WEBVTT - The Cambridge Analytica Scandal

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host, John in Strickland. I'm an executive producer

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<v Speaker 1>with how Stuff Works in a love all things tech,

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<v Speaker 1>and we're continuing our story about Cambridge and Alytica, and

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<v Speaker 1>also continuing Jonathan's slow descent towards laryngitis. I'm all right

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<v Speaker 1>at the moment. I got my cup of water with me,

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<v Speaker 1>but I am recording this immediately after recording the previous

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<v Speaker 1>two episodes of tech Stuff, So if I start getting

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<v Speaker 1>particularly raspy, I apologize, but it's because my health is

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<v Speaker 1>slowly failing. In our last episode, I talked about how

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<v Speaker 1>two old Etonian's, first Nigel Oaks and later Alexander Nicks,

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<v Speaker 1>formed a company that depended heavily on psychological information of

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<v Speaker 1>questionable utility to form a consulting company that would take

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<v Speaker 1>that data and create action items for clients. They focused

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<v Speaker 1>mainly on political clients, with Nix's push to focus more

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<v Speaker 1>exclusively on elections, and I ended just as the organization

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<v Speaker 1>they created, Strategic Communication Laboratories or SCL, had spun off,

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<v Speaker 1>a new entity backed by American billionaires and This new

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<v Speaker 1>entity was called Cambridge Analytica. That entity incorporated in Delaware

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<v Speaker 1>on December thirty one, two thousand thirteen, so the very

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<v Speaker 1>last day of two thousand thirteen. Before incorporating, NIX had

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<v Speaker 1>led a few attempts to get cozy with American politics,

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<v Speaker 1>but things had not really gone well. The Republican candidate

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<v Speaker 1>for governor of Virginia was Ken Cucinelli, and a political

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<v Speaker 1>action committee supporting Cucinelli had hired SCL. Now remember this

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<v Speaker 1>was this was before Cambridge Analytica had become an official thing.

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<v Speaker 1>S c L was to post to create a list

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<v Speaker 1>of voters who could be persuaded to support Cucinelli. That

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<v Speaker 1>was what they were contracted to do. But the deadline

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<v Speaker 1>came and went and still no list, and eventually the

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<v Speaker 1>political action committee, the pack cut ties with the firm,

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<v Speaker 1>saying well, you're not delivering upon your promise, so we're

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<v Speaker 1>not gonna do business anymore. But s c L had

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<v Speaker 1>also worked with another PACK in Virginia, also supporting Cucinelli.

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<v Speaker 1>This one was called the Americans for Limited Government and

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<v Speaker 1>they wanted SCL to provide the group with a list

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<v Speaker 1>of women voters from suburban areas who traditionally would vote Democrat,

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<v Speaker 1>but who were thought to possibly flip Republican. So s

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<v Speaker 1>c L eventually produced a list of women and handed

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<v Speaker 1>it over, But upon closer inspection it turned out that

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<v Speaker 1>this was a list of Republican supporters, not flippable Democrats.

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<v Speaker 1>So in other words, those people that already were kind

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<v Speaker 1>of promising to vote that way. So s c L

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<v Speaker 1>and Knicks had not performed very well in two thousand thirteen,

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<v Speaker 1>And if the mercers had learned about that, the billionaires

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<v Speaker 1>who had backed decided to help form Cambridge Analytica, maybe

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<v Speaker 1>they wouldn't have funded the founding of Cambridge an Analytica

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<v Speaker 1>if they had known about those failures. Steve Bannon became

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<v Speaker 1>a driving force behind the scenes at Cambridge Analytica. He's

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<v Speaker 1>was the executive over at Bright Barton News at the time.

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<v Speaker 1>According to Chris Wiley, that's the data analyst who had

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<v Speaker 1>UH first come on board in order to look into

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<v Speaker 1>using data from various sources to support sc l's efforts,

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<v Speaker 1>and was the one to recommend going towards using social

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<v Speaker 1>media and apps similar to the one that that Stillwell

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<v Speaker 1>had created back over at the University of Cambridge. UH

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<v Speaker 1>He said that Bannon was really interested in using social

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<v Speaker 1>media and messaging as a way to wage psychological warfare

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<v Speaker 1>to push a particular political philosophy. And in fact, to

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<v Speaker 1>quote Wiley, he said, Cambrage Analytica was quote Bannon's arsenal

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<v Speaker 1>of weaponry to wage a culture war on America using

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<v Speaker 1>military strategies end quote. He said, Bannon was absolutely fascinated

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<v Speaker 1>with the idea of using military tactics to wage a

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<v Speaker 1>political war in in a campaign. The mercers meanwhile, use

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<v Speaker 1>their leverage as wealthy go op backers to convince many

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<v Speaker 1>different campaigns to actually go ahead and make use of

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<v Speaker 1>Cambridge Analytica. So, out of the eight federal level clients

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<v Speaker 1>that Cambridge Analytica one in two thousand thirteen and two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand and fourteen, the clients they landed out of all

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<v Speaker 1>eight of them, all eight where received being financial backing

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<v Speaker 1>from the mercers. So how about that. So, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>in two thousand fourteen, Robert Mercer donated one million dollars

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<v Speaker 1>to John Bolton's Superpack, and then that same superpack went

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<v Speaker 1>and hired Cambridge Analytica for consulting work to the tune

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<v Speaker 1>of three dollars. Kind of odd they reviews of the

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<v Speaker 1>work that Cambridge an Altica were returning. The reviews were

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<v Speaker 1>not great, they weren't spectacular. Apart from one U S

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<v Speaker 1>Senate race in North Carolina, that one was pretty positive

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<v Speaker 1>about Cambridge an Analytica, but a lot of other reports

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<v Speaker 1>were saying they aren't really delivering upon what they promised,

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<v Speaker 1>but the hype continued. Nix was really really good at

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<v Speaker 1>selling an idea. Never mind that the idea did not

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<v Speaker 1>really have a lot of solid foundation in academic scholarship

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<v Speaker 1>or published scientific research, or or even proof that their

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<v Speaker 1>efforts were effective in the field. He was still really

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<v Speaker 1>selling it, and the company in began to test certain

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<v Speaker 1>messages that would later show up in a future campaign. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>this was during the mid term elections often, and the

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<v Speaker 1>messages that they were testing out in different regions appeared

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<v Speaker 1>to be firmly rooted in Steve Bannon's philosophy. So these

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<v Speaker 1>this is when we started seeing phrases like build a

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<v Speaker 1>wall or drain the swamp. They're being tested at that

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<v Speaker 1>time in fourteen among different Republican populations, messages that were

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<v Speaker 1>critical of immigrants and ones that criticized big government would

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<v Speaker 1>roll into rotation and test out, and the company also

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<v Speaker 1>began testing the waters to see what the general opinion

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<v Speaker 1>among Republican voters was about a certain Vladimir Putin, the

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<v Speaker 1>President of Russia. And this was all during those mid

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<v Speaker 1>terms of fourteen years before they would be used in

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<v Speaker 1>greater rollouts in twenty. In two thousand fifteen, Ted Ru's

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<v Speaker 1>announced his candidacy for president, although that announcement did not

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<v Speaker 1>go as planned. Uh So, his campaign, before they had

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<v Speaker 1>announced that it was a campaign, had secured the services

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<v Speaker 1>of Cambridge Analytica to design the campaign website, the official

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<v Speaker 1>website for Ted Cruz running for president. It did not

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<v Speaker 1>start off great. So Ted Cruz sends out a tweet

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<v Speaker 1>before midnight, uh the day before he's going to announce

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<v Speaker 1>his candidacy, and it's a very teasing tweet. Everyone knew

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<v Speaker 1>what it really meant because there were there's no shortage

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<v Speaker 1>of uh pundits out there saying Ted Cruz was going

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<v Speaker 1>to put his name in the ring for president, but

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<v Speaker 1>the official announcement had not yet happened, and he said,

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<v Speaker 1>just wait, it's gonna come really soon. And what was

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<v Speaker 1>supposed to happen was one minute after midnight, the official

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<v Speaker 1>campaign website was supposed to launch, but his team couldn't

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<v Speaker 1>get the website to park. They couldn't get it live.

