1 00:00:01,400 --> 00:00:04,520 Speaker 1: I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea. I was a 2 00:00:04,519 --> 00:00:07,880 Speaker 1: CIA officer stationed around the world in high threat posts 3 00:00:07,880 --> 00:00:09,600 Speaker 1: in Europe, Russia, and in Asia. 4 00:00:09,640 --> 00:00:12,720 Speaker 2: And I served in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, 5 00:00:12,800 --> 00:00:16,880 Speaker 2: and in war zones. We sometimes created conspiracies to deceive 6 00:00:16,920 --> 00:00:17,840 Speaker 2: our adversaries. 7 00:00:18,120 --> 00:00:21,800 Speaker 1: Now we're going to use our expertise to deconstruct conspiracy 8 00:00:21,840 --> 00:00:23,599 Speaker 1: theories large and small. 9 00:00:23,880 --> 00:00:26,320 Speaker 2: Could they be true? Or are we being manipulated? 10 00:00:26,840 --> 00:00:34,040 Speaker 1: This is mission implausible. So here in Washington, Jerry, you 11 00:00:34,040 --> 00:00:36,360 Speaker 1: get to avoid it because you're hiding out there in Hawaii. 12 00:00:36,400 --> 00:00:39,160 Speaker 1: But here in Washington it is still every day there's 13 00:00:39,159 --> 00:00:41,320 Speaker 1: new information about Trump nominees. 14 00:00:41,440 --> 00:00:43,839 Speaker 2: Only somebody would write an our editorial in the New 15 00:00:43,920 --> 00:00:44,680 Speaker 2: York Times. 16 00:00:44,800 --> 00:00:47,640 Speaker 1: Well I did. I went on a PBS news hour 17 00:00:47,680 --> 00:00:50,120 Speaker 1: to talk about this the other day, and today an 18 00:00:50,200 --> 00:00:52,440 Speaker 1: article just came out in the New York Times called 19 00:00:52,479 --> 00:00:54,760 Speaker 1: running Spies is Not a Game for Amateurs that I 20 00:00:54,800 --> 00:00:58,520 Speaker 1: wrote along with former CIA and NSA Director General Michael Hayden, 21 00:00:58,560 --> 00:01:01,520 Speaker 1: who we both respect as a great long time intelligence 22 00:01:01,560 --> 00:01:04,320 Speaker 1: professional and was it a really excellent director at this CIA. 23 00:01:04,440 --> 00:01:06,119 Speaker 1: So this happens to be a lot about what we're 24 00:01:06,160 --> 00:01:08,240 Speaker 1: going to talk about today, it's really Jermane Now I 25 00:01:08,319 --> 00:01:09,080 Speaker 1: got to reread it. 26 00:01:09,200 --> 00:01:11,080 Speaker 3: I've wanted to talk to you about this for a while. 27 00:01:11,480 --> 00:01:16,240 Speaker 3: Telsea Gabbard being nominated to be the Director of National Intelligence, 28 00:01:16,800 --> 00:01:19,479 Speaker 3: it freaking a lot of people out, even a lot 29 00:01:19,520 --> 00:01:21,840 Speaker 3: of Republicans out. Can we start with it? 30 00:01:21,920 --> 00:01:22,040 Speaker 1: So? 31 00:01:22,600 --> 00:01:25,320 Speaker 3: Was there a Director of National Intelligence but when you 32 00:01:25,360 --> 00:01:28,920 Speaker 3: were still in CIA or did that come after it happened? 33 00:01:29,480 --> 00:01:31,880 Speaker 1: If you remember in two thousand and four, after the 34 00:01:31,959 --> 00:01:35,800 Speaker 1: nine to eleven when President Bush was running again and 35 00:01:35,840 --> 00:01:38,039 Speaker 1: there was a lot of back and forth about how 36 00:01:38,040 --> 00:01:40,440 Speaker 1: they were going to respond from nine to eleven, and 37 00:01:40,480 --> 00:01:42,760 Speaker 1: a new law came in to create the Director of 38 00:01:42,880 --> 00:01:45,800 Speaker 1: National Intelligence, and it was meant to be a way 39 00:01:45,840 --> 00:01:48,680 Speaker 1: of making sure that the intelligence community works better together 40 00:01:48,720 --> 00:01:50,680 Speaker 1: and all those other kind of things. And so it's 41 00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:53,080 Speaker 1: a fairly new, I guess maybe twenty years old now, 42 00:01:53,200 --> 00:01:56,120 Speaker 1: organization which is meant to deal with the budgets and 43 00:01:55,840 --> 00:01:58,640 Speaker 1: the bigger picture issues about the intelligence community. 44 00:01:58,720 --> 00:02:02,800 Speaker 2: Yeah. She would oversee eighteen intelligence agencies, different ones that 45 00:02:02,840 --> 00:02:05,160 Speaker 2: the US has, and she has a budget of about 46 00:02:05,240 --> 00:02:08,919 Speaker 2: seventy billion dollars and she serves as the principal advisor 47 00:02:09,400 --> 00:02:11,480 Speaker 2: to the President on intelligence matters. 48 00:02:11,720 --> 00:02:15,360 Speaker 1: It includes the intelligence community parts of the military. Now 49 00:02:15,560 --> 00:02:18,720 Speaker 1: it's a little different because she doesn't control them, because 50 00:02:18,720 --> 00:02:21,520 Speaker 1: they're controlled by the Secretary of Defense. So the NSA 51 00:02:21,600 --> 00:02:24,600 Speaker 1: is essentially a part of the Defense Department, as are 52 00:02:24,680 --> 00:02:27,480 Speaker 1: the intelligence services in the Marines and Army and Navy 53 00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:30,240 Speaker 1: and such, and so the DNI has that role of 54 00:02:30,320 --> 00:02:33,760 Speaker 1: working over all of those different eighteen organizations, some of 55 00:02:33,800 --> 00:02:37,040 Speaker 1: them directly under the DNI and some of them jointly 56 00:02:37,120 --> 00:02:39,560 Speaker 1: with the military, and also the FBI, which is part 57 00:02:39,600 --> 00:02:40,760 Speaker 1: of the Justice Department as well. 58 00:02:40,760 --> 00:02:43,960 Speaker 2: And scarily, she, at least in theory d or the 59 00:02:44,000 --> 00:02:47,760 Speaker 2: DNI sets like folk guy, what it is we're going 60 00:02:47,840 --> 00:02:49,639 Speaker 2: to be focused