WEBVTT - The Think 2018 Science Slam Part One

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<v Speaker 1>Get in tech with technology with tech Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer at how Stuff

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<v Speaker 1>Works and I love all things tech and I am

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<v Speaker 1>continuing a special series of podcasts recorded on location in

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<v Speaker 1>Las Vegas, Nevada during the two thousand and eighteen IBM

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<v Speaker 1>Think Conference. So if you think this doesn't sound like

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<v Speaker 1>a normal episode, that's why I am literally by myself

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<v Speaker 1>in a hotel room. I've got an air conditioner blasting

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<v Speaker 1>at me not far away, because I am in Las Vegas,

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<v Speaker 1>a desert. There's no producer here, there's no studio here.

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<v Speaker 1>It's just me and a recorder and a microphone and

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<v Speaker 1>a song in my heart and a dream in my brain,

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<v Speaker 1>and the A C just shut off so it'll be

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<v Speaker 1>a little more quiet now. But the Think Conference is

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<v Speaker 1>a pretty big deal. It's a hundreds thousands of people

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<v Speaker 1>all gathered together learning about uh top topics in computing,

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<v Speaker 1>getting education and workshops involved in all sorts of different things.

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<v Speaker 1>And last night I went to a science slam at

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<v Speaker 1>the conference where we were treated to five different presentations

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<v Speaker 1>by scientists that are related to IBM Research, and we

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<v Speaker 1>got to learn about some breakthrough sciences and some scientific

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<v Speaker 1>work that was pretty pretty interesting, and I wanted to

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<v Speaker 1>kind of report on that and what I saw and

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<v Speaker 1>the sort of implications that the presentations have for us,

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<v Speaker 1>as you know, human being type folks. Well, the presentation

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<v Speaker 1>was opened by the Director of IBM Research, Our Krishna,

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<v Speaker 1>who came up on stage and sort of set the

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<v Speaker 1>ground explained what in brief the five different science breakthroughs

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to be about. There was a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>overlap between them, so expect that when I get into

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<v Speaker 1>the nitty and the gritty. And he then introduced the

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<v Speaker 1>actual MC of the evening, Jamie Garcia. Now, Jamie Garcia

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<v Speaker 1>is a polymer chemist. She works on lots of different projects,

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<v Speaker 1>including ways to figure out how to break down long

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<v Speaker 1>chain polymers so that you can get rid of plastics

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<v Speaker 1>that would otherwise pollute the environment. So an important work.

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<v Speaker 1>It was pretty interesting hearing her talk. She talked about

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<v Speaker 1>how her specific work is very tricky because if you

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<v Speaker 1>want to create computer models of long chain polymers, it

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<v Speaker 1>requires a lot of processing power. The bigger the molecule is,

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<v Speaker 1>the more processing power it needs to simulate the interaction

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<v Speaker 1>of molecules properly because the computer is trying to keep

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<v Speaker 1>track of all the little sub atomic particles. All those

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<v Speaker 1>little electrons have to be modeled and simulated, and as

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<v Speaker 1>you add atoms to your molecule, creating these long chains,

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<v Speaker 1>it creates exponential more work for your computer. So she

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<v Speaker 1>has a vested interest based upon what she studies in

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<v Speaker 1>the advancement of computer sciences. Then she began to introduce

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<v Speaker 1>the actual presenters, and each presenter had about five minutes

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<v Speaker 1>to present his or her study her work and explain

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<v Speaker 1>what they were there about. And it was really interesting

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<v Speaker 1>because there was a it was a good variety. There

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<v Speaker 1>were two men and three women who each got up

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<v Speaker 1>on stage, and they all were trying to explain to

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<v Speaker 1>us the importance of their various projects and what what

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<v Speaker 1>stage they were in, why we should be interested, and

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<v Speaker 1>they all had very different styles, and it was very

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<v Speaker 1>interesting to see these different uh approaches of present presenting

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<v Speaker 1>this information to a general audience, because you know, a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of people in the crowd were not scientists or

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<v Speaker 1>data analysts or anything like that, so it was it

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<v Speaker 1>is a challenging thing to have to communicate science to

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<v Speaker 1>an audience where you're not entirely certain what their background

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<v Speaker 1>happens to be, but they all did a really good job.

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<v Speaker 1>The first one to get up was a guy named

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<v Speaker 1>Andreas Kind, who is an expert on uh cryptography and blockchain,

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<v Speaker 1>and I mentioned a bit in the preview episode the

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<v Speaker 1>kind of Overview episode that blockchain was going to be

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<v Speaker 1>one of the topics that I was going to look

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<v Speaker 1>into here, and I've got a little bit better grip

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<v Speaker 1>on what some aspects of blockchain are all about, and

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<v Speaker 1>it really blew my mind. So Kind came out and

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<v Speaker 1>mentioned that almost everything that we encounter, whether it's a

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<v Speaker 1>product like a designer bag or shoes or car parts,

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<v Speaker 1>or even drugs like medical drugs, has been copied at

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<v Speaker 1>some point, and he cited a number that in counterfeit

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<v Speaker 1>goods were valued at one eight trillion dollars. So you're

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<v Speaker 1>looking at a massive problem across multiple industries where you

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<v Speaker 1>could encounter copies of stuff being passed off as if

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<v Speaker 1>they were the real thing, and in some cases that

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<v Speaker 1>just ends up being kind of a a slap in

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<v Speaker 1>the face to rich people who are buying luxury goods.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, it might be hard for you to feel

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<v Speaker 1>any kind of sympathy for that, because who's going to

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<v Speaker 1>feel badly about a billionaire walking up to a play

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<v Speaker 1>a said buying, you know, some sort of ridiculously expensive wallet,

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<v Speaker 1>and then finding out three months later that it was

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<v Speaker 1>actually a cheap knockoff that was being passed off as

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<v Speaker 1>the real thing. Most of us probably wouldn't lose very

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<v Speaker 1>much sleep about that. Although that is a legitimate problem,

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<v Speaker 1>and obviously anyone who has built their business on creating

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<v Speaker 1>luxury goods of any kind has a really really powerful

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<v Speaker 1>interest in this. They don't want their products to be

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<v Speaker 1>copied because that obviously undervalues what they do. If no

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<v Speaker 1>one trusts that the thing you're selling is actually from you,

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<v Speaker 1>then you're not going to sell very much of it.

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<v Speaker 1>But there are other issues as well that affect, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the common folk like myself, where even if we didn't

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<v Speaker 1>feel sympathy for the rich people who we're buying these

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<v Speaker 1>luxury goods, we may feel very strongly about these other cases.

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<v Speaker 1>So Andrea's kind gave another example about car parts, and

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<v Speaker 1>specifically he was talking about breaks, but it really could

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<v Speaker 1>be any car part. He said that in certain parts

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<v Speaker 1>of the world, depending upon where you are, you might

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<v Speaker 1>discover that up to forty of auto parts in the

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<v Speaker 1>aftermarket are copies. They are not the legitimate part that

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<v Speaker 1>they are, you know, claimed to be, So that could

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<v Speaker 1>be a huge issue. If perhaps you were getting new

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<v Speaker 1>brakes put into your vehicle, your old brakes are wearing out.

