WEBVTT - What the IPCC Really Said About Carbon Dioxide Removal 0:00:09.960 --> 0:00:13.560 Welcome back to Drilled. I'm Amy Westerwald. You might remember 0:00:13.720 --> 0:00:17.480 I was slowly making my way through the most recent 0:00:17.640 --> 0:00:22.320 IPCC report. That's the Mitigation Report, which came out in April. Well, 0:00:22.360 --> 0:00:26.840 it's almost three thousand pages, and between life and work, 0:00:26.880 --> 0:00:29.200 it's taken me a while. But today I want to 0:00:29.240 --> 0:00:31.520 get into one of the main topics I saw a 0:00:31.520 --> 0:00:35.800 lot of people focusing on in the report, carbon dioxide removal. 0:00:36.520 --> 0:00:39.840 People really kind of saw what they wanted to see 0:00:39.880 --> 0:00:44.080 about CDR in this report. Some heralded it as proof 0:00:44.159 --> 0:00:48.800 that CDR will in fact save us, so no need 0:00:48.840 --> 0:00:52.519 to look into anything else. Others claimed the IPCC had 0:00:52.520 --> 0:00:55.880 actually said quite the opposite, and I wondered, how could 0:00:55.920 --> 0:00:58.160 that be. It was the first time I can remember 0:00:58.240 --> 0:01:02.360 people having that diverse of views about what the IPCC 0:01:02.560 --> 0:01:07.520 report actually said. For all its inscrutability, the IPCC report 0:01:07.600 --> 0:01:13.039 is generally not ambiguous about what the science says. So 0:01:13.280 --> 0:01:15.840 I read the report with a particular interest in all 0:01:15.880 --> 0:01:19.440 the places where CDR showed up and what the underlying 0:01:19.520 --> 0:01:22.840 data and research and the report actually said about it. 0:01:23.520 --> 0:01:26.200 Lucky for me, the smart folks over at the Center 0:01:26.280 --> 0:01:29.760 for International Environmental Law or CL had the same idea 0:01:30.000 --> 0:01:33.560 and put together a brilliant report on this subject. Today, 0:01:33.600 --> 0:01:36.279 I'm joined by the architects of that report, Nikki Reisch, 0:01:36.520 --> 0:01:39.600 director of the Climate and Energy Program at CL and 0:01:39.760 --> 0:01:43.920 Carol Muffett, the organization's president and CEO. They walked me 0:01:43.959 --> 0:01:47.080 through a whole bunch of the discrepancies on carbon removal 0:01:47.120 --> 0:01:49.960 tech in this report and were able to actually answer 0:01:49.960 --> 0:01:54.240 the question what did the IPCC say about the potential 0:01:54.320 --> 0:01:58.960 of this tech that's coming up? Right after this quick break. 0:02:10.400 --> 0:02:14.799 I was hoping that we could start with kind of 0:02:14.840 --> 0:02:17.959 your focus in this most recent analysis. 0:02:18.360 --> 0:02:24.280 The genesis of this report lies in a phenomenon that 0:02:24.360 --> 0:02:29.799 I've seen going back across several IPCC reports, and particularly 0:02:29.840 --> 0:02:33.080 saw it in the special report on one point five degrees, 0:02:33.200 --> 0:02:38.840 and that is that people will cherry pick individual lines 0:02:38.880 --> 0:02:42.960 out of the summary for policymakers and use those lines, 0:02:43.120 --> 0:02:46.760 often taken out of context, to spend very simple but 0:02:46.880 --> 0:02:51.000 deceptive narratives about what the IPCC is saying. And nowhere 0:02:51.360 --> 0:02:56.560 has that been clearer than in lines taken out of 0:02:56.600 --> 0:03:00.400 the summary for policymakers on things like carbon capture and 0:03:00.520 --> 0:03:04.600 storage and the role for CDR, and you know, with 0:03:04.680 --> 0:03:07.800 the SR one point five report. I found that to 0:03:07.880 --> 0:03:12.480 actually explain to people what the IPCC was really saying 0:03:12.800 --> 0:03:15.320 about these technologies, you actually had to go through the 0:03:15.360 --> 0:03:18.480 whole report and pull out, like here are all the 0:03:18.480 --> 0:03:23.320 cautionary notes that the IPCC had included around these technologies. 0:03:23.639 --> 0:03:26.360 There were warning signs flashing everywhere if you read the 0:03:26.360 --> 0:03:31.280 whole report, But if you read not only the executive summary, sorry, 0:03:31.280 --> 0:03:34.960 the Summary for policy Makers, but the press releases characterizing 0:03:34.960 --> 0:03:38.320 that Summary for policy makers, you would have believed that 0:03:38.840 --> 0:03:42.560 the IPCC was doing nothing but seeing the praises of 0:03:42.640 --> 0:03:45.440 these technologies, when nothing could be further from the truth. 