on. And she can do that through 61 00:02:49,639 --> 00:02:52,280 Speaker 2: budgets too, by controlling budgets, So you increase the counter 62 00:02:52,360 --> 00:02:55,080 Speaker 2: terrorism budget, so you go after counter terrorism. But if 63 00:02:55,120 --> 00:02:58,600 Speaker 2: you've got a conspiracy theorist, anyone who says I want 64 00:02:58,639 --> 00:03:03,079 Speaker 2: to spend ten billion dollars dollars saying did the US 65 00:03:03,120 --> 00:03:07,320 Speaker 2: support secret bio labs creating pathogens in ukrain which we 66 00:03:07,360 --> 00:03:10,920 Speaker 2: didn't complete, lie, you could still spend ten billion dollars 67 00:03:11,000 --> 00:03:14,080 Speaker 2: searching for a snipe that doesn't exist. Right, that's where 68 00:03:14,120 --> 00:03:15,960 Speaker 2: the danger comes in. And so you still put the 69 00:03:15,960 --> 00:03:19,880 Speaker 2: focus on something that either isn't true or doesn't exist or. 70 00:03:19,880 --> 00:03:22,200 Speaker 1: Well, in theory that should be done in coordination with 71 00:03:22,240 --> 00:03:24,280 Speaker 1: air Security advisor and in a state department and all these 72 00:03:24,280 --> 00:03:26,720 Speaker 1: other types of things. But yes, person has quite a 73 00:03:26,720 --> 00:03:29,400 Speaker 1: bit of influence. And what's interesting is I think a 74 00:03:29,400 --> 00:03:31,320 Speaker 1: lot of these Trump folks that are coming in, they 75 00:03:31,320 --> 00:03:34,200 Speaker 1: have such misperceptions about the agencies they're meant to run, 76 00:03:34,200 --> 00:03:37,480 Speaker 1: whether it's the FBI or the DNI, the CIA, And 77 00:03:37,560 --> 00:03:39,600 Speaker 1: I think they're going to come in like toilsa geber' 78 00:03:39,640 --> 00:03:41,040 Speaker 1: is gonna come in and thinking she's going to be 79 00:03:41,040 --> 00:03:44,040 Speaker 1: able to find some deep state thing or some fascinating stuff, 80 00:03:44,080 --> 00:03:46,080 Speaker 1: so she's gonna be able to immediately deal with it. 81 00:03:46,160 --> 00:03:48,480 Speaker 1: And like the first day, she's going to be sitting 82 00:03:48,480 --> 00:03:51,240 Speaker 1: in like a bunch of incredibly boring meetings going over 83 00:03:51,320 --> 00:03:54,640 Speaker 1: the Tunisian plan for the next ten years and what 84 00:03:54,680 --> 00:03:57,000 Speaker 1: did the analysts say about the economy and signing off 85 00:03:57,000 --> 00:03:59,960 Speaker 1: on a variety of products and meetings and things. That's 86 00:04:00,080 --> 00:04:03,480 Speaker 1: it's a coordination job. It's they don't run the secret 87 00:04:03,520 --> 00:04:06,160 Speaker 1: operations that you think of with the CIA, with the 88 00:04:06,240 --> 00:04:07,120 Speaker 1: NSA or the kind of. 89 00:04:07,200 --> 00:04:11,080 Speaker 3: Yeah, I spent some time with the National Economic Council 90 00:04:11,240 --> 00:04:14,360 Speaker 3: Chair at the White House. And this is overstating it 91 00:04:14,480 --> 00:04:19,040 Speaker 3: that it's a glorified secretary or administrative assistant, because it is. 92 00:04:19,160 --> 00:04:22,479 Speaker 3: The person's views do matter, But it really is there's Treasury, 93 00:04:22,600 --> 00:04:25,720 Speaker 3: there's the FED, there's the They do the work, and 94 00:04:25,760 --> 00:04:28,320 Speaker 3: this is the person who convenes those bodies who know 95 00:04:28,400 --> 00:04:30,800 Speaker 3: they do have a lot of access these like the 96 00:04:30,920 --> 00:04:34,719 Speaker 3: D and I, the NSC, the National Economic Council Chair, 97 00:04:35,000 --> 00:04:37,440 Speaker 3: and in a presidency like the one we're about to 98 00:04:37,480 --> 00:04:40,960 Speaker 3: have where the last person in the room has outsized influence. 99 00:04:41,000 --> 00:04:43,880 Speaker 3: From all reports, it's not nothing, but yeah, it's a 100 00:04:43,920 --> 00:04:46,159 Speaker 3: lot of coordinating. So I want to go through a 101 00:04:46,200 --> 00:04:48,960 Speaker 3: couple different things. So one thing is we did this 102 00:04:49,240 --> 00:04:53,240 Speaker 3: when we had episodes on President elect Trump. Still hard 103 00:04:53,279 --> 00:04:56,200 Speaker 3: to say those words and Russia, where I'd say, what 104 00:04:56,279 --> 00:05:00,280 Speaker 3: we concluded is we're not in a position to say 105 00:05:00,600 --> 00:05:04,600 Speaker 3: he is an active agent of Russian intelligence. In fact, 106 00:05:04,640 --> 00:05:07,159 Speaker 3: we're skeptical that's the case. But at the same time, 107 00:05:07,160 --> 00:05:09,120 Speaker 3: if you look at it through a national security lens, 108 00:05:09,440 --> 00:05:11,680 Speaker 3: if he was applying for any job other than the 109 00:05:11,760 --> 00:05:14,599 Speaker 3: job he happened to get, he would not get a 110 00:05:14,680 --> 00:05:18,880 Speaker 3: national security clearance. That we talked about how in a 111 00:05:18,920 --> 00:05:21,880 Speaker 3: prosecutorial way, if you want to arrest someone and put 112 00:05:21,920 --> 00:05:25,680 Speaker 3: them in jail, you need beyond a reasonable doubt. But counterintelligence, 113 00:05:25,720 --> 00:05:29,000 Speaker 3: it's more like, does this person give us the act? So, John, 114 00:05:29,040 --> 00:05:30,880 Speaker 3: you tell me, because you spent time in Russia. This 115 00:05:30,960 --> 00:05:35,640 Speaker 3: is a person who has pretty openly said she supports that. 116 00:05:36,040 --> 00:05:38,680 Speaker 1: Yeah. So I just wrote an opinion piece for the 117 00:05:38,680 --> 00:05:41,599 Speaker 1: New York Times along with former CIA in NSA and 118 00:05:41,960 --> 00:05:45,239 Speaker 1: DNI Director General Michael Hayden. So Telsea Geerber is interesting 119 00:05:45,240 --> 00:05:50,040 Speaker 1: because she really embraces conspiracy theories and she champions Russian disinformation. 