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Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with text Stuff from world.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to text Stuff. I'm Jonathan Strickland,

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Speaker 1: and this week I am joined by my coworker extraordinaire

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Speaker 1: once again, Ben Boland. I've been Heathan. How's it going great?

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Speaker 1: Especially since you know, once again, I gave Ben the option.

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Speaker 1: I said, you could choose anything that's on this list,

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Speaker 1: and he picked something that wasn't. Yeah, but it's an

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Speaker 1: awesome topic. It's one that really fits both my show

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Speaker 1: and then your stuff they don't want you to know show,

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Speaker 1: and that's the X seven B and Jonathan, before we go,

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Speaker 1: and let me say, in my defense, I guess I

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Speaker 1: do owe you an apology. It may as well be public.

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Speaker 1: I thought it was anything that wasn't on that list.

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Speaker 1: That's fair. I totally switched that up. But you thought

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Speaker 1: you thought that list of like forty things represented all

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Speaker 1: seven episodes of Textuff. There were stuff you already have

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Speaker 1: in the mix. You've got a million projects. That's fair,

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Speaker 1: but no, you could have picked any of those actually

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Speaker 1: to be To be honest, I really do give any

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Speaker 1: potential guest host the full option of picking whatever topic

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Speaker 1: they want, and then you know, we go from there.

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Speaker 1: If it's something that we've already covered on tech stuff,

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Speaker 1: then I said, well, we need to make sure that

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Speaker 1: whatever it is we talk about is a different take

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Speaker 1: that kind of thing. But a lot of people like

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Speaker 1: to have the guidance of the list of potential topics.

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Speaker 1: When you come back with something that that isn't on

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Speaker 1: the list and I haven't covered, that's awesome. So in

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Speaker 1: this case, we're talking about a space plane, secret space plane,

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Speaker 1: and uh, it's been reported on in the news several times.

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Speaker 1: There's a at an upcoming launch that should be happening

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Speaker 1: in May of um is. As we record this, it's

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Speaker 1: early April, so obviously that still ways out and depending

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Speaker 1: on weather and stuff, it could end up being pushed back.

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Speaker 1: But we wanted to talk about what this plane is

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Speaker 1: and we'd love to talk about what it's doing. But

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Speaker 1: as you'll find out, that's a little complicated. There are

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Speaker 1: some guesses, and as we continue through today's episode, we

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Speaker 1: will arrive at some of that. But to be absolutely

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Speaker 1: honest from the jump, the people who do know what

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Speaker 1: it's doing are totally not allowed to talk about it. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: this is like almost Area fifty one level secrecy right

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Speaker 1: where where people it's it's it's common knowledge that the

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Speaker 1: thing exists, but not common knowledge of what's going on

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Speaker 1: with It's very much like Area fifty one, what's for

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Speaker 1: many years. So the setup I have on this is

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Speaker 1: on Friday October, an unmanned plane landed autonomously, I should add,

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Speaker 1: at Vandenburg Air Force Base in California, and it had

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Speaker 1: spent six hundred seventy four days, nearly two full years

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Speaker 1: in lower th orbit in space. It flew for two

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Speaker 1: years up in space. Yeah, um, so the landing marked

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Speaker 1: the end of the I call it a test flight,

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Speaker 1: but really you could just call it a mission of

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Speaker 1: the X thirty seven B space plane, also known as

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Speaker 1: the Orbital Test Vehicle or O t V. And there

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Speaker 1: are two of those planes in existence and together they've

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Speaker 1: logged more than one thousand, three hundred sixty seven days

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Speaker 1: in orbit total. Uh and that's across three missions. So

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Speaker 1: that's a lot of time at once. So you might

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Speaker 1: want to know what's going on. And the thing is,

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Speaker 1: like we mentioned, the need to know basis that you

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Speaker 1: don't need to know, and neither do we. Well, I

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Speaker 1: think eventually that we're going to know. We being the

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Speaker 1: public eventually we have to know. Um. But there's there's

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Speaker 1: a story behind this. It's a culmination of stuff that

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Speaker 1: began decades ago, right, Yeah, it started back in the

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Speaker 1: nineteen nineties. Uh so turn your watch back, if you will,

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Speaker 1: to the magical decade of the nineties. Grunge music is

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Speaker 1: all the rage. You know, the Generation xers are making

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Speaker 1: sardonic entertainment left and right, Empire records that kind of thing. Um. So,

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Speaker 1: NASA at that point was looking into the future of

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Speaker 1: space exploration, particularly the type that doesn't need human beings

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Speaker 1: on spacecraft. Yeah. Humans are such a hassle in space.

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Speaker 1: You have to you have to spend so much time,

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Speaker 1: technology and money just like make them not die. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: get the little guys up there and back. Yeah. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Keeping keeping humans alive in space is a tall order

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Speaker 1: because there's a lot of stuff in space that is

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Speaker 1: really deadly. Right. It's not our neck of the woods,

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Speaker 1: So vacuum space, you've got radiation, you've got microgravity, which

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Speaker 1: over a long enough time period can cause some serious

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Speaker 1: health problems. Objects at high speeds, yeah, space debris, all

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Speaker 1: this sort of stuff. And you know, clearly the space

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Speaker 1: age we've had our share of tragedies and you know,

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Speaker 1: we definitely aren't making light of that. That's one of

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Speaker 1: the reasons why so much effort and money has have

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Speaker 1: been put forward into these unmanned missions. And can we

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Speaker 1: find ways of getting stuff to space, let's say, like

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Speaker 1: a like a refueling mission or a you know, uh,

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Speaker 1: you're replenishing inventory aboard the International Space Station without the

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Speaker 1: need for a manned space flight. And so there there's

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Speaker 1: a real reason why NASA was interested in this, and

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Speaker 1: um they were, you know. Apart from that, it also

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Speaker 1: reduces cost. Oh yeah, yeah, you don't have to have

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Speaker 1: a life support system, for example, in an unmanned spacecraft.

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Speaker 1: That alone, we'll save you millions of bucks. Right. So

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Speaker 1: in NASA announced that it was developing a pair of vehicles,

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Speaker 1: one called the orbital Vehicle and one called the Approach

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Speaker 1: and Landing Test Vehicle or a L t V UH.

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Speaker 1: And the A l t V S purpose was to

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Speaker 1: test the approach and landing systems of an unmanned plane,

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Speaker 1: so this one was not designed to go into space.

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Speaker 1: The A L t V and H. NASA partnered with

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Speaker 1: Boeing and the Air Force in order to get this

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Speaker 1: program going. So the A l t V was just

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Speaker 1: an unmantened I say just it was an unmanned plane,

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Speaker 1: because it was amazing to me that you could build

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Speaker 1: an autonomous vehicle that could land a plane, yeah, on

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Speaker 1: a landing strip. Well, in this case, it wasn't taking

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Speaker 1: off because what they did with this was they would

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Speaker 1: lift it up on another vehicle and then drop it,

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Speaker 1: and then they would allow the unmanned vehicle to fly

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Speaker 1: itself to the proper landing destination and land so the

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Speaker 1: al V it could not take off on its own,

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Speaker 1: it couldn't go into space. But it was designed mainly

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Speaker 1: as a test platform for the autonomous guidance system and

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Speaker 1: landing sort of a proof of concept, yeah, because I mean, obviously,

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Speaker 1: if you want to build upon this and create a vehicle,

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Speaker 1: an unmanned vehicle that can go into space, first you

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Speaker 1: want to make absolutely certain that you have taken steps

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Speaker 1: to show that it can land before you pour in

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Speaker 1: all the money that is necessary for it to be

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Speaker 1: able to survive the rigors of space travel. Yeah. And

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Speaker 1: there's a little bit of a I guess a geopolitical

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Speaker 1: calculation with this kind of stuff too, because if in

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Speaker 1: orbit decays, right, if the thing gets into space and

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Speaker 1: it crashes or it just doesn't land where it's supposed to.

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Speaker 1: Then not only have you the launching party, lost billions

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Speaker 1: of dollars, right, but you've also given all of this

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Speaker 1: research to another country, and maybe not a friendly one.

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Speaker 1: Yeah exactly. I mean we've seen this sort of stuff

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Speaker 1: throughout the history of the uh well really the Cold

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Speaker 1: War is you know, like things like the YouTube's YouTube

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Speaker 1: spy plane going down and the fact that that was

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Speaker 1: a huge concern that that uh the the adversaries to

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Speaker 1: the United States had suddenly gained access to some of

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Speaker 1: that technology. Uh well, you know that's clearly another concern

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Speaker 1: for this sort of stuff. You want to make sure

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Speaker 1: that everything is working properly before you ever put it

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Speaker 1: towards any kind of sensitive use or even just a

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Speaker 1: scientific experiment or whatever, Like maybe it's too you know, um,

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Speaker 1: deploy a satellite or something, or even even something more sophisticated,

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Speaker 1: like to fix a satellite to repair solar panels. Yeah. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: So this, like I said, Boeing was partnering with NASA

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Speaker 1: to develop these It would ultimately under this part of

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Speaker 1: the the program own it would only develop the alt

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Speaker 1: V for NASA that's as far as it got. But

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Speaker 1: it was designated as the X thirty seven A aircraft

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Speaker 1: or spacecraft. Really yeah, yeah, yeah, it's so much easier

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Speaker 1: to say that than uh, you know, alt V or whatever.

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Speaker 1: So it was similar to an earlier unmanned aircraft that

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Speaker 1: was again made by Boeing, but this one was operated

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Speaker 1: by the Air Force. It was the X forty A

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Speaker 1: H And again the X forty A was meant as

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Speaker 1: a test platform for things that would ultimately go on

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Speaker 1: an unmanned space plane type vehicle. Uh so another proof

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Speaker 1: of concept, kind of like the idea that we want

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Speaker 1: to make sure that we get, you know, take the

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Speaker 1: right steps. We're not gonna we're not gonna leap and

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Speaker 1: jump over like six steps of development. We're going to

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Speaker 1: use this as an incremental approach. So the X forty

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Speaker 1: A could not actually go into space, but again was

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Speaker 1: to test certain technolog je's It also was too small

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Speaker 1: for NASA, and could we Yeah, it was too small

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Speaker 1: for NASSY. Could we before we go on? Uh, could

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Speaker 1: you talk a little bit about just the dramatic waste

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Speaker 1: in typical conventional launches. Oh? Sure, yeah, I mean, like

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Speaker 1: so generally speaking, the rule of thumb is that a

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Speaker 1: launch with a government funded space launch is about ten

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Speaker 1: thousand dollars per pound. Per per pound, every pound of

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Speaker 1: payload that you want to put into space cost ten grand.

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Speaker 1: So imagine that you have a vehicle that has all

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Speaker 1: these different support systems on it for astronauts. That adds

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Speaker 1: to the weight, plus then you have the payload of

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Speaker 1: the spacecraft itself. So something like the Space Shuttle program,

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Speaker 1: which was designed to take material into space, either as

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Speaker 1: like a satellite to be deployed, or tools to repair

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Speaker 1: things that already existed like the hubble Um, or even

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Speaker 1: just a trip to the International Space to bring supplies

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Speaker 1: up there. All of that weight is a factor in

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Speaker 1: the cost of launch. If you do an unmanned spacecraft

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Speaker 1: and you reduce the weight of the spacecraft, you've reduced

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Speaker 1: the You know, even even though the X three seven

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Speaker 1: A was larger than the X forty A, it's still

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Speaker 1: significantly smaller than Space Shuttle, and that means that it

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Speaker 1: would cost less to put up. You know, you have

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Speaker 1: to use less fuel, so it costs less to put

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Speaker 1: it up into lower th orbit. When I say less,

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Speaker 1: it's still really expensive. By the way, when I the

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Speaker 1: reason why I stressed government funded space launch is there

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Speaker 1: a lot of private companies that have been arguing that

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Speaker 1: by privatizing they could bring down the price of launching

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Speaker 1: payloads into space. So things like space x have really

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Speaker 1: helped to to reduce that cost. So then getting into

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Speaker 1: the differences between the X forty A and the X

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Speaker 1: thirty seven A, despite the fact that it's a lower

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Speaker 1: number of the X thirty seven A is a bigger spacecraft.

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Speaker 1: It's a larger than the X forty A. And there

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Speaker 1: are other differences as well. Once we get to the

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Speaker 1: one that actually was designed to go into space, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that one's got advanced thermal protection spacecraft systems, that kind

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Speaker 1: of thing. So the thirty seven A and the forty

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Speaker 1: A were both designed just to be test platforms, so

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Speaker 1: they didn't need all that all the extra stuff. So

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Speaker 1: we're going through this incremental testing and starting to see

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Speaker 1: if we can really make this this vision a reality,

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Speaker 1: this autonomous, super secret spacecraft, which I just love the

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Speaker 1: idea of it out at how um, how do the

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Speaker 1: bureaucratic changes. So yeah, this we're talking a lot about

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Speaker 1: NASA right now, and you might be thinking, well, why

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Speaker 1: is this space plane so secret. NASA is not about secrecy,

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Speaker 1: and it's not the thirty seven A wasn't meant to

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Speaker 1: be secret at all. In fact, that's a lot of

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Speaker 1: the information you can find about the spacecraft is right

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Speaker 1: there on NASA's website because it's it's all publicly available.

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Speaker 1: But some changes would end up making the let's say,

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Speaker 1: the stewardship of the thirty seven X three seven program

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Speaker 1: change hands. So first, in two thousand and one, the

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Speaker 1: Air Force withdrew its support for the project, it's financial support.

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Speaker 1: It was one of three parties that was partner to

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Speaker 1: fund this, the other two being NASA and Boeing. Air

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Speaker 1: Force pulls out in two thousand one, NASA keeps going

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Speaker 1: with the partnership with Boeing. Uh, they had to end up, um,

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Speaker 1: you know, going to the government and saying, hey, we

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Speaker 1: need grants and stuff in order for this to keep going,

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Speaker 1: otherwise the project's gonna collapse from the inside. This continues

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Speaker 1: until two thousand four, and that's when NASA ends up

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Speaker 1: handing over the control of the X thirty seven program

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Speaker 1: to the Defense Advanced Research Projects AGE and SEE also

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Speaker 1: known as DARPA, which I've talked about multiple times. On

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Speaker 1: this podcast. Yeah, we've talked about a couple of other

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Speaker 1: shows too. DARPA. I'm assuming that people have heard this

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Speaker 1: name before, but the rumors are true. It is the

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Speaker 1: closest thing the US has to a mad science department. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's the Department of Defenses mad science department. Yeah. And

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Speaker 1: it's not like DARPA is filled with a bunch of

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Speaker 1: yeah in lab coats, like locked away forty forty levels underground.

