1
00:00:00,200 --> 00:00:04,680
Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

2
00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080
Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

3
00:00:09,160 --> 00:00:12,119
Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

4
00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:13,920
Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

5
00:00:26,200 --> 00:00:27,960
Speaker 2: Welcome back to the show. My name is Matt, my

6
00:00:28,080 --> 00:00:28,880
Speaker 2: name is Noah.

7
00:00:28,960 --> 00:00:32,000
Speaker 3: They call me Ben. Folks. We're joined as always with

8
00:00:32,080 --> 00:00:36,480
Speaker 3: our super producer, Dylan the Tennessee pal Fagan. Most importantly

9
00:00:36,880 --> 00:00:40,519
Speaker 3: are you. You are here? That makes this the stuff

10
00:00:40,560 --> 00:00:45,280
Speaker 3: they don't want you to know? Now, quick recap. Previously

11
00:00:45,479 --> 00:00:50,960
Speaker 3: on our program we dove into something called the Legacy Program.

12
00:00:51,280 --> 00:00:54,920
Speaker 3: This is chapter two of a two part series we're

13
00:00:54,920 --> 00:00:58,840
Speaker 3: calling it How Aliens Could Work. So please, please, please,

14
00:00:59,040 --> 00:01:02,440
Speaker 3: if you haven't checked out our first chapter, whether on

15
00:01:02,480 --> 00:01:07,119
Speaker 3: Netflix or your podcast platform of choice, pause here, check

16
00:01:07,200 --> 00:01:10,160
Speaker 3: that out and then just coming back to us. We

17
00:01:10,240 --> 00:01:13,960
Speaker 3: will wait. Oh, you're back. Thank you so much. Guys.

18
00:01:14,000 --> 00:01:16,919
Speaker 3: The chapter one was a wild ride for us, right.

19
00:01:17,080 --> 00:01:20,120
Speaker 4: Mm hmm, yeah, no, it sure was. Ziggin and Zagon

20
00:01:20,240 --> 00:01:21,040
Speaker 4: ride through.

21
00:01:21,040 --> 00:01:23,720
Speaker 3: Outer space, violating the laws of physics.

22
00:01:24,040 --> 00:01:26,600
Speaker 2: Well yeah, through the halls of Congress, I guess, and

23
00:01:26,640 --> 00:01:30,080
Speaker 2: the Pentagon and all these various organizations that may have

24
00:01:30,280 --> 00:01:35,319
Speaker 2: some form of hand in knowing about and hiding alien technology.

25
00:01:35,360 --> 00:01:38,760
Speaker 3: Congress does it? No, Congress does it. No, that's the thing.

26
00:01:39,000 --> 00:01:39,920
Speaker 2: Harry Reid knows.

27
00:01:40,800 --> 00:01:42,960
Speaker 4: No, somebody knows. And can I just say, I think

28
00:01:43,000 --> 00:01:45,080
Speaker 4: it's a great callback to our alma mater, how stuff works,

29
00:01:45,120 --> 00:01:49,080
Speaker 4: calling this how stuff might work.

30
00:01:49,920 --> 00:01:53,200
Speaker 3: There you go, that's this. So this is chapter two,

31
00:01:53,280 --> 00:01:55,640
Speaker 3: and thank you everyone, friends and neighbors for checking out

32
00:01:55,720 --> 00:01:59,800
Speaker 3: chapter one. It's a series on the alleged existence of

33
00:01:59,800 --> 00:02:03,400
Speaker 3: some thing called the Legacy Program, according to Dru believers,

34
00:02:03,680 --> 00:02:07,000
Speaker 3: as discussed in a recent documentary, The Age of Disclosure,

35
00:02:07,320 --> 00:02:12,560
Speaker 3: this is a soup's top secret, compartmentalized initiative across generations,

36
00:02:12,680 --> 00:02:17,280
Speaker 3: across years, across agencies existing in the shadows, and the

37
00:02:17,320 --> 00:02:21,639
Speaker 3: mission is to locate, acquire, and spirit away remnants of

38
00:02:21,680 --> 00:02:26,600
Speaker 3: alien craft that have crashed to Earth, including not just technology,

39
00:02:26,840 --> 00:02:32,200
Speaker 3: fellow conspiracy realist, but organic remains or biologics.

40
00:02:32,560 --> 00:02:35,960
Speaker 2: Yeah, but that technology is the stuff that all the

41
00:02:36,000 --> 00:02:38,880
Speaker 2: corporations out there really want to know about and get

42
00:02:38,880 --> 00:02:42,000
Speaker 2: their hands on. Theoretically right, and we get.

43
00:02:41,840 --> 00:02:44,240
Speaker 4: That colfusion, Yeah, let me get that hyperdrict, let me

44
00:02:44,280 --> 00:02:46,000
Speaker 4: get that zero point energy.

45
00:02:45,960 --> 00:02:48,359
Speaker 2: And that's the stuff that has launched us to where

46
00:02:48,400 --> 00:02:51,440
Speaker 2: we are right now, where we're developing the robots and

47
00:02:51,480 --> 00:02:54,600
Speaker 2: the AI to power the rubets, and you know, the

48
00:02:54,639 --> 00:02:57,160
Speaker 2: eventual takeover of everything that you know and love.

49
00:02:57,160 --> 00:02:59,600
Speaker 4: Stop doesn't have to be that way. We can change

50
00:02:59,600 --> 00:03:01,400
Speaker 4: the future. Man, We just got to write it up.

51
00:03:01,600 --> 00:03:05,400
Speaker 3: And that's the stuff they don't want you to know.

52
00:03:05,680 --> 00:03:14,760
Speaker 3: We'll be right back, gentlemen, earthlings. I feel like we

53
00:03:14,880 --> 00:03:18,600
Speaker 3: owe a quick summation of Age of Disclosure for anybody

54
00:03:18,680 --> 00:03:23,359
Speaker 3: who didn't heed our disclaimer and didn't check out chapter

55
00:03:23,400 --> 00:03:27,720
Speaker 3: one just yet. Age of Disclosure. It's a mixtape, right,

56
00:03:27,760 --> 00:03:31,160
Speaker 3: It's a compilation of interviews from some people who have

57
00:03:31,200 --> 00:03:32,520
Speaker 3: some serious bona fides.

58
00:03:32,880 --> 00:03:36,520
Speaker 2: Yeah, according to whoever wrote the summation on Prime Video,

59
00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:39,840
Speaker 2: it's an explosive documentary that reveals an eighty year global

60
00:03:39,840 --> 00:03:42,840
Speaker 2: cover up of non human intelligent life and a secret

61
00:03:42,880 --> 00:03:46,160
Speaker 2: war among major nations to reverse engineer advanced technology.

62
00:03:46,320 --> 00:03:52,480
Speaker 3: Of secret war unrelated to the Marvel universe. But that's

63
00:03:52,480 --> 00:03:55,240
Speaker 3: a nice sort of phrase, and yet somewhat related. I mean,

64
00:03:55,440 --> 00:03:57,600
Speaker 3: it's definitely seems seems to be a bit of an inspiration.

65
00:03:57,680 --> 00:03:59,920
Speaker 2: Well, and the only reason we really talked about it

66
00:03:59,920 --> 00:04:04,000
Speaker 2: is because it features testimony from thirty four different US government,

67
00:04:04,320 --> 00:04:06,560
Speaker 2: military and intelligence community insiders.

68
00:04:06,920 --> 00:04:10,040
Speaker 3: Right, And we want to be clear, a lot of

69
00:04:10,040 --> 00:04:14,600
Speaker 3: these folks in the military intel community, they are former

70
00:04:15,000 --> 00:04:18,960
Speaker 3: members of those communities. And one thing that's very important,

71
00:04:19,080 --> 00:04:22,640
Speaker 3: mission critical to point out here, folks, is that intelligence

72
00:04:22,680 --> 00:04:29,080
Speaker 3: in general is perishable. Okay, knowing secret government intelligence sometimes

73
00:04:30,279 --> 00:04:34,880
Speaker 3: I swear to whatever God exists, it is like buying

74
00:04:35,360 --> 00:04:38,200
Speaker 3: a fruit that instantly goes bad. It's like buying a

75
00:04:38,200 --> 00:04:39,839
Speaker 3: bunch of bananas, or.

76
00:04:40,080 --> 00:04:42,600
Speaker 4: So it's like buying an avocado avocado.

77
00:04:42,640 --> 00:04:45,320
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's like buying a bunch of bananas. Because what

78
00:04:45,400 --> 00:04:50,680
Speaker 3: you know as a gospel, secret gospel one Thursday may

79
00:04:50,800 --> 00:04:55,560
Speaker 3: change or become irrelevant two thursdays later. So we honed

80
00:04:55,680 --> 00:04:58,039
Speaker 3: in on something that really stuck out to us, the

81
00:04:58,200 --> 00:05:03,200
Speaker 3: allegations surrounding a thing called the Legacy Program. And at

82
00:05:03,240 --> 00:05:05,560
Speaker 3: the bottom of our research here, I've actually I found

83
00:05:05,600 --> 00:05:09,560
Speaker 3: a really cool visual aid that talks about the process.

84
00:05:09,760 --> 00:05:14,360
Speaker 3: We explored the alleged process of capturing alien craft, and

85
00:05:15,200 --> 00:05:19,159
Speaker 3: I think we had a wild ride with it. We know,

86
00:05:19,520 --> 00:05:23,719
Speaker 3: we knew some of what to expect as we were

87
00:05:23,880 --> 00:05:27,520
Speaker 3: going into chapter one, but it is fair to say

88
00:05:27,640 --> 00:05:31,520
Speaker 3: that we and hopefully you folks were collectively astonished by

89
00:05:31,760 --> 00:05:36,159
Speaker 3: the other stuff we discovered, and that's why we're continuing

90
00:05:36,480 --> 00:05:39,240
Speaker 3: this investigation in chapter two.

91
00:05:39,560 --> 00:05:41,480
Speaker 2: You guys know this. I've been rewatching the X Files,

92
00:05:41,520 --> 00:05:44,920
Speaker 2: and when you go through and look at the primary conspiracy,

93
00:05:44,960 --> 00:05:47,920
Speaker 2: there the concept that there's some kind of cabal within

94
00:05:47,960 --> 00:05:51,320
Speaker 2: the US government that's unknown to the US government itself,

95
00:05:51,680 --> 00:05:55,159
Speaker 2: that is in league with extraterrestrials, and you don't really

96
00:05:55,200 --> 00:05:57,520
Speaker 2: understand why or how any of it's happening. You know,

97
00:05:57,560 --> 00:05:59,800
Speaker 2: the cancer man is involved in a group of guys

98
00:05:59,800 --> 00:06:02,760
Speaker 2: that hang out in this this darkened room where there's

99
00:06:02,800 --> 00:06:06,600
Speaker 2: like a butler. I guess.

100
00:06:06,640 --> 00:06:10,320
Speaker 3: Twelve. It's very Majestic twelve. I think, yeah, I think

101
00:06:10,360 --> 00:06:10,720
Speaker 3: it is.

102
00:06:10,920 --> 00:06:13,520
Speaker 2: It is meant to represent Majestic twelve in the show,

103
00:06:13,640 --> 00:06:17,039
Speaker 2: the fictional show The X Files. The crazy thing about

104
00:06:17,360 --> 00:06:19,680
Speaker 2: the Legacy program and what's in the documentary The Age

105
00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:22,920
Speaker 2: of Disclosure. It feels like the two things are almost

106
00:06:23,000 --> 00:06:27,200
Speaker 2: exactly the same thing. Or somehow Chris Carter just projected

107
00:06:27,200 --> 00:06:30,400
Speaker 2: through time and knew about this project or knew that

108
00:06:30,440 --> 00:06:32,159
Speaker 2: the Age of Disclosure was going to come out, or

109
00:06:32,200 --> 00:06:35,000
Speaker 2: the Age of Disclosure is in some weird way based

110
00:06:35,000 --> 00:06:36,960
Speaker 2: on stuff that was in the X Files, right or

111
00:06:37,000 --> 00:06:39,560
Speaker 2: could it I mean, could it be that somehow they

112
00:06:39,640 --> 00:06:41,440
Speaker 2: knew and it's the real thing.

113
00:06:41,279 --> 00:06:44,159
Speaker 3: Which goes to the other conspiracy theory that's a long

114
00:06:44,240 --> 00:06:49,520
Speaker 3: running one. It's the idea that Big Hollywood is slowly

115
00:06:49,680 --> 00:06:57,120
Speaker 3: normalizing the concept of humans or earth folk encountering extra terrestrials.

116
00:06:57,200 --> 00:07:00,359
Speaker 3: And I love that point. Quick visual aid for us here, folks.

117
00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:03,960
Speaker 3: Age of disclosure essentially takes these kind of two separate

118
00:07:03,960 --> 00:07:08,000
Speaker 3: ideas and says boop, same thing, and they do it

119
00:07:08,160 --> 00:07:08,599
Speaker 3: very well.

120
00:07:08,600 --> 00:07:11,360
Speaker 4: Which is so Big Hollywood is like soft selling us

121
00:07:11,400 --> 00:07:13,760
Speaker 4: the idea of aliens, so that when we find out

122
00:07:13,800 --> 00:07:15,960
Speaker 4: that it's real, we're like not that surprised, or we

123
00:07:16,000 --> 00:07:18,440
Speaker 4: sort of like softened warm to the idea a little bit.

124
00:07:19,120 --> 00:07:21,760
Speaker 4: I'm here for that. Yeah, Hollywood does have its propaganda,

125
00:07:21,840 --> 00:07:24,400
Speaker 4: and especially when they are in league with the military,

126
00:07:24,840 --> 00:07:26,480
Speaker 4: and we've talked about this plenty, when they get to

127
00:07:26,560 --> 00:07:29,080
Speaker 4: use all those vehicles and weapons and stuff in order

128
00:07:29,120 --> 00:07:33,400
Speaker 4: to make things that are vaguely, if not outrightly propagandist.