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<v Speaker 1>You go to an auto mechanic shop, you pay a

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<v Speaker 1>certain amount of money to have brand new brakes put in,

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<v Speaker 1>but you may not be absolutely certain that the brakes

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<v Speaker 1>that are being put in are the real deal, like

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<v Speaker 1>they are actually made by the company that you are

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<v Speaker 1>told made them. It may be that they were cheap knockoffs,

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<v Speaker 1>and thus they may not perform at the right level,

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<v Speaker 1>and they might fail more readily than a real set

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<v Speaker 1>of brakes would from the actual manufacturer. That the could

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<v Speaker 1>be life and death, and that obviously is something that

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<v Speaker 1>affects anybody. It's not just the people who have money

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<v Speaker 1>to burn, it's all of us who may rely upon

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<v Speaker 1>this sort of thing. And even if you aren't someone

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<v Speaker 1>who drives, and you're you're not too concerned about auto

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<v Speaker 1>parts and whether or not they're the real thing, or

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<v Speaker 1>maybe maybe you think you know, I'll risk it, I'll

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<v Speaker 1>be careful and maybe my skill as a driver will

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<v Speaker 1>counteract any downfall of the parts there might be. It's

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<v Speaker 1>still not that easy to just kind of walk away

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<v Speaker 1>from this, uh. As Kind pointed out, another big issue

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<v Speaker 1>is medical drugs. He cited a case of a blood

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<v Speaker 1>thinning drug and some researchers who discovered that some instances

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<v Speaker 1>of this blood thinning drug had up to filler material

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<v Speaker 1>in them. In other words, there were instances of this

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<v Speaker 1>drug where it had been replaced with non active ingredients

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<v Speaker 1>are even harmful ones, and this obviously can cause medical problems.

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<v Speaker 1>It can lead to uh serious issues, even even the

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<v Speaker 1>death of the person who is taking the drug potentially,

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<v Speaker 1>and that of course is absolutely unacceptable. And again depending

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<v Speaker 1>on what country you are. In some countries, you you

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<v Speaker 1>are not certain about the origin of the medication that

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<v Speaker 1>you're getting. In certain countries, you know, if you're going

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<v Speaker 1>to a reputable doctor and reputable pharmacist, you're in pretty

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<v Speaker 1>good shape. You're reasonably certain that the medication you are

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<v Speaker 1>taking is in fact what you were told it would be.

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<v Speaker 1>But in other countries where the medical industry isn't as

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<v Speaker 1>as well established and maybe not as well funded, then

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<v Speaker 1>you can't necessarily be certain. You may be taking drugs

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<v Speaker 1>that were bought at a discount, and it turns out

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<v Speaker 1>that a lot of them just don't have the active

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<v Speaker 1>ingredients they're they're supposed to have, and it's not going

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<v Speaker 1>to be an effective treatment for you. So all of

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<v Speaker 1>these different examples were problems that kind was pointing out

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<v Speaker 1>that he said blockchain could help solve, and that raised

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<v Speaker 1>a question. Guys, They're still more to come about the

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<v Speaker 1>science Slam, but before we jump into the next segment,

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<v Speaker 1>let's take another quick break to thank our sponsor. Blockchain

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<v Speaker 1>is a digital construct, right. Blockchain is math and code.

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<v Speaker 1>It's something that exists on computers, but not quote unquote

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<v Speaker 1>in the real world. There's no physical presence of blockchain.

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<v Speaker 1>With cryptocurrency. It's easy to understand more or less at

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<v Speaker 1>a high level why blockchain is effective because every single

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<v Speaker 1>trans action that you make with cryptocurrency becomes part of

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<v Speaker 1>this blockchain that you cannot alter, at least you cannot

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<v Speaker 1>reasonably alter it without having to rebuild the entire blockchain

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<v Speaker 1>from that point of transaction moving forward, and since the

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<v Speaker 1>blockchain is constantly getting added to essentially every ten minutes

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<v Speaker 1>in the case of bitcoin. Your computer is never going

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<v Speaker 1>to be fast and strong enough to build back that

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<v Speaker 1>chain and uh and beat out the rest of the

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<v Speaker 1>system so that you can alter a transaction and make

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<v Speaker 1>it look legitimate. So anytime you buy something with bitcoin,

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<v Speaker 1>anytime you transfer bitcoin to someone else, that transaction becomes

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<v Speaker 1>part of a block of transactions that the overall system

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<v Speaker 1>will validate, and once validated, it joins the chain, and

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<v Speaker 1>every future transaction that is made will contain a record

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<v Speaker 1>that includes your transaction. Though this ledger of transactions is

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<v Speaker 1>shared across the entire network of computers that are participating

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<v Speaker 1>in that blockchain. So if you have ten thousand computers

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<v Speaker 1>in this network, all ten thousand can see that ledger

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<v Speaker 1>and they can see the history of transactions that includes

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<v Speaker 1>the one that you just did. So it makes it

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<v Speaker 1>impossible to really alter things. It's a very reliable record,

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<v Speaker 1>and it makes it very difficult for you to claim

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<v Speaker 1>that you didn't actually spend that bitcoin, and you in

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<v Speaker 1>fact still have that bitcoin and you could spend it

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<v Speaker 1>on something else, well the ledger will say otherwise, and

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<v Speaker 1>that will mean that you will not have a legitimate argument.

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<v Speaker 1>That is fine for bitcoin transactions, but how can you

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<v Speaker 1>use that same technology to ensure that real physical things

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<v Speaker 1>are what they say they are, because if you could

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<v Speaker 1>tag a physical object in such a way that it

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<v Speaker 1>was related to a point of data within a blockchain,

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<v Speaker 1>then you could trace the movement of that that physical

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<v Speaker 1>component as it moved through a system. As Kind pointed out,

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<v Speaker 1>manufacturing in the twenty first century is really really complicated

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<v Speaker 1>because you have lots of different entities that contribute to

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<v Speaker 1>making all sorts of stuff, whether it's drugs or electronics

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<v Speaker 1>or car parts. You might have factories and manufacturing facilities

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<v Speaker 1>that are spread around the world that are all contributing

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<v Speaker 1>toward this. Even if you're talking about food supply, you

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<v Speaker 1>might be able to go to your local grocery store.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's say that you live someplace like San Francisco, California.

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<v Speaker 1>You might be able to go to a market in

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<v Speaker 1>San Francisco and pick up food that was originally grown

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<v Speaker 1>in Japan. Well, you don't know the pathway that food

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<v Speaker 1>took from the point of origin where it was grown

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<v Speaker 1>or caught. Let's say it's fish. You don't know where

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<v Speaker 1>that fish was caught. You don't know who that fish

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<v Speaker 1>was sold to, you don't know where that fish was processed.

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<v Speaker 1>All you know is where you bought the fish. That's

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<v Speaker 1>your last point of contact. You don't know anything else

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<v Speaker 1>about it. But with blockchain, if you were able to

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<v Speaker 1>somehow physically link the fish into a blockchain operation, you

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<v Speaker 1>can actually look at that chain of events and trace

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<v Speaker 1>back every single point of contact that fish had all

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<v Speaker 1>the way back to where it was caught, and you

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<v Speaker 1>would be able to verify that in fact everything was

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<v Speaker 1>UH was safe and healthy, that it didn't pass through

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<v Speaker 1>any hands where there might have been contamination, or at

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<v Speaker 1>least it decreases that, and if there were contamination, you

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<v Speaker 1>would be able to trace exactly where that happened because

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<v Speaker 1>you would be able to look at the chain of

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<v Speaker 1>events and say, well, according to this, it must have

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<v Speaker 1>happened at this processing facility, which would make it much

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<v Speaker 1>easier to UH to do inspections to make certain that

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<v Speaker 1>everything is on the up and up. But how do

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<v Speaker 1>you actually tag that? How do you have some sort

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<v Speaker 1>of record between the physical object and the digital record,

0:15:06.680 --> 0:15:10.840
<v Speaker 1>Because if if you don't have some way of verifying

0:15:11.240 --> 0:15:13.680
<v Speaker 1>that the physical object you're looking at is in fact

0:15:13.720 --> 0:15:17.080
<v Speaker 1>the same one that's in the digital record, you can't

0:15:17.080 --> 0:15:21.360
<v Speaker 1>be certain that the blockchain is an effective uh list

0:15:21.400 --> 0:15:26.480
<v Speaker 1>of transactions for that specific physical object. If I'm looking

0:15:26.480 --> 0:15:29.120
<v Speaker 1>at a pair of shoes and the blockchain tells me

0:15:29.160 --> 0:15:31.320
<v Speaker 1>that the pair of shoes is absolutely legitimate because I

0:15:31.320 --> 0:15:34.240
<v Speaker 1>can trace everything back, But it turns out the blockchain

0:15:34.600 --> 0:15:37.280
<v Speaker 1>is a record of a different pair of shoes, I

0:15:37.280 --> 0:15:39.800
<v Speaker 1>don't I don't know that because there's nothing that's tying

0:15:39.840 --> 0:15:42.840
<v Speaker 1>the physical object in my hands to this digital record.

