Speaker 1: Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show
Speaker 1: where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news.
Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. The CDC, also known as the Centers
Speaker 1: for Disease Control and Prevention, has been emphasizing that a
Speaker 1: strategy called contact tracing is going to be essential to
Speaker 1: reopening the country. Here's Robert Redfield, the head of the CDC,
Speaker 1: speaking at a White House press conference earlier this month.
Speaker 1: We're going to be very aggressively focused on early case recognition, isolation,
Speaker 1: and contact tracing. Contact tracing is the process of identifying
Speaker 1: people who've come into contact with an infected person and
Speaker 1: alerting them so that they can get tested and isolate
Speaker 1: themselves to slow the spread of the disease. This is
Speaker 1: a job that has traditionally been done by public health
Speaker 1: workers in several countries around the world, including Singapore, South Korea.
Speaker 1: Much contact tracing was done digitally with the help of
Speaker 1: apps the people downloaded onto their phones. To learn more
Speaker 1: about contact tracing, how it works, what it's good for,
Speaker 1: and what the challenges are facing contact tracing. We're joined
Speaker 1: by doctor Louise Iverse. She's the executive director of the
Speaker 1: Massachusetts General Center for Global Health at the Massachusetts General
Speaker 1: Hospital in Boston. She's a doctor who specializes in infectious
Speaker 1: disease and IT outbreaks, and she's been thinking very deeply
Speaker 1: about that question. Louise, thank you for being here. I
Speaker 1: wonder if you could start by just explaining to us
Speaker 1: contact tracing one oh one, what is it? And then
Speaker 1: we'll move to what's it for. So contact tracing is
Speaker 1: basically identifying and then isolating people who have been exposed
Speaker 1: to an infectious disease. And the idea is that by
Speaker 1: isolating those people who been exposed, you can interrupt the
Speaker 1: chains of transmission and in good quality contact tracing. Explain
Speaker 1: to me what the mechanics are. First we discover that
Speaker 1: person X call M Noah has been exposed to the
Speaker 1: virus and is infectious. Then what happens. So the first
Speaker 1: step is identifying what we call an index case. So
Speaker 1: an index case is a person who is confirmed to
Speaker 1: have the illness in this situation COVID nineteen. So let's
Speaker 1: say you have a positive COVID nineteen test. Then that
Speaker 1: triggers a notification to the public health authorities. So then
Speaker 1: what they do is call you up and speak with
Speaker 1: you and try to motivationally interview you to remember where
Speaker 1: you've been, who you've been in contact with. For COVID nineteen,
Speaker 1: we think especially about being with someone within about six
Speaker 1: feet of distance physically for about ten or fifteen minutes more.
Speaker 1: And we make a list of all your contacts, and
Speaker 1: then we set about communicating with those people who are
Speaker 1: contacts and giving them particular pieces of advice. You might
Speaker 1: offer contacts a test. You certainly want to know if
Speaker 1: any contact is already having symptoms, because they might actually
Speaker 1: become a case. Then if you have symptoms and a
Speaker 1: positive test, you become a case. You definitely want those
Speaker 1: folks to quarantine. And you know, many people are not
Speaker 1: in a position to easily self isolate, so many people
Speaker 1: talk about supported isolation or supported quarantine. You know, where
Speaker 1: you investigate in speaking with the contact what their barriers
Speaker 1: are to being able to stay home for two weeks.
Speaker 1: So that's kind of the process. And why does that
Speaker 1: not very quickly spiral to enormous numbers. I mean, I
Speaker 1: can understand that under social distancing it might not spiral
Speaker 1: that much because I'm not sure I've actually been in
Speaker 1: contact that much with anybody except from my kids. But
Speaker 1: if I had been out and about because there wasn't
Speaker 1: social distancing, there would presumably be many people, and then
Speaker 1: that would lead to many other people and the tree
Speaker 1: would grow very, very rapidly. So how is this doable
Speaker 1: in a non socially distanced environment. I mean, you just
Speaker 1: perfectly described the pandemic, you know, because that's exactly why
Speaker 1: there's exponential spread, is because every person potentially infects other people.
Speaker 1: So you're totally right. Contact tracing is a big task.
Speaker 1: It quickly becomes very many people, and you are essentially
Speaker 1: trying to chase ahead of the speed of the virus
Speaker 1: and at least take out of circulation enough people so
Speaker 1: that they don't go on to contribute to that exponential spread.
