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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They called

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Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer

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Speaker 1: Alexis code named Doc Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you are you,

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Speaker 1: You are here, and that makes this stuff they don't

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Speaker 1: want you to know. It's the top of the week,

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Speaker 1: which means it's time for some strange news. Uh, We've

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Speaker 1: we've got a lot, got a lot going on today.

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Speaker 1: We sometimes will hop on our group thread and say,

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Speaker 1: you know, like kick ideas back and forth. And one

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Speaker 1: one beautiful thing that happened behind the behind the curtain

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Speaker 1: today is leading up to today's episode. We were kicking

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Speaker 1: around ideas that we were all kind of on the

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Speaker 1: same page about, uh, where do you where do you

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Speaker 1: guys want to go? First? You want to go to

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Speaker 1: Do you want to go to China? Do you want

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Speaker 1: to go to uh Myanmar formerly Burma? Do you want

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Speaker 1: to go to Russia? We're going to all of these places.

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Speaker 1: By the way, folks. So I hope at least one

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Speaker 1: of those sounded exciting to you in the audience. I

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Speaker 1: feel like Myanmar might be the top story. Sure, absolutely.

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Speaker 1: Now I bring this story to the table today knowing

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Speaker 1: some things, but not many things, and I will be

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Speaker 1: leaning on you folk, to you gents, just to help

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Speaker 1: me get through some of this. Just putting that out

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Speaker 1: there as a disclaimer before we jump in. I am

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Speaker 1: using a timeline, a chronology of events in the history

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Speaker 1: of Myanmar and Burma um. It is on BBC dot com.

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Speaker 1: The title, if you're looking for it, is Meanmar Profile

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Speaker 1: dash Timeline. It's just got everything going back all the

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Speaker 1: way to ten fifty seven ce. BBC is great for those,

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Speaker 1: by the way, they have one for pretty much every

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Speaker 1: country exactly. If you ever just want to get a

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Speaker 1: basic idea of important things that have happened, check it out.

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Speaker 1: Turns out Brits are very organized and good at chronology.

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Speaker 1: Well they're a little biased, but yeah, yeah we um. Also,

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Speaker 1: if you're looking for a little bit of vicarious travel

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Speaker 1: and you want to learn more, I think we've recommended

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Speaker 1: this on the air before. Check out Wiki travel articles.

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Speaker 1: Take them with a wheelbarrow of salt, but do check

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Speaker 1: them out. There are a lot of fun absolutely, and

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Speaker 1: for the purposes of this story, there's a second timeline

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Speaker 1: for more recent events that is very helpful to look

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Speaker 1: at if you wanted to follow along or think about

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Speaker 1: what's occurring here, just get some more some more info

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Speaker 1: for yourself is on Al Jazeera. It's called Me and

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Speaker 1: Mar Timeline of a Fragile Democracy. I believe it starts

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Speaker 1: in seven Yeah, so that'll be helpful. Just keep those

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Speaker 1: things in mind. All right. I'm actually going to a

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Speaker 1: very different news source, something very much US based, CBS

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Speaker 1: News for the article that kind of brought me into

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Speaker 1: the conversation and down the rabbit hole. It is titled

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Speaker 1: European leaders condemn coup as Me and Mars military seizes power,

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Speaker 1: detains a song su Chi. Now this kind of just

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Speaker 1: popped up in my news feed and started learning about it.

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Speaker 1: Let's talk about what's happening, um ben. I would just

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Speaker 1: say again at the top here, this feels like an

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Speaker 1: episode like very much worth our time. So we may

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Speaker 1: not hit everything right now, but we'll give you the

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Speaker 1: lay of the land. Something very interesting happened in Me

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Speaker 1: and Mar again, formerly Burma has been mentioned there. It's

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Speaker 1: uh oh wow, I got rid of my map, but

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Speaker 1: you can check out me and more of the country.

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Speaker 1: It is in Asia. It is to the east of

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Speaker 1: India and to the west of Thailand. You can think

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Speaker 1: about it being over there. It's got a very interesting

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Speaker 1: history over the years. The most important thing for you

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Speaker 1: to know in this context is that for for a

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Speaker 1: number of years up until two thousand eleven, I believe

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Speaker 1: Ben correct me if I'm wrong here, UH, it was

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Speaker 1: controlled by essentially a military junta. The military was largely

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Speaker 1: in control of what happened in the country and functioned

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Speaker 1: as a government. And then some things changed in two

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Speaker 1: thousand eleven where the military kind of took a step

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Speaker 1: back and some elections were held, and then the trajectory

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Speaker 1: of the country felt like it was moving towards democracy,

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Speaker 1: if not fully taking up democracy as its new way forward.

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Speaker 1: And then after a large series of events in November

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Speaker 1: of that year, UH, this this party called the Opposition

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Speaker 1: National League for Democracy. UH. They which is led by

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Speaker 1: on San su Chi, which is the person that was

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Speaker 1: detained very recently. So what a lot of the hubub

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Speaker 1: is about. Um she was actually able well, she and

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Speaker 1: her party were able to get enough parliamentary seats in

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Speaker 1: order to form a government, which is a big deal.

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Speaker 1: It's very then we can talk about this maybe just

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Speaker 1: for a moment. Democracies in a lot of countries function

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Speaker 1: very differently than here in the United States with our

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Speaker 1: two party system, where essentially whoever wins the presidency kind

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Speaker 1: of controls that House over here, and then whoever you know,

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Speaker 1: within the House and Congress. Each seat is individually elected,

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Speaker 1: rather than you know, one person or one majority wins

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Speaker 1: a certain number of votes and then they get to

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Speaker 1: form their own group in parliament. Right, Yeah, we're looking

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Speaker 1: in in many democracies outside of the United States. What

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Speaker 1: we're looking at is the formation of coalitions. So say

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Speaker 1: you have a party, say you have like a Green Party,

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Speaker 1: and then you have um, I don't know, mad live

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Speaker 1: the words. However you want the Conservative Socialist Party or

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Speaker 1: the Democratic Libertarian Party or whatever, and they can't all

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Speaker 1: quite get a majority rules, so they vultron up together

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Speaker 1: and do their best to create a coherent platform based

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Speaker 1: on the goals that each of those groups prioritizes. So

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Speaker 1: we can get messy and make for strange bedfellows at times,

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Speaker 1: but it is it does tend to be better for

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Speaker 1: the average citizen in those countries because they are more

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Speaker 1: likely to have at least some of their values represented

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Speaker 1: in government versus you know, um, look how ridiculously difficult

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Speaker 1: it is by design to start a viable third party

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Speaker 1: in the US with any chance of winning significant positions

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Speaker 1: in office. M hm. Such a good point then, So

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Speaker 1: so we're talking about this occurring in things are infinitely

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Speaker 1: complicated up until this year, in this month, February. Um,

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Speaker 1: in in November, I believe of last year there were elections.

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Speaker 1: I want to say that's true. Yeah, I believe there

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Speaker 1: were elections in November, and and there was there appeared

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Speaker 1: to be a landslide victory for that same party Unsung

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Speaker 1: Succi was leading. And the army itself took kind of

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Speaker 1: kind of mirrors what was happening in the United States

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Speaker 1: here with our elections. The army just said, there is

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Speaker 1: this is not right. The there has been voter manipulation.

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Speaker 1: There has been someone has messed with these numbers. This

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Speaker 1: is this election is a fraud. And the army itself,

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Speaker 1: there's a chief Minong Klang. He he took power. Essentially,

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Speaker 1: the military took power in the country in a full

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Speaker 1: on coup, and that is what's happening right now. They

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Speaker 1: ended up detaining many members of that party that won

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Speaker 1: the election and others who essentially opposed the military rule.

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Speaker 1: I'm gonna jump back to that CBS article to actually

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Speaker 1: read some of this to you. It's weird the way

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Speaker 1: with the way it happened. On television there in Mayan

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Speaker 1: mar there is a military run network, and on in

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Speaker 1: this network, someone one of the one of the anchors,

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Speaker 1: I assumer, someone who was regularly appearing, came on and

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Speaker 1: just announced that the military has taken control of the

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Speaker 1: country and it will be in control for one year.

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Speaker 1: And it's just kind of all happened at once. People

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Speaker 1: were detained and then the announcement came through, and all

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Speaker 1: of a sudden life in Myanmar as just a regular

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Speaker 1: citizen has has changed. Um, everything got flipped turned upside down,

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Speaker 1: as they say, sorry, sorry, you know. And of course

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Speaker 1: on the western side, in the United States and in

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Speaker 1: many parts of Europe, everyone is coming out of the

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Speaker 1: woodwork and saying this is terrible, this is awful. I mean,

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Speaker 1: obviously it is right anytime a democratic election is overthrown

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Speaker 1: by the might essentially of a military power within that government.

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Speaker 1: It's probably not a good thing in the long run,

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Speaker 1: at least, it's kind of a hard, hard thing to

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Speaker 1: put a value judgment on. But generally when when a

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Speaker 1: strong arm comes through and just forces action, it's less

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Speaker 1: good than if the people decide something. Yeah, he says,

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Speaker 1: just to clarify. Essentially, a military junta is it's like

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Speaker 1: a coup from within. I mean, it's it's like a

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Speaker 1: a strong man military official usurping the power of elected

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Speaker 1: officials or of whomever is supposedly in charge, and then

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Speaker 1: wielding his influence over the military and using that to

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Speaker 1: you know, cause a sea change in government. And it's

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Speaker 1: it's pretty controversial because of military. Uh. Military intervention of

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Speaker 1: this sort has has often been portrayed as a good

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Speaker 1: thing in other cases across the world and over time,

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Speaker 1: like interfering to prevent the rise of extremism or fascism.

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Speaker 1: These things are can be considered part of a military's

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Speaker 1: constitutional duty, you know, enemies abroad, domestic and abroad. But

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Speaker 1: in this case, there is a big, big red badger

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Speaker 1: just over the horizon that has that has a lot

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Speaker 1: of influence in Miamar and Matt, I think we'll get

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Speaker 1: to that in a in a second. Well, yeah, well,

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Speaker 1: I mean it's it's exactly what you're talking about. The

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Speaker 1: Constitution of Myanmar was formed jointly with the military, UM

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Speaker 1: and there is a at least according to the television

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Speaker 1: station that is owned by the military. When they announced this,

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Speaker 1: they said that there was there's a section of the

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Speaker 1: constitution that allows the military to take over in a

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Speaker 1: time of national emergency. So essentially an emergency was declared

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Speaker 1: for the length of one year, and the moment it

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Speaker 1: was declared, the military is now in power at least

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Speaker 1: according to the people who are causing this coup um,

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Speaker 1: and they will stay in power for one year UM.

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Speaker 1: And they specifically said the takeover was in part due

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Speaker 1: to this is this is what I'm getting from CBS News.

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Speaker 1: The government's failure to act on the military's claims. Now

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Speaker 1: that's important, the military's claims of voter fraud in the

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Speaker 1: November election, and it's it's failure to postpone the election

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Speaker 1: because of the coronavirus crisis. Well, they demanded they demanded

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Speaker 1: a recounts, which was not granted because from what I understand,

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Speaker 1: the country's election commission, Uh did not see evidence of fraud.