0:15:43.040 --> 0:15:45.360
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't do me any good. So here's the problem.

0:15:45.440 --> 0:15:48.440
<v Speaker 1>How do you How do you link those two? Andrea's

0:15:48.520 --> 0:15:52.240
<v Speaker 1>kind talked about a way of doing that using something

0:15:52.320 --> 0:15:58.359
<v Speaker 1>called crypto anchors. These are anchor points on physical objects

0:15:58.760 --> 0:16:04.600
<v Speaker 1>that can link them to digital ledgers like blockchain and uh.

0:16:04.640 --> 0:16:06.520
<v Speaker 1>The whole idea is that you have to have some

0:16:06.560 --> 0:16:10.160
<v Speaker 1>sort of encryption, physical encryption that you can attach to

0:16:10.200 --> 0:16:14.080
<v Speaker 1>those physical objects in some way that would allow you

0:16:14.160 --> 0:16:18.240
<v Speaker 1>to verify that, in fact, the chain of events is

0:16:18.280 --> 0:16:22.000
<v Speaker 1>exactly what the digital record says it is. But what

0:16:22.080 --> 0:16:24.720
<v Speaker 1>does that even mean? Like, what what sort of physical

0:16:25.040 --> 0:16:27.640
<v Speaker 1>crypto anchor could you come up with? He gave a

0:16:27.680 --> 0:16:30.520
<v Speaker 1>couple of different examples. One of them I thought was

0:16:30.600 --> 0:16:36.120
<v Speaker 1>incredibly interesting. He talked about a malaria test. Now, if

0:16:36.160 --> 0:16:38.840
<v Speaker 1>you are in another country and you need to take

0:16:38.840 --> 0:16:41.160
<v Speaker 1>a malaria test, you've been bitten by a mosquito, and

0:16:41.200 --> 0:16:44.200
<v Speaker 1>you want, obviously you want to make sure that you

0:16:44.320 --> 0:16:48.320
<v Speaker 1>are testing negative for malaria. You want to also be

0:16:48.400 --> 0:16:51.240
<v Speaker 1>certain that that test is legitimate, that it came from

0:16:51.280 --> 0:16:56.760
<v Speaker 1>a trusted source. So he showed off a type of

0:16:56.840 --> 0:17:00.320
<v Speaker 1>malaria test this piece of paper that had very tiny,

0:17:00.360 --> 0:17:03.160
<v Speaker 1>little colorful dots on one part of the paper, and

0:17:03.160 --> 0:17:09.480
<v Speaker 1>those colorful dots represented an algorithm, a code. So first

0:17:09.480 --> 0:17:11.879
<v Speaker 1>you would look at those colorful dots and you would

0:17:12.320 --> 0:17:15.520
<v Speaker 1>make certain that it was the right pattern, the right colors,

0:17:15.600 --> 0:17:19.160
<v Speaker 1>and you would have a blockchain record of this malaria

0:17:19.280 --> 0:17:23.639
<v Speaker 1>test that would correspond to the code that you're looking

0:17:23.640 --> 0:17:25.880
<v Speaker 1>at the physical code. So as long as the physical

0:17:25.920 --> 0:17:29.679
<v Speaker 1>code on the malaria test matched the one that was

0:17:30.040 --> 0:17:34.439
<v Speaker 1>on the blockchain, you then could feel confident that, in fact,

0:17:34.480 --> 0:17:37.359
<v Speaker 1>this test is a legitimate one. But you say, what

0:17:37.480 --> 0:17:40.800
<v Speaker 1>about counterfeiting? What would happen if someone was able to

0:17:40.840 --> 0:17:43.600
<v Speaker 1>look at the blockchain, they were able to see what

0:17:43.720 --> 0:17:46.320
<v Speaker 1>the code was supposed to be. They take some regular

0:17:46.320 --> 0:17:48.560
<v Speaker 1>old paper that doesn't have a malaria test on it

0:17:48.640 --> 0:17:52.439
<v Speaker 1>at all. Then they very very carefully placed those dots

0:17:52.440 --> 0:17:56.399
<v Speaker 1>in the right configuration, in the right set of colors. Well,

0:17:56.880 --> 0:18:01.280
<v Speaker 1>the secret to this is that the actual code itself

0:18:01.680 --> 0:18:05.080
<v Speaker 1>is the thing you see is only half of the code.

0:18:05.400 --> 0:18:10.400
<v Speaker 1>When you expose that piece of paper to liquid, then

0:18:10.840 --> 0:18:14.240
<v Speaker 1>the ink dots, which are on little bitty micro pillars,

0:18:14.320 --> 0:18:17.600
<v Speaker 1>some of them wash away, some of them are revealed,

0:18:18.240 --> 0:18:20.960
<v Speaker 1>and you have a new code that will be there

0:18:21.320 --> 0:18:24.720
<v Speaker 1>in replace. It's usually in this case with the malaria test,

0:18:24.760 --> 0:18:27.560
<v Speaker 1>you would actually use a serum to do this. So

0:18:27.640 --> 0:18:31.119
<v Speaker 1>only with contact with the legitimate serum would this series

0:18:31.160 --> 0:18:33.439
<v Speaker 1>of dots change and they would change it to a

0:18:33.480 --> 0:18:35.480
<v Speaker 1>new code. And that new code is also tied to

0:18:35.520 --> 0:18:38.639
<v Speaker 1>the blockchain, so you would have a before and after.

0:18:38.880 --> 0:18:41.840
<v Speaker 1>So after adding serum to this malaria test, you could

0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:45.480
<v Speaker 1>then verify that in fact, the malaria test is a

0:18:45.560 --> 0:18:48.040
<v Speaker 1>legitimate one, it's a legitimate source. Then you can actually

0:18:48.160 --> 0:18:51.679
<v Speaker 1>use the malaria test on a patient. So that is

0:18:51.720 --> 0:18:54.760
<v Speaker 1>sort of the way to confound counterfeiters. If you think

0:18:54.800 --> 0:18:58.000
<v Speaker 1>about it, it's not that different from like a special

0:18:58.040 --> 0:19:02.639
<v Speaker 1>water mark on uh uh a unit of currency, or

0:19:03.000 --> 0:19:05.200
<v Speaker 1>one of those elements where you have like a transparent

0:19:05.280 --> 0:19:09.640
<v Speaker 1>panel that's inside a dollar bill or or some other

0:19:09.760 --> 0:19:12.159
<v Speaker 1>unit of currency. It's one of those things that is

0:19:12.160 --> 0:19:17.639
<v Speaker 1>meant to to uh make counterfeiting much more difficult. So

0:19:17.680 --> 0:19:21.920
<v Speaker 1>by having this dual layer of code that only gets

0:19:21.960 --> 0:19:24.439
<v Speaker 1>revealed if you add serum to the malaria test, you

0:19:24.520 --> 0:19:29.199
<v Speaker 1>have helped ensure that the the test that you you

0:19:29.280 --> 0:19:31.720
<v Speaker 1>have in your possession is in fact an authentic one

0:19:31.760 --> 0:19:35.560
<v Speaker 1>and it is linked back to this instance of the blockchain.