120 00:05:50,560 --> 00:05:53,240 Speaker 1: And it's not just me. The former Nation Security Advisor 121 00:05:53,279 --> 00:05:56,600 Speaker 1: for President Trump, H. R. McMaster said it specifically that 122 00:05:56,760 --> 00:05:59,800 Speaker 1: she parrots Putin's talking points and so you could talk 123 00:06:00,160 --> 00:06:03,000 Speaker 1: her job. She has no significant experience directing or managing 124 00:06:03,080 --> 00:06:06,240 Speaker 1: much of anything. And I'll let Jerry talk about her 125 00:06:06,279 --> 00:06:09,839 Speaker 1: background in Hawaii. But in terms of the stuff that 126 00:06:09,880 --> 00:06:13,320 Speaker 1: she's done, she's almost like anti national security. She's become 127 00:06:13,440 --> 00:06:16,719 Speaker 1: this avatar for that. She's antagonized the intelligence community in 128 00:06:16,720 --> 00:06:20,040 Speaker 1: person by writing a bill to protect Russian citizen Edward Snowden, 129 00:06:20,080 --> 00:06:23,080 Speaker 1: who ill legally stole as much as two million classified 130 00:06:23,080 --> 00:06:27,479 Speaker 1: defense and intelligence documents. She's went to Syria and met 131 00:06:27,520 --> 00:06:32,599 Speaker 1: with Syrian Butcher Assad and completely tried to support the 132 00:06:32,640 --> 00:06:36,120 Speaker 1: fact that the Russians weren't bombing children and hospitals and things. 133 00:06:36,160 --> 00:06:39,280 Speaker 1: And so she's very not only is she not qualified, 134 00:06:39,720 --> 00:06:42,599 Speaker 1: she seems to have gone further to be almost working 135 00:06:42,680 --> 00:06:45,000 Speaker 1: against our general national security issues. 136 00:06:45,120 --> 00:06:47,160 Speaker 2: If she were to get this job, she would oversee 137 00:06:47,160 --> 00:06:51,240 Speaker 2: these eighteen US intelligence agencies who all have different ways 138 00:06:51,240 --> 00:06:55,880 Speaker 2: of acquiring intelligences, intelligence and analyzing it. And for the 139 00:06:55,880 --> 00:06:59,760 Speaker 2: Assad regime back in twenty seventeen, it and it's Russian 140 00:06:59,760 --> 00:07:05,400 Speaker 2: ill is. We're dropping poison gas on civilian populations ile EPO. 141 00:07:06,120 --> 00:07:09,279 Speaker 2: And despite the fact that all eighteen agreed that this 142 00:07:09,400 --> 00:07:12,120 Speaker 2: was going on, she said, I don't believe it. So 143 00:07:12,520 --> 00:07:16,440 Speaker 2: what happens when you gather intelligence, you analyze it. You're 144 00:07:16,440 --> 00:07:18,760 Speaker 2: listening to the pilots drop it, You're listening to people 145 00:07:18,840 --> 00:07:23,200 Speaker 2: on the ground screaming. You've smuggled out materials that show 146 00:07:23,280 --> 00:07:26,480 Speaker 2: that siren gas or poison gas was used, And she says, 147 00:07:26,560 --> 00:07:28,720 Speaker 2: I just don't believe it, Well, how do you deal 148 00:07:28,760 --> 00:07:31,200 Speaker 2: with that as an intelligence organization? And I think the 149 00:07:31,240 --> 00:07:34,520 Speaker 2: answer to that is we don't friggin know because it's 150 00:07:34,560 --> 00:07:38,480 Speaker 2: never happened before. Right, This is where you get. There's 151 00:07:38,480 --> 00:07:41,640 Speaker 2: intelligence and facts and when you can analyze the different 152 00:07:41,680 --> 00:07:44,040 Speaker 2: and it can make you can make mistakes. But then 153 00:07:44,080 --> 00:07:46,800 Speaker 2: there's just faith, and you can accept anything on faith. 154 00:07:46,840 --> 00:07:49,400 Speaker 2: If you just say I don't believe it, that could 155 00:07:49,400 --> 00:07:52,520 Speaker 2: be enough. So I live in Awahu and I know 156 00:07:52,760 --> 00:07:55,000 Speaker 2: of through the locals and through the local scuttle but 157 00:07:55,160 --> 00:07:57,360 Speaker 2: and people here, if you come to Hawaii and talk 158 00:07:57,400 --> 00:07:59,560 Speaker 2: to the locals here and Kaylu on the windward side, 159 00:08:00,000 --> 00:08:02,840 Speaker 2: I'll tell you that we know where Colsey Gabord comes from. 160 00:08:02,840 --> 00:08:06,840 Speaker 2: It's something called the Science of Identity Foundation, and it's 161 00:08:06,840 --> 00:08:10,640 Speaker 2: like Harry Krishna. They were so crazy that that Harry 162 00:08:10,720 --> 00:08:14,440 Speaker 2: Krishna's kicked them out. And they have this gurus named 163 00:08:14,600 --> 00:08:17,480 Speaker 2: Chris Butler, although he goes with this long Guru something 164 00:08:17,560 --> 00:08:21,080 Speaker 2: or other name now. And the sect that she is 165 00:08:21,160 --> 00:08:26,560 Speaker 2: affiliated with is anti gay, stream, anti Muslim, which sort 166 00:08:26,560 --> 00:08:29,280 Speaker 2: of shows why she's willing to reach out to almost 167 00:08:29,320 --> 00:08:32,600 Speaker 2: anybody who's killing Muslims and Stream obedience. You know, there's 168 00:08:32,640 --> 00:08:35,400 Speaker 2: really concern that is she loyal to Chris Butler and 169 00:08:35,559 --> 00:08:40,160 Speaker 2: her Hindu Hari Krishna offshoot sect, or is she is 170 00:08:40,200 --> 00:08:44,000 Speaker 2: she loyal to the Constitution? And it's unfortunately maybe not 171 00:08:44,040 --> 00:08:45,040 Speaker 2: a rhetorical question. 