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<v Speaker 1>Once again, a product from Cambridge Analytica was not performing

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<v Speaker 1>the way people expected. So several minutes after midnight, crews

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<v Speaker 1>would announce his candidacy on Twitter. So so didn't get

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<v Speaker 1>to share the link to the official campaign website. It

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<v Speaker 1>was not live yet. He just went ahead and announced

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<v Speaker 1>on Twitter because the plan was not going according to plan. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>Initially a dozen Cambridge Analytica employees were on the staff

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<v Speaker 1>with the Cruise campaign, but apparently the company consistently failed

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<v Speaker 1>to deliver results and so that number was whittled down

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<v Speaker 1>to three. As the campaign continued, Cambridge Analytica broke down

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<v Speaker 1>Cruises target audience into four categories temperamental people, relaxed leaders,

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<v Speaker 1>timid traditionalists, and stoic traditionalists, and this was based off

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<v Speaker 1>the data the company had gathered about those potential voters,

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<v Speaker 1>and the company had also created suggested messaging for each group,

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<v Speaker 1>saying well, this target group, this type of messaging will

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<v Speaker 1>work most effectively, but for this other group, you want

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<v Speaker 1>to go with this different approach. And the whole idea

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<v Speaker 1>was that they were targeting psychological anchor points that would

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<v Speaker 1>give Cruizes campaign the advantage. Now Cruizes campaign made use

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<v Speaker 1>of data that Cambridge General Nitteca had gathered using Alexander

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<v Speaker 1>Cogan's Facebook app, the one that had retrieved information about

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<v Speaker 1>users friends without those friends consent. And also this was

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<v Speaker 1>in violation of Facebook's policies. Facebook was told that it

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<v Speaker 1>was going to be an academic research project and therefore

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<v Speaker 1>the data was supposed to just stay with Cogan and

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<v Speaker 1>not change hands. But that's not what happened. Cogan did

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<v Speaker 1>essentially sell the data from his possession to Cambridge Analytica,

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<v Speaker 1>so Ted Cruz making use of this data was big news, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>and once people heard about it. No one had really

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<v Speaker 1>known about it at this point, but the information started

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<v Speaker 1>to leak. And this is a good point to talk

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<v Speaker 1>about how Facebook shares information among users. If you are

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<v Speaker 1>a user, some of you may not use Facebook, but

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<v Speaker 1>here's how it works. So you've got yourself a news feed,

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<v Speaker 1>and that's where posts from your friends will show up,

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<v Speaker 1>and occasionally, you know, posts from advertisers things like that

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<v Speaker 1>will show up there too, And you can post your

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<v Speaker 1>own things to Facebook, pictures, thoughts, whatever, and you probably know.

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<v Speaker 1>There are various privacy settings that you can activate before

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<v Speaker 1>you post stuff to Facebook. You could choose public that

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<v Speaker 1>means anyone who is on Facebook can view that material,

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<v Speaker 1>or you can choose different privacy settings. You can set

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<v Speaker 1>so that only your friends can read your posts, so

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<v Speaker 1>anyone who isn't your friend won't see the post that

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<v Speaker 1>you've you've put in. You can even exclude specific people,

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<v Speaker 1>or you can select only specific people to be able

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<v Speaker 1>to see it. But you get the idea. Well, until

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<v Speaker 1>if you developed an app for Facebook, you could request

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<v Speaker 1>friends permission on that app, and that would give you

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<v Speaker 1>access to view user friend data. And if a user

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<v Speaker 1>says sure, yeah, i'll I want to use this app,

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<v Speaker 1>I agree to that, then that would mean you would

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<v Speaker 1>be able to view that user's friends as if you

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<v Speaker 1>were that user. And in fact, it's like you have

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<v Speaker 1>just become a friend to all of that users friends.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's let's use an example to make this more clear.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's say that Ben Bolan Ben Boland's using Facebook and

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<v Speaker 1>Ben Bowen comes across an app that I have made

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<v Speaker 1>any Season is an app from before, and he sees

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<v Speaker 1>that in this app, I've said I want to have

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<v Speaker 1>permission to view your your friends data, and Ben Bolan,

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<v Speaker 1>being the conniving jerk face that he is and not

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<v Speaker 1>giving a care about the privacy of his friend's data, says, sure,

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<v Speaker 1>I want to know what howson hogwarts I belong to.

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<v Speaker 1>I want to take this quiz, so he agrees. Then

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<v Speaker 1>I get to see that all, not just all of

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<v Speaker 1>Ben Bolen's data, but all of Ben Boland's friends data

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<v Speaker 1>as if I were Ben Bowlen. I get to see

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<v Speaker 1>all of his friends data, just as if I were him,

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<v Speaker 1>and I can collect all that data and make use

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<v Speaker 1>of it at all. Because he was so thoughtless, I

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<v Speaker 1>should give out his email address so that you can

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<v Speaker 1>send him complaints because he does that to me all

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<v Speaker 1>the time on his podcasts. But I'm not gonna because honestly,

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<v Speaker 1>Ben Bolan is actually a really nice guy and I

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<v Speaker 1>like him, but it's great to use him as an example.

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<v Speaker 1>So this is why that number of people who may

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<v Speaker 1>have been affected by the Cambridge Analytica scandal is so

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<v Speaker 1>high at eighty seven million users, even though reportedly only

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<v Speaker 1>two seventy thousand people actually took the survey and agreed

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<v Speaker 1>to the the app permissions, and the average Facebook user

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<v Speaker 1>you see it has three thirty eight friends. That's that's

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<v Speaker 1>the average some people and more some people if you

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<v Speaker 1>were But if you multiply two by eight, you'll get

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<v Speaker 1>more than nine million possible friends. And granted there's bound

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<v Speaker 1>to be some overlap between different users. I'm honestly always

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<v Speaker 1>surprised to find friends I know from very different circles

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<v Speaker 1>who also happened to know each other. But you can

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<v Speaker 1>see why that seven million number got there. So in

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<v Speaker 1>Facebook would change that policy. These days, if you develop

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<v Speaker 1>an app, you can still send a friends permission request

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<v Speaker 1>and Facebook will review your app before allowing it to

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<v Speaker 1>be on the platform. But now that does not give

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<v Speaker 1>you access to view all of the friends data of

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<v Speaker 1>a user. Instead, what it does is it lets you

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<v Speaker 1>see a list of friends of that user who also

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<v Speaker 1>haven't all that same app. So you don't get new

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<v Speaker 1>information about new people. You just you just get to

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<v Speaker 1>know about connections between existing people who have already downloaded

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<v Speaker 1>your app. So you're just you know, you already have

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<v Speaker 1>that other users information because they installed your app already. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's a very different policy. Well, when I come back,

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<v Speaker 1>I'll talk more about what Cambridge Analytica did and why

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<v Speaker 1>it got into so much trouble. But first, let's take

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<v Speaker 1>a quick break to thank our sponsor. Cambridge Analytica used

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<v Speaker 1>all that data to build out psycho graphic models of

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<v Speaker 1>potential voters, essentially putting them in these different categorizations. About

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<v Speaker 1>two months before the Iowa caucus, Caucuses and primaries are

0:14:49.680 --> 0:14:54.640
<v Speaker 1>how we decide which nominees within a party will become

0:14:54.680 --> 0:14:58.240
<v Speaker 1>the official party nominee for general election. If you're not

0:14:58.280 --> 0:15:01.120
<v Speaker 1>from the United States, it gets pretty confused ing anyway,

0:15:01.160 --> 0:15:03.280
<v Speaker 1>About two months before the Iowa Caucus, which is one

0:15:03.280 --> 0:15:07.080
<v Speaker 1>of the the it's the first big event that can

0:15:07.120 --> 0:15:10.240
<v Speaker 1>really set the tone for a nominee, The Guardian ran

0:15:10.280 --> 0:15:13.800
<v Speaker 1>a story revealing that Cambrage Analytica had possession of unauthorized

0:15:13.840 --> 0:15:17.320
<v Speaker 1>Facebook data and that therefore the Cruise campaign was depending

0:15:17.400 --> 0:15:20.560
<v Speaker 1>upon information that was gathered in an unethical way, that

0:15:20.680 --> 0:15:24.560
<v Speaker 1>they were relying upon information that people did not consent

0:15:24.800 --> 0:15:30.200
<v Speaker 1>to sharing. Facebook responded to this by telling Cambrage Analytica

0:15:30.280 --> 0:15:34.280
<v Speaker 1>and Alexander Cogan that they needed to delete all that data.