0:19:35.880 --> 0:19:38.359
<v Speaker 1>And by having this unique kind of code for every

0:19:38.359 --> 0:19:42.479
<v Speaker 1>single malaria test, you make it incredibly difficult for anyone

0:19:42.520 --> 0:19:46.200
<v Speaker 1>to make a legitimate counterfeit or a legitimate a seemingly

0:19:46.320 --> 0:19:50.119
<v Speaker 1>legitimate counterfeit. And I thought that was really neat this

0:19:50.200 --> 0:19:55.399
<v Speaker 1>idea of making sure using these physical uh components, something

0:19:55.440 --> 0:19:58.480
<v Speaker 1>that you could then link to a digital record. It's

0:19:58.560 --> 0:20:02.200
<v Speaker 1>really really clever. Now kind also talked very briefly, because

0:20:02.200 --> 0:20:04.480
<v Speaker 1>he was coming towards the end of his his presentation

0:20:04.520 --> 0:20:09.879
<v Speaker 1>at this point, about the use of micro chips. I

0:20:09.960 --> 0:20:12.720
<v Speaker 1>was gonna say microelectronics, and I guess technically it kind

0:20:12.720 --> 0:20:14.720
<v Speaker 1>of is, but I mean they're super super small. We're

0:20:14.720 --> 0:20:17.560
<v Speaker 1>talking about chips that are about the size of a

0:20:17.640 --> 0:20:20.760
<v Speaker 1>grain of rice that have more than a million discrete

0:20:20.760 --> 0:20:23.760
<v Speaker 1>components on them, so essentially like a million transistors on

0:20:23.840 --> 0:20:28.479
<v Speaker 1>this little size of rice chip, or even the size

0:20:28.480 --> 0:20:32.199
<v Speaker 1>of a grain of salt. These chips can still have

0:20:32.400 --> 0:20:38.800
<v Speaker 1>very sophisticated components to them, including things like motion sensors

0:20:38.920 --> 0:20:43.680
<v Speaker 1>or or a transmitter sensor. And the idea is that

0:20:43.760 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 1>these particular chips will cost very little less than ten

0:20:47.920 --> 0:20:51.920
<v Speaker 1>cents to create a single chip, and that they are

0:20:52.040 --> 0:20:56.240
<v Speaker 1>able to monitor and analyze and communicate and even act

0:20:56.840 --> 0:21:02.240
<v Speaker 1>on information. And these little tiny chips would be able

0:21:02.320 --> 0:21:06.240
<v Speaker 1>to analyze products and measure them in such a way

0:21:06.280 --> 0:21:10.879
<v Speaker 1>to make absolutely certain that they are in fact um legitimate.

0:21:10.920 --> 0:21:13.720
<v Speaker 1>They would concentrate on what are considered to be unique

0:21:14.119 --> 0:21:17.600
<v Speaker 1>identify irs or whatever the product is, whether it's the

0:21:17.640 --> 0:21:23.359
<v Speaker 1>specific shape or the chemical makeup or uh any other

0:21:23.400 --> 0:21:27.040
<v Speaker 1>sort of physical property that is considered to be unique

0:21:27.160 --> 0:21:31.040
<v Speaker 1>to that product, that it would be almost impossible, if

0:21:31.080 --> 0:21:35.240
<v Speaker 1>not outright impossible, for someone to duplicate that exactly. You

0:21:35.240 --> 0:21:36.960
<v Speaker 1>would have the chip program in such a way to

0:21:37.040 --> 0:21:40.919
<v Speaker 1>detect that quality, and if the quality is not present,

0:21:41.000 --> 0:21:44.520
<v Speaker 1>then obviously the chip would indicate that, and the chip

0:21:44.600 --> 0:21:47.800
<v Speaker 1>would be the thing that's low. That's that's tied to

0:21:47.880 --> 0:21:50.840
<v Speaker 1>the blockchain. So as long as the chip is active

0:21:51.000 --> 0:21:54.159
<v Speaker 1>on this uh, this product, whatever it may be, and

0:21:54.200 --> 0:21:57.200
<v Speaker 1>that it's verifying that it is in fact authentic, and

0:21:57.440 --> 0:22:00.280
<v Speaker 1>you can record the process of where the chip was

0:22:00.320 --> 0:22:03.560
<v Speaker 1>from one point in the supply chain to the next,

0:22:03.640 --> 0:22:06.199
<v Speaker 1>all the way to its end point, whether it's a

0:22:06.200 --> 0:22:10.879
<v Speaker 1>consumer or a doctor or a manufacturing facility, whatever it

0:22:10.960 --> 0:22:13.639
<v Speaker 1>might be. You could then look at the blockchain verify

0:22:13.760 --> 0:22:16.040
<v Speaker 1>that in fact, all the right steps were taken, it

0:22:16.080 --> 0:22:18.439
<v Speaker 1>went to all the right points of contact, all the

0:22:18.520 --> 0:22:23.920
<v Speaker 1>right processes were uh were performed on this product, and

0:22:24.320 --> 0:22:26.520
<v Speaker 1>the chip is still verifying that the product that is

0:22:26.600 --> 0:22:29.479
<v Speaker 1>in your hands is in fact authentic, then you have

0:22:29.680 --> 0:22:32.520
<v Speaker 1>this ability to say, yes, this is the real thing.

0:22:32.800 --> 0:22:36.800
<v Speaker 1>And at least according to kind Uh, he said that

0:22:37.840 --> 0:22:41.960
<v Speaker 1>using this you could end up cutting counterfeiting in half

0:22:42.440 --> 0:22:46.000
<v Speaker 1>within the next couple of years, and then moving forward

0:22:46.040 --> 0:22:49.679
<v Speaker 1>you could reduce it even further. So this again would

0:22:49.880 --> 0:22:54.879
<v Speaker 1>help people be certain that the thing they got was

0:22:55.440 --> 0:22:58.280
<v Speaker 1>completely legitimate and they wouldn't have to worry about whether

0:22:58.400 --> 0:23:01.240
<v Speaker 1>or not the product they had was going to fail

0:23:01.280 --> 0:23:04.760
<v Speaker 1>on them or be harmful to them or otherwise not

0:23:04.920 --> 0:23:08.639
<v Speaker 1>be what they thought they were getting. So that was

0:23:09.000 --> 0:23:12.679
<v Speaker 1>number one of five. Still have some more people to

0:23:12.720 --> 0:23:16.160
<v Speaker 1>talk about, some more ideas, more cool notions that were

0:23:16.160 --> 0:23:19.520
<v Speaker 1>brought up at the IBM Research Science Slam. I think,

0:23:20.760 --> 0:23:23.920
<v Speaker 1>but first let's take a quick break to thank our sponsor.