129
00:07:32,800 --> 00:07:36,800
Speaker 3: And the idea too. With the Big Hollywood concept, or

130
00:07:36,800 --> 00:07:39,800
Speaker 3: at least the conspiracy theory surrounding it, folks, is that

131
00:07:40,760 --> 00:07:48,280
Speaker 3: this syop works because when true evidence of extraterrestrials is revealed,

132
00:07:48,880 --> 00:07:53,400
Speaker 3: people won't immediately encounter that economic collapse the Bank of

133
00:07:53,440 --> 00:07:57,040
Speaker 3: England has been worried about recently. Instead, they'll say, oh,

134
00:07:57,120 --> 00:08:00,200
Speaker 3: this reminds me of my favorite movie, Close Encounters of

135
00:08:00,240 --> 00:08:04,600
Speaker 3: the Third Kind or.

136
00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:06,840
Speaker 2: Vibes Yeah, I want I want to strike at the

137
00:08:06,840 --> 00:08:09,760
Speaker 2: heart of this concept, the Majestic twelve concept that we've

138
00:08:09,760 --> 00:08:13,120
Speaker 2: talked about before on the show. The idea that there

139
00:08:13,240 --> 00:08:16,440
Speaker 2: are there's a small group of people who are either

140
00:08:16,600 --> 00:08:20,520
Speaker 2: in top level positions within some kind of government organization,

141
00:08:20,600 --> 00:08:23,720
Speaker 2: whether that's Department of Energy, the US Air Force, name

142
00:08:23,800 --> 00:08:27,600
Speaker 2: your your group, right, and then those people are connected

143
00:08:27,640 --> 00:08:31,240
Speaker 2: with c suite people among private organizations that are like

144
00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:36,200
Speaker 2: government contractors. And but they're all people who are non elected, right,

145
00:08:36,320 --> 00:08:39,720
Speaker 2: so they're not directly connected to this whole system of

146
00:08:39,800 --> 00:08:43,439
Speaker 2: representative government that we you know, that we have, and

147
00:08:44,000 --> 00:08:47,400
Speaker 2: so they can operate on their own basically, and in

148
00:08:47,440 --> 00:08:50,079
Speaker 2: a lot of ways they're above the law, or or

149
00:08:50,120 --> 00:08:53,280
Speaker 2: at least seem to be above the law, because you

150
00:08:53,320 --> 00:08:56,160
Speaker 2: can't take them to Congress to do things you can't

151
00:08:56,360 --> 00:08:59,760
Speaker 2: censure them for specific laws and purposes.

152
00:08:59,800 --> 00:09:00,560
Speaker 4: They don't exists.

153
00:09:00,679 --> 00:09:03,439
Speaker 3: They're above the law. Yes, they don't exist. It's a cabal,

154
00:09:03,559 --> 00:09:06,800
Speaker 3: that's like. That's one of the things I'm still obsessed

155
00:09:06,800 --> 00:09:11,480
Speaker 3: with after all these years, the interlocking Vinn diagrams of

156
00:09:11,559 --> 00:09:15,080
Speaker 3: the rarefied air at the top of the socioeconomic pyramid.

157
00:09:15,360 --> 00:09:17,880
Speaker 2: But we know, like right now, if you went on

158
00:09:17,920 --> 00:09:19,640
Speaker 2: the street and you ask people, if you asked me,

159
00:09:19,840 --> 00:09:23,120
Speaker 2: if I was on the street, hey, who's running up

160
00:09:23,160 --> 00:09:26,800
Speaker 2: these specific programs within the Department of Energy that we're

161
00:09:26,840 --> 00:09:29,679
Speaker 2: going to talk about today, I would have no idea nobody.

162
00:09:29,760 --> 00:09:33,000
Speaker 2: These are not household names that anybody knows about. You know. Again,

163
00:09:33,040 --> 00:09:34,600
Speaker 2: these are not people you vote for. These are not

164
00:09:34,640 --> 00:09:38,960
Speaker 2: people that are on anybody's radar that could theoretically be

165
00:09:39,080 --> 00:09:42,120
Speaker 2: doing some of the things that are alleged in the documentary. Again,

166
00:09:42,320 --> 00:09:46,400
Speaker 2: that is a huge alleged, right right, but it's there.

167
00:09:46,520 --> 00:09:49,520
Speaker 3: Yeah, And I don't disagree with that man on the

168
00:09:49,600 --> 00:09:54,120
Speaker 3: street analogy, that person on the street analogy, because who

169
00:09:54,160 --> 00:09:58,040
Speaker 3: in the audience today can just, off the top of

170
00:09:58,080 --> 00:10:04,720
Speaker 3: their head name named the Directorate of Science Grand Poobah

171
00:10:04,920 --> 00:10:08,480
Speaker 3: at the CIA, we had to name drop one of

172
00:10:08,520 --> 00:10:13,120
Speaker 3: the long running former bosses there in chapter one. So

173
00:10:13,160 --> 00:10:17,680
Speaker 3: it's an excellent point I agree with that we have again,

174
00:10:19,679 --> 00:10:24,920
Speaker 3: we have to establish the existence of this particular program.

175
00:10:25,040 --> 00:10:29,239
Speaker 3: The Legacy program has yet to be officially proven or confirmed.

176
00:10:29,600 --> 00:10:34,160
Speaker 3: But multiple nations, not just Uncle Sam, have always had

177
00:10:34,240 --> 00:10:37,360
Speaker 3: programs kind of like this, from the days of ancient

178
00:10:37,400 --> 00:10:42,880
Speaker 3: Empires to current era stuff. Your favorite world superpowers have

179
00:10:43,559 --> 00:10:48,840
Speaker 3: and are and will spend a lot of time, blood, sweat,

180
00:10:48,840 --> 00:10:53,000
Speaker 3: and treasure trying to capture and retrieve any foreign technology

181
00:10:53,200 --> 00:10:56,720
Speaker 3: from a spaceship sure to a trabushe I just like

182
00:10:56,760 --> 00:10:58,840
Speaker 3: saying trebushe I just like saying.

183
00:10:58,640 --> 00:11:03,000
Speaker 4: It doesn't gain much more foreign than than alien technology.

184
00:11:03,160 --> 00:11:05,719
Speaker 4: You know, if we're talking about stuff that would be

185
00:11:05,760 --> 00:11:08,720
Speaker 4: important to know about and potentially learn from and potentially

186
00:11:08,840 --> 00:11:12,320
Speaker 4: harness or get a leg up on the opposition.

187
00:11:11,920 --> 00:11:14,680
Speaker 2: With oh yeah, and and that, and that totally goes

188
00:11:14,720 --> 00:11:17,880
Speaker 2: to so things that have crashed, right like that stealth

189
00:11:17,880 --> 00:11:21,600
Speaker 2: helicopter that accidentally crash at that time we killed bin Laden,

190
00:11:21,880 --> 00:11:24,120
Speaker 2: I guess, or you know, I took him and then

191
00:11:24,240 --> 00:11:27,760
Speaker 2: buried him at sea or whatever we did. This body,

192
00:11:28,559 --> 00:11:32,880
Speaker 2: you guys have you guys see that Lonely Island produced movie.

193
00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:35,240
Speaker 2: Oh gosh, what does it call. It'scott Connor Forever.

194
00:11:35,000 --> 00:11:38,679
Speaker 4: And keep on keeping on, never stop it, never stop,

195
00:11:38,720 --> 00:11:39,160
Speaker 4: never stopping.

196
00:11:39,679 --> 00:11:42,320
Speaker 2: Yeah, but that song about I think it's the Finest

197
00:11:42,360 --> 00:11:46,000
Speaker 2: Girl or I can't remember the action title of the song. No, no,

198
00:11:46,000 --> 00:11:46,360
Speaker 2: I'll do.

199
00:11:46,320 --> 00:11:54,240
Speaker 3: It like we've been loud. Yeah, it's beautifully written, by

200
00:11:54,280 --> 00:11:56,480
Speaker 3: the way.

201
00:11:56,800 --> 00:11:58,840
Speaker 2: Oh sorry, I think about that every time I think

202
00:11:58,840 --> 00:12:02,400
Speaker 2: about that operation now with stealth helicopter Sandberg.

203
00:12:03,160 --> 00:12:04,800
Speaker 3: Fred Armison is in the video.

204
00:12:04,960 --> 00:12:07,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, oh yes, Oh my god, the way he looks

205
00:12:07,160 --> 00:12:10,240
Speaker 2: after his hand gets touched, it's just amazing.

206
00:12:10,280 --> 00:12:10,600
Speaker 4: Fred.

207
00:12:11,840 --> 00:12:13,880
Speaker 2: The point is there's that kind of stuff, but then

208
00:12:13,880 --> 00:12:17,360
Speaker 2: there's also the extensive corporate espionage that we've talked about

209
00:12:17,440 --> 00:12:19,680
Speaker 2: before on this show. You can go back on our

210
00:12:19,720 --> 00:12:22,320
Speaker 2: audio feed and listen to those episodes that the thing

211
00:12:22,360 --> 00:12:25,679
Speaker 2: that other countries will do to try and infiltrate private corporations,

212
00:12:25,720 --> 00:12:29,720
Speaker 2: often to figure out what they're creating right, how specific

213
00:12:29,800 --> 00:12:32,360
Speaker 2: technology works, and then take it back, take that knowledge

214
00:12:32,400 --> 00:12:35,000
Speaker 2: back to their country to build something similar or the same.

215
00:12:35,120 --> 00:12:38,480
Speaker 3: As well as academia, you know, which feeds a lot

216
00:12:38,520 --> 00:12:41,600
Speaker 3: of private R and D. Look at the at the

217
00:12:41,640 --> 00:12:45,960
Speaker 3: top like flattery. O'Connor said, all things that rise converge.

218
00:12:46,080 --> 00:12:52,360
Speaker 3: I'm paraphrasing, but great author these things become interlocking. These

219
00:12:52,360 --> 00:12:55,480
Speaker 3: people do tend to know each other, they share some

220
00:12:55,600 --> 00:13:00,280
Speaker 3: of the concerns. We can conclusively prove that stuff like

221
00:13:00,400 --> 00:13:06,400
Speaker 3: the Legacy program existed exist today. Stealth helicopters excellent example there,

222
00:13:06,480 --> 00:13:12,360
Speaker 3: matt nuclear sub retrieval, Russian shadow vessels. That's technology that

223
00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:15,640
Speaker 3: people already you know, everybody knows how a boat works

224
00:13:15,679 --> 00:13:20,559
Speaker 3: at this point. But retrieving foreign assets has always been

225
00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:23,600
Speaker 3: part of the greatest of games, even you know, onto

226
00:13:23,800 --> 00:13:29,199
Speaker 3: retrieving individuals like certain Latin American dictators. See how that ages.

227
00:13:30,240 --> 00:13:33,520
Speaker 3: So it's well established. I guess you know. The point

228
00:13:33,520 --> 00:13:36,199
Speaker 3: that we had to say is if you're if there's

229
00:13:36,240 --> 00:13:38,679
Speaker 3: a if there really is a pro if aliens are

230
00:13:38,720 --> 00:13:41,320
Speaker 3: real and have landed on planet Earth, and there really

231
00:13:41,400 --> 00:13:44,920
Speaker 3: is a series of programs to capture them and acquire

232
00:13:44,960 --> 00:13:48,520
Speaker 3: their stuff, it's going to follow the same precedent. The

233
00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:51,920
Speaker 3: only difference would be maybe a higher level of secrecy,

234
00:13:52,000 --> 00:13:54,200
Speaker 3: which is kind of a tall milkshake to sip.

235
00:13:54,320 --> 00:13:57,800
Speaker 2: Right it is, and we've oscillated on that concept for

236
00:13:57,840 --> 00:14:01,760
Speaker 2: a long time. Is it possible to keep this kind

237
00:14:01,800 --> 00:14:04,760
Speaker 2: of thing a secret if you need this many people.

238
00:14:04,760 --> 00:14:06,600
Speaker 2: I think about the number of people you would really

239
00:14:06,679 --> 00:14:11,680
Speaker 2: need to run a program like this, I think, And

240
00:14:11,720 --> 00:14:13,520
Speaker 2: maybe I'm wrong here, correct me if I'm right here, guys,

241
00:14:13,679 --> 00:14:16,880
Speaker 2: I think the argument coming from the Age of Disclosure

242
00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:22,160
Speaker 2: documentary is that these individual arms that we're about to

243
00:14:22,200 --> 00:14:26,760
Speaker 2: talk about here, the groups who let's say, pick up

244
00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:31,320
Speaker 2: foreign materials that have crashed, right and then safely transport

245
00:14:31,400 --> 00:14:33,720
Speaker 2: those to a secret location or to you know, a

246
00:14:33,760 --> 00:14:37,440
Speaker 2: base somewhere, and let's say an air force base. Then

247
00:14:37,600 --> 00:14:42,000
Speaker 2: the groups who are going to reverse engineer that technology.

248
00:14:42,080 --> 00:14:44,720
Speaker 2: These are all separate groups working on in their own thing, right,

249
00:14:44,800 --> 00:14:47,240
Speaker 2: kind of with blinders on to what everybody else is doing.