0:03:46.000 --> 0:03:50.280 And so that's why we sent out to analyze these documents. 0:03:50.280 --> 0:03:52.840 And I'll say that part of the reason for the 0:03:52.880 --> 0:03:56.880 focus on the Summary for policy Makers is that it 0:03:57.040 --> 0:04:01.120 is the window into which the vast majority of the 0:04:01.160 --> 0:04:07.320 world views what the IPCC has examined and what it's found. 0:04:07.760 --> 0:04:12.200 And so our goal was to actually unpack what the 0:04:12.200 --> 0:04:17.720 IPCC is really saying about these technologies, to push back 0:04:17.760 --> 0:04:22.920 against those oversimplified and frankly false narratives that the IPCC 0:04:23.120 --> 0:04:27.000 is saying. You know, CCS and CDR are the solutions 0:04:27.040 --> 0:04:30.719 to the climate crisis, because the IPCC really doesn't say that. 0:04:31.160 --> 0:04:34.640 I think the additional complication comes from the fact that, 0:04:35.000 --> 0:04:41.120 you know, the Summary for Policymakers is unique among the 0:04:41.200 --> 0:04:47.320 IPCC documents in being the one moment where politics really 0:04:47.360 --> 0:04:52.279 does come into play. As states negotiate that summary line 0:04:52.440 --> 0:04:56.240 by line by line, and when you've got a thousand 0:04:56.279 --> 0:05:00.520 pages of text to work with, like, there is a 0:05:00.680 --> 0:05:04.000 lot of leeway in terms of word choice, in terms 0:05:04.000 --> 0:05:08.080 of emphasis in what goes into that summary, And this 0:05:08.120 --> 0:05:10.320 is part of what we were trying to expose, is 0:05:10.360 --> 0:05:14.960 that you know, the IPCC has these complex and extensive 0:05:15.000 --> 0:05:18.479 warnings on these technologies and the over reliance on them, 0:05:19.120 --> 0:05:21.920 but you don't get that in the Summary for policy Makers, 0:05:22.240 --> 0:05:25.760 precisely because there was all this political pressure to tell 0:05:25.800 --> 0:05:27.000 a very different story. 0:05:27.240 --> 0:05:29.640 I think I would just add that the other critical 0:05:29.680 --> 0:05:33.599 piece we wanted to unpack in this analysis was to 0:05:34.800 --> 0:05:40.280 expose the way that the assumptions built into the models 0:05:40.320 --> 0:05:43.800 that the IPCC is reviewing and reporting on really skew 0:05:43.920 --> 0:05:48.719 perceptions of what's possible, and that those assumptions, while acknowledged 0:05:48.760 --> 0:05:52.720 in passing by the IPCC in its report, really play 0:05:52.760 --> 0:05:57.440 a much greater role in the way that the report 0:05:57.600 --> 0:06:02.200 describes mitigation pathway and can really skew the way that 0:06:02.240 --> 0:06:05.800 the public and policymakers take away messages. And so we 0:06:05.880 --> 0:06:10.840 really examine some of the key political and economic assumptions 0:06:11.560 --> 0:06:18.760 that constrain the way the models represent what mitigation pathways 0:06:18.800 --> 0:06:22.800 are available and what outcomes are possible. And so we 0:06:22.920 --> 0:06:26.440 go into unpacking some of that about the focus on 0:06:26.480 --> 0:06:31.800 and assumptions about economic growth that really exclude the possibility 0:06:32.040 --> 0:06:38.320 of reconceiving growth as something other than the inexorable accumulation 0:06:38.520 --> 0:06:42.120 of and use of resources, So that possibility is really 0:06:42.160 --> 0:06:45.000 written out of many of the underlying models. And the 0:06:45.040 --> 0:06:50.520 models also really have an approach to cost and portraying 0:06:50.600 --> 0:06:54.880 the cost of mitigation measures that don't capture the costs 0:06:54.920 --> 0:06:58.039 of climate change itself or adaptation to climate change. So 0:06:58.080 --> 0:07:00.960 what you get is a really skewed picture of the 0:07:01.080 --> 0:07:05.719 least cost mitigation measures for a particular temperature target, and 0:07:05.839 --> 0:07:11.600 that bias towards avoiding near term costs really ends up 0:07:12.360 --> 0:07:19.280 skewing the models towards reliance on future speculative technologies rather 0:07:19.360 --> 0:07:22.400 than near term available mitigation measures. 