0:23:31.160 --> 0:23:34.639
<v Speaker 1>The second person to come up was a PhD student

0:23:35.040 --> 0:23:40.440
<v Speaker 1>named Chichilia Boscini and chi Chilia. She talked about lattice

0:23:40.520 --> 0:23:47.520
<v Speaker 1>based cryptography and I loved Chichilia's presentation. UH. This young

0:23:47.560 --> 0:23:51.879
<v Speaker 1>woman got up on stage and began to speak about

0:23:51.960 --> 0:23:58.520
<v Speaker 1>post quantum cryptography lattice based UH encryption systems, and she

0:23:58.600 --> 0:24:03.439
<v Speaker 1>made it funny and engaging, which is kind of a

0:24:03.480 --> 0:24:06.800
<v Speaker 1>magic power. She talked about how once you learn the

0:24:06.840 --> 0:24:11.240
<v Speaker 1>fundamentals of mathematics, you can build all sorts of things,

0:24:11.280 --> 0:24:14.119
<v Speaker 1>and that when she was a child, she fell in

0:24:14.200 --> 0:24:17.160
<v Speaker 1>love with math. She thought math was fun. She liked

0:24:17.440 --> 0:24:20.280
<v Speaker 1>coming up with problems and solving them. She talked about

0:24:20.280 --> 0:24:23.640
<v Speaker 1>a teacher who would use a story of a fictional

0:24:23.640 --> 0:24:28.280
<v Speaker 1>old old lady who had an electric wheelchair, and a

0:24:28.359 --> 0:24:31.760
<v Speaker 1>fictional old lady kept on getting into various problems. Various

0:24:31.880 --> 0:24:35.520
<v Speaker 1>situations and the math problems were all related. To figuring

0:24:35.560 --> 0:24:39.640
<v Speaker 1>out how this nice old lady in electric wheelchair could

0:24:39.680 --> 0:24:42.399
<v Speaker 1>get out of a various predicaments. So it was this

0:24:42.520 --> 0:24:46.600
<v Speaker 1>sort of this real world kind of of scenario to

0:24:46.960 --> 0:24:53.600
<v Speaker 1>frame all these very ethereal math problems. And Chilia loved it.

0:24:53.720 --> 0:24:58.600
<v Speaker 1>So she went into looking UH into math further and

0:24:58.640 --> 0:25:01.840
<v Speaker 1>studying it, you know, is her primary area of focus.

0:25:02.400 --> 0:25:05.959
<v Speaker 1>She also talked about things like number theory, where you

0:25:06.000 --> 0:25:10.400
<v Speaker 1>take integer numbers and you take prime numbers and their properties.

0:25:11.040 --> 0:25:14.120
<v Speaker 1>And you may remember in the review episode I talked

0:25:14.119 --> 0:25:18.200
<v Speaker 1>about how cryptography is very much reliant. Our current status

0:25:18.200 --> 0:25:21.440
<v Speaker 1>of cryptography is very much reliant on things like prime

0:25:21.520 --> 0:25:26.440
<v Speaker 1>numbers and factoring. So to give you a quick update

0:25:26.560 --> 0:25:28.960
<v Speaker 1>on what I said or a quick refresher, I guess

0:25:28.960 --> 0:25:32.400
<v Speaker 1>on what I said. If you're looking at modern day cryptography,

0:25:32.400 --> 0:25:36.359
<v Speaker 1>modern day encryption UH strategies, typically what you do is

0:25:36.400 --> 0:25:40.760
<v Speaker 1>you take an extremely large prime number. That's a number

0:25:40.800 --> 0:25:43.959
<v Speaker 1>that's only divisible by itself. It doesn't have any other factors,

0:25:44.040 --> 0:25:47.240
<v Speaker 1>so you can't divide by two or four or seven

0:25:47.320 --> 0:25:49.639
<v Speaker 1>or anything like that. It's only divisible by itself. But

0:25:49.760 --> 0:25:53.440
<v Speaker 1>you take a really really big prime number. I'm talking

0:25:53.440 --> 0:25:58.040
<v Speaker 1>about a number there's hundreds of digits long, so enormous number,

0:25:58.720 --> 0:26:03.399
<v Speaker 1>and then you multiply it another equally huge prime number,

0:26:03.840 --> 0:26:05.680
<v Speaker 1>and then you get a product. You get you get

0:26:05.800 --> 0:26:08.880
<v Speaker 1>something that is the product of these two enormous prime

0:26:08.960 --> 0:26:12.400
<v Speaker 1>numbers that becomes sort of your key to encrypting everything.

0:26:12.800 --> 0:26:16.040
<v Speaker 1>And encryption obviously takes other steps past this. You've got

0:26:16.080 --> 0:26:18.679
<v Speaker 1>your encryption key, but then you've got to keep on

0:26:18.800 --> 0:26:21.840
<v Speaker 1>going and actually encrypt everything. But the point being that

0:26:22.320 --> 0:26:25.880
<v Speaker 1>someone could get hold of that encryption key, but they

0:26:25.960 --> 0:26:28.760
<v Speaker 1>don't know the secrets of how things were encrypted because

0:26:28.760 --> 0:26:31.560
<v Speaker 1>they don't have the actual prime numbers that you used

0:26:31.720 --> 0:26:34.240
<v Speaker 1>to create the key. In order to figure out what

0:26:34.280 --> 0:26:36.959
<v Speaker 1>those prime numbers are, you would have to start setting

0:26:36.960 --> 0:26:40.840
<v Speaker 1>a computer program to taking that enormous product and starting

0:26:40.840 --> 0:26:45.040
<v Speaker 1>to divide by various large prime numbers and making certain

0:26:45.119 --> 0:26:49.320
<v Speaker 1>that the other, uh any any you know, reasonable or

0:26:49.440 --> 0:26:52.679
<v Speaker 1>real integer number that you would get by dividing by

0:26:52.680 --> 0:26:55.760
<v Speaker 1>a prime number was also a prime number. And this

0:26:55.800 --> 0:26:59.760
<v Speaker 1>whole process is very very difficult for a classic computer

0:27:00.040 --> 0:27:03.639
<v Speaker 1>can take an incredibly long time to solve. We're talking

0:27:04.119 --> 0:27:07.280
<v Speaker 1>years or decades or even longer to solve some of

0:27:07.320 --> 0:27:10.600
<v Speaker 1>these really hard problems because computers are just going to

0:27:10.680 --> 0:27:13.360
<v Speaker 1>do it sequentially. They're just gonna keep trying, and once

0:27:13.400 --> 0:27:15.920
<v Speaker 1>they try one prime number, they might try a prime

0:27:16.000 --> 0:27:18.119
<v Speaker 1>number and the result they get back is not a

0:27:18.200 --> 0:27:21.320
<v Speaker 1>real number, or it's not a whole integer. Well, that

0:27:21.320 --> 0:27:23.639
<v Speaker 1>that result has to get tossed out because it cannot

0:27:23.680 --> 0:27:26.800
<v Speaker 1>be an answer to your question. Or it might get

0:27:26.920 --> 0:27:29.920
<v Speaker 1>a prime number and it takes this huge number, divides

0:27:29.960 --> 0:27:31.639
<v Speaker 1>it by a prime number, and it gets a second

0:27:31.880 --> 0:27:34.800
<v Speaker 1>whole integer. Everything is cool there, but then the second

0:27:34.800 --> 0:27:37.639
<v Speaker 1>whole integer turns out not to be a prime number,

0:27:37.840 --> 0:27:39.880
<v Speaker 1>which the computer also has to test, right. It has

0:27:39.920 --> 0:27:43.320
<v Speaker 1>to make sure that the result is also a prime number.

0:27:43.359 --> 0:27:45.600
<v Speaker 1>If the result was not a prime number, then that

0:27:45.720 --> 0:27:48.360
<v Speaker 1>result is invalid and the computer has to keep going.