0:15:34.600 --> 0:15:38.680
<v Speaker 1>But Facebook really doesn't have any enforceable authority here. The

0:15:38.800 --> 0:15:43.160
<v Speaker 1>data had already changed hands first to Alexander Cogan and

0:15:43.200 --> 0:15:47.800
<v Speaker 1>then from Alexander Cogan to Cambridge Analytica. Chris Wiley said

0:15:48.200 --> 0:15:51.520
<v Speaker 1>that at this point he had already left Cambrige gen

0:15:51.520 --> 0:15:54.880
<v Speaker 1>Ata and he had deleted that data. But all he

0:15:54.920 --> 0:15:57.880
<v Speaker 1>had to do was fell out a little form and

0:15:58.040 --> 0:16:02.080
<v Speaker 1>click a checkbox and said that onto Facebook to say, hey, yeah,

0:16:02.120 --> 0:16:05.400
<v Speaker 1>I followed your instructions. But Facebook didn't take any steps

0:16:05.400 --> 0:16:07.680
<v Speaker 1>to actually verify that. And he says he could have

0:16:07.760 --> 0:16:12.280
<v Speaker 1>kept all of the data Facebook Facebook never would have known. Uh.

0:16:12.320 --> 0:16:15.520
<v Speaker 1>And and years later people said that the information was

0:16:15.560 --> 0:16:19.040
<v Speaker 1>still available from that time, that information that was gathered

0:16:19.200 --> 0:16:22.240
<v Speaker 1>by the initial app was still readily available. The New

0:16:22.280 --> 0:16:25.040
<v Speaker 1>York Times reported the data at least some of it

0:16:25.080 --> 0:16:31.120
<v Speaker 1>was still remaining in use as Cruise narrowly one in Iowa,

0:16:31.280 --> 0:16:33.520
<v Speaker 1>and Alexander Nicks was very quick to jump on that

0:16:33.600 --> 0:16:37.360
<v Speaker 1>news and boast about how his company, how Cambridge Analytica

0:16:37.520 --> 0:16:40.840
<v Speaker 1>helped push Cruise to victory, and that Cruise had started

0:16:41.040 --> 0:16:45.360
<v Speaker 1>in a very low place, like maybe polling at single

0:16:45.440 --> 0:16:51.520
<v Speaker 1>digit percentages, although that was not, you know true. Others

0:16:51.600 --> 0:16:55.040
<v Speaker 1>on Cruises campaign staff were not very quick to give

0:16:55.080 --> 0:16:58.280
<v Speaker 1>any credit to Cambridge Analytica, but Nicks was selling his

0:16:58.360 --> 0:17:01.160
<v Speaker 1>idea to a bigger audience now and staffers on the

0:17:01.200 --> 0:17:05.200
<v Speaker 1>campaign were concerned that Cambridge Analytica wasn't forthcoming and how

0:17:05.240 --> 0:17:08.240
<v Speaker 1>it was coming up with the various categories for voters.

0:17:08.280 --> 0:17:13.080
<v Speaker 1>They were not transparent in how they were making these determinations.

0:17:13.440 --> 0:17:15.960
<v Speaker 1>So the campaign staff says, we can't really tell how

0:17:16.000 --> 0:17:18.120
<v Speaker 1>well we're doing, and we can't even we don't even

0:17:18.119 --> 0:17:20.480
<v Speaker 1>know how they're coming to these determinations, so we can't

0:17:20.560 --> 0:17:24.280
<v Speaker 1>judge how well they're doing in the United States. Uh,

0:17:24.359 --> 0:17:28.359
<v Speaker 1>in order to become a nominee, like I said, you

0:17:28.400 --> 0:17:31.960
<v Speaker 1>have to participate in these caucuses, in these primaries. By

0:17:31.960 --> 0:17:35.760
<v Speaker 1>the time Cruizes campaign was working in South Carolina, staffers

0:17:35.800 --> 0:17:38.400
<v Speaker 1>noticed that the data they were getting from Cambridge Analytica

0:17:38.640 --> 0:17:42.080
<v Speaker 1>was woefully out of date. CRUs would come in third

0:17:42.119 --> 0:17:45.639
<v Speaker 1>place in South Carolina, and you didn't see Nick's jumping

0:17:45.720 --> 0:17:48.840
<v Speaker 1>up on the news to talk about that problem. Cruises

0:17:48.920 --> 0:17:53.560
<v Speaker 1>campaign stopped relying on Cambridge Analytica shortly thereafter, saying, you know,

0:17:54.480 --> 0:17:56.560
<v Speaker 1>I don't think this is really working out. I don't

0:17:56.600 --> 0:18:00.359
<v Speaker 1>think we're getting the return that we were promised. Now,

0:18:00.480 --> 0:18:02.800
<v Speaker 1>Nix did have the chutzpa to appear at the Concordia

0:18:02.880 --> 0:18:07.240
<v Speaker 1>Summit and claimed that Cambridge Analytica helped push ted Cruz

0:18:07.280 --> 0:18:11.880
<v Speaker 1>to a second place finish for the Republican nomination. Uh

0:18:12.000 --> 0:18:14.560
<v Speaker 1>The story Nix was selling was that Cruise had been

0:18:14.680 --> 0:18:19.360
<v Speaker 1>so far behind that getting second place was an enormous

0:18:19.359 --> 0:18:22.600
<v Speaker 1>achievement all by itself, and that the only reason he

0:18:22.640 --> 0:18:24.720
<v Speaker 1>was able to really get there was because Cambridge Analytica

0:18:24.840 --> 0:18:27.440
<v Speaker 1>was able to lift him much further than he was

0:18:27.480 --> 0:18:30.760
<v Speaker 1>going to go on his own. That's not necessarily an

0:18:30.800 --> 0:18:33.959
<v Speaker 1>accurate betrayal of what happened, as I understand it from

0:18:34.000 --> 0:18:36.840
<v Speaker 1>the various reports I've read, but it appeared that that

0:18:36.960 --> 0:18:40.399
<v Speaker 1>was Alexander Nick's messaging, and his next move was to

0:18:40.440 --> 0:18:42.760
<v Speaker 1>take aim at the Trump campaign to see if Cambridge

0:18:42.760 --> 0:18:45.560
<v Speaker 1>Analytica could get hired on to help in those efforts.