172 00:08:45,040 --> 00:08:48,079 Speaker 1: Famously, when she was in Syria after she saw Asad, 173 00:08:48,600 --> 00:08:50,760 Speaker 1: she was taken by her minders to go see where 174 00:08:51,040 --> 00:08:54,400 Speaker 1: the Russians and the Syrians had bombed civilians and a 175 00:08:54,559 --> 00:08:56,440 Speaker 1: famous as she was talking to a bunch of children, 176 00:08:56,800 --> 00:08:59,400 Speaker 1: and these children whose families and many of their parents 177 00:08:59,400 --> 00:09:02,280 Speaker 1: have been killed and the bombing, were explaining what they'd 178 00:09:02,320 --> 00:09:04,600 Speaker 1: been through. And she looked at them and said, I 179 00:09:04,600 --> 00:09:06,679 Speaker 1: don't know if I believe you. How can you prove 180 00:09:06,720 --> 00:09:09,320 Speaker 1: that this wasn't Isis that did this? And her minder 181 00:09:09,559 --> 00:09:15,400 Speaker 1: just almost wanted to explode to say, Isis doesn't have airplanes, right, 182 00:09:15,440 --> 00:09:18,200 Speaker 1: they don't have an air force. It's in the Russia. 183 00:09:18,360 --> 00:09:23,880 Speaker 2: And when Russian television haul's her Russia's girlfriend, our adversary 184 00:09:24,000 --> 00:09:27,680 Speaker 2: says that she's their Gael freaking take them at their word. 185 00:09:27,720 --> 00:09:30,400 Speaker 2: That that makes me more than Leary. 186 00:09:30,960 --> 00:09:33,240 Speaker 1: Culture really matters in our world. You've heard us say 187 00:09:33,280 --> 00:09:36,040 Speaker 1: that before that culture is defined by mission, and culture 188 00:09:36,080 --> 00:09:39,000 Speaker 1: is really important in an organization. And for example, when 189 00:09:39,000 --> 00:09:41,480 Speaker 1: we describe the culture that's different between the CIA and 190 00:09:41,520 --> 00:09:43,800 Speaker 1: the FBI, we say that the FBA are cops and 191 00:09:43,840 --> 00:09:46,760 Speaker 1: we're robbers, and so we work together, but it's often 192 00:09:46,800 --> 00:09:48,920 Speaker 1: difficult because we have a very different way of looking 193 00:09:48,960 --> 00:09:51,840 Speaker 1: at the world. But when she's coming in and some 194 00:09:51,880 --> 00:09:53,720 Speaker 1: of the other people in the Trump administrations and saying 195 00:09:53,720 --> 00:09:56,520 Speaker 1: they won't take background checks, they won't let the FBI 196 00:09:56,600 --> 00:10:00,000 Speaker 1: or others do investigations in background checks, oh my goodness, 197 00:10:00,160 --> 00:10:04,040 Speaker 1: that's failing leadership one on one, because your entire population 198 00:10:04,400 --> 00:10:07,920 Speaker 1: of people who work for you have intrusive background checks, 199 00:10:08,080 --> 00:10:10,559 Speaker 1: and they have polygraphs, and they have to report all 200 00:10:10,640 --> 00:10:13,200 Speaker 1: your bank money and all the things you own, and 201 00:10:13,240 --> 00:10:15,280 Speaker 1: you have to do this every year. You have to 202 00:10:15,320 --> 00:10:17,640 Speaker 1: report on every foreigner you meet if you happen to 203 00:10:17,640 --> 00:10:19,880 Speaker 1: be dating for and you have to report all those days. 204 00:10:20,280 --> 00:10:22,200 Speaker 1: And she's going to come in and say, I don't 205 00:10:22,240 --> 00:10:24,480 Speaker 1: need a background check, And that's just crazy. 206 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:27,440 Speaker 3: And that's true of any culture, right anyone can understand 207 00:10:27,480 --> 00:10:29,200 Speaker 3: when everyone has to take a pay cut and you 208 00:10:29,240 --> 00:10:31,599 Speaker 3: find out the CEO got a big stock option that 209 00:10:32,040 --> 00:10:33,320 Speaker 3: that doesn't go over very well. 210 00:10:33,400 --> 00:10:37,000 Speaker 2: So there's a law called the Pierce Blackledge Doctrine, and 211 00:10:37,040 --> 00:10:40,600 Speaker 2: it prohibits the US government from punishing a defendant for 212 00:10:40,720 --> 00:10:44,040 Speaker 2: exercising their legal rights right so in your First Amendment 213 00:10:44,080 --> 00:10:48,200 Speaker 2: right to assemble or to express an opinion. And close 214 00:10:48,320 --> 00:10:50,840 Speaker 2: to Tulca Gambert is also I think we need to 215 00:10:50,880 --> 00:10:53,000 Speaker 2: discuss the elephant in the room, Cash Mattel, as well, 216 00:10:53,040 --> 00:10:56,040 Speaker 2: because FBI also in a lot of ways more dangerous 217 00:10:56,040 --> 00:11:00,680 Speaker 2: because internally it's law enforcement and its intelligence collect and 218 00:11:00,920 --> 00:11:04,520 Speaker 2: Cash Prattel famously has said that he is. He has 219 00:11:04,559 --> 00:11:07,400 Speaker 2: a list and he's published in his book of people 220 00:11:07,440 --> 00:11:10,839 Speaker 2: he's coming for now back to CIA. Among that is 221 00:11:11,600 --> 00:11:17,080 Speaker 2: former CIA director right, Gina Hasbell, and current CIA director. 222 00:11:17,000 --> 00:11:18,880 Speaker 1: Ray FBI director right. 