0:07:22.400 --> 0:07:23.720 Now I want to talk to you about that a 0:07:23.760 --> 0:07:26.400 little bit more, because I think it's so interesting that 0:07:26.560 --> 0:07:31.240 in this report, where you had this new chapter, chapter five, right, 0:07:31.320 --> 0:07:35.840 which is really questioning a lot of these economic assumptions, 0:07:35.880 --> 0:07:39.360 you also still had these models that were based on 0:07:40.200 --> 0:07:46.040 the traditional interpretations of growth and on some economic models 0:07:46.040 --> 0:07:48.440 that are starting to be more and more questioned. So 0:07:48.920 --> 0:07:51.400 I'm curious, I guess just what you think of that. 0:07:51.720 --> 0:07:55.680 Maybe I'll start with that point about things being contradictory. 0:07:55.720 --> 0:07:59.200 I think that was actually one of the precise reasons 0:07:59.240 --> 0:08:03.720 that we wanted to do this analysis, is because there 0:08:03.760 --> 0:08:08.160 are really clear warning signs in the Working Group one 0:08:08.360 --> 0:08:13.200 and Working Group two reports that emphasize that we have 0:08:13.520 --> 0:08:18.640 extraordinarily limited amount of time that we need to reduce 0:08:18.760 --> 0:08:23.360 fossil fuel emissions into the atmosphere because we have to 0:08:23.440 --> 0:08:26.240 keep warming below one point five degrees. And the OBBOCC 0:08:26.760 --> 0:08:30.520 warns in the clearest possible terms that going beyond one 0:08:30.560 --> 0:08:38.040 point five degrees, even temporarily, will result in irreversible losses 0:08:38.080 --> 0:08:42.680 to ecosystems, to communities, to human lives. And you really 0:08:42.720 --> 0:08:48.560 don't see the recognition of that urgency, the recognition of 0:08:48.600 --> 0:08:51.640 the critical importance of not going beyond one point five 0:08:51.679 --> 0:08:57.200 degrees reflected in Working Group three, and I think that 0:08:57.960 --> 0:09:01.679 in a similar way, the Working Group two report really 0:09:01.800 --> 0:09:06.839 highlighted the critical importance of centering issues of social justice, 0:09:06.880 --> 0:09:12.760 of human rights, of centering issues of equity, including in 0:09:12.880 --> 0:09:16.040 responses to the climate crisis. And you would think that 0:09:16.040 --> 0:09:20.600 that as well would frame the analysis of options that 0:09:21.040 --> 0:09:24.240 Working Group three was looking at, but in fact it doesn't. 0:09:24.760 --> 0:09:28.319 And you mentioned the point about constant I think one 0:09:28.320 --> 0:09:31.120 of the things that was really striking for us, even 0:09:31.160 --> 0:09:35.080 in the late stages of this report is Fig. Seven 0:09:35.360 --> 0:09:39.480 from the Working Group three report, which lays out in 0:09:39.559 --> 0:09:43.839 really stark terms. I think that the difference between the 0:09:43.880 --> 0:09:48.120 promise of renewable energy and the reality of renewable energy 0:09:48.160 --> 0:09:52.679 and electrification and the potential of some of these technologies 0:09:52.760 --> 0:09:56.440 like carbon capture and storage and CDR. If you look 0:09:56.480 --> 0:10:00.400 at Fig. Seven, what you find is that there enormous 0:10:00.600 --> 0:10:05.360 near term emission reductions to be made at relatively low cost, 0:10:05.520 --> 0:10:08.880 some in fact, you know, at negative cost, which means, 0:10:08.920 --> 0:10:13.040 you know, the economy benefits from accelerating wind and solar 0:10:13.160 --> 0:10:18.200 energy deployments. You could you could achieve more reductions from 0:10:18.559 --> 0:10:21.520 reducing methane emissions from oil and gas, and of course 0:10:21.520 --> 0:10:24.439 you could achieve even more if you stopped producing so 0:10:24.559 --> 0:10:27.040 much oil and gas in the first place. And then 0:10:27.080 --> 0:10:33.000 you compare that with the IPCC's own evaluation of the 0:10:33.040 --> 0:10:38.600 costs and potential of CCS and CCUS, and it's striking 0:10:38.679 --> 0:10:44.000 because the IPCC is saying here in graphic terms, literally, look, 0:10:44.360 --> 0:10:48.840 this stuff is extraordinary expensive and it has very limited potential. 