
Speaker 1: what's running. Yeah, and then once you find out that

515
00:31:18,840 --> 00:31:23,560
Speaker 1: your company is surveiling you, you have zero recourse against it. Yeah,

516
00:31:23,600 --> 00:31:25,520
Speaker 1: and we were talking earlier. If you do look at

517
00:31:25,520 --> 00:31:28,240
Speaker 1: your processes, it might have an obvious name like what

518
00:31:28,360 --> 00:31:30,560
Speaker 1: what did you say? Like we are watching you dot

519
00:31:30,640 --> 00:31:33,040
Speaker 1: e xc. Yeah, but it might not because a lot

520
00:31:33,120 --> 00:31:37,800
Speaker 1: of these are disguised. So um, like everything's cool dot

521
00:31:37,920 --> 00:31:45,280
Speaker 1: ex um. And there's, like I said, very little you

522
00:31:45,360 --> 00:31:48,680
Speaker 1: can do if not nothing. But luckily, the courts are

523
00:31:49,360 --> 00:31:53,040
Speaker 1: starting to rule or have on one specific thing in

524
00:31:53,200 --> 00:31:57,040
Speaker 1: favor of employees or people seeking employment. Um. There was

525
00:31:57,080 --> 00:32:01,720
Speaker 1: a growing trend among companies where they were demanding the

526
00:32:01,880 --> 00:32:07,280
Speaker 1: social media passwords and log in for like Facebook pages

527
00:32:07,320 --> 00:32:10,400
Speaker 1: and stuff like that when the applicants Facebook page wasn't

528
00:32:10,440 --> 00:32:14,160
Speaker 1: publicly visible. But yeah, and people would hand that over yeah,

529
00:32:14,200 --> 00:32:18,360
Speaker 1: and they were ye yes of the as a condition

530
00:32:18,440 --> 00:32:22,520
Speaker 1: of even being considered. Um. And so some states started

531
00:32:22,560 --> 00:32:26,360
Speaker 1: to outlaw that pretty quick, which is good. Yeah, that's terrible.

532
00:32:26,440 --> 00:32:29,680
Speaker 1: I mean I don't do anything on Facebook that anyone

533
00:32:29,760 --> 00:32:33,400
Speaker 1: would care about, but a lot of people do. So

534
00:32:33,600 --> 00:32:37,240
Speaker 1: if you're looking for a job, if you have a job,

535
00:32:38,120 --> 00:32:40,760
Speaker 1: especially if you suspect your company is more straight laced

536
00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:45,720
Speaker 1: than you are, you just want to post everything with

537
00:32:45,920 --> 00:32:49,520
Speaker 1: the idea, send every email, is it, every website with

538
00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:53,760
Speaker 1: the idea that you're being watched and you have zero

539
00:32:54,040 --> 00:32:57,280
Speaker 1: expectation of privacy. The courts have found when you are

540
00:32:57,400 --> 00:32:59,840
Speaker 1: on a company network, on a company device, and then

541
00:33:00,080 --> 00:33:03,880
Speaker 1: even beyond that, there have been instances where people have

542
00:33:04,040 --> 00:33:08,160
Speaker 1: been fired and lost lawsuits as a result um for

543
00:33:08,400 --> 00:33:11,120
Speaker 1: stuff they did that was maybe related to work, that

544
00:33:11,440 --> 00:33:13,440
Speaker 1: was not on the company device, that was not on

545
00:33:13,520 --> 00:33:16,240
Speaker 1: company time or on a company network, but it was

546
00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:18,720
Speaker 1: like they were blogging about, you know, making fun of

547
00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:22,520
Speaker 1: their coworkers. Still got fired. So basically, you just have

548
00:33:22,720 --> 00:33:25,120
Speaker 1: to I don't know what you have to do, but

549
00:33:25,200 --> 00:33:27,680
Speaker 1: it's sad. It's a sad state of affairs when even

550
00:33:27,800 --> 00:33:31,840
Speaker 1: your own personal stuff, your own personal opinions done on

551
00:33:31,960 --> 00:33:35,719
Speaker 1: your personal blog like can get you fired legally. Oh

552
00:33:35,800 --> 00:33:39,200
Speaker 1: and we didn't even mention cameras. Oh yeah, most offices

553
00:33:39,480 --> 00:33:43,040
Speaker 1: have cameras in their office. Um, I know we do.