250
00:14:47,840 --> 00:14:50,960
Speaker 2: So it does make me wonder if that's a strong

251
00:14:51,080 --> 00:14:54,480
Speaker 2: enough argument for Like, this is me going internally and saying,

252
00:14:54,520 --> 00:14:56,160
Speaker 2: I don't know if that's a strong enough argument for

253
00:14:56,200 --> 00:15:00,000
Speaker 2: me to believe, but there is something to that, because

254
00:15:00,160 --> 00:15:03,120
Speaker 2: I know with a big corporation, with any big group, right,

255
00:15:03,440 --> 00:15:08,120
Speaker 2: big group project, you often don't know what your coworkers

256
00:15:08,160 --> 00:15:10,160
Speaker 2: are doing or like how much work they're doing. And

257
00:15:10,200 --> 00:15:12,200
Speaker 2: that's just because there's not enough time in the day

258
00:15:12,240 --> 00:15:14,160
Speaker 2: to be like, hey, this is what I'm doing, this

259
00:15:14,200 --> 00:15:16,320
Speaker 2: is what I'm working on, here's the specifics, here's all

260
00:15:16,360 --> 00:15:17,840
Speaker 2: the stuff I'm touching this week.

261
00:15:17,920 --> 00:15:19,680
Speaker 4: Yeah, well if we went back into the office, Matt,

262
00:15:19,720 --> 00:15:22,800
Speaker 4: then we would have much Sometimes.

263
00:15:23,320 --> 00:15:27,920
Speaker 3: Yeah, sometimes need to know basis is just scheduling. That's true.

264
00:15:27,920 --> 00:15:29,720
Speaker 3: But I love that we're putting that back up because

265
00:15:29,720 --> 00:15:32,640
Speaker 3: we talked about it in chapter one of this series,

266
00:15:32,720 --> 00:15:35,800
Speaker 3: which is you know, a great comparison is the Manhattan

267
00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:39,640
Speaker 3: Project and oh, Gridge, there are people driving truck that

268
00:15:39,680 --> 00:15:42,120
Speaker 3: worked out, it did work out. There are people driving

269
00:15:42,200 --> 00:15:45,680
Speaker 3: trucks they don't really know what's on the truck and

270
00:15:45,720 --> 00:15:49,560
Speaker 3: they meet like one guy who unloads stuff and then

271
00:15:49,640 --> 00:15:52,080
Speaker 3: points them to a different car and they leave in

272
00:15:52,080 --> 00:15:54,800
Speaker 3: that car and they get a check later in the

273
00:15:54,800 --> 00:15:58,080
Speaker 3: mail or something. That's compartmentalization for sure.

274
00:15:58,080 --> 00:15:59,960
Speaker 4: I mean we've seen evidence of that, like in this

275
00:16:00,080 --> 00:16:04,400
Speaker 4: FBI raid on the voting offices in Fulham County. There

276
00:16:04,440 --> 00:16:06,800
Speaker 4: was a video where somebody was speaking to the FBI

277
00:16:06,840 --> 00:16:09,520
Speaker 4: agents who were removing all of these documents and asking

278
00:16:09,560 --> 00:16:12,720
Speaker 4: them if they knew what they were and they seemed

279
00:16:12,760 --> 00:16:16,120
Speaker 4: to genuinely not no right that their job was not

280
00:16:16,280 --> 00:16:18,840
Speaker 4: to know. Their job was just to retrieve and to

281
00:16:18,880 --> 00:16:20,760
Speaker 4: hand it to somebody, and then they immediately referred to

282
00:16:20,840 --> 00:16:23,560
Speaker 4: them to the public relations guy who was quote unquote

283
00:16:23,560 --> 00:16:24,880
Speaker 4: somewhere around outside.

284
00:16:25,360 --> 00:16:28,920
Speaker 3: Yes, perfect, it was bitching off airs gear enough for this?

285
00:16:29,120 --> 00:16:33,360
Speaker 3: Why was Tulca Gabbard there? I mean, it's it's the

286
00:16:33,360 --> 00:16:37,480
Speaker 3: banality of evil, ana Errant would argue. But when you

287
00:16:37,640 --> 00:16:43,080
Speaker 3: it also removes a bit of ownership, agency, and accountability

288
00:16:43,520 --> 00:16:46,560
Speaker 3: right from individuals in a system or in a process,

289
00:16:46,640 --> 00:16:50,840
Speaker 3: because now later something evil happens. You can be that

290
00:16:50,920 --> 00:16:54,640
Speaker 3: person who says, look, I didn't know the full lay

291
00:16:54,680 --> 00:16:57,080
Speaker 3: of the land. I didn't see the whole forest. I

292
00:16:57,240 --> 00:16:59,760
Speaker 3: was a small shrub in the forest, and my job

293
00:17:00,160 --> 00:17:02,360
Speaker 3: was to drive things from point A to point Z.

294
00:17:02,840 --> 00:17:05,600
Speaker 3: So we really can't be mad at me because I

295
00:17:05,800 --> 00:17:07,679
Speaker 3: was just the transporter.

296
00:17:07,920 --> 00:17:11,080
Speaker 4: Yeah, once enough information gets out there and people are

297
00:17:11,119 --> 00:17:13,040
Speaker 4: more aware of the big picture, at a certain point

298
00:17:13,160 --> 00:17:14,720
Speaker 4: becomes complicity.

299
00:17:14,480 --> 00:17:17,399
Speaker 3: One hundred percent, you know, yeah, one hundred percent. And

300
00:17:17,440 --> 00:17:22,280
Speaker 3: that's why we started asking ourselves with these conversations about compartmentalization.

301
00:17:22,720 --> 00:17:26,399
Speaker 3: Philip conspiracy realist, We said, what would a program like

302
00:17:26,480 --> 00:17:29,800
Speaker 3: this look like? As we said, earlier, calling back to

303
00:17:29,840 --> 00:17:33,040
Speaker 3: our house Stuff Works Roots, we said, how would this

304
00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:38,320
Speaker 3: function given that there's an enormous expense involved, could you

305
00:17:38,359 --> 00:17:40,800
Speaker 3: maybe trace the money? For instance, I believe in Age

306
00:17:40,800 --> 00:17:46,800
Speaker 3: of Disclosure, we have Louise Elizondo and Dan Farrah, the

307
00:17:46,840 --> 00:17:52,560
Speaker 3: director are quote a number something north of trillions of dollars,

308
00:17:52,680 --> 00:17:55,879
Speaker 3: like more than a trillion dollars were used in the

309
00:17:56,000 --> 00:17:59,560
Speaker 3: legacy program, So how could you hide that much money?

310
00:18:00,240 --> 00:18:03,679
Speaker 2: A lot of that we talked about Katherine Austin Fits

311
00:18:03,720 --> 00:18:07,080
Speaker 2: and her allegations that the US government has somehow hidden

312
00:18:07,200 --> 00:18:11,280
Speaker 2: or lost like twenty trillion dollars or more to create

313
00:18:11,320 --> 00:18:13,639
Speaker 2: all kinds of underground bunkers and stuff. But what if

314
00:18:13,640 --> 00:18:17,200
Speaker 2: it's not bunkers, what if it's this kind of program.

315
00:18:17,280 --> 00:18:19,520
Speaker 3: That's an excellent question, Matt, because I remember we did

316
00:18:19,560 --> 00:18:23,280
Speaker 3: that our weekly Strange News segment where Katherine Austin Fits

317
00:18:23,600 --> 00:18:27,600
Speaker 3: alleged that the US has a twenty one trillion dollar

318
00:18:28,280 --> 00:18:35,240
Speaker 3: underground network of cities and compounds essentially for the one

319
00:18:35,359 --> 00:18:38,960
Speaker 3: percenters and the connected. So you can check that out

320
00:18:39,119 --> 00:18:42,200
Speaker 3: in I think we did it mid last year, twenty

321
00:18:42,240 --> 00:18:46,840
Speaker 3: twenty five. But gosh, what a great point that if

322
00:18:46,880 --> 00:18:49,199
Speaker 3: that is true. It has a been conclusively proven. But

323
00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:51,280
Speaker 3: what a great point about how easy it is for

324
00:18:51,480 --> 00:18:57,200
Speaker 3: very powerful entity to hide so much money. Right, It's

325
00:18:57,240 --> 00:18:59,720
Speaker 3: way easier for those folks than it would be for

326
00:18:59,720 --> 00:19:00,399
Speaker 3: an individual.

327
00:19:00,480 --> 00:19:03,159
Speaker 2: But the money could also just be tied in to

328
00:19:03,400 --> 00:19:07,920
Speaker 2: the US Department of Energies Protection program operations, right, or

329
00:19:08,080 --> 00:19:12,040
Speaker 2: or their Office of Environment, Health and Safety and Security

330
00:19:12,119 --> 00:19:15,080
Speaker 2: or whatever's there are all these places where money could

331
00:19:15,160 --> 00:19:18,359
Speaker 2: be kind of hidden and squirrelled away just for special

332
00:19:18,359 --> 00:19:20,679
Speaker 2: access programs that we have no awareness of.

333
00:19:21,359 --> 00:19:25,040
Speaker 3: Yeah, and with with our thought programs, well we are

334
00:19:25,119 --> 00:19:28,480
Speaker 3: thought experiment, we have a program. Yet, folks, I guess

335
00:19:28,480 --> 00:19:31,879
Speaker 3: this is kind of a program. That's nice. There's a

336
00:19:31,920 --> 00:19:35,960
Speaker 3: podcast that's nice. It's nice to think about it this way. So, okay,

337
00:19:36,240 --> 00:19:40,199
Speaker 3: we're talking about these proposed cover tactics. That's something that

338
00:19:40,240 --> 00:19:42,560
Speaker 3: a lot of people who believe in the Legacy program

339
00:19:42,760 --> 00:19:46,000
Speaker 3: argues occurs. We know there is this proven precedent of

340
00:19:46,119 --> 00:19:51,359
Speaker 3: hiding secret initiatives behind existing agencies and sub agencies. That's

341
00:19:51,600 --> 00:19:55,560
Speaker 3: conclusively proven, that is in arguable, absolutely right, So maybe

342
00:19:55,560 --> 00:20:02,640
Speaker 3: there are publicly acknowledged programs, sub agencies, departments, sub departments,

343
00:20:02,760 --> 00:20:05,320
Speaker 3: you know, stuff buried under red tape that can function

344
00:20:05,400 --> 00:20:07,960
Speaker 3: as cover for legacy program activities.

345
00:20:08,200 --> 00:20:09,840
Speaker 4: Well, I guess my question to that, Ben is it

346
00:20:09,840 --> 00:20:12,040
Speaker 4: makes me think of the way like kind of nefarious

347
00:20:12,080 --> 00:20:17,320
Speaker 4: stuff is often packed or hidden inside of seemingly innocuous legislation.

348
00:20:19,000 --> 00:20:23,200
Speaker 4: Do you think that these entities could be discovered if

349
00:20:23,200 --> 00:20:26,280
Speaker 4: an eagle eyed citizen were to look deeply enough and

350
00:20:26,280 --> 00:20:28,560
Speaker 4: sift enough through the red tape or is it beyond

351
00:20:28,600 --> 00:20:29,480
Speaker 4: even that.

352
00:20:29,840 --> 00:20:33,480
Speaker 3: That's a great question, though, I hope. So that's just

353
00:20:33,520 --> 00:20:37,040
Speaker 3: speaking for myself as a single entity. I do hope.

354
00:20:37,080 --> 00:20:41,080
Speaker 3: So we know to your question that that kind of

355
00:20:41,080 --> 00:20:45,040
Speaker 3: whistleblowing has occurred in the past, so it has successfully

356
00:20:45,160 --> 00:20:48,200
Speaker 3: happened every so often. And to your point, one thing

357
00:20:48,280 --> 00:20:51,399
Speaker 3: that is really interesting to all of us about the

358
00:20:51,400 --> 00:20:55,919
Speaker 3: age of disclosure is there's no shortage of voices in

359
00:20:56,000 --> 00:21:00,000
Speaker 3: that documentary who claimed to be that guy who claimed

360
00:21:00,160 --> 00:21:02,879
Speaker 3: to be that whistleblower, you know, and they're just saying

361
00:21:03,000 --> 00:21:04,359
Speaker 3: please listen to Well, it's a.

362
00:21:04,359 --> 00:21:08,040
Speaker 2: Weird situation because don't forget everybody, we do have Presidential

363
00:21:08,080 --> 00:21:11,480
Speaker 2: Policy Directive nineteen which says, hey, if you're in the

364
00:21:11,560 --> 00:21:15,240
Speaker 2: DoD or any sensitive situation in government, you can come

365
00:21:15,320 --> 00:21:18,760
Speaker 2: forward and we're not gonna We're not gonna do anything

366
00:21:18,800 --> 00:21:21,120
Speaker 2: to you. We're gonna protect you if you come forward.

367
00:21:21,400 --> 00:21:24,720
Speaker 2: But then you've also got things like in the Department

368
00:21:24,800 --> 00:21:29,560
Speaker 2: of Energy, where they've got a DOE insider threat program,

369
00:21:29,920 --> 00:21:32,439
Speaker 2: which you have to decide. Let's say I'm in the

370
00:21:32,440 --> 00:21:35,440
Speaker 2: Department of Energy, I know some stuff program, I'm gonna

371
00:21:35,440 --> 00:21:38,720
Speaker 2: I'm gonna go tell somebody right, see something, say something.

372
00:21:39,119 --> 00:21:41,639
Speaker 2: Who's gonna come for me? Is it gonna be the

373
00:21:41,680 --> 00:21:45,560
Speaker 2: folks who protect the whistleblowers or the folks that find

374
00:21:45,560 --> 00:21:46,560
Speaker 2: the insider threats?