0:10:49.600 --> 0:10:52.440 And yet you know when you look at the report itself, 0:10:52.800 --> 0:10:56.640 you don't see that reflected in the analysis at all. 0:10:56.960 --> 0:10:59.480 In fact, the story that the some of it for 0:10:59.600 --> 0:11:04.160 policy appears to tell is one that really puts CCS 0:11:04.200 --> 0:11:06.640 and CDR at the forefront of solution. 0:11:07.520 --> 0:11:08.600 That's so interesting. 0:11:08.679 --> 0:11:11.720 We focus a lot in this analysis on the major 0:11:12.400 --> 0:11:16.600 gap or contradiction or disconnect if you will, between this 0:11:16.720 --> 0:11:20.480 report and what the headlines are and the last report 0:11:20.520 --> 0:11:24.800 that really emphasized in loud and clear terms the irreparable 0:11:24.840 --> 0:11:27.680 harm that will result from overshooting one point five. So 0:11:27.760 --> 0:11:31.520 you would think, following on the heels of that report, 0:11:32.080 --> 0:11:38.199 that a report focused on mitigation strategies would center or 0:11:38.240 --> 0:11:41.680 at least focus heavily on those measures that would enable 0:11:41.720 --> 0:11:45.199 the world to avoid overshoot of one point five degrees. 0:11:45.240 --> 0:11:49.239 And the irreparable harm that the IPCC just showed would follow. 0:11:49.520 --> 0:11:54.199 And yet we see a presentation of these modeled pathways 0:11:54.760 --> 0:11:57.679 side by side, so that in presenting the C one 0:11:57.800 --> 0:12:00.839 modeled pathways, those that involve no or low overshoot of 0:12:00.880 --> 0:12:06.720 one point five right alongside scenarios that model at temperature 0:12:06.840 --> 0:12:11.720 rise to catastrophic levels can be misread or would suggest 0:12:11.760 --> 0:12:14.080 that all options are on the table, that all those 0:12:14.120 --> 0:12:19.640 pathways are somehow acceptable or conceivable policy options. And you 0:12:19.760 --> 0:12:22.440 referenced the chapter on demand side measures, which I think 0:12:22.480 --> 0:12:25.200 you know is a really important one to see in 0:12:25.280 --> 0:12:29.200 this report. But we did notice similarly that many of 0:12:29.240 --> 0:12:35.800 the most new and radical and critically progressive thinking about 0:12:35.840 --> 0:12:40.439 reconceptualizing demand and the systemic change needed to actually reduce 0:12:41.000 --> 0:12:46.040 energy demand is not yet reflected in the modeling of 0:12:46.120 --> 0:12:50.479 mitigation pathways, in those integrated assessment models that really underlie 0:12:51.080 --> 0:12:54.520 the graphs and charts of projected pathways. And you know, 0:12:54.559 --> 0:12:58.840 there's a lag time always between new science and the 0:12:58.880 --> 0:13:01.760 consensus science. That's sort of summarized here. But what we're 0:13:01.800 --> 0:13:05.520 also seeing is that the scientific studies that are produced 0:13:05.960 --> 0:13:11.760 are influenced by the government sources, the corporate entities, and 0:13:11.840 --> 0:13:15.920 other funders that really guide what research is done, and 0:13:15.960 --> 0:13:18.400 so there's a real gap and a need to ensure 0:13:19.080 --> 0:13:23.120 that research is being done to actually map and model 0:13:23.200 --> 0:13:25.360 what it would look like to implement some of these 0:13:25.400 --> 0:13:29.560 systemic changes, because there is a deep contradiction between the 0:13:29.600 --> 0:13:33.800 IPCC's own recognition and multiple places in the report that 0:13:34.040 --> 0:13:38.800 economic growth, businesses usual economic growth and conceptions of it 0:13:38.840 --> 0:13:42.440 is one of the major drivers of emissions and is 0:13:42.679 --> 0:13:45.440 a driver of this current crisis. So we need to 0:13:45.480 --> 0:13:50.320 reconceptualize growth, and yet the models are sort of prisoner 0:13:50.400 --> 0:13:56.720 to this fixed concept of growth continuing apace and even 0:13:56.760 --> 0:13:59.959 accelerating in the future, when if we want to tackle 0:14:00.559 --> 0:14:05.080 this crisis and avoid human catastrophe, we need to upend 0:14:05.120 --> 0:14:08.120 those assumptions and rethink the approach entirely. 