0:27:48.400 --> 0:27:50.359
<v Speaker 1>So this is a very very long process once you

0:27:50.400 --> 0:27:54.199
<v Speaker 1>get to truly large numbers. However, we don't know for

0:27:54.280 --> 0:27:59.560
<v Speaker 1>certain that this particular process is uh is truly a

0:27:59.680 --> 0:28:03.919
<v Speaker 1>hard problem. There's no mathematical proof that it is a

0:28:03.960 --> 0:28:08.120
<v Speaker 1>hard problem. There's circumstantial evidence that it's a very hard

0:28:08.160 --> 0:28:11.120
<v Speaker 1>problem because computers are not very good at solving it,

0:28:11.760 --> 0:28:16.320
<v Speaker 1>but that that alone is not a mathematical proof. Mathematical

0:28:16.359 --> 0:28:19.399
<v Speaker 1>proofs and evidence are two different things. I think I

0:28:19.400 --> 0:28:24.119
<v Speaker 1>actually listened to a gentleman talk with this young woman yesterday,

0:28:24.520 --> 0:28:29.480
<v Speaker 1>and I think he was getting proof. The word proof

0:28:29.520 --> 0:28:32.040
<v Speaker 1>was was causing him to hang up a bit because

0:28:32.040 --> 0:28:35.560
<v Speaker 1>he wasn't thinking mathematical proofs. He was thinking proof. I said, hey,

0:28:35.600 --> 0:28:37.760
<v Speaker 1>I have evidence here, I have proof that this is

0:28:37.800 --> 0:28:41.280
<v Speaker 1>a hard problem. It's not exactly the same thing. They're related,

0:28:41.320 --> 0:28:44.280
<v Speaker 1>but not the same thing. But she explained that with

0:28:44.400 --> 0:28:48.440
<v Speaker 1>quantum computers, if you're able to quantize the information, and

0:28:48.440 --> 0:28:51.720
<v Speaker 1>you're able to use quantum computers, because quantum computers use cubits,

0:28:51.760 --> 0:28:55.400
<v Speaker 1>and if you have a sufficient number of cubits, if

0:28:55.400 --> 0:28:58.680
<v Speaker 1>you have a quantum computer that's powerful enough, it could

0:28:58.760 --> 0:29:02.320
<v Speaker 1>take minute it's to solve a problem that would take

0:29:02.360 --> 0:29:05.720
<v Speaker 1>a classical computer years and years and years to solve

0:29:05.960 --> 0:29:08.800
<v Speaker 1>a classical computer to solve a problem like this. Like

0:29:08.840 --> 0:29:11.240
<v Speaker 1>I mentioned in the preview episode, quantum computers are not

0:29:11.280 --> 0:29:15.479
<v Speaker 1>necessarily great for all computational problems, but for a certain

0:29:15.560 --> 0:29:19.440
<v Speaker 1>set of computational problems, they would be far more efficient

0:29:19.760 --> 0:29:23.320
<v Speaker 1>assuming you had a powerful enough quantum computer. Now, she

0:29:23.360 --> 0:29:27.080
<v Speaker 1>did say, there is some good news. We don't have

0:29:27.160 --> 0:29:31.600
<v Speaker 1>to worry about our encryption schemes falling apart overnight. That

0:29:32.040 --> 0:29:34.200
<v Speaker 1>it took years and years and years to create a

0:29:34.240 --> 0:29:37.320
<v Speaker 1>quantum computer with just a single cubit, and these days

0:29:37.320 --> 0:29:40.600
<v Speaker 1>you're talking about quantum computers that are only at around

0:29:40.640 --> 0:29:43.840
<v Speaker 1>the fifty cubit range, and you would need many, many,

0:29:43.920 --> 0:29:46.840
<v Speaker 1>many more cubits in order to be a serious threat

0:29:46.880 --> 0:29:50.200
<v Speaker 1>to cryptography. That before we get to that point where

0:29:50.240 --> 0:29:52.800
<v Speaker 1>there's gonna be more years of work and development to

0:29:52.840 --> 0:29:56.440
<v Speaker 1>make quantum computers reliable and make sure they don't just

0:29:56.720 --> 0:30:01.480
<v Speaker 1>decohere easily and decoherences when the quantum states all begin

0:30:01.520 --> 0:30:04.920
<v Speaker 1>to collapse in on themselves. So if that happens, then

0:30:04.960 --> 0:30:07.800
<v Speaker 1>a quantum computer turns into a classical computer, and then

0:30:07.800 --> 0:30:10.680
<v Speaker 1>you're just back to where you were before. UH. You

0:30:11.240 --> 0:30:13.440
<v Speaker 1>have a computer that's going to go through the old

0:30:13.520 --> 0:30:17.200
<v Speaker 1>process of trying to solve this problem. Quantum computers sort

0:30:17.240 --> 0:30:20.920
<v Speaker 1>of solve problems in parallel. They kind of test all

0:30:21.080 --> 0:30:26.760
<v Speaker 1>possible UH answers simultaneously because cubits can act in superposition

0:30:26.840 --> 0:30:30.440
<v Speaker 1>and be zero one and all technically all values in between.

0:30:30.880 --> 0:30:35.280
<v Speaker 1>And because of that, you can run multiple problems and

0:30:35.400 --> 0:30:38.320
<v Speaker 1>each bit is acting as either a zero or a one.

0:30:38.600 --> 0:30:42.000
<v Speaker 1>That means you get every single potential combination depending on

0:30:42.040 --> 0:30:45.000
<v Speaker 1>how many cubits you have at your disposal. Right, so

0:30:45.040 --> 0:30:48.400
<v Speaker 1>if you have fifty cubits, that's the equivalent of fifty bits,

0:30:48.400 --> 0:30:50.880
<v Speaker 1>except the bits can be both zero and one at

0:30:50.880 --> 0:30:54.560
<v Speaker 1>the same time. You can run any problem that would

0:30:54.640 --> 0:30:58.440
<v Speaker 1>require fifty bits or fewer, and it will run all

0:30:58.480 --> 0:31:03.840
<v Speaker 1>the potential solution simultaneously, and then will analyze those results,

0:31:03.880 --> 0:31:08.240
<v Speaker 1>and it then assigns sort of a threshold of confidence

0:31:08.800 --> 0:31:12.040
<v Speaker 1>for each of those results at the end of the process.

0:31:12.120 --> 0:31:16.200
<v Speaker 1>And technically usually whichever result has the highest level of

0:31:16.200 --> 0:31:20.680
<v Speaker 1>confidence is most likely the correct one. Uh, this is

0:31:20.880 --> 0:31:23.080
<v Speaker 1>kind of it sounds like I'm dancing around things, but

0:31:23.080 --> 0:31:27.280
<v Speaker 1>that's because quantum is weird. Quantum does not answer in certainties.