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Speaker 1: But yeah, but if you look at the military's perspectives

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Speaker 1: from their public statements, they say they're doing this as

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Speaker 1: a legal, proactive, and preventative move to maintain stability, which

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Speaker 1: is an odd thing to say with a straight face,

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Speaker 1: given that these events forced all the banks to close, shops,

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Speaker 1: running out of food, communication infrastructures could put these those

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Speaker 1: three things alone. Are surprised. Is not the hallmarks of

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Speaker 1: a stable government. Yeah, it's a serious issue, and it's

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Speaker 1: panic that comes from this kind of action, right you,

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Speaker 1: and uncertainty about what's to come. So you know, every everyday,

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Speaker 1: people like you listening and me and everybody on this

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Speaker 1: zoom call, if something like this starts going down, one

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Speaker 1: of the first things you try and do is prepare

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Speaker 1: yourself and your family with whatever essentials you need, with

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Speaker 1: maybe cash if you can get as much cash out

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Speaker 1: as you can, just in case you have to make

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Speaker 1: moves um and the banks stopped working all of a

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Speaker 1: sudden at some point. Uh. That's yeah, that kind of

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Speaker 1: panic is is happening right now and we'll probably continue

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Speaker 1: for quite a while. I can only imagine the fear

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Speaker 1: that's generated in a moment like this. One important point

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Speaker 1: to make here is that like what, yes, this is

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Speaker 1: this can be considered a coup, but how much of

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Speaker 1: a change is it? Because the military dictatorship went out

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Speaker 1: of power ostensibly in but not really, not really if

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Speaker 1: you look at it, because it was able to force

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Speaker 1: a compromise with the new government where it was granted

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Speaker 1: of the seats in parliament. And so if you asked

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Speaker 1: the average person familiar with the situation, the real see,

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Speaker 1: the real secret, not a secret here is that the

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Speaker 1: military and the junta could close its hands around the

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Speaker 1: neck of the government any time it wanted to. They

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Speaker 1: just didn't for a while until you know this week.

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Speaker 1: Jeez oh, they also had a veto over any constitutional changes. Wow,

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Speaker 1: I did. I didn't even realize that. There's so much

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Speaker 1: to be learned here. And I'm just gonna say one

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Speaker 1: more time, this is worth us looking at for a

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Speaker 1: full episode, really giving you a good background on me

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Speaker 1: and mar and what's been happening there and then all

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Speaker 1: the d hills, because we're gonna be learning a lot

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Speaker 1: more over the course of this week of what's going down.

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Speaker 1: A couple more things we can tell you here before

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Speaker 1: we wrap this section. That same military TV network stated

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Speaker 1: that the generals in charge of the country now because

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Speaker 1: I remember immediately they become in charge of the country,

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Speaker 1: had removed a total of twenty four government ministers and

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Speaker 1: deputy ministers and replaced them with eleven handpicked replacements. So

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Speaker 1: they just picked out their own people and put them

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Speaker 1: in power there. They also mentioned that the new commander

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Speaker 1: in chief would be a person who this this person

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Speaker 1: that took over that already mentioned General Menong Klang h

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Speaker 1: l A I n g would be in charge, but

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Speaker 1: there's a sitting vice president Mint Sway m y i

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Speaker 1: n T s w E would be elevated to acting

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Speaker 1: president um And this person is also a general who

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Speaker 1: who is apparently at least according to CBS News and

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Speaker 1: I don't I don't know the full story here yet,

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Speaker 1: but is best known for a crackdown on Buddhist monks

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Speaker 1: and that occurred in two thousand seven. And this person

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Speaker 1: was it is a close ally of former junta leader

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Speaker 1: uh Faun Sway s h w V can I put

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Speaker 1: in two points place. Succi is also has also come

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Speaker 1: under fire for persecution of the Rohinga Muslims. Uh you

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Speaker 1: may have heard that headline in the news in past years. UH.

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Speaker 1: And one crazy thing that I hope that will explore

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Speaker 1: for sure in the full episode is I am wondering,

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Speaker 1: not without basis you guys, I am wondering whether this

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Speaker 1: newest coup was in part uh motivated by astrology. What

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Speaker 1: are we talking about? Don't ruin yourself, don't search, don't

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Speaker 1: search yet We'll make it worth your while. Astrology. All

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Speaker 1: of this, UH makes me think of, you know, the idea, oh,

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Speaker 1: this would never happen in the United States. Um. But

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Speaker 1: then you mentioned the kind of potential positive version of this,

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Speaker 1: where a military coup could overtake, you know, a power

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Speaker 1: grab by an overreaching president or or or or whatever government, right. Um.

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Speaker 1: And it seems like, you know, we got to a

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Speaker 1: place pretty recently that the borderline approach that. But it

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Speaker 1: also makes me think of the plot of the fantastic

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Speaker 1: Stanley Kubrick movie UH, Doctor Strange Love, where in a

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Speaker 1: lone rogue high level military general essentially hijacks the entire

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Speaker 1: military and orders a an attack on the U s

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Speaker 1: SR that will ultimately result in UH mutual destruction. UM.

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Speaker 1: And there are certain safeguards in place that he uses

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Speaker 1: that prevent any intervention in this. If anyone hasn't seen that,

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Speaker 1: I think that's a really great, uh, you know, satirical

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Speaker 1: example of what can happen when one person has too

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Speaker 1: much our Yeah, no, for sure. I I want to

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Speaker 1: just remind everybody and imagine the scenario. Imagine you are

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Speaker 1: wherever you are, UM, maybe in Kansas somewhere, maybe in

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Speaker 1: the middle of Los Angeles, wherever you are listening to this.

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Speaker 1: Imagine that all of a sudden you go to turn

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Speaker 1: on the television and none of the stations are coming in.

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Speaker 1: For some reason, you can't get access to you know,

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Speaker 1: Verizon or whatever it is you know, a T and T.

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Speaker 1: Nothing's just no signals coming through. So you try to

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Speaker 1: log in, but for some reason your WiFi can't connect

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Speaker 1: out to the internet, and you don't understand what's going on.

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Speaker 1: You try and make a phone call to a relative

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Speaker 1: or some of a friend that lives nearby, but the

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Speaker 1: phone isn't making connections to anybody else. Just just imagine

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Speaker 1: that that begins occurring, um and imagine living through that.

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Speaker 1: And how I know I would be in a state

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Speaker 1: of serious panic if that were occurring, and I would

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Speaker 1: be hunkered down immediately. Um. That happened to many, many,

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Speaker 1: many people when this When this went down, dude, people

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Speaker 1: freaked out the season finale of The Sopranos when their

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Speaker 1: TV went black for a split second, like what happened?

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Speaker 1: Like the world collectively kind of lost their minds, thinking

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Speaker 1: that like the cable had all gone out at the

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Speaker 1: same time or something. I mean, absolutely, dude, if if

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Speaker 1: I felt like all of a sudden communication was cut

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Speaker 1: off from more than one source, I would absolutely be panicking.

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Speaker 1: Pro tip, if you can you have the ability to

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Speaker 1: do so, highly recommend keeping a landline phone. They're antiquated. Uh,

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Speaker 1: they're not super useful the way that mobile phones are,

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Speaker 1: but they have one important advantage that a lot of

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Speaker 1: people are not aware of. If you have a corded phone,

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Speaker 1: a landline phone, it'll work during a power outage. It's

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Speaker 1: because because the same thing that allows voy to carry

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Speaker 1: also powers the phone. So keep one. If you're feeling

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Speaker 1: especially paranoid or you think that your ability to communicate

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Speaker 1: might be compromised. Is a coupever good thing? It's a

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Speaker 1: good question, at least typically the way these are supposed

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Speaker 1: to occur. If it's in a good case is that

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Speaker 1: the military intervenes for a limited window of time, and

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Speaker 1: during that window of time they facilitate free and fair elections,

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Speaker 1: and then they transfer back to a civilian government. They're

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Speaker 1: just supposed to come in and cameo. They're not supposed

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Speaker 1: to rule for you know, fifty four years or something.

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Speaker 1: So that's that's part of why there's that limited time

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Speaker 1: frame of one year. But will that result in a

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Speaker 1: free and fair election, I don't know, because the civilians

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Speaker 1: in the military don't seem to agree on what constitutes

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Speaker 1: of real election exactly. All right, So well, we will

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Speaker 1: keep looking out for update, done this and hopefully come

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Speaker 1: back with more info very soon. For now, we're going

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Speaker 1: to take a quick break. Here's some sponsors, and then

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Speaker 1: we'll be right back. And we've returned. I want to

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Speaker 1: thank everybody who's reached out to me on Instagram or

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Speaker 1: on Twitter, or has reached out to us on the

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Speaker 1: Facebook group page. Here's where it gets crazy. Uh, there

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Speaker 1: is an awesome story that just came out solving a

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Speaker 1: very old mystery. Uh. This is going to be familiar

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Speaker 1: to any of our long time listeners and fellow conspiracy

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Speaker 1: realist folks. Dealt Love Pass. This is a tale that

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Speaker 1: is um core conspiracy lore. You know, I I love

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Speaker 1: the classic stuff. They don't want you to know vibe

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Speaker 1: about this. Uh, it's it's a hell of us story.

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Speaker 1: I'll give you a breakdown of the story itself, quicking dirty,

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Speaker 1: and then we can explore the problems with that story

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Speaker 1: and we can explore the news. So, Ben, before you

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Speaker 1: get into this, you're saying Pass is solved. Uh maybe, Okay, Okay, good,

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Speaker 1: there's still maybe some mystery. All right, let's keep going.

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Speaker 1: So the Dat Love Pass incident refers to a series

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Speaker 1: of events that occurred in February nineteen fifty nine, exactly

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Speaker 1: sixty two years to the day as we record today.

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Speaker 1: Strange news. So back in February nine fifty nine and

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Speaker 1: the Northern Ural Mountains, nine Russian hikers died somehow during

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Speaker 1: the nights while they were camping in a site they

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Speaker 1: had cut from the snow slope of the mountains. Uh,

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Speaker 1: something happened. No one was sure what, but whatever happened

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Speaker 1: was fatal, and there were were puzzling things at the

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Speaker 1: crime scene. First, several, uh, several folks were inadequately dressed.

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Speaker 1: It seemed they had thrown off their clothes. One hiker's

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Speaker 1: tongue was missing. Uh Also, there was a lot of

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Speaker 1: physical trauma, and then later rumors would muddy the story.

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Speaker 1: But we know that the Soviet authorities who investigated this

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Speaker 1: determined that six had died from hypothermium, three had been

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Speaker 1: killed by physical trauma. And there's a phrase they used

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Speaker 1: which was an unknown overwhelming force depending on how you translated.

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Speaker 1: This was seen immediately as a cover up and very soon.

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Speaker 1: To remember, the story circulated before the rise of civilian internet,

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Speaker 1: so very soon new stuff got added to the mix.

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Speaker 1: You'll hear allegations that there were high radiation levels. You'll

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Speaker 1: hear allegations that people were even glowing, or that there

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Speaker 1: was unidentified aerial phenomena in the sky in the in

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Speaker 1: the days leading up to this incident. The problem with this,

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Speaker 1: for skeptics and true believers and conspiracy realist alike is

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Speaker 1: that one this occurred under the purview of a notoriously

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Speaker 1: secretive government, uh to a lot of time passed before

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Speaker 1: this story really got its uh like due diligence research

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Speaker 1: wise outside of the USSR. And then the next part

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Speaker 1: is and the skeptics hated this is that there wasn't

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Speaker 1: really solid proof that a mundane event could explain this.

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Speaker 1: So you could say, you could say it was just

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Speaker 1: hypothermia all you want, But then someone who believed something

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Speaker 1: different could say, well, hypothermia the doesn't tear people's tongues out,

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Speaker 1: or hypothermia doesn't crack your skull or give you incredible

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Speaker 1: chest trauma. That's These are just the facts, and it

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Speaker 1: was it was not consistent UH injury to all of them.