223 00:11:18,920 --> 00:11:22,200 Speaker 2: And so this is without any evidence or anything. He's 224 00:11:22,240 --> 00:11:26,959 Speaker 2: telegraphing vindictive prosecutions, which is illegal in the United States, 225 00:11:27,320 --> 00:11:30,200 Speaker 2: saying he's coming after them, and it doesn't matter if 226 00:11:30,240 --> 00:11:32,280 Speaker 2: there's evidence or not. He says, we'll do it civilly, 227 00:11:32,440 --> 00:11:36,240 Speaker 2: we'll do it criminally. And I think for most Americans, 228 00:11:36,240 --> 00:11:39,600 Speaker 2: CIA and the intelligence community is important, but almost more 229 00:11:39,640 --> 00:11:43,400 Speaker 2: important is rule of law and what they're going to 230 00:11:43,440 --> 00:11:46,600 Speaker 2: do about what Trump calls these enemies within and how 231 00:11:46,640 --> 00:11:51,240 Speaker 2: our bureau brothers are going to respond to demands that 232 00:11:51,320 --> 00:11:53,920 Speaker 2: they for the first time when American history, or certainly 233 00:11:53,920 --> 00:11:56,679 Speaker 2: since the nineteen fifties sixties, that the FBI is going 234 00:11:56,679 --> 00:12:00,000 Speaker 2: to go after select political and I think that's if. 235 00:12:00,160 --> 00:12:04,040 Speaker 2: A bigger question is how law enforcement and intelligence will 236 00:12:04,080 --> 00:12:07,079 Speaker 2: work together to either not do that or are there 237 00:12:07,160 --> 00:12:09,439 Speaker 2: enough Quizzlings out there who will come forward and say, yeah, 238 00:12:09,480 --> 00:12:09,920 Speaker 2: I'll do it. 239 00:12:10,120 --> 00:12:13,080 Speaker 1: These are very powerful organizations and if they're turned against 240 00:12:13,080 --> 00:12:15,600 Speaker 1: the American public, it really can be very dangerous. 241 00:12:15,760 --> 00:12:17,920 Speaker 3: The other thing that's been on my mind, this is 242 00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:20,840 Speaker 3: not the funniest episode we've ever done. You talked in 243 00:12:20,880 --> 00:12:24,080 Speaker 3: an earlier episode about how much of the intelligence that 244 00:12:24,440 --> 00:12:28,800 Speaker 3: is essential to our national security comes from allied powers 245 00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:32,559 Speaker 3: and whether without a background check. I think, just based 246 00:12:32,640 --> 00:12:36,160 Speaker 3: on her own utterances, I don't think I would risk 247 00:12:36,200 --> 00:12:40,040 Speaker 3: my life to share information or even risk a sources 248 00:12:40,120 --> 00:12:43,040 Speaker 3: life or whatever, knowing that Tulsa Gabbert might know who 249 00:12:43,080 --> 00:12:45,959 Speaker 3: gave it to them and who gave it to CIA. 250 00:12:46,120 --> 00:12:48,720 Speaker 3: So can you talk about that, like the chilling effect 251 00:12:48,800 --> 00:12:52,479 Speaker 3: on collaboration with other nations, with other spy services. 252 00:12:52,800 --> 00:12:54,959 Speaker 1: Yeah, Foreign partners are going to hesitate to share their 253 00:12:54,960 --> 00:12:58,160 Speaker 1: most precious secrets with us, and not just because they 254 00:12:58,200 --> 00:13:00,720 Speaker 1: think that the leader Tulsea Gabbert or even the president 255 00:13:01,000 --> 00:13:03,560 Speaker 1: might not be trustworthy. That's certainly a real problem. But 256 00:13:03,640 --> 00:13:05,760 Speaker 1: if these guys get their way, they talk about destroying 257 00:13:05,800 --> 00:13:09,120 Speaker 1: these organizations, about putting their own people in these positions. 258 00:13:09,120 --> 00:13:11,160 Speaker 1: They're talking about taking all the senior people in the 259 00:13:11,200 --> 00:13:13,760 Speaker 1: FBI and CIA and make them take loyalty tests or 260 00:13:13,760 --> 00:13:17,240 Speaker 1: pushing them out. Foreign partners are not going to work 261 00:13:17,280 --> 00:13:19,600 Speaker 1: with people who aren't professionals but are the tool of 262 00:13:19,640 --> 00:13:23,000 Speaker 1: one political party or another. In fact, the CIA has 263 00:13:23,240 --> 00:13:26,520 Speaker 1: benefited for years and recruited many a spy who was 264 00:13:26,559 --> 00:13:29,520 Speaker 1: disgusted by the corruption and cronyism in their own societies. 265 00:13:29,880 --> 00:13:33,199 Speaker 1: So essentially, if we're creating this problem for ourselves, we're 266 00:13:33,240 --> 00:13:35,240 Speaker 1: hurting ourselves in two ways. Our partners aren't going to 267 00:13:35,280 --> 00:13:37,839 Speaker 1: share with us, and people might actually be able to 268 00:13:37,880 --> 00:13:41,080 Speaker 1: recruit American spies to steal things from inside our places. 269 00:13:41,160 --> 00:13:45,040 Speaker 3: And when you're recruiting an agent, you're making a very 270 00:13:45,080 --> 00:13:47,600 Speaker 3: long term commitment. Right You're not saying, hey, trust me, 271 00:13:48,080 --> 00:13:50,560 Speaker 3: I will do everything in my power for the next 272 00:13:50,559 --> 00:13:52,960 Speaker 3: three and a half years to keep you safe. And 273 00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:55,719 Speaker 3: then all bets are off right, Like there's an I 274 00:13:55,720 --> 00:13:58,040 Speaker 3: assume implied. I don't know how explicit you have to 275 00:13:58,080 --> 00:14:01,640 Speaker 3: be saying it doesn't matter the president is, doesn't matter 276 00:14:01,640 --> 00:14:02,800 Speaker 3: who controls Congress. 277 00:14:03,080 --> 00:14:06,000 Speaker 2: We've got you, I'll keep you alive. Period. 278 00:14:06,480 --> 00:14:06,760 Speaker 1: Yeah. 279 00:14:06,800 --> 00:14:08,240 Speaker 2: There's no trauma after that. Yeah. 280 00:14:08,400 --> 00:14:11,800 Speaker 1: Yeah. And so recruiting and running spies inside the halls 281 00:14:11,800 --> 00:14:15,040 Speaker 1: of places in Moscow or Beijing or Tehran, it's not 282 00:14:15,600 --> 00:14:18,240 Speaker 1: an amateur's game. And it takes years and years. And 283 00:14:18,240 --> 00:14:21,280 Speaker 1: that's another thing about the culture. The CIA and the 284 00:14:21,360 --> 00:14:25,080 Speaker 1: intelligenmuti is hierarchical, like the defense department. So you're a privator, 285 00:14:25,160 --> 00:14:27,360 Speaker 1: you're a colonel, you're a general, and those things matter, 286 00:14:27,400 --> 00:14:29,480 Speaker 1: and it takes years to get from one to the next. 287 00:14:29,800 --> 00:14:32,800 Speaker 1: When somebody comes in who's never done any of those 288 00:14:32,800 --> 00:14:35,280 Speaker 1: things in that most senior position ahead was a very 289 00:14:35,320 --> 00:14:37,160 Speaker 1: low level position, all of a sudden, now they're in 290 00:14:37,240 --> 00:14:40,920 Speaker 1: charge of all of these people who put in time, experience, 291 00:14:41,160 --> 00:14:43,680 Speaker 1: often in hard places, and now this person is the 292 00:14:43,720 --> 00:14:47,800 Speaker 1: boss just because they have political connections. That creates another 293 00:14:47,840 --> 00:14:49,720 Speaker 1: sort of cultural friction that's going to be it's going 294 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:51,920 Speaker 1: to be very difficult on allies. 