0:18:45.760 --> 0:18:48.439
<v Speaker 1>He had already attempted once before, but Trump was not

0:18:48.560 --> 0:18:51.919
<v Speaker 1>interested in hiring a political consultant that was already working

0:18:51.960 --> 0:18:55.959
<v Speaker 1>for one of his opponents. He had also around this

0:18:56.000 --> 0:18:59.520
<v Speaker 1>time allegedly reached out to Julian Assange. He's the founder

0:18:59.560 --> 0:19:01.880
<v Speaker 1>of Wicky Leaks. Assange had said that he got hold

0:19:01.920 --> 0:19:05.439
<v Speaker 1>of internal emails from the Clinton campaign, and these are

0:19:05.480 --> 0:19:08.480
<v Speaker 1>the same emails that we later discovered were harvested from

0:19:08.480 --> 0:19:11.520
<v Speaker 1>a cyber attack that was led by Russian hackers. So

0:19:11.640 --> 0:19:16.480
<v Speaker 1>Russian hackers attack Clinton's email servers, get access to these

0:19:16.480 --> 0:19:19.920
<v Speaker 1>emails and send them to Julian Assange over at Wiki Leaks,

0:19:19.920 --> 0:19:22.800
<v Speaker 1>who then says, hey, I've got these emails. And then

0:19:22.920 --> 0:19:26.200
<v Speaker 1>Alexander Nicks reaches out to Julian Osange and says, I'd

0:19:26.200 --> 0:19:29.320
<v Speaker 1>really think we should talk about the possibility of making

0:19:29.440 --> 0:19:32.879
<v Speaker 1>use of this information. According to an article in Mother Jones,

0:19:33.400 --> 0:19:36.480
<v Speaker 1>Nicks really wanted to weaponize those emails, but Assange ended

0:19:36.520 --> 0:19:40.040
<v Speaker 1>up passing on that offer. Alexander Nicks would go on

0:19:40.119 --> 0:19:42.920
<v Speaker 1>to claim this company had essentially done all the marketing

0:19:42.960 --> 0:19:46.440
<v Speaker 1>and messaging for the Trump campaign, that Cambridge an Analytica

0:19:46.920 --> 0:19:50.760
<v Speaker 1>was ultimately responsible for developing the approach Trump used during

0:19:50.800 --> 0:19:55.639
<v Speaker 1>the whole election, and that Cambridge Analytica effectively won the

0:19:55.680 --> 0:19:58.520
<v Speaker 1>presidency for Trump, and that it was because of Cambridge

0:19:58.520 --> 0:20:01.680
<v Speaker 1>Analytica's research that Trump was able to target the voters

0:20:01.880 --> 0:20:04.520
<v Speaker 1>that would swing the election his way. He could lose

0:20:04.560 --> 0:20:08.399
<v Speaker 1>the popular vote, and he did by nearly three million votes,

0:20:09.000 --> 0:20:11.880
<v Speaker 1>but he won in areas that got him the electoral

0:20:11.960 --> 0:20:15.760
<v Speaker 1>votes he needed to win the presidency, and Alexander Nick

0:20:15.840 --> 0:20:18.919
<v Speaker 1>said that this was because Cambridge Analytica had done the

0:20:18.960 --> 0:20:22.280
<v Speaker 1>research and knew who to target and that's why Trump won.

0:20:22.720 --> 0:20:26.600
<v Speaker 1>Others in Trump's campaign are not so quick to credit

0:20:26.680 --> 0:20:31.520
<v Speaker 1>Cambridge Analytica. They dispute these claims. They say that the

0:20:31.600 --> 0:20:35.000
<v Speaker 1>firm was not instrumental in Trump's messaging, and that most

0:20:35.040 --> 0:20:38.600
<v Speaker 1>of those efforts were being funneled directly into Facebook from

0:20:38.640 --> 0:20:42.639
<v Speaker 1>the campaign itself rather than through Cambridge Analytica, and that

0:20:42.760 --> 0:20:45.960
<v Speaker 1>the consulting firm had even screwed up some major TV

0:20:46.160 --> 0:20:51.560
<v Speaker 1>ad deals, serving ads and locations that were a complete bust,

0:20:52.200 --> 0:20:54.520
<v Speaker 1>and that they were handling the campaign in a very

0:20:54.560 --> 0:20:57.119
<v Speaker 1>amateurish way. So, in other words, the story Nix was

0:20:57.240 --> 0:21:00.240
<v Speaker 1>telling didn't seem to match up with what other people

0:21:00.600 --> 0:21:03.879
<v Speaker 1>who had been involved in these campaigns had to say

0:21:03.920 --> 0:21:07.320
<v Speaker 1>about the matter. Steve Bannon, who would become the chief

0:21:07.359 --> 0:21:11.000
<v Speaker 1>political strategist for Trump for a while anyway, remained more

0:21:11.119 --> 0:21:14.600
<v Speaker 1>or less in charge of Cambridge Analytica until April seventeen,

0:21:14.880 --> 0:21:17.359
<v Speaker 1>which was several months after Trump had taken office, which

0:21:17.880 --> 0:21:21.120
<v Speaker 1>I don't know sounds like a conflict to me. By

0:21:21.119 --> 0:21:24.600
<v Speaker 1>the end of twenty seventeen, Cambridge Analytica had withdrawn from

0:21:24.640 --> 0:21:28.080
<v Speaker 1>pursuing consulting gigs in politics in the US. The official

0:21:28.119 --> 0:21:31.240
<v Speaker 1>reason that Alexander Nicks gave was that there was going

0:21:31.280 --> 0:21:33.960
<v Speaker 1>to be too many other political consulting firms in the mix,

0:21:35.040 --> 0:21:36.720
<v Speaker 1>which meant there'll be more sharks in the water and

0:21:36.760 --> 0:21:39.840
<v Speaker 1>not enough food. It's gonna be too competitive, not not

0:21:40.000 --> 0:21:43.080
<v Speaker 1>lucrative enough, so the company was going to look elsewhere.

0:21:43.520 --> 0:21:45.400
<v Speaker 1>But a lot of the reports I read were very

0:21:45.400 --> 0:21:48.680
<v Speaker 1>skeptical of this claim, because if in fact, you were

0:21:48.720 --> 0:21:53.160
<v Speaker 1>a consulting firm that had just helped a candidate when

0:21:53.320 --> 0:21:57.760
<v Speaker 1>the position of President of the United States, you would

0:21:57.760 --> 0:22:01.440
<v Speaker 1>think you could leverage that into being a very lucrative

0:22:01.480 --> 0:22:06.800
<v Speaker 1>selling point for future campaigns. What these journalists have said

0:22:07.000 --> 0:22:13.040
<v Speaker 1>is that effectively Cambridge Analytica had been under delivering on

0:22:13.119 --> 0:22:20.840
<v Speaker 1>their their their promises regularly repeatedly, that perhaps those psychographic

0:22:20.920 --> 0:22:23.960
<v Speaker 1>models that the company had been touting may not have

0:22:24.040 --> 0:22:28.720
<v Speaker 1>been nearly as effective as the company was suggesting, and

0:22:28.880 --> 0:22:32.719
<v Speaker 1>that also they had a general lack of knowledge about

0:22:32.760 --> 0:22:37.480
<v Speaker 1>how US politics work. That these Brits were coming into

0:22:37.600 --> 0:22:41.760
<v Speaker 1>a US system and they didn't really understand the way

0:22:42.119 --> 0:22:45.480
<v Speaker 1>politics work in the United States, and that all of

0:22:45.520 --> 0:22:50.119
<v Speaker 1>this meant that people were viewing Cambridge Analytica as a

0:22:50.200 --> 0:22:55.479
<v Speaker 1>bad consulting firm for at least for American politics, and

0:22:55.480 --> 0:22:58.399
<v Speaker 1>it essentially landed the company on a do not hire

0:22:58.400 --> 0:23:01.880
<v Speaker 1>a list for both parties. So the general consensus seemed

0:23:01.920 --> 0:23:05.240
<v Speaker 1>to be that Trump had won the presidency despite participation

0:23:05.280 --> 0:23:08.520
<v Speaker 1>of Cambridge and Analytica, not because of it. So you've

0:23:08.520 --> 0:23:10.960
<v Speaker 1>got two different stories here. You have Alexander Nick saying

0:23:11.560 --> 0:23:14.359
<v Speaker 1>we're not gonna get involved in ten because there's not

0:23:14.440 --> 0:23:16.840
<v Speaker 1>enough money in it, and you have everyone else saying

0:23:17.119 --> 0:23:20.000
<v Speaker 1>you're not gonna get involved in ten because nobody wants you.