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Speaker 1: It wasn't like the same thing. I mean, there were

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Speaker 1: there are variations, right, and it seemed like some intervening

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Speaker 1: force was at play right amidst the various individual victims.

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Speaker 1: So the mystery stands, and it does so much so

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Speaker 1: much for UH shows like stuff they don't want you

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Speaker 1: to know. Matt and I were in the trenches and

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Speaker 1: dat love for a long time. And interestingly enough, it's

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Speaker 1: one of those stories since it never had an explanation

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Speaker 1: that was solid, it's one of those stories that we

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Speaker 1: still get emails about. People still reach out to me

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Speaker 1: on social about this and have for a number of years.

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Speaker 1: We just pointed them to our video on this, and

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Speaker 1: I think several years ago we also did an audio

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Speaker 1: podcast on on these events. So one thing I noticed

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Speaker 1: is that the frequency of people asking about this began

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Speaker 1: to increase. Over you'll see trends like this come and go,

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Speaker 1: depending on any number of factors. But for everyone who

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Speaker 1: wrote in about this, especially if you wrote in congratulations,

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Speaker 1: you're plugged in your oddly prescient my friends, because a

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Speaker 1: new study released claims to have solved this enduring mystery

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Speaker 1: very recently. A study published in Communications, Earth and Environment

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Speaker 1: walked through several computer models too. In their opinion, uh,

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Speaker 1: maybe not conclusively proved, but strongly suggests that we know

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Speaker 1: the murderer of those nine hikers in a weird way.

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Speaker 1: It might have been a self inflicted disaster kind of avalanche.

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Speaker 1: Not the kind you're picturing, folks, not the kind from

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Speaker 1: films about avalanches, not the not the kind of thing, uh,

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00:27:09,920 --> 00:27:14,160
Speaker 1: triggered by Sorrowman in Lord of the Rings when they're

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00:27:14,280 --> 00:27:15,920
Speaker 1: when you know, the thing that drives them back to

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Speaker 1: the minds of Maria. Instead, this is something called a

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Speaker 1: slab avalanche. Um. Not to sound dismissive her clib but

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Speaker 1: I feel like they missed an opportunity to call it

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Speaker 1: a slab balanche, which is just it was right there. Uh,

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Speaker 1: here's what happened. The reason that we say this doesn't

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Speaker 1: really compare to the avalanches of film and fiction is

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Speaker 1: because typically those avalanches appear to happen as an instant

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Speaker 1: a to b if then reaction. But the truth is

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Speaker 1: these actual avalanches, the ones that they're describing in the study,

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Speaker 1: which we'll get into in a second, Uh, they have

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Speaker 1: kind of a timer on them. An avalanche can happen

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Speaker 1: minutes after the event that creates it, or it can

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Speaker 1: happen hours and hours later. And this snow slide, this

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Speaker 1: slab blanche, according to the authors of this study, could

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Speaker 1: account for a lot of the missing pieces of information

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Speaker 1: the bedeviled skeptics and conspiracy realist alike for for decades.

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Speaker 1: For again, in sixty two years comes to us from

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Speaker 1: Johan Guam, who is the head of the snow Avalanche

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Speaker 1: Simulation Laboratory, and Alexander Pouzin, who is the chair of

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Speaker 1: Geotechnical Engineering at e t H Zurich. They dug deep, guys.

429
00:28:42,280 --> 00:28:46,600
Speaker 1: They poured over as much declassified Soviet research on this

430
00:28:46,720 --> 00:28:50,600
Speaker 1: as they could, and then they took the latest avalanche

431
00:28:50,640 --> 00:28:55,000
Speaker 1: research and simulations and tried to plug in this data

432
00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:59,280
Speaker 1: trying to essentially recreate the crime scene on a computer.

433
00:29:00,280 --> 00:29:03,600
Speaker 1: I want to pause here. When we have talked about

434
00:29:03,800 --> 00:29:07,600
Speaker 1: thatt Love in the past, what what did you guys think.

435
00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:10,160
Speaker 1: I didn't think it was just an avalanch. I thought

436
00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:13,160
Speaker 1: it was some kind of like murderer situation or some

437
00:29:13,280 --> 00:29:17,880
Speaker 1: kind of ritualistic something. When you hear about smashed skulls

438
00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:21,720
Speaker 1: and missing tongues, my brain immediately goes to psychopath on

439
00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:25,440
Speaker 1: the loose. It was he was always cryptid for me, Eddie,

440
00:29:26,080 --> 00:29:31,000
Speaker 1: or some some type of large creature was causing me him.

441
00:29:31,920 --> 00:29:36,520
Speaker 1: I was into the idea of secret technology myself, you know,

442
00:29:36,600 --> 00:29:39,880
Speaker 1: I thought I thought that would work with the Cold

443
00:29:39,920 --> 00:29:44,840
Speaker 1: War era experimentation that was so frequent back in the day.

444
00:29:45,920 --> 00:29:48,040
Speaker 1: By the way, that doesn't mean that's what we actually

445
00:29:48,480 --> 00:29:52,920
Speaker 1: think happened. That's just kind of our well what how

446
00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:57,040
Speaker 1: did you call it? Our pet theory? I guess so

447
00:29:58,240 --> 00:30:00,600
Speaker 1: you Here are some of the missing pieces that the

448
00:30:00,640 --> 00:30:04,640
Speaker 1: authors of the study were bothered by. First, this is

449
00:30:04,680 --> 00:30:10,960
Speaker 1: your grizzly fact for today, folks. First, most people in avalanches,

450
00:30:11,120 --> 00:30:14,280
Speaker 1: if they die, they don't die due to broken bones

451
00:30:14,720 --> 00:30:19,120
Speaker 1: or brain trauma or anything like that. They die bi asphyxiation,

452
00:30:19,840 --> 00:30:22,959
Speaker 1: they're buried alive. It's a very unclean way to go.

453
00:30:23,720 --> 00:30:28,680
Speaker 1: And this is where challengers to the avalanche theory really

454
00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:33,720
Speaker 1: butter their bread, because if you look at the slope

455
00:30:33,760 --> 00:30:37,320
Speaker 1: and the incline of where the hikers chose to camp,

456
00:30:37,640 --> 00:30:39,600
Speaker 1: it doesn't look like a hill. It doesn't look like

457
00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:42,840
Speaker 1: very avalanche friendly territory, you know what I mean. It's

458
00:30:42,840 --> 00:30:46,320
Speaker 1: a slope, but it's not like a harsh mountain face

459
00:30:46,520 --> 00:30:50,680
Speaker 1: and a steep incline. Uh. And they it's quite likely

460
00:30:50,760 --> 00:30:53,760
Speaker 1: that the hikers, who knew what they were doing, purposely

461
00:30:53,880 --> 00:30:56,560
Speaker 1: selected this site because it looked like there's it's not

462
00:30:56,680 --> 00:31:03,000
Speaker 1: avalanche territory. But when they camping, according to the authors here,

463
00:31:03,040 --> 00:31:08,240
Speaker 1: what they did is they cut into the snow, into

464
00:31:08,800 --> 00:31:12,320
Speaker 1: the uh, into the slope the same way that you

465
00:31:12,400 --> 00:31:15,760
Speaker 1: might see like a ranch style home built into a

466
00:31:15,880 --> 00:31:18,960
Speaker 1: hill on the in the suburbs split level, or a

467
00:31:19,000 --> 00:31:22,280
Speaker 1: hobbit hole built into the side of a of a hill. Sure,

468
00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:27,840
Speaker 1: and the thing that happened was that they triggered an avalanche,

469
00:31:28,720 --> 00:31:34,200
Speaker 1: and the avalanche took several hours to get to them, uh,

470
00:31:34,320 --> 00:31:37,560
Speaker 1: several hours to reach kind of a critical mass and

471
00:31:37,560 --> 00:31:39,760
Speaker 1: and ensue. You know, think they would have noticed that

472
00:31:39,840 --> 00:31:42,080
Speaker 1: or it would have awakened them the vibrations or even

473
00:31:42,080 --> 00:31:45,880
Speaker 1: off further in the distance. Uh well maybe, but not

474
00:31:45,880 --> 00:31:49,200
Speaker 1: not giving them enough time to run away, because they

475
00:31:49,240 --> 00:31:52,959
Speaker 1: would have when it happened. It happened very quickly, and

476
00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:57,400
Speaker 1: the tensions leading up to it, according to this idea,

477
00:31:57,480 --> 00:32:00,920
Speaker 1: would not have been super easy to certain if you're

478
00:32:00,960 --> 00:32:04,280
Speaker 1: just a human hiking with the technology they had. So

479
00:32:04,840 --> 00:32:10,000
Speaker 1: a slab avalanche occurs when there's a dense slab of

480
00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:14,959
Speaker 1: snow that's sitting over a snow layer that's weaker, so

481
00:32:15,000 --> 00:32:19,760
Speaker 1: it's already kind of heavy and haphazard, and when there's

482
00:32:19,800 --> 00:32:23,880
Speaker 1: some sort of trigger that compromises that weaker snow or

483
00:32:24,120 --> 00:32:27,880
Speaker 1: you know, pushes harder on that that strong slab than

484
00:32:28,360 --> 00:32:32,640
Speaker 1: it eventually tips over it falls, it creates a snow slide.

485
00:32:32,840 --> 00:32:35,920
Speaker 1: And this can occur on slopes with an angle of

486
00:32:36,320 --> 00:32:40,000
Speaker 1: fewer than thirty degrees. So something that doesn't look like

487
00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:45,080
Speaker 1: avalanche territory again, And the other thing is another question.

488
00:32:45,480 --> 00:32:49,160
Speaker 1: Avalanches are big, right why didn't somebody else notice this?

489
00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:54,360
Speaker 1: And Soviet authorities are well acquainted with avalanches. Russia is

490
00:32:54,440 --> 00:33:00,800
Speaker 1: a snow filled country. This avalanche could have been comparatively small,

491
00:33:01,680 --> 00:33:05,560
Speaker 1: and if it were small enough, rescuers wouldn't see signs

492
00:33:05,640 --> 00:33:10,080
Speaker 1: of an avalanche later. But even the smallest of these

493
00:33:10,080 --> 00:33:16,120
Speaker 1: slab avalanches can weigh hundreds and hundreds of pounds, meaning

494
00:33:16,160 --> 00:33:18,800
Speaker 1: that if you were depending on where you're standing when

495
00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:22,360
Speaker 1: it hit, you could have your bones broken, you could

496
00:33:22,400 --> 00:33:25,400
Speaker 1: have your skull cracked, you could have your ribs crushed.