295 00:14:52,480 --> 00:14:57,640 Speaker 2: Famously, in twenty sixteen, George Papadopolos got drunk in London 296 00:14:58,240 --> 00:15:02,200 Speaker 2: with the I Commission, the Ambassador, the Australian Ambassador to 297 00:15:02,440 --> 00:15:07,960 Speaker 2: Great Britain. George Papadopolis was on Trump's national security team 298 00:15:08,000 --> 00:15:10,040 Speaker 2: when he was running for president as an advisor, and 299 00:15:10,080 --> 00:15:13,840 Speaker 2: he got drunk and he told him in great detail 300 00:15:14,080 --> 00:15:17,560 Speaker 2: that he knows, through a Russian connection because he's talking 301 00:15:17,600 --> 00:15:20,760 Speaker 2: to Russian intelligence during an intermediary, that the Russians have 302 00:15:20,840 --> 00:15:24,520 Speaker 2: got the goods on the Democratic National Committee. They stolen 303 00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:26,720 Speaker 2: the emails and these are the emails that they stole 304 00:15:26,760 --> 00:15:29,880 Speaker 2: that both the GRU and the SBR fancy Bear and cozy. 305 00:15:30,160 --> 00:15:35,240 Speaker 2: So the Australians came forward to the FBI and said, hey, 306 00:15:35,320 --> 00:15:38,800 Speaker 2: not for nothing, but we got this guy saying that 307 00:15:38,920 --> 00:15:42,880 Speaker 2: the Russians have stolen Democratic National Committee email and the 308 00:15:42,920 --> 00:15:45,880 Speaker 2: FBI goes, oh my god, because they knew they had, 309 00:15:46,360 --> 00:15:49,800 Speaker 2: So how did George Poppadopolis know this? This then opens 310 00:15:49,880 --> 00:15:53,800 Speaker 2: up whole Russia Russia Russia quote unquote hoax. This is 311 00:15:53,840 --> 00:15:56,880 Speaker 2: what kicked it off. And then Papadopolis does the right thing. 312 00:15:56,920 --> 00:16:01,440 Speaker 2: He lies to the FBI leads his Facebook accounts that 313 00:16:01,480 --> 00:16:04,920 Speaker 2: are incriminating, and he destroys his cell phone so that 314 00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:07,400 Speaker 2: the FBI can't check on what he was saying. And 315 00:16:07,440 --> 00:16:10,600 Speaker 2: so this and not the Steel dossier is what kicked 316 00:16:10,640 --> 00:16:14,520 Speaker 2: off the whole What is the relationship between Russian intelligence 317 00:16:14,840 --> 00:16:18,760 Speaker 2: and Trump World through Papadopoulos. I think this time around, 318 00:16:18,760 --> 00:16:20,880 Speaker 2: the Australians would be sold, just keep your house shut, 319 00:16:20,960 --> 00:16:23,000 Speaker 2: Let the Russians do whatever they want to The Americans, 320 00:16:23,200 --> 00:16:25,000 Speaker 2: I think what's going to save us, if anything, and 321 00:16:25,080 --> 00:16:28,960 Speaker 2: what I tell myself is their incompetence. If they are 322 00:16:29,080 --> 00:16:33,120 Speaker 2: so incompetent and so corrupt and so unable to carry 323 00:16:33,160 --> 00:16:37,440 Speaker 2: through cash, Hotel Tulsi, Gabbert Hags, all these guys they 324 00:16:37,440 --> 00:16:40,480 Speaker 2: get confirmed. I think what's only going to save us 325 00:16:40,600 --> 00:16:45,080 Speaker 2: is bureaucratic sloth and their inability to actually do the 326 00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:46,880 Speaker 2: shit that they say they do. 327 00:16:47,120 --> 00:16:52,520 Speaker 1: Also, I wonder populists traditionally often make up enemies to attack, institutions, 328 00:16:52,560 --> 00:16:56,480 Speaker 1: to attack to get power, right, But now they're in power. 329 00:16:56,560 --> 00:17:00,600 Speaker 1: These are their institutions, right, So now destroying the institutions 330 00:17:00,640 --> 00:17:03,400 Speaker 1: that they rely on doesn't make as much sense now. 331 00:17:03,440 --> 00:17:05,680 Speaker 1: In the past, obviously they were mad about the Russia 332 00:17:05,720 --> 00:17:08,480 Speaker 1: investigations in Hunter Biden's laptop and all those kind of things, 333 00:17:08,960 --> 00:17:11,240 Speaker 1: and that's because they were running for election and they 334 00:17:11,240 --> 00:17:14,399 Speaker 1: wanted to use those as handy attacks against their political rivals. Well, 335 00:17:14,440 --> 00:17:17,600 Speaker 1: now those things don't matter anymore. They're not running for election. 336 00:17:17,640 --> 00:17:21,360 Speaker 1: They're in power. They should want these institutions to work 337 00:17:21,400 --> 00:17:24,080 Speaker 1: effectively for them, So they should put their loyal people 338 00:17:24,080 --> 00:17:26,119 Speaker 1: in charge. So that does it feels comfortable he's got 339 00:17:26,119 --> 00:17:29,240 Speaker 1: people in charge, but they shouldn't look to destroy things further, 340 00:17:29,440 --> 00:17:31,840 Speaker 1: Like Bannon has said, we're going to destroy the administrative state. 