0:23:21.720 --> 0:23:25.520
<v Speaker 1>Was when things really fell apart for Cambridge Analytica. Over

0:23:25.680 --> 0:23:29.320
<v Speaker 1>in the United Kingdom, the BBC sent in an undercover

0:23:29.400 --> 0:23:34.120
<v Speaker 1>reporter to look into scl and Cambridge Analytica, which we're

0:23:34.160 --> 0:23:36.960
<v Speaker 1>still claiming to be two separate entities, but we're operating

0:23:37.000 --> 0:23:40.560
<v Speaker 1>more or less as a single one. This reporter got

0:23:41.600 --> 0:23:44.040
<v Speaker 1>got got stuff on tape, was able to capture on

0:23:44.160 --> 0:23:48.520
<v Speaker 1>tape discussions in which Alexander Nix himself talked about spreading

0:23:48.560 --> 0:23:53.800
<v Speaker 1>misinformation on purpose and even blackmailing political opponents of clients

0:23:53.840 --> 0:23:58.640
<v Speaker 1>through entrapment, essentially by by hiring sex workers to go

0:23:59.240 --> 0:24:03.080
<v Speaker 1>and and uh proposition those opponents and then use that

0:24:03.520 --> 0:24:08.520
<v Speaker 1>as a way of blackmailing those opponents. This gut, you know,

0:24:08.560 --> 0:24:11.680
<v Speaker 1>came to light, it was published, it it aired, and

0:24:11.720 --> 0:24:15.119
<v Speaker 1>then Alexander Nicks tried to shrug the whole thing off, said, oh, no, no, no, this,

0:24:15.960 --> 0:24:19.040
<v Speaker 1>I wasn't talking about things we would actually do. I

0:24:19.119 --> 0:24:23.919
<v Speaker 1>was engaging in this ridiculous hypothetical situation and uh in

0:24:23.960 --> 0:24:26.320
<v Speaker 1>a way to try and win a client. But we

0:24:26.359 --> 0:24:29.080
<v Speaker 1>would never actually do any of that. And a lot

0:24:29.119 --> 0:24:33.720
<v Speaker 1>of the people that Noah Alexander Nick say yeah, this

0:24:33.800 --> 0:24:38.159
<v Speaker 1>is kind of in line with his approach anything to

0:24:38.280 --> 0:24:41.840
<v Speaker 1>land that sale. So would the company have engaged in

0:24:41.880 --> 0:24:46.640
<v Speaker 1>these behaviors Maybe not. Maybe that was all talk, but

0:24:46.680 --> 0:24:49.119
<v Speaker 1>it's not good talk, especially not good talk to have

0:24:49.359 --> 0:24:54.479
<v Speaker 1>on tape and play out in public. Uh. This, by

0:24:54.520 --> 0:24:57.280
<v Speaker 1>the way, would end up resulting in Cambridge Analytic a

0:24:57.400 --> 0:25:00.680
<v Speaker 1>suspending Alexander Nix in response to that warn't coming out,

0:25:01.160 --> 0:25:05.200
<v Speaker 1>and so he would be suspended as CEO and would

0:25:05.240 --> 0:25:08.560
<v Speaker 1>effectively be removed from power over in the United States,

0:25:08.920 --> 0:25:13.680
<v Speaker 1>investigations into Russian interference in the twenty sixteen elections extended

0:25:13.680 --> 0:25:16.440
<v Speaker 1>over to Cambridge Analytica and Nicks was called to appear

0:25:16.480 --> 0:25:19.760
<v Speaker 1>before the House Intelligence Committee via video conference so he

0:25:19.800 --> 0:25:23.159
<v Speaker 1>didn't have to travel to the States. His testimony was

0:25:23.240 --> 0:25:25.880
<v Speaker 1>never made public. According to Alexander Nicks, he was only

0:25:25.920 --> 0:25:29.440
<v Speaker 1>asked five questions and that was a total breeze, uh

0:25:29.640 --> 0:25:31.240
<v Speaker 1>or maybe it was three questions. He said, was in

0:25:31.280 --> 0:25:34.080
<v Speaker 1>and out in like five minutes. Also in twenty eighteen,

0:25:34.080 --> 0:25:36.440
<v Speaker 1>the British Parliament called Nicks to appear before them to

0:25:36.520 --> 0:25:40.840
<v Speaker 1>discuss another event that happened in sixteen, which was the

0:25:40.960 --> 0:25:44.160
<v Speaker 1>UK's vote to leave the European Union, also known as Brexit.

0:25:44.760 --> 0:25:48.280
<v Speaker 1>The general policy at s c L was that they

0:25:48.280 --> 0:25:51.359
<v Speaker 1>weren't going to get involved in local politics. Remember s

0:25:51.400 --> 0:25:54.320
<v Speaker 1>c L and Cambridge Analytica both are located in the UK.

0:25:55.400 --> 0:25:58.359
<v Speaker 1>But the company had also released a statement saying it

0:25:58.440 --> 0:26:01.760
<v Speaker 1>was forming a partnership with an ganization campaigning in favor

0:26:01.840 --> 0:26:05.480
<v Speaker 1>of Brexit. But Alexander Nick said his company never actually

0:26:05.520 --> 0:26:10.520
<v Speaker 1>did any work. It was something that was announced but

0:26:10.640 --> 0:26:13.960
<v Speaker 1>never never actually came to fruition. According to Alexander Nick's

0:26:14.280 --> 0:26:19.760
<v Speaker 1>investigations into that matter continue because they involve finance issues

0:26:20.080 --> 0:26:23.240
<v Speaker 1>about rules about what, where and when money can be spent,

0:26:23.760 --> 0:26:27.199
<v Speaker 1>and how these efforts can be coordinated or not coordinated.

0:26:27.600 --> 0:26:31.439
<v Speaker 1>It gets really super complicated, and it involves another organization

0:26:31.440 --> 0:26:35.439
<v Speaker 1>that's located of Canada, an organization that has connections to

0:26:35.560 --> 0:26:38.840
<v Speaker 1>Chris Wiley, the data analysts who became a whistleblower for

0:26:38.880 --> 0:26:42.960
<v Speaker 1>Cambridge Analytica. But that probably will merit its own episode,

0:26:43.000 --> 0:26:46.720
<v Speaker 1>and that investigation is still ongoing. So rather than do

0:26:46.920 --> 0:26:50.160
<v Speaker 1>a half finished episode, I don't think I'd rather wait

0:26:50.200 --> 0:26:52.440
<v Speaker 1>to hear more about it. Well, I do have a

0:26:52.440 --> 0:26:54.879
<v Speaker 1>little bit more to say about Cambridge Analytica and the

0:26:54.920 --> 0:27:00.680
<v Speaker 1>fallout that resulted from the various reports, but let's take

0:27:00.680 --> 0:27:11.120
<v Speaker 1>another quick break to thank our sponsor. Chris Wiley would

0:27:11.119 --> 0:27:14.480
<v Speaker 1>tell The Observer that in July two thousand fourteen, he

0:27:14.720 --> 0:27:17.760
<v Speaker 1>and Alexander Nixt met with executives of a company called

0:27:17.880 --> 0:27:22.280
<v Speaker 1>Luke Oil. Luke Oil is the second largest oil company

0:27:22.320 --> 0:27:26.640
<v Speaker 1>in Russia, and the head of Luke Oil was vat Alekporov,

0:27:27.119 --> 0:27:29.280
<v Speaker 1>who was close friends with a guy you might have

0:27:29.320 --> 0:27:33.439
<v Speaker 1>heard of, a guy named Vladimir Putin. Wiley said to

0:27:33.440 --> 0:27:36.840
<v Speaker 1>the Observer that at the time he was confused why

0:27:36.920 --> 0:27:39.600
<v Speaker 1>Cabrige Analytica was being called in to have a meeting

0:27:39.600 --> 0:27:42.320
<v Speaker 1>with a Russian oil company in the first place. I mean,

0:27:42.320 --> 0:27:45.359
<v Speaker 1>why would an oil company want to know how Cabrige

0:27:45.359 --> 0:27:48.879
<v Speaker 1>Analytica was targeting and profiling American voters and has sending

0:27:48.880 --> 0:27:53.440
<v Speaker 1>out messaging to American voters. According to an email, Alexander

0:27:53.520 --> 0:27:56.040
<v Speaker 1>Nick had said that the purpose was to explain how

0:27:56.119 --> 0:27:59.520
<v Speaker 1>their work they were doing in US elections could apply

0:27:59.760 --> 0:28:03.640
<v Speaker 1>to the Russian oil business, which left wildly totally at

0:28:03.640 --> 0:28:06.760
<v Speaker 1>a loss. He said, I don't see where this connection is.