497
00:33:26,600 --> 00:33:31,160
Speaker 1: So this is this is where they're at. And they

498
00:33:31,200 --> 00:33:35,560
Speaker 1: did various simulations not just of how this would occur,

499
00:33:35,880 --> 00:33:41,760
Speaker 1: but of how people would be injured like in this scenario. Well,

500
00:33:41,800 --> 00:33:44,600
Speaker 1: and the other thing then is is we know that

501
00:33:44,640 --> 00:33:47,960
Speaker 1: some people some of the group did die there. They

502
00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:50,520
Speaker 1: perished in the tent or right near the tent, But

503
00:33:50,560 --> 00:33:55,280
Speaker 1: then there are others who died further away. Is there

504
00:33:55,320 --> 00:33:59,280
Speaker 1: anything discussing what may have happened to them? Great question, Matt,

505
00:33:59,680 --> 00:34:02,800
Speaker 1: and something that I'm glad to say the authors are

506
00:34:03,000 --> 00:34:08,640
Speaker 1: aware of, because they still they don't claim with certitude

507
00:34:09,080 --> 00:34:14,000
Speaker 1: that this is the silver bullet solution. Instead, they say

508
00:34:14,040 --> 00:34:16,520
Speaker 1: in a documentary about this paper that was just released,

509
00:34:17,000 --> 00:34:20,040
Speaker 1: they say, personally, we do not believe that the mystery

510
00:34:20,080 --> 00:34:23,480
Speaker 1: can ever be solved because no one survived to tell

511
00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:26,360
Speaker 1: the story. What we did in our paper is to

512
00:34:26,400 --> 00:34:30,600
Speaker 1: show the plausibility of the avalanche hypothesis based on solid

513
00:34:30,920 --> 00:34:36,520
Speaker 1: physical and experimental evidence in a way. Matt Um, I

514
00:34:36,520 --> 00:34:40,880
Speaker 1: guess you could call this a kind of non living

515
00:34:41,440 --> 00:34:45,400
Speaker 1: cryptod because it's such an unusual kind of avalanche, you

516
00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:48,320
Speaker 1: know what I mean, It hasn't it took our species

517
00:34:48,320 --> 00:34:51,640
Speaker 1: sixty two years to think about this, and it's just

518
00:34:51,680 --> 00:34:54,640
Speaker 1: really quickly, like I mean, when you're talking about the

519
00:34:54,719 --> 00:34:57,080
Speaker 1: way it moves, you know, you think of an avalanche

520
00:34:57,120 --> 00:34:59,600
Speaker 1: as being like powdery snow, and people would typically die

521
00:34:59,640 --> 00:35:04,239
Speaker 1: from a fixiation. This is literally huge rigid pieces that

522
00:35:04,560 --> 00:35:07,520
Speaker 1: coming down this uh, the side of the mountain where

523
00:35:07,520 --> 00:35:10,280
Speaker 1: there camped, could have hit them on the edge, coming

524
00:35:10,320 --> 00:35:13,200
Speaker 1: down like almost like a giant slab of marble and

525
00:35:13,239 --> 00:35:16,840
Speaker 1: then knocked you know, their skulls open, or literally you know,

526
00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:19,080
Speaker 1: could have caught someone by the jaw and and and

527
00:35:19,200 --> 00:35:22,640
Speaker 1: rip their tongue out. Is that the conjecture here? Yeah, yeah,

528
00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:25,920
Speaker 1: quite possibly. I mean at that point we're still talking

529
00:35:25,960 --> 00:35:33,200
Speaker 1: about um various likelihoods with no with no solid proof, right,

530
00:35:33,880 --> 00:35:37,160
Speaker 1: so we have to remember it also took the original

531
00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:42,120
Speaker 1: rescuers several months to recover the bodies of all nine hikers.

532
00:35:42,160 --> 00:35:45,239
Speaker 1: They were definitely on a man hunts. I would like

533
00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:49,680
Speaker 1: to shout out Vice and Smithsonian mag for some excellent

534
00:35:49,760 --> 00:35:56,440
Speaker 1: reporting on this, as well as the St. Petersburg Times. Uh,

535
00:35:56,760 --> 00:35:59,879
Speaker 1: here's the thing about missing organs. And this is kind

536
00:35:59,880 --> 00:36:02,279
Speaker 1: of gross and explicit, but I think a lot of

537
00:36:02,520 --> 00:36:04,400
Speaker 1: a lot of folks have spent time in the wild

538
00:36:04,440 --> 00:36:08,720
Speaker 1: are familiar with this. Uh. Scavengers go for the soft

539
00:36:08,920 --> 00:36:13,160
Speaker 1: stuff first. Those are the delicacies. The eyeballs, the tongue,

540
00:36:13,760 --> 00:36:18,800
Speaker 1: the you know, your unmentionables. Those those things are easy

541
00:36:19,000 --> 00:36:23,040
Speaker 1: for creatures to access, and there are a lot less

542
00:36:23,080 --> 00:36:27,520
Speaker 1: work than say, trying to uh gnaw at bone marrow

543
00:36:27,960 --> 00:36:30,040
Speaker 1: things like that. Right, you have to be a scavenger

544
00:36:30,080 --> 00:36:34,799
Speaker 1: specifically adapted to that sort of diet. So it's completely

545
00:36:34,840 --> 00:36:40,000
Speaker 1: plausible that one of the victims, such as uh Ludomelia Dubinina,

546
00:36:40,640 --> 00:36:45,040
Speaker 1: was missing both eyeballs and her tongue because something happened

547
00:36:45,040 --> 00:36:49,120
Speaker 1: along after the avalanche occurred and after she expired, and

548
00:36:49,160 --> 00:36:51,640
Speaker 1: then it ate the eyes and the tongue and continued

549
00:36:51,719 --> 00:36:58,160
Speaker 1: upon its way. Yeah, So then do just positives. What

550
00:36:58,200 --> 00:37:02,239
Speaker 1: I'm imagining is, does avalanche occurs at the side of

551
00:37:02,280 --> 00:37:05,479
Speaker 1: the tent where they dug out from the side right,

552
00:37:05,880 --> 00:37:09,800
Speaker 1: causing that avalanche to the slab to slide on top

553
00:37:09,880 --> 00:37:13,160
Speaker 1: of one of the other layers. The heavy stuff kills

554
00:37:13,480 --> 00:37:17,520
Speaker 1: some people almost immediately or at least gravely injures them.

555
00:37:17,640 --> 00:37:22,880
Speaker 1: Then maybe people who have survived that initial sliding slab

556
00:37:24,320 --> 00:37:27,359
Speaker 1: gather each other up, who are able to walk, and

557
00:37:27,400 --> 00:37:29,879
Speaker 1: try to get the heck out of there, and then

558
00:37:31,000 --> 00:37:34,480
Speaker 1: maybe freeze and that's what that's how they Yeah, yeah,

559
00:37:34,520 --> 00:37:39,920
Speaker 1: the idea is that, uh, they were sleeping the slab struck. Uh.

560
00:37:40,200 --> 00:37:44,560
Speaker 1: The they those who could ran searching for shelter at

561
00:37:44,560 --> 00:37:47,759
Speaker 1: a at a ridge nearby to get a sense of

562
00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:51,040
Speaker 1: the weather conditions. They couldn't see much further than maybe

563
00:37:51,160 --> 00:37:55,160
Speaker 1: fifty ft in front of them themselves, and so they

564
00:37:55,280 --> 00:37:58,320
Speaker 1: froze to death as they were trying to find shelter,

565
00:37:58,400 --> 00:38:00,480
Speaker 1: and then as they were trying to make their back

566
00:38:00,600 --> 00:38:05,319
Speaker 1: to the tent. Perhaps and again, the Soviet government's lack

567
00:38:05,360 --> 00:38:12,200
Speaker 1: of transparency, uh, the official findings, lack of scientific details

568
00:38:13,239 --> 00:38:16,759
Speaker 1: made for a perfect storm of conspiracy. And you know,

569
00:38:16,880 --> 00:38:21,720
Speaker 1: in oddly enough, the current Russian government had announced plans

570
00:38:21,760 --> 00:38:28,319
Speaker 1: to reinvestigate this incident, so reframing of this is um

571
00:38:28,560 --> 00:38:31,200
Speaker 1: was in the cards for a while. They they opened

572
00:38:31,320 --> 00:38:34,960
Speaker 1: a new investigation, and part of it, I think is

573
00:38:35,600 --> 00:38:41,160
Speaker 1: just recognize the importance I enclosure for the families and

574
00:38:41,239 --> 00:38:45,320
Speaker 1: relatives of those who passed away, and hopefully taking lessons

575
00:38:45,400 --> 00:38:49,200
Speaker 1: learned so that we understand situations like these when they

576
00:38:49,280 --> 00:38:52,399
Speaker 1: occur in the future again, which is again just it's

577
00:38:52,440 --> 00:38:56,320
Speaker 1: a statistical certainty that something like this would occur again.

578
00:38:57,840 --> 00:39:02,280
Speaker 1: But it has critics. That's the other thing. The slab

579
00:39:02,280 --> 00:39:06,879
Speaker 1: a blanche has has some folks poking holes in it already.

580
00:39:07,800 --> 00:39:11,279
Speaker 1: Here are here are some of the objections. One the

581
00:39:11,360 --> 00:39:14,640
Speaker 1: lack of physical traces of an avalanche found by rescuers.

582
00:39:15,000 --> 00:39:17,160
Speaker 1: We mentioned that it would have to be a pretty

583
00:39:17,239 --> 00:39:22,239
Speaker 1: small avalanche comparatively speaking to not leave behind a ton

584
00:39:22,280 --> 00:39:25,360
Speaker 1: of evidence. Uh. Secondly, and I think this is a

585
00:39:25,360 --> 00:39:30,239
Speaker 1: little more valid, uh, the gap we mentioned These can

586
00:39:30,280 --> 00:39:34,719
Speaker 1: occur minutes after the snow is compromised or hours. But

587
00:39:35,400 --> 00:39:38,680
Speaker 1: when we're looking at this slab blanche as an explanation here,

588
00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:42,320
Speaker 1: we have to remember there was a nine hour gap

589
00:39:42,640 --> 00:39:46,480
Speaker 1: between the hikers building their camp cutting into the mountain

590
00:39:46,520 --> 00:39:50,759
Speaker 1: to form a barrier against the wind and then the

591
00:39:50,880 --> 00:39:54,240
Speaker 1: snow hitting the fan managed to keep it a family show,

592
00:39:57,120 --> 00:40:00,239
Speaker 1: And then they also talked about the shallow slope of

593
00:40:00,320 --> 00:40:04,719
Speaker 1: the campsite and of course the traumatic injuries. So it's

594
00:40:04,800 --> 00:40:10,600
Speaker 1: not it's not conclusive yet, but the investigators are one

595
00:40:10,600 --> 00:40:13,880
Speaker 1: of the investigators least poserin is certain that if the

596
00:40:13,920 --> 00:40:18,440
Speaker 1: group had not cut into the sloope, nothing would have happened.

597
00:40:18,520 --> 00:40:21,800
Speaker 1: But when they cut into the slope, they created a crack,

598
00:40:22,840 --> 00:40:27,920
Speaker 1: and it propagated, it expanded over time. If you have

599
00:40:28,080 --> 00:40:32,480
Speaker 1: ever been unfortunate enough to crack your smartphone, you are

600
00:40:32,560 --> 00:40:36,319
Speaker 1: well aware of how this process works. That crack will

601
00:40:36,360 --> 00:40:41,279
Speaker 1: slowly expand and branch off if you have shield. Wind

602
00:40:41,320 --> 00:40:45,359
Speaker 1: shield was the mighty X example. Yeah, exactly. Uh boy,

603
00:40:45,480 --> 00:40:48,160
Speaker 1: A one shield crack is one of the most like

604
00:40:48,360 --> 00:40:53,320
Speaker 1: existentially depressing problems to have because you see it every

605
00:40:53,440 --> 00:40:57,879
Speaker 1: day wherever you're driving. Yeah, just a little a little,

606
00:40:57,920 --> 00:41:00,960
Speaker 1: a little bit closer, you know. It makes it about mortality.

607
00:41:01,840 --> 00:41:04,480
Speaker 1: The seventh Seal, all of all the all the hits,

608
00:41:05,040 --> 00:41:07,600
Speaker 1: how much you need that extra fifty dollars to get

609
00:41:07,640 --> 00:41:09,719
Speaker 1: it replaced? But you just can't seem to find it.