375
00:21:46,680 --> 00:21:49,719
Speaker 3: Right? What happens when you snitch? And this is this

376
00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:54,360
Speaker 3: happens in government throughout the world to various degrees. Check

377
00:21:54,400 --> 00:22:00,280
Speaker 3: out the recent the recent blood bath of Chinese leadership

378
00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:04,280
Speaker 3: that's occurring as we record on Friday, January thirtieth. But

379
00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:08,720
Speaker 3: it also consider your favorite local big corporation, which will

380
00:22:08,760 --> 00:22:14,359
Speaker 3: inevitably have an hr internal reporting line. Then we're just

381
00:22:14,359 --> 00:22:18,720
Speaker 3: going to say beware, you know, ask yourself some serious questions.

382
00:22:20,440 --> 00:22:22,159
Speaker 3: Maybe that's a story for another evening.

383
00:22:22,400 --> 00:22:25,480
Speaker 2: I think you might be right, man. Don't forget. There's

384
00:22:25,480 --> 00:22:28,960
Speaker 2: also an Intelligence Community Whistleblow or Protection Act that exists.

385
00:22:29,160 --> 00:22:32,760
Speaker 2: So even in the intelligence community, you can theoretically come forward.

386
00:22:33,880 --> 00:22:35,320
Speaker 2: Scary thing is no I.

387
00:22:35,280 --> 00:22:39,560
Speaker 4: Mean, I mean, but yeah, but then watch out for

388
00:22:39,560 --> 00:22:42,919
Speaker 4: those little red dots right yeah, yeah, that's the wrong window.

389
00:22:43,160 --> 00:22:46,560
Speaker 2: That's exactly right, the wrong just hanging out alone or

390
00:22:46,560 --> 00:22:48,760
Speaker 2: in a jail cell. God, you know I'm recording.

391
00:22:48,840 --> 00:22:51,399
Speaker 3: Be careful recording by a window right now, you guys,

392
00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:52,000
Speaker 3: don't do that.

393
00:22:53,320 --> 00:22:56,280
Speaker 2: Let's time stamp it gallade. Maxwell is going to go

394
00:22:56,520 --> 00:22:59,920
Speaker 2: testify again. It is Friday, January thirtieth, and she is

395
00:23:00,119 --> 00:23:00,679
Speaker 2: still alive.

396
00:23:00,920 --> 00:23:04,320
Speaker 3: Okay, yeah, cool, and we'll let us start the clock. Yeah.

397
00:23:04,359 --> 00:23:07,600
Speaker 3: So there is again, there's no concrete proof of the

398
00:23:07,680 --> 00:23:11,600
Speaker 3: Legacy program, just like there's no mimetics division. Shout out

399
00:23:11,640 --> 00:23:15,480
Speaker 3: to all our fellow SCP fans. Since we don't have

400
00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:18,199
Speaker 3: the entirety of the picture, the view of the forest,

401
00:23:19,119 --> 00:23:23,280
Speaker 3: the understanding of the whole puzzle, we have to look

402
00:23:23,320 --> 00:23:26,520
Speaker 3: at the breadcrumbs that we do know. And it turns

403
00:23:26,520 --> 00:23:30,880
Speaker 3: out there are more than a few proven, known, actual facts,

404
00:23:30,920 --> 00:23:35,240
Speaker 3: initiatives and sub agencies that, as we record tonight, would

405
00:23:35,400 --> 00:23:38,879
Speaker 3: just possibly be part of the biggest cover up in

406
00:23:39,040 --> 00:23:42,480
Speaker 3: all of human history. I think we pause for a

407
00:23:42,480 --> 00:23:43,719
Speaker 3: word from our sponsors.

408
00:23:44,800 --> 00:23:56,320
Speaker 5: Oh, I agree, here's where it gets crazy, That is right, folks,

409
00:23:56,480 --> 00:24:00,080
Speaker 5: hear us Well, Matt Noel and yours truly did a

410
00:24:00,200 --> 00:24:02,919
Speaker 5: lot of digging and we found some stuff that is,

411
00:24:04,080 --> 00:24:09,360
Speaker 5: while it's not smoking gun proof, it is fascinating.

412
00:24:09,720 --> 00:24:13,960
Speaker 4: It is interesting in italics smoking man proof.

413
00:24:14,520 --> 00:24:16,840
Speaker 3: What do we have? Oh yeah, yeah, we don't have

414
00:24:16,920 --> 00:24:19,960
Speaker 3: the entire puzzle because if we did, we'd probably be

415
00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:23,560
Speaker 3: in front of Congress or we'd be definestrating, you know,

416
00:24:23,840 --> 00:24:27,680
Speaker 3: or having some non consensual conversations with firearms.

417
00:24:27,760 --> 00:24:29,360
Speaker 2: Active auto defenestration.

418
00:24:29,520 --> 00:24:31,960
Speaker 4: Right, I'm in front of a giant window. There are

419
00:24:32,040 --> 00:24:35,560
Speaker 4: multiple rooftops visible to me right now, you know, freaking

420
00:24:35,640 --> 00:24:35,840
Speaker 4: me out.

421
00:24:35,960 --> 00:24:38,399
Speaker 3: Yeah, saying the same thing, like, sit in front of

422
00:24:38,400 --> 00:24:40,720
Speaker 3: a window. I gotta send you a picture of this view, guys,

423
00:24:41,320 --> 00:24:43,880
Speaker 3: just so it's time stamped in case something happens.

424
00:24:43,640 --> 00:24:45,919
Speaker 2: I want to see. Yeah, I'm sorry. It's coming up

425
00:24:45,920 --> 00:24:51,240
Speaker 2: with more things. It's like uh self administered polonium mouth rents.

426
00:24:51,400 --> 00:24:54,080
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, I was gonna say enema, but mouth rerints

427
00:24:54,119 --> 00:24:55,000
Speaker 4: is a little more wholesome.

428
00:24:55,280 --> 00:25:02,160
Speaker 3: Extreme duffel bag spelunking. Right, that's another one, right, right?

429
00:25:02,280 --> 00:25:09,200
Speaker 3: Uh not non consensual or black bag cosplay, non considerual

430
00:25:09,320 --> 00:25:11,960
Speaker 3: corporate limbs. Spin off, you know what I mean, that's

431
00:25:11,960 --> 00:25:13,760
Speaker 3: why they Yeah, that's got to be a good action.

432
00:25:14,760 --> 00:25:17,800
Speaker 2: Literally spinned off, spin spun, spun spun.

433
00:25:17,960 --> 00:25:20,800
Speaker 3: Now, we do have a lot of things that could

434
00:25:20,920 --> 00:25:24,040
Speaker 3: arguably be puzzle pieces, right, And this is this is

435
00:25:24,080 --> 00:25:28,160
Speaker 3: because when you get to if we're if we're being

436
00:25:28,200 --> 00:25:31,239
Speaker 3: completely honest, right, and we're not being the sort of

437
00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:34,840
Speaker 3: over zealous skeptics, or we're not being the overly credulous

438
00:25:35,240 --> 00:25:39,680
Speaker 3: quote unquote true believers, everybody can admit the US government

439
00:25:39,840 --> 00:25:43,920
Speaker 3: is huge. It's byzantine, it's labyrintine, it's it's so big

440
00:25:43,960 --> 00:25:46,520
Speaker 3: that when you get to the secret stuff, you went

441
00:25:46,560 --> 00:25:49,760
Speaker 3: through all these special access programs, things you have to

442
00:25:49,760 --> 00:25:52,840
Speaker 3: be read on, as as we call it, need to

443
00:25:52,840 --> 00:25:57,000
Speaker 3: know stuff, compartmentalization, a continence worth of red tape and

444
00:25:57,080 --> 00:26:00,000
Speaker 3: black high lighters, and as odd as it may say,

445
00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:05,280
Speaker 3: out any government employee watching or hanging out with US tonight, folks,

446
00:26:05,480 --> 00:26:10,520
Speaker 3: you know that sometimes one agency can do something that

447
00:26:10,600 --> 00:26:15,119
Speaker 3: another agency has no knowledge of, and they can do

448
00:26:15,119 --> 00:26:18,760
Speaker 3: double work sometimes without talking to each other. They can

449
00:26:18,880 --> 00:26:24,040
Speaker 3: also work at cross purposes. So it's not uncommon historically,

450
00:26:24,080 --> 00:26:27,320
Speaker 3: for instance, for the CIA to do stuff that is

451
00:26:27,359 --> 00:26:31,520
Speaker 3: in direct opposition of some other US government agency. Not

452
00:26:31,560 --> 00:26:35,200
Speaker 3: even necessarily malevolent, they just have they're just very protective

453
00:26:35,200 --> 00:26:36,920
Speaker 3: of their turf and they haven't talked to each other.

454
00:26:37,000 --> 00:26:39,720
Speaker 3: This happens with innocuous agencies too, right.

455
00:26:39,720 --> 00:26:42,920
Speaker 2: So, as far as the Age of Disclosure documentary is concerned,

456
00:26:43,640 --> 00:26:48,400
Speaker 2: the Legacy program that they talk about is supposedly controlled

457
00:26:48,400 --> 00:26:51,000
Speaker 2: and run by the Department of Energy, the Air Force,

458
00:26:51,119 --> 00:26:54,160
Speaker 2: and then some contractors. And then in our previous episode, Ben,

459
00:26:54,400 --> 00:26:56,439
Speaker 2: you found some connections with the CIA, right.

460
00:26:56,320 --> 00:27:00,199
Speaker 3: Oh, Tons, yeah, Tons, And this is this goes back

461
00:27:00,240 --> 00:27:02,639
Speaker 3: to our earlier point that people were talking about the

462
00:27:02,720 --> 00:27:07,040
Speaker 3: Legacy program, you know, well before the publication of the

463
00:27:07,119 --> 00:27:11,320
Speaker 3: documentary Age of Disclosure. But maybe we talk about that part.

464
00:27:11,400 --> 00:27:14,720
Speaker 3: This is a great in for us. Let's in will

465
00:27:14,760 --> 00:27:18,320
Speaker 3: be a funny punt later, we promise. Let's maybe talk

466
00:27:18,359 --> 00:27:21,160
Speaker 3: about some of the parts of the government and parts

467
00:27:21,200 --> 00:27:25,240
Speaker 3: of those interlocking private public cabals that could be involved

468
00:27:25,240 --> 00:27:27,880
Speaker 3: in something like the Legacy program. And I know we're

469
00:27:27,880 --> 00:27:30,320
Speaker 3: all hot about this one. Why not start with the

470
00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:33,560
Speaker 3: Department of Energy. It's such a great name I think

471
00:27:33,560 --> 00:27:35,000
Speaker 3: it's the coolest department name.

472
00:27:35,040 --> 00:27:38,080
Speaker 4: Well, it's interesting because it's responsible for so much. I mean, like,

473
00:27:38,359 --> 00:27:41,760
Speaker 4: on the one hand, it makes so many rules and

474
00:27:41,800 --> 00:27:46,520
Speaker 4: regulations surrounding you know, how energy is deployed and safety regulations.

475
00:27:46,520 --> 00:27:49,520
Speaker 4: But it also has a whole other aspect to it

476
00:27:49,840 --> 00:27:52,879
Speaker 4: in terms of weaponry and the way that some of

477
00:27:52,880 --> 00:27:55,919
Speaker 4: this technology figures into things that are much outside of

478
00:27:55,960 --> 00:27:58,880
Speaker 4: the scope of just like you know, powering our fridges, Well.

479
00:27:58,840 --> 00:28:01,480
Speaker 2: Yeah we couldn't. We our militaries wouldn't be able to

480
00:28:01,520 --> 00:28:08,000
Speaker 2: do much without energy, right, Without power, not much innovation, technology,

481
00:28:08,080 --> 00:28:11,439
Speaker 2: commerce without power, without energy, none of that really happens.

482
00:28:11,480 --> 00:28:13,960
Speaker 2: So it's not again, it's not talked about on a

483
00:28:14,000 --> 00:28:17,760
Speaker 2: regular basis as that much of an interesting thing. But

484
00:28:17,960 --> 00:28:22,440
Speaker 2: then you jump to like this group is like figuring

485
00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:25,680
Speaker 2: out where let's say, oil reserves are in other countries

486
00:28:25,720 --> 00:28:29,240
Speaker 2: where maybe you could pluck a president out out of

487
00:28:29,280 --> 00:28:33,280
Speaker 2: the sky and run that country's oil, or maybe we

488
00:28:33,359 --> 00:28:36,840
Speaker 2: need to find some some rare earth minerals in another

489
00:28:37,040 --> 00:28:38,160
Speaker 2: place called what.

490
00:28:38,120 --> 00:28:39,240
Speaker 3: Do they call it Iceland?

491
00:28:39,280 --> 00:28:40,880
Speaker 2: Oh, no, it's Greenland.

492
00:28:42,160 --> 00:28:45,800
Speaker 3: Common there is a common mistake made by all sorts

493
00:28:45,840 --> 00:28:47,840
Speaker 3: of people. But then also I would add to that,

494
00:28:48,800 --> 00:28:53,200
Speaker 3: maybe they would also need to keep an eye on

495
00:28:53,320 --> 00:28:57,640
Speaker 3: any plucky young entrepreneur who invents something that is seen

496
00:28:57,640 --> 00:29:01,480
Speaker 3: as a threat to national security, because the Invention Secrecy

497
00:29:01,520 --> 00:29:06,360
Speaker 3: Act of nineteen fifty one is authorizing the Department of

498
00:29:06,560 --> 00:29:12,480
Speaker 3: Energy specifically to go and take your invention. It's deeper

499
00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:14,840
Speaker 3: than hip hop, It's bigger than wrap. Energy is a

500
00:29:14,880 --> 00:29:18,840
Speaker 3: big word, and they are involved with every known aspect,

501
00:29:18,920 --> 00:29:22,320
Speaker 3: every conceivable aspect of the concept of energy.