554
00:33:44,800 --> 00:33:48,520
Speaker 1: We do. Yeah, well, you know the little bubble and

555
00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:54,800
Speaker 1: the ceilings. As I thought they were rain collectors, not

556
00:33:55,000 --> 00:33:57,840
Speaker 1: rank collectors. Um. Yeah, companies have camera set up to

557
00:33:58,160 --> 00:34:04,040
Speaker 1: uh for fitzcreepers and like, um, theft. Yeah, but they

558
00:34:04,080 --> 00:34:07,480
Speaker 1: can also see you know, if you're having a liaison

559
00:34:07,720 --> 00:34:10,399
Speaker 1: in a coffee room. Well they can, like if you're

560
00:34:10,440 --> 00:34:13,640
Speaker 1: that dumb, they can watch what you're doing on your computer.

561
00:34:14,200 --> 00:34:17,320
Speaker 1: They can surveil your computer, your desktop, just from watching

562
00:34:17,440 --> 00:34:21,080
Speaker 1: your pointed towards your screen. This is where Josh said,

563
00:34:21,080 --> 00:34:24,920
Speaker 1: you haven't You've got like four of those above your desk. Shoot.

564
00:34:25,640 --> 00:34:28,000
Speaker 1: Uh and did you read the IKEA story that I

565
00:34:28,080 --> 00:34:30,880
Speaker 1: sent you? I did. It seemed above and beyond the

566
00:34:31,280 --> 00:34:35,000
Speaker 1: um the realm of acceptability. Yeah. A woman, a twelve

567
00:34:35,120 --> 00:34:38,240
Speaker 1: year employee. UM, sort of high level. She was deputy

568
00:34:38,320 --> 00:34:41,399
Speaker 1: director of Communications and Merchandizing for all of France. I'd

569
00:34:41,400 --> 00:34:44,040
Speaker 1: call it fairly high level for stores and France is

570
00:34:44,080 --> 00:34:49,560
Speaker 1: their third biggest market. Really. Her name was Virginie Pauline.

571
00:34:50,880 --> 00:34:53,279
Speaker 1: I'm sure there's a weal better French way to say that,

572
00:34:53,880 --> 00:34:56,320
Speaker 1: but she got hepotetic c and had to take a

573
00:34:56,400 --> 00:34:59,879
Speaker 1: year off of work. And IKEA thought, well, I don't

574
00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:02,200
Speaker 1: I think she's as sick as she says, And so

575
00:35:02,480 --> 00:35:04,879
Speaker 1: we're gonna hire a private investigator. We're going to give

576
00:35:04,920 --> 00:35:07,879
Speaker 1: them their her social Security number, her personal cell phone number,

577
00:35:08,080 --> 00:35:11,239
Speaker 1: her bank account details, and whatever else they need and

578
00:35:11,360 --> 00:35:13,480
Speaker 1: you go find out how sick she is. And a

579
00:35:13,560 --> 00:35:16,280
Speaker 1: lot of those things were ill gotten to from corrupt

580
00:35:16,360 --> 00:35:22,040
Speaker 1: like public workers, cops and stuff. So people were rightfully outraged.

581
00:35:22,080 --> 00:35:24,200
Speaker 1: And I think it's in court still because this was

582
00:35:24,280 --> 00:35:27,160
Speaker 1: late last year, uh, seeing if they broke the law

583
00:35:27,239 --> 00:35:30,759
Speaker 1: by doing this. But apparently IKEA has been doing this,

584
00:35:31,000 --> 00:35:33,279
Speaker 1: like said the hundreds of employees of course, of the

585
00:35:33,360 --> 00:35:37,080
Speaker 1: last decade. So when you get that crappy furniture that

586
00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:39,720
Speaker 1: you don't know how to put together, or the lamp

587
00:35:39,800 --> 00:35:42,879
Speaker 1: ad if you like that ad, someone posted that it's

588
00:35:42,880 --> 00:35:46,719
Speaker 1: really good, it's great. Yeah, the lamp doesn't move apparently, No,

589
00:35:47,080 --> 00:35:49,440
Speaker 1: I think I said it was computer animated. It's just

590
00:35:49,520 --> 00:35:53,359
Speaker 1: a lamp. What towns Spike Jones that made it seem

591
00:35:53,400 --> 00:35:56,480
Speaker 1: real with his Oh it was a Spike Jones joint. Yeah.