610
00:41:10,440 --> 00:41:12,560
Speaker 1: I feel like you and I were going through that

611
00:41:12,680 --> 00:41:17,319
Speaker 1: the same period man, in the Discovery days. Uh, there

612
00:41:17,400 --> 00:41:19,680
Speaker 1: is there is a fun like note here I thought

613
00:41:19,719 --> 00:41:24,400
Speaker 1: was enjoyable. Then we can end on this. The researchers

614
00:41:24,600 --> 00:41:30,640
Speaker 1: credit a surprising source for helping them unravel this puzzle.

615
00:41:31,640 --> 00:41:33,600
Speaker 1: You're not gonna You're probably not gonna be able to

616
00:41:33,600 --> 00:41:36,080
Speaker 1: guess what it is. Uh, So we'll just tell you, folks,

617
00:41:36,920 --> 00:41:42,080
Speaker 1: is Frozen. That's right, the Disney film from Frozen. Let

618
00:41:42,080 --> 00:41:46,280
Speaker 1: it go, the whole nine. Uh. According to some reporting

619
00:41:46,320 --> 00:41:50,080
Speaker 1: from National Geographic, one of the authors of the study

620
00:41:50,400 --> 00:41:54,720
Speaker 1: was watching Frozen, and remember this, this is an avalanche expert.

621
00:41:54,760 --> 00:41:58,719
Speaker 1: He was watching Frozen and he was thinking, Wow, I

622
00:41:58,800 --> 00:42:03,400
Speaker 1: am so impressed by how good they are depicting snow.

623
00:42:04,400 --> 00:42:06,960
Speaker 1: In fact, I am so impressed because I am an

624
00:42:07,000 --> 00:42:11,880
Speaker 1: avalanche specialist. I'm gonna reach out to the people who

625
00:42:12,000 --> 00:42:15,200
Speaker 1: made Frozen and I'm gonna ask them for the code

626
00:42:15,280 --> 00:42:19,120
Speaker 1: they used to animate snow, because it's amazing. They should

627
00:42:19,160 --> 00:42:21,960
Speaker 1: be working for me. Why are you in Hollywood? It's

628
00:42:21,960 --> 00:42:27,080
Speaker 1: about more than the money, you guys. I'm editorializing maybe

629
00:42:27,120 --> 00:42:30,920
Speaker 1: a bit, but he've reached out and they gave him

630
00:42:30,960 --> 00:42:35,000
Speaker 1: the code, and then they used that along with grizzly

631
00:42:35,360 --> 00:42:40,160
Speaker 1: research on cadavers conducted by GM General Motors back in

632
00:42:40,200 --> 00:42:44,920
Speaker 1: the nineties seventies. Why I have there's a pretty creepy

633
00:42:44,960 --> 00:42:47,840
Speaker 1: car stuff episode about this too. It's a true story.

634
00:42:48,719 --> 00:42:54,320
Speaker 1: Once upon a time General Motors used real dead bodies

635
00:42:54,600 --> 00:42:57,600
Speaker 1: instead of crash test dummies. Did you know that that

636
00:42:57,640 --> 00:43:00,080
Speaker 1: we ever talked about? We we did talk about that,

637
00:43:01,200 --> 00:43:05,319
Speaker 1: maybe not on the air, but that was just one

638
00:43:05,320 --> 00:43:07,759
Speaker 1: of those moments where in the office one of us

639
00:43:07,800 --> 00:43:10,280
Speaker 1: looked over at the other one, uh from the computer,

640
00:43:10,760 --> 00:43:14,000
Speaker 1: and then like cursed softly under their breath, and then

641
00:43:14,040 --> 00:43:17,120
Speaker 1: we lost two hours from whatever we're supposed to be doing.

642
00:43:17,840 --> 00:43:20,480
Speaker 1: So it's not you know. When we had that conversation,

643
00:43:20,520 --> 00:43:23,320
Speaker 1: it was the first time I ever imagined a haunting

644
00:43:23,480 --> 00:43:27,560
Speaker 1: of a vehicle. And you know, yeah, I don't know

645
00:43:27,600 --> 00:43:31,000
Speaker 1: if you remember this. There's the concept of ghost ships

646
00:43:31,000 --> 00:43:33,960
Speaker 1: has always been around, but I had never thought about

647
00:43:34,000 --> 00:43:37,759
Speaker 1: a ship like on the sea in on the its

648
00:43:37,760 --> 00:43:42,399
Speaker 1: interior being haunted until that terrible, terrible horror movie came

649
00:43:42,400 --> 00:43:45,680
Speaker 1: out called ghost Ship or whatever it was called. But

650
00:43:45,840 --> 00:43:48,040
Speaker 1: that one happened but then we had this conversation about

651
00:43:48,160 --> 00:43:52,040
Speaker 1: crash the dummies being cadavers, and I imagined, just like

652
00:43:52,120 --> 00:43:56,640
Speaker 1: a camera getting haunted over the years, with an actual

653
00:43:56,800 --> 00:44:00,879
Speaker 1: apparition like attached to the physical play. I think people

654
00:44:00,880 --> 00:44:04,040
Speaker 1: would pay extra for it. I think, I don't know,

655
00:44:04,400 --> 00:44:08,120
Speaker 1: advertised as a feature. It feels like a real hazard

656
00:44:08,160 --> 00:44:10,239
Speaker 1: if you're on the highway, and yeah, yeah, I guess

657
00:44:10,280 --> 00:44:12,399
Speaker 1: it depends on the ghost, you know. But if it's

658
00:44:12,440 --> 00:44:16,520
Speaker 1: like helpful ghost mode, why use a defroster when you

659
00:44:16,520 --> 00:44:23,160
Speaker 1: can have somebody Oh, that's true, that's true. We okay,

660
00:44:23,560 --> 00:44:28,480
Speaker 1: we need to workshop this. First, proved ghosts exist. Secondly,

661
00:44:29,400 --> 00:44:32,440
Speaker 1: figure out how to modify them and put them in

662
00:44:32,440 --> 00:44:35,759
Speaker 1: an automobile coming to a dealer near you on it.

663
00:44:36,160 --> 00:44:39,600
Speaker 1: Thank you, love fast for anybody who feels that this

664
00:44:39,680 --> 00:44:43,600
Speaker 1: is kind of a downer um that this, or feels

665
00:44:43,640 --> 00:44:47,040
Speaker 1: that this is itself the continuation of a cover up.

666
00:44:47,320 --> 00:44:49,480
Speaker 1: There's one last thing I want to leave you with

667
00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:54,200
Speaker 1: that may be of interest. Remember earlier I mentioned that

668
00:44:54,320 --> 00:44:58,880
Speaker 1: twenty nineteen reopened investigation on part of the Russian government.

669
00:44:59,480 --> 00:45:04,040
Speaker 1: They were not investigating all the proposed causes. They went

670
00:45:04,160 --> 00:45:07,800
Speaker 1: for the three most likely ones, and so This means

671
00:45:08,160 --> 00:45:14,320
Speaker 1: that they squarely in advance decided to ignore the idea

672
00:45:14,480 --> 00:45:19,960
Speaker 1: of anything like um an individual human or cryptid murderer,

673
00:45:20,080 --> 00:45:26,399
Speaker 1: unexplainable unidentified flying objects, or of course secret Soviet tech.

674
00:45:26,840 --> 00:45:29,759
Speaker 1: So if you are feeling very x files, you still

675
00:45:29,840 --> 00:45:34,160
Speaker 1: want to believe there may be something else still buried

676
00:45:34,440 --> 00:45:38,320
Speaker 1: beneath the avalanche of reporting on this story. We're gonna

677
00:45:38,320 --> 00:45:41,160
Speaker 1: pause for word from our sponsor. We'll be back with

678
00:45:41,239 --> 00:45:51,560
Speaker 1: more strange news. And we're back with more strange news.

679
00:45:52,560 --> 00:45:54,360
Speaker 1: I guess this is it. This is our third segment.

680
00:45:54,560 --> 00:45:57,319
Speaker 1: I guess I have the honor and the privilege of

681
00:45:57,400 --> 00:45:59,760
Speaker 1: going last today, and it is kind of a momentous

682
00:45:59,840 --> 00:46:03,000
Speaker 1: day in the history of of technology. Maybe not day,

683
00:46:03,400 --> 00:46:07,960
Speaker 1: it's week perhaps, um, But you guys are children of

684
00:46:07,960 --> 00:46:11,239
Speaker 1: the Internet, like myself. We all grew up with dial

685
00:46:11,320 --> 00:46:14,720
Speaker 1: up modems, and remember the first day that a cable

686
00:46:14,760 --> 00:46:18,280
Speaker 1: modem was a thing, and Spotify and all that, uh,

687
00:46:18,320 --> 00:46:21,040
Speaker 1: you know, and even before that, geo cities and animated

688
00:46:21,080 --> 00:46:24,360
Speaker 1: gifts and all of the little things a little beautiful

689
00:46:24,800 --> 00:46:27,800
Speaker 1: treasures that the Internet has bestowed upon us over the years,

690
00:46:27,880 --> 00:46:31,239
Speaker 1: and one of the things that we can all absolutely

691
00:46:31,239 --> 00:46:36,320
Speaker 1: thank for many of those treasures, UH is the Adobe company.

692
00:46:36,600 --> 00:46:41,120
Speaker 1: Uh and Adobe Flash. You guys remember Flash? Oh yeah,

693
00:46:41,239 --> 00:46:45,600
Speaker 1: when the first band I was in had a website

694
00:46:45,640 --> 00:46:48,840
Speaker 1: that was this amazing flash animation a friend of ours

695
00:46:48,880 --> 00:46:51,359
Speaker 1: made of just the name of our band, but like

696
00:46:51,520 --> 00:46:54,600
Speaker 1: forming in Flash, it was it was, it was beautiful.

697
00:46:55,040 --> 00:46:57,879
Speaker 1: And it's the first program I ever used to edit

698
00:46:57,920 --> 00:47:01,080
Speaker 1: a video. The first video ever made was like a

699
00:47:01,200 --> 00:47:04,839
Speaker 1: terrible Flash thing where I just I wasn't animating, I

700
00:47:04,840 --> 00:47:07,720
Speaker 1: was just shooting video and then putting it into Flash

701
00:47:07,920 --> 00:47:10,319
Speaker 1: and trying to put together a thing. Some of my

702
00:47:10,400 --> 00:47:15,200
Speaker 1: favorite NERRK games are in Flash or were that's Uh,

703
00:47:15,440 --> 00:47:17,320
Speaker 1: it's the thing in the past. I tried to figure

704
00:47:17,320 --> 00:47:19,160
Speaker 1: it out, but I went ahead and just played them

705
00:47:19,200 --> 00:47:22,680
Speaker 1: all one last time. That's right, You've got it, Ben,

706
00:47:22,719 --> 00:47:27,120
Speaker 1: you nailed it. Because Flash is dead as of January

707
00:47:27,160 --> 00:47:31,240
Speaker 1: twelve of this year. Uh, Flash has has bit the dust.

708
00:47:31,320 --> 00:47:34,799
Speaker 1: It is it is absolutely um no longer supported by

709
00:47:34,920 --> 00:47:39,279
Speaker 1: Adobe in that it won't be patched anymore. There will

710
00:47:39,280 --> 00:47:42,080
Speaker 1: be no more updates. And depending on who you ask.