0:28:07.119 --> 0:28:10.399
<v Speaker 1>And according to Wiley, the presentation focused on ways to

0:28:10.520 --> 0:28:14.960
<v Speaker 1>disrupt and affect elections. The entire presentation was really geared

0:28:15.080 --> 0:28:17.960
<v Speaker 1>up to what cabra j Analytica was doing with the

0:28:18.040 --> 0:28:21.159
<v Speaker 1>data that it had in the United States, and that

0:28:21.200 --> 0:28:23.639
<v Speaker 1>seems to be a pretty strange presentation to give to

0:28:23.680 --> 0:28:28.960
<v Speaker 1>a petroleum company. Coincidentally, or maybe not so coincidentally, American

0:28:29.000 --> 0:28:32.080
<v Speaker 1>intelligence indicates that it was right around this time when

0:28:32.160 --> 0:28:36.480
<v Speaker 1>Russian hackers began targeting social media platforms to plant propaganda

0:28:36.600 --> 0:28:39.680
<v Speaker 1>and fake stories in an effort to affect elections in

0:28:39.680 --> 0:28:42.320
<v Speaker 1>the United States as well as push for Brexit in

0:28:42.360 --> 0:28:45.000
<v Speaker 1>the UK. So this is where that fake news stuff

0:28:45.040 --> 0:28:47.920
<v Speaker 1>starts starts to come in, the fake news that was

0:28:48.280 --> 0:28:53.360
<v Speaker 1>planted in social media to rile up different UH electoral bases.

0:28:53.920 --> 0:29:00.600
<v Speaker 1>And so the suggestion is that perhaps this meeting between

0:29:00.640 --> 0:29:07.080
<v Speaker 1>Cambrage Analytica and Luke Oil might have sparked this approach.

0:29:07.640 --> 0:29:10.840
<v Speaker 1>Cambra Generalytica didn't appear to actually do any work with

0:29:10.880 --> 0:29:13.440
<v Speaker 1>a Luke Oil, didn't appear to accept a contract, but

0:29:13.560 --> 0:29:17.800
<v Speaker 1>did make this presentation that may have created that inspiration

0:29:17.840 --> 0:29:21.640
<v Speaker 1>for Russia to interfere with the election through misinformation campaigns

0:29:22.040 --> 0:29:26.360
<v Speaker 1>using social media as the platform. Whether Cambridge Analytica had

0:29:26.400 --> 0:29:29.520
<v Speaker 1>any measurable effect on the various elections in the United

0:29:29.520 --> 0:29:34.480
<v Speaker 1>States remains a matter of debate. It also is not

0:29:34.600 --> 0:29:37.520
<v Speaker 1>exactly a smoking gun case that the company contributed to

0:29:37.600 --> 0:29:41.320
<v Speaker 1>Russia's interference with a two thousand sixteen election. Cambridge Analytica

0:29:41.440 --> 0:29:45.640
<v Speaker 1>certainly tried to influence the election. They were hired to

0:29:45.760 --> 0:29:49.320
<v Speaker 1>try and help various candidates get elected, and some of

0:29:49.320 --> 0:29:52.800
<v Speaker 1>those candidates did get elected. I mean, that was the

0:29:52.840 --> 0:29:55.880
<v Speaker 1>whole point of it. But it mostly seems to come

0:29:55.920 --> 0:29:59.280
<v Speaker 1>across as snake oil. To me, I'm sure there's merit

0:29:59.400 --> 0:30:01.680
<v Speaker 1>in the idea behind it. I'm sure. I mean that

0:30:01.840 --> 0:30:04.640
<v Speaker 1>it seems intuitive that if you know a lot about

0:30:04.640 --> 0:30:07.720
<v Speaker 1>it person, you can more effectively communicate to that person.

0:30:08.360 --> 0:30:12.280
<v Speaker 1>But it sounds to me that Alexander Nicks was largely

0:30:12.320 --> 0:30:15.520
<v Speaker 1>more talk than substance when it came to producing results.

0:30:15.600 --> 0:30:19.040
<v Speaker 1>This is based off the numerous reports I've read and

0:30:19.120 --> 0:30:25.760
<v Speaker 1>the various sites that have posted people who are familiar

0:30:25.920 --> 0:30:29.840
<v Speaker 1>with the company and the way it worked. Um, just

0:30:29.960 --> 0:30:34.080
<v Speaker 1>drawing those conclusions based on those numerous reports. Now, that

0:30:34.120 --> 0:30:36.320
<v Speaker 1>doesn't change the fact that the company engaged in some

0:30:36.400 --> 0:30:40.640
<v Speaker 1>really murky stuff. Leveraging Facebook data without user consent is

0:30:40.680 --> 0:30:44.760
<v Speaker 1>a huge ethical problem, though the company has repeatedly denied

0:30:44.760 --> 0:30:47.920
<v Speaker 1>it did any such thing, despite evidence pointing to the contrary,

0:30:48.360 --> 0:30:51.920
<v Speaker 1>much of that evidence provided by Chris Wiley. In addition,

0:30:52.360 --> 0:30:55.520
<v Speaker 1>the mess is really brought into focus Facebook's role. The

0:30:55.560 --> 0:30:59.480
<v Speaker 1>company did very little to protect user data and still

0:30:59.680 --> 0:31:03.560
<v Speaker 1>does very little to protect user data. So why is that? Well,

0:31:05.000 --> 0:31:07.720
<v Speaker 1>ultimately the answer comes down to money. You see, user

0:31:07.800 --> 0:31:13.600
<v Speaker 1>data and privacy are of our data. Security specifically and privacy,

0:31:13.680 --> 0:31:17.200
<v Speaker 1>they're a little concern to Facebook's shareholders. Those are the

0:31:17.200 --> 0:31:20.680
<v Speaker 1>people who own stock in Facebook. What they want is

0:31:20.680 --> 0:31:24.360
<v Speaker 1>a return on investment. They want to spend money to

0:31:24.520 --> 0:31:26.680
<v Speaker 1>own part of Facebook, and then they want Facebook to

0:31:26.680 --> 0:31:29.040
<v Speaker 1>make way more money so that they get some of

0:31:29.080 --> 0:31:32.840
<v Speaker 1>that money. So that means they want to see Facebook grow.

0:31:33.080 --> 0:31:34.840
<v Speaker 1>They want to see it growing revenue, they want to

0:31:34.840 --> 0:31:38.440
<v Speaker 1>see it growing users. They don't care about the quality

0:31:38.480 --> 0:31:42.480
<v Speaker 1>of the service as long as it doesn't impact those numbers.

0:31:43.080 --> 0:31:47.160
<v Speaker 1>Facebook could be a terrible, terrible, terrible experience, but as

0:31:47.200 --> 0:31:50.760
<v Speaker 1>long as it drove that growth and revenue and in users,

0:31:51.600 --> 0:31:55.440
<v Speaker 1>shareholders aren't going to care because that doesn't that that's

0:31:55.440 --> 0:31:57.080
<v Speaker 1>not important to them. What's important to them is that

0:31:57.120 --> 0:32:00.920
<v Speaker 1>return on investment. So Facebook's primary focus has always been

0:32:00.920 --> 0:32:05.040
<v Speaker 1>on delivering returns, not on creating a better service. And

0:32:05.080 --> 0:32:07.120
<v Speaker 1>that's something that can happen to any company. I'm not

0:32:07.240 --> 0:32:11.240
<v Speaker 1>singling Facebook out to say they are particularly at fault here.