592
00:35:57,120 --> 00:36:01,719
Speaker 1: Nice talented dude, he really is. And her was great, Um,

593
00:36:01,840 --> 00:36:03,120
Speaker 1: and I want to point out one thing you said.

594
00:36:03,160 --> 00:36:05,200
Speaker 1: If you said, if you think your company is more

595
00:36:05,280 --> 00:36:07,839
Speaker 1: straight laced, I would even say, like, if you think

596
00:36:07,920 --> 00:36:10,879
Speaker 1: your company like, no way would they do this, don't

597
00:36:10,920 --> 00:36:13,800
Speaker 1: be fooled. You know, if you think it's just some

598
00:36:13,920 --> 00:36:17,560
Speaker 1: super cool, hip, hipster young company, they might be spine

599
00:36:17,600 --> 00:36:19,120
Speaker 1: on you as well. Yeah, I mean if they want

600
00:36:19,160 --> 00:36:24,640
Speaker 1: you out, like you're just giving them dirt. Pretty much,

601
00:36:24,719 --> 00:36:27,279
Speaker 1: in any tech type company or anything that has any

602
00:36:27,280 --> 00:36:31,320
Speaker 1: sort of trade secrets, I'm sure you're being heavily, heavily monitored.

603
00:36:33,280 --> 00:36:36,239
Speaker 1: So I guess go forth and relax everybody. Yeah, I

604
00:36:36,360 --> 00:36:39,759
Speaker 1: feel good about everything. Uh. If you want to know

605
00:36:39,960 --> 00:36:42,319
Speaker 1: more about being surveiled at work again, go check out

606
00:36:42,360 --> 00:36:45,280
Speaker 1: tech Stuff. You'll like it. Uh. And you can type

607
00:36:45,320 --> 00:36:52,160
Speaker 1: the keywords employers spying in the search part how stuff

608
00:36:52,200 --> 00:36:54,520
Speaker 1: works dot Com. It will likely bring up this article.

609
00:36:55,120 --> 00:36:57,279
Speaker 1: And since I said search parts, time for a listener mail.

610
00:36:59,600 --> 00:37:04,520
Speaker 1: I'm gonna call this Norbert the Hungarian. Hi guys, this

611
00:37:04,680 --> 00:37:07,879
Speaker 1: is Norbert. I live in a small town in Hungary,

612
00:37:07,920 --> 00:37:10,080
Speaker 1: about forty miles away from the capitol. I always listened

613
00:37:10,080 --> 00:37:12,400
Speaker 1: to the podcast while commuting and love the show. I

614
00:37:12,480 --> 00:37:14,440
Speaker 1: work for an I t company, Hey, how about that?

615
00:37:16,320 --> 00:37:19,680
Speaker 1: Think about that? Giving email, chat and phone support for

616
00:37:19,719 --> 00:37:23,160
Speaker 1: American users, mostly from New Jersey, North Carolina, and Illinois.

617
00:37:23,520 --> 00:37:25,360
Speaker 1: And here's the thing. I'm not sure whether it is

618
00:37:25,440 --> 00:37:29,719
Speaker 1: due to cultural differences, but what I have noticed is

619
00:37:29,800 --> 00:37:34,799
Speaker 1: that almost none of the users greet us he said, great, us,

620
00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:39,680
Speaker 1: sweet norber when we answer their calls or when receiving

621
00:37:39,760 --> 00:37:44,080
Speaker 1: emails from them, neither a simple hey nor a good morning. Nothing.

622
00:37:44,600 --> 00:37:47,080
Speaker 1: The conversation usually starts off from their side with a

623
00:37:47,200 --> 00:37:52,480
Speaker 1: long yeah. Is there a reason why this is so? Guys?

624
00:37:52,960 --> 00:37:56,960
Speaker 1: I also need to add talking to you who norbert us? No,

625
00:37:57,200 --> 00:38:00,760
Speaker 1: I'm saying like who people who go Yeah, New Jersey,

626
00:38:00,800 --> 00:38:03,600
Speaker 1: North Carolina and Illinois. But it's like the boss from

627
00:38:03,680 --> 00:38:06,800
Speaker 1: office space. Yeah, that's exactly what I was thinking. I

628
00:38:06,880 --> 00:38:09,920
Speaker 1: also need to add to this that here we are

629
00:38:09,960 --> 00:38:13,960
Speaker 1: talking about educated people and not end users, street people.