Speaker 1: So it is a very very big task. It is
Speaker 1: certainly normally in public health what we try to do
Speaker 1: at the beginning of epidemics, and so there's certainly debate
Speaker 1: at the moment in Massachusetts, say about how helpful it
Speaker 1: is to be trying to do contact tracing. I do
Speaker 1: think that the human capacity to do it gets quickly stretched.
Speaker 1: If we had over two thousand positive cases and new
Speaker 1: positive cases in Massachusetts yesterday and the same amount the
Speaker 1: day before you quickly get into the number of contacts.
Speaker 1: It's very, very many. And this is why I personally
Speaker 1: became interested in the idea that technology should be able
Speaker 1: to somehow help us in trying to deal with this
Speaker 1: huge task. In a place like Massachusetts is a good
Speaker 1: example where we both are, where there's already what you
Speaker 1: epidemiologists call community spread. What would the scale of contact
Speaker 1: tracing have to be actually to use it to beat
Speaker 1: the virus down? Has that ever been done? I mean, obviously,
Speaker 1: contact tracing has been used successfully as it was in
Speaker 1: South Korea to help control the virus, but only a
Speaker 1: few people have it. But are there any examples in
Speaker 1: the world where contact tracing has been used to knock
Speaker 1: back community spread? I think you could look at Ebola
Speaker 1: virus disease as a example of a very frightening illness
Speaker 1: with a much higher mortality rate that we're seeing for
Speaker 1: COVID nineteen, where contact tracing has essentially been a major
Speaker 1: contributor to ending the outbreak. Certainly in the twenty fourteen
Speaker 1: twenty fifteen outbreak in West Africa before there was a vaccine.
Speaker 1: They're very different diseases, so I'm not trying to say
Speaker 1: that they are transmitted the same way. But the question
Speaker 1: for COVID nineteen is if we don't try to contain
Speaker 1: the virus, what is our alternative. We don't have a treatment,
Speaker 1: we don't have a prevention, a vaccine. I think from
Speaker 1: the perspective of public health folks, if we don't try
Speaker 1: to do contact racing, we're just kind of sitting back
Speaker 1: to say, well, it escaped and there's nothing we can do.
Speaker 1: We just have to wait. So I think when you
Speaker 1: look at the numbers in the United States and certainly Massachusetts,
Speaker 1: it just seem overwhelming. But basically, the two features around
Speaker 1: contact tracing that are important are you have to be fast,
Speaker 1: because you need to identify the contacts and put them
Speaker 1: in isolation quickly, and then you have to have good
Speaker 1: quality testing. So if you have an accurate test that's widespread,
Speaker 1: and you have contact tracing that's fast, then you could
Speaker 1: be successful. You know, Massachusetts just hired or is in
Speaker 1: the process of hiring a thousand people to work on
Speaker 1: contact tracing, and I think that's a big start. I
Speaker 1: think even if we don't really believe that it's possible
Speaker 1: right now at the peak of our epidemics, we definitely
Speaker 1: need to have contact tracing set up and established and
Speaker 1: robust for when we do all start coming back into
Speaker 1: circulation and moving around, when we get to the bottom
Speaker 1: of our plateau, because we're going to have other waves
Speaker 1: of illness and we need to be able to blunt
Speaker 1: those much more aggressively than we did with this first wave.
Speaker 1: If you have a thousand contact tracers up and doing
Speaker 1: their jobs at their phones, and you have two thousand
Speaker 1: cases in a day, does that ratio work? I mean,
Speaker 1: how long does it take one contact tracer to trace
Speaker 1: all of the contacts of a person? So I think
Speaker 1: the first job is really the case investigation, so they
Speaker 1: speak to the case. I've spoken with some people who
Speaker 1: are working on this now and they say that first
Speaker 1: call can be forty minutes, forty five minutes. Speaking to
Speaker 1: contacts can be shorter. Some contacts don't answer the phone.