0:32:11.640 --> 0:32:15.440
<v Speaker 1>They follow a very similar pathway that tons of other

0:32:15.520 --> 0:32:20.320
<v Speaker 1>companies follow. But when it's a company that's gathering tons

0:32:20.360 --> 0:32:24.120
<v Speaker 1>of personal data about all of us, largely because we're

0:32:24.120 --> 0:32:27.280
<v Speaker 1>sharing it willingly, but not not just through that, this

0:32:27.360 --> 0:32:30.920
<v Speaker 1>becomes a concern, and I question Facebook's decision to ever

0:32:31.000 --> 0:32:34.120
<v Speaker 1>allow developers to create apps that would give those developers

0:32:34.160 --> 0:32:37.160
<v Speaker 1>access to the data belonging to friends of people who

0:32:37.200 --> 0:32:40.800
<v Speaker 1>downloaded those apps, friends who had never actually been given

0:32:40.840 --> 0:32:43.360
<v Speaker 1>the opportunity to say yes or no to having their

0:32:43.440 --> 0:32:47.040
<v Speaker 1>data shared. I think that's a terrible, terrible policy that

0:32:47.320 --> 0:32:49.800
<v Speaker 1>to have ever been in place, and I'm glad that

0:32:49.840 --> 0:32:52.320
<v Speaker 1>it's gone, but it never should have been there. So

0:32:52.400 --> 0:32:55.040
<v Speaker 1>it's just not cool to say, hey, I can look

0:32:55.080 --> 0:32:58.160
<v Speaker 1>at all your information because your buddy Bill said it

0:32:58.280 --> 0:33:01.800
<v Speaker 1>was okay, Because the rash response to that is go

0:33:01.920 --> 0:33:04.200
<v Speaker 1>take a flying leap, because Bill does not have the

0:33:04.320 --> 0:33:07.840
<v Speaker 1>rights to give you permission to look at my information.

0:33:08.080 --> 0:33:11.520
<v Speaker 1>And yet for years that's exactly how Facebook allowed developers

0:33:11.600 --> 0:33:15.160
<v Speaker 1>to create apps. As I mentioned earlier, they've since changed

0:33:15.200 --> 0:33:17.680
<v Speaker 1>that policy, but it was ludicrous to have it in

0:33:17.680 --> 0:33:22.120
<v Speaker 1>the beginning, not to mention this awful passing the buck

0:33:22.200 --> 0:33:26.240
<v Speaker 1>situation has been going on between the various parties involved

0:33:26.240 --> 0:33:29.640
<v Speaker 1>in this scandal. No one is taking accountability for this.

0:33:30.200 --> 0:33:33.440
<v Speaker 1>So Facebook's initial response was, Hey, it's not our fault.

0:33:33.560 --> 0:33:36.280
<v Speaker 1>We were told this was for an academic research project,

0:33:36.640 --> 0:33:39.880
<v Speaker 1>and that met our criteria, so we said, go ahead,

0:33:39.960 --> 0:33:42.680
<v Speaker 1>it's fine. It's not our fault that they abused that.

0:33:42.920 --> 0:33:45.400
<v Speaker 1>In fact, we told him to knock it off, as

0:33:45.400 --> 0:33:48.520
<v Speaker 1>if somehow that makes it okay to share user data

0:33:48.640 --> 0:33:52.840
<v Speaker 1>without their consent. Then you have Alexander Cogan, whose response

0:33:52.960 --> 0:33:57.600
<v Speaker 1>was nothing I did was technically illegal, which might be true,

0:33:57.640 --> 0:34:00.160
<v Speaker 1>but that doesn't mean that it wasn't unethical and it

0:34:00.280 --> 0:34:03.800
<v Speaker 1>was against Facebook's terms of service, although again Cogan had

0:34:03.880 --> 0:34:06.760
<v Speaker 1>said I didn't read the terms of service, and clearly

0:34:06.800 --> 0:34:09.440
<v Speaker 1>Facebook didn't read my terms of service, or else they

0:34:09.440 --> 0:34:12.160
<v Speaker 1>would have never allowed my app to publish. So everyone

0:34:12.280 --> 0:34:14.720
<v Speaker 1>is equally at fault because no one reads terms of service.

0:34:15.080 --> 0:34:17.880
<v Speaker 1>And Cambrage analyticas response was, Hey, all we did was

0:34:17.920 --> 0:34:21.640
<v Speaker 1>by data. We didn't specifically hire anyone to scrape information

0:34:21.640 --> 0:34:29.520
<v Speaker 1>well user consent, So no one is accepting responsibility for this. Uh,

0:34:29.520 --> 0:34:31.800
<v Speaker 1>and I would argue that they all are at fault

0:34:32.280 --> 0:34:35.720
<v Speaker 1>in some measure. The story reminds us that there remains

0:34:35.760 --> 0:34:38.759
<v Speaker 1>out there a gray market, and that gray market is

0:34:38.800 --> 0:34:43.160
<v Speaker 1>filled with information about us. It's the data we generate

0:34:43.280 --> 0:34:46.279
<v Speaker 1>as we navigate over the Internet. We create it when

0:34:46.280 --> 0:34:48.840
<v Speaker 1>we post a social media we create it when we

0:34:48.880 --> 0:34:51.960
<v Speaker 1>make an online purchase, we leave traces as we move

0:34:52.040 --> 0:34:55.799
<v Speaker 1>from one website to another in our browsing histories. We

0:34:55.880 --> 0:34:59.680
<v Speaker 1>created a messages. It's created about us without us even

0:34:59.719 --> 0:35:03.360
<v Speaker 1>taking active participation, and all of that data has value

0:35:03.360 --> 0:35:06.400
<v Speaker 1>to it. There are different ways you can use that data.

0:35:06.480 --> 0:35:08.879
<v Speaker 1>You can use it to sell to people, you can

0:35:08.960 --> 0:35:13.200
<v Speaker 1>use it for political purposes, as Cambridge Analytica did. And

0:35:13.320 --> 0:35:15.680
<v Speaker 1>that data is out there on the gray market, and

0:35:15.680 --> 0:35:18.239
<v Speaker 1>it is for sale. If you have the money, you

0:35:18.280 --> 0:35:22.440
<v Speaker 1>can buy it, and it's shockingly cheap on an individual basis.

0:35:22.440 --> 0:35:24.160
<v Speaker 1>It's only when you start talking about in bulk that

0:35:24.239 --> 0:35:29.560
<v Speaker 1>gets really expensive. But that is a disturbing thing to remember,

0:35:29.600 --> 0:35:31.960
<v Speaker 1>and there's no indication that that's going to go away.

0:35:31.960 --> 0:35:34.640
<v Speaker 1>As long as the money is there, it's gonna stick around.

0:35:35.239 --> 0:35:39.960
<v Speaker 1>Cambridge Analytica and its sister or parent or whatever company

0:35:40.160 --> 0:35:44.080
<v Speaker 1>scl Elections they are no more. Both entities dissolved in

0:35:44.080 --> 0:35:48.000
<v Speaker 1>the Spring of and while they no longer exist officially,

0:35:48.160 --> 0:35:51.919
<v Speaker 1>investigations continue into both companies, and at least in the UK,

0:35:52.440 --> 0:35:55.719
<v Speaker 1>we may see more efforts to bring charges against individuals

0:35:56.000 --> 0:35:59.920
<v Speaker 1>who worked for those companies. The United States, it's a

0:36:00.000 --> 0:36:03.200
<v Speaker 1>little less certain the House Intelligence Committee had an investigation,

0:36:03.680 --> 0:36:06.000
<v Speaker 1>but they shut that down. It was an investigation to

0:36:06.000 --> 0:36:09.799
<v Speaker 1>look into Russian meddling in the US election that got

0:36:09.800 --> 0:36:11.960
<v Speaker 1>shut down for reasons that I'm not going to go

0:36:12.000 --> 0:36:14.359
<v Speaker 1>into because that gets super political and it doesn't really

0:36:14.400 --> 0:36:17.560
<v Speaker 1>have a place in this podcast. Investigations in the US

0:36:17.640 --> 0:36:20.480
<v Speaker 1>might come back at some point, but for the moment,

0:36:20.640 --> 0:36:23.000
<v Speaker 1>it's mostly in the realm of journalism and out of

0:36:23.040 --> 0:36:27.200
<v Speaker 1>the courts in the US. Meanwhile, Alexander Nix and Rebecca Mercer,

0:36:27.239 --> 0:36:33.000
<v Speaker 1>along with Silver others who were connected to Cambridge Analytica,

0:36:33.200 --> 0:36:37.040
<v Speaker 1>ended up organizing to create a new data analyst company

0:36:37.080 --> 0:36:40.239
<v Speaker 1>called Emmer Data E M. E R D A t

0:36:40.480 --> 0:36:43.640
<v Speaker 1>A that was established in the summer of sev and

0:36:43.719 --> 0:36:46.600
<v Speaker 1>its headquarters are in the same building where Cambridge Analytica

0:36:46.680 --> 0:36:49.800
<v Speaker 1>was now. According to Nigel Oaks, the guy who founded

0:36:49.800 --> 0:36:54.240
<v Speaker 1>the company that eventually spawned Cambridge Analytica, the whole purpose

0:36:54.280 --> 0:36:58.440
<v Speaker 1>for Emmer Data was ultimately to acquire Cambridge Analytica and

0:36:58.800 --> 0:37:02.360
<v Speaker 1>s c L Elections together and form a brand new entity.