502
00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:26,040
Speaker 4: Well, the crux of so many big, you know, apocalyptic

503
00:29:26,160 --> 00:29:29,239
Speaker 4: sci fi type stories is energy or like you know,

504
00:29:29,400 --> 00:29:34,080
Speaker 4: free energy. They who control you know, cold fusion, controls

505
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:35,840
Speaker 4: the world. I mean, it really is that one of

506
00:29:35,840 --> 00:29:39,360
Speaker 4: the most important puzzle pieces in the grand scheme of

507
00:29:39,720 --> 00:29:43,880
Speaker 4: global you know, warfare, economics, all the things that you

508
00:29:43,960 --> 00:29:45,440
Speaker 4: just mentioned that I mean, is it is.

509
00:29:45,720 --> 00:29:48,000
Speaker 3: It's a big deal. I just want to emphasize again.

510
00:29:48,080 --> 00:29:50,600
Speaker 3: And folks, I know I sound like a broken record,

511
00:29:50,640 --> 00:29:54,080
Speaker 3: but please check out our episode on the Invention Secrecy

512
00:29:54,120 --> 00:29:57,760
Speaker 3: Act of nineteen fifty one. It is tied directly to

513
00:29:58,280 --> 00:30:00,800
Speaker 3: some of the stuff we're talking about, and it is

514
00:30:00,840 --> 00:30:03,400
Speaker 3: a true conspiracy and you need to know about it.

515
00:30:03,520 --> 00:30:06,120
Speaker 2: Please be careful, well, it just it makes me wonder

516
00:30:06,160 --> 00:30:13,239
Speaker 2: how far that organization would go to protect the you know,

517
00:30:13,280 --> 00:30:16,960
Speaker 2: for national security or whatever, the country's resources, as well

518
00:30:16,960 --> 00:30:19,080
Speaker 2: as how far they would go to suppress, let's say,

519
00:30:19,160 --> 00:30:22,760
Speaker 2: research into something that would upend the current power structure.

520
00:30:23,040 --> 00:30:27,640
Speaker 2: Right that that Energy provides specifically for militaries, but again

521
00:30:27,680 --> 00:30:31,960
Speaker 2: also for the money sector, for the markets and things

522
00:30:32,040 --> 00:30:34,840
Speaker 2: like that. And that's why I think that Department Energy

523
00:30:34,880 --> 00:30:36,640
Speaker 2: is so interesting for us to look at. When you

524
00:30:36,680 --> 00:30:38,880
Speaker 2: when you look deep into the organization, you realize, oh,

525
00:30:38,960 --> 00:30:41,480
Speaker 2: it's not this, it's not one big thing. It's a

526
00:30:41,520 --> 00:30:47,959
Speaker 2: bunch of smaller organizations within the umbrella corporation hat resident

527
00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:52,000
Speaker 2: evil everybody of the Department of Energy, and specifically just

528
00:30:52,040 --> 00:30:53,920
Speaker 2: one of the things we looked at was that Protection

529
00:30:54,120 --> 00:30:57,560
Speaker 2: Program Operations Group. I guess that's in there.

530
00:30:57,680 --> 00:30:59,479
Speaker 3: Can you tell us a little bit more about that.

531
00:30:59,680 --> 00:31:04,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's it's basically security. It's is Department of Energy

532
00:31:04,120 --> 00:31:08,680
Speaker 2: Security Forces. It's very strange. If you go deep into it,

533
00:31:09,080 --> 00:31:14,120
Speaker 2: you can find this thing called officially Designated Federal Security

534
00:31:14,160 --> 00:31:19,240
Speaker 2: Authority or the o d FSA, as well as trusted agents,

535
00:31:19,680 --> 00:31:23,560
Speaker 2: which are essentially appear to be contractors at least according

536
00:31:23,600 --> 00:31:26,280
Speaker 2: to some of the writing you can find online here,

537
00:31:26,640 --> 00:31:30,280
Speaker 2: like this is DOEO four seven three dot three A.

538
00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:35,240
Speaker 2: So exciting, isn't it. It's an order. It's from twenty sixteen,

539
00:31:36,040 --> 00:31:38,880
Speaker 2: and it is establishing requirements for the management and operation

540
00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:42,800
Speaker 2: of the Department of Energy, Federal Protective Forces and contractor

541
00:31:42,880 --> 00:31:46,760
Speaker 2: Protective Forces. And it is it goes into the physical

542
00:31:46,800 --> 00:31:50,960
Speaker 2: security of property and personnel under the cognizance of DOE,

543
00:31:51,760 --> 00:31:55,960
Speaker 2: which it goes further to describe. We'll just I'll read

544
00:31:56,000 --> 00:32:01,040
Speaker 2: it out really fast under the doees purview, ranging from facility, buildings,

545
00:32:01,080 --> 00:32:05,200
Speaker 2: government property, and employees to national security interests, which is

546
00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:08,600
Speaker 2: always an interesting one, right because that can be a

547
00:32:08,640 --> 00:32:12,640
Speaker 2: wide range of things as well as classified information, special

548
00:32:12,760 --> 00:32:17,880
Speaker 2: nuclear material and nuclear weapons and we know nuclear stuff, right,

549
00:32:17,920 --> 00:32:20,320
Speaker 2: that's one of the biggest things because the Atomic Energy

550
00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:23,000
Speaker 2: Commission and all of that and some of the Atomic

551
00:32:23,120 --> 00:32:26,800
Speaker 2: Energy Acts that end up going into the Department of Energy.

552
00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:29,960
Speaker 2: That's like it's bread and butter. That's why it's there, right,

553
00:32:31,120 --> 00:32:34,040
Speaker 2: or for a large part, the nukes and the nuclear

554
00:32:34,160 --> 00:32:36,720
Speaker 2: energy is why Department of Energy does its thing. So

555
00:32:36,760 --> 00:32:39,160
Speaker 2: you would need security for that. It's just strange to

556
00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:41,480
Speaker 2: really think about it. Do you guys ever think about

557
00:32:42,600 --> 00:32:45,520
Speaker 2: like official Department of Energy security personnel?

558
00:32:45,640 --> 00:32:49,320
Speaker 3: I do now for sure. I mean, this is something

559
00:32:49,480 --> 00:32:51,760
Speaker 3: I'm so glad you brought this to us because this

560
00:32:52,360 --> 00:32:56,760
Speaker 3: reminds me of another thing in that umbrella corporation. Great reference.

561
00:32:56,800 --> 00:33:01,160
Speaker 3: By the way, it's the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

562
00:33:01,440 --> 00:33:04,320
Speaker 3: Its street name is in what so that that pays

563
00:33:04,360 --> 00:33:07,400
Speaker 3: off for the dumb joke we made earlier. Office of

564
00:33:07,440 --> 00:33:12,480
Speaker 3: Intelligence and Counterintelligence. It is part of the Department of Energy.

565
00:33:12,760 --> 00:33:17,440
Speaker 3: We've got a quote from their own website. I'm gonna

566
00:33:17,440 --> 00:33:22,920
Speaker 3: do an evil voice just editorialize the ALFICE provides counterintelligence

567
00:33:23,040 --> 00:33:27,680
Speaker 3: and cyber threat intelligence support to protect the people, facilities,

568
00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:33,160
Speaker 3: and intellectual property throughout the DOE complex as well as

569
00:33:33,200 --> 00:33:36,160
Speaker 3: it is the department and its mission to protect the

570
00:33:36,440 --> 00:33:42,080
Speaker 3: energy sector, which is largely in private hands.

571
00:33:42,120 --> 00:33:44,120
Speaker 2: The private hands thing. What do you think? What do

572
00:33:44,160 --> 00:33:45,440
Speaker 2: you what do they mean by that?

573
00:33:45,520 --> 00:33:48,160
Speaker 3: Is that like Scuckwork's defense and discuss Well, I mean

574
00:33:48,400 --> 00:33:53,760
Speaker 3: part of it, but also you know, like Westinghouse nuclear reactors,

575
00:33:54,520 --> 00:34:00,560
Speaker 3: fossil fuel extraction. It's their embedded intelligence arm They they

576
00:34:00,680 --> 00:34:05,200
Speaker 3: are so deep with every other US intelligence agency. You

577
00:34:05,240 --> 00:34:08,399
Speaker 3: can imagine. And they also and this is again, this

578
00:34:08,440 --> 00:34:12,920
Speaker 3: is not us blowing rainbows and spinning campfire stories, despite

579
00:34:12,960 --> 00:34:16,120
Speaker 3: the way this weird lighting looks on my end. They

580
00:34:16,200 --> 00:34:21,720
Speaker 3: are conducting foreign intelligence analysis. To your earlier points about

581
00:34:21,800 --> 00:34:24,160
Speaker 3: figuring out, you know, where the oil is in a

582
00:34:24,320 --> 00:34:29,520
Speaker 3: different country, and they do something called collections support for

583
00:34:29,520 --> 00:34:35,400
Speaker 3: foreign nuclear weapons, fuel cycle programs, nuclear terrorism, nuclear material security,

584
00:34:35,600 --> 00:34:40,120
Speaker 3: strategic science, and technological developments and trends again Invention Secrecy

585
00:34:40,160 --> 00:34:43,920
Speaker 3: Act and Energy security spoopy doopy.

586
00:34:44,160 --> 00:34:46,839
Speaker 2: You know, according to Molder, oftentimes when there's been a

587
00:34:46,960 --> 00:34:50,520
Speaker 2: close encounter with some kind of UAPUFO, there is some

588
00:34:50,640 --> 00:34:54,800
Speaker 2: kind of background radiation elevation going on, so you could

589
00:34:54,840 --> 00:34:57,879
Speaker 2: say maybe there was nuclear material there and it would

590
00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:00,000
Speaker 2: fall under the purview of set intelligence.

591
00:35:00,640 --> 00:35:03,160
Speaker 3: Yeah, if we're at the DOE, you know, because federal

592
00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:08,239
Speaker 3: agencies are always having turf wars. If it's tennessee h

593
00:35:08,600 --> 00:35:12,600
Speaker 3: Frederick Copenhagen and redacted runded the DOE. As soon as

594
00:35:12,640 --> 00:35:15,560
Speaker 3: we hear about that radiation, we're immediately showing up and

595
00:35:15,600 --> 00:35:18,240
Speaker 3: we're going, hey, guys, thanks for coming to the meeting.

596
00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:24,000
Speaker 3: This technically qualifies as energy. So raise your hand if

597
00:35:24,000 --> 00:35:27,840
Speaker 3: you have a department about energy. I only see the

598
00:35:27,960 --> 00:35:30,520
Speaker 3: four of us in this meeting with our hands raised.

599
00:35:30,560 --> 00:35:33,320
Speaker 3: Is there anybody else who has a Department of Energy?

600
00:35:33,360 --> 00:35:35,640
Speaker 4: It's kind of funny how innocuous The description on the

601
00:35:35,719 --> 00:35:39,120
Speaker 4: DOE or the the DOE website is. Their mission is

602
00:35:39,160 --> 00:35:44,799
Speaker 4: outlined as ensuring America's security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental,

603
00:35:44,800 --> 00:35:49,160
Speaker 4: and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions.

604
00:35:49,920 --> 00:35:54,360
Speaker 2: Oh see that science. Department of Energy equals science in

605
00:35:54,440 --> 00:35:54,839
Speaker 2: my brain.

606
00:35:55,120 --> 00:35:55,960
Speaker 3: Yeah, we research.

607
00:35:56,640 --> 00:36:02,400
Speaker 4: Ben's about also yoinking research and innovations that perhaps threaten that,

608
00:36:03,280 --> 00:36:05,680
Speaker 4: you know, scientific hegemony from others.

609
00:36:05,880 --> 00:36:08,360
Speaker 3: I think that's a great word for it, no hegemony,

610
00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:10,960
Speaker 3: because a point that we need to hit there is

611
00:36:11,800 --> 00:36:15,680
Speaker 3: the idea of a threat to national security, especially with invention.

612
00:36:15,880 --> 00:36:21,480
Speaker 3: Secrecy is sometimes weaponized against the spirit of the law

613
00:36:22,040 --> 00:36:27,560
Speaker 3: because national security the way it's rationalized is sometimes synonymous

614
00:36:27,600 --> 00:36:31,160
Speaker 3: with what you're talking about, the hegemonic world order, like

615
00:36:31,280 --> 00:36:35,120
Speaker 3: is it is it national security or is it bad

616
00:36:35,239 --> 00:36:39,200
Speaker 3: for the current one percent? That's the question, you know

617
00:36:39,200 --> 00:36:41,719
Speaker 3: what I mean, And that's what they run into. So

618
00:36:41,760 --> 00:36:45,120
Speaker 3: I love that you're making that point, Doe man. Maybe

619
00:36:45,160 --> 00:36:48,000
Speaker 3: we should just get hired with the DOE they have.

620
00:36:48,320 --> 00:36:48,600
Speaker 4: I'm good.

621
00:36:48,680 --> 00:36:51,920
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, I was reading there job, but I wanted

622
00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:53,879
Speaker 3: to see if they had a role that I could

623
00:36:53,920 --> 00:36:57,360
Speaker 3: I could maybe fill Office of Intelligence and counter Intelligence.

624
00:36:57,440 --> 00:36:59,239
Speaker 4: Let me know, it seems like a lot of work,

625
00:36:59,440 --> 00:37:01,880
Speaker 4: a lot of Styes, high real high pressure. Yeah, I

626
00:37:01,880 --> 00:37:03,160
Speaker 4: think I'm gonna stick with this podcast.

627
00:37:04,000 --> 00:37:06,760
Speaker 2: Well, we just need to hit up a guy named

628
00:37:06,840 --> 00:37:09,600
Speaker 2: Gary White. Let me share a quick thing with you, guys.