711
00:47:42,200 --> 00:47:44,920
Speaker 1: And I'm not a super duper you know in the

712
00:47:44,960 --> 00:47:48,640
Speaker 1: weeds computer expert, in this way, I have enough of

713
00:47:48,640 --> 00:47:51,719
Speaker 1: a working understanding to understand the basics of things like

714
00:47:51,800 --> 00:47:54,759
Speaker 1: coding and line commands, command lines and all that. But

715
00:47:55,960 --> 00:47:59,200
Speaker 1: apparently there is some kind of built in thing in

716
00:47:59,239 --> 00:48:02,640
Speaker 1: the latest verse in a FLASH that deactivates it in

717
00:48:02,719 --> 00:48:05,160
Speaker 1: some way. We'll get into what that could mean or

718
00:48:05,239 --> 00:48:07,200
Speaker 1: does mean, But I just wanted to do just a

719
00:48:07,239 --> 00:48:10,000
Speaker 1: little bit of a brief kind of history of Flash

720
00:48:10,040 --> 00:48:11,680
Speaker 1: because a lot of this stuff it was kind of

721
00:48:11,680 --> 00:48:15,040
Speaker 1: nostalgic and fun for me. Uh. Flash originally started in

722
00:48:15,160 --> 00:48:21,640
Speaker 1: n when two friends by the name of Jonathan Gay

723
00:48:21,760 --> 00:48:25,719
Speaker 1: and Charlie Jackson met at a Macintosh users group and

724
00:48:25,920 --> 00:48:28,720
Speaker 1: decided that kind of that kind of became pals based

725
00:48:28,760 --> 00:48:33,480
Speaker 1: on their mutual mutual appreciation of programming for Max, because

726
00:48:33,520 --> 00:48:35,160
Speaker 1: that wasn't as much of a thing at the time.

727
00:48:35,160 --> 00:48:37,880
Speaker 1: We hadn't seen the mac renaissance that we you know,

728
00:48:37,960 --> 00:48:39,560
Speaker 1: that lad to where we are now with things like

729
00:48:39,600 --> 00:48:43,040
Speaker 1: the iPhone Max being the absolute gold standard for audio

730
00:48:43,120 --> 00:48:45,960
Speaker 1: and computer editing and animation all of that. So they

731
00:48:46,000 --> 00:48:48,680
Speaker 1: were very much ahead of the curve and they essentially

732
00:48:48,760 --> 00:48:51,080
Speaker 1: kind of put their heads together through their skills of

733
00:48:51,080 --> 00:48:53,840
Speaker 1: being able to kind of program basic graphic editors and

734
00:48:53,920 --> 00:48:57,560
Speaker 1: games and such, and decided they wanted to make something

735
00:48:57,560 --> 00:49:02,480
Speaker 1: that would use pen computers, essentially early forms of tablets

736
00:49:02,480 --> 00:49:05,359
Speaker 1: that use like a stylus. So they started building something

737
00:49:05,400 --> 00:49:08,759
Speaker 1: called smart Sketch, the graphics editor for Mac for pen computers,

738
00:49:08,960 --> 00:49:14,440
Speaker 1: and then it eventually evolved into something called future Splash

739
00:49:14,480 --> 00:49:17,879
Speaker 1: that was originally a component for Smart Sketch and then

740
00:49:17,920 --> 00:49:20,440
Speaker 1: became kind of a thing unto itself, and it was

741
00:49:20,800 --> 00:49:23,520
Speaker 1: an animator. And if you if you what you're talking about,

742
00:49:23,520 --> 00:49:28,040
Speaker 1: Matt with the really rudimentary kind of Flash editor, that's

743
00:49:28,080 --> 00:49:30,680
Speaker 1: sort of what this early version looked like. It was

744
00:49:30,960 --> 00:49:33,839
Speaker 1: essentially almost had the look of a word document with

745
00:49:33,920 --> 00:49:36,799
Speaker 1: like a big empty field at the bottom, and then

746
00:49:36,840 --> 00:49:39,960
Speaker 1: at the top you had a very rudimentary version of

747
00:49:40,040 --> 00:49:42,239
Speaker 1: what you might see today in after effects or in

748
00:49:42,280 --> 00:49:44,880
Speaker 1: any kind of editor where you have multiple tracks or

749
00:49:44,960 --> 00:49:49,280
Speaker 1: layers that you can drag things into. Its incorporated things

750
00:49:49,360 --> 00:49:51,879
Speaker 1: like tweening or in between, where you can like set

751
00:49:51,920 --> 00:49:54,600
Speaker 1: a beginning point an endpoint for like a rudimentary kind

752
00:49:54,600 --> 00:49:57,600
Speaker 1: of stick animation UM and or two D animation. Then

753
00:49:57,600 --> 00:50:02,080
Speaker 1: it would fill in the gaps um so in where

754
00:50:02,120 --> 00:50:05,160
Speaker 1: many of us probably came across Flash originally was the

755
00:50:05,200 --> 00:50:09,319
Speaker 1: company called Macromedia bought Flash in ninety six, uh, and

756
00:50:09,360 --> 00:50:13,400
Speaker 1: then it became Macromedia Flash turned from future Splash into

757
00:50:13,440 --> 00:50:17,080
Speaker 1: flash Um and that's kind of the the big heyday

758
00:50:17,080 --> 00:50:20,399
Speaker 1: of Flash was when it became basically it was so

759
00:50:20,520 --> 00:50:25,200
Speaker 1: popular because of early adoption from like Netscape if you

760
00:50:25,200 --> 00:50:29,000
Speaker 1: remember Netscape, or eventually it was called Mozilla because it

761
00:50:29,040 --> 00:50:32,560
Speaker 1: could do like animation headers for websites that didn't require

762
00:50:32,600 --> 00:50:35,040
Speaker 1: like real time video playback, and it was just like

763
00:50:35,360 --> 00:50:37,920
Speaker 1: much more versatile than an animated gift, which was all

764
00:50:37,960 --> 00:50:40,640
Speaker 1: just stored in one file, and it was interactive. You

765
00:50:40,680 --> 00:50:44,200
Speaker 1: could add little buttons almost like a DVD menu, things

766
00:50:44,200 --> 00:50:46,960
Speaker 1: called action scripts, and it became kind of the design

767
00:50:47,000 --> 00:50:49,840
Speaker 1: platform dujur for the Internet. And it's really what we

768
00:50:49,920 --> 00:50:53,000
Speaker 1: think of as the look of the Internet from the

769
00:50:53,040 --> 00:50:55,920
Speaker 1: mid to late nineties, and even the early days of

770
00:50:55,960 --> 00:50:59,840
Speaker 1: YouTube entirely based around Flash. The earliest versions of YouTube

771
00:51:00,040 --> 00:51:03,960
Speaker 1: were designed in Flash. UH. In fact, Chad Hurley, Stephen

772
00:51:04,080 --> 00:51:07,960
Speaker 1: Chen and Joe wad kareem Um were kind of toying

773
00:51:07,960 --> 00:51:10,920
Speaker 1: with the idea of maybe doing a dating site or

774
00:51:10,960 --> 00:51:13,920
Speaker 1: you know, something else, and they had a meeting with

775
00:51:13,960 --> 00:51:17,759
Speaker 1: an investor named Keith rebois. Forgive me if I'm mispronouncing,

776
00:51:17,800 --> 00:51:20,239
Speaker 1: that's r A b O I s um. And he

777
00:51:20,280 --> 00:51:23,640
Speaker 1: mentioned they were working on a streaming video site and

778
00:51:23,680 --> 00:51:25,920
Speaker 1: he asked if they were designing in flash. When they

779
00:51:25,960 --> 00:51:30,120
Speaker 1: said yes, he agreed to invest because it was so ubiquitous. Um.

780
00:51:30,320 --> 00:51:32,560
Speaker 1: Then the you know, the tied for flash kind of

781
00:51:32,600 --> 00:51:36,000
Speaker 1: turned when the iPhone came out and Steve Jobs basically

782
00:51:36,280 --> 00:51:40,200
Speaker 1: unequivocally counted it out of any iPhone releases. He found

783
00:51:40,200 --> 00:51:43,279
Speaker 1: it to be uh buggy, He found it to be unstable,

784
00:51:43,520 --> 00:51:46,520
Speaker 1: He found it to have security flaws, so it was

785
00:51:46,600 --> 00:51:49,319
Speaker 1: not um part of the iPhone at all. And that

786
00:51:49,360 --> 00:51:52,239
Speaker 1: really kind of spelled the beginning of the end for flash.

787
00:51:52,680 --> 00:51:57,160
Speaker 1: UM so R I P Flash. But my real story

788
00:51:57,200 --> 00:52:01,320
Speaker 1: for today, I guess is what like what about? Surely

789
00:52:01,360 --> 00:52:06,120
Speaker 1: there are some you know, websites or god forbid, larger

790
00:52:06,160 --> 00:52:10,759
Speaker 1: institutions that are still relying on Flash and didn't get

791
00:52:10,800 --> 00:52:13,640
Speaker 1: the memo that it was gonna you know, go the

792
00:52:13,640 --> 00:52:16,839
Speaker 1: way of the dodo um and and that actually turns

793
00:52:16,880 --> 00:52:19,640
Speaker 1: out to be the case for a a small region

794
00:52:19,840 --> 00:52:24,200
Speaker 1: in China. And this wasn't like, you know, news to anybody.

795
00:52:24,440 --> 00:52:27,680
Speaker 1: You know. Adobe announced that they were sun setting flashback

796
00:52:27,680 --> 00:52:31,480
Speaker 1: in two thousand seventeen. UM, they would be deactivating the

797
00:52:31,719 --> 00:52:35,200
Speaker 1: plug in and its extensions by the end of so

798
00:52:35,239 --> 00:52:38,120
Speaker 1: they actually gave a little bit of a grace, you know,

799
00:52:38,719 --> 00:52:43,040
Speaker 1: a couple of weeks into UM. But earlier this month

800
00:52:43,120 --> 00:52:48,480
Speaker 1: when it happened a according to Apple Daily, officials at

801
00:52:48,600 --> 00:52:53,400
Speaker 1: the China Railway shen Yang had been using flash based

802
00:52:53,440 --> 00:52:59,560
Speaker 1: software to plan many aspects of their daily train routes

803
00:53:00,080 --> 00:53:04,160
Speaker 1: and shipping UM and as a result of of the

804
00:53:04,160 --> 00:53:07,560
Speaker 1: the sunsetting of the software, it caused about twenty hours

805
00:53:07,560 --> 00:53:12,760
Speaker 1: of absolute chaos UM. Apparently they weren't able to dispatch

806
00:53:12,880 --> 00:53:16,120
Speaker 1: trains uh and it led to the railroad shutting down

807
00:53:16,280 --> 00:53:22,200
Speaker 1: completely in Diean lion Ning Province. UM. And apparently they

808
00:53:22,200 --> 00:53:25,560
Speaker 1: were able to roll back the software to an earlier

809
00:53:25,680 --> 00:53:31,520
Speaker 1: version of flash player that didn't have this uh deactivating code. UM.

810
00:53:31,520 --> 00:53:34,560
Speaker 1: But again I've seen some some chatter on the internet

811
00:53:34,880 --> 00:53:37,239
Speaker 1: saying maybe that's not entirely the case. The idea of

812
00:53:37,239 --> 00:53:40,759
Speaker 1: the self deactivating code that does seem a little kind

813
00:53:40,760 --> 00:53:43,120
Speaker 1: of weird why they would do that. But it still

814
00:53:43,239 --> 00:53:46,680
Speaker 1: feels like if it wasn't being supported, or if there

815
00:53:46,719 --> 00:53:48,799
Speaker 1: was like some kind of it needed an update. I'm

816
00:53:48,840 --> 00:53:51,160
Speaker 1: not exactly sure. Um what what do you guys think

817
00:53:51,200 --> 00:53:52,880
Speaker 1: about this? Does this have the ring of truth? Or

818
00:53:52,880 --> 00:53:56,759
Speaker 1: does this seem like maybe somebody missed something along the way.