Speaker 1: Some contacts immediately say okay, no problem. Others may take
Speaker 1: a little more time. Others may be in difficulties, you know,
Speaker 1: they're worried about their job. They need to be referred
Speaker 1: to social services. It's not a fast task, so that
Speaker 1: I grant you, It is not fast. And how does
Speaker 1: one find people whose phone numbers one doesn't know, or
Speaker 1: whose name is one doesn't know. Do you just have
Speaker 1: to sort of give up on that person you try
Speaker 1: to use some reasonable detective efforts to find them. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I think you know. Again. Contact tracing historically is a
Speaker 1: pretty nuanced activity, and the people who are trained to
Speaker 1: do it in normal public health circumstances are like investigators.
Speaker 1: They're like disease detectives. They tried to understand what's going on.
Speaker 1: They tried to look at how many contacts became sick,
Speaker 1: and so if many of the contacts became sick, you
Speaker 1: might need to do a deeper investigation. It's nuanced, and
Speaker 1: we are in the middle of this massive crisis in
Speaker 1: some ways, you know, trying to adapt what's a thoughtful
Speaker 1: and specialized and very human interaction into perhaps something that
Speaker 1: can happen faster. But yes, one may not know all
Speaker 1: of the people that you were in contact with. If
Speaker 1: you took a bus or a commuter rail, you may
Speaker 1: have been in the same car as someone for twenty minutes.
Speaker 1: You don't know who they are. So there are certainly
Speaker 1: weaknesses in the capacity at this level of scale to
Speaker 1: do it. If we look at say South Korea, who
Speaker 1: had a very successful containment effort. They used many components
Speaker 1: to their contact tracing activities. They looked at closed circuit television,
Speaker 1: they looked at credit card transactions. They had a lot
Speaker 1: of components to their contact tracing, and they had large
Speaker 1: numbers of people doing it. So I think on principle,
Speaker 1: it's clear that it works. And I think the question
Speaker 1: that you're coming back to me with is really is
Speaker 1: this feasible at the scale that we're at. And my
Speaker 1: response to that is, we have to make it feasible,
Speaker 1: because in the absence of a vaccine, in the absence
Speaker 1: of a treatment, if we don't try to expand our
Speaker 1: contact tracing, I don't really see other solutions for us
Speaker 1: for the eyebreak. We'll be back in just a moment.
Speaker 1: You mentioned the obvious appeal of so called digital contact
Speaker 1: tracing or automated depending on what terminology you like better,
Speaker 1: as opposed to the manual or what I would call
Speaker 1: the human form. And South Korea has gotten attention for
Speaker 1: what it's done. Israel has also gotten attention, positive and negative,
Speaker 1: for the fact that it's internal intelligence services. Just told
Speaker 1: everybody one day, by the way we've been tracking where
Speaker 1: you all are on your GPS phone data this entire time,
Speaker 1: and now we're going to put that to COVID. I
Speaker 1: actually know somebody who, as far as she knows, she
Speaker 1: was just in her house and she got a text
Speaker 1: message from the Internal Security Services in Israel saying you've
Speaker 1: been close to somebody who has the virus, and you know,
Speaker 1: she tried to reach some human being to say no,
Speaker 1: I wasn't you know, maybe someone stood outside my housin
Speaker 1: smoked a cigarette, but she wasn't able to reach anybody,
Speaker 1: so she self isolated. So that's a very immediately intrusive
Speaker 1: form of this. My questions about this are really fond
Speaker 1: of two categories. One is can it work? That's question one,
Speaker 1: and then question two will be can it be ethical?
Speaker 1: So I think we see that it can work because
Speaker 1: it has worked. So it worked in South Korea, some
Speaker 1: component of it worked in Wuhan, and actually, from a
Speaker 1: public health perspective, if we could identify every case and
Speaker 1: identify every person who'd been in contact with that case
Speaker 1: and isolate them, we would be able to stop transmission.
Speaker 1: So theoretically it can work, and in practice we've seen
Speaker 1: places being able to implement it, especially at the beginning
Speaker 1: of their eyebreaks. So I do think it's feasible. The
Speaker 1: question is, in terms of technology, what can work Bluetooth.