0:14:09.520 --> 0:14:13.560 M Yeah, I'm curious what you guys think. You know, 0:14:13.679 --> 0:14:15.880 do you mention the research just how much this sort 0:14:15.920 --> 0:14:21.200 of illustrates the need to get certain umber interests out 0:14:21.240 --> 0:14:23.680 of the research realm. 0:14:24.040 --> 0:14:24.240 You know. 0:14:24.360 --> 0:14:27.760 I think there's a simple answer and a complex answer. 0:14:27.920 --> 0:14:31.400 I'll start with a simple one. We have seen a 0:14:31.520 --> 0:14:39.560 long history of the fossil fuel industry funding research programs, 0:14:39.600 --> 0:14:47.320 funding research projects, funding entire research institutions at colleges and universities, 0:14:47.360 --> 0:14:53.840 particularly at many of the most prestigious universities like MIT, 0:14:55.120 --> 0:14:57.880 and you look at the research that comes out of 0:14:57.920 --> 0:15:02.400 those programs, and much of it emphasizes technologies like this. 0:15:02.800 --> 0:15:06.560 MIT ran a whole program on carbon capture and storage 0:15:06.600 --> 0:15:09.560 for a long time. I think you see a heavy 0:15:10.080 --> 0:15:14.520 focus in a lot of this industry funded research on 0:15:15.040 --> 0:15:20.320 what can be done that allows business as usual while 0:15:20.640 --> 0:15:25.000 managing the problem, or appearing to manage the problem, and 0:15:25.040 --> 0:15:30.000 I think that is just a fundamental conflict. Importantly, much 0:15:30.000 --> 0:15:33.640 of that government support has also come from government agencies 0:15:33.680 --> 0:15:38.280 who have the promotion of fossil fuel production and use 0:15:38.640 --> 0:15:42.160 as part of their agency mandate. And so I think 0:15:42.200 --> 0:15:47.000 the net consequence is you get this body of science 0:15:47.240 --> 0:15:52.200 that is funded by, supported by, and driven by the 0:15:52.680 --> 0:15:58.160 underlying agendas of the companies and government agencies that are 0:15:58.200 --> 0:16:03.840 funding it. And even with the best intentions of the 0:16:03.880 --> 0:16:07.560 researchers involved, I think the pressure is clear to produce 0:16:07.640 --> 0:16:10.800 outcomes that are going to keep the money flowing. The 0:16:10.880 --> 0:16:15.720 net result is these modeled realities become our perception of 0:16:15.840 --> 0:16:20.600 the real reality, and modeled realities are pushing us towards 0:16:20.600 --> 0:16:22.760 the planet that is frankly unlivable. 0:16:23.480 --> 0:16:25.360 Yeah, just on that, if I can just jump in 0:16:25.440 --> 0:16:29.000 on that, on that last point, just to underscore something 0:16:29.520 --> 0:16:32.880 that we were talking about before about all of the 0:16:32.960 --> 0:16:37.880 assumptions built into these you know, modeled realities and how 0:16:37.920 --> 0:16:41.880 they skew the outcomes. I think, you know, a critical 0:16:42.000 --> 0:16:45.200 reflection that may seem obvious, but I don't think is 0:16:45.280 --> 0:16:51.480 frequently acknowledged, is that, you know, models that incorporate various 0:16:51.520 --> 0:16:57.680 mitigation measures reflect outcomes based on what would happen if 0:16:57.680 --> 0:17:01.440 those mitigation measures worked in practice like they do in theory. 0:17:01.880 --> 0:17:05.600 They don't model what happens when they fail. So the 0:17:05.640 --> 0:17:11.600 models that build in, for example, reliance on CCS model 0:17:12.320 --> 0:17:19.800 what happens if CCS worked perfectly as designed in theory. 0:17:19.920 --> 0:17:23.199 But in reality, what we've seen to date is that 0:17:23.280 --> 0:17:27.040 CCS projects have repeatedly over promised and under delivered on 0:17:27.080 --> 0:17:32.680 emissions reductions and haven't achieved those promised outcomes. The IPCC's 0:17:32.760 --> 0:17:37.040 report says explicitly that what's assumed is where it refers 0:17:37.080 --> 0:17:43.159 to CCS in modeled scenarios that assumes a capture a 0:17:43.160 --> 0:17:46.399 carbon dioxide capture rate of ninety to ninety five percent. 