341 00:17:32,359 --> 00:17:34,600 Speaker 1: Now that may not be the truth. They may actually 342 00:17:34,600 --> 00:17:38,080 Speaker 1: believe these things. They may believe that there's terrible people 343 00:17:38,160 --> 00:17:39,840 Speaker 1: working against the president there and they need to be 344 00:17:39,840 --> 00:17:41,840 Speaker 1: destroyed and all these other kind of things. And if 345 00:17:41,840 --> 00:17:44,760 Speaker 1: that's true, that really is dangerous. But perhaps they'll come 346 00:17:44,760 --> 00:17:47,399 Speaker 1: around and realize, hey, like why are we destroying this 347 00:17:47,440 --> 00:17:49,960 Speaker 1: thing that we rely on. There's going to be crisis, 348 00:17:50,000 --> 00:17:53,399 Speaker 1: there's going to be international things that conceivably the administrations 349 00:17:53,440 --> 00:17:56,800 Speaker 1: are going to want strong military and a strong counterintelligence 350 00:17:56,840 --> 00:17:58,240 Speaker 1: service and a strong intelligence service. 351 00:17:58,320 --> 00:18:00,440 Speaker 3: So I wanted to end on a funny note, and 352 00:18:00,560 --> 00:18:03,400 Speaker 3: that John, you really found the funniest possible note that 353 00:18:03,520 --> 00:18:06,920 Speaker 3: the entire Trump administration will come in on January twentieth, 354 00:18:06,960 --> 00:18:08,879 Speaker 3: and by January twenty third, they'll be like, you know what, 355 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:12,000 Speaker 3: maybe we should just be super competent professionals who run 356 00:18:12,080 --> 00:18:12,440 Speaker 3: this thing. 357 00:18:12,560 --> 00:18:16,600 Speaker 2: Really well, let's keep the institution put weaponize them. 358 00:18:16,600 --> 00:18:18,280 Speaker 4: All right, we're going to get right back into that, 359 00:18:18,359 --> 00:18:28,200 Speaker 4: but first let's hear this, and we're back with Mission implausible. 360 00:18:28,600 --> 00:18:31,320 Speaker 2: So may you live in interesting times? Is that a 361 00:18:31,440 --> 00:18:35,000 Speaker 2: Yiddish curse? Is that a Chinese curse? Who's responsible for that? 362 00:18:35,440 --> 00:18:38,119 Speaker 3: I have heard Chinese, I've never heard it in the 363 00:18:38,200 --> 00:18:41,840 Speaker 3: Yiddish context. And there's a lot of conspiracy theories about 364 00:18:41,920 --> 00:18:44,240 Speaker 3: US Jews. One thing I can say is if there's 365 00:18:44,240 --> 00:18:46,360 Speaker 3: a Yiddish saying, I've heard it. So do you think 366 00:18:46,640 --> 00:18:50,720 Speaker 3: President Biden should just pardon the enemy's list? And I 367 00:18:50,800 --> 00:18:53,480 Speaker 3: want to make clear you to our enemies, you're on 368 00:18:53,520 --> 00:18:54,359 Speaker 3: the enemy's list. 369 00:18:55,119 --> 00:18:55,880 Speaker 1: So this is a. 370 00:18:55,960 --> 00:18:59,439 Speaker 5: Very hard self you and John, Yes, you know I 371 00:18:59,440 --> 00:19:02,480 Speaker 5: wouldn't take it because my understanding is the pardon is 372 00:19:02,520 --> 00:19:05,040 Speaker 5: you have to admit your guilt before you get the 373 00:19:05,200 --> 00:19:06,520 Speaker 5: and we haven't done anything wrong. 374 00:19:06,640 --> 00:19:08,240 Speaker 3: You haven't done this specific thing wrong. 375 00:19:08,840 --> 00:19:09,880 Speaker 1: Yeah, that's true. That's true. 376 00:19:10,800 --> 00:19:14,000 Speaker 3: I'm sure you've done plenty wrong. I feel fairly confident 377 00:19:14,040 --> 00:19:15,359 Speaker 3: about that, But I don't know. 378 00:19:15,480 --> 00:19:18,080 Speaker 1: And the issue of pardons, I don't have a great 379 00:19:18,720 --> 00:19:21,760 Speaker 1: take on that, Like that seems to me. When we 380 00:19:21,800 --> 00:19:24,240 Speaker 1: are an intelligence we were focused on collecting the best 381 00:19:24,240 --> 00:19:27,120 Speaker 1: intelligence we could for our policymakers, but we didn't get 382 00:19:27,160 --> 00:19:29,560 Speaker 1: into policy ourselves. We didn't try to advise things that 383 00:19:29,600 --> 00:19:33,760 Speaker 1: should be having. This seems to be very partisan political things. 384 00:19:33,800 --> 00:19:38,919 Speaker 1: And there's a whole Justice Department, FBI checks stuff behind 385 00:19:38,960 --> 00:19:41,040 Speaker 1: the whole pardon thing, and I just don't know enough 386 00:19:41,080 --> 00:19:44,159 Speaker 1: to say yes, no, should they. We've gotten into this 387 00:19:44,200 --> 00:19:46,600 Speaker 1: game where both sides are like thinking the other sides 388 00:19:46,720 --> 00:19:48,760 Speaker 1: up to illegal stuff, and they're going to protect their side, 389 00:19:48,800 --> 00:19:51,080 Speaker 1: and it just seems skeazy and I just as soon 390 00:19:51,359 --> 00:19:52,560 Speaker 1: stay away from it. 391 00:19:52,400 --> 00:19:55,920 Speaker 2: No one's above the law, and I think giving pardons, 392 00:19:56,320 --> 00:20:00,200 Speaker 2: especially to relatives, it simply shows that there's one set 393 00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:03,560 Speaker 2: of justice for them and another set of justice for 394 00:20:03,600 --> 00:20:08,320 Speaker 2: the restless. So when President Trump, then President Trump hardened 395 00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:13,440 Speaker 2: Jared Kushner's father who was charged with sixteen tax evasion charges, 396 00:20:13,840 --> 00:20:16,159 Speaker 2: and then he was also charged and found guilty and 397 00:20:16,200 --> 00:20:20,919 Speaker 2: pled guilty to making a sex tape about his own 398 00:20:21,200 --> 00:20:24,000 Speaker 2: brother in law. He lured his own brother in law 399 00:20:24,119 --> 00:20:26,680 