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Speaker 1: In fact, mostly what DARPA does is invite other entities

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Speaker 1: to develop for specific purposes. So I did an episode

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Speaker 1: not long ago talking about how DARPA was instrumental in

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Speaker 1: the rapid development of autonomous car technology. Yeah. Um so

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Speaker 1: in this it's very akin to that. This is an

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Speaker 1: autonomous spacecraft technology. So you know, you're you're talking about

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Speaker 1: the continuation of an idea and just expanding it, you know,

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Speaker 1: explaining the parameters. Really. Uh So, in this case, DARPA

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Speaker 1: takes over, and it meant that the X three seven

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Speaker 1: fell under the control of the Department of Defense, which

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Speaker 1: also meant that the X three seven suddenly became a

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Speaker 1: classified project. It was no longer this this you know,

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Speaker 1: very public facing project from NASA. Now it's a classified

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Speaker 1: project under the Department of Defense. Yeah, which you know,

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Speaker 1: which is kind of a bummer, but also understandable given

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Speaker 1: that the kind of technology that they would be working

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Speaker 1: on is not something you want or or really can

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Speaker 1: have open sourced, you know, because other countries will get involved,

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Speaker 1: other countries will reverse engineer, and there's a lot of

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Speaker 1: um Again, this is this is where I think we

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Speaker 1: start to see a political aspect to become even more apparent.

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Speaker 1: But but the story is not done yet, right. So

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Speaker 1: remember the Air Force had pulled sort of it's it's

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Speaker 1: supporting two thousand one. November two thousand and six, it

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Speaker 1: announces it's going to develop a variation of the X

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Speaker 1: thirty seven A. Remember the orbital vehicle that NASA had proposed.

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Speaker 1: They never got to the point where that was actually built.

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Speaker 1: They had built the one that was the approach and

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Speaker 1: landing test vehicle, but not the orbital one. And the

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Speaker 1: Air Force wanted to build an orbital vehicle. Uh. They

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Speaker 1: called it the orbital test vehicle, so the O t

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Speaker 1: V UH, and they designated it the X thirty seven B.

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Speaker 1: So thirty seven A was the one that NASA used

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Speaker 1: to test this approach and landing uh technology, and this

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Speaker 1: one was meant to actually go into space. Uh. So

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Speaker 1: the top secret program falls to the control of the

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Speaker 1: Air Force. Now, the official word from the Air Force

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Speaker 1: as to the purpose of the X thirty seven program

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Speaker 1: is this is a direct quote from their website. The

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Speaker 1: X thirty seven B Orbital Test Vehicle or O t

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Speaker 1: V is an experimental test program to demonstrate technologies for

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Speaker 1: a reliable, reusable, unmanned space test platform for the US

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Speaker 1: Air Force. The primary objectives of the X thirty seven

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Speaker 1: B are twofold reusable spacecraft technologies for America's future in

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Speaker 1: space and operating experiments which can be returned to and

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Speaker 1: examined on Earth. So, um, there's some important stuff in

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Speaker 1: there that really does play into the purpose of this thing.

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Speaker 1: The big one being that it is a reusable spacecraft,

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Speaker 1: so it's not a one and done right uh. And

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Speaker 1: this was the same purpose for the Space Shuttle program.

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Speaker 1: It was the difference between that and previous programs where

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Speaker 1: like a capsule would go up and come back down,

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Speaker 1: and then once it came down and had to be retired,

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Speaker 1: you couldn't use it again. This is the difference between

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Speaker 1: you know, those and and those previous UH spacecraft and

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Speaker 1: things like the Space Shuttle and the X thirty seven spacecraft. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: we're kind of locked into it at this point because

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Speaker 1: we've put so much money in at the front, so

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Speaker 1: we'll have to we'll have to make that money back. Um.

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Speaker 1: I'm I'm just tickled because what I love about these

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Speaker 1: relatively up to kind of explanations is that there there's clearly, um,

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Speaker 1: there's clearly a reliance on vague language. The word test

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Speaker 1: is used three times in the first sentence, and the

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Speaker 1: substantive You are right, they are saying substantive things. The

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Speaker 1: reusable spacecraft is probably the biggest part of it. Another

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Speaker 1: part is the testing of the instruments, which, again, although

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Speaker 1: you and I don't really know that, that seems like

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Speaker 1: one of the best guesses. Yeah, and you know, you

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Speaker 1: could argue that part of this, the existence of this

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Speaker 1: is really just too incrementally build towards a future spacecraft

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Speaker 1: that has not yet been designed for specific purposes that

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Speaker 1: may go beyond this testing that we're talking about. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And another wise, maybe that it's to test related technologies

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Speaker 1: that are not intended to make the spacecraft itself more effective,

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Speaker 1: but rather just say, hey, we built this sensor. The

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Speaker 1: sensor is meant to do this specific task when it's

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Speaker 1: in space, but we don't know if the sensor can

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Speaker 1: actually withstand being in space, like being exposed to radiation.

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Speaker 1: But then you think, oh, I've got this unmanned vehicle.

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Speaker 1: I can put it up into orbit for hundreds of

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Speaker 1: days at a time and expose the sensor to the

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Speaker 1: same kinds of radiation it will would experience if it

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Speaker 1: were incorporated into some other type of spacecraft, and then

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Speaker 1: we can test and see if in fact the thing

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Speaker 1: we designed will still work, you know, once it's in space.

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Speaker 1: So those are I mean, that's a valid thing. But

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Speaker 1: but because of the secrecy involved, the fact that these

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Speaker 1: these d tails cannot legally be shared, has led to

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Speaker 1: some really interesting hypotheses, some more grounded than others. I

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Speaker 1: like that to use the term grounded. Yes, space ground

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Speaker 1: here all day. I'm surprised we got this far without

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Speaker 1: another space fund. We've got a ton in the notes

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Speaker 1: and they were all well unintentional, might be going a

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Speaker 1: bit far, Like I would realize that while typing it out,

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Speaker 1: and I'm like, oh, okay, I'm ahead to do it.

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Speaker 1: But we do know, we do know a lot about

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Speaker 1: the X thirty seven. You can see pictures of it online.

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Speaker 1: You can see some great footage of it that comes

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Speaker 1: from i think ultimately from the Air Force themselves. Yeah. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: because I mean the landing is impressive, right, the fact

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Speaker 1: that this is landing autonomously, so it's unmanned. But it's

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Speaker 1: not just unmanned. There's no one remote controlling this aircraft

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Speaker 1: when it comes down and land, right. It's not a drone.

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Speaker 1: That's very important. Yeah, it's it's it's fully under its

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Speaker 1: own NA navigation power. Uh. So here's some of the

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Speaker 1: facts that we know about it. And a lot of

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Speaker 1: this is because again, it started its life out as

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Speaker 1: a NASA project, so there were some details that were

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Speaker 1: already out there and the Air Force is like, well, heck,

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Speaker 1: we don't care about this part. This isn't the important part.

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Speaker 1: Just don't talk about the lasers, right, yeah, I mean

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Speaker 1: the tickle device. Yeah, it's just there to tickle space.

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Speaker 1: That's all it's meant to do. So here's what we

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Speaker 1: do know. Uh. It is twenty nine ft three inches long,

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Speaker 1: which is about eight point nine meters. When it's on

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Speaker 1: its landing gear. It is nine ft six inches tall

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Speaker 1: or about two point nine ms. Now at that space,

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Speaker 1: even if you had a pressurized cabin, you wouldn't be

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Speaker 1: able to really have astronauts right in it. Uh. The

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Speaker 1: X three seven B does not have a pressurized cabin,

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Speaker 1: so it cannot carry up anything living, at least nothing

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Speaker 1: that you expect to remain. So it's it could carry

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Speaker 1: up non animate uh like cargo that could and not

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Speaker 1: a whole lot of it at that's at that size.

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Speaker 1: From wing tip to wing tip, it is four ft

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Speaker 1: eleven inches wide or four point five meters, and it

364
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Speaker 1: weighs a slimming eleven thousand pounds or four thousand UH.

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Speaker 1: It's power system it uses lithium ion batteries to to

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Speaker 1: supply power to its um it's thrusters, but it is

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Speaker 1: uh it's got gallium arsenide solar cells to recharge those.

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Speaker 1: That's why it can stay in space so long. Because

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Speaker 1: that's the question that a lot of people have at

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Speaker 1: the beginning, is how does it manage to retain power

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Speaker 1: for that long and returned to its original um you know,

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Speaker 1: returned to its launch point on its own power. This

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Speaker 1: is not necessarily a powerful vehicle on its own. No,

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Speaker 1: it cannot take off from Earth, and it certainly cannot

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Speaker 1: escape Earth's gravity on its own. It has to have

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Speaker 1: a launch vehicle, also more commonly referred to by we

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Speaker 1: mere mortals as rockets. So you guess, trap one of

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Speaker 1: these suckers onto a rocket UM, typically an Atlas V

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Speaker 1: Applas Atlas five. I guess I should say, let's say

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Speaker 1: V call I X I I UM the Atlas five rocket.

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Speaker 1: You have to strap it up to one of those

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Speaker 1: suckers to get it out into space in the first place. So,

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Speaker 1: and that actually has raised some folks um objections to

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Speaker 1: this whole approach, but we'll get into that a little bit.

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Speaker 1: So the way it would work is, originally they were

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Speaker 1: thinking about having this kind of piggyback onto a space shuttle,

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Speaker 1: So if you were going to launch a space shuttle,

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Speaker 1: you could also launch a space plane. However, the Columbia

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Speaker 1: disaster really caused NASA to reevaluate the space shuttle program

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Speaker 1: for quite some time. In fact, it was it was

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Speaker 1: put on the ground for a good long time after

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Speaker 1: the Columbia disaster, as NASA was reevaluating the program and

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Speaker 1: seeing how to make it so that that kind of

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Speaker 1: tragedy would never happen again, So I meant that that

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Speaker 1: would no longer be a viable means of getting the

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Speaker 1: X thirty seven into space. So at that point, the

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Speaker 1: reevaluation for X thirty seven meant they looked at it

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Speaker 1: as a payload for other launch vehicles, and they settled

399
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Speaker 1: on the United Launch Alliance at last five. So the

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Speaker 1: launch vehicle delivers the X thirty seven to low Earth orbit.

401
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Speaker 1: Low Earth orbit is the same orbit that you find

402
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Speaker 1: the International Space Station. It's the same Earth orbit the

403
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Speaker 1: Hubble spacecraft or Hubble space telescope is in. It's the

404
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Speaker 1: same Earth orbit. Or it's the same orbit that all

405
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Speaker 1: the Space Shuttle missions went to. So in other words,

406
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Speaker 1: there have only been a couple of times that human

407
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Speaker 1: beings have ever gone beyond beyond low Earth orbit. Those

408
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Speaker 1: times would be when we sent people to the Moon. Otherwise,

409
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Speaker 1: everything has been in low Earth orbit, which is relatively

410
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Speaker 1: close to the Earth. From our perspective, it's way the

411
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Speaker 1: heck out there. But if you were to look at

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Speaker 1: Earth from a much like not even a bird's eye view, obviously,

413
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Speaker 1: but much further out, you would say, oh, low Earth

414
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Speaker 1: orbit is still very much in the neighborhood. Yeah, a

415
00:25:01,680 --> 00:25:04,359
Speaker 1: space bird. Well, I guess one of the great ways

416
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Speaker 1: to imagine this is if you look at a picture

417
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Speaker 1: with the distance between Earth's Moon and Earth, Yeah, and

418
00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:14,480
Speaker 1: then you see the line your Earth orbit is very

419
00:25:14,680 --> 00:25:17,760
Speaker 1: very close. Yeah, exactly. And it's also where a lot

420
00:25:17,800 --> 00:25:20,720
Speaker 1: of space debris happens to be. There's other space because

421
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Speaker 1: we do have satellites that are much further out right,

422
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Speaker 1: We've got like the the geosynchronous satellites are much further

423
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Speaker 1: out than lowerth orbit. But those were delivered by unmanned spacecraft.

424
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Speaker 1: They weren't They weren't put there by astronauts. Uh, So

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Speaker 1: that that is, you know, we do have stuff that's

426
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Speaker 1: further out, but it's not stuff from manned missions. And

427
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Speaker 1: this unmanned mission would end up going and that's say,

428
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Speaker 1: very low Earth orbit. Uh, and it could stay. Originally

429
00:25:50,040 --> 00:25:51,920
Speaker 1: I think they were planning on having it stayed between

430
00:25:51,960 --> 00:25:54,960
Speaker 1: two hundred and three hundred days, not quite a year. Yeah,

431
00:25:55,000 --> 00:25:57,760
Speaker 1: that would be pretty much the limit that was originally,

432
00:25:57,840 --> 00:25:59,720
Speaker 1: or at least that was kind of what the mission

433
00:25:59,760 --> 00:26:02,439
Speaker 1: for meters were going to be. But as it turns out,

434
00:26:02,480 --> 00:26:04,520
Speaker 1: it can stay up there much longer than that. So

435
00:26:04,720 --> 00:26:09,560
Speaker 1: the very first mission for an X thirty seven launched

436
00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:15,919
Speaker 1: on April and landed on December three, landed without a hitch.

437
00:26:16,480 --> 00:26:19,639
Speaker 1: Some of their tests landings that they did where they

438
00:26:19,680 --> 00:26:23,879
Speaker 1: just dropped one of these X thirty seven's from another aircraft,

439
00:26:24,520 --> 00:26:28,160
Speaker 1: some of them were successful, not all of them were. Yeah,

440
00:26:28,400 --> 00:26:31,120
Speaker 1: they had some issues where I think on the very

441
00:26:31,200 --> 00:26:33,480
Speaker 1: I think the very first time they tried to land

442
00:26:33,520 --> 00:26:38,359
Speaker 1: one um when the mission hadn't been scrapped for weather.

443
00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:41,679
Speaker 1: It ended up landing on the landing strip, but it

444
00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:45,040
Speaker 1: overshot a little bit and rolled off the end and

445
00:26:45,119 --> 00:26:49,120
Speaker 1: sustained minor damage. No. No, And then remember they built

446
00:26:49,160 --> 00:26:51,560
Speaker 1: two of these things. Originally they were just going to

447
00:26:51,680 --> 00:26:54,360
Speaker 1: do one, but they ended up building two. So that

448
00:26:54,480 --> 00:27:00,560
Speaker 1: first mission lasted two four days, and the X thirty

449
00:27:00,560 --> 00:27:04,760
Speaker 1: seven traveled approximately ninety one million miles in those two

450
00:27:05,280 --> 00:27:08,280
Speaker 1: four days, which is about a hundred forty six million kilometers.