629
00:37:09,600 --> 00:37:09,799
Speaker 3: Sure.

630
00:37:10,560 --> 00:37:13,839
Speaker 2: This is the US Department of Energy Order d OE

631
00:37:14,040 --> 00:37:18,440
Speaker 2: O four seventy dot three B. This is the Graded

632
00:37:18,560 --> 00:37:23,200
Speaker 2: Security Protection or GSP policy. This is very interesting to

633
00:37:23,280 --> 00:37:26,799
Speaker 2: be guys. What what do you think? What do you

634
00:37:26,800 --> 00:37:29,080
Speaker 2: think graded security protection means?

635
00:37:29,160 --> 00:37:31,040
Speaker 4: I mean it's got a slight slope to it.

636
00:37:31,960 --> 00:37:37,960
Speaker 3: You said you're saying graded g R A D ed right, Yes, yes, okay,

637
00:37:38,000 --> 00:37:41,080
Speaker 3: so it's not cheese related. No, it's not great.

638
00:37:41,760 --> 00:37:43,320
Speaker 4: I stick with my original answer.

639
00:37:44,160 --> 00:37:46,279
Speaker 2: So I'll tell you what. I don't freaking know what

640
00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:49,879
Speaker 2: it means. According to this order, it says this order

641
00:37:49,960 --> 00:37:52,879
Speaker 2: is classified as secret and D no foreign and will

642
00:37:52,920 --> 00:37:56,360
Speaker 2: not be available on the Directive's portal. This order cancels

643
00:37:56,360 --> 00:38:00,120
Speaker 2: and supersedes a different one for seventy dot three a

644
00:38:00,600 --> 00:38:05,560
Speaker 2: design basis threat policy. But you can again contact Gary

645
00:38:05,600 --> 00:38:07,440
Speaker 2: White and it gives you his phone number and his

646
00:38:07,520 --> 00:38:11,080
Speaker 2: email address at the DOOE dot gov. The reason why

647
00:38:11,080 --> 00:38:13,960
Speaker 2: I think it's interesting, guys, is the concept of having

648
00:38:14,120 --> 00:38:18,040
Speaker 2: some kind of graded level of a threat, you know,

649
00:38:18,200 --> 00:38:20,520
Speaker 2: similar to back in the day when we were under

650
00:38:20,560 --> 00:38:24,160
Speaker 2: threat after nine to eleven and then everybody was living

651
00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:28,000
Speaker 2: under this weird like color graded scale of whether or

652
00:38:28,040 --> 00:38:29,879
Speaker 2: not there's gonna be another attack.

653
00:38:29,640 --> 00:38:33,160
Speaker 3: Which is very unfair to color blind entities, by the way,

654
00:38:33,840 --> 00:38:38,640
Speaker 3: just use numbers like that, you know, regal film trope

655
00:38:38,640 --> 00:38:42,359
Speaker 3: about defcon you know what I mean that that kind

656
00:38:42,400 --> 00:38:48,719
Speaker 3: of Okay, so graded security protection. This reminds you of that.

657
00:38:49,160 --> 00:38:51,719
Speaker 3: Have we called Gary because this looks like it's from

658
00:38:52,040 --> 00:38:54,520
Speaker 3: eight but then it got certified in eleven.

659
00:38:56,120 --> 00:38:58,560
Speaker 2: I know, but I bet somebody is at that off

660
00:38:58,719 --> 00:39:00,960
Speaker 2: like in that office. You know, I guarantee you that

661
00:39:01,080 --> 00:39:03,080
Speaker 2: number is not a cell phone number. That is a

662
00:39:03,320 --> 00:39:04,760
Speaker 2: it's office phone number.

663
00:39:04,800 --> 00:39:08,040
Speaker 3: One area code. That definitely is not a cell phone.

664
00:39:08,320 --> 00:39:10,120
Speaker 4: We'll just hit him up at Gary dot White at

665
00:39:10,480 --> 00:39:13,000
Speaker 4: at DOE dot com.

666
00:39:13,360 --> 00:39:15,840
Speaker 3: Oh he's a junior too, Okay.

667
00:39:15,520 --> 00:39:16,880
Speaker 2: Yeah, I don't want to do to the guy, and

668
00:39:16,880 --> 00:39:18,600
Speaker 2: who knows what he has to do with anything. It's

669
00:39:18,640 --> 00:39:21,040
Speaker 2: just it's weird that we can't know that information, like

670
00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:22,960
Speaker 2: what does that even mean? Doesn't have anything to do

671
00:39:23,000 --> 00:39:25,160
Speaker 2: with it, And it just made me imagine that there's

672
00:39:25,200 --> 00:39:28,880
Speaker 2: some level in there that is like this is silly,

673
00:39:28,920 --> 00:39:33,799
Speaker 2: but like the alien stuff that's like level infrared.

674
00:39:34,120 --> 00:39:36,680
Speaker 3: I love it too, and we've got to no, don't

675
00:39:36,680 --> 00:39:39,200
Speaker 3: be sorry, this is great. We've got to also confirm

676
00:39:39,280 --> 00:39:43,160
Speaker 3: that a lot of times when stuff is classified as

677
00:39:43,160 --> 00:39:45,160
Speaker 3: boring as it is to say a lot, a lot

678
00:39:45,160 --> 00:39:49,359
Speaker 3: of times when you actually figure out the thing, it's

679
00:39:49,400 --> 00:39:53,640
Speaker 3: going to be so banal and bureaucratic and kind of boring.

680
00:39:54,360 --> 00:39:57,640
Speaker 3: It's often a lot of cya and we're just hoping.

681
00:39:58,040 --> 00:40:01,000
Speaker 3: You know. It reminds me this is such a Georgia reference,

682
00:40:01,040 --> 00:40:05,239
Speaker 3: but it reminds me of like visiting Delonaga, the tourism

683
00:40:05,320 --> 00:40:08,880
Speaker 3: site where you can pan for gold. Kids love it.

684
00:40:08,920 --> 00:40:11,040
Speaker 3: I think we all love it growing up. And the

685
00:40:11,120 --> 00:40:13,520
Speaker 3: idea is that you know, you might actually find a

686
00:40:13,560 --> 00:40:16,759
Speaker 3: little gold, but you're gonna need to be there for

687
00:40:16,800 --> 00:40:19,360
Speaker 3: a long time because most of it is plain old dirt.

688
00:40:19,280 --> 00:40:22,000
Speaker 4: Or if you want to sept farther removed from that,

689
00:40:22,080 --> 00:40:24,560
Speaker 4: you can just ride the Delanaga mine train at six

690
00:40:24,600 --> 00:40:25,480
Speaker 4: Flags over Georgia.

691
00:40:25,680 --> 00:40:29,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, if you don't have too much time, you know,

692
00:40:29,320 --> 00:40:31,160
Speaker 3: to get all the way up to Deladaga, and you're

693
00:40:31,200 --> 00:40:34,680
Speaker 3: just in town for a night or two days, you

694
00:40:34,719 --> 00:40:37,520
Speaker 3: need a week, just just hit the mind train. Well.

695
00:40:37,560 --> 00:40:39,480
Speaker 2: I like that idea though, because if you ever do

696
00:40:39,640 --> 00:40:42,680
Speaker 2: that thing in Dolanaga or any other wherever you are

697
00:40:43,080 --> 00:40:45,319
Speaker 2: panning for gold, you might get some specs, right, like

698
00:40:45,480 --> 00:40:47,680
Speaker 2: literally specs of gold that you'll take over to a

699
00:40:47,719 --> 00:40:50,040
Speaker 2: person who will put it into a vial of water

700
00:40:50,160 --> 00:40:57,080
Speaker 2: after they bite. Marvel at your gold specs. Okay, guys,

701
00:40:57,080 --> 00:40:58,759
Speaker 2: could we stay in the DOE for a little while.

702
00:40:58,800 --> 00:40:59,160
Speaker 4: Please.

703
00:40:59,440 --> 00:41:02,719
Speaker 2: This inside threat program that I mentioned before, you can

704
00:41:02,920 --> 00:41:04,839
Speaker 2: find this. I'm gonna just give you order numbers because

705
00:41:04,840 --> 00:41:06,479
Speaker 2: you can find these actually online if.

706
00:41:06,400 --> 00:41:07,360
Speaker 3: You'll look them up. Yeah.

707
00:41:07,600 --> 00:41:11,719
Speaker 2: This is US Department of Energy Order DOEO four seven

708
00:41:11,880 --> 00:41:15,880
Speaker 2: zero dot five, and this establishes responsibilities and requirements for

709
00:41:15,960 --> 00:41:20,040
Speaker 2: the Department of Energy Insider Threat Program. The purpose is

710
00:41:20,080 --> 00:41:24,200
Speaker 2: to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threat actions by federal

711
00:41:24,280 --> 00:41:28,600
Speaker 2: and contractor employees in accordance with the requirements of Executive

712
00:41:28,719 --> 00:41:32,160
Speaker 2: Order one three, five eight seven, which is just god,

713
00:41:32,200 --> 00:41:33,919
Speaker 2: I don't even want to read that. There's so many

714
00:41:33,960 --> 00:41:37,160
Speaker 2: words strung together in an executive order about reforms to

715
00:41:37,200 --> 00:41:41,080
Speaker 2: improve security, it's insane. But just this, I was thinking

716
00:41:41,080 --> 00:41:45,160
Speaker 2: about the concept of men in black, right, this idea

717
00:41:45,200 --> 00:41:49,080
Speaker 2: that there could be some group that specifically goes out

718
00:41:49,160 --> 00:41:53,719
Speaker 2: and warns people, threat threatens people, maybe soft threats, or

719
00:41:53,760 --> 00:41:56,160
Speaker 2: at least just shows up as a menacing force to

720
00:41:56,320 --> 00:41:59,480
Speaker 2: let you know you shouldn't be doing whatever you're doing

721
00:41:59,600 --> 00:42:02,279
Speaker 2: or talking about whatever you're talking about. And I'm not

722
00:42:02,360 --> 00:42:05,640
Speaker 2: saying that's what the Insider Threat program is. I think

723
00:42:05,680 --> 00:42:10,440
Speaker 2: perhaps just this concept of within that organization that is

724
00:42:10,440 --> 00:42:12,440
Speaker 2: alleged within that documentary to be a part of the

725
00:42:12,520 --> 00:42:16,799
Speaker 2: Legacy program, this could be an interesting arm to use

726
00:42:16,960 --> 00:42:20,760
Speaker 2: as that like, hey, you better shut the heck up, sure,

727
00:42:20,880 --> 00:42:21,640
Speaker 2: or we're going to.

728
00:42:21,640 --> 00:42:22,240
Speaker 4: Take you out.

729
00:42:22,360 --> 00:42:23,520
Speaker 3: Sure. Yeah.

730
00:42:23,560 --> 00:42:25,839
Speaker 2: And did we talk about the Office of Secure Transportation.

731
00:42:26,400 --> 00:42:29,319
Speaker 3: Yeah, let's get to that, and then the CIA and

732
00:42:29,320 --> 00:42:31,239
Speaker 3: then the rest of the world, because it's bigger than

733
00:42:31,239 --> 00:42:41,160
Speaker 3: the United States. After a brief word from our sponsors.

734
00:42:41,440 --> 00:42:43,759
Speaker 4: And we're back, tell us about transportation. Matt, I don't

735
00:42:43,760 --> 00:42:45,400
Speaker 4: think this is this is one that you looked into.

736
00:42:46,120 --> 00:42:48,600
Speaker 4: I'm not very I'm not up on the concept.

737
00:42:48,640 --> 00:42:53,040
Speaker 2: Here is if you've got sensitive materials and you've all

738
00:42:53,320 --> 00:42:54,960
Speaker 2: like that, you need to go retrieve, let's say, and

739
00:42:54,960 --> 00:42:58,640
Speaker 2: take to a secure location. Let's say the types of

740
00:42:58,640 --> 00:43:03,879
Speaker 2: transportation you already have are they're meant to transport let's say,

741
00:43:03,880 --> 00:43:08,000
Speaker 2: fissile materials, right, crazy sensitive stuff. You don't want anyone

742
00:43:08,040 --> 00:43:10,200
Speaker 2: to know about what's in your truck when you're moving it,

743
00:43:10,280 --> 00:43:12,600
Speaker 2: or in your railcar when you're moving it. And you

744
00:43:12,640 --> 00:43:15,560
Speaker 2: also have to make sure other people are protected when

745
00:43:15,600 --> 00:43:17,520
Speaker 2: that thing's let's say, on the highway on a truck.

746
00:43:18,000 --> 00:43:21,879
Speaker 2: If you've got radioactive materials that aren't fully secured, then

747
00:43:21,360 --> 00:43:25,040
Speaker 2: you're gonna radiate everybody in their you know, their minivans

748
00:43:25,200 --> 00:43:26,600
Speaker 2: driving down the road next to you.

749
00:43:26,760 --> 00:43:29,440
Speaker 4: Sure, maybe got to make sure that tailgate's well secured.

750
00:43:29,680 --> 00:43:32,640
Speaker 2: Yes, So, Department of Energy has this thing called the

751
00:43:32,800 --> 00:43:36,919
Speaker 2: Office of Secure Transportation. It was established in nineteen seventy five.

752
00:43:37,840 --> 00:43:42,480
Speaker 2: It's part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, and they've

753
00:43:42,520 --> 00:43:44,520
Speaker 2: got this thing. You guys, I've got a quick little

754
00:43:44,560 --> 00:43:48,640
Speaker 2: video to share that has hilarious audio in it because

755
00:43:48,640 --> 00:43:51,560
Speaker 2: I'm just trying to imagine where the guy doing voiceover

756
00:43:51,800 --> 00:43:54,600
Speaker 2: is with regards to his mic, and it feels like

757
00:43:54,640 --> 00:43:58,000
Speaker 2: it's halfway into his mouth. So just really quick, just

758
00:43:58,040 --> 00:43:58,600
Speaker 2: super quick.