Speaker 2: into a tryst with a prostitute, paid her twenty five 400 00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:30,480 Speaker 2: thousand dollars, filmed it, and tried to blackmail his brother 401 00:20:30,520 --> 00:20:33,320 Speaker 2: in law not to testify against him, and pled guilty 402 00:20:33,359 --> 00:20:36,479 Speaker 2: to that. Trump pardoned him and has just named him 403 00:20:36,480 --> 00:20:39,760 Speaker 2: ambassador to France. I think that's wrong, and I think 404 00:20:39,760 --> 00:20:42,600 Speaker 2: it's also I'm sorry, Hunter Barden. I think it's wrong 405 00:20:42,640 --> 00:20:44,680 Speaker 2: that he gets a pardon. Oh, and then he gave 406 00:20:44,760 --> 00:20:46,200 Speaker 2: the film to the guy's. 407 00:20:45,920 --> 00:20:50,880 Speaker 6: Wife, his mother, his sister. That's right, but he got 408 00:20:50,880 --> 00:20:53,680 Speaker 6: pardoned for that. And I don't see that as any 409 00:20:53,800 --> 00:20:55,600 Speaker 6: versus Hunter Biden. But I don't think either of them 410 00:20:55,600 --> 00:20:56,439 Speaker 6: should have been pardoned. 411 00:20:56,560 --> 00:20:59,320 Speaker 3: Agreed. I think it's you can understand as a dad, 412 00:20:59,640 --> 00:21:01,400 Speaker 3: but we're not president. 413 00:21:01,520 --> 00:21:01,760 Speaker 2: Yeah. 414 00:21:01,840 --> 00:21:06,119 Speaker 3: I couldn't agree. More so if Tulsea Gabbard becomes d 415 00:21:06,280 --> 00:21:10,080 Speaker 3: and I, would you expect a lot of CIA senior 416 00:21:10,119 --> 00:21:14,679 Speaker 3: brass officers to quit? And for that matter, would you 417 00:21:14,920 --> 00:21:17,439 Speaker 3: expect agents to say, we get work with you anymore? 418 00:21:17,440 --> 00:21:19,440 Speaker 3: We're too afraid. 419 00:21:19,440 --> 00:21:22,040 Speaker 1: In terms of people leaving. I saw that just recently, 420 00:21:22,040 --> 00:21:24,720 Speaker 1: the Attorney General gave a talk to the Justice Farm 421 00:21:24,800 --> 00:21:29,240 Speaker 1: people encouraging them to stay. The country needs experience, professionals 422 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:31,680 Speaker 1: and a lot of these jobs. Now, like I mentioned before, 423 00:21:31,680 --> 00:21:34,159 Speaker 1: like if they truly are going to try to destroy 424 00:21:34,200 --> 00:21:37,800 Speaker 1: these organizations and put just rank partisan people with no 425 00:21:37,920 --> 00:21:40,679 Speaker 1: experience into these kinds of jobs, lots of people are 426 00:21:40,680 --> 00:21:43,280 Speaker 1: going to leave. But it remains to be seen. Some 427 00:21:43,280 --> 00:21:44,959 Speaker 1: of these things that people say a cash hotel, I'm 428 00:21:45,000 --> 00:21:46,560 Speaker 1: going to go in and I'm going to first day 429 00:21:46,560 --> 00:21:49,440 Speaker 1: close the FBI and send everybody else. That's just those 430 00:21:49,480 --> 00:21:53,119 Speaker 1: are not realistic things. And oftentimes in the past politicians 431 00:21:53,160 --> 00:21:54,880 Speaker 1: have said things that came in and once they realize 432 00:21:54,920 --> 00:21:57,359 Speaker 1: what they have and that these people are professionals and 433 00:21:57,400 --> 00:21:59,840 Speaker 1: they work for them, things change. So I think there 434 00:22:00,160 --> 00:22:03,760 Speaker 1: be people who are at retirement age that we're planning 435 00:22:03,760 --> 00:22:05,600 Speaker 1: to stay. A number of them will try to leave 436 00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:09,120 Speaker 1: and others will try to stay. But I do think 437 00:22:09,280 --> 00:22:12,920 Speaker 1: if the incompetence and the real sort of disdain for 438 00:22:13,359 --> 00:22:16,320 Speaker 1: the institutions they run continues, you're going to see not 439 00:22:16,359 --> 00:22:18,840 Speaker 1: as much people leaving, but a lot of more leaking. 440 00:22:19,200 --> 00:22:21,560 Speaker 1: It's gonna be very interesting to be reading the newspaper 441 00:22:21,560 --> 00:22:22,720 Speaker 1: over the next couple of years. 442 00:22:22,760 --> 00:22:25,320 Speaker 2: I think people who followed through on threats like that, 443 00:22:25,359 --> 00:22:27,840 Speaker 2: I'm going to defund the police, right. This is the 444 00:22:27,920 --> 00:22:31,000 Speaker 2: FBI in this case, and the DOJ. It's people like 445 00:22:31,119 --> 00:22:34,760 Speaker 2: pole pot In, like maw Right. They just shut down governments. 446 00:22:34,880 --> 00:22:37,080 Speaker 2: It didn't work out well for them. So I don't 447 00:22:37,080 --> 00:22:39,280 Speaker 2: think cash Hotel is actually going to follow through on this, 448 00:22:39,400 --> 00:22:41,560 Speaker 2: but you can still cause a lot of destruction. I 449 00:22:41,560 --> 00:22:43,640 Speaker 2: think a lot of people just go into internal exile 450 00:22:43,920 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 2: and just try to hang out for four years. I'm 451 00:22:46,840 --> 00:22:50,560 Speaker 2: just really proud that I got Smoot Hawley, Senator reads 452 00:22:50,600 --> 00:22:53,760 Speaker 2: smooth into a show, right. I've been wanting to do 453 00:22:53,800 --> 00:22:58,400 Speaker 2: that forever. 454 00:22:58,880 --> 00:23:03,920 Speaker 7: Mission Implausible produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'shay, John Cipher, 455 00:23:04,240 --> 00:23:08,639 Speaker 7: and Jonathan Stern. The associate producer is Rachel Harner. Mission 456 00:23:08,680 --> 00:23:12,720 Speaker 7: Implausible is a production of Honorable Mention and Abominable pictures 457 00:23:12,760 --> 00:23:14,120 Speaker 7: for iHeart Podcasts.