451
00:27:09,000 --> 00:27:12,560
Speaker 1: The second mission was launched on March five eleven. Now

452
00:27:12,600 --> 00:27:15,399
Speaker 1: this was the second of the two X thirty seven,

453
00:27:16,000 --> 00:27:17,960
Speaker 1: so it wasn't the same one that went up in

454
00:27:19,600 --> 00:27:22,240
Speaker 1: important to remember because remember the whole purpose of these

455
00:27:22,320 --> 00:27:25,080
Speaker 1: was so you have reusable the idea being you could

456
00:27:25,119 --> 00:27:28,119
Speaker 1: turn it around fairly quickly and launch it for a

457
00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:31,280
Speaker 1: new mission. But they didn't reuse the original one, not

458
00:27:31,359 --> 00:27:34,359
Speaker 1: for this one. They decided, all right, we're going to

459
00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:37,280
Speaker 1: stagger these. So the second one went up in on

460
00:27:37,359 --> 00:27:42,320
Speaker 1: March two thousand eleven. Uh, this was supposed to only

461
00:27:42,440 --> 00:27:45,520
Speaker 1: last only it's a weird way of putting it only

462
00:27:45,600 --> 00:27:49,520
Speaker 1: last two hundred seventy days as an incredibly long time

463
00:27:49,880 --> 00:27:52,480
Speaker 1: to just be you know, just being a spacecraft. Remember

464
00:27:52,480 --> 00:27:54,760
Speaker 1: it's not the International Space Station or anything like that.

465
00:27:55,520 --> 00:27:58,080
Speaker 1: But on November twenty nine, two thousand eleven, the Air

466
00:27:58,080 --> 00:28:00,399
Speaker 1: Force announced it was going to extend the mission, you know,

467
00:28:00,600 --> 00:28:03,400
Speaker 1: just let go for a while off. So it eventually

468
00:28:03,520 --> 00:28:07,879
Speaker 1: landed on June twelve, which means it lasted four hundred

469
00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:12,080
Speaker 1: sixty nine days. That is mind blowing. Yeah, so the

470
00:28:12,160 --> 00:28:16,439
Speaker 1: spacecraft was just orbiting Earth for four six days. Sometimes,

471
00:28:16,440 --> 00:28:18,639
Speaker 1: by the way, it's low enough that you can spot it.

472
00:28:19,560 --> 00:28:24,640
Speaker 1: Amateur satellite investigators or observers can check it out. You

473
00:28:24,680 --> 00:28:29,640
Speaker 1: can go online and find the find the correct forums,

474
00:28:29,960 --> 00:28:34,800
Speaker 1: which allow you to track pretty much anything that is

475
00:28:34,840 --> 00:28:37,640
Speaker 1: in orbit. If it's close enough to be seen, it's

476
00:28:37,920 --> 00:28:41,960
Speaker 1: it's the Great Achilles heel of secrecy in space. Yeah. Yeah,

477
00:28:42,080 --> 00:28:45,600
Speaker 1: if you're like, hey, that's stars moving, the chances are

478
00:28:45,640 --> 00:28:47,720
Speaker 1: it's not a star, and it's not. It's not the

479
00:28:47,760 --> 00:28:51,719
Speaker 1: Death Star. Probably probably, it's more likely a space station

480
00:28:51,920 --> 00:28:55,880
Speaker 1: or a spacecraft. Um. So the third mission launched onto

481
00:28:55,880 --> 00:29:00,160
Speaker 1: Samarrella AT and this one was the same spacecraft that

482
00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:03,880
Speaker 1: did the launched So this was the first one, the

483
00:29:03,920 --> 00:29:11,040
Speaker 1: first X thirty seven b um. Now this particular one, uh,

484
00:29:11,480 --> 00:29:14,040
Speaker 1: lasted for six d seventy four days. This is the

485
00:29:14,040 --> 00:29:15,520
Speaker 1: one we talked about where it was just shy of

486
00:29:15,600 --> 00:29:20,400
Speaker 1: two years. Um, pretty amazing that it could stay up

487
00:29:20,440 --> 00:29:23,400
Speaker 1: that long. It landed on October seventeen, So this is

488
00:29:23,400 --> 00:29:24,920
Speaker 1: the one I was referring to at the top of

489
00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:29,320
Speaker 1: the show. And uh, the fourth mission is scheduled to

490
00:29:29,400 --> 00:29:33,040
Speaker 1: launch on May six, but again we're in early April

491
00:29:33,040 --> 00:29:36,360
Speaker 1: as we record this, so that's still in our future, right.

492
00:29:36,760 --> 00:29:40,800
Speaker 1: But what happens on these missions, that's a great question. Then.

493
00:29:42,600 --> 00:29:45,000
Speaker 1: Remember how I said it was classified and top secret?

494
00:29:45,400 --> 00:29:48,160
Speaker 1: Do you think I have that clearance? Where we going?

495
00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:50,880
Speaker 1: I thought this was I thought you were doing a bit.

496
00:29:51,200 --> 00:29:53,440
Speaker 1: You're the guy who knows the stuff. They don't want

497
00:29:53,480 --> 00:29:55,560
Speaker 1: you to know if anything, I should be asking you

498
00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:59,040
Speaker 1: this question. Well, uh yeah, well here's the thing, and

499
00:29:59,040 --> 00:30:02,560
Speaker 1: and and thank you for the shout out, but rumors

500
00:30:02,680 --> 00:30:07,680
Speaker 1: proliferate me in the absence of transparency. That's actually absolutely

501
00:30:07,720 --> 00:30:10,960
Speaker 1: like if you you know, you obviously can't deny the

502
00:30:11,000 --> 00:30:14,840
Speaker 1: existence of this thing, because we all know it exists,

503
00:30:15,440 --> 00:30:18,880
Speaker 1: but if you cannot also explain the reason for it,

504
00:30:19,000 --> 00:30:22,000
Speaker 1: or what its purposes or what it is doing, then

505
00:30:22,080 --> 00:30:25,680
Speaker 1: in the absence that vacuum of information, nature of whors

506
00:30:25,720 --> 00:30:29,880
Speaker 1: a vacuum. So we'll fill it with conjecture. Don't worry

507
00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:32,360
Speaker 1: about not telling us what it does. We will take

508
00:30:32,360 --> 00:30:35,560
Speaker 1: care of that for you by suggesting every kind of

509
00:30:35,640 --> 00:30:39,320
Speaker 1: hypothesis you can imagine. Okay, But with all that being said,

510
00:30:39,840 --> 00:30:42,640
Speaker 1: now we get to do one of the most enjoyable,

511
00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:47,880
Speaker 1: fascinating and sometimes slippery, slopish kind of things, which is

512
00:30:48,160 --> 00:30:51,520
Speaker 1: we begin to assemble some of the facts we definitely

513
00:30:51,600 --> 00:30:55,000
Speaker 1: know and see if that builds out toward a larger picture. Right,

514
00:30:55,040 --> 00:30:58,120
Speaker 1: all right, Yeah, So here's here's what we know. DARPA

515
00:30:58,160 --> 00:31:01,000
Speaker 1: took control of it. It's part of the Department of Defense.

516
00:31:01,600 --> 00:31:04,840
Speaker 1: The Air Force is running it, so it's a military operation.

517
00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:08,400
Speaker 1: With it being a military operation, you can therefore assume

518
00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:11,680
Speaker 1: that it's going to be doing some things that would

519
00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:16,920
Speaker 1: in the long term support military operations. Right, it's not.

520
00:31:17,120 --> 00:31:21,440
Speaker 1: It's not gonna be a cable television satellite deployment device.

521
00:31:21,640 --> 00:31:24,040
Speaker 1: That's not gonna help you know, the air forces. Like

522
00:31:24,040 --> 00:31:26,480
Speaker 1: we're strapped for cash. Let's see if Comcast wants us

523
00:31:26,480 --> 00:31:29,000
Speaker 1: to put something up in the sky, that's not gonna happen.

524
00:31:29,560 --> 00:31:34,600
Speaker 1: So therefore we narrow that the down the possible uses

525
00:31:34,720 --> 00:31:37,680
Speaker 1: for this to military things that would benefit the military

526
00:31:37,720 --> 00:31:43,240
Speaker 1: in some form or fashion. So that gives us some

527
00:31:43,240 --> 00:31:49,080
Speaker 1: some direction. Uh So, one of the popular hypotheses is

528
00:31:49,120 --> 00:31:52,400
Speaker 1: that the X three seven is acting like a spy satellite,

529
00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:58,400
Speaker 1: which maybe to spy upon land targets or even other

530
00:31:58,920 --> 00:32:02,800
Speaker 1: spacecraft other targets in space, so it could be a satellite. Um.

531
00:32:02,800 --> 00:32:05,120
Speaker 1: In fact, there were a lot of people saying, hey,

532
00:32:05,160 --> 00:32:09,840
Speaker 1: this you know, most recent test had the spacecraft X

533
00:32:09,920 --> 00:32:15,600
Speaker 1: thirty seven on the same general orbit as a Chinese satellite. Yeah,

534
00:32:15,600 --> 00:32:19,800
Speaker 1: the Tongue Young one or some and yeah, and that's

535
00:32:19,800 --> 00:32:22,200
Speaker 1: a that's a space lab. It's been up for a while,

536
00:32:22,280 --> 00:32:26,200
Speaker 1: it has its own refueling so of course people people

537
00:32:26,200 --> 00:32:29,800
Speaker 1: would guess that this is a satellite either spine on

538
00:32:29,920 --> 00:32:34,560
Speaker 1: other satellites or giving imagery from the ground mapping. In

539
00:32:34,560 --> 00:32:38,080
Speaker 1: other words, in the orbitable path of the X thirty

540
00:32:38,160 --> 00:32:42,640
Speaker 1: seven B takes it over on Southeast Asia, Latin America,

541
00:32:43,120 --> 00:32:45,959
Speaker 1: parts the Middle East, notably I Rock. So it's not

542
00:32:46,240 --> 00:32:49,840
Speaker 1: an unreasonable guess. Yeah, you can understand why people would

543
00:32:49,920 --> 00:32:53,960
Speaker 1: would suggest this. Um, and we don't know all the

544
00:32:54,320 --> 00:32:57,120
Speaker 1: equipment that's aboard the X seven years. I have noticed

545
00:32:57,120 --> 00:32:59,480
Speaker 1: that we didn't give you a rundown on like it

546
00:32:59,560 --> 00:33:02,080
Speaker 1: has kind of camera system on it or because we

547
00:33:02,120 --> 00:33:04,520
Speaker 1: don't know, but we'd love to do that. But the

548
00:33:04,600 --> 00:33:06,240
Speaker 1: stuff we do know is sort of vague. We know

549
00:33:06,320 --> 00:33:09,480
Speaker 1: it has the solar array, right, we know that. We

550
00:33:09,560 --> 00:33:13,280
Speaker 1: know that's what allows it to stay up for so long. Uh,

551
00:33:13,400 --> 00:33:15,160
Speaker 1: you know, I can't say that would be able to

552
00:33:15,160 --> 00:33:17,960
Speaker 1: stay up indefinitely, but it certainly is staying up there

553
00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:21,200
Speaker 1: an incredibly long amount of time for something designed to

554
00:33:21,360 --> 00:33:23,560
Speaker 1: fly up and fly back down. Yeah, you know it's

555
00:33:23,600 --> 00:33:28,680
Speaker 1: not again, it's not space station. UM. So here's the

556
00:33:28,720 --> 00:33:31,920
Speaker 1: thing about the idea of it spying on the space Lab.

557
00:33:32,080 --> 00:33:37,280
Speaker 1: That's not really physically possible, right right, Yeah, absolutely, because

558
00:33:37,720 --> 00:33:40,000
Speaker 1: you can. You can check out some of the words

559
00:33:40,080 --> 00:33:44,560
Speaker 1: from the analysts. This idea of it following a satellite

560
00:33:45,000 --> 00:33:48,520
Speaker 1: came about from that speculation. But there's a guy named

561
00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:52,720
Speaker 1: Jim Oberg who is who is a space analyst, which

562
00:33:52,760 --> 00:33:54,800
Speaker 1: is a great job to have. Yeah, I would love

563
00:33:54,840 --> 00:33:59,040
Speaker 1: to have that job. Looks pretty empty to me. Yeah,

564
00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:02,840
Speaker 1: I believe that's start. No, it's moving, Yeah, exactly. We'd

565
00:34:02,880 --> 00:34:05,560
Speaker 1: be very good at that. Yeah, I think I think

566
00:34:05,560 --> 00:34:09,319
Speaker 1: we got a new podcast, so so um, let's go

567
00:34:09,360 --> 00:34:12,040
Speaker 1: ahead and and uh, well we'll finish quoting Jim and

568
00:34:12,040 --> 00:34:14,120
Speaker 1: invite him to the show later on our on our

569
00:34:14,160 --> 00:34:17,520
Speaker 1: space ample of stuff. Uh. He points out that these

570
00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:21,440
Speaker 1: two objects, the Chinese Space Lab and the X thirty

571
00:34:21,440 --> 00:34:24,960
Speaker 1: seven B, there in orbits that crossed the equator about

572
00:34:25,040 --> 00:34:28,239
Speaker 1: ninety degrees apart. So when they do criss cross each

573
00:34:28,280 --> 00:34:31,920
Speaker 1: other's paths, they're going thousands of meters per second. So

574
00:34:32,040 --> 00:34:35,480
Speaker 1: how how can you make an observation You're you're going

575
00:34:35,560 --> 00:34:39,239
Speaker 1: by so quickly that there's no there's no way to

576
00:34:39,239 --> 00:34:42,560
Speaker 1: get any meaningful information. Um, it would be kind of like,

577
00:34:42,880 --> 00:34:45,879
Speaker 1: let's let's imagine that Ben for a moment, that that

578
00:34:45,960 --> 00:34:49,799
Speaker 1: you're writing with Scott. Okay, yeah, now Scott Scott from

579
00:34:49,840 --> 00:34:53,360
Speaker 1: car stuff, because you guys do car stuff together. Scott,

580
00:34:54,360 --> 00:34:57,759
Speaker 1: he's got a lead foot man. He likes he likes

581
00:34:57,760 --> 00:35:02,439
Speaker 1: to drive fast. So let's say that he's driving by Uh,

582
00:35:02,520 --> 00:35:05,000
Speaker 1: you're you're in the passenger seat. He's he's flying down

583
00:35:05,000 --> 00:35:08,640
Speaker 1: the road. He's in one of his his amazingly souped

584
00:35:08,760 --> 00:35:12,279
Speaker 1: up muscle cars. By the way, totally making this up.

585
00:35:12,560 --> 00:35:14,879
Speaker 1: But let's let's say that he's or sports vehicle. Let's

586
00:35:14,880 --> 00:35:16,719
Speaker 1: say it's either faster than a muscle car. It's a

587
00:35:16,760 --> 00:35:19,480
Speaker 1: sports car that's designed to go fast. It's it's one

588
00:35:19,520 --> 00:35:21,879
Speaker 1: of those that was converted from an old race car.