630
00:38:14,040 --> 00:38:18,279
Speaker 1: That's what he's over here. In Europe, this is unacceptable.

631
00:38:18,360 --> 00:38:20,360
Speaker 1: It is a sign of disrespect and ignorance as this

632
00:38:20,480 --> 00:38:22,680
Speaker 1: normal practice in US. Should I worry about it? You

633
00:38:22,760 --> 00:38:28,600
Speaker 1: guys could answer? That would be amazing. Yeah, norm, Here's

634
00:38:28,640 --> 00:38:32,400
Speaker 1: my deal is you can sniff out sales calls and things,

635
00:38:32,840 --> 00:38:35,120
Speaker 1: and I'm never friendly to those. In fact, most of

636
00:38:35,160 --> 00:38:39,080
Speaker 1: those aren't even a person. Now it's just a recording. Yeah, right,

637
00:38:39,160 --> 00:38:42,200
Speaker 1: you know, but um, if you are offering I T support,

638
00:38:43,200 --> 00:38:47,040
Speaker 1: if it's unsolicited cold calls, I am not surprised that

639
00:38:47,239 --> 00:38:50,600
Speaker 1: there there he's getting that. But if like this is

640
00:38:50,680 --> 00:38:53,440
Speaker 1: the company, Yeah, he said he's giving email, chat and

641
00:38:53,480 --> 00:38:57,359
Speaker 1: phone support. So he's trying to So I guess he's

642
00:38:57,440 --> 00:39:00,359
Speaker 1: responding to a request. I would guess then, right, I guess.

643
00:39:00,360 --> 00:39:01,920
Speaker 1: The only thing I can think of, Norbert, is that

644
00:39:02,040 --> 00:39:06,520
Speaker 1: maybe there you're supporting them because something's not working and

645
00:39:06,600 --> 00:39:09,200
Speaker 1: so they're ticked off. Maybe. Yeah, Americans get stressed out

646
00:39:09,239 --> 00:39:12,160
Speaker 1: when computer's malfunction. Yeah, and there's a tendency to shoot

647
00:39:12,160 --> 00:39:16,160
Speaker 1: the messenger in all cultures. I think. Yeah. I think

648
00:39:16,200 --> 00:39:19,480
Speaker 1: we've said yeah to start every sentence in the last

649
00:39:19,560 --> 00:39:22,840
Speaker 1: like thirty seconds. Anyway, Norbert, I apologize on behalf of Americans.

650
00:39:22,920 --> 00:39:25,720
Speaker 1: And if you ever call me buddy, I'm gonna say, hey, Norbert,

651
00:39:25,760 --> 00:39:28,200
Speaker 1: how are you doing, buddy? Good morning Norbert, and then

652
00:39:28,600 --> 00:39:30,840
Speaker 1: we'll just get going from there. That's a T shirt.

653
00:39:31,480 --> 00:39:35,520
Speaker 1: Get what good morning, Norbert? Yeah? Yeah? Have you ever

654
00:39:35,600 --> 00:39:38,880
Speaker 1: been hungry? I have you have to. Yeah, you mean

655
00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:40,920
Speaker 1: I went to Budapest. It's beautiful. That's where I went.

656
00:39:40,960 --> 00:39:42,600
Speaker 1: I thought it was beautiful, to one of the most

657
00:39:42,640 --> 00:39:46,600
Speaker 1: beautiful cities around. Yeah, and it was inexpensive and um,

658
00:39:46,880 --> 00:39:49,400
Speaker 1: the people were beautiful and nice, museums were great. Did

659
00:39:49,440 --> 00:39:52,200
Speaker 1: you go to the hospital in the rock? Uh? Now,

660
00:39:52,360 --> 00:39:58,600
Speaker 1: what's up? It's this cavern system underneath Budapest that was

661
00:39:58,680 --> 00:40:03,719
Speaker 1: converted in the thirty into a secret bunker and hospital

662
00:40:04,040 --> 00:40:07,600
Speaker 1: and like power plant to where the city could hide

663
00:40:08,320 --> 00:40:11,160
Speaker 1: under the city. And it came in Handy and World

664
00:40:11,200 --> 00:40:12,960
Speaker 1: War two and during the Cold War, and it was

665
00:40:13,000 --> 00:40:15,600
Speaker 1: a secret up until like the sixties, seventies, maybe eighties,

666
00:40:17,080 --> 00:40:21,680
Speaker 1: maybe like until the end of communism in Hungary. Um,

667
00:40:21,920 --> 00:40:27,160
Speaker 1: it was in the pest side, I believe. Yeah, but

668
00:40:27,280 --> 00:40:32,719
Speaker 1: it's it's this amazing museum now filled with um mannequins,

669
00:40:32,960 --> 00:40:36,640
Speaker 1: dummies who are like being having surgery performed upon them.