0:31:27.440 --> 0:31:32.520
<v Speaker 1>Quantum answers in probabilities. So it may say that I'm

0:31:33.480 --> 0:31:37.440
<v Speaker 1>confident that this particular result is in fact the solution

0:31:37.520 --> 0:31:40.440
<v Speaker 1>to your problem, and you have to decide where's your threshold,

0:31:40.440 --> 0:31:43.920
<v Speaker 1>where is the what is the cut off for certainty

0:31:44.000 --> 0:31:46.720
<v Speaker 1>that you need before you go forward and say, all right,

0:31:46.800 --> 0:31:48.920
<v Speaker 1>this is our result. But if you do have a

0:31:49.000 --> 0:31:52.320
<v Speaker 1>quantum computer with a sufficient number of cubits and you're

0:31:52.320 --> 0:31:58.680
<v Speaker 1>presented encrypted information, then you could potentially do the equivalent

0:31:58.720 --> 0:32:01.720
<v Speaker 1>of a brute force attack of figuring out what that

0:32:01.880 --> 0:32:05.479
<v Speaker 1>encryption scheme, what what numbers it uses if you have

0:32:05.600 --> 0:32:07.760
<v Speaker 1>this this quantum computer, because it can run all those

0:32:07.800 --> 0:32:12.480
<v Speaker 1>calculations I talked about earlier essentially simultaneously and then give

0:32:12.560 --> 0:32:15.320
<v Speaker 1>you the most likely answer, and then you would have

0:32:16.000 --> 0:32:19.240
<v Speaker 1>essentially the keys to the kingdom. And it's it's kind

0:32:19.240 --> 0:32:22.600
<v Speaker 1>of like thinking about someone has found the perfect way

0:32:22.640 --> 0:32:26.240
<v Speaker 1>to create a skeleton key that fits every single lock

0:32:26.440 --> 0:32:29.560
<v Speaker 1>that's ever been made. Once you do that, then locks

0:32:29.560 --> 0:32:32.680
<v Speaker 1>are useless because someone could get hold of one of

0:32:32.680 --> 0:32:35.480
<v Speaker 1>those skeleton keys, they can get access to everything. So

0:32:35.520 --> 0:32:38.880
<v Speaker 1>this is why people talk about quantum computers as being

0:32:38.920 --> 0:32:43.080
<v Speaker 1>the end of our current encryption strategy, because it won't

0:32:43.240 --> 0:32:45.400
<v Speaker 1>do you any good. If someone actually has access to

0:32:45.440 --> 0:32:49.000
<v Speaker 1>a quantum computer, they can decrypt anything that's out there

0:32:49.360 --> 0:32:52.680
<v Speaker 1>that's using that particular approach. So she said, well, eventually

0:32:52.720 --> 0:32:54.640
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna get there. We're not there yet. We're at

0:32:54.680 --> 0:32:57.959
<v Speaker 1>fifty cubits. And in order to get a quantum computer stable,

0:32:58.040 --> 0:33:00.600
<v Speaker 1>you have to keep it at an incredibly low temperature

0:33:00.640 --> 0:33:03.800
<v Speaker 1>to maintain that quantum state, and you cannot interfere with

0:33:03.880 --> 0:33:06.520
<v Speaker 1>that machine at all, because if you do, then the

0:33:06.560 --> 0:33:10.560
<v Speaker 1>coherence dissipates and you're back to having a less powerful

0:33:10.600 --> 0:33:13.480
<v Speaker 1>classical computer. But eventually we're gonna get to a point

0:33:13.520 --> 0:33:15.120
<v Speaker 1>where they are going to be powerful enough. So we

0:33:15.200 --> 0:33:18.920
<v Speaker 1>have to start thinking about what the next evolution in

0:33:18.960 --> 0:33:22.680
<v Speaker 1>cryptography must be in order to protect our data from

0:33:22.960 --> 0:33:27.840
<v Speaker 1>the quantum world. And this brings us to the lattice

0:33:28.000 --> 0:33:31.680
<v Speaker 1>based approach. I had no idea this was a thing,

0:33:31.880 --> 0:33:34.280
<v Speaker 1>and it blew my mind when she talked about it.

0:33:34.520 --> 0:33:40.440
<v Speaker 1>Classic cryptography, we're using large prime numbers. With lattice based approaches,

0:33:40.800 --> 0:33:47.080
<v Speaker 1>you create a a applotting system. Imagine a two dimensional grid,

0:33:47.600 --> 0:33:50.440
<v Speaker 1>so just grid paper. You've got that grid in front

0:33:50.480 --> 0:33:53.040
<v Speaker 1>of you, and you take a point. You make a

0:33:53.080 --> 0:33:57.200
<v Speaker 1>point on that grid, and the lattice problem requires that

0:33:57.240 --> 0:33:59.720
<v Speaker 1>you find the points in a grid that are closest

0:33:59.800 --> 0:34:03.920
<v Speaker 1>to that fixed point you've chosen. That fixed point you've chosen,

0:34:03.920 --> 0:34:06.920
<v Speaker 1>it's called the origin. And so your job as a

0:34:06.960 --> 0:34:09.279
<v Speaker 1>computer is, all right, let me find the points that

0:34:09.320 --> 0:34:12.920
<v Speaker 1>are closest to the origin, and that will be the

0:34:12.920 --> 0:34:16.200
<v Speaker 1>basis of my cryptography. If it's two dimensional. You could

0:34:16.200 --> 0:34:18.359
<v Speaker 1>do it yourself. You can just look at a piece

0:34:18.400 --> 0:34:21.080
<v Speaker 1>of grid paper. You see a point that's on there already.

0:34:21.280 --> 0:34:24.680
<v Speaker 1>You can quickly identify which points are the closest to

0:34:24.840 --> 0:34:27.440
<v Speaker 1>that central point, and you would have the answer right

0:34:27.480 --> 0:34:30.080
<v Speaker 1>in front of you. It's it's it's a it's not

0:34:30.160 --> 0:34:35.480
<v Speaker 1>a difficult problem. What Chilia said was, imagine that you

0:34:35.600 --> 0:34:39.399
<v Speaker 1>don't use just two dimensions. Imagine you use use more

0:34:39.480 --> 0:34:43.600
<v Speaker 1>than two dimensions. Imagine you use one hundred dimensions. Here's

0:34:43.600 --> 0:34:47.239
<v Speaker 1>the thing. We can't really imagine that we live in

0:34:47.280 --> 0:34:50.600
<v Speaker 1>a world of three dimensions that we observe directly. For

0:34:50.800 --> 0:34:53.279
<v Speaker 1>if you argue about time being a dimension, although you

0:34:53.320 --> 0:34:56.760
<v Speaker 1>cannot physically see time, you see the effects of time

0:34:57.280 --> 0:35:02.440
<v Speaker 1>through the causality. But if you were to add extra dimensions,

0:35:02.440 --> 0:35:06.520
<v Speaker 1>which you can do computationally, even though we as human

0:35:06.560 --> 0:35:10.200
<v Speaker 1>beings are not capable of really imagining that, it would

0:35:10.239 --> 0:35:13.400
<v Speaker 1>it makes this problem far, far, far more difficult to solve,

0:35:14.080 --> 0:35:18.360
<v Speaker 1>perhaps too difficult even for quantum computers to solve in

0:35:18.400 --> 0:35:22.960
<v Speaker 1>an arbitrarily easy fashion. So if you do make such

0:35:23.000 --> 0:35:26.360
<v Speaker 1>a problem a lattice based problem, where you know the

0:35:26.400 --> 0:35:29.920
<v Speaker 1>answer and the person that you're sending information to also

0:35:30.200 --> 0:35:33.839
<v Speaker 1>knows the answer, but no one else knows the answer. Then,

0:35:33.880 --> 0:35:36.160
<v Speaker 1>even if they have a quantum computer, they can't just

0:35:36.239 --> 0:35:41.840
<v Speaker 1>brute force figure out the solution to your cryptography strategy

0:35:42.040 --> 0:35:47.000
<v Speaker 1>because it's too difficult to map out. Uh. There's no

0:35:47.239 --> 0:35:51.880
<v Speaker 1>mathematical proof that can simplify this nos, no sort of

0:35:51.960 --> 0:35:57.080
<v Speaker 1>shortcut to the in destination, and so a lattice based

0:35:57.280 --> 0:36:02.560
<v Speaker 1>strategy for cryptography might be the few sure of cryptography

0:36:02.560 --> 0:36:06.600
<v Speaker 1>in general. I think that's amazing, and honestly I still

0:36:06.640 --> 0:36:10.320
<v Speaker 1>only have kind of a semi basic grasp on the concept.