589
00:35:22,800 --> 00:35:26,920
Speaker 1: And you zoom past a person that neither of you know,

590
00:35:28,719 --> 00:35:31,839
Speaker 1: and he asks you what colored their eyes were. It's

591
00:35:31,920 --> 00:35:36,279
Speaker 1: like that, except multiply it by way faster speeds. So

592
00:35:36,719 --> 00:35:39,120
Speaker 1: it's just it's it's impossible to get any kind of

593
00:35:39,160 --> 00:35:43,680
Speaker 1: meaningful information from that. So what's another hypothesis. How about

594
00:35:43,760 --> 00:35:47,919
Speaker 1: it's not actually doing any spying of its own, it's

595
00:35:48,000 --> 00:35:52,600
Speaker 1: just testing spy technology. Okay, like, what why would they

596
00:35:52,640 --> 00:35:55,160
Speaker 1: be doing that? Well, let's say that again, kind of

597
00:35:55,160 --> 00:35:58,560
Speaker 1: like that idea of these sensors that you might want

598
00:35:58,640 --> 00:36:04,319
Speaker 1: in order to to monitor something like, uh, nuclear deployment

599
00:36:04,600 --> 00:36:08,360
Speaker 1: in another country, or any other kind of sensor you

600
00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:11,440
Speaker 1: can imagine that would be useful for military purposes. And

601
00:36:11,480 --> 00:36:14,440
Speaker 1: they've built these on Earth. See here's the downfall that

602
00:36:14,520 --> 00:36:17,759
Speaker 1: we have about our our technologies for space. We have

603
00:36:17,920 --> 00:36:22,879
Speaker 1: to build them for the most part here on Earth. So, yeah,

604
00:36:22,920 --> 00:36:25,680
Speaker 1: that's where we keep all our stuff, right, that's the

605
00:36:25,719 --> 00:36:28,160
Speaker 1: way the tick would say, not the Earth, That's where

606
00:36:28,160 --> 00:36:31,799
Speaker 1: I keep all my stuff. So because we have all

607
00:36:31,800 --> 00:36:34,320
Speaker 1: that stuff here and we're developing everything here, we're building

608
00:36:34,320 --> 00:36:38,359
Speaker 1: it here, we can never be fully certain that the

609
00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:41,440
Speaker 1: thing we designed here on Earth is going to work

610
00:36:41,680 --> 00:36:45,399
Speaker 1: the way we had intended once it's in space. So

611
00:36:45,440 --> 00:36:49,600
Speaker 1: it may be that this is acting as a platform

612
00:36:49,719 --> 00:36:52,799
Speaker 1: to test these technologies, see if they are in fact

613
00:36:52,960 --> 00:36:57,319
Speaker 1: viable in a space environment, and return to Earth, so

614
00:36:57,360 --> 00:37:00,719
Speaker 1: that we can be certain that the stuff we developed

615
00:37:01,080 --> 00:37:03,120
Speaker 1: is in fact doing what it was intended to do,

616
00:37:03,400 --> 00:37:06,040
Speaker 1: or at least figure out how it broke. Yeah, exactly. Yeah,

617
00:37:06,080 --> 00:37:08,200
Speaker 1: if it's not working, then we try and figure out

618
00:37:08,239 --> 00:37:10,600
Speaker 1: why is it not working, what caused that? What was

619
00:37:10,640 --> 00:37:15,640
Speaker 1: the thing was did it encounter a like some cosmic

620
00:37:15,719 --> 00:37:18,680
Speaker 1: radiation and it ended up messing everything up. If so,

621
00:37:18,840 --> 00:37:20,920
Speaker 1: is there some way we can shield it from that

622
00:37:20,920 --> 00:37:23,759
Speaker 1: that kind of thing? I think actually that this is

623
00:37:23,760 --> 00:37:29,359
Speaker 1: probably the the most likely out of all the different hypotheses. Yeah,

624
00:37:29,440 --> 00:37:32,040
Speaker 1: I agree, because pretty much what the Air Force has said,

625
00:37:32,920 --> 00:37:36,480
Speaker 1: and and it's it has precedent behind it because they've

626
00:37:36,520 --> 00:37:40,000
Speaker 1: continually built these platforms, as you said earlier, So it

627
00:37:40,120 --> 00:37:42,880
Speaker 1: makes sense. And you also want to check because especially

628
00:37:42,920 --> 00:37:46,400
Speaker 1: if this is new, uh new technology of any sort,

629
00:37:46,560 --> 00:37:48,480
Speaker 1: it's going to be a little bit delicate, and you know,

630
00:37:48,680 --> 00:37:53,319
Speaker 1: sensors are well sensitive. Yeah. Yeah, And and you could

631
00:37:53,400 --> 00:37:55,200
Speaker 1: even argue that maybe it doesn't even go that far.

632
00:37:55,280 --> 00:37:58,160
Speaker 1: Maybe it's just the Air Force wanting to test this

633
00:37:58,280 --> 00:38:03,560
Speaker 1: autonomous uh nature and to make sure that they can

634
00:38:03,560 --> 00:38:07,840
Speaker 1: rely upon it even if the mission extends much further

635
00:38:07,920 --> 00:38:12,040
Speaker 1: out than what was originally anticipated. That's valuable information to know.

636
00:38:12,320 --> 00:38:17,200
Speaker 1: Maybe it's not doing anything remotely you know, secret right now,

637
00:38:17,239 --> 00:38:20,840
Speaker 1: other than just making sure it works, which that's important

638
00:38:20,880 --> 00:38:24,919
Speaker 1: to know, and we can't know without the tests. So

639
00:38:25,760 --> 00:38:29,399
Speaker 1: then there's another hypothesis where um, the X thirty seven

640
00:38:29,440 --> 00:38:33,799
Speaker 1: is a delivery mechanism for space weapons, space weapons. How

641
00:38:33,840 --> 00:38:37,239
Speaker 1: do we define space weapons? That's an excellent question. It's

642
00:38:37,280 --> 00:38:39,680
Speaker 1: one that cannot be answered right now because it's a

643
00:38:39,760 --> 00:38:42,960
Speaker 1: question that comes up over and over in treaty discussions

644
00:38:43,280 --> 00:38:49,839
Speaker 1: and h arms control discussions. People disagree over and by

645
00:38:49,840 --> 00:38:53,960
Speaker 1: people I mean states like countries, disagree over the definition

646
00:38:53,960 --> 00:38:57,200
Speaker 1: of space weapons. So, for example, perhaps you have a

647
00:38:57,239 --> 00:39:02,160
Speaker 1: missile detection system, like a satellite system that's deployed. Some

648
00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:04,879
Speaker 1: would argue that as a space weapon. Now it might

649
00:39:04,880 --> 00:39:09,000
Speaker 1: be up space weapon in the form of defense, but

650
00:39:09,440 --> 00:39:13,279
Speaker 1: they would still argue that counts under certain definitions. And

651
00:39:13,360 --> 00:39:17,880
Speaker 1: other states, presumably the states that actually have missile detection

652
00:39:17,960 --> 00:39:21,600
Speaker 1: systems in place, would say this totally doesn't count as

653
00:39:21,600 --> 00:39:24,680
Speaker 1: a space weapon. And we'll talk more about why they

654
00:39:24,719 --> 00:39:28,720
Speaker 1: would say that a little bit later. But the Pentagon,

655
00:39:29,000 --> 00:39:31,840
Speaker 1: just for the record, denies that in fact, the X

656
00:39:31,880 --> 00:39:34,440
Speaker 1: thirty seven has anything to do with space weapon deployment.

657
00:39:34,560 --> 00:39:39,240
Speaker 1: Explicitly denies it. And also, you know this concern about

658
00:39:39,400 --> 00:39:42,520
Speaker 1: space weapons and militarization. I know, we'll talk about it

659
00:39:42,520 --> 00:39:45,160
Speaker 1: a little bit later, but there is also precedent in

660
00:39:46,360 --> 00:39:53,520
Speaker 1: unclassified public record Pentagon statements, especially under Rumsfeld's heading of

661
00:39:53,640 --> 00:39:58,799
Speaker 1: the Administration, Donald Rumsfeld. There is an active desire on

662
00:39:58,960 --> 00:40:02,120
Speaker 1: the part of not just the US but other countries

663
00:40:02,440 --> 00:40:07,000
Speaker 1: to to explore the possibilities of defensive capability in space.

664
00:40:07,480 --> 00:40:09,480
Speaker 1: It just makes sense. It's not a secret. I mean,

665
00:40:09,800 --> 00:40:13,880
Speaker 1: anyone who lived through the eighties remembers the star Wars program,

666
00:40:13,880 --> 00:40:16,520
Speaker 1: the so called star Wars program, which was a proposed

667
00:40:16,520 --> 00:40:22,080
Speaker 1: and ultimately abandoned plan to put an anti missile system

668
00:40:22,160 --> 00:40:26,440
Speaker 1: into space to protect against the potential first strike situation

669
00:40:27,200 --> 00:40:29,560
Speaker 1: or even you know, not even a first strike, but

670
00:40:29,640 --> 00:40:33,680
Speaker 1: maybe even a counter strike if you're being super cynical

671
00:40:34,280 --> 00:40:38,200
Speaker 1: of you know, a system meant to to uh disarm

672
00:40:38,400 --> 00:40:43,000
Speaker 1: or disable incoming missiles that could target the United States. Ultimately,

673
00:40:43,040 --> 00:40:47,239
Speaker 1: it didn't go into place. Um and I want to

674
00:40:47,280 --> 00:40:49,360
Speaker 1: say I've done an episode about that, but if I haven't,

675
00:40:49,360 --> 00:40:53,160
Speaker 1: I absolutely need to. Yeah, I feel like we talked

676
00:40:53,200 --> 00:40:55,239
Speaker 1: about this, maybe we talked about off air, but that

677
00:40:55,280 --> 00:40:58,040
Speaker 1: would be that would be a fantastic episode. Uh, It's

678
00:40:58,400 --> 00:41:01,040
Speaker 1: it's such an it's such an interesting thing. We could

679
00:41:01,040 --> 00:41:04,439
Speaker 1: also talk about dead hands systems, but yeah, but that's

680
00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:07,839
Speaker 1: a story for another day. Doctor Strange love stuff. Yeah,

681
00:41:08,640 --> 00:41:11,800
Speaker 1: I'm almost certain that Chris and I did one episode

682
00:41:11,800 --> 00:41:13,440
Speaker 1: on it at some point, but I'll have to do

683
00:41:13,480 --> 00:41:16,120
Speaker 1: a search because once you do around seven hundred episodes,

684
00:41:17,080 --> 00:41:21,320
Speaker 1: you really can't remember. Yeah. Well, and for me, honestly

685
00:41:21,360 --> 00:41:25,840
Speaker 1: after I did about ten episodes. But so anyway, there

686
00:41:25,880 --> 00:41:29,560
Speaker 1: are other hypotheses as well, or other other um statements

687
00:41:29,600 --> 00:41:33,239
Speaker 1: that have come out from various experts about the potential

688
00:41:33,400 --> 00:41:36,840
Speaker 1: use of the X thirty seven. Uh. Laura Grego of

689
00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:40,680
Speaker 1: the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists

690
00:41:41,200 --> 00:41:43,479
Speaker 1: says that the design of the X thirty seven really

691
00:41:43,520 --> 00:41:46,560
Speaker 1: limits what it could be able to do, and she

692
00:41:46,640 --> 00:41:50,279
Speaker 1: says that really can't maneuver easily in orbit, so it

693
00:41:50,280 --> 00:41:53,240
Speaker 1: would be very limited in its use as either spy

694
00:41:53,320 --> 00:41:57,120
Speaker 1: technology or a space weapon. Like we were saying earlier,

695
00:41:57,520 --> 00:42:02,400
Speaker 1: you can sometimes see this thing from so maneuvering it is.

696
00:42:02,640 --> 00:42:05,520
Speaker 1: It's really hard to make that a secret, right right.

697
00:42:05,600 --> 00:42:08,040
Speaker 1: Let's say, like if if everyone notices that the X

698
00:42:08,080 --> 00:42:11,160
Speaker 1: thirty seven happens to be in a particular quadrant that's

699
00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:14,600
Speaker 1: near say a Russian spy satellite, and that spy satellite

700
00:42:14,600 --> 00:42:17,239
Speaker 1: suddenly goes offline, it does not take a lot of

701
00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:21,600
Speaker 1: imagination to connect those two things together. This is not

702
00:42:21,640 --> 00:42:24,880
Speaker 1: a who done it? Yeah, so probably not going to

703
00:42:24,920 --> 00:42:29,080
Speaker 1: be used for clandestine purposes in that case. Um. She

704
00:42:29,160 --> 00:42:31,560
Speaker 1: also says it's not large enough to be a satellite launcher.

705
00:42:31,560 --> 00:42:34,239
Speaker 1: It doesn't have the cargo capacity to hold most satellites.

706
00:42:34,280 --> 00:42:37,600
Speaker 1: I mean, if you're talking about like the small cluster

707
00:42:37,680 --> 00:42:41,279
Speaker 1: satellites that some people have referred to. Maybe, but it's

708
00:42:41,360 --> 00:42:45,640
Speaker 1: not designed to carry anything of substantial size, so that's

709
00:42:45,680 --> 00:42:47,799
Speaker 1: probably not what it's being used. What it can do,

710
00:42:47,880 --> 00:42:50,879
Speaker 1: she says, is carry cargo up into space, and that's

711
00:42:50,920 --> 00:42:55,680
Speaker 1: about it. Then you have another expert, Mark Gubrand or Gubrid,

712
00:42:55,760 --> 00:42:59,000
Speaker 1: who is an adjunct Assistant professor of physics and Astronomy

713
00:42:59,000 --> 00:43:00,960
Speaker 1: at the University of North care Larne at Chapel Hill,

714
00:43:01,480 --> 00:43:03,960
Speaker 1: who says that space planes like the X thirty seven

715
00:43:04,200 --> 00:43:07,640
Speaker 1: are not more effective than traditional launches of satellites or

716
00:43:07,680 --> 00:43:11,280
Speaker 1: space weapons, even potential space weapons. So in other words,

717
00:43:11,640 --> 00:43:14,960
Speaker 1: putting them into other types of spacecraft to go up

718
00:43:14,960 --> 00:43:18,240
Speaker 1: into space that that aren't designed to come back down,

719
00:43:18,600 --> 00:43:21,600
Speaker 1: so there's no real advantage Like, yeah, you've got the

720
00:43:21,640 --> 00:43:25,000
Speaker 1: reusable factor, which presumably would cut down on the cost

721
00:43:25,239 --> 00:43:29,640
Speaker 1: somewhat of space launches. But that it's such a complicated

722
00:43:29,719 --> 00:43:32,279
Speaker 1: endeavor and it's really designed to stay up there for

723
00:43:32,320 --> 00:43:34,960
Speaker 1: a really long time, that it doesn't make sense to

724
00:43:35,080 --> 00:43:37,960
Speaker 1: use it as a delivery mechanism. There's no reason why

725
00:43:37,960 --> 00:43:41,120
Speaker 1: your delivery mechanism would need to remain up in low

726
00:43:41,200 --> 00:43:45,480
Speaker 1: earth orbit for hundreds of days. You just get out there,

727
00:43:45,520 --> 00:43:48,719
Speaker 1: you deliver it, you're done. So his argument is that, well,

728
00:43:48,800 --> 00:43:51,120
Speaker 1: it doesn't really make sense. In fact, he would argue

729
00:43:51,160 --> 00:43:54,239
Speaker 1: that the only reason that the program still exists because

730
00:43:54,239 --> 00:43:56,799
Speaker 1: it has so much momentum, that there was so much

731
00:43:56,880 --> 00:44:01,200
Speaker 1: money and effort put into developing it, that it would

732
00:44:01,600 --> 00:44:03,759
Speaker 1: you know, it's kind of taken a life of its own.