759
00:43:58,640 --> 00:44:00,239
Speaker 4: Is this gonna to trigger our Cenis.

760
00:44:01,760 --> 00:44:02,120
Speaker 3: It might?

761
00:44:04,719 --> 00:44:05,520
Speaker 4: Yes? Yes?

762
00:44:05,680 --> 00:44:08,760
Speaker 2: This video is from the National Nuclear Security Administration.

763
00:44:09,760 --> 00:44:14,920
Speaker 6: In two thousand, Doe created National Nuclear Security Administration. This

764
00:44:15,080 --> 00:44:19,760
Speaker 6: office administers the total United States nuclear weapons program, including

765
00:44:19,760 --> 00:44:24,400
Speaker 6: the design, production, and delivery of nuclear weapons and components.

766
00:44:24,920 --> 00:44:30,320
Speaker 6: OST has developed the Safeguards Transporter or SGT, a technologically

767
00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:34,320
Speaker 6: advanced vehicle that enhances safety and security for special nuclear

768
00:44:34,320 --> 00:44:38,760
Speaker 6: material cargoes. The SGT is constructed to survive very severe

769
00:44:38,880 --> 00:44:43,279
Speaker 6: highway accidents, including impact and a long duration fire. The

770
00:44:43,360 --> 00:44:47,600
Speaker 6: sgts are designed and built to deter, surprise, and delay

771
00:44:47,800 --> 00:44:52,520
Speaker 6: even the most aggressive adversary. OST convoys are composed of

772
00:44:52,640 --> 00:44:57,440
Speaker 6: unmarked escort and transport vehicles. The only easily recognized feature

773
00:44:57,800 --> 00:44:59,760
Speaker 6: is the US government license plate.

774
00:45:00,320 --> 00:45:00,880
Speaker 3: What are these like?

775
00:45:01,040 --> 00:45:03,360
Speaker 4: Leadlined though? I mean, there's got to be something that

776
00:45:03,400 --> 00:45:06,600
Speaker 4: sets them aside to warrant all of those outrageous acronyms

777
00:45:06,760 --> 00:45:07,719
Speaker 4: he's thrown around there.

778
00:45:08,880 --> 00:45:11,759
Speaker 2: Yeah, well, and you know, admittedly this is a very

779
00:45:11,800 --> 00:45:14,279
Speaker 2: old video, as you can tell by the voiceover and

780
00:45:14,520 --> 00:45:18,080
Speaker 2: the quality of the video, but there are this organization

781
00:45:18,600 --> 00:45:21,640
Speaker 2: to the Office of Secure Transportation within the DOE has

782
00:45:21,680 --> 00:45:23,640
Speaker 2: these specialized trucks, right, and they had them back then.

783
00:45:23,719 --> 00:45:26,359
Speaker 2: You can only imagine how that type of transportation has

784
00:45:26,400 --> 00:45:30,600
Speaker 2: improved over the years. And it's very secretive and it's

785
00:45:30,640 --> 00:45:33,359
Speaker 2: extremely secure. I don't know, it doesn't you can't tell

786
00:45:33,360 --> 00:45:36,520
Speaker 2: from that video, but there there are some highly trained

787
00:45:36,840 --> 00:45:40,360
Speaker 2: human beings hiding in that truck, you know, with with

788
00:45:40,440 --> 00:45:43,480
Speaker 2: automatic weapons, ready to jump out, and you know, protect

789
00:45:43,480 --> 00:45:46,480
Speaker 2: the cargo. And it is also always trailed, at least

790
00:45:46,480 --> 00:45:49,920
Speaker 2: according to you know, that official video, there by several

791
00:45:50,000 --> 00:45:53,000
Speaker 2: unmarked vehicles, vans, trucks, all kinds of stuff like that.

792
00:45:54,000 --> 00:45:56,040
Speaker 2: And I think about I go back to the X Files, guys.

793
00:45:56,080 --> 00:46:00,000
Speaker 2: I think about the episodes where there is a track

794
00:46:00,239 --> 00:46:03,400
Speaker 2: trailer that's got let's say, an alien body on it,

795
00:46:03,520 --> 00:46:05,759
Speaker 2: or it's got pieces of a spacecraft on it, or

796
00:46:05,800 --> 00:46:11,720
Speaker 2: Alex Krychik, and they use very similar technology in that show.

797
00:46:12,160 --> 00:46:15,520
Speaker 2: And then this thing exists for real within the government. Why,

798
00:46:16,640 --> 00:46:19,799
Speaker 2: I guess can't really prove a negative, but to me,

799
00:46:19,840 --> 00:46:21,440
Speaker 2: it feels like it could definitely be a part of it.

800
00:46:21,480 --> 00:46:22,799
Speaker 4: I guess I see your point, though, I mean, it

801
00:46:22,800 --> 00:46:26,960
Speaker 4: does seem like that level of sensitive material or technology

802
00:46:27,160 --> 00:46:30,719
Speaker 4: or whatever organic material would be treated with the same

803
00:46:30,920 --> 00:46:34,400
Speaker 4: level of security and risk as some of these incredibly

804
00:46:34,719 --> 00:46:38,360
Speaker 4: you know, dangerous materials that we know about, like you know,

805
00:46:38,480 --> 00:46:44,720
Speaker 4: nuclear waste and or fissile material or weapon payloads or whatever.

806
00:46:44,800 --> 00:46:47,160
Speaker 4: It does seem like it would you know, fall under

807
00:46:47,200 --> 00:46:50,680
Speaker 4: a similar wheelhouse, if not require a little more specialized

808
00:46:50,680 --> 00:46:52,719
Speaker 4: equipment to move, but you could probably get by with

809
00:46:52,800 --> 00:46:54,359
Speaker 4: using the same stuff. Is that what you're saying.

810
00:46:54,680 --> 00:46:58,560
Speaker 2: I yeah, if is it a giant spacecraft, then probably

811
00:46:58,560 --> 00:47:01,080
Speaker 2: can't use that tractor trailer, But you know, but.

812
00:47:01,160 --> 00:47:04,040
Speaker 4: A piece of it, the drivet trainer, whatever the flipp

813
00:47:04,040 --> 00:47:04,440
Speaker 4: you call it.

814
00:47:04,640 --> 00:47:08,600
Speaker 3: And folks, I'd like to directly I'm reading your minds

815
00:47:08,640 --> 00:47:11,400
Speaker 3: a little bit, fellow conspiracy realist, I'd like to directly

816
00:47:11,440 --> 00:47:16,239
Speaker 3: address a question several of us probably just had, which is, hey,

817
00:47:16,280 --> 00:47:19,400
Speaker 3: if this stuff is so top secret, then why is

818
00:47:19,440 --> 00:47:23,840
Speaker 3: it not being spirited away via aircraft? The issue is

819
00:47:24,239 --> 00:47:29,280
Speaker 3: that aircraft are actually often easier to trace and follow

820
00:47:29,920 --> 00:47:33,800
Speaker 3: than something that looks somewhat like a faceless semi truck

821
00:47:34,000 --> 00:47:38,480
Speaker 3: or a non distinctive semi truck. So I mean, yeah,

822
00:47:38,520 --> 00:47:41,319
Speaker 3: and obviously anybody's paying attention to the Middle East right

823
00:47:41,360 --> 00:47:46,120
Speaker 3: now knows that there's a lot of theater and signals

824
00:47:46,200 --> 00:47:50,360
Speaker 3: with transponders being turned on and off in the world

825
00:47:50,440 --> 00:47:54,960
Speaker 3: of aviation. But taking a road trip is actually a

826
00:47:55,080 --> 00:47:58,560
Speaker 3: very smart way to do something. It's also less predictable

827
00:47:59,040 --> 00:48:02,640
Speaker 3: than being on the immovable path of a train track,

828
00:48:02,840 --> 00:48:06,160
Speaker 3: So that's why this is one of our culprits for sure.

829
00:48:06,200 --> 00:48:08,160
Speaker 2: But I mean, how often do you really look at

830
00:48:08,400 --> 00:48:09,960
Speaker 2: the trains when they go by?

831
00:48:10,239 --> 00:48:13,120
Speaker 4: You know? I look at him for a really long time. Yeah,

832
00:48:14,120 --> 00:48:17,520
Speaker 4: but I'm mainly just the admiring the graffiti.

833
00:48:17,800 --> 00:48:21,120
Speaker 3: Yeah, I drive to train yards to stare at them.

834
00:48:21,160 --> 00:48:23,400
Speaker 3: He gives you a sense of peace. But yeah, the

835
00:48:23,400 --> 00:48:24,440
Speaker 3: graffiti's awesome too.

836
00:48:24,560 --> 00:48:28,080
Speaker 4: You're a train spot Ben, I didn't know that about you.

837
00:48:26,760 --> 00:48:29,440
Speaker 4: And hang out with Francis Bourgeois.

838
00:48:29,680 --> 00:48:31,680
Speaker 3: I do not. I'm not on that guy's level, but

839
00:48:31,960 --> 00:48:34,880
Speaker 3: do check him out. He's I love that guy. He's awesome.

840
00:48:35,000 --> 00:48:37,520
Speaker 3: And we've got we have other stuff we want to

841
00:48:37,560 --> 00:48:39,680
Speaker 3: get to. One thing. We have to mention is we

842
00:48:39,680 --> 00:48:44,600
Speaker 3: we talked about the CIA's purported Office of Global Access

843
00:48:44,760 --> 00:48:48,640
Speaker 3: and forgot to mention one of our favorite riffs about

844
00:48:48,680 --> 00:48:52,880
Speaker 3: the acronym or the initialism O g A, which is

845
00:48:53,320 --> 00:48:57,520
Speaker 3: it's a cynical Gallows humor joke. Within the world of

846
00:48:57,600 --> 00:49:04,640
Speaker 3: big government, you will you'll read reports about operations where

847
00:49:04,680 --> 00:49:11,760
Speaker 3: someone says OGA and they're actually referring to other government

848
00:49:11,920 --> 00:49:15,919
Speaker 3: agency and it's a veiled reference to the CIA when

849
00:49:16,000 --> 00:49:18,360
Speaker 3: the company or the shop doesn't want to be involved

850
00:49:18,360 --> 00:49:19,720
Speaker 3: with a project on record?

851
00:49:20,000 --> 00:49:24,560
Speaker 4: Is the OGA like the the original gangsters of government agencies?

852
00:49:24,600 --> 00:49:26,520
Speaker 3: Basically, I think those are both true, and I think

853
00:49:26,520 --> 00:49:31,080
Speaker 3: that's a beautiful point we did mention, like, so Age

854
00:49:31,120 --> 00:49:35,360
Speaker 3: of Disclosure doesn't get as far into this as they should.

855
00:49:35,719 --> 00:49:40,479
Speaker 3: But if you are looking at the actual like nuts

856
00:49:40,520 --> 00:49:44,440
Speaker 3: and bolts or pitches about the alleged legacy program, and

857
00:49:44,480 --> 00:49:47,680
Speaker 3: you're going into the research existed before the documentary, then

858
00:49:47,719 --> 00:49:53,320
Speaker 3: you'll see tons and tons of associations with the CIA,

859
00:49:54,040 --> 00:49:57,840
Speaker 3: that retrieval unit we alluded to in chapter one. You'll

860
00:49:57,880 --> 00:50:02,319
Speaker 3: also see the DS and T, you know, the Directorate

861
00:50:02,360 --> 00:50:05,680
Speaker 3: of Science and Technology. It's very real. To that earlier

862
00:50:05,719 --> 00:50:08,480
Speaker 3: point we made it's something a lot of people won't

863
00:50:08,520 --> 00:50:11,360
Speaker 3: know about. It's not a story. The Jedi of mass

864
00:50:11,400 --> 00:50:15,600
Speaker 3: media will tell you. They are the precursor or predecessor,

865
00:50:15,640 --> 00:50:19,320
Speaker 3: I should say, to the ARROW program, the All Domain

866
00:50:19,400 --> 00:50:23,920
Speaker 3: Anomaly Resolution Office. These are the folks who post a

867
00:50:23,960 --> 00:50:29,080
Speaker 3: project Bluebook, created something called the Robertson Panel, and they're

868
00:50:29,120 --> 00:50:32,759
Speaker 3: the ones who famously said ninety percent of blue Book

869
00:50:32,800 --> 00:50:36,399
Speaker 3: sightings are mundane and everybody shut up about the other

870
00:50:36,520 --> 00:50:40,799
Speaker 3: ten percent, and then they classified that until nineteen seventy nine.

871
00:50:40,800 --> 00:50:43,520
Speaker 3: That's where so many of these conspiracies come from. I

872
00:50:43,560 --> 00:50:46,080
Speaker 3: can't believe we didn't talk about the Robertson panel yet,

873
00:50:46,400 --> 00:50:48,080
Speaker 3: but there you have it.

874
00:50:48,320 --> 00:50:49,440
Speaker 4: Maybe another episode.

875
00:50:49,600 --> 00:50:52,560
Speaker 3: Maybe this is feeling more and more like a Part three,

876
00:50:52,800 --> 00:50:53,160
Speaker 3: is it not?

877
00:50:53,440 --> 00:50:54,000
Speaker 4: I think so.

878
00:50:54,760 --> 00:50:54,920
Speaker 3: Well.