0:17:46.960 --> 0:17:49.800 That's a rate that just simply has not been consistently 0:17:49.800 --> 0:17:53.159 achieved by any CCS projects to date. So when your 0:17:53.359 --> 0:18:02.560 model is reflecting a theoretical, hypothetical, imagine possible outcome, and 0:18:03.359 --> 0:18:08.120 real world policy choices are being based on that aspirational picture, 0:18:08.840 --> 0:18:12.240 we find ourselves in, you know, the very deep water 0:18:12.440 --> 0:18:16.879 and very you know world ablaze that we're currently living in. 0:18:18.760 --> 0:18:22.680 That to me was like the scariest thing in your analysis, 0:18:22.720 --> 0:18:26.200 because I was just like, oh God, that's just not 0:18:27.119 --> 0:18:30.760 gonna work. There was that paper last year that Ben 0:18:30.960 --> 0:18:34.240 Fronta did about how some of the economists who had 0:18:34.280 --> 0:18:38.760 been commissioned to do white papers in the nineties and 0:18:38.920 --> 0:18:42.280 came up with some of the economic growth models are 0:18:42.320 --> 0:18:45.440 now kind of saying, oops, we didn't include the cost 0:18:45.640 --> 0:18:51.000 of inaction. But you know, that's now what twenty years on. 0:18:52.760 --> 0:18:55.639 I guess I'm curious what you guys think the chances 0:18:55.680 --> 0:18:59.679 are of these models being updated to actually reflect reality 0:19:00.600 --> 0:19:05.720 quickly enough for policymakers to actually find them useful. 0:19:06.119 --> 0:19:11.320 I think we've suffered from this approach to modeling for 0:19:11.359 --> 0:19:16.959 a very long time, and we've seen the impacts of 0:19:17.200 --> 0:19:21.720 climate change and the costs of those impacts systemically and 0:19:21.840 --> 0:19:27.600 systematically underestimated for years. If you look at any given 0:19:27.920 --> 0:19:31.760 year in recent years, what we see are climate fueled 0:19:32.000 --> 0:19:37.800 or climate exacerbated disasters in countries around the world that 0:19:37.880 --> 0:19:42.960 take an array of forms and add up to untold 0:19:43.040 --> 0:19:47.520 billions of dollars literally every year, year and year out. 0:19:47.960 --> 0:19:53.679 I think the problem now is like the accumulated costs 0:19:53.720 --> 0:19:57.119 of those losses are accelerating every year, and they're only 0:19:57.160 --> 0:20:01.640 going to accelerate what it would take to integrate projections 0:20:01.680 --> 0:20:06.720 of those increased costs into the models. Frankly, I don't know, 0:20:07.200 --> 0:20:10.240 but I think part of my concern is that we 0:20:10.320 --> 0:20:13.639 have lost an extraordinary amount of time and waiting for 0:20:13.800 --> 0:20:17.280 more economic models to prove to us a reality that 0:20:17.320 --> 0:20:22.119 we see unfolding around us every day is maybe not 0:20:22.320 --> 0:20:25.359 the strategy we need. What we need is to recognize 0:20:25.880 --> 0:20:29.119 that we have solutions right in front of us and 0:20:30.320 --> 0:20:34.119 crafting extraordinarily complex models to say that, well, maybe the 0:20:34.160 --> 0:20:37.639 solutions that we have, you know, aren't necessary because we 0:20:37.640 --> 0:20:40.560 could admit something that might work fifty years from now. 0:20:40.960 --> 0:20:43.560 It's just not the way to address this crisis. 0:20:44.040 --> 0:20:48.040 I think one of the key takeaways from this report buried, 0:20:48.119 --> 0:20:52.920 though it may be in places, is really that we 0:20:53.320 --> 0:21:01.160 have the mitigation measures we need. They exist, their affordable, proven, 0:21:01.920 --> 0:21:04.240 they work, and what we need to do is to 0:21:04.320 --> 0:21:08.600 deploy them rapidly and now. And those measures are clearly 0:21:08.920 --> 0:21:14.200 renewable energy reduction and energy demand. Those are the key 0:21:14.359 --> 0:21:17.320 center pieces of an effective strategy. And there are some 0:21:17.600 --> 0:21:20.720 models in the mix of the thousands that are reviewed 0:21:20.760 --> 0:21:25.520 here that of course do show just how quickly we 0:21:25.680 --> 0:21:31.119 could reduce emissions and how hopeful the world might be 0:21:31.400 --> 0:21:35.600 if we were to accelerate those policy measures that rely 0:21:35.760 --> 0:21:41.560 on proven mitigation strategies that are available now and not 0:21:42.000 --> 0:21:45.919 speculative ones that may or may not work at all, 0:21:46.000 --> 0:21:48.960 and that bring a host of other environmental and social 0:21:49.200 --> 0:21:54.200 risks along with them. What's