733
00:44:04,080 --> 00:44:06,440
Speaker 1: It's a sunk cost at this point. Yeah, saying that,

734
00:44:06,480 --> 00:44:09,680
Speaker 1: you know, it doesn't make sense compared to the alternatives. However,

735
00:44:10,239 --> 00:44:13,360
Speaker 1: it's we already got the ball rolling, and now it's

736
00:44:13,400 --> 00:44:16,720
Speaker 1: going to continue to roll right wherever it ends up rolling.

737
00:44:16,760 --> 00:44:19,880
Speaker 1: And then there's another interesting thing that you have proposed.

738
00:44:20,080 --> 00:44:22,120
Speaker 1: You said, what what if it's what if there's a

739
00:44:22,120 --> 00:44:25,520
Speaker 1: psychological aspect? Yeah, there there's some who have suggested that

740
00:44:25,600 --> 00:44:29,240
Speaker 1: perhaps at least part of the reason why this project,

741
00:44:29,480 --> 00:44:32,120
Speaker 1: let's say that the project ultimately people say, yeah, there's

742
00:44:32,120 --> 00:44:35,319
Speaker 1: no there's no practical reason to continue it because we

743
00:44:35,360 --> 00:44:39,040
Speaker 1: can accomplish a lot of the same goals using alternative

744
00:44:39,120 --> 00:44:43,839
Speaker 1: means that don't require this autonomous vehicle. UM. Some have said, well,

745
00:44:43,880 --> 00:44:48,560
Speaker 1: maybe it's just a kind of freak out potential adversaries

746
00:44:48,640 --> 00:44:54,080
Speaker 1: like the Chinese. I like, okay, first off, that sounds

747
00:44:54,280 --> 00:44:57,280
Speaker 1: so ridiculous on the offset, it sounds like a billion

748
00:44:57,320 --> 00:45:01,040
Speaker 1: dollar prank. Yeah, I agree, like, like, hey, guys, you know,

749
00:45:02,200 --> 00:45:05,360
Speaker 1: I'm concerned about what's happening over in China, and obviously

750
00:45:05,440 --> 00:45:07,879
Speaker 1: we can't declare war or anything like that, but how

751
00:45:07,880 --> 00:45:11,920
Speaker 1: do we scare them? Now? You could say that, however,

752
00:45:12,000 --> 00:45:14,840
Speaker 1: spot Thick was kind of that, you know, that's not

753
00:45:14,920 --> 00:45:17,640
Speaker 1: a bad that's not a bad comparison, and we we

754
00:45:17,719 --> 00:45:21,040
Speaker 1: do know that right now, there's there's this very um

755
00:45:21,239 --> 00:45:26,400
Speaker 1: sensitive is a good word, A sensitive and ongoing uh

756
00:45:27,040 --> 00:45:31,400
Speaker 1: elbow knocking between nations in space. Um. One thing that

757
00:45:31,480 --> 00:45:34,680
Speaker 1: working on this episode made me think about was the

758
00:45:34,760 --> 00:45:37,760
Speaker 1: incident in two thousand seven where the Chinese government shot

759
00:45:37,800 --> 00:45:41,680
Speaker 1: a satellite down from space and it was it was

760
00:45:42,200 --> 00:45:45,120
Speaker 1: pitched to the public as like whom it was bad

761
00:45:45,160 --> 00:45:48,840
Speaker 1: and we wanted to make sure that nothing terrible happened

762
00:45:48,840 --> 00:45:50,400
Speaker 1: to it. So we took care of it. But it

763
00:45:50,440 --> 00:45:54,320
Speaker 1: was also there was a psychological aspect between the countries,

764
00:45:54,600 --> 00:45:57,920
Speaker 1: right too. Here's what we can do. Look at our capability.

765
00:45:58,000 --> 00:46:01,040
Speaker 1: We can bring down a satellite from the surface, like

766
00:46:01,080 --> 00:46:03,600
Speaker 1: we can launch an attack from the surface of the

767
00:46:03,600 --> 00:46:06,360
Speaker 1: Earth and bring down a satellite. Also, the rest of

768
00:46:06,360 --> 00:46:10,120
Speaker 1: the world said, guys, don't don't clutter up space more

769
00:46:10,200 --> 00:46:13,080
Speaker 1: than it already, and you are literally making it more

770
00:46:13,160 --> 00:46:16,360
Speaker 1: dangerous for everything else that's out in low earth orbit.

771
00:46:16,800 --> 00:46:18,719
Speaker 1: I mean, maybe that's the reason there hasn't been any

772
00:46:18,760 --> 00:46:22,520
Speaker 1: extraterrestrial contact. Maybe we're the equivalent of people who have

773
00:46:22,600 --> 00:46:25,520
Speaker 1: refrigerators and stuff in their yard, or or or the

774
00:46:25,560 --> 00:46:28,880
Speaker 1: equivalent of like, well, you know, I really want to

775
00:46:28,960 --> 00:46:32,400
Speaker 1: check out that beautiful waterfall, but there's all this abandoned

776
00:46:32,400 --> 00:46:35,840
Speaker 1: barbed wire and broken glass here. I'm kind of scared

777
00:46:35,880 --> 00:46:37,239
Speaker 1: that if I try and walk through there, I'm going

778
00:46:37,280 --> 00:46:39,799
Speaker 1: to cut myself up. Like that's that's because, I mean,

779
00:46:40,040 --> 00:46:43,320
Speaker 1: space debris is a serious problem, not just for manned missions,

780
00:46:43,360 --> 00:46:46,959
Speaker 1: but unmanned spacecraft as well. Like, you know, we could

781
00:46:46,960 --> 00:46:50,520
Speaker 1: have communications satellites that would get taken down if they

782
00:46:50,600 --> 00:46:54,040
Speaker 1: encountered space debris. We're talking about things that could be

783
00:46:54,120 --> 00:46:58,399
Speaker 1: really tiny, I mean just like a couple of centimeters

784
00:46:58,440 --> 00:47:02,359
Speaker 1: per side, but traveling at those amazing speeds, they could

785
00:47:02,400 --> 00:47:05,040
Speaker 1: do massive amounts of damage if they collide with something. Now,

786
00:47:05,719 --> 00:47:09,319
Speaker 1: on the positive side, space is really big right on

787
00:47:09,360 --> 00:47:12,839
Speaker 1: the on the the less positive side, First of all,

788
00:47:13,000 --> 00:47:15,680
Speaker 1: there all all of these things are largely in the

789
00:47:15,719 --> 00:47:20,399
Speaker 1: same general orbit, you know, lower thorbit. Secondly, the more

790
00:47:20,440 --> 00:47:24,240
Speaker 1: debris you have, the more the greater the odds increase

791
00:47:24,360 --> 00:47:30,360
Speaker 1: of some sort of unintended collision. So making more garbage

792
00:47:30,480 --> 00:47:34,120
Speaker 1: up there is not great. And then there's also a

793
00:47:34,200 --> 00:47:36,959
Speaker 1: quote that you found from the London Times. Ah yes,

794
00:47:37,239 --> 00:47:40,839
Speaker 1: uh a, well back, an unnamed Air Force official love

795
00:47:40,920 --> 00:47:44,880
Speaker 1: that guy or a woman or that person, Yes, a

796
00:47:44,960 --> 00:47:49,200
Speaker 1: recurring character. An unnamed Air Force official did note that

797
00:47:49,280 --> 00:47:52,920
Speaker 1: the ultimate goal of the X thirt seven B is

798
00:47:53,000 --> 00:47:57,680
Speaker 1: to aid terrestrial war fighters, which is still pretty vague.

799
00:47:57,800 --> 00:48:00,799
Speaker 1: It's super vague, but it does can m that there

800
00:48:00,880 --> 00:48:03,759
Speaker 1: is a military aspect by the Air Force. Who knew?

801
00:48:04,040 --> 00:48:07,480
Speaker 1: Yeah right, I think again, you know, we see people

802
00:48:07,560 --> 00:48:11,760
Speaker 1: chasing explanations or speculation about what this is. But there's

803
00:48:11,800 --> 00:48:16,120
Speaker 1: clearly something about UM an informational edge that I think

804
00:48:16,160 --> 00:48:19,240
Speaker 1: he's in there. And you know, to be fair that

805
00:48:19,239 --> 00:48:23,440
Speaker 1: that phrasing, it could mean anything, right, It could It

806
00:48:23,440 --> 00:48:27,360
Speaker 1: could mean reconnaissance. It could mean support in the sense

807
00:48:27,560 --> 00:48:32,920
Speaker 1: of uh sending up a new satellite, small satellite, I guess,

808
00:48:33,000 --> 00:48:36,000
Speaker 1: or or some other kind of payload. Or it could

809
00:48:36,080 --> 00:48:38,960
Speaker 1: mean some kind of weaponization. I mean, it's so vaguely

810
00:48:39,239 --> 00:48:41,880
Speaker 1: defined that it could mean any of those things. So again,

811
00:48:42,120 --> 00:48:44,920
Speaker 1: and more often than not, it fuels the speculation as

812
00:48:44,920 --> 00:48:48,680
Speaker 1: opposed to oh now I understand exactly. Yeah, it's there's

813
00:48:48,840 --> 00:48:52,000
Speaker 1: there's something a little platitude in this about it. But

814
00:48:52,280 --> 00:48:54,799
Speaker 1: but this brings us to a bigger issue, which you

815
00:48:54,880 --> 00:48:59,560
Speaker 1: and I have been I'm fascinated by, Yeah, the concept

816
00:48:59,640 --> 00:49:05,200
Speaker 1: of oponization of space, like putting weapons into space for

817
00:49:05,320 --> 00:49:10,080
Speaker 1: the purposes of warfare. So we're talking like everything from

818
00:49:10,120 --> 00:49:14,359
Speaker 1: those missile defense systems to something that's more of an

819
00:49:14,360 --> 00:49:19,080
Speaker 1: attack based form of warfare, something like a system that

820
00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:24,040
Speaker 1: could either launch missiles or other types of weaponry from

821
00:49:24,120 --> 00:49:30,560
Speaker 1: space or support some other coordinated warfare efforts. UH. And

822
00:49:31,040 --> 00:49:34,600
Speaker 1: obviously this is one of those things that is a

823
00:49:34,960 --> 00:49:38,520
Speaker 1: very delicate subject. Particularly when you look at the Earth

824
00:49:38,560 --> 00:49:43,520
Speaker 1: and you say, how many nations are actually space faring nations? Right,

825
00:49:43,680 --> 00:49:46,719
Speaker 1: not as many as you think there there. Um, there

826
00:49:46,719 --> 00:49:49,960
Speaker 1: are some big strides being made that will change the game,

827
00:49:50,400 --> 00:49:54,120
Speaker 1: but right now the a lot of other nations are

828
00:49:54,120 --> 00:49:57,200
Speaker 1: still catching up to what the US and Russia did

829
00:49:57,400 --> 00:49:59,440
Speaker 1: in the eighties. Yeah, so you've got things like you've

830
00:49:59,480 --> 00:50:03,720
Speaker 1: got coalitions like the European Space Agency, and you've got

831
00:50:04,040 --> 00:50:07,960
Speaker 1: countries like India or China or Japan that all have

832
00:50:08,120 --> 00:50:11,279
Speaker 1: to some extent worked on this sort of stuff, some

833
00:50:11,360 --> 00:50:14,359
Speaker 1: of them using the resources of other nations in order

834
00:50:14,400 --> 00:50:17,520
Speaker 1: to actually launch things. But it is one of those

835
00:50:17,520 --> 00:50:21,040
Speaker 1: deals where you know you have the the potential to

836
00:50:21,160 --> 00:50:25,480
Speaker 1: affect a huge number of people, some of whom are

837
00:50:25,520 --> 00:50:28,439
Speaker 1: living in nations that have absolutely no capability of going

838
00:50:28,480 --> 00:50:32,040
Speaker 1: into space at the moment. So it ends up raising

839
00:50:32,080 --> 00:50:35,800
Speaker 1: some concerns, and in fact, the space race itself raised

840
00:50:35,800 --> 00:50:39,440
Speaker 1: a lot of concerns. You get to a point where, uh,

841
00:50:39,520 --> 00:50:42,960
Speaker 1: the then Soviet Union can launch a satellite into space.

842
00:50:43,000 --> 00:50:46,160
Speaker 1: In this case, spot Nick Sputnik could not do much.

843
00:50:46,160 --> 00:50:50,160
Speaker 1: It essentially beat essentially. All it really did was send

844
00:50:50,200 --> 00:50:56,440
Speaker 1: a message that said I'm still here until until it stopped. UM.

845
00:50:56,480 --> 00:50:58,960
Speaker 1: But that was enough to terrify people in the United

846
00:50:59,000 --> 00:51:03,040
Speaker 1: States because the other implication was that if the Soviet

847
00:51:03,120 --> 00:51:05,800
Speaker 1: Union could send a rocket all the way out into space,

848
00:51:05,840 --> 00:51:08,120
Speaker 1: it could also send a rocket all the way over

849
00:51:08,200 --> 00:51:12,600
Speaker 1: to the United States. So it raised a lot of

850
00:51:12,600 --> 00:51:17,360
Speaker 1: of concerns, not just about intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also

851
00:51:18,400 --> 00:51:22,440
Speaker 1: are we one day going to have war breakout where

852
00:51:22,680 --> 00:51:25,920
Speaker 1: the weapons are in space? Because that is terrifying, right,

853
00:51:26,080 --> 00:51:29,560
Speaker 1: just a nuclear weapon dropping from near Earth orbit. Yeah.