Speaker 1: I'm learning a lot about. It's very interesting because our phones,
Speaker 1: if they have Bluetooth in it, are emitting Bluetooth signals
Speaker 1: all the time. And the idea that your phone itself
Speaker 1: could identify other phones that you have been around and
Speaker 1: hold that information for some period of time and then
Speaker 1: notify you if and only if another phone gets flagged
Speaker 1: as being infected. It's an interesting opportunity to use a
Speaker 1: piece of technology that already exists, that many of us
Speaker 1: already have. So I think the idea of using Bluetooth
Speaker 1: proximity to try to help discover contacts is a very
Speaker 1: interesting and intriguing idea, And I think we have to
Speaker 1: figure out how it can be used, how accurate it is,
Speaker 1: how many false alarms it might give, how well it
Speaker 1: is at picking up whether you've been within six feet
Speaker 1: or if that's an error, If it can tell if
Speaker 1: there's a wall between your six feed like. There are
Speaker 1: many questions about it, but I do think it's intriguing
Speaker 1: and it's very laborious to do all the manual tracing yourself.
Speaker 1: So I think technology should be able to help us.
Speaker 1: Here's what seems to me to be the biggest challenge
Speaker 1: there in order to do the human contact tracing, the
Speaker 1: manual contact tracing. You said, what triggers the whole thing
Speaker 1: is that the public health authorities are informed that someone
Speaker 1: has had a positive test, and the people who are
Speaker 1: doing the contact tracing are indirectly working for the government.
Speaker 1: And if you're going to connect up the digital data
Speaker 1: to actual human tracing in order to give people the
Speaker 1: support and advice that you need, at some point you're
Speaker 1: going to have to connect the digital data that's been
Speaker 1: gathered to the real human being who is connected to
Speaker 1: the government. And I imagine there are some barriers we
Speaker 1: could put there to maybe keep certain aspects of the
Speaker 1: data from the government. But I think for the ordinary
Speaker 1: person going to think, well, look if my phone tells
Speaker 1: somebody everyone I've seen and what that means where I've been,
Speaker 1: that effectively the government is going to know that. How
Speaker 1: does one begin to think about making people feel safe
Speaker 1: and secure under those circumstances in the normal process. COVID
Speaker 1: nineteen is a notifiable illness Therefore, anyone who runs a
Speaker 1: test a laboratory, who runs the test, they must notify
Speaker 1: the public health authorities of a positive result. So already
Speaker 1: there's a kind of trust given to the state about
Speaker 1: a medical condition. I think many people don't realize that
Speaker 1: that exists. Already. There are notifiable diseases. They've always been
Speaker 1: notifiable diseases that the public health authorities are told about
Speaker 1: with your name, not just that there is a kise. Yes,
Speaker 1: effilment has this problem, and that is what normally triggers
Speaker 1: case investigators and contact tracers for other illnesses, although of
Speaker 1: course they're much more snow moving in general, so it
Speaker 1: happens at a much smaller volume. So no one has
Speaker 1: really heard of contact tracing before. So if in a
Speaker 1: perfect I'm calling it a human system. But of course
Speaker 1: the people who do this for a living keep reminding me,
Speaker 1: like we use software, it's not an unaided human process exactly.
Speaker 1: But if you had a perfect process, there would be
Speaker 1: this huge notebook or database that already did have all
Speaker 1: your contacts and all your information, and we already allow
Speaker 1: that to happen in the public interest because of notifiable infections.
Speaker 1: The interesting thing is that the human ability to do
Speaker 1: that is flawed, and so that massive database is not
Speaker 1: really there. And also in Massachusetts, for example, there are
Speaker 1: three hundred and fifty one boards of health. Those are
Speaker 1: municipal boards of health essentially county and municipal authorities exactly,
Speaker 1: And so there's some decentralization of the process, there's some
Speaker 1: kind of enactment of local authorities to do things. So
Speaker 1: there's not one massive, big data set of where everyone
Speaker 1: has been and who they've been in contact with, but
Speaker 1: in theory there could be. And yet when we propose
Speaker 1: to do that through technology, it does increase I think
Speaker 1: both the power of that creation of a data set,
Speaker 1: which makes us concerned rightly so, and I think it
Speaker 1: also would potentially increase the scale of the data that's available,
Speaker 1: and it would congregate it in a single place potentially,