lacking is the political will 0:21:54.800 --> 0:21:59.520 not this scientific proof, and I think that's a real 0:22:00.320 --> 0:22:03.680 change in where we are. And the importance of these 0:22:03.760 --> 0:22:08.960 reports is that, yes, there's of course benefit in deeper 0:22:09.480 --> 0:22:14.879 and more extensive study and intensifying that the scientific study 0:22:14.960 --> 0:22:19.760 of climate change, its dynamics, impacts, et cetera. But the 0:22:19.880 --> 0:22:22.800 science on the causes of climate change is crystal clear, 0:22:23.400 --> 0:22:28.720 and the known solutions that address those underlying drivers are 0:22:29.640 --> 0:22:33.800 evident and available, and so really we're not facing a 0:22:33.880 --> 0:22:38.639 gulf of scientific knowledge. We're facing a tremendous gulf and 0:22:38.840 --> 0:22:43.320 an absence of political will, and we need to unleash 0:22:43.359 --> 0:22:48.000 the stranglehold that vested interests have on our collective future 0:22:48.119 --> 0:22:51.040 and the policies that are going to keep it livable. 0:22:51.160 --> 0:22:54.600 If I can add just one point that I think 0:22:55.960 --> 0:22:59.439 is too often lost in these analysis, and that is 0:23:00.800 --> 0:23:07.760 that a CO two molecule omitted to the atmosphere today 0:23:08.000 --> 0:23:12.720 doesn't warm the atmosphere once and disappear. It warms the 0:23:12.720 --> 0:23:17.760 atmosphere and keeps on warming the atmosphere until ten years, 0:23:17.840 --> 0:23:20.960 one hundred years, sometimes a thousand years from now, when 0:23:20.960 --> 0:23:23.639 it eventually decays out of the atmosphere or it's pulled 0:23:23.640 --> 0:23:27.680 out of the atmosphere for some reason. That is really 0:23:27.680 --> 0:23:31.480 important because it means the impacts of each individual's CO 0:23:31.720 --> 0:23:35.399 two molecule are accumulative. It will keep contributing to warming 0:23:35.440 --> 0:23:38.040 as long as it's in the atmosphere, and that means 0:23:38.080 --> 0:23:42.440 that cutting emissions early, Cutting emissions now has a much 0:23:42.560 --> 0:23:47.639 higher impact than trying to cut emissions or pull carbon 0:23:47.680 --> 0:23:50.520 out of the atmosphere a decade from now. Or three 0:23:50.560 --> 0:23:53.520 decades from now. One of the really striking things that 0:23:53.600 --> 0:23:56.880 comes out of the IPCC report is there's a place 0:23:56.880 --> 0:24:02.520 where the ibc C acknowledges that the divergence between the 0:24:02.600 --> 0:24:06.879 high ambition pathways and the low ambition pathways would become 0:24:07.000 --> 0:24:10.200 clear in terms of emissions, in terms of other sorts 0:24:10.200 --> 0:24:14.359 of pollutants within a few years, and by twenty thirty 0:24:14.400 --> 0:24:17.320 we would start to see that divergence in terms of 0:24:17.359 --> 0:24:20.040 what the levels of nw CO two accumulating in the 0:24:20.040 --> 0:24:25.399 atmosphere are. That's an extraordinary thing to recognize, and I 0:24:25.440 --> 0:24:30.640 think our policy processes don't appreciate it enough. Literally, if 0:24:30.680 --> 0:24:36.240 we accelerate these responses, we'll start seeing the outcomes from that, 0:24:36.119 --> 0:24:41.159 the shifts in that really really rapidly. And by contrast, 0:24:41.240 --> 0:24:44.280 if we delay action, you know, we're not just fighting 0:24:44.359 --> 0:24:48.280 the emissions in twenty thirty, We're fighting the cumulative warming 0:24:48.680 --> 0:24:51.800 from all the missions between now and twenty thirty. 0:24:52.280 --> 0:24:54.480 Why do you think that there was such a difference 0:24:54.560 --> 0:24:59.320 between Working Group two and Working Group three, especially given 0:24:59.400 --> 0:25:01.760 that I feel like a lot of people were expecting 0:25:01.920 --> 0:25:05.680 Working Group three to kind of come out guns blazing 0:25:05.720 --> 0:25:07.639 in a way that it didn't really. 