854
00:51:30,000 --> 00:51:33,960
Speaker 1: So in nineteen sixty seven, several countries came together and

855
00:51:34,000 --> 00:51:36,719
Speaker 1: there was an open signing in nineteen sixty seven that

856
00:51:37,640 --> 00:51:40,880
Speaker 1: took place in UM the Soviet Union and the United

857
00:51:40,920 --> 00:51:43,799
Speaker 1: Kingdom and the United States for a treaty that is

858
00:51:43,840 --> 00:51:47,920
Speaker 1: called here's the full name, the Treaty on Principles Governing

859
00:51:47,960 --> 00:51:51,279
Speaker 1: the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of

860
00:51:51,360 --> 00:51:57,400
Speaker 1: Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. I

861
00:51:57,400 --> 00:51:59,120
Speaker 1: guess they didn't have a lot of time to work

862
00:51:59,120 --> 00:52:01,880
Speaker 1: on the title busy working on the actual agreement. It

863
00:52:01,920 --> 00:52:05,680
Speaker 1: wasn't so zippy with the title. It is informally referred

864
00:52:05,680 --> 00:52:08,239
Speaker 1: to as the Outer Space Treaty, which, oh that makes

865
00:52:08,239 --> 00:52:11,560
Speaker 1: a lot more sanchiesier. So set up a lot of

866
00:52:11,600 --> 00:52:16,280
Speaker 1: ground rules about about space because obviously at that point

867
00:52:16,360 --> 00:52:20,120
Speaker 1: only really two nations were in the space game, but

868
00:52:20,200 --> 00:52:24,720
Speaker 1: they were two nations that were philosophically opposed to one another.

869
00:52:24,800 --> 00:52:27,960
Speaker 1: They were in the middle of a Cold war. Uh,

870
00:52:28,000 --> 00:52:31,080
Speaker 1: And so you have all these other countries saying, you

871
00:52:31,080 --> 00:52:33,680
Speaker 1: guys are getting like, first of all, you're really angry

872
00:52:33,719 --> 00:52:37,239
Speaker 1: at each other. Secondly, you've both amassed a huge number

873
00:52:37,239 --> 00:52:40,120
Speaker 1: of weapons. Third you've demonstrated that you are very much

874
00:52:40,120 --> 00:52:43,279
Speaker 1: interested in going the outer space, and we would like

875
00:52:43,280 --> 00:52:46,200
Speaker 1: to have to have us all kind of calm down

876
00:52:46,920 --> 00:52:50,960
Speaker 1: some ground rules and just chill out a little bit.

877
00:52:51,000 --> 00:52:54,200
Speaker 1: But these are these are actually some fantastic rules, to

878
00:52:54,239 --> 00:52:57,040
Speaker 1: the point where I wish more nations were on board

879
00:52:57,080 --> 00:52:59,239
Speaker 1: with this plan. But what are what like are some

880
00:52:59,480 --> 00:53:03,240
Speaker 1: all right? So space exploration as discoveries belong to all humans,

881
00:53:03,360 --> 00:53:06,200
Speaker 1: not just one nation, So you can't hoard all the info.

882
00:53:06,680 --> 00:53:10,200
Speaker 1: So yeah, it's it's saying, look, there's the potential for

883
00:53:10,440 --> 00:53:13,760
Speaker 1: what we learn out in space to benefit all of humanity.

884
00:53:13,840 --> 00:53:17,920
Speaker 1: We cannot silo that information so that one nation benefits

885
00:53:18,040 --> 00:53:20,960
Speaker 1: at the expense of everybody. Else. So there was an

886
00:53:21,000 --> 00:53:24,000
Speaker 1: agreement that anything we learned that can become a benefit

887
00:53:24,120 --> 00:53:27,920
Speaker 1: needs to be shared with everyone. Anyone who with a

888
00:53:27,920 --> 00:53:31,600
Speaker 1: technological capacity can explore space, so it can't be off

889
00:53:31,680 --> 00:53:34,680
Speaker 1: limits to anyone. So, in other words, if the United

890
00:53:34,719 --> 00:53:38,680
Speaker 1: States has to developed this spacefaring technology and then some

891
00:53:38,800 --> 00:53:42,160
Speaker 1: other country that the US is maybe not so friendly with, does,

892
00:53:42,280 --> 00:53:45,200
Speaker 1: the US can't move to block them, right like Iran.

893
00:53:45,400 --> 00:53:48,960
Speaker 1: You will hear stuff about the Iranian Space Agency, and

894
00:53:49,520 --> 00:53:52,200
Speaker 1: you know, for some people it might seem strange that, uh,

895
00:53:52,680 --> 00:53:55,600
Speaker 1: it might seem strange that there's such controversy over nuclear

896
00:53:55,640 --> 00:54:01,200
Speaker 1: weapons but relatively little controversy over um, the space exploration.

897
00:54:01,520 --> 00:54:06,160
Speaker 1: Because yeah, exactly saying that, you know, philosophical disagreements or

898
00:54:06,239 --> 00:54:12,399
Speaker 1: ideological disagreements or or political arguments aside. All nations, all

899
00:54:12,520 --> 00:54:15,960
Speaker 1: states have a right to space exploration if they have

900
00:54:16,000 --> 00:54:20,360
Speaker 1: the technological capacity to do so. Uh, you can't claim

901
00:54:20,640 --> 00:54:23,799
Speaker 1: space property, Yeah, you can't. Can't go out there and

902
00:54:23,840 --> 00:54:26,200
Speaker 1: say this part of space belongs to the US, or

903
00:54:26,320 --> 00:54:30,400
Speaker 1: to the Russia or to whatever. Uh. So you can't

904
00:54:30,480 --> 00:54:32,200
Speaker 1: land on the moon plan a flag and say that

905
00:54:32,239 --> 00:54:35,240
Speaker 1: it belongs to you. Now, So Eddie Izard's whole routine

906
00:54:35,280 --> 00:54:37,880
Speaker 1: about how you can conquer just as long as you

907
00:54:37,880 --> 00:54:40,879
Speaker 1: have a flag does not apply to outer space. He's

908
00:54:40,880 --> 00:54:43,560
Speaker 1: going to be so upset. Nobody telling you guys, right well,

909
00:54:44,080 --> 00:54:46,160
Speaker 1: this also means that the US can't lay claim to

910
00:54:46,200 --> 00:54:50,759
Speaker 1: the Moon because we have an American flag up there. Um,

911
00:54:50,800 --> 00:54:54,280
Speaker 1: obviously the American flag is really in this sound studio someplace,

912
00:54:55,280 --> 00:54:58,640
Speaker 1: the whole hoax deal. And because somebody already sold off

913
00:54:58,719 --> 00:55:00,239
Speaker 1: most of the property on the Moon, and I have

914
00:55:00,280 --> 00:55:04,160
Speaker 1: a couple of acres myself. Yeah, you love those. I mean,

915
00:55:04,200 --> 00:55:06,879
Speaker 1: I'm sure those businesses are all on the open up right. Yeah.

916
00:55:07,080 --> 00:55:10,359
Speaker 1: Whenever you hear something like a a company offering up

917
00:55:10,400 --> 00:55:14,920
Speaker 1: space real estate, this treaty says that's not legal, at

918
00:55:15,000 --> 00:55:17,600
Speaker 1: least not for states to do so. Governments can't do it.

919
00:55:17,920 --> 00:55:20,360
Speaker 1: If you say, well, I'm a private individual, therefore I

920
00:55:20,400 --> 00:55:22,600
Speaker 1: can claim it, I'm sure you're going to have that.

921
00:55:22,600 --> 00:55:25,000
Speaker 1: That's gonna be very difficult to defend that. Not that

922
00:55:25,160 --> 00:55:27,040
Speaker 1: not that there's any reason to defend it right now,

923
00:55:27,080 --> 00:55:31,759
Speaker 1: It's totally not practical, but anyway. Um, Also, no one

924
00:55:31,840 --> 00:55:34,759
Speaker 1: is allowed to create weapons of mass destruction and place

925
00:55:34,840 --> 00:55:39,840
Speaker 1: them in space. This is a big one. Yeah, Now

926
00:55:40,440 --> 00:55:43,319
Speaker 1: it's talking about weapons of mass destruction, So it's a

927
00:55:43,440 --> 00:55:47,120
Speaker 1: very specific definition of the type of weaponry. Right, We're

928
00:55:47,120 --> 00:55:52,080
Speaker 1: talking about a weapon capable of killing or otherwise injuring

929
00:55:52,520 --> 00:55:55,200
Speaker 1: a huge number of folks at one go. Yeah, a

930
00:55:55,280 --> 00:55:59,799
Speaker 1: catastrophic effect every time the weapons used. So any weapon

931
00:55:59,840 --> 00:56:03,960
Speaker 1: that does not fall under that category is not you know,

932
00:56:04,040 --> 00:56:08,799
Speaker 1: it's not prohibited under these terms. Yeah, and that has

933
00:56:08,880 --> 00:56:14,200
Speaker 1: led to discussions of other treaties that would end up

934
00:56:14,239 --> 00:56:15,920
Speaker 1: filling in some of those gaps. But we'll get to

935
00:56:15,920 --> 00:56:19,319
Speaker 1: that in a second. Other rules include the fact that

936
00:56:19,360 --> 00:56:22,960
Speaker 1: celestial bodies can only be used for peaceful purposes. That

937
00:56:23,000 --> 00:56:25,400
Speaker 1: one's so interesting to me because you know what what

938
00:56:25,560 --> 00:56:30,279
Speaker 1: that also encompasses. Right. That means not weaponizing an asteroid,

939
00:56:30,800 --> 00:56:34,040
Speaker 1: for instance, or altering the path of something else in

940
00:56:34,160 --> 00:56:37,479
Speaker 1: space so that it collides with the planet. You can't

941
00:56:37,560 --> 00:56:40,360
Speaker 1: use an asteroid as a projectile weapon and aim it

942
00:56:40,600 --> 00:56:45,759
Speaker 1: on at like, you know, Russia, which you wouldn't want

943
00:56:45,760 --> 00:56:48,719
Speaker 1: to do anyway, I mean, right, like you don't want

944
00:56:48,719 --> 00:56:53,360
Speaker 1: to cause a planet wide extinction level event, which is

945
00:56:53,880 --> 00:56:56,319
Speaker 1: you know, in the cards something like that. I mean,

946
00:56:56,360 --> 00:56:58,759
Speaker 1: this is the kind of stuff that has killed off

947
00:56:59,040 --> 00:57:05,440
Speaker 1: entire you know, populations, entire you know, species, collections of species,

948
00:57:05,480 --> 00:57:09,879
Speaker 1: your past. So yeah, you cannot use celestial bodies for

949
00:57:09,920 --> 00:57:14,280
Speaker 1: any you know, uh, for any non peaceful purpose. Governments

950
00:57:14,280 --> 00:57:17,400
Speaker 1: are responsible for space activities, even if the activities themselves

951
00:57:17,440 --> 00:57:20,280
Speaker 1: are carried out by private organizations, which is very forward

952
00:57:20,320 --> 00:57:26,440
Speaker 1: thinking since only state run operations had existed at that point. So,

953
00:57:26,480 --> 00:57:31,240
Speaker 1: in other words, if space X does something really dumb

954
00:57:31,640 --> 00:57:34,840
Speaker 1: mountain space, the United States government would be held accountable

955
00:57:34,880 --> 00:57:38,520
Speaker 1: for that because that's uh the presumably if they launched

956
00:57:38,560 --> 00:57:41,120
Speaker 1: from the United States. I mean, it is a US

957
00:57:41,160 --> 00:57:44,640
Speaker 1: centered organization, So even though it's not run by the government,

958
00:57:45,320 --> 00:57:48,840
Speaker 1: the US would still be held responsible because they would

959
00:57:48,880 --> 00:57:51,760
Speaker 1: essentially be allowing for it to happen. Be aware of

960
00:57:51,800 --> 00:57:55,720
Speaker 1: space billionaires, because there you could get a lot of

961
00:57:55,720 --> 00:57:58,320
Speaker 1: trouble with your home country. Yeah, yeah, your home country

962
00:57:58,320 --> 00:58:02,400
Speaker 1: would get into a lot of trouble and stuff trickles

963
00:58:02,480 --> 00:58:06,720
Speaker 1: down right, we should say host country. That's what that's true.

964
00:58:06,760 --> 00:58:08,760
Speaker 1: That's true. That's probably the best way of putting it.

965
00:58:09,080 --> 00:58:12,920
Speaker 1: Uh So, if your stuff, meaning a state's property, falls

966
00:58:12,960 --> 00:58:15,880
Speaker 1: out of the sky and damages someone, you are at fault.

967
00:58:15,920 --> 00:58:18,360
Speaker 1: So in other words, if the US puts up a

968
00:58:18,400 --> 00:58:23,520
Speaker 1: satellite and the satellites orbit decays, and the decaying orbit

969
00:58:23,560 --> 00:58:27,520
Speaker 1: means the satellite starts to fall into the Earth and

970
00:58:27,800 --> 00:58:30,920
Speaker 1: does not burn up entirely and ends up colliding with

971
00:58:30,960 --> 00:58:36,400
Speaker 1: like a public library over in Eastern Europe, US chemicals

972
00:58:36,440 --> 00:58:39,520
Speaker 1: that US. The US is at fault there. It's because

973
00:58:39,520 --> 00:58:40,600
Speaker 1: they were the ones who put it up there and

974
00:58:40,640 --> 00:58:43,600
Speaker 1: they did not find a way to um to bring

975
00:58:43,640 --> 00:58:48,400
Speaker 1: it down safely. M Usually things like that are done

976
00:58:48,400 --> 00:58:52,440
Speaker 1: in a controlled way, where it's purposefully brought down so

977
00:58:52,520 --> 00:58:56,080
Speaker 1: that anything that would make it through the atmosphere. The

978
00:58:56,240 --> 00:58:59,120
Speaker 1: rare instance that that actually does happen with land in

979
00:58:59,160 --> 00:59:02,680
Speaker 1: an ocean for example. UM. But you know, it's always

980
00:59:02,680 --> 00:59:05,400
Speaker 1: possible that you could have a situation where you know,

981
00:59:05,480 --> 00:59:09,960
Speaker 1: the the spacecraft is not responding to your commands to

982
00:59:10,040 --> 00:59:12,880
Speaker 1: have it, you know, de orbit in a in a

983
00:59:12,920 --> 00:59:16,760
Speaker 1: controlled way. And that's kind of what this is covering. Also,

984
00:59:16,800 --> 00:59:21,120
Speaker 1: states are not supposed to contaminate celestial bodies. No littering

985
00:59:21,160 --> 00:59:25,240
Speaker 1: I'm talking to but look, take on any photographs, leave

986
00:59:25,280 --> 00:59:30,080
Speaker 1: only footprints, maybe a flag and maybe a couple of

987
00:59:30,160 --> 00:59:32,160
Speaker 1: lunar landers. I mean, come on, the moon is pretty big.