819
00:53:57,160 --> 00:54:01,880
Speaker 1: When you're talking about Flash itself being like deactivating activating itself,

820
00:54:01,880 --> 00:54:04,600
Speaker 1: the idea of why would they do that, Why would

821
00:54:04,600 --> 00:54:08,880
Speaker 1: they build a self deactivating clock into a piece of software.

822
00:54:08,960 --> 00:54:11,239
Speaker 1: I would think it would be more just them not

823
00:54:11,560 --> 00:54:14,319
Speaker 1: wanting to not supporting it anymore and not patching it

824
00:54:14,360 --> 00:54:17,160
Speaker 1: and not updating it. Well, it's a way to protect

825
00:54:17,600 --> 00:54:20,719
Speaker 1: end users because it really is Flash player really is

826
00:54:21,760 --> 00:54:25,759
Speaker 1: a massive vulnerability for attacks, and it has been for

827
00:54:25,800 --> 00:54:29,319
Speaker 1: a long time. And if it's no longer updated and

828
00:54:29,400 --> 00:54:32,000
Speaker 1: just supported and they left it dead on machines and

829
00:54:32,120 --> 00:54:36,360
Speaker 1: millions and millions of people across the world, then anyone

830
00:54:36,360 --> 00:54:39,279
Speaker 1: who wanted to could just find a machine that still

831
00:54:39,320 --> 00:54:44,000
Speaker 1: had it installed and get in through various ways. Two machine.

832
00:54:44,040 --> 00:54:45,480
Speaker 1: So I think I think it's a smart move on

833
00:54:45,520 --> 00:54:51,280
Speaker 1: Adobe's part to make sure it's self destructing. Um, actually,

834
00:54:51,280 --> 00:54:53,279
Speaker 1: you know what, I need to triple check and make

835
00:54:53,280 --> 00:54:58,160
Speaker 1: sure I actually took it off of this machine. Now, Yeah,

836
00:54:58,280 --> 00:55:03,480
Speaker 1: Flash and Flash had problem on the The exploits that

837
00:55:03,600 --> 00:55:06,879
Speaker 1: you mentioned, Matt are common, you know what I mean,

838
00:55:06,920 --> 00:55:12,440
Speaker 1: and they're not. They weren't necessarily high level hacker black

839
00:55:12,480 --> 00:55:15,640
Speaker 1: hats stuff. You could have script kitties just cut and

840
00:55:15,680 --> 00:55:19,440
Speaker 1: paste their way uh into into some pretty serious stuff

841
00:55:19,960 --> 00:55:24,319
Speaker 1: using Flash. The thing is, part of the problem is

842
00:55:24,400 --> 00:55:27,160
Speaker 1: not not just that was insecure, but that it was

843
00:55:27,239 --> 00:55:32,200
Speaker 1: powering a large portion of the Internet or of you know,

844
00:55:32,280 --> 00:55:35,680
Speaker 1: a lot of ways people encountered the Internet, and this

845
00:55:35,680 --> 00:55:38,560
Speaker 1: this was a heavy, heavy ways. The head that wears

846
00:55:38,600 --> 00:55:43,160
Speaker 1: the crown situation for Adobe because because they made it

847
00:55:43,560 --> 00:55:47,880
Speaker 1: so how many messages were they getting for years on

848
00:55:47,920 --> 00:55:51,560
Speaker 1: a daily basis saying what the hell is going on

849
00:55:52,120 --> 00:55:55,200
Speaker 1: with Flash? I bet they had some snarky titles to

850
00:55:55,480 --> 00:55:58,600
Speaker 1: like news flash, your plug in sucks or all kinds

851
00:55:58,600 --> 00:56:02,719
Speaker 1: of other weird mean messages uh. And the more popular

852
00:56:02,760 --> 00:56:04,960
Speaker 1: it got. It's kind of like the reason that the

853
00:56:05,000 --> 00:56:09,080
Speaker 1: Honda Civic is often listed as the most frequently stolen

854
00:56:09,120 --> 00:56:12,600
Speaker 1: car in the United States. It's not necessarily because it's

855
00:56:12,640 --> 00:56:15,600
Speaker 1: the most amazing car in the United States. It's because

856
00:56:15,600 --> 00:56:20,239
Speaker 1: it's super common. And because Flash was super common, hackers

857
00:56:20,400 --> 00:56:22,759
Speaker 1: were able to get more bang for their buck if

858
00:56:22,800 --> 00:56:27,000
Speaker 1: they built exploits that worked with this. If no, if like,

859
00:56:28,239 --> 00:56:31,759
Speaker 1: if a fewer people used Flash, than hackers would not

860
00:56:31,800 --> 00:56:34,799
Speaker 1: have paid near as much attention to it. Just just

861
00:56:34,800 --> 00:56:37,600
Speaker 1: gonna say, the civic is a lot easier to to

862
00:56:37,719 --> 00:56:40,640
Speaker 1: boost than I don't know what maserati. Well, you sell

863
00:56:40,760 --> 00:56:42,640
Speaker 1: for the part, never sell the whole car if you

864
00:56:42,680 --> 00:56:45,440
Speaker 1: want to make money. You know it's funny. Uh. There

865
00:56:45,480 --> 00:56:48,640
Speaker 1: was a little addendum on the The story originated on

866
00:56:49,280 --> 00:56:52,040
Speaker 1: a website called Apple Daily, and then there are other

867
00:56:52,120 --> 00:56:55,359
Speaker 1: websites that kind of reposted it and added some addendums.

868
00:56:55,360 --> 00:56:58,480
Speaker 1: But one that I got recently in a r S

869
00:56:58,520 --> 00:57:01,880
Speaker 1: Technica just posted an an update and it said a

870
00:57:01,920 --> 00:57:05,280
Speaker 1: reader found a blog post questioning whether the Flash problem

871
00:57:05,320 --> 00:57:08,840
Speaker 1: affected train dispatching. It also says that the railroad reverted

872
00:57:08,880 --> 00:57:10,759
Speaker 1: to an old version of Adobe Flash, but not a

873
00:57:10,760 --> 00:57:14,400
Speaker 1: pirated version. Um. That was actually the pirated version was

874
00:57:14,440 --> 00:57:17,600
Speaker 1: in the original Apple Daily article. But then, as a

875
00:57:17,680 --> 00:57:19,520
Speaker 1: non Chinese speaker, it's hard for me to be sure

876
00:57:19,840 --> 00:57:23,000
Speaker 1: if the Apple Daily article is accurate. Um. But then

877
00:57:23,040 --> 00:57:25,600
Speaker 1: this is the interesting part. The latest Flash client in

878
00:57:25,680 --> 00:57:28,960
Speaker 1: China can still be downloaded from flash dot CN as

879
00:57:28,960 --> 00:57:31,520
Speaker 1: per Adobe's end of life Flash support page, it has

880
00:57:31,600 --> 00:57:34,200
Speaker 1: no time bomb and we'll keep receiving six. So the

881
00:57:34,240 --> 00:57:37,320
Speaker 1: time bomb is reel security patches for a while. But

882
00:57:37,440 --> 00:57:41,080
Speaker 1: here's the most interesting part. There is a company called Harmon,

883
00:57:41,360 --> 00:57:44,600
Speaker 1: which is a subsidiary of Samsung that Adobe offloaded all

884
00:57:44,640 --> 00:57:49,800
Speaker 1: of its Flash related activities too, and apparently that you know,

885
00:57:50,120 --> 00:57:54,840
Speaker 1: support still exists for legacy flash based software that should

886
00:57:54,920 --> 00:57:57,960
Speaker 1: continue well passed the cut off date. So it sounds

887
00:57:57,960 --> 00:58:00,520
Speaker 1: to me like the administrators of this system in China

888
00:58:01,320 --> 00:58:04,360
Speaker 1: might have been more to blame than the software itself.

889
00:58:04,720 --> 00:58:08,960
Speaker 1: And if you were still running Flash at this point,

890
00:58:10,160 --> 00:58:15,200
Speaker 1: please remember to uninstall, uninstalled whatever you're doing there, because

891
00:58:15,240 --> 00:58:20,280
Speaker 1: in Adobe's own words, uh, they strongly recommend. Like a

892
00:58:20,400 --> 00:58:25,560
Speaker 1: month ago, they were strongly recommending all users immediately uninstalled

893
00:58:25,640 --> 00:58:28,360
Speaker 1: Flash because, like you were saying, Matt, it's been kind

894
00:58:28,360 --> 00:58:33,280
Speaker 1: of notoriously uh an entry point for you know, folks

895
00:58:33,320 --> 00:58:37,440
Speaker 1: wanting to do harm to systems, right, Yeah, Yeah, that's

896
00:58:37,480 --> 00:58:40,480
Speaker 1: that's why the update is always so important. The same

897
00:58:40,520 --> 00:58:46,960
Speaker 1: thing with Apple OS just recently strongly recommended everybody update. Um,

898
00:58:47,040 --> 00:58:50,600
Speaker 1: the same thing with the last Mac os that went through.

899
00:58:50,880 --> 00:58:54,760
Speaker 1: Just like every time a new exploit gets identified, you

900
00:58:54,880 --> 00:58:58,720
Speaker 1: gotta update and doesn't mean they go away. Doesn't mean

901
00:58:58,760 --> 00:59:00,800
Speaker 1: all of them go away or or there's never gonna

902
00:59:00,800 --> 00:59:03,320
Speaker 1: be another one. It just means the ones that are

903
00:59:03,720 --> 00:59:06,200
Speaker 1: that were aware of need to get fixed. It's a

904
00:59:06,240 --> 00:59:13,840
Speaker 1: beautiful dance of of trying to outsmart uh outsmart one another.

905
00:59:13,960 --> 00:59:18,920
Speaker 1: And the the disadvantage for the non hacker side of

906
00:59:18,920 --> 00:59:23,280
Speaker 1: the equation is that it's often reactionary. Right. That's why

907
00:59:23,320 --> 00:59:27,560
Speaker 1: you have white hat hackers who find exploits and notify

908
00:59:27,760 --> 00:59:31,720
Speaker 1: software creators. But remember, if you decide to keep Flash

909
00:59:31,880 --> 00:59:34,760
Speaker 1: because you have you have a soft spot for one

910
00:59:35,240 --> 00:59:39,200
Speaker 1: thing or another that's Flash related, remember it's not It's

911
00:59:39,240 --> 00:59:42,240
Speaker 1: not just a matter of whether you feel like you'll

912
00:59:42,280 --> 00:59:44,520
Speaker 1: be okay. Now you might be saying I don't have

913
00:59:44,560 --> 00:59:48,520
Speaker 1: a railroad direct, well good, and also you know, I'm sorry.

914
00:59:48,520 --> 00:59:51,120
Speaker 1: I know owning a railroad's dream for a lot of people.