879
00:50:55,239 --> 00:50:57,520
Speaker 4: Before we wrap this one, though, guys, but we've teased

880
00:50:57,520 --> 00:51:01,200
Speaker 4: this a few times about analogs to these types of

881
00:51:01,239 --> 00:51:03,040
Speaker 4: things in other countries.

882
00:51:03,360 --> 00:51:06,239
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, oh gosh, no, thank you for bringing us.

883
00:51:06,480 --> 00:51:09,200
Speaker 3: This is one of the biggest things, right because we

884
00:51:09,440 --> 00:51:13,399
Speaker 3: are individuals who often live in the United States, and

885
00:51:13,680 --> 00:51:15,560
Speaker 3: one of the things we always look for, and the

886
00:51:15,600 --> 00:51:18,000
Speaker 3: course of stuff they'll want you to know is whether

887
00:51:18,200 --> 00:51:21,680
Speaker 3: other big world powers are doing similar things. And I

888
00:51:21,719 --> 00:51:24,440
Speaker 3: love that you're bringing this up because here's the reality,

889
00:51:24,560 --> 00:51:28,520
Speaker 3: all right, there are strong allegations of similar programs in

890
00:51:28,640 --> 00:51:32,600
Speaker 3: China and Russia, and these are very different places from

891
00:51:32,640 --> 00:51:36,799
Speaker 3: the United States. But you have to grock this. I

892
00:51:36,840 --> 00:51:39,920
Speaker 3: hate that Elon took the word rock from us. Dylan

893
00:51:40,080 --> 00:51:43,680
Speaker 3: keep it in. But the thing we have to understand

894
00:51:43,800 --> 00:51:46,640
Speaker 3: is that even though these places are very culturally and

895
00:51:46,760 --> 00:51:52,320
Speaker 3: ideologically different, operationally they are going to tend to mirror

896
00:51:52,400 --> 00:51:55,840
Speaker 3: each other. Just like our series on assassination as a tactic,

897
00:51:56,520 --> 00:51:59,560
Speaker 3: the Big Boys, the Big Badgers, they find what works,

898
00:52:00,080 --> 00:52:04,200
Speaker 3: so they tend to be very similar in their operational approaches.

899
00:52:04,520 --> 00:52:07,360
Speaker 3: That's why we're asking if China and Russia in particular

900
00:52:07,480 --> 00:52:10,399
Speaker 3: have their own legacy programs. So here's the news. We

901
00:52:10,480 --> 00:52:13,319
Speaker 3: won't have time tonight to get to all this because

902
00:52:13,320 --> 00:52:17,120
Speaker 3: we're running long, but China and Russia do have their programs.

903
00:52:17,280 --> 00:52:20,240
Speaker 3: They are fascinating. They may be episodes in the future.

904
00:52:20,719 --> 00:52:25,799
Speaker 3: China has something called KURO, the China UFO Research Organization,

905
00:52:26,560 --> 00:52:31,240
Speaker 3: and then their version of NASA has a dedicated UFO

906
00:52:31,520 --> 00:52:35,160
Speaker 3: monitoring center and some of the coolest news or scariest

907
00:52:35,200 --> 00:52:39,480
Speaker 3: news back in twenty twenty one, the Chinese military went public.

908
00:52:39,960 --> 00:52:44,040
Speaker 3: They are currently using AI and machine learning and their

909
00:52:44,080 --> 00:52:50,839
Speaker 3: search for UFOs, which they call unidentified air conditions.

910
00:52:50,960 --> 00:52:54,440
Speaker 2: That's great, good woh. But it makes so much sense too,

911
00:52:54,480 --> 00:52:56,800
Speaker 2: because in those countries, as you said, Ben, they mirror

912
00:52:56,880 --> 00:52:59,480
Speaker 2: us in all the ways, and they've got these official

913
00:52:59,560 --> 00:53:04,120
Speaker 2: public facing things, these organizations that they're creating. Russia's got

914
00:53:04,120 --> 00:53:07,399
Speaker 2: one too that it's not the same, but it's similar, right,

915
00:53:07,640 --> 00:53:10,000
Speaker 2: stuff that they'll actually put a press release out about.

916
00:53:10,360 --> 00:53:14,239
Speaker 2: But they also those other countries also have the same

917
00:53:14,360 --> 00:53:16,960
Speaker 2: kinds of organizations that we do in the United States,

918
00:53:17,000 --> 00:53:20,760
Speaker 2: like the Department of Energy, like that Air Force Potential Connection,

919
00:53:20,880 --> 00:53:25,680
Speaker 2: and like that private industry via government contracts to make things.

920
00:53:26,040 --> 00:53:30,440
Speaker 3: Yeah. Absolutely, because they want an end result, they want

921
00:53:30,800 --> 00:53:36,160
Speaker 3: a profit, they want a financial, economic, or military edge

922
00:53:36,200 --> 00:53:41,280
Speaker 3: of some sort. And Russia's history with UFOs is riddled

923
00:53:41,280 --> 00:53:45,400
Speaker 3: with numerous sightings incidents. The Soviet Union kept this stuff

924
00:53:45,520 --> 00:53:48,440
Speaker 3: very close to the chest during the Cold War, but

925
00:53:49,280 --> 00:53:53,240
Speaker 3: they were doing stuff like bluebook investigations, and then after

926
00:53:53,480 --> 00:53:57,040
Speaker 3: the fall of the Soviet Union, the new Russian government

927
00:53:57,160 --> 00:53:59,799
Speaker 3: emerging in the nineteen nineties, was a little more for

928
00:54:00,000 --> 00:54:03,160
Speaker 3: it's coming. The public learned about the All Russian UFO

929
00:54:03,360 --> 00:54:07,880
Speaker 3: Research Center. They also learned that Russia had stories to tell.

930
00:54:08,160 --> 00:54:10,839
Speaker 3: They have their own versions of a David Grush, you know,

931
00:54:11,080 --> 00:54:13,960
Speaker 3: they have their own versions of the Louise Elazando. And

932
00:54:14,000 --> 00:54:17,960
Speaker 3: they tend to work much more closely with Russian based

933
00:54:18,160 --> 00:54:21,960
Speaker 3: civilian UFO enthusiast, which seems weird. I don't know if

934
00:54:22,000 --> 00:54:24,680
Speaker 3: I've got just like a stereotype of big Russian government,

935
00:54:25,000 --> 00:54:26,560
Speaker 3: but that seems oddly friendly.

936
00:54:27,000 --> 00:54:29,560
Speaker 2: Well, it makes me think about more the allegations in

937
00:54:29,560 --> 00:54:32,319
Speaker 2: the age of disclosure, this concept that all of these

938
00:54:32,360 --> 00:54:35,960
Speaker 2: countries are chomping at the bit to get that little

939
00:54:35,960 --> 00:54:39,480
Speaker 2: tiny edge right. So you want somebody to come forward

940
00:54:39,560 --> 00:54:42,560
Speaker 2: and say if you've seen something, right, you want somebody

941
00:54:42,600 --> 00:54:43,799
Speaker 2: to come forward. You just don't want it to be

942
00:54:43,840 --> 00:54:45,880
Speaker 2: on a public channel. You want it to be internal

943
00:54:46,320 --> 00:54:48,520
Speaker 2: so that hey, we can actually send someone out to

944
00:54:48,560 --> 00:54:50,839
Speaker 2: take a look at that thing. Oh, you think there

945
00:54:51,000 --> 00:54:53,600
Speaker 2: was some kind of craft that went into the ocean

946
00:54:53,640 --> 00:54:56,680
Speaker 2: at this specific point in the Arctic. We'll send a

947
00:54:56,719 --> 00:54:58,719
Speaker 2: team out to look for it. Right, But we're not

948
00:54:58,760 --> 00:55:02,000
Speaker 2: gonna raise a flag and say, hey, everybody, there's like UFO.

949
00:55:02,120 --> 00:55:05,400
Speaker 2: We figure there's sub merged objects over here because you

950
00:55:05,480 --> 00:55:07,560
Speaker 2: want it as that superpower. You want that thing.

951
00:55:07,920 --> 00:55:10,520
Speaker 3: I love. I love the idea of going of the

952
00:55:10,560 --> 00:55:14,840
Speaker 3: People's Liberation Army having an official Instagram page and going

953
00:55:14,920 --> 00:55:19,000
Speaker 3: live and saying, hey guys, it's your boy. The Chinese government.

954
00:55:19,239 --> 00:55:24,080
Speaker 3: We're going to Antarctica right now, but toss us alike.

955
00:55:24,280 --> 00:55:26,520
Speaker 3: We might see an alien, you know.

956
00:55:26,680 --> 00:55:27,720
Speaker 2: Get us.

957
00:55:27,880 --> 00:55:31,840
Speaker 3: Where should we go next?

958
00:55:31,920 --> 00:55:34,480
Speaker 2: That's from That's from Andy Sandberg.

959
00:55:36,960 --> 00:55:45,200
Speaker 3: I ever met in my whole life. Yeah, so we

960
00:55:45,320 --> 00:55:48,479
Speaker 3: have so much other stuff we're not going to get

961
00:55:48,520 --> 00:55:53,640
Speaker 3: to in tonight's episode. Basic questions like, if these aliens exist,

962
00:55:53,840 --> 00:55:58,600
Speaker 3: they're so advanced, why literally on Earth are they crashing

963
00:55:58,800 --> 00:56:02,920
Speaker 3: all the time? Is this a great distraction? Is there

964
00:56:02,960 --> 00:56:06,919
Speaker 3: a real legacy program? Is this posturing? Is this cover

965
00:56:07,080 --> 00:56:11,520
Speaker 3: for human made secret technology? Either way you slice it,

966
00:56:11,520 --> 00:56:16,160
Speaker 3: it's irrefutable. The majority of the planet seems to agree

967
00:56:16,280 --> 00:56:19,360
Speaker 3: that there is some serious stuff they don't want you

968
00:56:19,480 --> 00:56:23,440
Speaker 3: to know. However, since we are not big world governments,

969
00:56:23,760 --> 00:56:26,279
Speaker 3: we would love to know your thoughts and we love

970
00:56:26,320 --> 00:56:29,440
Speaker 3: to let you know stuff. While we are still waiting

971
00:56:29,480 --> 00:56:32,880
Speaker 3: for commercialized telepathy to roll out, why not hit us

972
00:56:32,920 --> 00:56:36,280
Speaker 3: up the old fashioned ways online, maybe a three minute

973
00:56:36,320 --> 00:56:39,640
Speaker 3: call or however long you'd like on our email address.

974
00:56:39,960 --> 00:56:43,160
Speaker 4: I'm really looking forward to the real life Scanners program

975
00:56:43,760 --> 00:56:46,640
Speaker 4: like from the David Cronenberg movie. But you can let

976
00:56:46,760 --> 00:56:48,720
Speaker 4: us know. Do you know about a real life Scanners

977
00:56:48,760 --> 00:56:51,240
Speaker 4: program that's coming. You can find us on your social

978
00:56:51,280 --> 00:56:54,279
Speaker 4: media platform of note at the handle Conspiracy Stuff or

979
00:56:54,320 --> 00:56:57,480
Speaker 4: Conspiracy Stuff Show, depending on your poison.

980
00:56:57,880 --> 00:56:59,680
Speaker 2: We have a phone number. It is one eight to

981
00:56:59,760 --> 00:57:04,120
Speaker 2: three three std WYTK. Turn the letters into numbers, then

982
00:57:04,200 --> 00:57:06,720
Speaker 2: use your phone to call it, and you voipe whatever

983
00:57:06,760 --> 00:57:08,880
Speaker 2: you want to do when you call in. Let us

984
00:57:08,960 --> 00:57:11,920
Speaker 2: know which rule is your favorite out of C. L.

985
00:57:12,040 --> 00:57:15,920
Speaker 2: Kelly Johnson's fourteen Rules of Skunkworks. You can find it.

986
00:57:16,080 --> 00:57:18,000
Speaker 2: Let us know what's your favorite. You want to send

987
00:57:18,080 --> 00:57:19,280
Speaker 2: us an email, you could do that too.

988
00:57:19,320 --> 00:57:21,000
Speaker 3: We are This is one of the best ways to

989
00:57:21,040 --> 00:57:23,400
Speaker 3: contact us. We are the entities that read every single

990
00:57:23,440 --> 00:57:26,400
Speaker 3: piece of correspondence we receive. Be well aware, yet I'm

991
00:57:26,400 --> 00:57:29,400
Speaker 3: afraid sometimes the void writes back. As a matter of fact,

992
00:57:29,480 --> 00:57:31,880
Speaker 3: you can see us sitting in a void. Right now.

993
00:57:32,920 --> 00:57:36,680
Speaker 3: Here's a question, riddle. Is this what is your favorite book?

994
00:57:36,960 --> 00:57:41,360
Speaker 3: By Roald Dahl, the children's author. I was rereading some

995
00:57:41,440 --> 00:57:45,160
Speaker 3: of this stuff and it is just so freaking dark.

996
00:57:45,760 --> 00:57:48,880
Speaker 4: Find the Twits, Remember the Twits. Nobody talks about the Twits.

997
00:57:49,200 --> 00:57:52,000
Speaker 3: I like George's Marvelous Medicine. It is about an eight

998
00:57:52,080 --> 00:57:55,880
Speaker 3: year old who conspires to murder his grandmother. So give

999
00:57:55,920 --> 00:57:58,400
Speaker 3: us dark, Give us, Yes, that's what I'm saying about

1000
00:57:58,440 --> 00:58:20,600
Speaker 3: the darkness. So meet us there. Conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

1001
00:58:20,760 --> 00:58:22,800
Speaker 2: Stuff they Don't want you to Know is a production

1002
00:58:22,920 --> 00:58:27,439
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1003
00:58:27,520 --> 00:58:30,360
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.