988
00:59:32,320 --> 00:59:36,320
Speaker 1: That's not really littering, right. Uh So, over time, obviously

989
00:59:36,400 --> 00:59:39,000
Speaker 1: this has been kind of updated. But there have been

990
00:59:39,040 --> 00:59:43,080
Speaker 1: other proposed treaties that would end up beefing up these

991
00:59:43,160 --> 00:59:47,240
Speaker 1: rules and defining them further, but they have had limited

992
00:59:47,280 --> 00:59:50,400
Speaker 1: success in adoption, and there are a lot of reasons

993
00:59:50,400 --> 00:59:53,760
Speaker 1: for that. So a proposed treaty inten would have placed

994
00:59:53,760 --> 00:59:56,600
Speaker 1: more limitations on weapons and space, at least in theory.

995
00:59:57,600 --> 01:00:00,480
Speaker 1: The draft treaty is formally called the Treaty on the

996
01:00:00,560 --> 01:00:04,080
Speaker 1: Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and

997
01:00:04,160 --> 01:00:08,880
Speaker 1: of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.

998
01:00:08,920 --> 01:00:12,080
Speaker 1: So it's supposed to limit states abilities to do things

999
01:00:12,080 --> 01:00:16,800
Speaker 1: like launch missile attacks on satellites or or put weaponization

1000
01:00:17,000 --> 01:00:22,440
Speaker 1: into space, even if it's not mass destruction. And there

1001
01:00:22,440 --> 01:00:25,800
Speaker 1: were two countries that submitted this treaty to the United Nations,

1002
01:00:26,400 --> 01:00:30,200
Speaker 1: and it was Russia and China. Now the United States

1003
01:00:30,360 --> 01:00:34,040
Speaker 1: opposed the treaty and said it would not sign such

1004
01:00:34,160 --> 01:00:36,920
Speaker 1: a treaty. And you might think, well, why would the

1005
01:00:37,040 --> 01:00:39,720
Speaker 1: US say no, I'm not going to sign a treaty

1006
01:00:39,760 --> 01:00:41,880
Speaker 1: that doesn't allow us to weabinize space. Does that mean

1007
01:00:41,880 --> 01:00:44,560
Speaker 1: the US is very much interested in sending up tons

1008
01:00:44,600 --> 01:00:47,640
Speaker 1: of weapons into space. Yeah, that that part it is

1009
01:00:47,680 --> 01:00:49,760
Speaker 1: hard to answer, but I can tell you what the

1010
01:00:49,800 --> 01:00:55,040
Speaker 1: official answers have been, which is that China and this

1011
01:00:55,120 --> 01:00:59,520
Speaker 1: is there. I am paraphrasing, but this is their perspective,

1012
01:00:59,720 --> 01:01:05,600
Speaker 1: not necessarily my own. China and Russia don't playfair. That's

1013
01:01:05,600 --> 01:01:08,320
Speaker 1: that's what they're That's what essentially the message has been

1014
01:01:08,400 --> 01:01:11,600
Speaker 1: is that that this treaty is something that if the

1015
01:01:11,720 --> 01:01:15,480
Speaker 1: United States signed it, because the US are the good guys.

1016
01:01:15,520 --> 01:01:18,680
Speaker 1: Remember this is a narrative. They're saying that the US

1017
01:01:18,720 --> 01:01:22,320
Speaker 1: are the good guys. The US would abide by this treaty.

1018
01:01:22,600 --> 01:01:26,960
Speaker 1: But Russia and China they're Tricksye, my precious, and they

1019
01:01:27,120 --> 01:01:29,520
Speaker 1: would totally ignore the treaty and say, look at the

1020
01:01:29,560 --> 01:01:32,800
Speaker 1: dumb Americans. They're totally abiding by these rules we've set,

1021
01:01:32,840 --> 01:01:35,080
Speaker 1: whereas we're actually going to send up as many weapons

1022
01:01:35,080 --> 01:01:38,160
Speaker 1: into space as we can, and we're going to end

1023
01:01:38,240 --> 01:01:40,560
Speaker 1: up getting dominance. It will be an arms race in

1024
01:01:40,720 --> 01:01:43,360
Speaker 1: space that we will have a leg up on because

1025
01:01:43,480 --> 01:01:47,360
Speaker 1: we're not paying attention to the treaty. It's difficult because

1026
01:01:47,360 --> 01:01:50,880
Speaker 1: they're It goes back to this idea of verification, right

1027
01:01:51,680 --> 01:01:56,840
Speaker 1: and that is such a tricky, nearly impossible thing when

1028
01:01:56,880 --> 01:01:59,520
Speaker 1: you're talking about state secrets like this, How do you

1029
01:01:59,600 --> 01:02:02,160
Speaker 1: how do you verify that no one is up to

1030
01:02:02,280 --> 01:02:05,360
Speaker 1: anything shady? Yeah, that was in fact that that was

1031
01:02:05,440 --> 01:02:09,560
Speaker 1: actually the way the us UH the representatives worded it.

1032
01:02:09,600 --> 01:02:14,080
Speaker 1: They said, well, and other people have essentially said more

1033
01:02:14,160 --> 01:02:16,360
Speaker 1: or less what I said, just in nicer language, but

1034
01:02:16,640 --> 01:02:20,560
Speaker 1: they the specific line was that this treaty as it

1035
01:02:20,600 --> 01:02:24,600
Speaker 1: stands is impossible to verify, meaning that you cannot there's

1036
01:02:24,640 --> 01:02:31,200
Speaker 1: no there's no regulatory agency that could monitor states and

1037
01:02:31,240 --> 01:02:33,640
Speaker 1: make certain that no one was actually doing what the

1038
01:02:33,640 --> 01:02:35,280
Speaker 1: treaty said. So, in other words, they said that you

1039
01:02:35,280 --> 01:02:38,400
Speaker 1: can't enforce the treaty because you cannot be certain that

1040
01:02:38,480 --> 01:02:41,160
Speaker 1: people are abiding by it, and so it ends up

1041
01:02:41,200 --> 01:02:43,880
Speaker 1: being a meaningless treaty. In the first place. It doesn't

1042
01:02:43,960 --> 01:02:48,240
Speaker 1: work because there's no means to monitor and therefore enforce it.

1043
01:02:48,480 --> 01:02:50,240
Speaker 1: So if there's no way to do that, then the

1044
01:02:50,280 --> 01:02:53,640
Speaker 1: treaty might as well not even exist, because what you

1045
01:02:53,680 --> 01:02:56,439
Speaker 1: are doing is creating a pressure on countries that want

1046
01:02:56,480 --> 01:02:59,840
Speaker 1: to follow it in good faith, while other countries may

1047
01:03:00,360 --> 01:03:04,160
Speaker 1: not share that and they'll just they'll violate it. Anyway,

1048
01:03:04,240 --> 01:03:06,440
Speaker 1: and there's there's no way to tell that they're violating

1049
01:03:06,480 --> 01:03:08,320
Speaker 1: it because again there's no way to monitor it and

1050
01:03:08,440 --> 01:03:12,320
Speaker 1: verify it. So um, I I totally get their point, Like,

1051
01:03:12,400 --> 01:03:16,439
Speaker 1: I don't disagree with that, And some might say, well,

1052
01:03:16,480 --> 01:03:19,640
Speaker 1: there's also ulterior motives that could be in play. Let's

1053
01:03:19,640 --> 01:03:22,200
Speaker 1: say that the United States wants to be able to

1054
01:03:22,280 --> 01:03:24,680
Speaker 1: have the option to send weapons, even if they're not

1055
01:03:24,720 --> 01:03:28,240
Speaker 1: weapons of mass destruction up into space. Sending signing such

1056
01:03:28,280 --> 01:03:30,320
Speaker 1: a treaty would say that they would not do that,

1057
01:03:30,400 --> 01:03:33,840
Speaker 1: and maybe they want the option to remain open. It

1058
01:03:33,960 --> 01:03:37,400
Speaker 1: may be that they're even specific plans in place that

1059
01:03:37,480 --> 01:03:40,480
Speaker 1: we're not privy to and obviously would not be privy to.

1060
01:03:41,120 --> 01:03:43,400
Speaker 1: I'd like to think that that's not the case, but

1061
01:03:43,520 --> 01:03:45,480
Speaker 1: at the same time, I'd also like to think the

1062
01:03:45,520 --> 01:03:48,560
Speaker 1: government's not looking at all my emails, and that unfortunately

1063
01:03:48,600 --> 01:03:52,080
Speaker 1: has proven to be false. So yeah, it's always when

1064
01:03:52,160 --> 01:03:55,440
Speaker 1: an intern at the n s A response to your emails, Yeah,

1065
01:03:55,960 --> 01:03:59,360
Speaker 1: I yeah, like you send any like I'm emailing you

1066
01:03:59,720 --> 01:04:01,640
Speaker 1: and the n s A in terms like oh, Ben's

1067
01:04:01,640 --> 01:04:04,439
Speaker 1: that lunch right now, He's not going to respond until

1068
01:04:04,440 --> 01:04:08,200
Speaker 1: like four Gary, I appreciate it. But school that stops

1069
01:04:08,240 --> 01:04:10,480
Speaker 1: kind of creepy, like say hi to your dad for me.

1070
01:04:10,680 --> 01:04:14,280
Speaker 1: Uh yeah, that that would be weird. But also just

1071
01:04:14,280 --> 01:04:18,480
Speaker 1: just anning here. Also, we know that the ability to

1072
01:04:19,200 --> 01:04:23,920
Speaker 1: interfere with another state satellites, it could be so crucial

1073
01:04:23,920 --> 01:04:28,000
Speaker 1: and so pivotal that it's going to happen. Somebody's going

1074
01:04:28,040 --> 01:04:31,280
Speaker 1: to try to do that. As as you've said before,

1075
01:04:31,320 --> 01:04:35,760
Speaker 1: you said in our notes here, this space war stuff

1076
01:04:36,120 --> 01:04:39,280
Speaker 1: is not some distant sci fi thing. It's real, and

1077
01:04:39,320 --> 01:04:41,120
Speaker 1: it's kind of we're kind of in the middle of

1078
01:04:41,120 --> 01:04:44,280
Speaker 1: the story. Yeah, the idea that you know, China bringing

1079
01:04:44,320 --> 01:04:48,160
Speaker 1: down a satellite by firing a missile at it purely

1080
01:04:48,240 --> 01:04:50,800
Speaker 1: because that was the most effective means of taking down

1081
01:04:50,800 --> 01:04:55,440
Speaker 1: the satellite does not ring true, right. It definitely seems

1082
01:04:55,440 --> 01:04:58,320
Speaker 1: more like a demonstration of here's what we are capable

1083
01:04:58,360 --> 01:05:03,040
Speaker 1: of doing. So if we ever enter an actual like conflict,

1084
01:05:03,040 --> 01:05:06,200
Speaker 1: whether it's an official war or not, we have the

1085
01:05:06,200 --> 01:05:10,960
Speaker 1: capability of bringing down your satellites. And so yeah, I

1086
01:05:10,960 --> 01:05:14,959
Speaker 1: mean we're talking about satellites that could provide communication, GPS data,

1087
01:05:15,160 --> 01:05:18,120
Speaker 1: all this kind of stuff. I mean, obviously, the further

1088
01:05:18,160 --> 01:05:20,400
Speaker 1: out the satellite is, the harder it is for you

1089
01:05:20,480 --> 01:05:22,560
Speaker 1: to create a system that's going to be capable of

1090
01:05:22,560 --> 01:05:24,400
Speaker 1: bringing it down. You're gonna be able to hit the

1091
01:05:24,400 --> 01:05:26,240
Speaker 1: ones that are more in lower orbit than the ones

1092
01:05:26,280 --> 01:05:28,920
Speaker 1: that are further out. I mean, you're talking about a

1093
01:05:28,960 --> 01:05:32,120
Speaker 1: target that's further out is and it's moving in an

1094
01:05:32,160 --> 01:05:35,440
Speaker 1: incredible speed like that. I'm not saying it's impossible. It

1095
01:05:35,520 --> 01:05:39,360
Speaker 1: certainly isn't. It's just a lot harder. But at any rate,

1096
01:05:40,120 --> 01:05:44,800
Speaker 1: the capability has been demonstrated. And uh, that is a

1097
01:05:44,960 --> 01:05:48,680
Speaker 1: very vulnerable and valid target if you are, if you're

1098
01:05:48,960 --> 01:05:52,760
Speaker 1: very serious about warfare, right, Yeah, absolutely, And this this

1099
01:05:52,840 --> 01:05:58,000
Speaker 1: brings us all back around to the subject we looked

1100
01:05:58,040 --> 01:06:00,680
Speaker 1: at today, which is the X third seven. And I

1101
01:06:00,720 --> 01:06:03,120
Speaker 1: gotta tell you, man, I've been holding onto this reference

1102
01:06:03,280 --> 01:06:05,240
Speaker 1: to the whole show, so okay, I've just gotta let

1103
01:06:05,240 --> 01:06:09,480
Speaker 1: it go. There's something about an unmanned vehicle in the

1104
01:06:09,600 --> 01:06:12,360
Speaker 1: darkness of space, just sort of orbiting in the silence

1105
01:06:12,440 --> 01:06:15,240
Speaker 1: that is so very event horizon to me. What's going

1106
01:06:15,320 --> 01:06:17,600
Speaker 1: to come back the next time? At lands? John right,

1107
01:06:18,200 --> 01:06:20,640
Speaker 1: a little hitchhiker. Yeah, I found your thing, man. I

1108
01:06:20,640 --> 01:06:22,600
Speaker 1: don't know what happened to the drive. He was gone

1109
01:06:22,640 --> 01:06:26,440
Speaker 1: when I got on I promise you. Yeah. Thanks, I've

1110
01:06:26,440 --> 01:06:29,080
Speaker 1: been working on that character for a while. Um. Yeah.