0:37:03.000 --> 0:37:06.279
<v Speaker 1>But then everything fell apart, and according to Oakes, all

0:37:06.280 --> 0:37:09.200
<v Speaker 1>of those organizations are now being wound down in the

0:37:09.200 --> 0:37:13.359
<v Speaker 1>near future. They're not going to continue on um. That's

0:37:13.360 --> 0:37:16.800
<v Speaker 1>according to Nigel Oaks. I don't know if that's official,

0:37:17.280 --> 0:37:19.880
<v Speaker 1>but that's what he says. Cogan's colleague, by the way,

0:37:20.080 --> 0:37:23.600
<v Speaker 1>who helped build the app was Joseph Chancellor. So Cogan

0:37:23.680 --> 0:37:28.080
<v Speaker 1>and Chancellor together built the survey and the Facebook application

0:37:28.239 --> 0:37:31.359
<v Speaker 1>that was at the heart of the United States controversy.

0:37:31.920 --> 0:37:34.719
<v Speaker 1>And here's a fun fact, Cogan would end up being

0:37:34.760 --> 0:37:40.239
<v Speaker 1>labeled by Facebook as being a terrible, uh person who

0:37:40.280 --> 0:37:42.080
<v Speaker 1>had well, maybe not a terrible person, but a person

0:37:42.080 --> 0:37:45.359
<v Speaker 1>who had violated the terms of service that he had

0:37:45.400 --> 0:37:51.720
<v Speaker 1>created a tool that was in strict violation of Facebook's policies. However,

0:37:51.880 --> 0:37:57.359
<v Speaker 1>Facebook also hired Joseph Chancellor to work for Facebook, so

0:37:57.520 --> 0:38:01.000
<v Speaker 1>one of the two developers was pointed out as saying,

0:38:01.000 --> 0:38:03.400
<v Speaker 1>you're a criminal, and the other one was hired to

0:38:03.480 --> 0:38:06.640
<v Speaker 1>work for the company. Although to be fair, Joseph Chancellor

0:38:06.760 --> 0:38:11.359
<v Speaker 1>no longer works for Facebook. Still interesting. Probably some sour

0:38:11.440 --> 0:38:15.960
<v Speaker 1>grapes there, I'm guessing for Cogan, probably not terribly happy

0:38:15.960 --> 0:38:21.920
<v Speaker 1>about that. Anyway. That wraps up the confusing, complicated, sad,

0:38:21.960 --> 0:38:26.040
<v Speaker 1>and infuriating tale of Cambridge Analytica, a company that I

0:38:26.080 --> 0:38:30.080
<v Speaker 1>think ultimately was more about promising stuff that it might

0:38:30.120 --> 0:38:33.520
<v Speaker 1>not have been able to deliver than anything else. But

0:38:33.760 --> 0:38:36.840
<v Speaker 1>because it was wrapped up in this other issue with Facebook,

0:38:36.920 --> 0:38:41.359
<v Speaker 1>it definitely was thrust into the spotlight. Otherwise, I think

0:38:41.360 --> 0:38:44.480
<v Speaker 1>it probably would have just kind of faded out of

0:38:44.640 --> 0:38:47.920
<v Speaker 1>US politics at least might have still gotten into trouble

0:38:47.960 --> 0:38:50.680
<v Speaker 1>elsewhere in the world. But in the US people seem

0:38:50.760 --> 0:38:53.480
<v Speaker 1>to have gotten wise and just felt that it wasn't

0:38:53.760 --> 0:38:58.839
<v Speaker 1>a valuable asset to have on your team. Interesting stuff. Well,

0:38:58.840 --> 0:39:01.640
<v Speaker 1>in our next episode, we're going to shine a light

0:39:01.880 --> 0:39:05.520
<v Speaker 1>on the dark Web. It was a listener request to

0:39:05.560 --> 0:39:07.480
<v Speaker 1>take a look at what the dark web is and

0:39:07.520 --> 0:39:11.040
<v Speaker 1>how it works. And then we will conclude the dark

0:39:11.080 --> 0:39:15.239
<v Speaker 1>and scary week of tech stuff, and we'll we'll try

0:39:15.320 --> 0:39:18.520
<v Speaker 1>and talk about fun things next week, like I don't know,

0:39:18.600 --> 0:39:23.080
<v Speaker 1>furbies or something. I'll figure it out. Tri's nodding. She's like, please,

0:39:23.760 --> 0:39:26.080
<v Speaker 1>please pick a happy note. I'm tired of hearing about

0:39:26.160 --> 0:39:29.960
<v Speaker 1>nuclear power and dark and deceptive politics. If you have

0:39:30.040 --> 0:39:33.640
<v Speaker 1>suggestions for future episodes of Tech Stuff, whether it's a technology,

0:39:33.719 --> 0:39:36.600
<v Speaker 1>a person, a company, whatever it may be, send me

0:39:36.640 --> 0:39:39.560
<v Speaker 1>an email. The email address for the show is tech

0:39:39.600 --> 0:39:41.719
<v Speaker 1>stuff at how stuff works dot com or drop me

0:39:41.719 --> 0:39:43.879
<v Speaker 1>a line on Facebook or Twitter. The handle for both

0:39:43.920 --> 0:39:47.400
<v Speaker 1>of those is tech stuff h s W. You should

0:39:47.440 --> 0:39:50.240
<v Speaker 1>also go on over to t public dot com slash

0:39:50.239 --> 0:39:53.040
<v Speaker 1>tech stuff. I was looking at your shirt and it's nice,

0:39:53.960 --> 0:39:56.640
<v Speaker 1>but it's looking like you know, you could spruce up

0:39:56.680 --> 0:39:59.480
<v Speaker 1>your fashion a little bit, add some variety there. I

0:39:59.560 --> 0:40:01.960
<v Speaker 1>know what you need. A tech stuff T shirt. It

0:40:02.000 --> 0:40:07.040
<v Speaker 1>makes any wardrobe into a fabulous array of clothing. It'll

0:40:07.120 --> 0:40:09.319
<v Speaker 1>brighten all the other clothes you put in there. See. Look,

0:40:09.360 --> 0:40:12.319
<v Speaker 1>I'm following Cambridge Analytica's lead. I'm making promises I can't

0:40:12.320 --> 0:40:14.960
<v Speaker 1>deliver upon, but they know there really are great shirts.

0:40:15.040 --> 0:40:17.120
<v Speaker 1>You need to go check them out t public dot

0:40:17.160 --> 0:40:19.439
<v Speaker 1>com slash tech stuff, and don't forget follow us over

0:40:19.600 --> 0:40:23.600
<v Speaker 1>at Instagram. I'm out and I'll talk to you again

0:40:24.480 --> 0:40:32.680
<v Speaker 1>really soon. For more on this and thousands of other topics,

0:40:32.920 --> 0:40:44.160
<v Speaker 1>is it how stuff works dot com