670
00:40:36,760 --> 00:40:38,960
Speaker 1: Some are like bleeding. It's supposed to take place in

671
00:40:39,040 --> 00:40:42,479
Speaker 1: the context of war. There's a mannequins screaming. I didn't

672
00:40:42,480 --> 00:40:45,520
Speaker 1: even know they made those things. But it's really awesome.

673
00:40:45,600 --> 00:40:48,440
Speaker 1: Like they have old timey medical equipment and if you

674
00:40:48,560 --> 00:40:51,839
Speaker 1: go on a tour of this museum. The last tour

675
00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:54,399
Speaker 1: of the night is a flashlight tour, so they turn

676
00:40:54,480 --> 00:40:57,040
Speaker 1: all the lights out and you're walking around with flashlights

677
00:40:57,080 --> 00:40:59,520
Speaker 1: and like coming like face to face with these like

678
00:40:59,719 --> 00:41:02,000
Speaker 1: dumb means when you come around the corner, it is

679
00:41:02,320 --> 00:41:04,440
Speaker 1: really neat. I need to go back to Budapest. Yeah,

680
00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:06,880
Speaker 1: I want to go back as well. When I was

681
00:41:06,920 --> 00:41:08,560
Speaker 1: I was younger, so I didn't you know, I do

682
00:41:08,840 --> 00:41:11,839
Speaker 1: your differently if at this age for sure? Oh yeah, sure?

683
00:41:11,920 --> 00:41:14,320
Speaker 1: Were you like backpack in here? Yeah? Yeah, And we

684
00:41:14,400 --> 00:41:16,239
Speaker 1: did some museums, but it was also a lot of

685
00:41:16,320 --> 00:41:21,480
Speaker 1: just walking around and people watching and getting drunk on

686
00:41:21,640 --> 00:41:25,279
Speaker 1: schnops in Budapest. Actually we had the bulls Blood wine

687
00:41:25,320 --> 00:41:27,680
Speaker 1: there because it was like a dollar a bottle, right, Yeah,

688
00:41:27,920 --> 00:41:30,440
Speaker 1: I didn't find it anywhere. No, No, I don't believe

689
00:41:30,480 --> 00:41:35,240
Speaker 1: I had any like the Apricot stops for good beautiful

690
00:41:35,560 --> 00:41:38,920
Speaker 1: all right. So that's hungry everybody. Uh. If you want

691
00:41:38,920 --> 00:41:41,120
Speaker 1: to get in touch with me and Chuck like Norbert did,

692
00:41:41,200 --> 00:41:44,280
Speaker 1: you can tweet to us s Y s K podcast.

693
00:41:44,360 --> 00:41:46,360
Speaker 1: You can join us on Facebook, dot com, slash stuff

694
00:41:46,360 --> 00:41:49,719
Speaker 1: you should know, hang out with us on Pinterest, or Instagram.

695
00:41:50,320 --> 00:41:54,200
Speaker 1: It's Instagram slash s y s K podcast right, and

696
00:41:54,360 --> 00:41:58,440
Speaker 1: look up pinterest dot com slash Josh and Chuck great uh.

697
00:41:58,480 --> 00:42:01,360
Speaker 1: And then you can send us an email to Stuff

698
00:42:01,400 --> 00:42:04,839
Speaker 1: Podcast at how stuff works dot com and you can

699
00:42:04,920 --> 00:42:06,279
Speaker 1: hang out with us at our home on the web.

700
00:42:06,480 --> 00:42:13,640
Speaker 1: Stuff you Should Know dot com. For more on this

701
00:42:13,800 --> 00:42:16,319
Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics, is it how stuff Works

702
00:42:16,320 --> 00:42:16,719
Speaker 1: dot com