1111
01:06:29,200 --> 01:06:31,920
Speaker 1: And it's interesting because you know, this is not necessarily

1112
01:06:32,720 --> 01:06:36,720
Speaker 1: the end of the space plane discussion. There's been some

1113
01:06:36,800 --> 01:06:40,080
Speaker 1: other talks about what the space plane might do, even

1114
01:06:40,480 --> 01:06:44,280
Speaker 1: in in light of the counter argument saying that perhaps

1115
01:06:44,280 --> 01:06:48,000
Speaker 1: it's not the most um efficient or useful means of

1116
01:06:48,000 --> 01:06:50,880
Speaker 1: getting things into space. The Air Force itself had announced

1117
01:06:50,880 --> 01:06:53,360
Speaker 1: back in twenty eleven that it would develop a new

1118
01:06:53,480 --> 01:06:56,800
Speaker 1: spacecraft based on the same design that would be even

1119
01:06:56,920 --> 01:07:00,480
Speaker 1: larger than the X leary seven be Remember the thirty

1120
01:07:00,520 --> 01:07:04,880
Speaker 1: seven is larger than the X forty. This one would

1121
01:07:04,920 --> 01:07:08,360
Speaker 1: be bigger than the X thirty seven, and the numbers

1122
01:07:08,440 --> 01:07:13,320
Speaker 1: ranged between like a hundred sixty and so bigger by

1123
01:07:13,360 --> 01:07:15,320
Speaker 1: almost a factor of two when you get to the

1124
01:07:15,360 --> 01:07:19,000
Speaker 1: higher ends. And uh, this one would potentially have a

1125
01:07:19,040 --> 01:07:23,880
Speaker 1: pressurized compartment, which means that could carry stuff what lives. Yeah,

1126
01:07:23,960 --> 01:07:28,000
Speaker 1: and and the it has been suggested, could carry a

1127
01:07:28,480 --> 01:07:32,560
Speaker 1: group of astronauts up to six into space. They don't

1128
01:07:32,600 --> 01:07:35,160
Speaker 1: have to pilot the thing because it could still have

1129
01:07:35,200 --> 01:07:38,640
Speaker 1: autonomous control, although they said that would also have manual control,

1130
01:07:39,360 --> 01:07:43,720
Speaker 1: so uh, astronauts could presumably I assume astronauts. Maybe they

1131
01:07:43,720 --> 01:07:47,120
Speaker 1: mean manual control from the ground, which is also a possibility,

1132
01:07:47,200 --> 01:07:50,240
Speaker 1: but that, um, the astronauts would not necessarily have to

1133
01:07:50,240 --> 01:07:56,280
Speaker 1: pilot this thing. It would be the X thirty seven CUM. Yeah,

1134
01:07:56,400 --> 01:08:00,760
Speaker 1: no idea if that project is still have opening or not,

1135
01:08:00,880 --> 01:08:04,200
Speaker 1: like it was announced in tleven. But again, when you're

1136
01:08:04,200 --> 01:08:07,400
Speaker 1: talking about secret space planes, right, you don't get a

1137
01:08:07,440 --> 01:08:10,760
Speaker 1: lot of updates until they launch one and then it

1138
01:08:10,920 --> 01:08:12,960
Speaker 1: lands and then people are like, oh, so, I guess

1139
01:08:12,960 --> 01:08:16,400
Speaker 1: that's still a thing. So we don't know. I mean

1140
01:08:16,439 --> 01:08:20,479
Speaker 1: we I don't know people know. It's not me. Yeah,

1141
01:08:20,520 --> 01:08:23,680
Speaker 1: I'm not I'm not privy to such information. But it

1142
01:08:23,720 --> 01:08:25,840
Speaker 1: could be that we see a development and who knows,

1143
01:08:25,920 --> 01:08:30,760
Speaker 1: maybe there will be demonstrable uses for space plane technology

1144
01:08:31,160 --> 01:08:36,679
Speaker 1: that uh end up being uh, you know, the best option,

1145
01:08:36,920 --> 01:08:39,880
Speaker 1: and that the objection saying that, hey, we have other

1146
01:08:39,880 --> 01:08:42,439
Speaker 1: means of getting stuff into space that end up being

1147
01:08:42,640 --> 01:08:45,960
Speaker 1: less complicated than this methodology. Maybe that will end up

1148
01:08:45,960 --> 01:08:48,680
Speaker 1: being moot. It's kind of hard to say right now

1149
01:08:48,720 --> 01:08:52,680
Speaker 1: because obviously, if you were to send astronauts up, you're

1150
01:08:52,720 --> 01:08:58,559
Speaker 1: probably not doing one of those crazy It would be

1151
01:08:58,680 --> 01:09:01,280
Speaker 1: very very tough on the on the human body. And

1152
01:09:01,280 --> 01:09:09,000
Speaker 1: I can't imagine you could carry enough oxygen, water, food, like, yeah,

1153
01:09:09,040 --> 01:09:11,320
Speaker 1: all the stuff, all the stuff that's necessary to keep

1154
01:09:11,360 --> 01:09:14,920
Speaker 1: people alive. I don't think you could carry all of

1155
01:09:14,960 --> 01:09:18,479
Speaker 1: that aboard a space plane that's designed to be up

1156
01:09:18,479 --> 01:09:20,559
Speaker 1: there for six hundred days. That's just not going to happen.

1157
01:09:21,280 --> 01:09:23,760
Speaker 1: So even if you were to say, well, we want

1158
01:09:23,800 --> 01:09:26,280
Speaker 1: to find out what happens fast, not when they're in

1159
01:09:26,320 --> 01:09:30,439
Speaker 1: a spacecraft for two years, and whether or not they

1160
01:09:30,479 --> 01:09:33,280
Speaker 1: come back as the Fantastic Four, I mean, you know,

1161
01:09:33,479 --> 01:09:36,920
Speaker 1: it's worth a shot. But but but one thing we

1162
01:09:36,960 --> 01:09:39,639
Speaker 1: have learned about space radiation is it does not work

1163
01:09:39,680 --> 01:09:41,960
Speaker 1: the way that Marvel Comics may have fled you as

1164
01:09:42,000 --> 01:09:44,760
Speaker 1: a child. No, it can. It can really mess you

1165
01:09:44,840 --> 01:09:47,719
Speaker 1: up big time. And uh, you know you're talking about

1166
01:09:47,840 --> 01:09:49,880
Speaker 1: particles that move with a ton of energy that have

1167
01:09:49,920 --> 01:09:55,559
Speaker 1: the capacity to do really like cellular level damage that

1168
01:09:55,640 --> 01:10:00,000
Speaker 1: can end up causing huge issues. Yeah, like irreparable damage.

1169
01:10:00,040 --> 01:10:03,519
Speaker 1: But let's let's go big because despite these problems, right,

1170
01:10:03,560 --> 01:10:06,240
Speaker 1: despite the secrecy, and I know it's a welly and

1171
01:10:06,280 --> 01:10:10,240
Speaker 1: spooky and stuff, I'm so excited because this gets us

1172
01:10:10,760 --> 01:10:14,599
Speaker 1: one one tiny step closer to one of the one

1173
01:10:14,600 --> 01:10:17,160
Speaker 1: of the big dreams I've had, uh since we started

1174
01:10:17,200 --> 01:10:20,280
Speaker 1: working together, which is the podcast on the Moon. I mean,

1175
01:10:20,520 --> 01:10:22,679
Speaker 1: if they can just get us to the moon, Jonathan,

1176
01:10:22,840 --> 01:10:24,720
Speaker 1: we could do the rest might be uh, might be

1177
01:10:24,720 --> 01:10:27,439
Speaker 1: a little quiet up there. I don't know how we're

1178
01:10:27,479 --> 01:10:29,600
Speaker 1: going to talk into the microphones. The way of the

1179
01:10:29,680 --> 01:10:32,599
Speaker 1: set up, Well, we'll just go it's a sound studio,

1180
01:10:32,680 --> 01:10:34,719
Speaker 1: come on, We'll just so just move the whole studio

1181
01:10:34,800 --> 01:10:37,120
Speaker 1: to them. That makes more sense. I was just thinking

1182
01:10:37,120 --> 01:10:39,960
Speaker 1: of the table on the mics, and also about how

1183
01:10:40,000 --> 01:10:42,599
Speaker 1: long the chords would have to be, and that anything

1184
01:10:42,600 --> 01:10:46,280
Speaker 1: we asked nol we'd have to wait. Yeah, there'll be

1185
01:10:47,040 --> 01:10:51,800
Speaker 1: a yeah, there'd be a noticeable delay. Um. But I'm

1186
01:10:51,840 --> 01:10:53,800
Speaker 1: still in favor of it personally because I think, uh,

1187
01:10:53,880 --> 01:10:55,880
Speaker 1: I think that could really position us in a way

1188
01:10:55,880 --> 01:10:59,839
Speaker 1: that other podcasts just haven't thought right to take advantage

1189
01:10:59,840 --> 01:11:01,479
Speaker 1: of that. I mean, it's kind of amazing to me

1190
01:11:01,520 --> 01:11:07,840
Speaker 1: that hasn't avenue honestly, don't. All right, So anyway, this

1191
01:11:07,880 --> 01:11:09,479
Speaker 1: has been a lot of fun to talk about the

1192
01:11:09,960 --> 01:11:13,200
Speaker 1: you know, even though obviously what we don't know as

1193
01:11:13,439 --> 01:11:16,760
Speaker 1: members of the general public far outweighs what we do know,

1194
01:11:17,760 --> 01:11:19,439
Speaker 1: but it's also fun just to kind of explore the

1195
01:11:19,439 --> 01:11:24,000
Speaker 1: psychology of not just like conspiracy theories in the sense

1196
01:11:24,040 --> 01:11:26,360
Speaker 1: of well, and since we don't have information, we have

1197
01:11:26,400 --> 01:11:29,439
Speaker 1: to fill that vacuum, but also just the idea of

1198
01:11:29,479 --> 01:11:34,400
Speaker 1: what what could be the motives for pursuing this. I mean,

1199
01:11:34,400 --> 01:11:36,679
Speaker 1: obviously we're talking about something that costs a huge amount

1200
01:11:36,680 --> 01:11:40,120
Speaker 1: of money. Maybe ultimately it's just a test of autonomous

1201
01:11:40,160 --> 01:11:44,639
Speaker 1: technology in a new, a new form, like a new

1202
01:11:45,040 --> 01:11:48,840
Speaker 1: a new a new environment, and that that ultimately could

1203
01:11:48,880 --> 01:11:51,960
Speaker 1: become really important, but in a totally different implementation, who knows.

1204
01:11:52,400 --> 01:11:54,080
Speaker 1: So it's been really interesting to talk. I want to

1205
01:11:54,080 --> 01:11:56,960
Speaker 1: thank you for bringing the topic up and joining me

1206
01:11:57,000 --> 01:12:00,000
Speaker 1: for this episode. Hey, thank you for having me. Next time.

1207
01:12:00,000 --> 01:12:02,840
Speaker 1: I'm not only will will I read the list, but

1208
01:12:03,000 --> 01:12:05,880
Speaker 1: I will understand how it is supposed to be. It's

1209
01:12:06,000 --> 01:12:10,439
Speaker 1: perfectly fine. Like I said, it's I didn't. I didn't

1210
01:12:10,479 --> 01:12:12,040
Speaker 1: realize that I had worded it in such a way

1211
01:12:12,080 --> 01:12:15,040
Speaker 1: saying don't pick anything on this list, but you totally didn't.

1212
01:12:15,120 --> 01:12:17,680
Speaker 1: I've probably just given it over. But yeah, thank you

1213
01:12:18,120 --> 01:12:22,640
Speaker 1: for this opportunity. I love talking about these space vehicles

1214
01:12:22,800 --> 01:12:26,080
Speaker 1: and the weaponry and I'm going to go ahead, uh

1215
01:12:26,240 --> 01:12:29,439
Speaker 1: and tell everyone if you haven't heard about your other show,

1216
01:12:29,560 --> 01:12:32,160
Speaker 1: Forward Thinking, that's that's the one where you don't hear

1217
01:12:32,200 --> 01:12:34,000
Speaker 1: so much about the weapons here about how awesome the

1218
01:12:34,040 --> 01:12:36,800
Speaker 1: future is going to be, right right, And I think

1219
01:12:36,840 --> 01:12:39,960
Speaker 1: that if you like these kind of conversations that you

1220
01:12:40,000 --> 01:12:43,479
Speaker 1: will also really enjoy that podcast as well. Yeah, the

1221
01:12:43,479 --> 01:12:46,519
Speaker 1: podcast is with Joe McCormick and Lauren Voge obam and

1222
01:12:46,600 --> 01:12:51,040
Speaker 1: together we explore topics about things that will be really

1223
01:12:51,080 --> 01:12:53,120
Speaker 1: important in the future, some of them in the short term,

1224
01:12:53,200 --> 01:12:55,720
Speaker 1: some of them in the far long term, and we

1225
01:12:55,800 --> 01:12:57,360
Speaker 1: have a lot of fun doing it. And of course

1226
01:12:57,360 --> 01:12:59,920
Speaker 1: there's the video series as well, which is is fantastic.

1227
01:13:01,040 --> 01:13:03,320
Speaker 1: Also you can check out the the dark and Shady

1228
01:13:03,400 --> 01:13:06,280
Speaker 1: side of our world over at Stuff they Don't want

1229
01:13:06,320 --> 01:13:08,880
Speaker 1: you to Know than Ben and Matt Frederick do an

1230
01:13:08,920 --> 01:13:12,240
Speaker 1: amazing job on that show. Thank you. Occasionally I show

1231
01:13:12,320 --> 01:13:16,680
Speaker 1: up as a as an unwinding accomplice, sometimes an unwilling

1232
01:13:16,800 --> 01:13:20,960
Speaker 1: accomplice sometimes, which reminds me we we should talk about

1233
01:13:21,000 --> 01:13:23,519
Speaker 1: we should talk about the next team up when you

1234
01:13:23,560 --> 01:13:26,320
Speaker 1: get a chance, But that is a story for another day.

1235
01:13:26,360 --> 01:13:29,519
Speaker 1: Everybody a surprised, Yeah, so thank you guys so much

1236
01:13:29,520 --> 01:13:31,880
Speaker 1: for listening. If you have any suggestions for future tech

1237
01:13:31,920 --> 01:13:36,679
Speaker 1: stuff topics, UM, future guest hosts, or future interviews, anything

1238
01:13:36,720 --> 01:13:38,760
Speaker 1: like that, we just have a question or comment, you

1239
01:13:38,760 --> 01:13:42,160
Speaker 1: should send that to me. My email address is tech

1240
01:13:42,240 --> 01:13:45,479
Speaker 1: stuff at how stuffworks dot com. Or drop me a

1241
01:13:45,479 --> 01:13:48,280
Speaker 1: line on Facebook or Twitter or Tumbler. The handle it

1242
01:13:48,360 --> 01:13:50,960
Speaker 1: all three of those is text stuff H s W

1243
01:13:51,560 --> 01:13:59,160
Speaker 1: and I'll talk to you again really soon for more

1244
01:13:59,160 --> 01:14:01,280
Speaker 1: on this and that, sins of other topics. Is it

1245
01:14:01,360 --> 01:14:11,439
Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com, M