Speaker 1: and it makes people concerned understandably about having a data
Speaker 1: set that others could access or use. So two people
Speaker 1: who I've been listening very carefully to and learning a
Speaker 1: lot from in the discussion about digital tools, especially bluetooth tools,
Speaker 1: have been a professor Ron Revest and Dannie Weisner, both
Speaker 1: at mit Ron actually created this group which creates a
Speaker 1: protocol a Bluetooth Proximity protocol CULPACKED that would ostensibly always
Speaker 1: have the information remaining on the phone and really only
Speaker 1: allow anonymized information into a centralized cloud. What Apple and
Speaker 1: Google have proposed to do with their operating systems on
Speaker 1: iPhones and androids to as far as I can see,
Speaker 1: is following the recommendations that are in the PACKED protocol
Speaker 1: that Ron has led, and that will maintain a degree
Speaker 1: of privacy for individuals. That seems robust technological solutions, I'm
Speaker 1: sure are part of the answer here, but they will
Speaker 1: also have to be a policy component to it as well,
Speaker 1: especially if we need to ultimately connect the data on
Speaker 1: people's phones about their contact to human tracing. The state
Speaker 1: will have to make a policy decision about that in
Speaker 1: light of the full set of public values and public
Speaker 1: norms and constitutional rules in it. That's going to be
Speaker 1: a tricky moment. Yeah, no single component of addressing the
Speaker 1: pandemic will work on its own. It just won't. Outbreaks
Speaker 1: are complex social phenomena as well as scientific events, so
Speaker 1: we have to have a comprehensive, integrated approach that acknowledges
Speaker 1: that humans don't make rational choices, that the virus is
Speaker 1: brand new and we're still learning about it. That we
Speaker 1: have to test more, that we have to connect testing
Speaker 1: to contact tracing, that some people can't self isolate without support,
Speaker 1: that some people a particularly vulnerable boat to being infected,
Speaker 1: and to the solutions we're proposed here, like the contact racing,
Speaker 1: and that we have to have a smart approach that
Speaker 1: can take care of the most vulnerable people, take care
Speaker 1: of sick people, help other people from getting infected, and
Speaker 1: allow us to start going back into society. Again, no
Speaker 1: one thing is a silver bullet, and it really requires
Speaker 1: strong leadership that has good scientific understanding and that embraces
Speaker 1: the social component of disease as well as just the
Speaker 1: medical component of disease. Sometimes when I'm listening to the
Speaker 1: debates about should we quote unquote reopen things, it starts
Speaker 1: with some people saying no, too dangerous, other people saying
Speaker 1: we must do it, and then comes a sort of
Speaker 1: reasonable voice saying, well, we can reopen once we have
Speaker 1: sufficient testing and sufficient contact tracing and supported isolation, and
Speaker 1: in a kind of Goldilocks way that seems to be,
Speaker 1: you know, the reasonable middle answer. One takeaway from me
Speaker 1: of our conversation is that it actually may not be
Speaker 1: that simple, and that the presence of robust testing and
Speaker 1: robust contact tracing where there's community spread doesn't guarantee successful
Speaker 1: control of the epidemic. Am I hearing you correctly in
Speaker 1: that regard? I think you know so. I'm an infectious
Speaker 1: diseases doctor at Mass Journal Hospital in Boston, and as
Speaker 1: a doctor in the hospital, it's been really terrifying over
Speaker 1: the last few weeks to see our cases going up
Speaker 1: and up and up. So I think that some of
Speaker 1: the hesitancies about reopening, so to speak, are that we
Speaker 1: fear that reopening in a trickle wouldn't really work and
Speaker 1: that we would quickly become overwhelmed. And I think the
Speaker 1: tentativeness over the medical side's capacity to care for sick
Speaker 1: people is really understandably a large part of the hesitancy
Speaker 1: in terms of opening up. I do think if we
Speaker 1: have really widespread testing, but we have to scale up
Speaker 1: testing really a lot, a lot more than we're doing,
Speaker 1: and if we have robust contact tracing in place, we
Speaker 1: could start reopening. The fear is that that brings us
Speaker 1: into a certain amounte of uncertainty, and none of us
Speaker 1: like uncertainty. We're really fearful that our hospitals will be
Speaker 1: overwhelmed and that people will die unnecessarily. And that's a
Speaker 1: scary thought. But at some point, you know, my opinion
Speaker 1: is that we have to make a plan. I think.
Speaker 1: I think the biggest challenge right now is that I
Speaker 1: don't really see the plan. I haven't seen the plan.