0:36:10.480 --> 0:36:15.920
<v Speaker 1>But the presentation was fantastic and I highly recommend you

0:36:15.960 --> 0:36:18.640
<v Speaker 1>look into it if this sort of stuff sounds interesting

0:36:18.680 --> 0:36:24.440
<v Speaker 1>to you. To Chilia made mathematics sound really entertaining and fun.

0:36:25.120 --> 0:36:28.720
<v Speaker 1>Uh I liked her approach. I don't think I would

0:36:28.719 --> 0:36:30.760
<v Speaker 1>find it nearly as fun. I think I would quickly

0:36:30.920 --> 0:36:34.560
<v Speaker 1>run up against the very limits no pun intended for

0:36:34.600 --> 0:36:37.680
<v Speaker 1>all my calculus fans out there, but the very limits

0:36:37.680 --> 0:36:40.799
<v Speaker 1>of my understanding of mathematics, and then I would get frustrated.

0:36:41.200 --> 0:36:47.000
<v Speaker 1>Because I loved math up through triggonometry, and then once

0:36:47.040 --> 0:36:50.000
<v Speaker 1>you got to calculus, I I I hit a wall

0:36:50.640 --> 0:36:53.640
<v Speaker 1>and I just suddenly could not get my mind wrapped

0:36:53.640 --> 0:36:57.440
<v Speaker 1>around those concepts. So I have a huge admiration for

0:36:57.480 --> 0:37:00.200
<v Speaker 1>people who not only understand the concepts, but they are

0:37:00.239 --> 0:37:06.080
<v Speaker 1>capable of communicating not just the general uh way that

0:37:06.640 --> 0:37:09.840
<v Speaker 1>this sort of stuff works, but also their own interest

0:37:09.920 --> 0:37:13.520
<v Speaker 1>and enthusiasm for the subject. Alright, guys, I recorded the

0:37:13.640 --> 0:37:16.520
<v Speaker 1>full episode about the Science Slam, and it turned out

0:37:16.520 --> 0:37:19.919
<v Speaker 1>to be a little long, So rather than do a

0:37:19.960 --> 0:37:23.400
<v Speaker 1>full epic length episode about the Science Slam, I figured

0:37:23.400 --> 0:37:26.360
<v Speaker 1>out end this episode here and we'll pick up in

0:37:26.400 --> 0:37:29.160
<v Speaker 1>the next one to talk about the other presenters who

0:37:29.280 --> 0:37:33.160
<v Speaker 1>took the stage at Think Conference two thousand eighteen IBMS

0:37:33.239 --> 0:37:36.880
<v Speaker 1>conference to chat about the science they've done and the

0:37:36.920 --> 0:37:39.360
<v Speaker 1>work that they're looking at and how that has the

0:37:39.400 --> 0:37:44.240
<v Speaker 1>potential to really change our world. I am incredibly thankful

0:37:44.280 --> 0:37:47.120
<v Speaker 1>that I got a chance to see these brilliant people

0:37:47.239 --> 0:37:50.719
<v Speaker 1>speak and to to get some inspiration from them, because

0:37:50.760 --> 0:37:53.920
<v Speaker 1>it was really cool to hear about stuff that usually

0:37:53.920 --> 0:37:56.640
<v Speaker 1>I just read like a press release about, but to

0:37:56.719 --> 0:37:59.160
<v Speaker 1>actually hear the people who are doing the research talk

0:37:59.200 --> 0:38:02.960
<v Speaker 1>about it and to kind of convey their excitement about

0:38:03.040 --> 0:38:07.280
<v Speaker 1>their fields of study was really invigorating. So make certain

0:38:07.320 --> 0:38:10.879
<v Speaker 1>you tune into that next episode to hear the conclusion

0:38:11.400 --> 0:38:14.600
<v Speaker 1>of the science slam and what else I learned, because

0:38:14.600 --> 0:38:16.640
<v Speaker 1>it was really cool stuff and I hope you guys

0:38:16.680 --> 0:38:19.960
<v Speaker 1>find it interesting too. If you guys have suggestions for

0:38:20.200 --> 0:38:22.720
<v Speaker 1>topics I should tackle in future episodes of tech Stuff,

0:38:22.760 --> 0:38:24.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, once I get through with this little mini

0:38:24.200 --> 0:38:26.920
<v Speaker 1>series over at the Think Conference, I'm gonna be right

0:38:26.960 --> 0:38:30.360
<v Speaker 1>back to my normal recording schedule and uh, you know,

0:38:30.440 --> 0:38:33.200
<v Speaker 1>good old reliable Jonathan talking about technology. If you have

0:38:33.239 --> 0:38:35.280
<v Speaker 1>anything that you would like me to talk about, maybe

0:38:35.280 --> 0:38:38.840
<v Speaker 1>there's a particular company or a technology or a person

0:38:39.320 --> 0:38:41.719
<v Speaker 1>that you think I should profile, or maybe there's someone

0:38:41.880 --> 0:38:44.160
<v Speaker 1>I should interview or have on as a guest host.

0:38:44.520 --> 0:38:46.400
<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with me let me know what you think.

0:38:46.600 --> 0:38:50.320
<v Speaker 1>The address for the show is tech Stuff at how

0:38:50.400 --> 0:38:53.120
<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com, or you can always drop me

0:38:53.160 --> 0:38:55.640
<v Speaker 1>a line on Twitter or Facebook. The handle for both

0:38:55.680 --> 0:38:59.799
<v Speaker 1>of those is text Stuff h s W. Don't forget

0:38:59.880 --> 0:39:02.040
<v Speaker 1>to over to Instagram. Check out tech Stuff over there.

0:39:02.040 --> 0:39:04.520
<v Speaker 1>We've got lots of behind the scenes photos and other

0:39:05.000 --> 0:39:08.959
<v Speaker 1>goodies for you to look at. And also I live

0:39:09.000 --> 0:39:12.000
<v Speaker 1>stream when I'm recording in the normal studio on Wednesdays

0:39:12.000 --> 0:39:14.280
<v Speaker 1>and Fridays. If you would like to see me record

0:39:14.320 --> 0:39:17.720
<v Speaker 1>this show live, you can go to twitch dot tv

0:39:17.880 --> 0:39:21.120
<v Speaker 1>slash tech Stuff on a Wednesday or Friday. The schedule

0:39:21.239 --> 0:39:24.120
<v Speaker 1>is up on the page there, and you can watch

0:39:24.239 --> 0:39:27.279
<v Speaker 1>as I record these shows, as I stumble my way

0:39:27.320 --> 0:39:30.840
<v Speaker 1>through mistakes, as I restart, and actually doesn't happen that often.

0:39:30.880 --> 0:39:33.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm mostly mostly what you hear is what I record,

0:39:34.480 --> 0:39:36.359
<v Speaker 1>and you can chat with me. There's a chat room

0:39:36.360 --> 0:39:38.399
<v Speaker 1>in there, and whenever I get to a break, I'm

0:39:38.440 --> 0:39:40.960
<v Speaker 1>happy to chat with all the people in there. Sometimes

0:39:40.960 --> 0:39:44.160
<v Speaker 1>you guys help shape the show and I really appreciate that,

0:39:44.280 --> 0:39:46.439
<v Speaker 1>So join in. Come on over to twitch dot tv

0:39:46.520 --> 0:39:49.040
<v Speaker 1>slash tech Stuff, be part of the group. I look

0:39:49.080 --> 0:39:51.160
<v Speaker 1>forward to seeing you and I'll talk to you again

0:39:51.760 --> 0:40:00.400
<v Speaker 1>really soon for more on this and Bathos of other topics.

0:40:00.640 --> 0:40:07.319
<v Speaker 1>Is that how stuff works dot com wh