0:25:07.760 --> 0:25:12.920 The key difference between these past reports on the physical 0:25:12.960 --> 0:25:17.080 science and the impacts and experiences of climate change and 0:25:17.440 --> 0:25:21.840 this Working Group three report on what can and effectively 0:25:21.880 --> 0:25:23.879 what should we do about it. Although the report is 0:25:23.920 --> 0:25:29.120 not prescriptive, it lays out science and research about what 0:25:29.800 --> 0:25:32.800 can be done to address this problem and really tease 0:25:32.920 --> 0:25:36.880 up what is ultimately a political and economic question about 0:25:37.359 --> 0:25:39.720 which steps are we going to take. All of them 0:25:40.080 --> 0:25:46.520 carry some cost, but some costs are born disproportionately by 0:25:47.600 --> 0:25:51.879 future generations but also by disadvantage populations today, and some 0:25:51.960 --> 0:25:55.200 of those costs are absolutely necessary to bear. What we 0:25:55.280 --> 0:26:00.320 saw was a sort of battleground between states with really 0:26:00.400 --> 0:26:05.480 vested interest in maintaining a business as usual approach to 0:26:06.440 --> 0:26:11.200 their economies to energy sector and trying to, as they might, 0:26:11.480 --> 0:26:15.879 to blunt any messages that suggest we need to radically 0:26:15.920 --> 0:26:22.160 rethink and drastically and dramatically move, beginning immediately away from 0:26:22.480 --> 0:26:27.640 all fossil fuels and replace them with renewables, and focus 0:26:27.720 --> 0:26:31.800 on the necessary systemic changes in the way that we 0:26:31.960 --> 0:26:38.399 use resources to lower demand and make our approach to 0:26:38.480 --> 0:26:39.520 living sustainable. 0:26:40.040 --> 0:26:44.040 Yeah, And I think what I would add to that is, 0:26:46.160 --> 0:26:51.880 first to recognize the extraordinary resistance on the part of 0:26:54.080 --> 0:26:58.040 some core governments, not just Saudi Arabia as a producer 0:26:58.080 --> 0:27:02.800 of oil and gas, but the US to grappling honestly 0:27:03.480 --> 0:27:10.240 with what the IPCC science tells us, and grappling honestly 0:27:10.440 --> 0:27:13.560 with what that means for how things need to change, 0:27:13.640 --> 0:27:19.720 because changing is politically unpalatable and politically uncomfortable, even when 0:27:19.720 --> 0:27:25.080 it's vitally necessary. And I think that is compounded by 0:27:25.400 --> 0:27:29.240 where we are in the trajectory of denial. We talked 0:27:29.320 --> 0:27:33.600 earlier about the role of industry and funding funding scientific 0:27:33.640 --> 0:27:36.480 research in the space, and I think if you if 0:27:36.480 --> 0:27:39.400 you watch the history, if you want, if you watch, 0:27:39.920 --> 0:27:43.679 if you pay attention to denial efforts across spaces and 0:27:43.720 --> 0:27:49.720 across time, they follow a pretty predictable arc. First, you 0:27:49.920 --> 0:27:55.320 deny that a phenomenon exists, and then you deny that 0:27:55.359 --> 0:27:58.359 the phenomenon is a problem, and then you deny that 0:27:58.400 --> 0:28:02.000 the problem is severe, and when that no longer works, 0:28:02.040 --> 0:28:06.280 then you deny that people are causing the problem or 0:28:06.280 --> 0:28:10.240 that you specifically are causing the problem. Then you turn 0:28:10.280 --> 0:28:13.280 to economics and say, oh, well, it's too expensive to 0:28:13.400 --> 0:28:16.640 address it. And then in the final stages, you take 0:28:16.760 --> 0:28:19.720 one or two one or two courses and we're seeing 0:28:19.720 --> 0:28:22.760 both of them play out. You argue that, oh, yes, 0:28:22.800 --> 0:28:25.160 the problem exists, and we're part of the solution, we've 0:28:25.200 --> 0:28:29.119 been part of the solution all along, or you couple 0:28:29.200 --> 0:28:31.960 that with the problem exists, but it's really too late 0:28:32.000 --> 0:28:34.280 to do anything about it, so we really just need 0:28:34.280 --> 0:28:40.680 to learn to adapt. And that schema, that playbook is 0:28:40.720 --> 0:28:43.120 one that we've seen play out over and over again. 0:28:43.240 --> 0:28:47.040 And so what does that mean for these IPCC analysis Well, 0:28:47.080 --> 0:28:50.680 I think it means that we know that the fossil 0:28:50.680 --> 0:28:53.880 fuel industry spent a really long time arguing that there 0:28:53.960 --> 0:28:57.320 was no such thing as climate change, and it lost 0:28:57.360 --> 0:29:00.280 that arguments in the weight of the overwhelming evidence, and 0:29:00.320 --> 0:29:03.479