Speaker 1: You have you seen the plan? The plan, you know,
Speaker 1: and if you haven't seen it and I haven't seen it,
Speaker 1: there is no plan. I mean, I think, Yeah, there's
Speaker 1: a lot of magical thinking. There's a lot of thought about, well,
Speaker 1: maybe we could hold out until there's a vaccine, but
Speaker 1: there may not be a vaccine. There's a lot of
Speaker 1: thought of we have to hold out until the therapies
Speaker 1: get much better, but we don't have any guarantee that
Speaker 1: the therapies will work. And then the fallback is when
Speaker 1: people say herd immunity in some generic sense, as though
Speaker 1: they knew exactly what that meant. And that's obviously a
Speaker 1: scenario in which you will be very difficult to avoid
Speaker 1: overwhelming the hospital. So I agree with you. So I
Speaker 1: have in my global health career, spent a lot of
Speaker 1: time responding to eyebreaks. You know, none like this but
Speaker 1: in disaster settings, you know, you have to move quickly
Speaker 1: and make decisions in the context of uncertainty. You know,
Speaker 1: in the US we are not as used to doing
Speaker 1: that because we have always really got the resources to
Speaker 1: do the modeling and get the science and wait until
Speaker 1: it's perfect. And I think we have to move ahead
Speaker 1: with making decisions that are imperfect using the best data
Speaker 1: that we have. But we do have to use the
Speaker 1: data that we have. I mean, we have to move forward.
Speaker 1: So you know, technology and other ideas they may seem ambitious,
Speaker 1: contact tracing might seem oh, it's not feasible, it's too many,
Speaker 1: But the way to be successful is just to take
Speaker 1: the next step forward and believe it's possible and keep
Speaker 1: building it as you're doing it. I think that's what
Speaker 1: we have to think about, or else, you know, we're
Speaker 1: just going to be struck. Thank you so much. This
Speaker 1: is tremendously clarifying, and there are bits of it that
Speaker 1: are inspiring and make one think there is a way forward,
Speaker 1: and then there are bits of it that cause one
Speaker 1: to feel a bit more panic. And I really appreciate
Speaker 1: it your honestly about it. Thank you all right, thank
Speaker 1: you Here on deep background. We've spoken to several guests
Speaker 1: who focused on the mechan that we can use gradually
Speaker 1: to emerge from the conditions of social isolation that we're
Speaker 1: presently in. Testing has been a consistent theme that we've
Speaker 1: heard about again and again and again, more and better testing.
Speaker 1: Speaking to doctor Ivers makes it clear that the testing
Speaker 1: is primarily valuable, however, to the extent that it is
Speaker 1: then used to lead to contact tracing, and the idea
Speaker 1: is that contact tracing itself can help manage the disease.
Speaker 1: This may be the only long run strategy that can
Speaker 1: be used in the absence of a vaccine and in
Speaker 1: the absence of better therapies. But contact tracing on its
Speaker 1: own is not a magic bullet. You have to reach
Speaker 1: enough people and that's a challenge. It's also very difficult
Speaker 1: to make contact tracing work in a scenario where as
Speaker 1: we have, the disease has spread into the entire community
Speaker 1: and we're not just tracking down a handful of names.
Speaker 1: Contact tracing is going to be central to our public
Speaker 1: discussion in the weeks and months ahead, its successes, its limitations,
Speaker 1: and the challenges that it faces. We will keep a
Speaker 1: close eye on this subject going forward and come back
Speaker 1: to you with more about contact tracing as this story develops.
Speaker 1: Until I speak to you next time, Be careful, be safe,
Speaker 1: and be well. Deep Background is brought to you by
Speaker 1: Pushkin Industries. Our producer is Lydia gene Coott, with research
Speaker 1: help from zooe Wynn. Mastering is by Jason Gambrell and
Speaker 1: Martin Gonzalez. Our showrunner is Sophie mckibbon. Our theme music
Speaker 1: is composed by Luis GERA special thanks to the Pushkin Brass,
Speaker 1: Malcolm Gladwell, Jacob Weisberg, and Mia Lobel. I'm Noah Feldman.
Speaker 1: I also write a regular column from Bloomberg Opinion, which
Speaker 1: you can find at Bloomberg dot com slash Feldman. To
Speaker 1: discover Bloomberg's original slate of podcasts, go to Bloomberg dot
Speaker 1: com slash Podcasts. You can follow me on Twitter at
Speaker 1: Noah R. Feldman. This is Deep Background.