915
00:59:51,440 --> 00:59:55,040
Speaker 1: But you have to remember that even if you keep

916
00:59:55,120 --> 00:59:59,520
Speaker 1: something around, Adobe is never going to update this again,

917
00:59:59,720 --> 01:00:03,560
Speaker 1: It's is going to get older and older and increasingly archaic,

918
01:00:04,320 --> 01:00:08,040
Speaker 1: which means the liability window you have there is just

919
01:00:08,120 --> 01:00:11,840
Speaker 1: going to enlarge overtotton some folks that I like, uh

920
01:00:12,240 --> 01:00:15,439
Speaker 1: YouTube channel of it's called the Internet Today. UM made

921
01:00:15,440 --> 01:00:18,560
Speaker 1: a really interesting point that it's something that you know,

922
01:00:18,840 --> 01:00:20,800
Speaker 1: we've probably all been in a situation we're wondering this

923
01:00:21,040 --> 01:00:23,680
Speaker 1: when you go to the airport and they're entering things

924
01:00:23,720 --> 01:00:27,160
Speaker 1: one finger at a time on these terminal computers you know,

925
01:00:27,200 --> 01:00:32,560
Speaker 1: that are clearly running some super old proprietary os you

926
01:00:32,600 --> 01:00:35,120
Speaker 1: know or think about like the types of operating systems

927
01:00:35,120 --> 01:00:38,600
Speaker 1: that run say, you know, nuclear power plants. They want

928
01:00:38,640 --> 01:00:42,800
Speaker 1: this to be as stable and uncomplicated as possible so

929
01:00:42,840 --> 01:00:46,680
Speaker 1: that they're dependable constantly and they don't constantly have to

930
01:00:46,760 --> 01:00:49,640
Speaker 1: update them. And these systems are not usually on the

931
01:00:49,680 --> 01:00:51,480
Speaker 1: wider web, you know a lot of the time, or

932
01:00:51,480 --> 01:00:53,920
Speaker 1: they're on some sort of intranet, uh, you know, for

933
01:00:54,000 --> 01:00:56,280
Speaker 1: the actual company, but it's not like they're connected or

934
01:00:56,320 --> 01:00:58,280
Speaker 1: have to you know, interface with all these other like

935
01:00:58,440 --> 01:01:01,200
Speaker 1: HTML five or or whatever her. So whenever you're at

936
01:01:01,200 --> 01:01:04,200
Speaker 1: the airport and you're wondering why it seems like such

937
01:01:04,200 --> 01:01:06,800
Speaker 1: an antiquated system, it's probably because it is, but it's

938
01:01:06,800 --> 01:01:11,280
Speaker 1: also probably for your benefit. And also, by the way, uh,

939
01:01:11,640 --> 01:01:16,520
Speaker 1: don't forget there was a massive US government hack there

940
01:01:16,600 --> 01:01:21,080
Speaker 1: there have been like state level hacks working off flash UM.

941
01:01:21,160 --> 01:01:24,280
Speaker 1: To your point about separating things from the wider Internet,

942
01:01:24,280 --> 01:01:27,600
Speaker 1: we're talking about two terms. There. There's fire walling and

943
01:01:27,600 --> 01:01:30,760
Speaker 1: then there's air gapping. Air Gapping means there is a

944
01:01:30,920 --> 01:01:35,880
Speaker 1: physical obstacle keeping something from ever being connected to the web.

945
01:01:35,960 --> 01:01:39,760
Speaker 1: That's why stuck snet, if anybody recalls, that was so impressive.

946
01:01:39,880 --> 01:01:44,080
Speaker 1: It had to be physically carried to the machines of

947
01:01:44,120 --> 01:01:49,000
Speaker 1: the Iranian government. But you're right, You're right. People want reliable.

948
01:01:49,320 --> 01:01:52,240
Speaker 1: They don't want I guess we can't say flashy in

949
01:01:52,240 --> 01:01:55,360
Speaker 1: this segment, but they don't want um, you know, really

950
01:01:55,360 --> 01:01:59,280
Speaker 1: showy impressive bells and whistle e stuff. They're completely okay

951
01:01:59,320 --> 01:02:03,720
Speaker 1: with the black and green text terminal screen as long

952
01:02:03,760 --> 01:02:06,959
Speaker 1: as they know it will always it will always work.

953
01:02:07,320 --> 01:02:09,560
Speaker 1: And shout out to the people, by the way, on

954
01:02:09,600 --> 01:02:12,439
Speaker 1: the development and maintenance side who have to keep those

955
01:02:12,480 --> 01:02:15,840
Speaker 1: dinosaurs breathing. I can't imagine, you know what I mean,

956
01:02:15,880 --> 01:02:19,320
Speaker 1: Like every large company, or many large companies have stuff

957
01:02:19,320 --> 01:02:25,080
Speaker 1: like this, especially oddly enough infrastructure related things, airlines, air

958
01:02:25,120 --> 01:02:30,920
Speaker 1: traffic control. I mean, anybody who's been into UM, the

959
01:02:30,920 --> 01:02:34,160
Speaker 1: the tech side of a lot of very powerful government

960
01:02:34,200 --> 01:02:38,920
Speaker 1: agencies will tell you war stories about legacy software. I

961
01:02:38,920 --> 01:02:41,480
Speaker 1: bet we have people who are listening today who have

962
01:02:41,600 --> 01:02:43,840
Speaker 1: some stories of their own. I'd love to hear them.

963
01:02:43,880 --> 01:02:48,120
Speaker 1: What's the oldest, weirdest thing you've seen? Totally tell us yeah,

964
01:02:48,240 --> 01:02:50,680
Speaker 1: and and shout out to Adobe in particular, because you're

965
01:02:50,680 --> 01:02:53,320
Speaker 1: only hearing this because I'm rolling right now in their

966
01:02:53,320 --> 01:02:55,760
Speaker 1: product called Audition. I think that might be the same

967
01:02:55,800 --> 01:02:58,560
Speaker 1: for you guys to ye. Don't feel bad for them this.

968
01:02:58,720 --> 01:03:04,640
Speaker 1: They're they're gonna be okay, folks. And you can also

969
01:03:04,720 --> 01:03:06,760
Speaker 1: think Premier for a lot of the videos that came

970
01:03:06,760 --> 01:03:08,480
Speaker 1: out on stuff they don't want you to know that

971
01:03:08,560 --> 01:03:11,000
Speaker 1: are still out there on stuff they don't want you

972
01:03:11,000 --> 01:03:12,919
Speaker 1: to know on the YouTube channel and you can find

973
01:03:12,960 --> 01:03:16,680
Speaker 1: that at YouTube dot com. Slash conspiracy stuff no longer

974
01:03:16,800 --> 01:03:19,400
Speaker 1: coded in flash like back in the day, but uh,

975
01:03:19,400 --> 01:03:22,480
Speaker 1: it's much much zippier. And you can see our heads

976
01:03:22,480 --> 01:03:26,120
Speaker 1: and boxes for every piece of content that we put out. Uh,

977
01:03:26,120 --> 01:03:29,840
Speaker 1: and let us know what you think, segue yes, Uh,

978
01:03:30,200 --> 01:03:33,200
Speaker 1: let us know. Let us know. Uh, you know that

979
01:03:33,280 --> 01:03:37,120
Speaker 1: sounds like let it snow, So let us know your

980
01:03:37,200 --> 01:03:41,840
Speaker 1: opinion about the new proposed explanation for dot Love Pass.

981
01:03:42,200 --> 01:03:44,680
Speaker 1: Do you feel vindicated, do you feel disappointed? Do you

982
01:03:44,800 --> 01:03:49,600
Speaker 1: feel there's more to the story? Also incredibly important here

983
01:03:49,720 --> 01:03:54,080
Speaker 1: if you are a resident of Myanmar or you have

984
01:03:54,200 --> 01:03:57,280
Speaker 1: spent time there, you have connections, let us know. We

985
01:03:57,320 --> 01:04:00,920
Speaker 1: would like we always liked your primary sources on the ground.

986
01:04:01,160 --> 01:04:03,320
Speaker 1: I do want to thank that people who have already

987
01:04:03,800 --> 01:04:08,520
Speaker 1: reached out with some with some questions and some accounts.

988
01:04:09,080 --> 01:04:11,560
Speaker 1: Uh this this is an area of the world that

989
01:04:11,680 --> 01:04:14,040
Speaker 1: is unfamiliar to a lot of the West, and we

990
01:04:14,160 --> 01:04:18,600
Speaker 1: hope that you explore with us in a future episode. Also,

991
01:04:18,640 --> 01:04:21,080
Speaker 1: if you own a railroad, what's that like? Let us know,

992
01:04:21,320 --> 01:04:25,520
Speaker 1: not counting railroad tycoon or whatever that simulator is, but

993
01:04:25,680 --> 01:04:28,040
Speaker 1: I hear good things. We try to be easy to

994
01:04:28,080 --> 01:04:32,200
Speaker 1: find on the internet, folks, unlike Adobe Flash. You can

995
01:04:32,600 --> 01:04:35,000
Speaker 1: you can find us on Facebook, you can find us

996
01:04:35,000 --> 01:04:37,520
Speaker 1: on Twitter, you can find us on Instagram. We love

997
01:04:37,560 --> 01:04:41,320
Speaker 1: to recommend our Facebook community page. Here's where it gets crazy,

998
01:04:41,320 --> 01:04:45,400
Speaker 1: where we have officially welcomed a brand new moderator. Say

999
01:04:45,480 --> 01:04:48,800
Speaker 1: hello to Jennifer when you get a chance. But I'm

1000
01:04:48,840 --> 01:04:51,600
Speaker 1: not going to we might be saying, you, guys know,

1001
01:04:51,680 --> 01:04:55,000
Speaker 1: I hate social media. It's not it's not my thing.

1002
01:04:55,080 --> 01:04:58,520
Speaker 1: It doesn't wreck my trains. If that's the case, well

1003
01:04:58,920 --> 01:05:00,880
Speaker 1: we've thought ahead on this and you are in luck

1004
01:05:00,920 --> 01:05:03,560
Speaker 1: because we also have a phone number. That's right. You

1005
01:05:03,600 --> 01:05:05,600
Speaker 1: can reach us at one three S T W I

1006
01:05:05,680 --> 01:05:08,360
Speaker 1: t K. That's s T d W I t K.

1007
01:05:08,520 --> 01:05:09,960
Speaker 1: I feel like I stuttered that one a little bit

1008
01:05:10,000 --> 01:05:12,520
Speaker 1: the first time around. Leave us a message at the

1009
01:05:12,560 --> 01:05:15,400
Speaker 1: sound of Ben's dulcet tones. Three minutes is the time

1010
01:05:15,440 --> 01:05:18,040
Speaker 1: limit that you will have. That is your three minutes.

1011
01:05:18,080 --> 01:05:19,880
Speaker 1: Do us a solid and try to stick to one

1012
01:05:20,160 --> 01:05:22,280
Speaker 1: of those three minute blocks. Will be much more likely

1013
01:05:22,480 --> 01:05:26,200
Speaker 1: to hear yourself on one of our weekly listener mail episodes.

1014
01:05:26,360 --> 01:05:28,640
Speaker 1: And please let us know what to call you or

1015
01:05:28,920 --> 01:05:30,880
Speaker 1: if this is absolutely off limits, to use your voice

1016
01:05:30,880 --> 01:05:33,040
Speaker 1: on listener mail episode, in which case we may still

1017
01:05:33,240 --> 01:05:36,600
Speaker 1: be able to recount your tail without using your audio,

1018
01:05:36,640 --> 01:05:38,120
Speaker 1: but we prefer to be able to play the audio.

1019
01:05:38,160 --> 01:05:40,200
Speaker 1: I think that has a nice dimension to it. That's right,

1020
01:05:40,240 --> 01:05:41,959
Speaker 1: And if you don't want to do any of those things,

1021
01:05:42,080 --> 01:05:45,200
Speaker 1: the best way to reach us. It's kind of old fashioned,

1022
01:05:45,400 --> 01:05:48,520
Speaker 1: but we love it. We are conspiracy at I heart

1023
01:05:48,640 --> 01:06:09,320
Speaker 1: radio dot com. Stuff they don't want you to know.

1024
01:06:09,560 --> 01:06:12,520
Speaker 1: Is a production of I heart Radio. For more podcasts

1025
01:06:12,520 --> 01:06:14,760
Speaker 1: from my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app,

1026
01:06:14,840 --> 01:06:17,720
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.